torts 3.docx

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CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

DOCTRINE:

The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to

recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of

action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the

plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not

constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed

for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages and

injury.Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;damage is the loss, hurt, or

harm which results from the injury; anddamages are the recompense or

compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage

without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a

violation of a legal duty. These situations are often calleddamnum absque injuria.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of

abuse of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must

concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs orpublic policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to

the plaintiff.

FACTS:

Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going

into their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties

which thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they

built the wall in order to protect their persons and their property from their

intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an easement be

created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of

the trial court by awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages

(p30,000.00) and exemplary damages (p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages

were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the property due

to the adobe wall restricting access.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

HELD:

Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The

mere fact of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must be

both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the

plaintiff resulting therefrom.Damages are merely a part of the remedy allowed

for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting

from the injury is damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded

for the damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe

wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of their rights as the owner

of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for in

Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1)

defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2)

The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None

of these requisites was present in this case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the

damage was not a result of an injury is calleddamnum absque injuriaand the

plaintiff is not normally given an award for damages.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must bedamnum et injuria.

***********************************

FEBTC v. Pacilan Digest

Far East Bank vs. Pacilan

G.R. 157314 July 29, 2005

Callejo Sr, J.:

Facts:

1. Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank (now BPI). He issued

several postdated checks, the last one being check no. 2434886 amounting to

P680. The said check was presented to petitioner bank for payment on April 4,

1988 but was dishonored. It appeared that the account of Pacilan has been closed

on the evening of April 4 on the ground that it was 'improperly handled'.

2. It appeared that the plaintiff issued four checks from March 30 - April 4, 1988

amounting in total to P7,410, on one hand, his funds in the bank only amounted to

P6,981.43, thus an overdraft of P 428.57 resulted therefrom. Consequently, the last

check was dishonored despite the fact that plaintiff deposited the amount the

following day.

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3. Pacilan wrote a complaint to the bank but after the bank did not reply, he filed

an action for damages against it and the employee (Villadelgado) who closed the

account. The plaintiff alleged that the immediate closure of his account was

malicious and intended to embarrass him.

4. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded actual damages

(P100,000) and exemplary damages (P50,000). The bank appealed, but the CA

affirmed the lower court's decision with modifications and held that the closure of

the bank of plaintiff's account despite its rules and regulation allowing a re-

clearing of a check returned for insufficiency of funds, is patently malicious and

unjustifiable. Hence, this appeal.

5. The petitioner contended that in closing the account, it acted in good faith and

in accordance with the pertinent banking rules and regulations governing the

operations of a regular demand deposit, allowing it to close an account if the

depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds or uncollected

deposits.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages

NO. The award of damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code is unjustifiable. Thepetitioner has the right to close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and

regulations on regular demand deposits. The facts do not show that the petitioner

abused its rights in the exercise of its duties. The evidence negates the existence of

bad faith and malice on the part of the petitioner bank, which are the second and

third elements necessary to prove an abuse of right in violation of Art. 19.

The records also showed that indeed plaintiff has mishandled his account by

issuing checks previously against insufficient funds not just once, but more than a

hundred times.

Moreover, the acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the closure of the

account cannot be considered as bad faith nor done with malice but a mere simple

negligence of its personnel.

As a result, whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered (by virtue of the subsequent

dishonor of the other checks he issued) should be borne by him alone as these was

the result of his own act in irregularly handling his account.

**********************************

McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS: It was the 8

th

of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between

Angeles City and SanFernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter,

Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, andKim, as well

as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction

of Angeles City (northward) in aFord Escort.Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by

Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in

theopposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to

Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as itwas carrying 200 hundred

cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.As the Escort approached one Pulong-

Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side

ofthe road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of

whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced

to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights

on, appliedhis brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get

back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck.The collision occurred on

the bridge.The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old,

Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap shewas sitting. Loida was seated in

the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back

of the Escort,received physical injuries from the collision.An information was filed

against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple

homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. Theconviction was affirmed by

the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by

the SC of hisPetition for Review.Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife

and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and herhusband for the

death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were

impleaded against as theemployers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included.

The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were

eventuallyconsolidated.The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the

respondents damages and attorney’s fees.On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate

Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it

wasGalang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident.

However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, theIAC set aside its original

decision and upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded

the lane of the truck andthe collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise

to the presumption that Koh was negligent.ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing

their original decision?HELD: NO. The petition has merit.

Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil

and criminal) should have been consolidated to prevent separate appreciation of the

evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses

in the criminalcase but the motion was denied. The non-consolidation

resulted in two conflicting decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict

ofGalang was deemed by the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar.

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On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately

concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligencethat was the immediate and proximate

cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the

petitionersconvincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck’s lane because as

it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boysdarted across the road from

the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.Araceli’s testimony was pretty much what

was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose swerved to the left, the

truckwas immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights on – to warn

the truck’s driver to slow down and let the Escortreturn to its lane. When asked as

to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck

just kept oncoming, indicating that it didn’t reduce its speed. She posited that if it

did, there wouldn’t have been a collision. Her testimonyremained intact, even upon

cross-examination – that Jose’s entry into Galang’s lane was necessary to avoid

what was, in his mindat the time, a greater peril – death or injury to the two idiots.

This is hardly negligent behavior.Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio

Tanhueco

1

, who was an impartial eyewitness. He said that the truck,moving at 50 to 60kph,

only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police investigated the scene of the

collision, they foundskidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. This indicated

that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision.While Galang

claimed that he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served to substantiateTanhueco’s statement that he stopped only

upon collision, considering the speed at which he was going

***************

Valenzuela vs CA

Lessons Applicable:

Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)

Factors in Determining Amount (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue

towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a

flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her

emergency lights and seeked help

She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon

While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the

tires, she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li

who was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the

ground

She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was

amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.

Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27,

000 (aritificial leg)]

RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under

Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840

actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of

plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24,

1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant,

from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for

unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000,

as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but

absolved Li's employer

Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated

Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located

just across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very

near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a

drizzle (NOT heavy rain)

ISSUE:

1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO

2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO

3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES

4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO

If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery

road, he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or

applying his brakes at the proper time and distance

it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to

safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for

both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards

Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao

2. NO.

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Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below

the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection

emergency rule

an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger

and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may

be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails

to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better

solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence

She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in searchfor a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find

no one to help her

She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to

verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed

she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind

a Toyota Corona Car

3. YES.

Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for

acts of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater

familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure

to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and

supervision of his employees

Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent

supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned

tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in

relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by

large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their

representatives.

Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the

accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in

Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court

below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from hisofficemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his

officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to

discuss sales and other work related strategies.

Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that

it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting

its company car to Li

4. YES.

As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we

are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court

is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and

psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent

driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting,

it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic

changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The

replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive

physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been

documented, are painful.

********************

Ilocos Norte Electric vs. CA

Facts: Nana Belen ventured out in flood waters to check on the status of her

grocery store after the storm. On her way to her grocery she was electrocuted.

Issue: WON Ilocos Norte Electric Corporation was liable

Held: yes

Ratio: The finding of the lower court, was based on what the defendant's employees

were supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on.

THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY,petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE

JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA

JUAN,respondents.

Herman D. Coloma for petitioner.

Glicerio S. Ferrer for private respondents.

PARAS,J.:

Sought to be reversed in this petition is the Decision * of the respondent Court of

Appeals' First Division, setting aside the judgment of the then Court of First

Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte, with the following dispositive portion:

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WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set aside and

another rendered in its stead whereby defendant is hereby

sentenced to pay plaintiffs actual damages of P30,229.45;

compensatory damages of P50,000.00; exemplary damages of

P10,000.00; attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit in

both instances. (p. 27 Rollo)

Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence whereby both patties strive for the

recognition of their respective versions of the scenario from which the disputed

claims originate. The respondent Court of Appeals (CA) summarized the evidence of

the parties as follows:

From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of

June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon

by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,

bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between

5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had

abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the

deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out

of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 GuerreroStreet, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction

of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and

proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have

been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the

deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five

Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo

Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned

by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance

of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the

deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two

girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric

wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the

water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of

the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased,

but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the

water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help

from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or

five blocks away.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in

law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife

Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the

City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of

defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the

electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero

Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house

were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in

Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the

deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an

electric post.

In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29,

1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National

Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed

certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such

abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00

and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an

inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines.

Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he

could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the

INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of

Guerrero. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and

Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across

the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the current

of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office of the

INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to

the NPC Compound.

At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again

on another inspection trip. Having learned of the death of IsabelLao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of

Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been

taken. Using the resuscitator which was a standard equipment in

his jeep and employing the skill he acquired from an in service

training on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His

efforts proved futile.Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of

the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to

the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them

about the grounded lines of the INELCO In the afternoon of the

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same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the

restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in

the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.

Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H.

del Pilar after learning that the deceased had been electrocuted.

Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal

Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of the

relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body at about

8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical

parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the

left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" (Exh.

C-1: p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree burn. About the

base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. C-

2, pp. 102-103,Ibid.) The certificate of death prepared by Dr.

Castro stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock

electrocution" (Exh. I; p. 103,Ibid.).

In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of

its officers and employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electric engineer;Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero, lineman; and

Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO Through the

testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought to prove that on

and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the

INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area No. 9 which

covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero Street,

did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life

and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO

equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date

in question. As a public service operator and in line with its

business of supplying electric current to the public, defendant hadinstalled safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons

and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as

floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had 12 linesmen

charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the

areas respectively assigned to them.

Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the

province of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to streets of

Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were

reported to have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the

southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was washed away

and where the INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the eastern

part near the residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in

the far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of

Segundo and Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the far northwest

side, near the premises of the Ilocos Norte National High School.

Fabico Abijero, testified that in the early morning before 6 o'clock

on June 29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and

Guerrero Streets to switch off the street lights in Area No. 9. He did

not see any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity. What he

saw were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.

A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by

the defense to show that the deceased could not have died of

electrocution Substantially, the testimony of the doctor is as

follows: Without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor,

not even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of

death. Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the

deceased three hours after her death, because cyanosis which

means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the

color of the skin purplish, appears only in a live person. The

presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased

(Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not sufficient to establish her death by

electrocution; since burns caused by electricity are more or less

round in shape and with points of entry and exit. Had the

deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her

palm would have been bigger and the injury more massive. (CA

Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo)

An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by theheirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide,

Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo), petitioner advanced the theory, as a special

defense, that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by

electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In

this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,

caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main

house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with

electric current whenever the switch is on. Petitioner then conjectures that the

switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the

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deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning of

June 29, 1967. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and

dismissed the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and

attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued the

controverted decision.

In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors committed by

the respondent CA:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed

grave abuse of discretion and error in considering

the purely hearsay alleged declarations of Ernesto

de la Cruz as part of theres gestae.

2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed

grave abuse of discretion and error in holding that

the strong typhoon "Gening" which struck Laoag

City and Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967 and the

flood and deluge it brought in its wake were not

fortuitous events and did not exonerate petitioner-company from liability for the death of Isabel Lao

Juan.

3. The respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused

its discretion and erred in not applying the legal

principle of "assumption of risk" in the present

case to bar private respondents from collecting

damages from petitioner company.

4. That the respondent Court of Appeals gravely

erred and abused its discretion in completely

reversing the findings of fact of the trial court.

5. The findings of fact of the respondent Court of

Appeals are reversible under the recognized

exceptions.

6. The trial court did not err in awarding moral

damages and attorney's fees to defendant

corporation, now petitioner company.

7. Assumingarguendo that petitioner company

may be held liable from the death of the late Isabel

Lao Juan, the damages granted by respondent

Court of Appeals are improper and exhorbitant.

(Petitioners Memorandum, p. 133, Rollo)

Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1) whether or not the deceased died of

electrocution; (2) whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's

death; and (3) whether or not the respondent CA's substitution of the trial court's

factual findings for its own was proper.

In considering the first issue, it is Our view that the same be resolved in the

affirmative. By a preponderance of evidence, private respondents were able to show

that the deceased died of electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily

derived from the photographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left

palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased

had clutched a live wire of the petitioner. This was corroborated by the testimony of

Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body of the deceased a few hours

after the death and described the said burnt wounds as a "first degree burn" (p.

144, TSN, December 11, 1972) and that they were "electrically charged" (p. 102,

TSN, November 28, 1972). Furthermore, witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida

Bulong added that after the deceased screamed "Ay" and sank into the water, they

tried to render some help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric

wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the water in a snake-like fashion

(supra). The foregoing therefore justifies the respondent CA in concluding that "(t)he

nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no

other conclusion than that they were "burns," and there was nothing else in the

street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the

dangling live wire of defendant company" (CA Decision, p. 22, Rollo).

But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that thedeceased was electrocuted, if such was really the case when she tried to open her

steel gate, which was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to

install to serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said

burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with

evidence. As required by the Rules, "each party must prove his own affirmative

allegations." (Rule 131, Sec. 1). Nevertheless, the CA significantly noted that

"during the trial, this theory was abandoned" by the petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23,

Rollo).

7


8/25

Furthermore the CA properly applied the principle ofres gestae. The CA said:

Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller, and Aida Bulong, a salesgirl,

were with the deceased during that fateful morning of June 29,

1967. This Court has not been offered any sufficient reason to

discredit the testimonies of these two young ladies. They were one

in the affirmation that the deceased, while wading in the waist-

deep flood on Guerrero Street five or six meters ahead of them,

suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. When

they approached the deceased to help, they were stopped by the

sight of an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-

like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz also tried to approach

the deceased, but he turned back shouting that thewater was

grounded. These bits of evidence carry much weight. For the

subject of the testimonies was a startling occurrence, and the

declarations may be considered part of theres gestae. (CA

Decision, p. 21, Rollo)

For the admission of theres gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be

present: (1) that the principal act, theres gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) thatthe statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; (3)

that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its

immediately attending circumstances (People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151; People vs.

Balbas, 122 SCRA 959). We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA' part in

view of the satisfaction of said requisites in the case at bar.

The statements made relative to the startling occurrence are admitted in evidence

precisely as an exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness

and necessity. "Trustworthiness" because the statements are made instinctively

(Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity" because such natural and

spontaneous utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the sameperson on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31). Therefore, the fact that the

declarant, Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to testify does not make the

testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong hearsay since the said

declaration is part of theres gestae. Similarly, We considered part of theres

gestae a conversation between two accused immediately after commission of the

crime as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs. Reyes, 82 Phil. 563).

While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide petitioner's Memorandum, p.

135, Rollo), Ernesto de la Cruz was not an actual witness to the instant when the

deceased sank into the waist-deep water, he acted upon the call of help of Aida

Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo with the knowledge of, and immediately after,

the sinking of the deceased. In fact the startling event had not yet ceased when

Ernesto de la Cruz entered the scene considering that the victim remained

submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that a state of mind

characterized by nervous excitement had been triggered in Ernesto de la Cruz's

being as anybody under the same contingency could have experienced. As such, We

cannot honestly exclude his shouts that the water was grounded from theres

gestae just because he did not actually see the sinking of the deceased nor hear her

scream "Ay."

Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a mere opinion of Ernesto de la

Cruz. While We concede to the submission that the statement must be one of facts

rather than opinion, We cannot agree to the proposition that the one made by him

was a mere opinion. On the contrary, his shout was a translation of an actuality as

perceived by him through his sense of touch.

Finally, We do not agree that the taking of Ernesto de la Cruz' testimony was

suppressed by the private respondents, thus, is presumed to be adverse to them

pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule 131. For the application of said Rule as against a

party to a case, it is necessary that the evidence alleged to be suppressed is

available only to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18 May 1955, 97 Phil. 953).

The presumption does not operate if the evidence in question is equally available to

both parties (StaplesHowe Printing Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan Assn., 36 Phil. 421). It is

clear from the records that petitioner could have called Ernesto de la Cruz to the

witness stand. This, precisely, was Linda Alonzo Estavillo's suggestion to

petitioner's counsel when she testified on cross examination:

Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far did he reach from

the gate of the house?

A. Well, you can ask that matter from him sir because he

is here. (TSN, p. 30, 26 Sept. 1972)

The foregoing shows that petitioner had the opportunity to verify the declarations of

Ernesto de la Cruz which, if truly adverse to private respondent, would have helped

its case. However, due to reasons known only to petitioner, the opportunity was not

taken.

8


9/25

Coming now to the second issue, We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor.

The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be

exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is

true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may

be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's

death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took

place. We subscribe to the conclusions of the respondent CA when it found:

On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred liability for the

electrocution and consequent death of the late Isabel Lao Juan,

defendant called to the witness-stand its electrical engineer, chief

lineman, and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence

and to negate the charge of negligence. The witnesses testified in a

general way about their duties and the measures which

defendantusually adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. From

these testimonies, the lower court found "that the electric lines and

other equipment of defendant corporation were properly

maintained by a well-trained team of lineman, technicians and

engineers working around the clock to insure that these

equipments were in excellent condition at all times." (P. 40, Record

on Appeal) The finding of the lower court, however, was based on

what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what

they actually did or failed to doon the datein question, and not on

the occasion of theemergency situation brought about by the

typhoon.

The lower court made a mistake in assuming that defendant's

employees worked around the clock during the occurrence of the

typhoon on the night of June 28 and until the early morning of

June 29, 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan of the National Power

Corporation affirmed that when he first set out on an inspectiontrip between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M. on June 29, 1967, he saw

grounded and disconnected electric lines of the defendant buthe

saw no INELCO lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on

Rizal Street wasstill closed. (pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Even

the witnesses of defendant contradict the finding of the lower

court. Conrado Asis, defendant's electrical engineer, testified that

he conducted a general inspection of the franchise area of the

INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day following the typhoon. The

reason he gave for the delay was that all their vehicles were

submerged. (p. 337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to Asis, he

arrived at his office at 8:00 A.M. on June 30and after briefing his

men on what to do they started out. (p. 338,lbid) One or two days

after the typhoon, the INELCO people heard "rumors that someone

was electrocuted" so he sent one of his men to the place but his

man reported back that there was no damaged wire. (p. 385,Id.)

Loreto Abijero, chief lineman of defendant, corroborated Engr.

Juan. He testified that at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 Engr.

Juan came to the INELCO plant and asked the INELCO people to

inspect their lines. He went with Engr. Juan and their inspection

lasted from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28,

1975) Fabico Abijero lineman of defendant, testified that at about

6:00 on June 29, 1967 the typhoon ceased. At that time, he was at

the main building of the Divine Word College of Laoag where he

had taken his family for refuge. (pp. 510-511,Ibid.)

In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag

City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29,

1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier ofelectricityto be

inconstant vigilto prevent or avoid any probable incident that

might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that

defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there

were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even

manning its office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)

Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it

that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an

agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must

be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this

high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right

to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitionerhaving been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the

victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines

or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant

is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or

omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).

Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no

application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding

circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and

9


10/25

brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5,

26 Sept. 1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept. 1972), the deceased,

accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to

see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for

exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her

the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury?

Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the

rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the

consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another

is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue hisendangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co.,

1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property,

a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the

deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a

right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect

her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from

recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence (ibid.,

p. 1165, 1166).

But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its discretion in completely

reversing the trial court's findings of fact, pointing to the testimonies of three of its

employees its electrical engineer, collector-inspector, lineman, and president-

manager to the effect that it had exercised the degree of diligence required of it in

keeping its electric lines free from defects that may imperil life and limb. Likewise,

the said employees of petitioner categorically disowned the fatal wires as they

appear in two photographs taken on the afternoon of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and

"E"), suggesting that said wires were just hooked to the electric post (petitioner's

Memorandum, p. 170, Rollo). However, as the CA properly held, "(t)he finding of the

lower court ... was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do,

not on what they actually did or failed to doon the datein question, and not on the

occasion of theemergency situation brought about by the typhoon" (CA Decision, p.25, Rollo). And as found by the CA, which We have already reiterated above,

petitioner was in fact negligent. In a like manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of

the several wires cannot stand the logical conclusion reached by the CA when it

held that "(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them

can lead to no other conclusion than that they were 'burns', and there was nothing

else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn

except the dangling live wire of defendant company" (supra).

"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt

efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474).

The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set

out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded

and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any

INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office (vide, CA

Decision,supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise

extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the

negligence of petitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:

. . .evenbefore June 28 the people in Laoag were already alerted

about the impending typhoon, through radio announcements.

Even the fire department of the city announced the coming of the

big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN, March 13, 1975) At the INELCO

irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because

"amperes of the switch volts were moving". And yet, despite these

danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that

defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was done. Asked why

the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he "was not the machine

tender of the electric plant to switch off the current." (pp. 467-

468,Ibid.) How very characteristic of gross inefficiency! (CA

Decision, p. 26, Rollo)

From the preceding, We find that the CA did not abuse its discretion in reversing

the trial court's findings but tediously considered the factual circumstances at

hand pursuant to its power to review questions of fact raised from the decision of

the Regional Trial Court, formerly the Court of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).

In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in

private respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the

victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatorydamages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit

case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the

deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit.

Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the victim's death, We affirm

the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's fees. Pusuant to recent

jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA

381), We increase the said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total

actual damages to P48,229.45.

10


11/25

The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the lower court was

properly made by the respondent CA, the charge of malice and bad faith on the

part of respondents in instituting his case being a mere product of wishful thinking

and speculation. Award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the

action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to litigate

(Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results from a person's exercising his

legal rights, it isdamnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110).

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent, except for the slight

modification that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED.

************************

EODORICO MANZANARES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

EDUARDO YANG, doing business under the

name and style of MANHATTAN ENTERPRISES,

INC., and TEODORICO MANZANARES,

Petitioners,

G.R. Nos. 153760-61

Present:

PANGANIBAN,C.J.

Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

- versus -

Spouses EDILBERTO EXALTACION and

ADELAIDA EXALTACION,

Respondents,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MANHATTAN ENTERPRISES, CO., and

TEODORICO MANZANARES,

Petitioners,

- versus -

LYDIA, CONSEJO, MIGUEL, JR., WILFREDO,

BELINDA, JOHNA, DANIEL, DESPOSORIO,

VICTOR, ANTONIETTE [all surnamed ANAS] and

MA. MILLIE ANAS-SACLOTE,

Respondents,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

TEODORICO MANZANARES, and EDUARDO

YANG,

11


12/25

Petitioners,

- versus -

FELICIDAD TOMAQUIN,

Respondent,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

MANHATTAN ENTERPRISES CO., and

TEODORICO MANZANARES,

Petitioners,

- versus -

EDUARDA DAPLINAN VDA. DE PASCO, ROSA

PASCO ALONZO, JESUSA PASCO BUSLON,

FRANCISCO PASCO, MIRAVER PASCO & MA.

TERESA PASCO,

Respondents,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

Promulgated:

TEODORICO MANZANARES, and EDUARDO

YANG,

Petitioners,

- versus -

CITA VICENTE,

Respondent.

October 12, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30

April 2002[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 19600 and CA-G.R. CV No. 53834 affirming the

joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal

Case No. 5782-M and Civil Cases No. 6734-M, 6769-M, 6935-M, 6894-M, and

8478-M.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

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13/25

At about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, a vehicular collision

took place along MacArthur Highway, Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, involving

an Isuzu six-wheeler truck bearing plate no. CBG 283 Pilipinas 82 and a

passenger jeepney with plate no. DDC 430 UV Pilipinas 82. The Isuzu truck was

owned by petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and was then driven by

petitioner TeodoricoManzanares. The passenger jeepney, on the other hand, was

registered in the name of Teodoro Basallo. It was established during the trial that

the passenger jeepney was heading southwards in the direction ofManila while the

Isuzu truck was heading the opposite way.

The incident resulted in the deaths of the driver of the

passenger jeepney Jesus Basallo, Miguel Anas, Ferdinand Exaltacion, and Antonio

Pasco. It also inflicted serious physical injuries to some of the passengers of

the jeepney, namely: Angela Enriquez,

Romeo Espelimbergo, Teresita dela Cruz, Cita Vicente, Jesus Bartolome, Rolando

Peralta, and Felicidad Raymundo.

As expected, the incident spawned the filing of civil suits by those harmed by thecollision.

The families of the deceased Ferdinand Exaltacion[2] and Miguel Anas[3] instituted

separate civil cases for damages against petitioners Manzanares, Manhattan

Enterprises, Inc., the latters managing partner, Eduardo Yang, and the operator of

the passenger jeepney, Teodoro Basallo. The heirs of Antonio Pasco opted to file a

complaint against petitioners Manhattan Enterprises Co.

and Teodorico Manzanares.[4]

The heirs of Jesus Basallo also filed a complaint for his death but their complaint

was dismissed for failure to prosecute.[5]

Two of those who sustained injuries also filed their respective complaints against

petitioners and Teodoro Basallo. In her complaint,[6] Felicidad Tomaquin claimed

that because of the incident, she would not be able to report to her work in a

factory for more than twelve months while Cita Vicente demanded that she be paid

her salary for the two-month period that she was unable to perform her job as a

secretary in a law firm in Bulacan.[7]

Except for the personal circumstances of the parties and the amount of

damages claimed, the civil cases filed against petitioner Manzanares alleged that he

drove the Isuzu truck in a grossly negligent, reckless, careless, and imprudent

manner without due regard to traffic rules and ordinances.

As for petitioners Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and Eduardo Yang, the

complainants alleged that they failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a

family in the selection and supervision of petitioner Manzanares who was their

employee when the mishap occurred.

Teodoro Basallo was sued on the basis of breach of contract of carriage as

he was the registered owner of the passenger jeepney.

In their joint answers,[8] petitioners denied the material allegations of thecomplaints and claimed, by way of special and affirmative defense, that

petitioner Manzanares was faultless in the accident in question; that petitioner

Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. had always exercised the diligence required in the

selection and supervision of all its employees; and that it had always acted in good

faith in dealing with others.

In his answers,[9] Teodoro Basallo alleged that while he owned the

passenger jeepney involved in the collision, the same was on lease to his brother

and the jeepneys driver, Jesus Basallo for P100.00 a day thus, he did not have a

contract of carriage with anyone.

Aside from the civil cases, an Information was also filed against

petitioner Manzanares before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The accusatory portion

of the information reads:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1983, in the municipality

of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the

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14/25

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said

accused Teodorico Manzanares y Domingo, being then the

chauffeur and person in charge of a truck bearing plate no. CBG

283 Pilipinas 82, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously drive and operate the same while passing along the

Mac-Arthur Highway in the said municipality in a negligent,

careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to the traffic

laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary

precautions to prevent accident to persons and damage to

property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and

imprudence, the said truck bearing plate no. CBG 283

T. Pilipinas 82, to bump a passenger jeep bearing plate no. DDC

430 UV Pilipinas 82 owned by Teodoro Basallo and driven by

JesusBasallo, thereby causing serious physical injuries which

directly caused the death of the said Jesus Basallo, Atty.

Miguel Anas y Alli, Ferdinand Exaltacion y de Guzman and Antonio

Pasco y Geronimo; serious physical injuries to the passenger(s)

thereof; namely: Angela Enriquez y Nicolas,

Romeo Espelimbergo and Teresita dela Cruz, Cita Vicente,

Jesus Bartolome, Rolando Peralta

and Felicidad Raymundo y Tomaquin which required medical

attendance for a period of two (2) to three (3) months barringcomplications and which incapacitated them from performing their

customary labor for the same period of time; and damage to the

said jeep in the amount ofP65,000.00, to the damage and prejudice

of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P65,000.00.[10]

These cases were later on consolidated and a joint trial ensued.

During the hearing of the cases, Dr. Eufemia B. Arellano, rural physician

of Malolos, Bulacan, testified that she issued the death certificates of

Jesus Basallo, Atty. Anas, and Antonio Pasco[11] and she was the one who signed

their autopsy reports. For Jesus Basallo, she identified the cause of death to be

cerebral hemorrhage due to fracture of the base of the skull and hemorrhage of the

lung due to multiple fractures of the ribs[12] while Atty. Anas died because of

cerebral hemorrhage due to fracture of the skull and hemorrhage of the lungs due

to multiple fractures of the ribs.[13] As for Pasco, his death was brought about by

cerebral hemorrhage due to multiple fractures of cranium and hemorrhage of the

lungs brought about by multiple fractures of his ribs.[14]

The prosecution likewise introduced in evidence the radiological report

on Exaltacion stating that he suffered from complete fracture of the distal end of

the left clavicle and complete fracture of the scapula.[15]

The following temporary medico-legal certificates with respect to the injuries to the

passengers of the jeepney were also admitted during the trial:

Angela Enriquez:

1. Lacerated wound on the left eyeball 4-5 cm. in size.

2. Hematoma, periorbital area left.

3. Abrasion, 3-4 cm. left lateral neck.

4. Complete, over-riding fracture middle third of the

clavicle, right.[16]

Cita Vicente

1. Lacerated wound, 6 cm. right parietal area.

2. Lacerated wound, 3 cm. left occipital area.

3. Contusion hematoma, right and left side of nasal

bone.

4. Abrasion, right arm.

5. Abrasion, right and left knee.[17]

Jesus Bartolome

1. 4-5 cms. Lacerated wound, deep right frontal.

14

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2. 3-4 cms. Lacerated wound, on the right eyebrow.

3. 5x1 cm. lacerated wound, right face.

4. Lacerated wound, 4-5 cm. medial aspect right hand.

5. Multiple abrasions, right hand.[18]

Rolando Peralta

1. Swelling of the right arm.[19]

Romeo Espelimbergo

1. Punctured wound, left arm, measuring 0.5 cm in

circumference, 1 cm. in depth.

2. Lacerated wound superficial face left side 1 cm. inlength.

3. Skin Abrasion, multiple, both lower extremities, and

left hand.

4. Skin burns 2nd degree multiple left eye inner cantus

and around the left leg.

5. Contusion with abrasion, left superior iliac spine

measuring 7 cms. x 7 cms.

6. X-ray of the hip shows an incomplete fracture of the

left acetabulum.[20]

Teresita Dela Cruz

1. Wound lacerated, 4-5 cm. temporo-perietal left.

2. Wound lacerated, mouth, left angle, 5 cm.

3. Complete fracture distal end of the clavicle, left.

4. Complete over-riding fracture 3rd rib anteriorly, left

and 2nd rib, right.

5. Complete, [over]-riding fracture middle third of the

tibia and fibula.[21]

Felicidad Tomaquin

1. Abrasion, left side of the mouth.

2. 4 cm. lacerated wound, at the right occipital area.

3. Hematoma, chest left side at the level of the angle of

lower.

4. Tenderness at the epigastric area.

5. Tenderness at the left lateral side of abdomen and

inguinal area.[22]

Subsequently, Patrolman Liberato Macapagal was presented as a witness and he

testified that at about 2:35 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, he received

a report about an accident which happened atBarangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.[23] When he arrived at the said place, he saw that the reported mishap involved a

passenger jeepney with plate number DDC 430 and an Isuzu delivery truck bearing

plate number CBG 283.[24] The two vehicles were resting on the right side of

the MacArthur Highway going towards Guiguinto, Bulacan. The Isuzu truck was

still on the asphalted highway while the passengerjeepney rested on the ramp.[25] In

the course of his investigation, he prepared a sketch showing the relative conditions

of the Isuzu truck and of the passenger jeepney as well as the other physicalevidence around these vehicles.[26] In addition, he also caused the taking of pictures

of the incident before the body of Jesus Basallo was extracted from the

passenger jeepney.[27]

Patrolman Macapagal also stated that he noticed skid marks along the highway

which were allegedly caused by the Isuzu truck when its driver stepped on its brake

pedal.[28] When asked as to the length of the skid marks, he replied that they

measured about fifteen to twenty meters.[29] While he was not certain as to the point

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of impact, Patrolman Macapagal stated that there were more pieces of broken glass

on the shoulder of the highway than there were on the asphalted portion thereof.[30]

After Patrolman Macapagal, Angela Enriquez, a passenger of the jeepney which

figured in the collision testified that the vehicle she was riding in was on the

inclined pavement of the cemented portion[31] of the highway when it was bumped

by the Isuzu truck which was then in the process of overtaking another vehicle.[32] Substantially, this was also how Tomaquin and Vicente recalled the

incident. Tomaquinstated during her turn at the witness stand that the jeep (they)

were riding was already ascending in the cemented portion of the highway [33]

while Vicente alleged that the

passenger jeepney wasumaakyat palang sa kalsada[34] when the incident took

place.

Another witness presented by the prosecution was Paterno Dimapilis who claimed

that he was resting near the entrance of the vulcanizing shop he was working

located along Barangay Tikay, Malolos,Bulacan.[35] He declared that the smash up

occurred in the following manner:

Q- Immediately before the collision, where was the

passenger jeepney?

A- It was at the shoulder of the road, sir.

Q- What shoulder if coming from Malolos (going) towards the

direction of Manila?

A- At the right shoulder of the road, sir.

Q- How about the 6 wheeler truck, where was it before the collision

took place?

A- The 6-wheeler truck came from the direction of Manila, sir.

Q- Where was it facing before the collision?

A- It was facing Malolos, sir.

Q- If the truck was coming from Manila while according to you the

jeep was facing towards Manila coming from Malolos, please tell

the Honorable Court how the collision took place?

A- That truck was following a Philippine Rabbit Bus, sir.

Q- Yes, please continue.

A- This Philippine Rabbit Bus wanted to overtake while the 6

wheeler truck also wanted to overtake but was in a dilemma

because there was an on-coming tamaraw jeep, sir.

Q- You said that the truck was placed in a dilemma

ornaalangan, what do you want to tell the court bynaalangan?

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A- Because of the dilemma of the driver of the 6 wheeler truck due

to the oncoming tamaraw jeep, the 6-wheeler truck (swerved) to

the left, sir.

Q- Left of what?

A- At the left side of the road coming from Manila going to Malolos,

sir.

Q- At that precise moment, when you saw the 6-wheeler truck

swerved to the left, did you notice where the

passenger jeepney was?

A- The passenger jeepney was at the right shoulder of the road

facing Manila, sir.

Q- Alright, what happened when the truck swerved to the left?

A- When the 6-wheeler truck was swerving to the left to avoid

the tamaraw, the passenger jeepney was about to stop on the

cemented portion of the road, sir, and that was the time when it

was bumped by the 6-wheeler truck, sir.[36]

For his part, petitioner Manzanares testified that he, together with a truck helper,

was on his way back to petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. premises after

delivering cement in Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacanwhen he got involved in an

accident with a passenger jeepney. According to him, he was following a passenger

bus which overtook another passenger jeepney unloading its passengers. After the

passenger bus successfully went back to its proper lane he tried to see if there was

any oncoming vehicle so that he too can overtake the passenger jeepney which was

then still occupying a portion of his side of the road.Seeing no oncoming vehicleexcept for another passenger jeepney on the shoulder at the opposite side of

the MacArthur Highway, he proceeded to overtake. However, the

passenger jeepney he was trying to pass immediately took its motion[37] forcing him

to apply the brakes of the Isuzu truck which skidded as a result. It was then that

the Isuzu truck bumped the passenger jeepney on the other side of the highway

then driven by Jesus Basallo.

When asked by the prosecutor on cross-examination,

petitioner Manzanares admitted that the two passenger jeepneys were obliquely

situated from one another and were about five to ten meters apart.[38] He also

claimed that while he was overtaking, Jesus Basallo suddenly climbed[39] onto the

asphalted portion of the highway forcing him to step on his brakes but despite his

effort, the Isuzu truck still skidded to the left without him even turning the

steering wheel to that side.[40]

After the trial, petitioner Manzanares was found guilty of reckless imprudence

resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries and damage toproperty. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. Criminal Case No. 5782-M entitled People of

the Philippines vs. Teodorico Manzanares. This Court finds the

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said accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Serious

Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. Accordingly, the said

accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison

term of a minimum of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty

(20) days of prisoncorreccional, medium to a maximum of seven (7)

years and four (4) months of prision mayor, medium and to pay the

costs.

The accused is likewise ordered to pay: 1) ANGELA ENRIQUEZ a)

actual damages in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250.00)

PESOS; b) moral damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED

(P500.00) PESOS; c) exemplary damages in the amount of ONE

HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; and d) attorneys fees and litigation

expenses in the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;

and 2) TERESITA DELA CRUZ a) actual damages in the amount of

ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; b) moral damages in the

amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; c) exemplary

damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS; and

d) attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ONE

THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.

II. In the Civil Cases

1) In Civil Case No. 6734-M, entitled Sps. Edilberto Exaltacion, et

al. vs. Eduardo Yang, et al., judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay

the former as follows:

a. actual damages in the

amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND SIX

HUNDRED THIRTY (P26,630.00) PESOS;

b. moral damages in the

amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND

(P150,000.00) PESOS;

c. exemplary damages in

the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)

PESOS;

d. attorneys fees in the

amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)

PESOS plus five (5%) per cent of the total amount

recoverable;

e. litigation expenses in the

amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00)

PESOS.

2) In Civil Case No. 6769-M entitled Lydia Anas, et al. vs.

Manhattan Enterprises Co., et al., judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the

latter to pay the former as follows:

a. actual damages in the amount of THIRTY

THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS;

b) compensatory

damages in the amount of NINETY FOUR

THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED (P94,900.00)

PESOS;

c) moral damages in the

amount of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00)

PESOS;

d) exemplary damages

in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)

PESOS; and

18


19/25

e) attorneys fees and

litigation expenses in the amount of TWENTY


3) In Civil Case No. 6935-M entitled Eduarda Daplinan Vda. De

Pasco, et al. vs. Manhattan Enterprises Co., et al., judgment is

hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the

defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:

a. actual damages in the

amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND

(P25,000.00) PESOS;

b. compensatory damages

in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND

(P30,000.00) PESOS;

c. moral damages in the

amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)

PESOS;

d. exemplary damages in

the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)

PESOS; and

e. attorneys fees and

litigation expenses in the amount of TWENTY


4) In Civil Case No. 6894-M

entitled Felicidad Tomaquin vs. Teodorico Manzanares, et al.,

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against

the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:

a. actual damages in the amount of ONE

THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS:

b. moral damages in the amount of FIVE

HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;

c. exemplary damages in the amount of TWO

HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS; and

d. attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the

amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.

5) In Civil Case No. 8478-M entitled Cita Vicente

vs. Teodorico Manzanares, et al., judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering the latterto pay the former as follows:

a. actual damages in the amount of FIVE

HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;

b. moral damages in the amount of ONE

THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;

c. exemplary damages in the amount of FIVE

HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS; and

d. attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the

amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED

(P2,500.00) PESOS.

19


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COSTS against the defendants in all of the instant 5 civil cases.[41]

In its assailed Decision of 30 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with

modification, the Decision of the trial court. The decretal portion of the Court of

Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, except for these MODIFICATIONS:

In Crim. Case No. 5782-M, the awards for exemplary damages,

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are DELETED;

In Civil Case No. 6734-M, the awards for exemplary damages,

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted; indemnity for

death of P50,000.00 is additionally awarded; and the award formoral damages is reduced toP50,000.00;


attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted; indemnity for

death of P50,000.00 is additionally awarded; and the award for

moral damages is reduced toP50,000.00;


attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted; indemnity fordeath of P50,000.00 is additionally awarded; and the award for

moral damages is increased toP50,000.00;


attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted; and


attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are deleted.

but in all other respects the appealed Decision is

otherwise AFFIRMED.[42]

Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court impugning the judgment of the

appellate court for the following reason:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION ONLY AS TO

DAMAGES THE APRIL 30, 2002 DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

BY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN FACTS WHICH MAY

SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE.[43]

Petitioners insist that the prosecution failed to discharge its duty of establishing

petitioner Manzanares guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the decisions both

of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals were based only on mere

assumptions. They pointed out that if it were true that

petitioner Manzanares swerved farther to the left of the highway while he was

overtaking, as found by the trial court, then, there was no reason why it still ended

up on the asphalted portion of the highway. Moreover, they claim that

petitioner Manzanares exercised caution before he proceeded to overtake the

passenger jeepney on his side of the road by making sure that there was nooncoming vehicle on the opposite side of the highway. It was only after

petitioner Manzanares was certain that he could successfully overtake that he did

so but Jesus Basallo suddenly and unexpectedly maneuvered his

passenger jeepney into the highway forcing petitioner Manzanares to apply the

brakes of his truck. Unfortunately, the Isuzu truck skidded and rammed into the

passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Basallo. Petitioners also impugn the reliance by

the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the testimony of Dimapilis by claiming

that the latter was a biased witness supplied by the parents of

Ferdinand Exaltacion, one of the passengers who died because of the incident.

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