CASTRO v. ACRO TAXICABThe first case referred to isCastro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., Inc., 82 Phil., 359. The facts of this case are: "Ruedas drove the cab so fast that when he had to turn it to the right or east of Zurbaran, it collided with another taxicab No. 936 owned by the same corporation coming from the north. Both cars were heavily damaged, and the first hit the fire hydrant that was on the sidewalk, east of Rizal Ave. and south east of Calle Zurbaran. Without losing time Castro boarded another car and directed the driver to take him to the Philippine General Hospital, and upon reaching Calle Carriedo in front of Tom's Dixie, he ordered the driver to stop and requested patrolman Jose Lomboy to accompany him to the hospital. Upon arriving there Dr. Eriberto Aguilar asked him to undress, looked over his body, and applied ointment to aching parts and told him to go home. The following day, as he was still suffering from acute pains on the left side of the chest, difficult breathing fever, and coughs, he called Dr. Herrera who prescribed some palliative medicines, and on the 17th, Dr. Herrera advised him to go to a hospital because it was a case for a surgeon. On July 18, he entered St. Luke's Hospital and was treated there by Dr. Flores who advised him to have an X-ray taken. Dr. Paulino J. Garcia took an X-ray picture (Exhibits A-1 and A-2) and this revealed five left ribs were fractured. After three days stay in the hospital charges were rather heavy, and was told by Dr. Flores that he would continue treating him at the house (pp. 23-25, t.s.n., July, 1940). Twice a week for two consecutive weeks and once in the third week after his discharge from the hospital (p. 48 t.s.n., Sept. 3, 1940), or three or four times, he was visited in his house and treated by Dr. Flores (p. 19, t.s.n., July 15), and after one month he was told to report to the Surgeon once every two weeks (p. 20, t.s.n., July 15), and reported twice (p. 48, t.s.n., Sept. 3). The Honorarium of Dr. Herrera is P100; on Dr. Flores, P150; and the hospital bill was P40." Castro was awarded P1,000 for actual expenses, and P3,000 as adequate compensation for pains and disability to work. (cited in Layda v. CA)In case of Juan Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Company, (82 Phil., 359; 47 Off. Gaz., [5] 2023), one of the question at issue was whether or not the provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines on moral damages should be applied to an act of negligence which occurred before the effectivity of said code, and this Court, through Mr. Justice Briones, sustaining the affirmative proposition and citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1941, and November 14, 1934, as well as the comment of Mr. Castan, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Spain, about the revolutionary tendency of Spanish jurisprudence, said the following: We conclude, therefore, reaffirming the doctrine laid down in the case of Lilius (59 J. F. 800) in the sense that indemnity lies for moral and patrimonial damages which include physical and pain sufferings.With this (doctrine), We effect in this jurisdiction a real symbiosis 1 of the Spanish and American Laws and, at the same time, We act in consonance with the spirit and progressive march of time (translation) (cited in Velayo v. Shell)The word "damage" in said article, comprehending as it does all that are embraced in its meaning, includes any and all damages that a human being may suffer in any and all the manifestations of his life: physical or material, moral or psychological, mental or spiritual, financial, economic, social, political, and religious. (as cited in receiver for the north negros sugar company v. ybanez)

BALLATAN v. CAThis is a petition for review oncertiorariof the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of the third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA) but reinstated the complaint against respondents Li Ching Yao and Jose N. Quedding. The appellate court found that it was the erroneous survey by respondent. Quedding that triggered the discrepancies in the lot areas and it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his fathers land. Thus, instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, the appellate court ordered them to pay petitioner Efren Bahlatan, and respondent Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached, thevalue to be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered respondent Quedding to pay respondents Go attorneys fees for his erroneous survey.The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIAs fault was not proved. The Court likewise ruled that all the parties herein are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must therefore be determined in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil Code. Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining owner. Thus, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Gos house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Gos are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the Gos improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to Court to fix the same. In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court likewise held that Article 448 of the Civil Code applies to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents Gos land.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; REAL ACTIONS; DOCKET AND FILING FEES; PAYMENT THEREOF, A REQUISITE BEFORE THE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION AND CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was foraccion publiciana, i.e.,the recovery of possession of real property which is a real action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fees. If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award. The same rule also applies to third-party claims and other similar pleadings.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT; DISMISSAL THEREOF, PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father's land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached on petitioners lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her property.3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ATTORNEYS FEES; ADDITIONAL FILING FEE ON CLAIM THEREOF DEEMED TO CONSTITUTE A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT AWARD. Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the amount prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to damages arisingafterthe filing of the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.4. ID.; PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF ACCESSION; GOOD FAITH IS ALWAYS PRESUMED; BURDEN OF PROOF LIES UPON HIM WHO ALLEGES BAD FAITH. Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties did. He constructed his house in 1982, respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their right must, therefore be determined in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF THE OWNER OF THE LAND WHEN IMPROVEMENT WAS BUILT BY A MISTAKEN BELIEF ON HIS LAND. Article 448 of the Civil Code has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining owner. petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to fix the same.6. ID.; ID.; ID,; ID.; WHEN THE OWNER OF THE LAND ELECTS TO SELL THE LAND OR BUY THE IMPROVEMENT, THE PURCHASE PRICE MUST BE FIXED AT PREVAILING MARKET VALUE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT. In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the improvements were built on the land. The time of taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a taking by the state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation. This is a case of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment. .Article 448 and the same conditions above-stated also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land.APPEARANCES OF COUNSELJose A. Dizon for petitioners.Jose C. Guico, Jr. Law Offices for private respondent Li Chang Yao.Rogelio E. Subong for Gonzalo Go and Winston S. Go.Rogelio R. Nacorda for private respondent Quedding.Macario O. Directo for Araneta Institute of Agriculture.This is a petition for review oncertiorariof the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32472 entitled "Eden Ballatan,et. al., plaintiffs-appelleesv. Gonzalo Go and Winston Go, appellants and third-party plaintiffs-appellantsv. Li Ching Yao,et.al., third-party defendants."[1]The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters of residential land belonging to petitioners.The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila.Lot No. 24, 414square meters in area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling.[2]Lots Nos. 25 and 26,with an area of 415 and 313 square meters respectively, are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr.[3]On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house.Adjacent to Lot No. 26 isLot No. 27, 417 square meters in area, and is registered in the name of respondent Li Ching Yao.[4]In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24.During the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property.[5]Her building contractor informed her that the area of her lot was actually less than that described in the title.Forthwith, Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his encroachment on her property.Respondent Go, however, claimed that his house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of his father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the AIA to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land area received from them. The AIA authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.In a report dated February 28, 1985, Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by a fewmeters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away, increased by two (2) meters. Engineer Quedding declared that he made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the boundaries to have been in their proper position.He, however, could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's area since he was not present at the time respondents Go constructed their boundary walls.[6]On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding made a third relocation survey upon request of the parties.He found that Lot No. 24 lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary, that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area; that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were gained by Lot No. 27 on its western boundary.[7]In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24.Respondents Go refused.The parties, including Li Ching Yao, however, met several times to reach an agreement on the matter.Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay.Respondents Go did not appear. Thus, on April 1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil Case No. 772-MN for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court, Malabon, Branch 169.The Go's filed their "Answer with Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.On August 23, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of petitioners.It ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of Lot No. 24, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.It dismissed the third-party complaint against: (1) AIA after finding that the lots sold to the parties were in accordance with the technical description and verification plan covered by their respective titles; (2) Jose N. Quedding, there being no privity of relation between him and respondents Go and his erroneous survey having been made at the instance of AIA, not the parties; and (3) Li Ching Yao for failure to prove that he committed any wrong in the subject encroachment.[8]The court made the following disposition:"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter:1. To demolish and remove all improvements existing and encroaching on plaintiff's lot;2. To clear, vacate and deliver possession of the encroached area to the plaintiffs;3. To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the following:a)P7,800.00 for the expenses paid to the surveyors;b)P5,000.00 for plaintiffs' transportation;4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the currentmarket value of the subject matter in litigation at the time of execution; and5. To pay the costs of suit.The third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiff Gonzalo Go and Winston Go against third-party defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED."Respondents Go appealed.On March 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding.Instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, the appellate court ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking.It also ordered Jose Quedding to pay respondents Go attorney's fees ofP5,000.00 for his erroneous survey.The dispositive portion of the decision reads:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the dismissal of the third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is concerned but modified in all other aspects as follows:1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the reasonable value of the forty-two (42) square meters of their lot at the time of its taking;2) Third-party defendant Li Ching Yao is hereby ordered to pay defendants-appellants the reasonable value of the thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's lot at the time of its taking; and3) Third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding is hereby ordered to pay to defendants-appellants the amount ofP5,000.00. as attorney's fees.LET THE RECORD of the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for further proceedings and reception of evidence for the determination of the reasonable value of Lots Nos. 24 and 26.SO ORDERED."[9]Hence, this petition.Petitioners allege that:"RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN:1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INSTANT CASE IN UTTER DISREGARD AND IN VIOLATION OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE VESTING BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS TO HEREIN PETITIONERS. RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER TO APPLY/USE EQUITY IN THE PRESENCE OF EXISTING LAWS TO THE CONTRARY.2.UNDER THE GUISE OF APPLYING EQUITY BUT IN EFFECT A VERY APPARENT PARTIALITY AND FAVOR TO RESPONDENTS GO, IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF THE ENCROACHED AREA AT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF ITS TAKING AND NOTTHE VALUE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT, THEREBY ENRICHING THE GO'S BUT DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THE FRUITS OR INCREASE IN VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED UNDER THE LAW AS THE REGISTERED OWNERS WITH TORRENS TITLE IN THEIR NAMES.3.WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ANY FILINGOR DOCKET FEE.4.WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS THE RECOVERY OF THE NECESSARY EXPENSES IN PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS IN THIS CASE."[10]Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial court.The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was foraccion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is a real action.The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.[11]In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any.[12]If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription.[13]Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.[14]Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fees.[15]If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award.[16]The same rule also applies to third-party claims and other similar pleadings.[17]In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents Go was incorporated in their answer to the complaint. The third-party complaint sought the same remedy as the principal complaint but added a prayer for attorney's fees and costs without specifying their amounts, thus:"ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT1. That summons be issued against Third-Party Defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao;2. That after hearing, they be sentenced to indemnify the Third-Party Plaintiffs for whatever is adjudged against the latter in favor of the Plaintiffs;3. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees as may be proved during trial;4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay the costs.Other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for."[18]The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial court without the requisite payment of filing fees, particularly on the Go's prayer for damages.[19]The trial court did not award the Go's any damages.It dismissed the third-party complaint.The Court of Appeals, however, granted the third-party complaint in part by ordering third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding to pay the Go's the sum ofP5,000.00 as attorney's fees.Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the amount prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon.The claim for attorney's fees refers to damages arisingafterthe filing of the complaint against the Go's.The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.[20]The Court of Appeals found that the subject portion is actually forty-two (42) square meters in area, not forty-five (45), as initially found by the trial court; that this forty-two (42) square meter portion is on the entire eastern side of Lot No. 24 belonging to petitioners; that on this said portion is found the concrete fence and pathway that extends from respondent Winston Go's house on adjacent Lot No. 25; that inclusive of the subject portion, respondents Go did not gain nor lose any portion of Lots Nos. 25 and 26; that instead, Lot No. 27, on which respondent Li Ching Yao built his house,encroached on the land of respondents Go, gaining in the process thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's land.[21]We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved.The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these discrepancies.And it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father's land.In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached on petitioners' lot.They are deemed builders in good faith[22]until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her property.[23]Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties did.[24]He constructed his house in 1982, respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985.[25]There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's adjoining land.Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.[26]All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith.Their rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property.Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:"Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548,[27]or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed the proper rent.However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure.The owner of the land may also oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the price of the land.If the owner chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the owner may remove the improvements thereon.The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting or sowing.In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land.If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement stands to the builder, planter or sower, is given to the owner of the land.[28]Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining owner.[29]The facts of the instant case are similar to those inCabral v. Ibanez,[30]to wit:"[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her husband Justino Bernardo, constructed their house in the belief that it was entirely within the area of their own land without knowing at that time that part of their house was occupying a 14-square meter portion of the adjoining lot belonging to the defendants, and that the defendants Bernardo M. Cabral and Mamerta M. Cabral were likewise unaware of the fact that a portion of plaintiff's house was extending and occupying a portion of their lot with an area of 14 square meters.The parties came to know of the fact that part of the plaintiff's house was occupying part of defendant's land when the construction of plaintiff's house was about to be finished, after a relocation of the monuments of the two properties had been made by the U.S. Army through the Bureau of Lands, according to their 'Stipulation of Facts,' dated August 17, 1951.On the basis of these facts, we held that:"The Court, therefore, concludes that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith and the relative rights of the defendant Mamerta Cabral as owner of the land and of the plaintiffs as owners of the building is governed by Article 361 of the Civil Code (Co Tao v. Joaquin Chan Chico, 46 Off. Gaz.5514).Article 361 of the old Civil Code has been reproduced with an additional provision in Article 448 of the new Civil Code, approved June 18, 1949."[31]Similarly, in Grana andTorralba v. Court of Appeals,[32]weheld that:"Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith.Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary or useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land.Respondents, as owners of the land, have therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which stands the improvement.It may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless.The more workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so.Of course, respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the aforementioned portion of the house.If such be the case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent.The parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the same."[33]In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion.If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands.If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon.If the value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent.If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to fix the same.In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment.The Court of Appeals erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the improvements were built on the land.The time of taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings.The instant case is not for expropriation.It is not a taking by the state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation.This is a case of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years.It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment.[34]Article 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is modified as follows:(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision their option to either buy the portion of respondents Go's improvement on their Lot No. 24, or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on which the improvement stands. If petitioners elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at the prevailing market price at the time of payment.If buying the improvement will render respondents Go's house useless, then petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to respondents Go.If petitioners choose to sell the land but respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises.But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease.Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease.From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their option, respondents Go shall pay reasonable monthly rent up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms.(2) Respondents Go are likewise directed to exercise their rights as owners of Lots Nos. 25 and 26,vis-a-visrespondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty seven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land in accordance with paragraph one abovementioned.(3) The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer Quedding, as third-party defendant, to pay attorney's fees ofP5,000.00 to respondents Go is affirmed. The additional filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award.(4) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is affirmed.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing,andBuena, JJ.,concur.

RCBC v. CA SYNOPSISIn March 1991, private respondent Atty. Felipe Lustre purchased a Toyota Corolla. He made a down payment ofP164,620.00, the balance of which was to be paid in 24 equal monthly installments thru RCBC as the financing agent. He issued 24 postdated checks in the amount ofP14,976.00 each. All the checks were thereafter encashed and debited from private respondents account, except for the check representing the payment for August 1991 which was unsigned and because of which the amount representing it was recalled and re-credited to private respondents account. Because of the recall, the last two checks dated February 10, 1993 and March 10, 1993 were no longer presented for payment, purportedly in conformity with petitioner banks procedure. It demanded payment of the balance including liquidated damages, but private respondent refused to pay, prompting petitioner to file an action for replevin and damages before the RTC. Private respondent in his answer interposed a counterclaim for damages. The RTC decided against petitioner (plaintiff) and granted the counterclaim of private respondent for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. In its appeal before the Supreme Court, petitioner contended that private respondents check representing the fifth installment was not encashed, such that the installment for August 1991 was not paid, hence, by virtue of the acceleration clause in the Chattel Mortgage executed by private respondent, petitioner was justified in treating the entire balance as due and demandable, and despite its demand private respondent refused to pay. In sum, petitioner imputed delay on private respondents.Article 1170 of the Civil Code states that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of delay are liable for damages. The delay in the performance of the obligation, however, must either malicious or negligent. Thus, assuming that private respondent was guilty of delay in the payment of the value of the unsigned check, private respondent can not be held liable for damages. There is no imputation, much less evidence, that private respondent acted with malice or negligence in failing to sign the check. If there was omission on his part, such was a mere inadvertence.SYLLABUS1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACTS OF ADHESION; JUST AS BINDING AS ORDINARY CONTRACTS.- It bears stressing that a contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that we have, on occasion, struck down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalidper se; they are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF TERMS THEREOF ARE CLEAR, LITERAL MEANING OF ITS STIPULATION SHALL CONTROL.- While ambiguities in a contract of adhesion are to be construed against the party that prepared the same, this rule applies only if the stipulations in such contract are obscure or ambiguous. If the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. In the latter case, there would be no need for construction.3. ID.; ID.; DELAY; MUST BE EITHER MALICIOUS OR NEGLIGENT.- Article 1170 of the Civil Code states that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of delay are liable for damages. The delay in the performance of the obligation, however, must be either malicious or negligent. Thus, assuming that private respondent was guilty of delay in the payment of the value of the unsigned check, private respondent cannot be held liable for damages. There is no imputation, much less evidence, that private respondent acted with malice or negligence in failing to sign the check.4. ID.; DAMAGES; LACK OF GOOD FAITH MADE PETITIONER LIABLE FOR DAMAGES IN CASE AT BAR.- As pointed out by the trial court, this whole controversy could have been avoided if only petitioner bothered to call up private respondent and ask him to sign the check. Good faith not only in compliance with its contractual obligations, but also in observance of the standard in human relations, for every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, behooved the bank to do so. Failing thus, petitioner is liable for damages caused to private respondent. These include moral damages for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation suffered by the latter. To deter others from emulating petitioners callous example, we affirm the award of exemplary damages. As exemplary damages are warranted, so are attorneys fees.5. ID.; ID.; AWARDED DAMAGES IN CASE AT BAR IS EXCESSIVE.- We, however, find excessive the amount of damages awarded by the trial court in favor of private respondent with respect to his counterclaims and, accordingly, reduce the same as follows: (a) Moral damages - fromP200,000.00 toP100,000.00, (b) Exemplary damages - fromP100,000.00 toP75,000.00, (c) Attorneys fees - fromP50,000.00 toP30,000.00.APPEARANCES OF COUNSELValdez Gonzales LuceroAssociates for petitioner.F. Washington Lustre for private respondent.A simple telephone call and an ounce-of good faith on the part of petitioner could have prevented the present controversy.On March 10, 1993, private respondent Atty. Felipe Lustre purchased a Toyota Corolla from Toyota Shaw, Inc. for which he made a down payment ofP164,620.00, the balance of the purchase price to be paid in 24 equal monthly installments.Private respondent thus issued 24 postdated checks for the amount ofP14,976.00 each.The first was dated April 10, 1991; subsequent checks were dated every 10thday of each succeeding month.To secure the balance, private respondent executed a promissory note[1]and a contract of chattel mortgage[2]over the vehicle in favor of Toyota Shaw, Inc.The contract of chattel mortgage, in paragraph 11 thereof, provided for an acceleration clause stating that should the mortgagor default in the payment of any installment, the whole amount remaining unpaid shall become due.In addition, the mortgagor shall be liable for 25% of the principal due as liquidated damages.On March 14, 1991, Toyota Shaw, Inc. assigned all its rights and interests in the chattel mortgage to petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).All the checks dated April 10, 1991 to January 10, 1993 were thereafter encashed and debited by RCBC from private respondent's account, except for RCBC Check No. 279805 representing the payment for August 10, 1991, which was unsigned.Previously, the amount represented by RCBC Check No. 279805 was debited from private respondent's account but was later recalled and re-credited to him.Because of the recall, the last two checks, dated February 10, 1993 and March 10, 1993, were no longer presented for payment.This was purportedly in conformity with petitioner bank's procedure that once a client's account was forwarded to its account representative, all remaining checks outstanding as of the date the account was forwarded were no longer presented for payment.On the theory that respondent defaulted in his payments, the check representing the payment for August 10, 1991 being unsigned, petitioner, in a letter dated January 21, 1993, demanded from private respondent the payment of the balance of the debt, including liquidated damages.The latter refused, prompting petitioner to file an action for replevin and damages before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC).Private respondent, in his Answer, interposed a counterclaim for damages.After trial, the RTC[3]rendered a decision disposing of the case as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:I.The complaint, for lack of cause of action, is hereby DISMISSED and plaintiff RCBC is hereby ordered,A.To accept the payment equivalent to the three checks amounting to a total of P44,938.00, without interestB.To release/cancel the mortgage on the car xxx upon payment of the amount of P44,938.00 without interest.C.To pay the cost of suitII.On The CounterclaimA.Plaintiff RCBC to pay Atty.Lustre the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages.B.RCBC to pay P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.C.RCBC to pay Atty.Obispo P50,000.00 as Attorney's fees.Atty.Lustre is not entitled to any fee for lawyering for himself.All awards for damages are subject to payment of fees to be assessed by the Clerk of Court, RTC, Pasay City.SO ORDERED.On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:We xxx concur with the trial court's ruling that the Chattel Mortgage contract being a contract of adhesion that is, one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto xxx - is to be strictly construed against appellant bank which prepared the form Contract xxx.Hence xxx paragraph 11 of the Chattel Mortgage contract [containing the acceleration clause] should be construed to cover only deliberate and advertent failure on the part of the mortgagor to pay an amortization as it became due in line with the consistent holding of the Supreme Court construing obscurities and ambiguities in the restrictive sense against the drafter thereof xxx in the light ofArticle 1377 of the Civil Code.In the case at bench, plaintiff-appellant's imputation of default to defendant-appellee rested solely on the fact that the 5thcheck issued by appellee xxx was recalled for lack of signature.However, the check was recalled only after the amount covered thereby had been deducted from defendant-appellee's account, as shown by the testimony of plaintiff's own witness Francisco Bulatao who was in charge of the preparation of the list and trial balances of bank customers xxx.The "default" was therefore not a case of failure to pay, the check being sufficiently funded, and which amount was in fact already debitted [sic] from appellee's account by the appellant bank which subsequently re-credited the amount to defendant-appellee's account for lack of signature.All these actions RCBC did on its own without notifying defendant until sixteen (16) months later when it wrote its demand letter dated January 21, 1993.Clearly, appellant bank was remiss in the performance of its functions for it could have easily called the defendant's attention to the lack of signature on the check and sent the check to, or summoned, the latter to affix his signature.It is also to be noted that the demand letter contains no explanation as to how defendant-appellee incurred arrearages in the amount of P66,255.70, which is why defendant-appellee made a protest notation thereon.Notably, all the other checks issued by the appellee dated subsequent to August 10, 1991 and dated earlier than the demand letter, were duly encashed.This fact should have already prompted the appellant bank to review its action relative to the unsigned check. xxx[4]We take exception to the application by both the trial and appellate courts of Article 1377 of the Civil Code, which states:The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.It bears stressing that a contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts.[5]It is true that we have, on occasion, struck down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.[6]Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se;[7]they are not entirely prohibited.[8]The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.[9]While ambiguities in a contract of adhesion are to be construed against the party that prepared the same,[10]this rule applies only if the stipulations in such contract are obscure or ambiguous.If the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[11]In the latter case, there would be no need for construction.[12]Here, the terms of paragraph 11 of the Chattel Mortgage Contract[13]are clear.Said paragraph states:11. In case the MORTGAGOR fails to pay any of the installments, or to pay the interest that may be due as provided in the said promissory note, the whole amount remaining unpaid therein shall immediately become due and payable and the mortgage on the property (ies) herein-above described may be foreclosed by the MORTGAGEE, or the MORTGAGEE may take any other legal action to enforce collection of the obligation hereby secured, and in either case the MORTGAGOR further agrees to pay the MORTGAGEE an additional sum of 25% of the principal due and unpaid, as liquidated damages, which said sum shall become part thereof.The MORTGAGOR hereby waives reimbursement of the amount heretofore paid by him/it to the MORTGAGEE.The above terms leave no room for construction.All that is required is the application thereof.Petitioner claims that private respondent's check representing the fifth installment was "not encashed,[14]such that the installment for August 1991 was not paid.By virtue of paragraph 11 above, petitioner submits that it "was justified in treating the entire balance of the obligation as due and demandable."[15]Despite demand by petitioner, however, private respondent refused to pay the balance of the debt.Petitioner, in sum, imputes delay on the part of private respondent.We do not subscribe to petitioner's theory.Article 1170 of the Civil Code states that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of delay are liable for damages.The delay in the performance of the obligation, however, must be either malicious or negligent.[16]Thus, assuming that private respondent was guilty of delay in the payment of the value of the unsigned check, private respondent cannot be held liable for damages.There is no imputation, much less evidence, that private respondent acted with malice or negligence in failing to sign the check.Indeed, we agree with the Court of Appeals' finding that such omission was mere "inadvertence" on the part of private respondent.Toyota salesperson Jorge Geronimo testified that he even verified whether private respondent had signed all the checks and in fact returned three or four unsigned checks to him for signing:Atty.Obispo:After these receipts were issued, what else did you do about the transaction?A:During our transaction with Atty. Lustre, I found out when he issued to me the 24 checks, I found out 3 to 4 checks are unsigned and I asked him to sign these checks.Atty.Obispo:What did you do?A:I asked him to sign the checks.After signing the checks, I reviewed again all the documents, after I reviewed all the documents and found out that all are completed and the downpayments was completed, we released to him the car.[17]Even when the checks, were delivered to petitioner, it did not object to the unsigned check.In view of the lack of malice or negligence on the part of private respondent, petitioner's blind and mechanical invocation of paragraph 11 of the contract of chattel mortgage was unwarranted.Petitioners conduct, in the light of the circumstances of this case, can only be described as mercenary.Petitioner had already debited the value of the unsigned check from private respondent's account only to re-credit it much later to him.Thereafter, petitioner encashed checks subsequently dated, then abruptly refused to encash the last two.More than a year after the date of the unsigned check, petitioner, claiming delay and invoking paragraph 11, demanded from private respondent payment of the value of said check and. that of the last two checks, including liquidated damages.As pointed out by the trial court, this whole controversy could have been avoided if only petitioner bothered to call up private respondent and ask him to sign the check.Good faith not only in compliance with its contractual obligations,[18]but also in observance of the standard in human relations, for every person "to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."[19]behooved the bank to do so.Failing thus, petitioner is liable for damages caused to private respondent.[20]These include moral damages for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation suffered by the latter.[21]The trial court found that private respondent was[a] client who has shared transactions for over twenty years with a bank xxx.The shabby treatment given the defendant is unpardonable since he was put to shame and embarrassment after the case was filed in Court.He is a lawyer in his own right, married to another member of the bar.He sired children who are all professionals in their chosen field.He is known to the community of golfers with whom he gravitates.Surely, the filing of the case made defendant feel so bad and bothered.To deter others from emulating petitioners callous example, we affirm the award of exemplary damages.[22]As exemplary damages are warranted, so are attorney's fees.[23]We, however, find excessive the amount of damages awarded by the trial court in favor of private respondent with respect to his counterclaims and, accordingly, reduce the same as follows:(a)Moral damages - fromP200,000.00 toP100,000.00,(b)(b)Exemplarydamages fromP100,000.00 toP75,000.00,(c)(c) Attorney's fees - fromP50,000,00 toP30,000.00.WHEREFORE, subject to these modifications, the decision of theCourt of Appeals isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo,andPardo, JJ., concur.

VDA. DE SEVERO v. GOThis case treated as a special civil action for certiorari was originally filed as a petition for review by way of appeal on certiorari seeking to set aside the order of the then Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch V, in Calbayog City dated April 6, 1976 dismissing Civil Case No. 522-CC entitled "Julita T. Vda, de Severo, et al., versus Luningning Feliciano Go, et al.' for lack of jurisdiction.The antecedents of the case are as follows:The late Ricardo Severo was an employee of herein private respondents Luningning Feliciano Go and Joaquin Go, first as baker of 'Joni's Cakes and Pastries," an enterprise owned by respondents located at 1634 P. Guevarra Street, Santa Cruz, Manila and finally, as driver-mechanic from 1961 up to February 16, 1972. On the latter date, unidentified armed men forcibly took away and/or carnapped the car owned by respondents and driven by Ricardo Severo who, in his efforts to resist the carnappers, was shot and killed by the latter. Up to now, the parties responsible for Severo's death have not been Identified nor apprehended.On September 18, 1974, herein petitioners, the widow and minor children of Ricardo Severo, filed an action against respondents-employers before the trial court for "Death Compensation and Damages" in the total amount of P74,500.00 the complaintinter aliaalleging:IVThat sometime on February 16, 1972 whi le the said Ricardo Severo was in the actual discharge of his duties as an employee of defendants that is, he was driving the car of defendants, carnappers forcefully took away and/or carnapped the said car of defendants and in his attempts to resist and prevent the subject car from being taken away, the said carnappers shot and killed the said Ricardo Severo, thus his death arose out of and in the course of his employment with defendants;VThat plaintiffs herein depend solely and rely completely upon the late Ricardo Severo for their financial needs and means of living, and at the time of his death the said Ricardo Severo was receiving monthly compensation by defendants herein at the rate of P250.00;VIThat for the loss of the life of said Ricardo Severo, plaintiffs herein are entitled to indemnification or death compensation from defendants in the least amount of P50,000.00 considering the fact that at the time of his death the said Ricardo Severo was only 33 years and could have lived for many years as he was in a very good physical condition;VIIThat because of the sudden and violent death which Ricardo Severo met in the faithful service to his employers the defendants herein, the plaintiffs herein suffered moral damages in the form of deep grief, lonesomeness, mental anguish and shock which sufferings although not capable of pecuniary estimation may be conservatively fixed at P20,000.00;VIIIThat defendants manifested bad faith when they willfully failed to comply with their promise that they would properly compensate plaintiffs herein for the death of Ricardo Severo and that they would help plaintiffs prosecute the carnappers-killers of said Ricardo Severo, thereby plaintiffs were compelled to institute this suit whereby they incur litigation expenses of at least P500.00 and to contract the services of their counsel on a contingent basis of P2,000.00.On November 18, 1974, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent Court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action but the same was denied by respondent Court in its order dated January 9, 1975. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court. On May 3, 1975, private respondents filed their answer traversing the material allegations of the complaint and raised as special affirmative defenses that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the claim of the petitioner and that the complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action.During the pre-trial on January 16, 1976, private respondents again filed a motion to dismiss reiterating their allegation that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the claim of petitioner and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Petitioners filed a reply (opposition) dated February 5, 1976 contending that their claim is not for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act but for damages under Article 1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, hence, cognizable by the regular courts.The respondent court, acting on the latest motion to dismiss, issued an order dated April 6, 1976 stating that petitioners' cause of action falls within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the proper forum was the Workmen's Compensation Commission. It declared itself without jurisdiction following Our ruling in the case of Robles vs. Yap Wing, L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 267, to wit:The Court after a careful consideration of the grounds in the defendants' motion, and considering the allegation of the complaint describing their main cause of action, which is a claim for death compensation and damages, is of the opinion and so holds that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The plaintiffs' right to relief being derived on an accident resulting in death of Ricardo Severo, an employee of the defendants, while engaged in the performance of the task assigned to him, this Court is devoid of statutory competence to pass upon the subject matter of the plaintiffs' claim, as of the time the cause of action accrue, falls within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act as amended and, therefore, the proper form (sic) was the Workmen's Compensation Commission, thru its regional offices under the Department of Labor, a body empowered to act upon all claims for compensation for death, injury or sickness. Thus our Supreme Court in the case of Ciriaco Robles vs. Yap Wing, No. L-20442, Oct. 4, 1971 ruled:Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 722(Amending Act. No. 3228), which took effect on June 20, 1952, claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act were cognizable by the regular courts, but since then, as provided in Section 46 thereof as amended, 'the Workmen's Compensation shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. ... In relation to this, Section 5 of the Act provides that the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to an employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury.The petition is impressed with merit. The ruling in the case of Robles vs. Yap Wing,supra, that the action of the injured employee or that of his heirs in case of his death is restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act relied upon by the trial court, no longer controls. We have abandoned the same in the recent case of Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Hon. Celso Avelino, G.R. No. L-43674, promulgated on June 30, 1987, citing the case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141. We stated thus.In the recent case ofFloresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141, involving a complaint for damages for the death of five miners in a cave-in on June 28, 1967, this Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule as presented by severalamici curiae. One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles case, is that the remedy of an employee for work connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that the action is selective and the employee of his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the employee cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. This latter view was adopted by the majority in theFlorescacase, reiterating as main authority its earlier decision inPacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, L-25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442. In so doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case. Three justices dissented.As clarified by Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his concurring opinion inYsmael, "the employee or his heirs have the choice of cause of action and corresponding relief, i.e., either an ordinary action for damages before the regular courts or a special claim for limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act before the Workmen's Compensation Commission ... However, tills right of choice is qualified in that the employee should be held to the particular remedy in which he has staked his fortunes and must pursue even his alternative claim for compensation exclusively in the same regular courts once he has opted to seek his remedy there rather than in the Workmen's Compensation Commission." This is what the petitioners did in filing their complaint for "Death Compensation and Damages" before respondent Court. Petitioners have opted to seek their remedy before the regular court. Their demand for compensation is predicated on the employer's liability for the death of their employee (Ricardo Severo) imposed by Article 1711 of the Civil Code which reads:Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to fortuitous cause if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of employment ...Petitioner's claim for compensation based on the Civil Code pertain to the jurisdiction of the regular courts (Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Co., 32 SCRA 442).WHEREFORE, the petition is Granted and the order dated April 6, 1976 of respondent Court dismissing petitioner's complaint is hereby Set Aside and the case Remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

BANEZ v. VALDEVILLA The orders of respondent judge1dated June 20, 1996 and October 16, 1996, taking jurisdiction over an action for damages filed by an employer against its dismissed employee, are assailed in this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in Iligan City. In 1993, private respondent "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in Iligan City. In a decision dated July 7, 1994, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and of backwages and attorney's fees. The decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time.2Elevated by petition forcertioraribefore this Court, the case was dismissed on technical grounds3; however, the Court also pointed out that even if all the procedural requirements for the filing of the petition were met, it would still be dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.On November 13, 1995, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Misamis Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-554, which prayed for the payment of the following:a. P709,217.97 plus 12% interest as loss of profit and/or unearned income of three years;b. P119,700.00 plus 12% interest as estimated cost of supplies, facilities, properties, space, etc. for three years;c. P5,000.00 as initial expenses of litigation; andd. P25,000.00 as attorney's fees.4On January 30, 1996, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the above complaint. He interposed in the court below that the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case. He accused private respondent of splitting causes of action, stating that the latter could very well have included the instant claim for damages in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter. He also pointed out that the civil action of private respondent is an act of forum-shopping and was merely resorted to after a failure to obtain a favorable decision with the NLRC.Ruling upon the motion to dismiss, respondent judge issued the herein questioned Order, which summarized the basis for private respondent's action for damages in this manner:Paragraph 5 of the complaint alleged that the defendant violated the plaintiff's policy re: His business in his branch at Iligan City wherein defendant was the Sales Operations Manager, and paragraph 7 of the same complaint briefly narrated themodus operandiof defendant, quoted herein: Defendant canvassed customers personally or through salesmen of plaintiff which were hired or recruited by him. If said customer decided to buy items from plaintiff on installment basis, defendant, without the knowledge of said customer and plaintiff, would buy the items on cash basis at ex-factory price, a privilege not given to customers, and thereafter required the customer to sign promissory notes and other documents using the name and property of plaintiff, purporting that said customer purchased the items from plaintiff on installment basis. Thereafter, defendant collected the installment payments either personally or through Venus Lozano, a Group Sales Manager of plaintiff but also utilized by him as secretary in his own business for collecting and receiving of installments, purportedly for the plaintiff but in reality on his own account or business. The collection and receipt of payments were made inside the Iligan City branch using plaintiff's facilities, property and manpower. That accordingly plaintiff's sales decreased and reduced to a considerable extent the profits which it would have earned.5In declaring itself as having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant controversy, respondent court stated:A perusal of the complaint which is for damages does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover damages as redress for defendant's breach of his contractual obligation to plaintiff who was damaged and prejudiced. The Court believes such cause of action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts.While seemingly the cause of action arose from employer-employee relations, the employer's claim for damages is grounded on the nefarious activities of defendant causing damage and prejudice to plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 7 of the complaint. The Court believes that there was a breach of a contractual obligation, which is intrinsically a civil dispute. The averments in the complaint removed the controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and brought it within the purview of civil law. (Singapore Airlines, Ltd. Vs. Pao, 122 SCRA 671.) . . .6Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above Order was denied for lack of merit on October 16, 1996. Hence, this petition.Acting on petitioner's prayer, the Second Division of this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") on March 5, 1997, enjoining respondents from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 95-554 until further orders from the Court.By way of assignment of errors, the petition reiterates the grounds raised in the Motion to Dismiss dated January 30, 1996, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,res judicata, splitting of causes of action, and forum-shopping. The determining issue, however, is the issue of jurisdiction.Art. 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, which was already in effect at the time of the filing of this case, reads:Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:xxx xxx xxx4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;xxx xxx xxxThe above provisions are a result of the amendment by Section 9 of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989, and which put to rest the earlier confusion as to who between Labor Arbiters and regular courts had jurisdiction over claims for damages as between employers and employees.It will be recalled that years prior to R.A. 6715, jurisdiction over all money claims of workers, including claims for damages, was originally lodged with the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC by Article 217 of the Labor Code.7On May 1, 1979, however, Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1367 amended said Article 217 to the effect that "Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages."8This limitation in jurisdiction, however, lasted only briefly since on May 1, 1980, P.D. No. 1691 nullified P.D. No. 1367 and restored Article 217 of the Labor Code almost to its original form. Presently, and as amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in Article 217 is comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages "arising from the employer-employee relations"Whereas this Court in a number of occasions had applied the jurisdictional provisions of Article 217 to claims for damages filed by employees,9we hold that by the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations" Article 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case.Even under Republic Act No. 875 (the "Industrial Peace Act", now completely superseded by the Labor Code), jurisprudence was settled that where the plaintiff's cause of action for damages arose out of, or was necessarily intertwined with, an alleged unfair labor practice committed by the union, the jurisdiction is exclusively with the (now defunct) Court of Industrial Relations, and the assumption of jurisdiction of regular courts over the same is a nullity.10To allow otherwise would be "to sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice."11Thus, even after the enactment of the Labor Code, where the damages separately claimed by the employer were allegedly incurred as a consequence of strike or picketing of the union, such complaint for damages is deeply rooted from the labor dispute between the parties, and should be dismissed by ordinary courts for lack of jurisdiction. As held by this Court inNational Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419:Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondent's claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioner's "doing business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee. Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are: first, those amounting to lost profits and earnings due to petitioner's abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and second, those equivalent to the value of private respondent's property and supplies which petitioner used in conducting his "business ".Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant action for damages would be to open anew the factual issue of whether petitioner's installment sale scheme resulted in business losses and the dissipation of private respondent's property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in the illegal dismissal case, where private respondent brought up as a defense the same allegations now embodied in his complaint, and presented evidence in support thereof. The Labor Arbiter, however, found to the contrary that no business losses may be attributed to petitioner as in fact, it was by reason of petitioner's installment plan that the sales of the Iligan branch of private respondent (where petitioner was employed) reached its highest record level to the extent that petitioner was awarded the 1989 Field Sales Achievement Award in recognition of his exceptional sales performance, and that the installment scheme was in fact with the knowledge of the management of the Iligan branch of private respondent.12In other words, the issue of actual damages has been settled in the labor case, which is now final and executory.Still on the prospect of re-opening factual issues already resolved by the labor court, it may help to refer to that period from 1979 to 1980 when jurisdiction over employment-predicated actions for damages vacillated from labor tribunals to regular courts, and back to labor tribunals. InEbon vs. de Guzman, 113 SCRA 52,1this Court discussed:The lawmakers in divesting the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of jurisdiction to award moral and other forms of damages in labor cases could have assumed that the Labor Arbiters' position-paper procedure of ascertaining the facts in dispute might not be an adequate tool for arriving at a just and accurate assessment of damages, as distinguished from backwages and separation pay, and that the trial procedure in the Court of First Instance would be a more effective means of determining such damages. . . .Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would meanduplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.So, on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 (which substantially reenacted Article 217 in its original form) nullified Presidential Decree No. 1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from employer-employee relations. . . . (Emphasis supplied).Clearly, respondent court's taking jurisdiction over the instant case would bring about precisely the harm that the lawmakers sought to avoid in amending the Labor Code to restore jurisdiction over claims for damages of this nature to the NLRC.This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the damages, claimed for were based on tort14, malicious prosecution15, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee16or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.17Neither can we uphold the reasoning of respondent court that because the resolution of the issues presented by the complaint does not entail application of the Labor Code or other labor laws, the dispute is intrinsically civil. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.18Thus, it is obvious that private respondent's remedy is not in the filing of this separate action for damages, but in properly perfecting an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision. Having lost the right to appeal on grounds of untimeliness, the decision in the labor case stands as a final judgment on the merits, and the instant action for damages cannot take the place of such lost appeal.Respondent court clearly having no jurisdiction over private respondent's complaint for damages, we will no longer pass upon petitioner's other assignments of error.WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the complaint in Civil Case No. 95-554 before Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. BALLESTEROSThis is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit:WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code hereby sentences them toreclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and further sentencing them to pay jointly and solidarily -1.The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSANDSEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P35,755.00), with interest;2.The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual damages in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS (P61,785.00), with interest;3.Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of TWO THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS AND FORTY CENTAVOS (P2,003.40), and moral damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), with interest;4.Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) each, with interest.5.The costs.The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they had undergone preventive imprisonment, if they agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, they shall be credited in the service thereof with only four-fifths of the time during which they had undergone preventive imprisonment.[1]In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino at Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte.They proceeded to the barangay hall at Carusipan to attend a dance.The group did not tarry for long at the dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks.In order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity, they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his companions.The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the topdown jeep and landed just beside it.He scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield.His younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and died.[2]Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the right foot, back of the right thigh, and legs and thighs, respectively.[3]The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney.[4]He did not survive.The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injured.Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued. Charged with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder, an information was filed as follows:That on or about (sic) May 28, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, nighttime purposely sought, with evident premeditation and treachery, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot Eduardo Tolentino Sr., Jerry Agliam, Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, with the use of firearms which caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and thereby inflicting gunshot wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of Murder, but which did not by reason of causes independent of the will of the defendant, namely the able and timely medical assistance given to said Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino which prevented their death.All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results.Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or any of his companions at the basketball court, as alleged by the complainants.Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact, just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test.He further asserted that paraffin tests are not infallible, and that his hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of which is urine.Lastly, he said that he was not even present at the crime scene when the firing incident took place; hence, he could not have been one of those who strafed the jeep.[5]For his part, Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, narrating to the court that, on May 28, 1991, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, he went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes.He returned home within thirty minutes and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00 oclock.The next morning, he busied himself with some chores, which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate.He handled the fertilizers without gloves.To counter the finding of traces of nitrates on his left hand, Ballesteros maintained that he uses his left hand in lighting cigarettes, as it was very painful for him to use his right hand.He likewise informed the trial court that he had no motive to kill the victims.[6]Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros, stating that he saw only Galo on the evening of the dance but did not talk to him.He denied joining the two later that night because after the dance, he went straight to the house of Michael Viloria, where he spent the night until he went to work at 7:00 oclock in the morning of the following day.[7]The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.The accused now come to the High Court on appeal, praying that the decision of the trial court be reversed and that a new one be entered acquitting them of the charges.The principal question to be resolved has to do with the merits of the decision of the lower court.Was it correct in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt?We answer in the affirmative.Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam recognized them as the assailants.This claim is unmeritorious.In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both described the area to be well illumined by the moon.The shooting took place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilocos Norte, where the air is free from darkening elements and turbidity.It being a summer evening, there could not have been any fog to becloud the atmosphere and hamper the vision of the victims, which would have prevented them from clearly seeing their assailants.They pinpointed the location of the malefactors to be approximately three meters from where they stood.[8]Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity between them, the victims could distinctly identify their assailants.It must be noted that Carmelo was acquainted with Galo and his brother, a butcher, since he used to deal with them in his business of buying and selling cattle.[9]Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal at Cadaratan School.Generally, people in rural communities know each other both by face and name.[10]Bulusan and Agliam were, not only townmates, but former classmates as well.The constant interaction between them through the years would necessarily lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very least, one would have been able to recognize the other easily.That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant.A distinction is herein timely made between motive and intent.Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result.Intent, on the other hand, is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.[11]Motive alone is not proof of a crime.[12]In order to tip the scales in its favor, intent and not motive must be established by the prosecution.Motive is hardly ever an essential element of a crime.A man driven by extreme moral perversion may be led to commit a crime, without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it.[13]Along the same line, a man who commits a crime with an apparent motive may produce different results, for which he is punished.As held in a line of cases, the rule is well-settled that the prosecution need not prove motive on the part of the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime.[14]Lack or absence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction thereof where there were reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony.[15]Accused-appellants attempt to offer wild excuses regarding the source of the gunpowder traces found on their hands is futile.Experts confirm the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine may leave traces of nitrates, but t