8/17/2019 Torts No. 3

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Hermana R. Cerezo vs. David TuazonG.R. No. 141538March 23, 24C!R"#$, %.

&ac's( A County Bus Lines passenger bus, ownedby Mrs. Cerezo and driven by Foronda, collidedwith a tricycle driven by Tuazon. Because of this,

 Tuazon led a co!plaint for da!ages on the basisof "uasi#delict against Mrs. Cerezo and Foronda.$u!!ons were served to Mrs. Cerezo but not toForonda.

 The trial court then rendered a decision ndingMrs. Cerezo liable for da!ages. The Court of Appeals a%r!ed the decision of the &TC. 'ence,the current petition.

(t is the contention of Mrs. Cerezo that the trialcourt cannot validly render )udg!ent as againsther because Foronda, an indispensable party, wasnot served with su!!ons. (n addition, Tuazon hasfailed to reserve his right to le a separate civilaction.

#ssue( *hether or not the )udg!ent of the trialcourt is binding upon Mrs. Cerezo despite thefailure of Tuazon to reserve his right to le aseparate civil action.

Ru)in*(  +es. The $upre!e Court ruled that the )udg!ent as against Mrs. Cerezo is valid andbinding because the civil case that was led isbased on "uasi#delict Article -/0 of the CivilCode1 and therefore there is no !ore need toreserve the right to le a separate civil action.

 To clarify, the Court stated that the sa!enegligent act !ay give rise to a civil liabilityarising fro! a delict under Article 23 of the &4Cor a "uasi#delict under Article -/0 of the CivilCode. The choice falls upon the petitioner whichof the two he would utilize to prosecute his clai!.(f he chooses to le his clai! under Article -/0,then such case shall proceed independently of the civil action.

(t is also i!portant to note that there is adistinction between the civil liability e5 delicto

and "uasi#delict. (n case of a "uasi#delict, thee!ployer6s liability under Article -72 is not onlysolidary but is also pri!ary and direct. This!eans that in order to hold the e!ployer liablefor da!ages, it is not necessary that the actuatortfeasor be i!pleaded as an indispensableparty. Moreover, the liability of two or !orepersons for "uasi#delict, being solidary, thepetitioner !ay go after each of the! for thewhole obligation. 'ence, the actual tortfeasor isneither an indispensable nor a necessary party ina co!plaint for da!ages against an e!ployeunder Article -72 of the Civil Code.

*ith this, it is the Court6s conclusion that there isno need to ac"uire )urisdiction over Foronda theactual tortfeasor1 before Mrs. Cerezo thee!ployer of Foronda1 !ay be held liable underArticle -72 of the Civil Code. This is because theliability of the e!ployer under such article ispri!ary, direct and solidary.

No'e(  The $upre!e Court, in )ustifying thisruling, cited it ruling in the case of Barredo vs.Garcia, which states that, 8To hold that there isonly one way to !a9e defendants liabilitye:ective, and that is, to sue the driver ande5haust his the latters1 property rst, would betanta!ount to co!pelling the plainti: to follow adevious and cu!berso!e !ethod of obtainingrelief. True, there is such a re!edy under oulaws, but there is also a !ore e5peditious waywhich is based on the pri!ary and directresponsibility of the defendant under article;-72< of the Civil Code. =ur view of the law is!ore li9ely to facilitate re!edy for civil wrongs

because the procedure indicated by thedefendant is wasteful and productive of delay, itbeing a !atter of co!!on 9nowledge thaprofessional drivers of ta5is and other si!ilapublic conveyances do not have su%cient !eanswith which to pay da!ages. *hy, then, shouldthe plainti: be re"uired in all cases to go throughthis roundabout, unnecessary, and probablyuseless procedure> (n construing the laws, courtshave endeavored to shorten and facilitate thepathways of right and )ustice.?