Title VIII. - NUISANCE(n)

Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;or(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created it.Art. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past existence.Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or(2) A civil action; or(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.Art. 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of.Art. 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.Art. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.Art. 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself.Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;(2) That such demand has been rejected;(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local police; and(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.Art. 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:(1) A civil action; or(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.Art. 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages:(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance

EMILIO GANCAYCO,- versus -CITY GOVERNMENT OFQUEZON CITYAND METROMANILADEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may beper seorper accidens.A nuisanceperse is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.[29]Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, theSangguniang Panglungsodis empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that theSangguniang Bayancannot declare a particular thing as a nuisanceper seand order its condemnation.It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisanceper se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of theSangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)RUFINA SALAO and LUCIO LUCAS,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.TEOFILO C. SANTOS,

Moreover, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisanceper seand nuisanceper accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. (Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co.vs.Municipal Council of Iloilo, 24 Phil., 471; Monteverdevs.Generoso, 52 Phil., 123, 127.) Appellants' smoked fish factory is not a nuisanceper se. It is a legitimate industry. If it be, in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, then it would be merely a nuisanceper accidens. (Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co.vs.Municipal Council of Iloilo,supra; Monteverdevs.Generoso,supra.) Consequently, the order of the municipal president and those of the health authorities issued with a view to the summary abatement of what they have concluded, by their own findings, as a nuisance, are null and void there having been no hearing in court to the effect.HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC.,petitioner,vs.GUILLERMO BALANDAN

The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this Jurisdiction inTaylor vs. Manila Electric16 Phil., 8.The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. (See65 C.J.S., p. 455.)The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children (65 C.J.S., p. 458).Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?The great majority of American decisions say no.

VIII TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS ASIDE FROM THOSE ART 2176

1. VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ART 32Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:(1) Freedom of religion;(2) Freedom of speech;(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;(5) Freedom of suffrage;(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures;(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances;(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and(19) Freedom of access to the courts.In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

ABERCA VS VERMoreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following text:However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year. Even assuming that the suspen

Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for violating the constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statute.However, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

2. DEFAMATION, FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.3. NEGLECT OF DUTY BY PUBLIC OFFICERSArt. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action

4. EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL OF DEFENDANT FOR FELONIES OR ACTS PUNISHABLE BUT WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.RULE 111 SEC 3&4Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardianad litemfor the minor heirs.The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)VS RULE 111 5&6Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action. (4a)Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN

To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x xWe do not agree.The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.x x x xAbsent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.33A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in aquasi-delictis entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37based on quasi-delict or culpa aquilianaFor failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount ofP40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.47As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. TheP100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced toP50,000.00.48Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.49The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered toP50,000.00.50The award ofP15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51

IX DAMAGES

DAMAGESCHAPTER 1GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.Art. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they are not in conflict with this Code.Art. 2197. Damages may be:(1) Actual or compensatory;(2) Moral;(3) Nominal;(4) Temperate or moderate;(5) Liquidated; or(6) Exemplary or corrective.Art. 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code.b. Damages distinguished from injuryCivil Law Torts and Damages Damnum Absque Injuria Actionable WrongPacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasas house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their property. This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of the blockade done by the families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for Mabasa to pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).ISSUE:Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.HELD:No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was well within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court that the easement was created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.

c. Distinguished from restitution and injunctiond. Requisites for recoverye. Kinds of Damages1. Actual or Compensatory Damages

ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury;(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;(6) In actions for legal support;(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.Art. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point. (1109a)Art. 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonably certainty.Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injuryFILSYN VS DELOS SANTOSin view of the absence of sufficient proof of its exercise of due diligence, Filsyn cannot escape its solidary liability as the owner of the wayward bus and the employer of the negligent driver of the wayward bus. x x xAs to the amount of the damages awarded by the CA, petitioner claims that it is not in accord with the evidence on record. It explained that the amounts used in computing for compensatory damages were based mainly on the assertions of the respondents as to the amount of salary being received by the two deceased at the time of their deaths.1awphilThis Court, in its ruling,16expounded on the nature of compensatory damages, thus:Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already possesses(dao emergente)and the other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). As expostulated by the Court inPNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals:17Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses(dao emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).18The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. The burden is to establish ones case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures. As the Court declared:As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.19

2. BF METAL VS LOMOTANExcept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.10Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.11InPeople v. Gopio,12the Court allowed the reimbursement of only the laboratory fee that was duly receipted as "the rest of the documents, which the prosecution presented to prove the actual expenses incurred by the victim, were merely a doctors prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses."13InViron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,14the Court particularly disallowed the award of actual damages, considering that the actual damages suffered by private respondents therein were based only on a job estimate and a photo showing the damage to the truck and no competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered was presented.In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost estimates to prove the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep. Exhibit "B," is a job estimate by Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which pegged the repair cost of the jeep atP96,000.00, while Exhibit "M," estimated the cost of repair atP130,655.00. FollowingViron, neither estimate is competent to prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.15

EMETRITA DE GUZMAN VS TUMOLVACIACs award of actual damages, however, is indeed not proper under the circumstances as there is no concrete evidence to support the plea. In determining actual damages, onecannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring compensatory or actual damages.[12]Article 2199 of the New Civil Code defines actual or compensatory damages as follows:Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he hasduly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.Unfortunately, De Guzman failed to adduce evidence to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual damage incurred.Contrary to her assertion, the handwritten calculation of reconstruction costs made by Engineer Santos and attached to his affidavit cannot be given any probative value because he never took the witness stand to affirm the veracity of his allegations in his affidavit and be cross-examined on them.

A. DAMAGES IN CONTRACTS AND QUASI CONTRACTS

CARIAGA VS LAGUNA

Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in good faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had forseen or could have reasonably forseen at the time the obligation was constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo Cariaga consisting of medical, hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are within this category. We are of the opinion, however, that the income which Edgardo Cariaga could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB. At that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic may not be first rate (Exhibits 4, 4-A to 4-C), it is, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have passed the board test in due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies.

B. Damages in Crimes and Quasi Delict with Death (Civil indemnity separate and distinct from moral)

PEOPLE VS VILLARICO

Penalty and DamagesThere is no question that the CA justly pronounced all the four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and punished them withreclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 248[52]of theRevised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, of theRevised Penal Code,considering the absence of any generic aggravating circumstance.However, the CA did not explain why it did not review and revise the grant by the RTC of civil liability in the amount ofonlyP50,000.00. Thereby, the CA committed a plainly reversible error for ignoring existing laws, like Article 2206 of theCivil Code,[53]which prescribes a death indemnity separately from moral damages, and Article 2230 of theCivil Code,[54]which requires exemplary damages in case of death due to crime when there is at least one aggravating circumstance; and applicable jurisprudence, specifically,People v. Gutierrez,[55]where we held that moral damages should be awarded to the heirs without need of proof or pleading in view of the violent death of the victim, andPeople v.Catubig,[56]wherewe ruled that exemplary damages were warranted whenever the crime was attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary. Here, the aggravating circumstance of treachery, albeit attendant or qualifying in its effect, justified the grant of exemplary damages.Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the heirs of HaideP75,000.00 as death indemnity;[59]P75,000.00 as moral damages;[60]andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages.[61]Asclarified inPeople v. Arbalate,[62]damages in such amounts are to be granted whenever the accused are adjudged guilty of a crime covered by Republic Act No. 7659, like the murder charged and proved herein. Indeed, the Court, observing inPeople v. Sarcia,[63]citingPeople v. Salome[64]andPeople v. Quiachon,[65]that the principal consideration for the award of damages xxx is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender, announced that:The litmus test[,] therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced toreclusion perpetua.People vs Apattad

Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to imposereclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.Pertinently, as early as July 9, 1998, this Court has held that when the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP 75,000,[79]racionating that [t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.[80]Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted,[81]without need of pleading or proving them.[82]In rape cases, it is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrantper sethe award of moral damages.[83]Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances,[84]to deter others from committing similar acts or for correction for the public good.[85]HEIRS OF CASTRO VS BUSTOS (ipad pix Phil law on Torts & Damages)

When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom are governed by the penal laws, "... subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104,id.) and said consequential damages in turn include "... those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107,id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said provisions.The general rule in the Civil Code is that:In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 inPeople v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case ofPeople v. Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicatedeven without proofof pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) "... damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) but "the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omisson in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or, as We have already stated, when there is a separate civil action.Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00, without the need of any evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the offense.2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount to be fixed by the Court according to the circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, the actual amount thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).6. Interests in the proper cases.7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the deceased and for moral damages arerecoverable separately from and in additionto the fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.The award of moral damages to the surviving spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and ascendants of the deceased, should be made to each of them individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental anguish and the depth or intensity of the same. Where it is shown that one or some did not suffer mental anguish or could not have suffered the same, no award of moral damages should be made to him or to them. For example: The evidence shows that the surviving widow, who had a paramour, when informed of the death of her husband, said: "Mabuti nga. Ngayon maaari na akong pakasal kay Pepe." Another example: The evidence shows that the legitimate children (or grandchildren) were aged one, two and four at the time their father was killed. In the very nature of things these children (or descendants) could not have suffered mental anguish. In these examples there should be no award of moral damages to the widow and the infant children.PEOPLE VS JOSE COMBATE

This Court will now endeavor to end, once and for all, the confusion as to the proper award of damages in criminal cases where the imposable penalty for the crime isreclusion perpetuaor death. As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of criminal cases: civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages. We shall discuss all three.First, civil indemnityex delictois the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.[21]This award stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.Civil liabilityex delictomay come in the form of restitution, reparation, and indemnification.[22]Restitution is defined as the compensation for loss; it is full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition for probation.[23]Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained.[24]Clearly, all of these correspond to actual or compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.[25]The other kinds of damages, i.e.,moral and exemplary or corrective damages,[26]have altogether different jural foundations.The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature.Del Mundo v. Court of Appealsexplained the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz:Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation.These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219[27]and Article 2220[28]of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong.[29]They may also be considered and allowed for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailants conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress.[30]ATTORNEYS FEES AS ACTUAL DAMAGES

QUIRANTE VS IAC

HELD: NO.present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED attorney's fees may be asserted either in: the very action in which the services in question have been rendered -as in this case. the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered. rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The rule against multiplicity of suits will in effect be served a separate action 2 Kinds of Attorney's fees 1. item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Codewherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution 2. claims are based on the contract for professional services, with the attorney as the creditors and the clients as the debtors It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that therecoveryof the amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies We are of the considered view that the orderlyadministrationof justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent ofrecoveryof attorney's fees by both petitioners herein. The court below will be in a betterposition, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds that the allegedconfirmationto attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court.

SPS ANDRADA VS PILIPINO SALES CORP.

The petitioners further seek attorneys fees based on Article 2208 (4) of theCivil Code,which provides that in the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except xxx (4) in cases ofclearly unfounded civil action or proceedingagainst the plaintiff xxx.The petitioners are not entitled to attorneys fees.It is well accepted in this jurisdiction that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and that not every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorneys fees.[10]Indeed, before the effectivity of the newCivil Code, such fees could not be recovered in the absence of a stipulation.[11]It was only with the advent of the newCivil Codethat the right to collect attorneys fees in the instances mentioned in Article 2208 was recognized,[12]and such fees are now included in the concept of actual damages.[13]One such instance is where the defendant is guilty of gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.[14]This is a corollary of the general principle expressed in Article 19 of theCivil Codethat everyone must, in the performance of his duties, observe honesty and good faith and the rule embodied in Article 1170 that anyone guilty of fraud (bad faith) in the performance of his obligation shall be liable for damages.But, as noted by the Court inMorales v. Court of Appeals,[15]the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule. The power of a court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of theCivil Codedemands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation and conjecture.[16]The general rule is that attorneys fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.[17]Herein, the element of bad faith on the part of Pilhino in commencing and prosecuting Civil Case No. 21,898-93, which was necessary to predicate the lawful grant of attorneys fees based on Article 2208 (4) of theCivil Code, was not established. Accordingly, the petitioners demand for attorneys fees must fail.INTEREST AS ACTUAL DAMAGES

EASTERN SHIPPING VS CA

(1)The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from the decision of the court a quo. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damaes awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.

When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of money.

The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD.

(2)From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shll begin to run only from the date of judgment of the court is made.

(3)The Court held that it should be computed from the decision rendered by the court a quo.

TERESITA DIO VS SPS JAPOR

n the instant case, the Court of Appeals found that the 5% interest rate per month and 5% penalty rate per month for every month of default or delay is in reality interest rate at 120%per annum. This Court has held that a stipulated interest rate of 5.5% per month or 66%per annumis void for being iniquitous or unconscionable.[16]We have likewise ruled that an interest rate of 6% per month or 72%per annumis outrageous and inordinate.[17]Conformably to these precedent cases, a combined interest and penalty rate at 10% per month or 120%per annum, should be deemed iniquitous, unconscionable, and inordinate. Hence, we sustain the appellate court when it found the interest and penalty rates in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in the present case excessive, hence legally impermissible. Reduction is legally called for now in rates of interest and penalty stated in the mortgage contract.What then should the interest and penalty rates be?The evidence shows that it was indeed the respondents who proposed the 5% interest rate per month for two (2) months. Having agreed to said rate, the parties are now estopped from claiming otherwise. For the succeeding period after the two months, however, the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the interest rate to 12%per annumand the penalty rate to 1% per month, in accordance with Article 2227[18]of the Civil Code.

LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITYPEOPLE VS LOPEZHowever, we modify the award for loss of earning capacity. The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity.10In this case, Liberty presented a certification from Tanod Publishing which showed that Melendres was a photo correspondent for Tanod Newspaper and that "his monthly salary ranges fromP1,780 toP3,570 on per story basis."11Liberty presented another certification from Tanod Publishing which showed that Melendres received the total amount ofP24,990 representing payment of honoraria and transportation allowance from 1 January to 31 July 2006.12The Court notes that the defense did not object when the prosecution presented these documents before the trial court. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.13It was also established that at the time of his death, Melendres was 41 years old.14Thus, Melendres net earning capacity can be derived from two sources: (1) his monthly salary15and (2) his honorarium and transportation allowance.16Loss of earning capacity is computed as follows:Net EarningCapacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income Living Expenses= [2/3 (80 age at death)] x GAI [50% of GAI]= [2/3 (80 41)] xP74,94017P37,470= [2/3 (39)] xP37,470= 26 xP37,470Net EarningCapacity =P974,220

HEIRS OF OCHOA VS GS TRANSPORT

While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the courts to determine net earning capacity which is, to wit:Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy*x (gross annual income - reasonable living expenses),53*Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 age of the deceased)we, however, find incorrect the amount ofP6,537, 244.96 arrived at. The award should beP6,611,634.59 as borne out by the following computation:Net earning capacity =2 (80-3654)

3x 450,844.4955-50%56

=88

3x 225,422.25

=29.33 x 225,422.25

=P6, 611,634.59

MORAL DAMAGES ART. 2217- 2220

SECTION 1. - Moral Damages

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be considered.Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;(4) Adultery or concubinage;(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;(6) Illegal search;(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;(8) Malicious prosecution;(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.KIELRUF VS CAELD: YES.AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Theawardof moral damages to Lucila and Legaspi is hereby INCREASED to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00 respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is INCREASED to P200,000.00.Legaspi is awarded exemplary damages of P50,000.00

Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of givinglove, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record. The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given her awarded only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing proper toawardmoral damages toLucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident.Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in thecategoryof anawarddesigned to compensate the claimant for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of defendant in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the courtit is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damagesand its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in thecategoryof anawarddesigned to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Itsawardis aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritualstatus quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs.

SECTION 2. - Nominal Damages

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.

ROBLES-FRANCISCO VS CFINonetheless, while the CA recognized the existence of just causes for petitioners dismissal, it found the petitioner entitled to nominal damages in the amount ofP5,000.00 due to Graphics, Inc.s failure to observe the procedural requirements of due process.Private respondent was not accorded due process when petitioner issued and served to the former the written notice of dismissal dated Jun. 15, 2004.A careful perusal of the records will show that the notice issued by the employer gives the employee only twenty-four (24) hours to answer and put up his defenses against the accusations laid upon him by the company, in contravention with the rule of a reasonable period as construed inKing of Kings Transport v. Mamac.Moreover, the scheduled hearing in front of Leticia D. Lago was on the same date at 1:00 p.m., which left private respondent with no recourse to secure the services of a counsel, much less prepare a good rebuttal against the alleged evidences for the valid dismissal of the former.x x x xx x x Considering that petitioner has made efforts in the past to afford private respondent the opportunity to be able to defend himself, but the latter, instead of availing such remedy, rejected the same; We have taken this into consideration, and impose [P]5,000.00 as the penalty for the employers failure to comply with the due process requirement.[7]onetheless, while the CA finding that the petitioner is entitled to nominal damages as his right to procedural due process was not respected despite the presence of just causes for his dismissal is affirmed, this Court finds the CA to have erred in fixing the amount that the Company is liable to pay.The CA should have taken cognizance of the numerous cases decided by this Court where the amount of nominal damages was fixed atP30,000.00 if the dismissal was for a just cause.One of such cases isAgabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[15]on which the CA relied in the Assailed Decision and was reiterated inGenuino v. National Relations Commission[16]as follows:In view of Citibank's failure to observe due process, however, nominal damages are in order but the amount is hereby raised to PhP 30,000 pursuant toAgabon v. NLRC.The NLRC's order for payroll reinstatement is set aside.InAgabon, we explained:The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at [P]30,000.00.We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees.At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.Thus, the award of PhP 5,000 to Genuino as indemnity for non-observance of due process under the CA's March 31, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 51532 is increased to PhP 30,000.[17]

SECTION 3. - Temperate or Moderate Damages

Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.

PNR VS BRUNTYRespondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.65This is in lieu of actual damages as it would be unfair for the victims heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot produce receipts.66

APOLINARIO DUENAS VS ALICE AFRICAespondent entitled to temperate damages in lieu of actual damagesNonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a party is entitled to temperate damages.Articles 2216, 2224 and 2225 of the Civil Code provide:Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated.The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.Art. 2224.Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.APOLINARIO DUENAS VS ALICE AFRICA . House repair in time for wedding of respondent sis Sally Africa. House construction was not finished. Respondent denied fault, was due to heavy rains & order to stop. Respondent prayed for the return of theP50,000.00 overpayment.She also prayed for an award ofP100,000.00 for the purpose of repairing what had been poorly constructed and at leastP200,000.00 to complete the project.. Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[23]The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.[24]There is no doubt that respondent sustained damages due to the breach committed by the petitioner.The transfer of the venue of the wedding, the repair of the substandard work, and the completion of the house necessarily entailed expenses.However, as earlier discussed, respondent failed to present competent proof of the exact amount of such pecuniary loss.To our mind, and in view of the circumstances obtaining in this case, an award of temperate damages equivalent to 20% of the original contract price ofP500,000.00, orP100,000.00 (which, incidentally, is equivalent to 1/3 of the total amount claimed as actual damages), is just and reasonable.

SECTION 4. - Liquidated Damages

Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.

NAPOCOR VS NATIONAL MRCHANDISING CORPNPCs appeal, L-33897. The trial court reduced the liquidated damages to twenty percent of the stipulated amount. the NPC contends the it is entitled to the full amount of liquidated damages in the sum of P360,572.80.

In reducing the liquidated damages, the trial court relied on article 2227 of the Civil Code which provides that "liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable."

Apparently, the trial court regarded as an equitable consideration the persistent efforts of Namerco and its principal to charter a steamer and that the failure of the New York firm to secure shipping space was not attributable to its fault or negligence.

The trial court also took into account the fact that the selling price of the sulfur was P450,716 and that to award as liquidated damages more than eighty percent of the price would not be altogether reasonable.

SOLEDAd LEONOR SUATENGCO VS CARMENCITA REYESStrictly speaking, the attorneys fees herein litigated are in the nature of liquidated damages and not the attorneys fees recoverable as between attorney and client enunciated and regulated by the Rules of Court.[9]Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach thereof.[10]The stipulation on attorneys fees contained in the said Promissory Note constitutes what is known as a penal clause.A penalty clause, expressly recognized by law, is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of an obligation.It functions to strengthen the coercive force of obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting from such a breach.The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the breach.[11]It is well-settled that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon the obligor.The attorneys fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel.[12]G.R. No. 153874 March 1, 2007TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.UNI-FIELD ENTERPRISES, INC.,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a petition for review1of the 7 January 2002 Decision2and 20 May 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56816. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 9 September 1997 Decision3of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (trial court) in Civil Case No. Q-95-24170.The FactsPetitioner Titan Construction Corporation (petitioner) is engaged in the construction business, while respondent Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc.4(respondent) is engaged in the business of selling various construction materials.From 1990 to 1993, petitioner purchased on credit various construction supplies and materials from respondent. Petitioners purchases amounted toP7,620,433.12 but petitioner was only able to payP6,215,795.70, leaving a balance ofP1,404,637.42. On 19 October 1994, respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner.5But the balance remained unpaid.On 26 June 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages against petitioner.In its Answer dated 18 August 1995, petitioner admitted the purchases but disputed the amount claimed by respondent. Petitioner also interposed a counterclaim and sought to recoverP204,527.99 from respondent based on damaged vinyl tiles, non-delivery of materials, and advances for utility expenses, dues, and insurance premiums on the condominium unit turned over by petitioner to respondent.On 9 September 1997, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The 9 September 1997 Decision provides:Accordingly, therefore, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff [respondent] as against the defendant [petitioner] and ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff [respondent] the following:1. The principal amount ofP1,404,114.00;2. Interest Charges in the amount ofP504,114.00 plus accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly reckoned from July, 1995 up to the time of full payment;3. Liquidated Damages in the amount ofP324,147.94;4. Attorneys Fees equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable and accumulated appearance fees atP1,000.00 per hearing; and5. Costs of suits.IT IS SO ORDERED.6Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its 7 January 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the trial courts 9 September 1997 Decision.In its 20 May 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe 7 January 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:A careful reading of the records of the case shows that in the answer to the complaint, the existence of the delivery receipts and invoices were not denied by appellant, rather, it admitted the transactions subject of the instant case. Clearly, if the damages alleged are liquidated or stipulated, they are deemed admitted when not specifically denied.x x x xFurther, appellant cannot question the interest rate on overdue accounts as the same was provided for in the delivery receipts and sales invoices, which have not been denied by it. Therefore, the terms and conditions therein have become the law between the parties, and both are bound by said conditions. Failure of a party to contest the terms and conditions results in his admission thereof.Appellant asserts that "nowhere is there any stipulation that plaintiff is entitled to a 24% interest". This is absurd. The Sales Invoices and Delivery Receipts, contained the provision that:"This invoice is the written contract between Unifield Enterprises, [I]nc. and the above-named customer. This is payable on demand unless otherwise indicated hereinabove. Interest of 24% per annum will be charged on overdue accounts, compounded with the outstanding principal obligation as they accrue. Claims or corrections hereto or in the goods must be communicated in writing to Uni-field Enterprises within two (2) days from receipt of the goods. x x x Should Unifield Enterprises, Inc. be constrained to effect collection through Court action and proceedings before the Fiscals [sic], said customer agrees to pay the following additional sums: (1) 25% liquidated damages based on the outstanding total obligation; (2) 25% attorneys fees based on the total claim including said liquidated damages; (3) appearance fees of counsel atP500.00 per hearing in addition to all other court costs and expenses. x x x"It is emphasized that contracts are perfected by mere consent; the stipulations of the contract being the law between the parties, courts have no alternative but to enforce them as they are agreed upon and written, there being no law or public policy against the stipulated provisions.Verily, this Court finds no reason to go against the findings of the lower court considering that the assailed decision was arrived at "after a careful review and perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in their pleadings filed before the" lower court.7(Citations omitted)The IssuesPetitioner raises the following issues:1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING LEGAL BASIS FOR [AWARDING] LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND INTEREST IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT; and2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD ALTER THE RESULTS OF THE CASE.8The Ruling of the CourtFactual Findings of the Trial Court and the Court of AppealsBind the CourtPetitioner asks the Court to review the records of the case and re-examine the evidence presented before the trial court and the Court of Appeals.As a rule, only questions of law may be appealed to the Court by petition for review. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors of law.9Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court.10In this case, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were based on substantial evidence which were not refuted with contrary proof by petitioner. We thus find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.On the Award of Interests, Liquidated Damages, and Attorneys FeesPetitioner insists that the trial court and the Court of Appeals had no legal basis to award interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees because the delivery receipts and sales invoices, which served as the basis for the award, were not formally offered as evidence by respondent. Petitioner also alleges that the delivery receipts and sales invoices were in the nature of contracts of adhesion and petitioner had no option but to accept the conditions imposed by respondent.While the delivery receipts and sales invoices did not form part of respondents formal offer of evidence,11records show that the delivery receipts and sales invoices formed part of petitioners formal offer of evidence.12The delivery receipts and sales invoices expressly stipulated the payment of interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees in case of overdue accounts and collection suits. Petitioner did not only bind itself to pay the principal amount, it also promised to pay (1) interest of 24% per annum on overdue accounts, compounded with the principal obligations as they accrue; (2) 25% liquidated damages based on the outstanding total obligation; and (3) 25% attorneys fees based on the total claim including liquidated damages. Since petitioner freely entered into the contract, the stipulations in the contract are binding on petitioner. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in using the delivery receipts and sales invoices as basis for the award of interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees.On the allegation that the delivery receipts and sales invoices are in the nature of contracts of adhesion, the Court has repeatedly held that contracts of adhesion are as binding as ordinary contracts.13Those who adhere to the contract are in reality free to reject it entirely and if they adhere, they give their consent.14It is true that on some occasions the Court struck down such contract as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant party and is reduced to the alternative of accepting the contract or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.15Considering that petitioner and respondent have been doing business from 1990 to 1993 and that petitioner is not a small time construction company, petitioner is "presumed to have full knowledge and to have acted with due care or, at the very least, to have been aware of the terms and conditions of the contract."16Petitioner was free to contract the services of another supplier if respondents terms were not acceptable. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that in its transactions with respondent it was the weaker party or that it was compelled to accept the terms imposed by the respondent. In fact, petitioner only questioned the terms of the contract after the trial court issued its 9 September 1997 Decision. The Court, therefore, upholds the validity of the contract between petitioner and respondent.However, the Court will reduce the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In this case, aside from the award ofP324,147.94 as liquidated damages, the trial court and the Court of Appeals also ordered petitioner to pay respondent attorneys fees "equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable."17The law allows a party to recover attorneys fees under a written agreement.18InBarons Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that:[T]he attorneys fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or