Quasi delict and torts defined and distinguished

Quasi delict and torts defined and distinguished

Baksh vs. CA

FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gasheem Shookat, an Iranian Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to marry after the end of the school semester and the petitioner asked the approval of her parents. She stated that the petitioner forced to live with him in his apartments. Respondent was a virgin before she was forced to live with the Iranian (petitioner). A week before she filed her complaint, petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.

On the petitioners counterclaim, he said that he never proposed marriage with the private respondent; he neither forced her to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only told her to stop from coming into his apartment because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport. He insisted that he must be awarded for damages for he suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.

RULING:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.

The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.

NOTE:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.

The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.

ANDAMO vs. IAC

Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.

This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.

Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.

PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTUAL RELATION NOT A BAR TO AN ACTION BASED ON TORT

Air France vs. Carrascoso

Facts:

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the planes tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the planes journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.

Issue:

Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis

Ruling:

Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

PSBA vs. CA

School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own students: the harm or negligent act must be committed by its students against another student, not by anoutsider

Generalrule onthe applicationof quasi-delict: no pre-existing contract between the parties

FACTS:Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the second-floor premises of theschool. The assailants were not members of the schools academic community but were elements from outside theschool. Theparentsof Carlitos filed a civil actionagainst theschoolauthorities, alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. The appellate court found in their favor, primarily anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts.Hence, the petition.ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis)

Whether or notthe applicationof the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-existing contract

HELD:The SC did not agree with the premises of the CAs ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts theschoolcould have been made liable.IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROMLIABILITY?It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Moreover, there is that built-in obligation to provide students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Theschoolmust ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractualliabilityto such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may breakthe contractunder such conditions that the same act which constitutes abreachofthe contractwould have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be done inbad faithand violative of Art. 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.In the present case, there is no finding thatthe contractbetween theschooland Carlitos had been breached thru the formers negligence in providing proper security measures.

NOTE:

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:

Any person whowilfullycauses loss or injury to another in a mannerthat is contrary to morals, good custom or public policyshall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).

Air Francepenalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." InAustro-American,supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test ofCangco,supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a conditionsine qua nonto the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.

Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology

Facts:

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).

financial support of her relatives.

2ndsem, enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.

PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the schools tennis and volleyball courts.

EACH=two tickets at the price of P100 each.

The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.

Refused scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.

Sit out and ejected

RTC > lack of cause of action

CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy

Ruling:

Liability for Tort

In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;[33] as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,[34] from which we quote:

x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airlines liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: x x x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x.

Coca-Cola vs. CA

Facts:

FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks are adulterated. As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

RULING:

The action in based on quasi-delict, therefore, it prescribes in four years. The allegations in the complaint makes a reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption. The vendees remedies are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee.

The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:

We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

American Express International, Inc. vs Cordero

Facts:

American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express charge card. An extension charge card, was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent, together with his family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop. While there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and handed his American Express extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager, informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card.

The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, asystem utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.

Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the humiliation he suffered. According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of respondents card and that petitioners inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of respondents extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which the petitioner should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

Ruling:

YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondents card without notice, as was done. The subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent was indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

NOTE:

Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following provision of the Civil Code:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[11]

Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

DUAL CIVIL LIABILITY FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION

Jarantilla vs CA

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar Jarantilla in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" towards the direction of the provicional capitol resulting to serious physical injuries thru reckless inprudence. Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action. Jarantilla was eventuallyacquitted because of reasonable doubt.On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a complaint (civil case) against the Jarantilla in the former Courtof First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action involved the same subject matter andact complained of in the dismissed criminal case. RTC wanted to enrich our jurisprudence. SoRTC denies motion to dismiss, grants damages to Sing, proposed that the case be elevated tothe SC by certiorari. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action (grounded onreasonable dobut) for physical injuries and who participated in the prosecution without reservingthe civil action can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission.

HELD:

YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.

Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not beenproved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.

Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.

Castillo vs. CA

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioners seek for the renewal of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the dismissal of the Court of First Instance of the complaint for damages filed by petitioners against the respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia Rosario.

On May 2, 1965, petitioner Bernabe Castillo (in his own behalf, and in behalf of Serapion Castillo who has since then become deceased, and Eulogio Castillo, his minor child) and Generosa Galang Castillo figured in a vehicular accident with private respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia Rosario at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan causing injuries to their persons and damages to their respective vehicles.

The parties have their own version of what actually happened on that fateful day. Each party is pointing to the negligence by the other as the proximate cause of the accident.

While the case was pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan file an information dated September 29. 1965 against Juanito Rosario for double physical injuries, double less serious physical injuries, and damage to property thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Urdaneta. Rosario was prosecuted and convicted in the criminal case. Castillo then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision acquitting him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision on the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners as well as the records of the case, dismissing the complain of the petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which then affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila as it found no negligence committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to the petitioners. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the judgement of acquittal extinguishes civil liability based on the same incident.

Ruling:

There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. According to a number of cases, 10 a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case.

Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.

But where the judgment of acquittal contained a declaration that no negligence can be attributed to the accused and that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist, such acquittal in the criminal action carried with it extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom.

With this finding, this Court actually exonerated appellee Juanito Rosario from civil liability. Since plaintiffs-appellants' civil action is predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged negligence which does not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already final, carried with it the extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom. It was the Court of Appeals findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanita Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With this findings, the Court of Appeals exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

Elcano vs. Hill

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his father, Atty. Marvin Hill with whom he was living and getting subsistence killed Agapito Elcano

CFI Civil Case: dismissed on the ground that he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. Spouses Elcano appealed

ISSUES:

W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action - NO

W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though Reginald is already married -YES

HELD: order appealed from is reversed

1. NO.

- separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

- If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life

- to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."

- ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

- in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law

- It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. YES

- While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

- Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible

- the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent

- Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

George Mckee and Araceli Koh Mckee vs. IAC , Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda

FACTS

Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and Manalo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, resulting in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando

When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. But before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge

As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filed for damages for the death and physical injuries sustained by the victims boarding the Ford Escort; as well as a criminal case against Galang

During the trial, evidence were presented showing that the driver of the Truck was speeding resulting in the skid marks it caused in the scene of the accident

The lower court found Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil cases were dismissed

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the decision in the civil cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the McKee family

On MR, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of the owners of the truck

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THE OVER SPEEDING OF THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE

The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence"

Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which they failed to do

Petition GRANTED. Resolution SET ASIDE and previous DECISION REINSTATED.

NOTE:

In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.

The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action."

Cerezo vs. Tuazon

TORTS: Presumption of Negligence: Employer's Vicarious Liability v. Subsidiary Liability

FACTS:

Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

HELD:

Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on quasi-delict under the Civil Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.

Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another) without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.

However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is separate and independent from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the filing of a separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the filing the of an independent action based on quasi-delict against the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.

PRESCRIPTION

Kramer vs. CA

Ruling:

Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.

The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.

Tan vs CA

Ruling:

Action against the Central Bank for "tortious interference," that is, in closing and liquidating a bank, prescribes in four years from the date of closure. In that case which is one for tort we held that Article 1146 is the applicable law.

We can not accept the petitioners' contention that the period during which authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and that the same began to run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino government took power. It is true that under Article 1154:

Art. 1154.The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing s right is not reckoned against him.

fortuitous events have the effect of tolling the period of prescription. However, we can not say, as a universal rule, that the period from September 21, 1972 through February 25, 1986 involves a force majeure. Plainly, we can not box in the "dictatorial" period within the term without distinction, and without, by necessity, suspending all liabilities, however demandable, incurred during that period, including perhaps those ordered by this Court to be paid. While this Court is cognizant of acts of the last regime, especially political acts, that might have indeed precluded the enforcement of liability against that regime and/or it's minions the Court is not inclined to make quite a sweeping pronouncement, considering especially the unsettling effects such a pronouncement is likely to bring about. It is our opinion that claims should be taken on a case-to-case basis. This selective rule is compelled, among others, by the fact that not all those imprisoned or detained by the past dictatorship were true political oppositionists, or, for that matter, innocent of any crime or wrongdoing. Indeed, not a few of them were manipulators and scoundrels.

The petitioner Vicente Tan claims that from June, 1974 through December, 1977, he was under detention; that sometime in August, 1977, the Central Bank lodged six criminal cases against him, along with several others, with Military Commission No. 5 in connection with alleged violation of the Central Bank Act, falsification of documents, and estafa, that while in detention, he was made to execute various agreements in which he conveyed the shares of stock in question; and that "[u]nder the foregoing factual setting . . . it would be foolhardy on the part of petitioners to institute . . . [any] action for reconveyance . . ." We are, therefore, convinced, from Vicente Tan's very behavior, that detention was not an impediment to a judicial challenge, and the fact of the matter was that he was successful in obtaining judicial assistance. Under these circumstances, we can not declare detention, or authoritarian rule for that matter, as a fortuitous event insofar as he was concerned, that interrupted prescription.

ELEMENTS OF A QUASI-DELICT

Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. CA

(see previous digests)

Ruling:

The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions onquasi-delictsas all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff.43It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180, the pertinent parts of which provides that:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

PBC vs. CA

Ruling:

Art. 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreetpaterfamiliasof the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.

The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information that of the name of the account holder should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up.

Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.

DEFINITION AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE

(see previous digests)

Syquia vs. CA

Bulilan vs. COA

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. CORONADO

Legal Issue:

Whether or not KAPALARAN BUS LINE (KBL) is liable for damages from the collision.

Facts of the Case:

The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing the an old highway towards Sta. Cruz collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. The sketch marked very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post.

Ruling of the Court:

YES. KBL is liable for the damages in the collision.

Reason behind the Ruling:

The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver, where the employer is held liable for damages; it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest consideirng Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision.

Bascos v. CA

Facts:

Rodolfo Cipriano, representing CIPTRADE, entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former bound itself to haul the latters 2000m/tons of soya bean meal from Manila to Calamba. CIPTRADE subcontracted with petitioner Estrellita Bascos to transport and deliver the 400 sacks of soya beans. Petitioner failed to deliver the cargo, and as a consequence, Cipriano paid Jibfair the amount of goods lost in accordance with their contract. Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Cipriano filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner denied that there was no contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck, and that the hijacking was a force majeure. The trial court ruled against petitioner.

Issues:

(1) Was petitioner a common carrier?

(2) Was the hijacking referred to a force majeure?

Held:

(1) Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as "(a) person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public." The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same.

(2) Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption. The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to overcome it. Thus, contrary to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce any evidence to prove her negligence. Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption conclusive against her.

Belgian Overseas C hartering vs Phil. First Insurance

Facts:

CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the MN Anangel Sky at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel Trading Corporation. On July 28, 1990, MN Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the subsequent days, discharged the subject cargo. Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order B.O. Tally sheet No. 154974. Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine Steel Trading Corporation declared the same as total loss.

Despite receipt of a formal demand, Phil. First insurance refused to submit to the consignees claim. Consequently, Belgian Overseas paid the consignee P506,086.50, and was subrogated to the latters rights and causes of action against defendants-appellees. Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by them, to the consignee as insured.

Impugning the propriety of the suit against them, defendants-appellees imputed that the damage and/or loss was due to pre-shipment damage, to the inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods, or to perils, danger and accidents of the sea, or to insufficiency of packing thereof, or to the act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their representatives. In addition thereto, defendants-appellees argued that their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the limitations of liability provided for in the bill of lading and other pertinent laws. Finally, defendants-appellees averred that, in any event, they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to prevent any damage/loss to said shipment.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have overcome the presumption of negligence of a common carrier

Held:

No.

Petitioners contend that the presumption of fault imposed on common carriers should not be applied on the basis of the lone testimony offered by private respondent. The contention is untenable.

Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety of the goods and the passengers they transport. Thus, common carriers are required to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of the goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires. The extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and received for transportation by the carrier until they are delivered, actually or constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.

Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence.

However, the presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to any of the following causes: (1) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) an act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or (5) an order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is liable therefor.

Corollary to the foregoing, mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.

That petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence is revealed in the case at bar by a review of the records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent.

Pilapil vs. CA

FACTS:Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondents bus was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander. Respondents personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost his left eyes vision and sustained a permanent scar.

Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.ISSUE:Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case?HELD:In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.

x x xWhile the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

x x xArticle 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

Pantranco vs Baesa

FACTS:

Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses

While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.

As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.

PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver.

CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa

ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.

Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages

For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it

there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger

1. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction

2. Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it

last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered

Associated Bank vs CA

Facts: Faustino Pangilinan, cashier of the Concepcion Emergency Hospital, forged the signature of Dr. Adena Canlas who was the Chief of the said hospital and endorsed 30 checks amounting to P203,300 to himself. The money was drawn from the account of the Province of Tarlac with PNB. Pangilinan deposited the checks to his personal savings account with Associated Bank which was cleared and paid for by PNB. The checks have a stamp of Associated Bank which reads All prior endorsements guaranteed by Associated Bank.

The Province of Tarlac, through the Provincial Treasurer, wrote PNB to restore the various amounts debited from the current account of the Province. PNB on its part demanded reimbursement from Associated Bank. Both banks resisted payment which led to the Province of Tarlac suing PNB. PNB in turn impleaded Associated Bank in the suit as a third-party defendant while Associated Bank impleaded Canlas and Pangilinan as fourth-party defendants.

The trial court ruled that 1) PNB should pay the Province of Tarlac the P203,300 with legal interests, 2) Associated Bank should be pay the same amount to PNB and 3) dismissed the complaints against Canlas and Pangilinan. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court

Issue: Who should bear the loss arising from the forgery, the Province of Tarlac, PNB, Associated Bank or Pangilinan?

Held: The SC held that the Province and Associated Bank should bear losses in the proportion of 50-50.

The Province can only recover 50% of the P203,300 from PNB because of the negligence they exhibited in releasing the checks to the then already retired Pangilinan who is an unauthorized person to handle the said checks.

On the other hand, Associated Bank is liable to PNB only to 50% of the same amount because of its liability as indorser of the checks that were deposited by Pangilinan, and guaranteed the genuineness of the said checks. They failed to exercise due diligence in checking the veracity of indorsements.

STANDARD OF CONDUCT OR DEGREE OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED

Schimtz Transport vs Transport Venture

FACTS:

Petitioner, who was in charge of securing requisite clearances, receive the cargoes from the shipside and deliver it to the consignee Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, hired the services of respondent Transport Venture Incorporation (TVI)s tugboat for the hot rolled steel sheets in coil. Coils were unloaded to the barge but there was no tugboat to pull the barge to the pier. Due to strong waves caused by approaching storm, the barge was abandoned. Later, the barge capsized washing 37 coils into the sea. Consignee was executed a subrogation receipt by Industrial Insurance after the formers filing of formal claim. Industrial Insurance filed a complaint against both petitioner and respondent herein. The trial court held that petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the subrogation.

ISSUE:

Was the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation exercised by TVI?

RULING:

TVIs failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but was the proximate cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable number of hours, at such a precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing that the barge does not have any power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. That it was nighttime and, therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat.

As for petitioner, for it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article 173953 of the Civil Code, prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before, during and after the occurrence of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods.

While petitioner sent checkers54 and a supervisor55 on board the vessel to counter-check the operations of TVI, it failed to take all available and reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting that TVI failed to arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea conditions, it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend help, but it did not.

SICAM vs. JORGE

G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007

Facts:

Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam to secure a loan.

On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.

Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu expressed disbelief stating that when the robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were deposited with Far East Bank near the pawnshop since it had been the practice that before they could withdraw, advance notice must be given to the pawnshop so it could withdraw the jewelry from the bank. Respondent Lulu then requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on but petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry.

Respondent Lulu is seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of damages. Petitioner is interposing the defense of caso fortuito on the robber committed against the pawnshop.

Issue:

WON Sicam is liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession? YES

Held:

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.

Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.

A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. No sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there was any security guard at all.

Sicams admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded. Petitioner Sicam testified that once the pawnshop was open, the combination was already off. Instead of taking the precaution to protect them, they let open the vault, providing no difficulty for the robbers to cart away the pawned articles.

In contrast, the robbery in this case took place in 1987 when robbery was already prevalent and petitioners in fact had already foreseen it as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank for safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in Austria, where no negligence was committed, we found petitioners negligent in securing their pawnshop as earlier discussed.

BPI vs. IAC

Facts: Spouses Arthur & Vivienne Canlas opened a joint account in Commercial Bank & Trust Comp (CBTC) with initial deposit of P2,250. Arthur Canlas had an existing separate personal account in the same branch. Upon opening the joint account, the new accounts teller pulled out form the banks files the old and existing signature card of Arthur Canlas, for ID and reference. By mistake, she placed the old personal account number of Arthur Canlas on the deposit slip for the new joint checking account of the spouses so that the initial deposit of P2,250 for the joint checking account was miscredited to Arthur's personal account. The spouses subsequently deposited other amounts in their joint account.

As a consequence, two checks were dishonored which the Canlas had issued against their joint account. The bank was unable to contract the spouses because of a wrong address.

Spouses Canlas filed a complaint for damages against CBTC in CFI Pampanga. During the pendency of the case, the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and CBTC were merged. As the surviving corporation under the merger agreement and under Section 80 (5) of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, BPI took over the prosecution and defense of any pending claims, actions or proceedings by and against CBTC.

RTC Pampanga rendered a decision against BPI, ordering them to pay actual damages (P5,000), moral damages (P300,000), and exemplary damages (P150,000). On appeal, the IAC deleted the actual damages and reduced the other awardsactual damages (P50,000), moral damages (P50,000) and exemplary damages (P50,000).

Issue: Whether or not BPI is guilty of gross negligence in the handling of the spouses Canlas bank account.

Held: YES. IAC decision modified by deleting the award of exemplary damages.

The bank is not expected to be infallible but it must bear the blame for not discovering the mistake of its teller despite the established procedure requiring the papers and bank books to pass through a battery of bank personnel whose duty it is to check and countercheck them for possible errors. Apparently, the officials and employees tasked to do that did not perform their duties with due care, as may be gathered from the testimony of the bank's lone witness, Antonio Enciso, who casually declared that "the approving officer does not have to see the account numbers and all those things. Those are very petty things for the approving manager to look into." Unfortunately, it was a "petty thing," like the incorrect account number that the bank teller wrote on the initial deposit slip for the newly-opened joint current account of the Canlas spouses that sparked this half-a-million-peso damage suit against the bank.

While the bank's negligence may not have been attended with malice and bad faith, nevertheless, it caused serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to the private respondents for which they are entitled to recover reasonable moral damages.

However, the absence of malice and bad faith renders the award of exemplary damages improper.

BIO vs. CA

Facts: in 1981, petitioner Lim Sio Bio, otherwise known as Cora Lim, started making money market placements with respondent bank. Her initial placement is evidenced by respondent bank's Official Receipt No. 237825 5 dated September 3, 1981 and by respondent bank's Investment Advice No. 17852, both in the amount of P120,000.00, the latter bearing the due date of January 31, 1982. Subsequently, said petitioner Lim made several other placements on different dates, for various amounts and due dates. All of these placements were supported by Official Receipts issued specifically to Lim Sio Bio or to Cora Lim, signed by Deborah Dee Santos, a duly authorized officer of respondent bank. These receipts were followed by an Investment Advice specifying the amount of placement, the date of maturity and the rate of interest to be earned. Whenever a placement matured, petitioner Lim would "roll over" the funds; i.e., it was renewed for a specific period and the interest earned on the placement would be added to the principal. At times, petitioner Lim would accumulate two or three maturing placements and "roll them over" as one. At such "roll over", an Investment Advice would also be given to her specifying the date of maturity, the amount "rolled over" and the rate of interest. No Official Receipt was issued for the "rolled over" amounts apparently because the funds never left