toward a pax west africana · human security, with specific attention focused on the right of the...

Toward a Pax West Africana:Building Peace in aTroubled Sub-region

International Peace Academy

Economic Community of West African States

Rapporteurs: Comfort Ero, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu,and Augustine Toure

SEPTEMBER 2001 ■ ABUJA, NIGERIA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

International Peace Academy’s Africa Program gratefully acknowledges the support of the governments ofDenmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development.

ABOUT IPA’S AFRICA PROGRAM

Toward a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-Region, a seminar which featured about 70military, diplomatic, civil society and academic participants mostly from West Africa, took place in Abuja,Nigeria, between 27 and 29 September 2001. The seminar was organized in partnership with the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS) and held in part at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja. Thisseminar was the second in a series of three meetings organized as part of the current phase of the IPA AfricaProgram’s project on Developing Regional and Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms in Africa. This workfollows seven years of collaboration between IPA and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) between1992 and 1998. The seventeen papers commissioned for the Abuja seminar will be published as an editedvolume. In a bid to enhance African efforts at developing regional and sub-regional security mechanisms,IPA is working with partner institutions in Africa to:

• assess major challenges faced by sub-regional organizations in Africa in their efforts to prevent andmanage conflicts and to operationalize their security mechanisms;

• provide a forum for civil society actors to contribute to efforts at developing security mechanisms intheir sub-regions;

• provide training for the staff and accredited officials to sub-regional secretariats;

• raise awareness of, and increase international support for, sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa;

• enhance networking and sharing of information among a variety of African actors;

• publish and disseminate policy-relevant research that will be useful to decision-makers, academics, andthe NGO community.

ABOUT THE RAPPORTEURS

Dr. Comfort Ero is the Sierra Leone Project Director at the International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone.

Dr. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu is the Program Associate for The UN, NATO and Other Regional Actors in the21st Century: Partners in Peace? project at the International Peace Academy, New York.

Mr. Augustine Toure is the Ruth Forbes Young Civil Society Fellow, 2001-2002, at the International PeaceAcademy, New York.

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1) The Roots of Pax West Africana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Explaining Pax AfricanaTrade and Security in ECOWAS

2) West Africa’s Security Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Greed: The Economic Dimensions of Civil WarGrievance: The Absence of Governance and SecurityGovernance: Democratization, the CSSDCA, and Civil Society

3) Policing West Africa: An Assessment of the ECOWAS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11From Monrovia to Bissau via FreetownTaming the Regional ‘Hegemon’Institutionalizing Conflict Management in West AfricaConfronting ECOMOG’s Operational Challenges

Table 1: Charting the dilemmas confronting the ECOMOG missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4) ECOWAS in the Global Security Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18ECOWAS and the West: Supporting Pax West AfricanaECOWAS and the UN: Co-operation and Conflict

5) From Military Security to Human Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Small Arms, Light WeaponsChildren and Armed Conflicts

6) Toward a Pax West Africana: Some Practical Steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Streamlining ECOWAS’ ActivitiesAddressing Personnel CapacityLogistics and Operational Factors – Targeting Donor ResponseECOWAS: Developing a Common Vision and Common ValuesECOWAS and Civil SocietyECOWAS and the UNECOWAS and the WestECOWAS and IPA

Annex I: Agenda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Annex II: Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

“TOWARD A PAX WEST AFRICANA: BUILDING PEACE IN A TROUBLED SUB-REGION”

Table of contents

Contents

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS is a sub-regional grouping of West African states established on 28 May 1975. Its fifteen currentmembers are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Côte d’Ivoire

Executive summary

• The Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS)1 has made various attempts to tackle therecurrence and emergence of new conflicts in itssub-region. With the ECOWAS Cease-fireMonitoring Group’s (ECOMOG) unprecedentedinterventions in the 1990s in Liberia, Sierra Leone,and Guinea-Bissau, the international communitywitnessed a major evolution in inter-Africanaffairs. The ECOMOG interventions marked animportant turning point in the practice ofpeacekeeping by regional and sub-regional organi-zations in Africa.

• In recognition of the need to consolidate itsdecade-long peacekeeping experience, ECOWAS isin the process of establishing a securitymechanism. However, while ECOWAS has beenpraised for its numerous military and diplomaticefforts to stem the tide of conflicts in West Africa,supporters and opponents alike have concludedthat ECOWAS still has a long way to go if it is tofulfil the objectives it set for itself under itsMechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security which itestablished in December 1999.

Some of the observations that emerged from theIPA/ECOWAS seminar held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 27-29September 2001, included the following:

• A major obstacle to peace and stability in WestAfrica is the lack of viable systems of governanceand democratization at all levels of society. In fact,the link between security, democratization andgovernance is made more explicit by theincreasing demand by ordinary people for a morepeople-centered approach to security rather thanthe traditional focus on regime survival. Hence,human security, with specific attention focused onthe right of the individual to live in peace and tosatisfy his/her basic needs, should at least shareequal status with traditional concerns with thesecurity of the state.

• In West Africa, security forces (police, military,paramilitary and intelligence) still remain a sourceof great insecurity. These forces often mete outindiscriminate violence against civilians andundermine efforts to achieve good governance anddevelopment. A key challenge is how to ensuredemocratic control of security forces and of thoseresponsible for their management and oversight(particularly the executive, finance ministries andrelevant parliamentary committees).

• The role of ECOWAS in promoting good governanceand democratization is paramount to building peacein West Africa. Of critical importance in this regardwill be how the organization integrates the need foraccountable government and the rights of citizens tobe protected from autocratic regimes with thesanctity of state sovereignty. Directly related to thisissue, is the increasing concern, particularlyexpressed by civil society actors, that ECOWAS hasbecome complicit with a ‘culture of impunity’ byoverlooking issues of justice in peace agreementssigned to end conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.These accords granted amnesty to faction fighters forwar crimes and atrocities in exchange for coopera-tion in implementing peace agreements. Theconsequence of such accords is that some of theseformer warlords have become presidents, whileothers have become ministers, affording them anopportunity to continue exploiting their countries’wealth and spreading instability across their borders.

• Over the last decade, the role of civil society hasbecome critical in shaping the discourse onresolving West Africa’s security dilemmas. Civilsociety groups have played an important role inefforts to develop a security mechanism, especiallythe emphasis on creating a more coherent andstrategic outlook in developing a co-ordinatedresponse to conflicts in West Africa. Furthermore,various local civil society actors have contributedto democratization efforts throughout the sub-region in the 1990s. However, ECOWAS govern-ments and civil society actors remain suspicious ofeach other. These suspicions can be dissipatedthrough closer collaboration. ECOWAS should


Executive Summary 1

1 ECOWAS’ fifteen current members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.


focus on working with civil society groups thatfocus on governance and security issues, toprovide early warning analysis and to assist inthinking through its response to conflicts.

• ECOWAS can only be effective if its member stateshave sufficient technical, human and financialresources to monitor and prevent conflicts in thesub-region. The signing of a protocol to create asecurity mechanism in 1999 was intended toimprove the security environment in West Africa.But this has not yet happened. Rather, high levelsof insecurity, lack of institutional consensus andlimited financial and human resources have so farundermined the potential conflict managementrole of the ECOWAS security mechanism.

• Nigeria’s role in shaping West Africa’s securityarchitecture is critical to its success. However, thisaspiring sub-regional hegemon needs to take theviews of other states into account in reachingdecisions within ECOWAS’ security bodies. Nigeriaalso needs to set an example of transparency anda c c o u n t a b i l i t y, both internally in managing domesticaffairs and externally in mediating conflicts. Nigeriacould play a leadership role in security issues in We s tAfrica as it has done in Liberia and Sierra Leone, butthis must be done within the multilateral frameworkof ECOWAS in which other states participate activelyin decision-making and contribute meaningfully tothe implementation of such decisions.

• Sub-regional peacekeeping in Africa is largely adirect consequence of the post-Cold Wa rdisengagement by the major western powers fromthe continent. The changing French security role inWest Africa, which now increasingly involvesproviding training and logistical support forAfrican peacekeepers, has coincided with anincreased, though limited, American and Britishsecurity role in West Africa. Critical voices inAfrica have, however, argued that these externalsecurity initiatives have neither been co-ordinatednor been consultative. While the role of Westerngovernments like the US, France, and Britain isvital in helping ECOWAS to improve the effective-ness of its mechanism, specific assistance shouldfocus on capacity building, mainly the provision oflogistics and finance and not just on training.

• The UN needs to pay particular attention to Liberia,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone, whichshare a similar history of instability, weak or repres-sive regimes, and an absence of the rule of law,p o v e r t y, and human rights abuses. Special attentionwill also need to be paid to political, ethnic andreligious tensions in Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, aswell as the problems in Senegal’s Casamance region.Many participants in Abuja viewed positively thedecision by the UN to create a West Africa office inDakar and to appoint a Special Representative of theSecretary-General to head this office. This initiativewas also seen as recognition that a sub-regionalapproach is needed to tackle the nexus betweengovernance and security in West Africa. ECOWA Sshould devise a strategic framework indicating areasof priority and steps needed to build effectivecooperation between ECOWAS and the UN in thefield of conflict management.

• Attention to human security requires intensifiedefforts to curb the scourge of small arms and lightweapons in West Africa, and to alleviate theimpact of armed conflicts on children in WestAfrica. In response to the alarming proliferation ofsmall arms and light weapons (SALW) and itsnegative impact on long-term sustainable develop-ment, ECOWAS members signed a renewable three-year Moratorium on the Importation, Exportationand Manufacture of Light Weapons in 1998.H o w e v e r, despite the 1998 Moratorium, We s tAfrican societies remain awash with small armsand light weapons. Slow progress in establishingthe implementing mechanisms of the Moratoriumat the national level has been compounded by thelack of cooperation among states in harmonizingpolicies on a bilateral and regional basis.

• The role of children in armed conflicts representsboth a national and regional problem. Thisincludes the recruitment of children as childsoldiers, the use of children as sex slaves, and thetrafficking of children as slave labor. A sub-regional approach that integrates national policieswith regional strategies is required to address theseproblems. The Accra Declaration and Plan ofAction adopted by ECOWAS member states in April2000 could offer a useful approach towardaddressing the crisis of West Africa’s youth.

2 Executive Summary


1) The Roots of Pax West Africana

How to manage security, prevent conflicts, andstrengthen the Economic Community of West

African States’ (ECOWAS) evolving securitymechanism and learn lessons from ECOMOG’s (theE C OWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group) militaryinterventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s, were the central concerns of theseminar “Toward a Pax West Africana: Building Peacein a Troubled Sub-region”. The seminar was organizedby the New York-based International Peace Academy(IPA) in partnership with the ECOWAS secretariat inAbuja, Nigeria, on 27-29 September 2001, and broughttogether about 70 soldiers, diplomats, academics andcivil society activists mostly from across the WestAfrican sub-region.

Explaining Pax Africana

It is perhaps appropriate to start by explaining the titleof the seminar. In 1967, Kenyan political scientist, AliMazrui, published his seminal work ‘Toward a PaxAfricana’.2 This study was written at a time when theold colonial order was coming to an end and the newlyindependent states of Africa were searching for indige-nous systems to manage Africa’s internationalrelations. Mazrui asked the question ‘who will policeAfrica now that the imperial order is coming to anend?’ The phrase ‘African solutions for Africanproblems’ became a popular slogan in the 1960s todescribe the aspirations of African leaders to achievewhat Mazrui called ‘continental jurisdiction’. Thisconcept urged local African actors to manage theirown conflicts, and inter-African interventions wereconsidered more legitimate than extra-Africaninterventions.

The OAU was a living embodiment of African aspira-tions for a Pax Africana to ensure that the continenthad jurisdiction over its own affairs. But the OAU hadbarely come into existence in 1963 when many statesbecame hostage to Cold War rivalries. Some African

leaders benefited from these interventions, launchedmost often by the superpowers, the US and the SovietUnion, and France. Many African regimes survived thefirst thirty years of independence largely because ofm i l i t a r y, financial and political assistance fromexternal powers.

The end of the Cold War saw a collapse of this patron-client system. The slow decline of Western interventionin Africa crystallized after the debacle surrounding thedeath of 18 American soldiers during the US-led UNintervention into Somalia in 1993 and the failure ofthe UN Security Council to respond meaningfully tothe April 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Following thesehorrendous events, Mazrui’s question of who wouldpolice post-colonial Africa became pertinent onceagain. This question was particularly pressing due tothe institutional weakness and lack of experience ofAfrica’s regional and sub-regional organizations inmanaging conflicts. The tools and techniques ofconflict management such as peacemaking,peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuildingwere in limited supply in Africa.3

Following their gradual disengagement from thecontinent after Somalia and Rwanda, Western govern-

The Roots of Pax West Africana 3

Left to right, Professor Adebayo Ad e d e j i, African Center forDevelopment and Strategic Studies, General Theophilus Danjuma,Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, AmbassadorJohn Hirsch, Vice President, International Peace Academy, at theopening session at the ECOWAS Secretariat.

2 Ali Mazrui, Toward A Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967.3 See the report by International Peace Academy (IPA)/Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA),War, Peace and Reconciliation in Africa, November-December 1999.


4 The Roots of Pax West Africana

ments elaborated various initiatives to address Africanconflicts. In place of sending their national troops tou n d e r t a ke peacekeeping missions, external powersoffered to ‘educate’ African armies on UNpeacekeeping practices and doctrines and the role ofmilitaries in responding to humanitarian crises. Severalprograms were introduced in the mid-1990s includingthe US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI); theFrench Renforcement des Capacités pour le Maintien dela paix en Afrique (Reinforcement of AfricanPeacekeeping Capacity - RECAMP); and the UK’sAfrican Peacekeeping Training Support Programme.4 Ina sense, Western powers were redefining their rules ofengagement in Africa and the nature of military co-operation on the continent. No longer willing tointervene directly to prop up ailing governments or torisk casualties in conflicts of little strategic signifi-cance, the response was ironically to encourage‘African solutions for African problems.’

Prior to these initiatives and the two failed interven-tions in Somalia and Rwanda, some ECOWAS stateshad undertaken to respond to conflicts in West Africa.The creation of a peacekeeping force in August 1990by five ECOWAS states (Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, SierraLeone and Gambia) to intervene in the Liberian civilwar was a significant precedent for the Africancontinent. With no expectation that the West wouldintervene in the Liberian conflict, the five West Africanstates established ECOMOG in a bid to end the civilwar. In many ways, ECOMOG was an embodiment ofPax Africana. Since 1990, ECOMOG has intervened inLiberia (1990-1997), Sierra Leone (1997-2000) andGuinea-Bissau (1999). The question is no longer whowill police West Africa now that the Cold War’sexternal actors have left. In the post-Cold War era, thequestion now is whether ECOWAS can consolidate theexperience gained over the last decade by transformingECOMOG into a viable security apparatus in WestAfrica. ECOMOG has been playing a limited policing

role more by accident than by design. Related to thesequestions are issues of governance and democracy, twofactors that are increasingly fundamental to thesecurity of any state. ECOWAS’ capacity to tackle thenexus between good governance and security will bekey to any attempt to build peace in West Africa.

Trade and Security in ECOWAS

Before addressing governance and security issues, it isimportant to note that ECOWAS was established as aneconomic rather than a security organization. TheTreaty establishing ECOWAS was signed in Lagos on 28May 1975. The aims initially assigned to ECOWAS byits charter were centered on the promotion of "co-operation and development in all fields of economicactivity". ECOWAS set out to achieve a commonmarket in which goods, services and people wouldmove freely across the sub-region, and in whichmembers would derive benefits from increased tradeand a common external tariff. But for the first twodecades of its existence, ECOWAS’ goals werehampered by the rivalry between Nigeria and Francewhich led to the establishment of competing organiza-tions in West Africa. ECOWAS states also lacked basicinfrastructure and their economies remained dependenton primary commodities. Further frustrating efforts atpolitical co-operation across the linguistic divide,France maintained military bases in Côte d’Ivoire andSenegal, and intervened militarily in various parts ofAfrica in support of local client regimes.

In the 1990s, ECOWAS’ renewed focus on institution-building and sub-regional economic and monetaryintegration represented an important attempt toovercome a credibility deficit generated by programsthat have had little impact on the living conditions ofWest African citizens. However, ECOWAS’ efforts atmarket integration through trade liberalization havefailed to yield the desired results. Intra-regional trade

4 On these programs, see Jendayi Frazer, “The Africa Crisis Response Initiative: Self-Interested Humanitarianism,” The Brown Journalof World Affairs, Summer/Fall 1997, vol. 4 issue 2, pp. 103-118; Eboe Hutchful, “Peacekeeping Under Conditions of ResourceStringency,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds.), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa,Johannesburg and Pretoria: The South African Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies, 1999, pp.113-117; Paul Omach, “The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests,” African Affairs,vol.99 no. 394, January 2000, pp. 73-95; and Rocklyn Williams, “Beyond Old Borders: Challenges to Franco-South African SecurityRelations in the New Millennium,” African Security Review , vol. 8 no. 4, 1999, pp.3-19.


The Roots of Pax West Africana 5

still represents an insignificant portion of the totalofficial exports of the sub-region, increasing only from4 percent to about 11 per cent over the past twodecades. The initial plan to create a single monetaryzone by 1994 had registered little progress by 1993,when the Cotonou treaty postponed the deadline for amonetary union until 2009.

Complicating factors in monetary and trade integrationin West Africa arose from the different and at timescompeting integration projects of francophone andanglophone West Africa. Ghana’s president, KwameNkrumah’s dismantling of the common British-createdsub-regional institutions in the late 1950s had anegative impact on regional integration. French WestAfrica, however, recognized the need to minimize therestrictions and constraints that fragmentation hadimposed on its development through vigorous andrelentless promotion of cooperation and integration.Cooperation within the franc CFA currency zone led tothe creation of the all-francophone CommunautéÉconomique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) in 19735,which later became the Union Économique etMonétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) in 1994.

Recognizing the need to stem instability in order topromote economic integration and development,ECOWAS undertook two sub-regional security initia-tives: the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression in

1978 and the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to MutualAssistance on Defense (MAD) in 1981. The firstProtocol called on member states to resolve theirconflicts peacefully through ECOWAS, while thesecond promised mutual assistance for externallyinstigated or supported aggression as well as thecreation of an Allied Armed Forces of the Community(AAFC), consisting of stand-by forces from ECOWASstates. This force was never established.

Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali,Mauritania, Niger, and Togo signed a Mutual DefensePact, the Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance enmatière de Défence (ANAD) in 1977. Like the ECOWA S1 9 81 defense Protocol, members promised to settledisputes peacefully and to assist each other in theevent of an armed attack. ANAD agreed, in October1984, to set up a Force de Pa i x consisting of stand-byforces from member states to intervene in crisissituations. Like the AAFC, this force was neverestablished. However, ANAD did have some success indefusing a border crisis between Burkina Faso andMali in 1985. But, just as the CEAO and ECOWA Swere rival organizations in the economic field, ANADwas a potential rival to ECOWAS in the security field.E C OWAS heads of state have recently taken a positivestep in changing this perception by their decision tointegrate ANAD into the new ECOWAS securitymechanism of 1999.

5 On the rivalry between CEAO and ECOWAS, see S.K.B. Asante, “ECOWAS/CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa,” in RalphOnwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds.), The Future of Regionalism in Africa, London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1985, pp. 74-95; DanielBach, “The Politics of West African Economic Cooperation: CEAO and ECOWAS,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 21, 4, 1983,pp.601-621; Olatunde Ojo, “Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS,” International Organisation, 34 (4) Autumn 1980, pp.571-601;and Omotayo Olaniyan, “Nigeria and ECOWAS: A Role and Problem Analysis,” in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.), Nigeria’sExternal Relations, pp.126-140.

2) West Africa’s Security Dilemma

Two important factors need to be addressed at theoutset. First, not all of West Africa is in a perennial

state of crisis. Liberia’s unfinished conflict, SierraLeone’s uncertain path to peace, and Guinea’s cross-border clashes with Liberia, are only part of the WestAfrican security landscape. There has been a parallelprocess of democratization, and efforts to achieveeconomic growth and development since West Africanstates gained independence in the 1960s. The achieve-ments of several countries (for example Benin, Ghana,Mali and Senegal), especially in sustaining constitu-tional democracy, are often overshadowed by theperpetual cycle of conflicts in a sub-region that canpotentially serve as a vector for strong economicgrowth.

A second factor that needs to be addressed is that We s tAfrica’s security dilemma needs to be understoodwithin a broader context of a globalized world. Theconflicts in the sub-region and in other parts of thecontinent are not unique. The wars in West Africa inthe past decade highlight the contemporary nature ofconflicts. In many ways, West Africa is a microcosmof global (in)security. Major security concerns such aswar economies, dilemmas of peacekeeping, smallarms, the rise in non-state armed groups, militias andmercenaries, and the use of children in combat are notnew to contemporary Africa; these furies have rearedtheir ugly heads in spectacular fashion in today’sother conflict-prone regions (Afghanistan, theBalkans, Cambodia, Chechnya, Colombia, and SriLanka), and in other periods.6 M o r e o v e r, conflicts arehardly ever exclusively local incidents; they oftenhave various interconnected dimensions ranging fromnational to regional to global linkages.

Nonetheless, an analysis of West Africa in the lastdecade offers depressing reading. The reality of thedilemmas confronting the sub-region was starklydescribed by Professor Adebayo Adedeji who, in hiskeynote address at the IPA / E C OWAS seminar in Abuja,

provided a grim entrée of complexities when he saidthat ‘West Africa is moving backwards faster’ becausethe sub-region still lacks the essential ingredientsnecessary for building peace: good governance,integration, economic progress and stability. Thereasons for this state of affairs are numerous, but thereremains no consensus or acceptable framework ofanalysis for explaining conflicts in West Africa. Wewill next focus attention on three factors that arecrucial to understanding West Africa’s securitydilemma: greed, grievance and governance.

Greed: Economic dimensions of civil war

In the last five years, a plethora of studies has emergedto explain why conflicts, instability, and poorgovernance are still rife in sub-Saharan Africa. A ke yand influential paradigm that has pervaded thegeneral discourse on contemporary conflicts is theargument that economic motivations are criticalfactors in understanding why civil wars occur. In itsmost explicit and as some critics assert, misleadingform, the work by Paul Collier, director of the Wo r l dBank Development Research Group, argues that‘greed’ rather than ‘grievance’ remains pivotal tounderstanding conflicts.7 In Africa, this analysis hasbenefited from the strong empirical data offered byrebel leaders such as Charles Taylor in Liberia, FodayS a n koh in Sierra Leone and Jonas Savimbi in Angola


6 West Africa’s Security Dilemma

6 Comfort Ero, “Africa’s Global Impact,” Special Issue on Structural Conflict in the New Global Disorder: Insecurity and Development,IDS Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 2001, p. 90.7 Paul Collier, “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in Mats Berdal and David Malone, Greed and Grievance: EconomicAgenda in Civil Wars London: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 91-111.

West Africa is among the world’s most unstable sub-regions: 37 out of 72 successful military coups d’état inAfrica (about 50 percent), between 1960 and 1990,occurred in West Africa, a sub-region with less than athird of the OAU’s membership. In the last decade,Liberia and Sierra Leone have been embroiled inprotracted civil wars, Guinea-Bissau experienced a briefinternecine conflict in the late 1990s, Casamanceseparatists have continued to battle the Senegalesegovernment as they have done for two decades, theTuareg problem has simmered in Mali and Niger, andLiberia and Guinea continue to accuse each other oflaunching cross-border raids against their territories in aconflict also involving Sierra Leoenean rebels.

who have exploited their country’s resources throughw a r f a r e .

The dynamics of ‘greed’ are certainly an additionallayer of analysis that helps to explain further whyfighting occurs and what motivates or drives individ-uals or groups to engage in warfare. It is evident thatthe spoils of war have left individual rebel leaders rich.But civil wars are never singularly about one issue.Collier’s model cannot explain why conflicts occur incountries with minimal resources (for example,Guinea-Bissau) or why some resource-rich countriesare not at war (for example, Botswana). Conflicts suchas those confronting Liberia and Sierra Leone arecharacterized by a complex interconnection of ‘greed’and ‘grievance’. Moreover, ‘greed’ is not just abouteconomic accumulation. Rather it should bebroadened to focus on the political interests of thoseengaged in conflicts and draw attention to those whomight see an advantage in using conflicts for theirown ends.

Thus what we seem to be witnessing in contemporaryAfrican conflicts are traditional grievances based onpolitical and economic exclusion, human rightsviolations, the lack of justice, increasing poverty,social crises, weak institutions and political manipula-tion of ethnic divisions. These factors interact with thenew ‘post-industrial society’ conflicts supposedlydriven by consummate businessmen and entrepre-neurs of war and political elites who exploitgrievances and use war as a means of seekingopportunities for predatory accumulation.8 Such ananalysis also suggests that the study of conflict mustinvolve a deep and broad understanding of theirh i s t o r y. Each conflict has its own dynamic ands p e c i f i c i t y, which are often overlooked in policyresponses or donor assistance. Moreover, closerattention should be paid to the actors, variousnetworks and groups in conflicts, including theirlinkages with governments and other groups ins o c i e t y. Rebel formations and the tactics they employto coerce or mobilize groups in society to fight ontheir behalf need to be more closely analyzed.9

Grievance: The absence of Good Governance andS e c u r i t y

The presence of the ‘warlord’ pillaging society ofnatural resources, coercing disaffected, unemployedyouth into violent attacks, cannot hide the fact thatkey problems in many West African societies stemfrom poor governance and undemocratic regimes. Infact, the absence of effective governance anddemocratic control of the state and its key institutionsis a constant threat to ordinary citizens. In manycases, the state is unable to fulfil its basic functions.The first sign of poor governance can often be seen indeficient law and order services. The inability of somestates to govern, to provide basic services and toprotect their citizens is key to understanding thesecurity dilemma confronting many West Africansocieties. Along with institutions tasked withproviding security to citizens and maintaining lawand order, several states have limited jurisdictionoutside their capitals. The power of the state to controlviolence and to fulfil its social duties has often beeneroded by leaders who have sought to turn statesecurity forces into praetorian guards for regimesurvival rather than for the protection of ordinarycitizens. The state, in several instances, is a majorsource of insecurity.

The state’s security sectors, namely the police and thea r m y, are often complicit in the violence, as well as inlooting and extorting goods from citizens. In most ofpost-independence West Africa, governance anddemocratization failedto take root (forexample in Nigeria,Gambia, Ghana andSierra Leone) becauseof the role of them i l i t a r y. Coups andcounter-coups were apermanent feature ofthe sub-region’spolitics. The coup inCôte d’Ivoire in


West Africa’s Security Dilemma 7

8 Comfort Ero, “Africa’s Global Impact,” op. cit., p. 92.9These issues were raised by Ibrahim Abdullah, Kwesi Aning, Eboe Hutchful and Ismail Rashid during their presentations on the panel“Rebels, Sobels and the Political Economy of Conflicts in West Africa,” at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September2001.

“The incidence of coupsappears to be on the wanein West Africa but theconditions that give rise tosuch interventions persistand may yet obstruct orderail the sub-region’sfragile democratic experi-ment.”

Jimmy Kandeh

December 1999 was a reminder that, while manystates in West Africa are formal democraciesconducting free and fair elections at regular intervals,democracy throughout the sub-region continues toface tensions that could easily reverse the gains of thepast decade. The history of political and economicmismanagement, including the misuse of the state’ssecurity sector, has meant that security forces areoften the proponents of undemocratic and corruptpractices. In some instances, conventional statesecurity structures have either been in decay forseveral years or have been unable to respond tooutbreaks of violence. In addition, the lack of training,adequate pay and effective management hasundermined the capacity of security forces to respondto violent disorder in their societies.

The role of the police has often been overlooked inspreading instability, partly because West Africa’spolice forces are usually not involved in stagingcoups. Yet the role of police forces, notably in SierraLeone, Liberia and Nigeria has been to add to thegeneral sense of insecurity and undemocratic practiceby the security sector.10 In several societies, the policehave inflicted violence rather than protected civiliansfrom criminality and violence. Civilians constantlyfind themselves to be victims of armed robbery,harassment, theft, thuggery, rape and other unspeak-able offences committed by members of securityforces. Ordinary citizens in West Africa also sufferdisproportionately from the indiscriminate use offorce. On the West African coastline, the Niger Delta(Nigeria), Liberia and Sierra Leone, societies havewitnessed the indiscriminate use of force againstcitizens who simply yearn for basic human securityneeds to be met by their governments. In response tothe failure of the security sector to protect its citizens,several local communities have created vigilantegroups like the K a m a j o r in Sierra Leone. In easternNigeria, a state government has tried to use theBakassi Boys as a crime-fighting police force, due tothe ineffectiveness of the federally-controlled,resource-starved police. However, this state govern-ment has been unable to establish a proper system of

oversight, leading tothe use of exc e s s i v eviolence by themembers of theBakassi Boys againstinnocent civilians.

The case for securitysector reform anddemocratic control ofsecurity forces is of theutmost concernprimarily because itstrikes at the heart ofthe governance-security nexus. Acritical focus on all theconstituent parts ofthe security sector,including those whomanage and overseeits functioning, isbased on the assumption that the intervention ininternal political crises by ill-disciplined and unprofes-sional security forces is a source of instability, tensionand ultimately conflict. Security-sector reform hasbecome a prerequisite for preventing conflicts andpost-conflict peacebuilding in states like Sierra Leoneand Guinea-Bissau. The aim is to integrate a goodgovernance agenda with the goals of security sectorreform and to ensure democratic control of thesecurity-sector. Given the past history of mistrustbetween civil society groups and the military, it isimportant to have a proactive program of confidence-building between security forces, the military and civilsociety, and to improve civil society’s knowledge andunderstanding of security issues.

Governance: Democratization, the CSSDCA, andCivil Society

The tensions arising from what are seen as therudimentary requirements of human security, namelyjustice, personal safety, accountable executives, and



10 See, for example, Abiodun Alao, Security Sector Reform in Democratic Nigeria, Working Paper no.2, Center For Defense Studies,London, February 2000; and Comfort Ero, Sierra Leone’s Security Complex, Working Paper no. 3, Center For Defense Studies, London,June 2000.

“The West Africancommunity (as well asother African communi-ties) should take heed thatthe post-Cold War, post-apartheid wave of Pa n -Africanism seeks tograpple with afundamental question:how do Africans establishnorms and institutions toprotect and guarantee thesecurity of their citizenswithout underminingsecurity and engenderingconflicts amongst states?How should Africans goabout balancing state-rights with peoples’-rights?”

Chris Landsberg

democratic practices, clearly underscore the linkbetween good governance, democracy and security inmost West African states. The absence of these factorscontinue to undermine the principle objective ofE C OWAS, namely economic integration and politicalco-operation among member states.

Amos Sawyer and Chris Landsberg argue that thesolutions to the crisis of governance and consequentlysecurity were clearly set out in the 1991 Conference onS e c u r i t y, Stability, Development and Co-operation inAfrica (CSSDCA).11 Among the key factors necessaryfor meeting the security needs of individuals and forimproving the conditions for development, stabilityand governance, the CSSDCA asserts the need forconstitutionalism and principles of law, respect forhuman rights, political pluralism, accountable andtransparent government, proper management ofpublic finances to reduce the imbalance favoringmilitary expenditure, and better co-operation amonggovernments, civil society groups and intergovern-mental organizations.

The proposals set out by the CSSDCA sought to shiftthe balance from respect for the sovereign rights ofstates to respect for the human rights of citizens. Thenewly-created African Union (AU) will take over thework and assets of the OAU, and will pursue similargoals. The new African Union aims to limit theabsolute terms of sovereignty of states by recognizingthe right of the regional body to intervene in threeinstances: when constitutionalism is undermined bythe illegitimate overthrow of a government; acts ofgenocide; and in cases in which internal strife in astate threatens regional stability. These criteria arealmost identical to those included in the ECOWA SProtocol Relating to the Mechanism for ConflictPrevention, Management, Resolution, Pe a c e ke e p i n gand Security agreed in Lomé in December 1999.1 2 B u tthere are doubts as to whether African leaders willpursue such robust intervention to defend any of theseareas. While the CSSDCA and the African Union both

espouse noble intentions, a key question is whetherthey can function effectively. As several participantswondered during the IPA / E C OWAS seminar: ‘who willintervene in Nigeria if ever there was a need tostrengthen constitutionalism in that country?’

The CSSDCA proposals, which have been promotedthrough ministerial meetings on the subject since 1999led by Nigeria and South Africa, as well as thecreation of the African Union, could signify a majorshift in the thinking and outlook of African leaders.Both initiatives are seen as the future paradigm indefining and understanding African security in thenew millennium. Both challenge Africans to addresscritical questions about the accountability of theirleaders. According to Chris Landsberg, two importantquestions that need to be asked in twenty-first centuryAfrica are: ‘how should we hold each other account-able? And, how should Africa be governed?’ Theefficacy of efforts by Africans to hold themselvesaccountable will be determined, inter alia, by thewillingness of their leaders to ensure that justice is notsacrificed for the sake of ensuring that warringfactions endorse peace agreements for expedientshort-term goals without proper accountability fortheir war crimes.

The implications of the blanket amnesty in Liberia in1995 and Sierra Leone in 1999 and the divisionsevident among West African leaders as the UNSecurity Council debated whether to impose economicand travel sanctions on Charles Taylor’s regime inLiberia in early 2001, have led many civil societyactors in West Africa to conclude that ECOWA Sleaders are complicit in the ‘culture of impunity’.1 3

There is widespread skepticism among civil societygroups in West Africa about whether ECOWAS candeliver justice for ordinary civilians who have sufferedgreatly at the hands of repressive leaders.

In the area of conflict management, the CSSDCA’ sfinal report of 1991 proposed inter alia the develop-


West Africa’s Security Dilemma 9

11 See Olusegun Obasanjo and Felix Mosha (eds.), Africa: Rise to Challenge , New York: Africa Leadership Forum, 1993.12 See the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security,Lomé, 10 December 1999.13 Economic and travel sanctions were imposed on Liberia by the Security Council in May 2001.

ment of a continental peacekeeping machinery,promotion of conflict prevention and military self-reliance in Africa; the establishment of an AfricanCouncil of Elders to mediate conflicts; and the drasticreduction in military expenditures in Africa. Some ofthese ideas have been incorporated into the ECOWA Ssecurity mechanism.

It is important to highlight the important role of civilsociety groups, who were actively represented at theI PA / E C OWAS seminar, in managing conflicts in We s tAfrica. Civil society actors include religious organiza-tions, women’s organizations, human rights activists,the media, and traditional leaders. Several Africangovernments continue to regard civil society organi-zations with grave suspicion. In extreme cases, somegovernments have dismissed such groups as foreignagents and unpatriotic enemies of the state. SeveralE C OWAS states, such as Mali and Sierra Leone,h o w e v e r, have embraced the role of civil society actorsin preventing and managing local conflicts and inreintegrating former combatants into local communi-ties. Civil society actors have also been useful humanrights monitors and promoted democratization in theircountries. The ECOWAS security mechanismrecognizes the role of civil society actors in twoimportant areas: first, in gathering information for thelocal bureaus in ECOWAS’ evolving early warning

system; and second, in undertaking mediation effortsthrough the Council of Elders.

In the early 1990s, civil society actors in Benin, Mali,and Niger played an instrumental role in democratictransitions. In Liberia, the Inter-Faith MediationCommittee (IFMC) crafted the ECOWAS Peace plan of1990, while the Catholic Justice and Pe a c eCommission monitored human rights issues duringthe Liberian civil war. In Sierra Leone, a cross-sectionof women’s organizations pressured the militarygovernment to hold democratic elections in February1996, while the Inter-Religious Council of SierraLeone (IRCSL) played a crucial role during the negoti-ation of the Lomé peace agreement of 1999. Severaltraditional leaders and women’s organizations havebeen involved in efforts at resolving the Tuaregproblem in northern Mali. But, in some cases,coalitions of civil society groups in West Africa havebeen unable to operate in a cohesive and effectivem a n n e r. The lack of institutional capacity hassometimes led to strong personalities dominatingthese groups, some of which have also been accusedof elitism and a lack of transparency and democratica c c o u n t a b i l i t y. Many participants in Abuja, however,recognized the potential of civil society groups tocontribute to the management of conflicts in We s tA f r i c a .



3) Policing West Africa:An Assessment of the ECOWASResponse

Akey challenge for ECOWAS remains how to deviseeffective methods and institutions to respond to

West Africa’s conflicts. ECOWAS has had to adapt itsinstitutions to play a conflict management role in anatmosphere of political instability and bad governancewhich has plagued many of its member states. Theweakness of national economies, the low-level ofeconomic and technological development, and theresultant failure to build a common market have alsoimpeded ECOWAS’ progress. Due to these constraints,some commentators question ECOWAS’ capacity toplay a peace and security role.

Twenty-six years after it was created, ECOWAS has yetto achieve many of its stated objectives. Its commonm a r ket has not yet been built, and monetary union isstill to come. Despite a protocol on the free movementof persons, freedom of movement remains difficultacross much of West Africa. Added to this, economicpolicies within the sub-region remain to beharmonized. The continuing existence of about 40intergovernmental organizations, many pursuingsimilar goals, is a further obstacle to unity. Thelinguistic and cultural divide between anglophone andfrancophone states continues to be an additionalbarrier to economic and political progress. In manyways, regionalism and the quest for integration inWest Africa have become a mirage.1 4

From Monrovia to Bissau via Freetown

West Africa is a troubled sub-region, but is also a sub-region which launched three unprecedented militaryinterventions in a bid to end conflicts through collec-tive sub-regional efforts. More than any other sub-regional organization in Africa, ECOWAS has set inmotion a process that can be adapted for managingconflicts in Africa and elsewhere. That an organiza-

tion created for thepurpose of enhancingeconomic and politicalco-operation couldtransform itself into asub-regional securityapparatus shouldcertainly be hailed asan innovative andsignificant evolutionin the practice ofinter-African security.Several West Africanstates, led by Nigeriain two of the threecases, embarked on ajourney that wouldeventually lead themto intervene in theinternal affairs of three member states. ECOMOG hasbeen at the helm of sub-regional security for morethan a decade in West Africa since it first intervenedin Liberia in 1990. The ECOMOG intervention inLiberia represented a watershed in Africa’s collectives e c u r i t y. Since entering Liberia, ECOWAS has tried totransform and expand its mandate from political andeconomic matters to managing, resolving andpreventing conflicts.

There is as yet no consensus, as reflected in thevarious exchanges between practitioners, in particularseveral West African generals and diplomats, and civilsociety activists and academics, as to whetherE C OWAS has been effective in its security role. Aninventory or evaluation of ECOWAS’ role in conflictmanagement offers a mixed track record and raisesdoubts about the organization’s capacity or ability tobuild peace in its sub-region. Participants stressed thatthe strengths and weaknesses of ECOWAS andECOMOG are that these bodies are ultimately a reflec-tion of the internal governance dilemmas andinstability of their constituent states.

At each stage of its interventions in Liberia, Sierra


Policing West Africa: An Assessment of the ECOWAS Response 11

14 The problems of regionalization and integration at a political and economic level were raised by Daniel Bach in his presentationon “ECOWAS: Trade, Security and Regionalization in West Africa, Supranationalism, Hegemony and Multilaterialism,” at theIPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.

“All three unprecedentedmilitary missions ofECOMOG in Liberia, SierraLeone and Guinea-Bissau…saw sub-regional armiessailing to Monrovia,Freetown and Bissau on amodern mission civili-satrice. Like the Europeanexplorers centuries earlier,these seamen of renais-sance Africa were attempt-ing to bring reason andenlightenment to truculent“tribes” and warlordsengaged in senselesswarfare.”

Adekeye Adebajo

Leone and Guinea-Bissau, ECOMOG found its abilityto function effectively constrained by several factors:division among member states who, having failed tofind a common approach, backed various rivalfactions; warlords who plundered their countries’resources and politicians who negotiated in bad faith;the ambitions of an aspiring hegemonic, Nigeria, andthe aggressive interventionist tendencies or clandes-tine behavior of several sub-regional states1 5 (see Ta b l e1). ECOMOG’s use of force in Liberia and Sierra Leone,without consensual sub-regional approval and UNSecurity Council approval, led some critics to questionits legitimacy and to regard it as an instrument ofNigeria’s hegemonic ambitions.

Throughout ECOMOG’s peacekeeping experiences,fundamental questions that confronted ECOWA Smember states related to the absence of accountabilityand transparency in decisions on the use of force. Onecontentious area remains the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of thosestates that use force in the name of humanitariancauses, regional security or self-defense. Severalparticipants in Abuja also noted the need to scrutinizeclosely the role of external actors, both within andoutside Africa. These include western and Asiancommercial firms which collude with warlords toplunder resources and external powers who contributeto fueling conflicts through support to internal parties.The role of sub-regional actors in using armies acrossvarious borders to undermine rather than to promotesub-regional stability was highlighted. As severalparticipants noted, a major factor underminingE C OWAS’ various attempts at building peace was theindependent actions of these states in using militaryforce or providing military support to various armedgroups in contravention of ECOWAS decisions.

Four important examples of military support tobelligerents cited by participants included: first, Côted’Ivoire and Burkina Faso’s support for CharlesTaylor’s NPFL in Liberia; second, the support ofseveral ECOMOG states like Nigeria, Sierra Leone andGuinea for anti-NPFL factions in Liberia; third,Liberia and Burkina Faso’s support for theRevolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone;and fourth, Senegal’s (backed by Guinea) militarysupport to president João Bernado ‘Nino’ Vieiraagainst General Ansumane Mané in Guinea-Bissau’sconflict.

Another destructive conflict involves two of the threemembers of the Mano River Union – Liberia andGuinea. The warlord-turned-president of Liberia,Charles Ta y l o r, has been at the heart of growingregional crises since his insurgent movement, theNPFL, invaded Liberia in 1989 and later joined RUFrebels in their attacks on Sierra Leone. The NPFL-RUFcollaboration with Guinean dissidents launchedattacks on that country from September 2000following claims that Guinean leader, Lansana Conté,was supporting Liberian rebels against Ta y l o r ’ sregime. Ulimo-K leader, Alhaji Kromah, operated fromGuinea during Liberia’s civil war. Guinea-Liberiantensions are now a potential flashpoint for a sub-regional conflagration following Lansana Conté’sreported support for dissident Liberian forces callingthemselves Liberians United for Reconciliation andDemocracy (LURD) which currently occupy parts ofnorthern Liberia. Events in the Mano River basinprovide clear evidence that efforts at building peace inWest Africa will remain frustrated as long as leaderscontinue to act in ways that destabilize the sub-r e g i o n .


12 Policing West Africa: An Assessment of the ECOWAS Response

15 On the ECOMOG interventions, see Colonel Festus Aboagye, ECOMOG: A Subregional Experience in Conflict Resolution,Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia, Accra: Sedco Enterprise, 1999; Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia,Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002; Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria,ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, forthcoming; Eric G. Bermanand Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, Geneva and Pretoria: UN Institute for Disarmament Researchand Institute for Security Studies, 2000; Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia,Hampshire, London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1998; Robert Mortimer, “From ECOMOG to ECOMOG II:Intervention in Sierra Leone,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics: The African State Systemin Flux, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, Third Edition, 2000, pp.188-207; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States,Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in SierraLeone, Oxford and New Hampshire: James Currey and Heinemann, 1998; and Margaret Vogt (ed.), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG:A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping , Lagos: Gabumo Press, 1993.

Taming the regional ‘hegemon’

Concerns over the use of force are of particular signif-icance when discussing the role of Nigeria as thepotential hegemon in West Africa. The role andperformance of Nigeria in ECOMOG led to numerousdebates among seminar participants at theI PA / E C OWAS seminar. Supporters of Nigeria’s role inECOMOG were quick to state that its presence waspivotal in reducing violence in the sub-region, whileits critics challenged its domineering role in ECOWA S .Supporters argued that Nigeria’s vast contribution toE C OWAS and ECOMOG cannot be overlooked. Nigeriaprovided the bulk of the men and money forECOMOG’s efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. With 75percent of West Africa’s GNP, 50 percent of its popula-tion, and a 94,500-strong army that dwarfs thecombined total of those of its neighbours, Nigeriaremains a potential hegemon in West Africa.

Several participants questioned Nigeria’s role in WestAfrica: is it enough to say that without Nigeria leadingthe ECOMOG force in Liberia and Sierra Leone, thesituation in both countries would have been far worse?

Is it enough to say thatwithout Nigeria therecan be no ECOMOG? Isit enough to say thatevery alliance needs ahegemon to succeed?What about the roleand responsibility ofthat hegemon? Howdo ECOWAS states goabout managing therole of a regionalhegemon? How canstates/regimes be heldaccountable for theirexercise of force across borders? These are relevantquestions which need to be addressed in order todevelop an effective security mechanism in WestAfrica. Furthermore, these questions are particularlypertinent as some states appreciate Nigeria’s sacrificesand leadership, but as Nigeria’s Defense Minister,General Theophilus Danjuma, noted during his openingaddress to the seminar, some ECOWAS states still fearthe strength of an aspiring Nigerian hegemon.



Participants at IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, “Toward a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in A Troubled Sub-Region,” Abuja, Nigeria,27-29 September 2001.

“West African states mustface two realities: first theneed to establish a securityregime for the sub-regionis inevitable if the sub-region and its componentstates are to develop.S e c o n d l y, a hegemon isrequired to propel thesecurity regime andNigeria fits into thatdescription.”

Gen. Theophilus DanjumaNigerian Defense Minister

As ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary, Cheick Diarraobserved, Nigeria is both the problem and the solutionin the move toward a Pax West Africana. ECOWASneeds Nigeria, but the specter of a bulldozing hegemonis still a source of concern for many states. BecauseNigeria is expected to play a dominant role in WestAfrica, its actions must be responsible, accountable,and transparent. The introduction of other contingentsfrom outside the sub-region into peaceke e p i n gmissions in West Africa could be a way of reducingNigeria’s dominance. Some participants urged thatpowerful regional forces should be placed withinmultinational UN peacekeeping missions as is currentlythe case with the UN mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL). This would not only increase the legiti-macy and access to external resources, but also be aneffective way to enhance the UN’s strength in regionswhere external powers are reluctant to intervene.

The democratic transition in Nigeria may provide anopening in which to temper the fears of a domineeringNigeria. Since President Olusegun Obasanjo came topower in May 1999, Nigeria has been more reluctant,due to the financial costs and lack of domestic support,to play the role of sub-regional policeman. It seemsincreasingly doubtful that Nigeria has both thecapacity and the will to continue to intervene in sub-regional trouble spots. Thus, other ECOWAS states needto develop their capacity to intervene in managingregional conflicts in case Nigeria is unable to provideits resources to such missions. Nigerian casualties inLiberia and Sierra Leone were estimated to be over1,000, while the costs of both missions officially raninto billions of dollars, though a large amount of thesefunds vanished through the corruption of Nigeria’smilitary leaders. It is unlikely that the Nigerian civiliangovernment will be able to sustain these casualties andcosts without some loss of domestic political support.Internal political and financial constraints will alsotemper Nigeria’s robust policies on peaceke e p i n gmissions in the future. 16

Nigeria’s refusal to contribute peacekeepers to Guinea-Bissau in 1998 and its reduction of troops from 12,000to 4,000 in Sierra Leone by 2000 are clear signs of a

growing weariness at the costs of protractedp e a c e keeping in West Africa. Yet, the failure ofECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau provides a clear illustrationthat unless other ECOWAS states equip themselves torespond effectively to conflicts, then Nigeria will findit increasingly difficult to withdraw totally from itssub-regional peacekeeping commitments. The task forNigeria, therefore, is to work closely with its sub-regional counterparts to ensure that member statesshare in the burden of managing conflicts.

Institutionalizing conflict management in We s tA f r i c a1 7

A major development within ECOWAS has been theattempt to develop various frameworks for enhancingthe capacity of sub-regional states to mount apeacekeeping force. The first step came with therevision of the ECOWAS treaty and protocols in 1993,which made provision for maintaining peace andsecurity. Since then, member states have agreed, inprinciple, to set up formal mechanisms that wouldallow ECOMOG to function as a security apparatus forthe sub-region. Significantly, in October 1998,ECOWAS leaders endorsed the draft framework of WestAfrican Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense andInternal Affairs, for an ECOWAS security mechanismwith the objective of providing ECOWAS with thecapacity to standardize its operations in managingconflicts in West Africa. The ECOWAS securitymechanism, which was formally adopted at its summitin Lomé in December 1999, is a bid to institutionalizeconflict management in West Africa.



16 See Adekeye Adebajo, “Nigeria: Africa’s New Gendarme?”, Security Dialogue, vol.31 no.2, June 2000, pp.185-199.17 This section is based partly on the concept paper prepared for the IPA/ECOWAS seminar in Abuja.

Lessons identified, but not learned

1. Regional autocrats critical in triggering civil wars.2. Repeated failure to establish clear mandates in peace

missions.3. Peacekeepers logistically ill-equipped to provide

security.4. Failure to develop effective strategies and sanctions to

deal with sub-regional spoilers.5. Failure of peacekeepers to maintain principles of

neutrality.

The creation of the mechanism is also an attempt toconsolidate the lessons learned from the ECOMOGinterventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. ECOMOG, as Ad e keye Adebajo noted, has gonethrough its experimental ‘guinea-pig’ phase. But whilesome lessons have been learned (for example, the needfor the active involvement of francophone states fromthe outset in managing the peacemaking process inSierra Leone in order to defuse political divisionsbetween members as occurred in Liberia), others haveyet to be identified or learned. The next stage underthe ECOWAS security mechanism is to consolidate,implement and institutionalize ECOWAS’ structures forpeace support operations in West Africa. Moreover,lessons from the three ECOMOG interventions need tobe embedded in the overall policy direction of theo r g a n i z a t i o n .

The ECOWAS security mechanism proposed theestablishment of several organs to implement securitydecisions, namely the Mediation and Security Council,a Defense and Security Commission, and a Council ofElders. The ECOWAS mechanism also calls forimproved co-operation in early warning, conflictprevention, peacekeeping operations, cross-bordercrime, and the trafficking in small arms and narcotics.In order to support ECOWAS’ move to preventconflicts, four zonal observation bureaus for gatheringpolitical, economic and social information forE C OWAS’ early warning system are currently beingestablished in Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Benin),Monrovia (Liberia) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso).A Department for Political Affairs, Defense andSecurity (DPADS), under the current ECOWAS DeputyE xecutive Secretary, Cheick Diarra, will take on theresponsibility for co-ordinating the work of thesezonal observation bureaus.

The ECOWAS security mechanism is also attempting toimplement the ECOWAS 1981 Protocol Relating toMutual Assistance on Defense (MAD) by calling forthe establishment of a stand-by force of brigade-sizeconsisting of specially-trained and equipped units ofnational armies ready to be deployed at short notice.The main tasks of the proposed force will involveobservation and monitoring, peacekeeping, humani-tarian intervention, enforcement of sanctions andembargoes, preventive deployment, peacebuilding

operations, disarmament and demobilization, andpolicing activities, including anti-smuggling and anti-criminal activities. These were many of the tasks thatECOMOG performed in Liberia and Sierra Leone andattempted to perform in Guinea-Bissau. The new sub-regional force is expected to embark on periodictraining exercises to enhance the cohesion of troopsand the compatibility of their equipment. Fourthousand troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côted’Ivoire, Niger, Togo, and Ghana have already take npart in joint military exercises in the Burkinabé townof Kompienga and northern Togo in May 1998, withNigeria involved in the military planning of thesee xe r c i s e s .

It is envisaged that the new ECOMOG force will beused in three cases: an internal armed conflict withina member state actively supported from outside thesub-region; conflict between two or more memberstates; and internal conflicts that threaten to trigger ahumanitarian disaster, pose a serious threat to sub-regional peace and security, and/or which follow theoverthrow or attempted overthrow of a democrati-cally-elected government. While the first twoscenarios for justifying military intervention wereincluded in the ECOWAS 1981 Defense Protocol, thelast scenario was a conscious effort to provide legalcover for future interventions, again based on theLiberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau experiences.In Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, ECOMOG intervened byarguing that the situation threatened a humanitariandisaster and posed a threat to sub-regional peace ands e c u r i t y. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG restored thedemocratically-elected government of PresidentAhmed Tejan Kabbah to power in March 1998 afterdissident soldiers overthrew it on 25 May 1997.

Despite the clear sign that ECOMOG has givenpractical expression to the security mechanism,E C OWAS faced difficulties in intervening decisively totry to restore constitutional rule following theoverthrow of the government of Henri Konan Bédié inCôte d’Ivoire in December 1999 through a militarycoup, though its members did condemn the coup. Norwas ECOMOG able to deploy its troops in the midst ofcross-border conflicts between Liberia, Guinea andSierra Leone between October 2000 and March 2001 .ECOMOG sought to play a cross-border monitoring



role, but Guinean head of state, Lansana Conté wantedan enforcer. Guinean forces are currently attemptingto play this role in the name of national self-defense.

Confronting ECOMOG’s Operational Challenges

The implementation of much of what is envisaged in theE C OWAS security mechanism will depend on how farmember states can tackle many of the operationalchallenges that continue to undermine ECOMOG’smilitary operations. All three ECOMOG interventionsclearly exposed the logistical weaknesses of We s tAfrican armies. During the Abuja seminar, participantspointed to the operational difficulties that are a featureof contemporary peace operations in open-endedconflicts, but are more apparent in a sub-region, such asWest Africa, with limited resources. Such factors includethe problems of command and control, doctrine,administration, and logistics. A call was made in Abujafor better co-ordination between headquarters and ForceCommanders in the field. Participants also highlighted

the limited capability of ECOMOG to undertake thecomplete disarmament, demobilization and reintegra-tion of troops in the peace implementation phase, whichcontinues to affect stability in post-war Liberia.

The issue of financing remains a major stumbling blocto efforts at turning ECOMOG into a credible force andto building a stand-by force. The ECOWAS securitymechanism foresees troop-contributing countriesbearing financial costs for the first three months ofmilitary operations before ECOWAS takes over thecosts. Under the new ECOWAS security mechanism, aSpecial Peace Fund is to be established to raiserevenue through a community levy, with funding alsoexpected to be provided by the UN and its agencies,the OAU and the rest of the international community.For the foreseeable future, addressing many of theseoperational dilemmas, especially logistical support,will require external assistance until the sub-regiondevelops its own capabilities and establishes a securefunding base.




4) ECOWAS in the Global SecurityFramework

Regionalism is part of the global trend of the post-Cold War era which is reflected in the increasing

willingness of sub-regional organizations to play apeacekeeping role outside the UN framework. Otherregional actors in organizations such as NATO haveembarked on peacekeeping missions in the Balkanswhere the UN has been unable or unwilling to respond.The emphasis on regional peacekeeping in Africa ispartly a direct consequence of the gradual disinterestof, and disengagement by, the major powers in the UNSecurity Council to intervene in long drawn-out andopen-ended conflicts on the continent. This followedthe botched US intervention in Somalia in 1993 andthe controversial French intervention in Rwanda in1994.

ECOWAS and the West: Supporting Pax WestAfricana

Critical voices at the Abuja seminar argued thatexternal security initiatives have not been coordinated,that Africans have not been adequately consulted onthese initiatives, and that emphasis on training ismisplaced since logistical and financial support aremore essential for African peacekeepers. The changingFrench security role in West Africa, which nowincreasingly involves providing training and logisticalsupport for African peacekeepers, and the growingNigerian frustrations with sub-regional peacekeepinghave coincided with an increased, though limited,American and British security role in West Africa.Britain currently has a small military contingent inSierra Leone which is training a new national armyand has placed military personnel in key strategic postsin the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL) to support the peacekeeping mission.Following on from its 1996 ACRI program tostrengthen the military capabilities of African states forregional peacekeeping, the US government embarkedon Operation Focus Relief (OFR) aimed at training andequipping seven West African battalions for the UNmission in Sierra Leone. Participants in the ten-weekOFR included: Nigeria (five battalions), Senegal (one

battalion), and Ghana (one battalion). The wholeprogram cost about $90 million.

France has invited non-francophone states to partici-pate in its Renforcement des Capacités Africaines demaintien de la Paix (RECAMP), launched in 1997 tostrengthen African peacekeeping capacity. Logisticalsupport for the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau wasprovided entirely by France. As France has adopted aless directly military interventionist stance followingpolicy debacles in Zaire and Rwanda in the 1990s, theFrench military presence in Africa has been drasticallyreduced and two military bases were closed in theCentral African Republic in April 1998. Paris, however,still maintains bases in four African countries,including in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. France’sdecision not to intervene militarily after a militarycoup against the friendly regime of Henri Konan Bédiéin its wealthiest former West African colony, Côted’Ivoire, in December 1999, was seen by many as ahistoric watershed. The incident fueled much specula-tion about the prospect of France’s apparent militarydisengagement from Africa drawing francophonestates in West Africa into closer security co-operationwith Nigeria and other ECOWAS states. In March 2000,the all-francophone Conseil de l’Entente i n v i t e dNigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, to a meeting inTogo to discuss security issues: the first time the leaderof a non-francophone state has attended such ameeting.

The post-Cold War shift in the Africa policies ofBritain, France and the US has led to an increasingpreference to promote economic liberalization anddemocratization processes, though not always consis-tently, and to de-emphasize the potential of directmilitary intervention. This has been particularlystriking in the case of French policies in Africa. Franceactively supported the Hutu-power regime of JuvénalHabyarimana, which was actively opposed to theRwandan expatriate “a n g l o p h o n e ” rebels inneighboring Uganda. “Opération Turquoise” (1994) wasFrance’s last major military operation in Africa.Ostensibly humanitarian, the operation in factprovided cover for the flight of thousands ofgénocidaires from Rwanda in large part as a reaction towhat France perceived to be “Anglo-Saxon” incursionsinto its pré carré (backyard).

18 ECOWAS in the Global Security Framework


Between 1997 and 2001, French troops in Africa havedeclined from 8,000 to 5,600. The secret defenseprotocols of 1961 (notably with Côte d’Ivoire, Gabonand Chad), which authorized French interventions inthese countries in order to “restore law-and-order incase of domestic strife,” have since been abandoned. Inline with changing French policy, France has relocatedmilitary training from its own country to sub-regionaltraining centers in Africa (Thiès in Senegal; Koulikoroin Mali; and Bouaké in Côte d’Ivoire). Finally, theprovision of financial, material and logistical supportto sub-regional and pan-African peacekeeping forces(in cooperation with Britain and the U.S.) has becomeFrance’s preferred mode of pursuing military interven-tions in Africa as evidenced by its support for all-African interventions in the Central African Republicand Guinea-Bissau in the late 1990s.1 8 R E C A M Pprovides training, while the École de Maintien de laPaix de Zambakro (EMPZ) is a pan-African, tri-lingualregional peacekeeping center designed to train Africanofficers as observers or senior staff officers inpeacekeeping operations. Since 1999, the EMPZ hastrained 310 officers from 25 African countries.

RECAMP was designed to enable African countries,under the aegis of the UN and the OAU, to participatein peacekeeping operations in Africa by preparingAfrican battalions for sub-regional peaceke e p i n goperations. Acting under a joint UN-OAU mandate,RECAMP operations seek to stabilize conflicts throughpreventive deployment; to protect vulnerable popula-tions; and to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts.France has used RECAMP to participate in the financingand training of around 1,500 African military officersand provided equipment necessary for a peaceke e p i n gbattalion in Senegal (1998). The first RECAMP ‘test’ wasthe multinational “Exercise Guidimakha” (1998)involving some 3,500 military personnel from France,Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Cape Verde, The Gambia,Ghana, and Guinea Bissau, with one infantry platoonand one aircraft each contributed by the US and Britain,

and one aircraft provided by Belgium. This ‘war game’required significant technical, logistical and financialsupport from France and cost $6 million. Ironically, theevolving French security policy in West Africa may infact increase the financial and military dependence ofAfrican armies on France. However, French militarybases in Africa may well become the tactical supportand training centers for African armies in the twenty-first century.

As earlier noted, US peacekeeping in Africa effectivelycame to an end following the death of 18 US soldiersin Somalia in October 1993. American peacekeepingpolicy was reformulated and encapsulated in PresidentBill Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), stipulating that the objectives of an operationmust be in America’s national interests, cannot beopen-ended, must include a clear exit strategy, andmust ensure American involvement over command andcontrol arrangements.

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) wasconceived in 1996 as a $25 million a year Americanpeacekeeping, capacity-building and training programwhich would initially focus on seven ‘core’ Africancountries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal,Tunisia, and Uganda. However, the US soon sought toexpand participation in ACRI beyond the originalparticipants. Thus, by July 1997, US Special Forcestraining was expanded to include officers fromCameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Rwanda, SouthAfrica and Zambia. American military training wasalso provided to enlisted ranks in 21 Africanc o u n t r i e s .2 0 This process led to the creation, inNovember 1999, of the Africa Center for StrategicStudies (ACSS). Managed by the Department ofDefense, the ACSS is designed to offer senior Africancivilian and military leaders an academic and practicalprogram and to create new and open lines ofcommunication between American officers and thefuture leadership of participating countries.21

ECOWAS in the Global Security Framework 19

18 See Jean-Dominique Geslin, “Quels gendarmes pour l’Afrique?” Jeune Afrique, 15-21 June 1999, pp. 27-8, which notes that theZambakro training center is financed by France to the tune of 15 million francs; and Guy Martin, “Francophone Africa and France:A Changing Relationship?”, paper presented at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.19 École de Maintien de la Paix de Zambakro: Présentation Générale, Organisation, Bilan Actuel et Infrastructure, Bouaké: EMPZ, 2000.20 Wayne Madsen, Genocide and Covert Operation in Africa, 1993-1999, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999, pp. 251-269.21 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Background Note, n.d.


Through the ACRI program, the US has sought to offertraining and equipment to what it described as“democratizing and civilian-ruled” African states.ACRI trained battalions from Senegal, Uganda, Malawi(1997), Mali, Ghana (1998) and Benin (1999), thoughcritics raised questions about the democratic creden-tials of some of these regimes. ACRI training alsoincludes convoy escorts, logistics, negotiationtechniques, command and control, and protection ofrefugees. Nigeria and South Africa initially rejectedACRI. Abuja, under a military regime at the time andexcluded from participation, saw the initiative as adivisive effort to weaken African security initiatives.Pretoria argued that any such initiative should comethrough the UN. But several ECOWAS states like Benin,Ghana, Mali and Senegal participated in ACRI. Severalparticipants in Abuja, however, criticized the programfor focusing on training rather than on providing moresubstantive logistical support and for being grosslyunder-funded at an annual cost of $25 million.

The third major western actor in Africa is Britain. TheBritish intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000, dueto its unilateral approach, raised an interestingdimension about the future of the West’s role inkeeping the peace in sub-Saharan Africa. Thisintervention launched to support the UN mission inSierra Leone where 500 peacekeepers had beenkidnapped by RUF rebels was a potentially significantevent for contemporary Africa after a period ofreluctance by Western governments to intervene inAfrican conflicts. Significantly, while much praise hasbeen heaped on Britain’s role in Sierra Leone, the UKrefused to place its troops under UN command, prefer-ring instead to offer senior military personnel at theheadquarters in Freetown and a small contingent,based in the capital, supported the UN peacekeepingmission.

The fears of western policymakers of publicdisapproval of involvement in Africa appear in thiscase to have been unfounded. According to KayeWhiteman and Douglas Yates, the Freetown mission is“the most significant British intervention in Africa in

recent years, and certainly of its kind”.22 The missionhas proved to be both positive and problematic. TheUN has recovered from the RUF attacks in May 2000and made progress in its disarmament tasks. However,the British contingent’s relations with UNAMSILremain complex as its troops remain separate from theUN command structure. The British contingent has alsobeen involved in training a new Sierra Leonean army,while the UK has used its position as a permanentmember of the UN Security Council to maintainsupport for UNAMSIL's 17,000 peacekeepers.

ECOWAS and the UN: Co-operation and Conflict

Co-operation between the UN and ECOMOG in Liberiabetween 1993 and 1997, though sometimes fraughtwith disagreements over strategy and mandates,represented the first time that the UN had deployedobservers alongside an existing regional force. The UNcurrently has a peacebuilding office in Liberia andGuinea-Bissau as well as its largest peacekeepingmission in the world in Sierra Leone.

Several participants at the seminar expressed skepti-cism about the role of the UN in Africa. Manyconcluded that the UN Security Council is too remote,


Left to right, General Rufus Kupolati, Former ECOMOG Commander inLiberia, and Ambassador James Jonah, Former UN Under-Secretary forPolitical Affairs

22 Kaye Whiteman and Douglas Yates, “American, British and French Military Cooperation in West Africa,” paper presented at theIPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.


ECOWAS in the Global Security Framework 21

slow and ponderous and incapable of protecting thesecurity interests of small states and sub-regionalstates that do not fit into the national strategicinterests of the major powers. These are some of thefactors that necessitated the creation of a sub-regionalsecurity umbrella under ECOWAS. The diminished roleof the UN in Africa has imposed security responsibili-ties on ECOWAS. But the increasing recognition of thedeficiencies within ECOWAS, including the pursuit ofparochial and contradictory agendas by sub-regionalstates, as well as ECOMOG’s resource constraints, meanthat further emphasis needs to be placed on a clearersharing of responsibility between ECOWAS and the UN.It is evident that ECOWAS cannot both keep the peaceand focus on peacemaking and peacebuilding; theorganization has neither the financial and humancapital, nor the technical skills required to assist war-torn societies by itself. Training for ECOMOG personnelis a necessary prerequisite, but equally important is

that the UN, able to draw on greater financial resourcesthan ECOWAS, carries the burden of peacebuilding.24

The emphasis, according to several participants inAbuja, should be on enhancing and solidifying thepartnership between ECOWAS and other African sub-regional organizations, while the UN should not beabsolved of its primary responsibility for maintaininginternational peace and security globally.

The ECOWAS/UN partnership requires logistical andfinancial support as well as specialized training andsupport for troops contributing to peace operations.This is especially appropriate in light of the recommen-dations of the Brahimi Report of August 2000 on theneed for inter-operability and the deployment of largerunits (brigade rather than battalion) in support of UNpeace operations.24 ECOWAS states will need additionaltraining for stand-by peacekeeping units and betterequipment to perform effectively in such operations. Infact, the Brahimi Report could have been written solelyon the basis of analyzing ECOMOG’s problems over thepast decade. The report emphasizes the need forpolitical cohesion and direction, better rules of engage-ment, resources, command and control, andequipment, all of which are reminiscent of theproblems which plagued ECOMOG’s three missions.

One cannot, however, overlook the important, thoughlimited, burden-sharing experience between ECOWASand the UN in peacekeeping efforts in West Africa.Participants in Abuja noted the need to assess theeffectiveness of UN peacebuilding offices in Liberiaand Guinea-Bissau. The UN office in Liberia has beenslow in its delivery of peacebuilding assistance and itscredibility among Liberian civil society actors wasdamaged by its reluctance to criticize the human rightsrecord of the government of Charles Taylor. In contrast,the UN’s small peacebuilding office in Guinea-Bissauwas praised for working with civil society actors topressure the government on human rights issues.25

23 See International Peace Academy/Center on International Cooperation, Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on theBrahimi Report on UN Peace Operations, Regional Meetings, February-March 2001, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Singapore andLondon.24 Ibid. The “Brahimi Report” has become a short hand title for the UN review of peacekeeping operations published in August 2000by a panel chaired by the former Algerian Foreign Minister and UN Undersecretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi. See Report of the Panelon United Nations Peace Operations, UN General Assembly Document A/55/305, 17 August 2000.25 These points were raised by Adekeye Adebajo during his presentation “Seamen from Renaissance Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia, SierraLeone and Guinea-Bissau,” at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.

“Perhaps the greatest threat to the cordial cooperationbetween ECOWAS and the United Nations relates to [the]question of financial support. ECOWAS members do notunderstand the reluctance of the UN to fund theiroperation in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In particular theyargue correctly that the Security Council recognizes thevaluable role that ECOMOG has played in saving livesand property in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Theypoint out that in the absence of ECOWAS at crucialstages Sierra Leone in particular would have experi-enced greater disaster. They recall with pride thatwithout the efforts of ECOMOG, costly in blood andfinance, the entire sub-region would have gone up inflames. Why then, they ask, is the UN unwilling to playtheir part and provide the necessary funding. They tendto dismiss, as mere excuses, all explanations that inprinciple the UN cannot fund any operation not underits command and control.”

Ambassador James JonahFormer Minster of Finance in Sierra Leone

The UN and western powers have often advocated aregional response to conflicts in West Africa. But asidefrom legitimizing ECOMOG operations, the UN’s ownmissions in West Africa have often failed to coordinatetheir policies effectively with ECOWAS. It was not untilthe collapse of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 2000 thatthe UN Security Council sought to devise a regionalresponse to Sierra Leone’s conflict and even then, therewere divisions and obstacles about the nature of thisresponse. Since January 2001, the UN has, however,tried to develop a series of responses to counter thecharge that it failed to fulfil a key objective inmanaging conflicts, namely conflict prevention. A UN

inter-agency mission led by Assistant Secretary-General, Ibrahima Fall, visited West Africa between 6and 27 March 2001. Following its recommendations,Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, has decided toestablish a UN office in Dakar and to appoint a SpecialRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General for WestAfrica.26 An important recommendation by the inter-agency mission is that any future UN office focus onharmonizing the UN’s activities with those of ECOWAS.These recommendations need to be urgentlyimplemented in light of the deteriorating securitysituation in the Mano River area and its potential todestabilize the entire West African sub-region.



26 Report of the Inter-Agency Mission to West Africa, “Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Durable and Sustainable Solutions toPriority Needs and Challenges in West Africa,” UN Security Council document, 2 May 2001, S/2001/434.

5) From Military Security toHuman Security

Two issues related to human security discussed at theAbuja seminar were: the scourge of small arms and

light weapons in the sub-region, and the impact ofarmed conflicts on children in West Africa. Both civilwars in Liberia and Sierra Leone witnessed widespreadhuman rights abuses and atrocities. Thousands ofdrug-induced child soldiers were often only nominallycontrolled by their leaders. The use of child soldiers toprosecute these wars and the exploitation of childrenas sex slaves has become a source of concern in WestAfrica. In recognition of these concerns, the UN SpecialRepresentative for Children and Armed Conflict, OlaraOtunnu and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) DirectorCarol Bellamy, are addressing the issue of children andarmed conflicts. The proliferation of small arms andlight weapons has escalated the intensity and impact ofintra-state armed conflicts, with an estimated sevenmillion weapons currently circulating in West Africa.The easy availability of these weapons increases thelethality and duration of hostilities and adverselyaffects post-conflict peacebuilding as current events inthe Mano river basin so clearly demonstrate.

Small Arms, Light Weapons

In response to the alarming proliferation of small armsand light weapons (SALW) and its negative impact onlong-term sustainable development, a renewable three-year Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation andManufacture of Light Weapons was signed on 31October 1998 in Abuja, by ECOWAS members. Heads ofstate also approved a Code of Conduct in Lomé, Togo,in December 1999, spelling out the concrete actions tobe taken by member states in order to implement theMoratorium. The Moratorium is a voluntary commit-ment; in essence a confidence-building measure aimedat tackling widespread instability in the West Africansub-region.27

Technical assistance to support the implementation ofthe ECOWAS Moratorium is being provided throughthe Program for the Co-ordination and Assistance forSecurity and Development (PCASED) under theauspices of the United Nations Development Program(UNDP). Despite the 1998 Moratorium, West Africansocieties remain awash with small arms and lightweapons. A closer examination of states which areplagued by the proliferation of small arms and lightweapons shows that they are invariably weak, vulner-able, and open to threats from various internal andexternal sources. These societies suffer from low levelsof socio-economic development, unequal access toresources, high unemployment, and high levels ofpoverty. In several instances, governments in WestAfrica have lost control over large swaths of theirterritories.28 Furthermore, the task of providing securityto citizens and of maintaining law and order where thestate is weak or non-existent is daunting. Non-stateactors (including criminalized and marginalized youthas well as established insurgent forces) with easyaccess to small arms and light weapons heighteninsecurity. Such insecurity is also exacerbated by roguemilitaries, presidential security forces and nationalpolice. The result is an arms race among police, rebelgroups, criminal gangs, vigilantes, the military,warlords, presidential security forces, and criminalgangs.

A number of West African states conducted symbolicarms reduction ceremonies to coincide with the UNConference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and LightWeapons in All its Aspects held in New York from 9 to20 July 2001. In Mali, at least 500 small arms wereburned in a weapons-for-development program underthe auspices of the Malian National Commissionagainst the Proliferation of Small Arms and PCASED.This program also involved the exchange of arms foragricultural tools.

The lack of political will in stemming the proliferationof small arms and light weapons is illustrated by theslow progress toward creating the individual National


27 See Comfort Ero and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, “Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Constraints and Options,” paperpresented at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.28 C. Smith and A. Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa, London Defense Studies, No. 42, Center for Defense Studies,November 1997, pp. 4-5.

From Military Security to Human Security 23

Commissions called for by the 1998 Moratorium. Thecommissions are seen as the concrete implementingmechanism for the Moratorium to succeed and to assistin co-ordinating between national ministries andstakeholders, particularly the security-sector and civilsociety actors. In essence, the commissions ‘serve asfocal points for implementation of activities at thenational level.’29 Only three National Commissionscurrently exist in Guinea, Mali and Niger, and thesehave not yet become fully operational.

The slow progress in establishing the NationalCommissions has been exacerbated by the lack ofcooperation among states in harmonizing policies ona bilateral and sub-regional basis. In particular,progress to harmonize national legislation on thesmall arms issue in West Africa has been very slow,though as a preliminary step, documentation on theseissues has started to be collected by the ECOWA Ssecretariat from some member states. Major obstaclesto implementing the Moratorium also include the lackof training and equipment. A training curriculum hasbeen developed in collaboration with the ECOWA Ssecretariat, but training programs on weaponsmanagement techniques for law enforcement officershave not yet been held. Also significant is the lack ofcapacity within the ECOWAS secretariat to play astronger role in providing oversight for the implemen-tation of the Moratorium. This problem is reflected inthe limited number of personnel working on smallarms issues within the organization. There is still aneed to restructure the ECOWAS secretariat to meetthe needs of the Moratorium and other sub-regionalsecurity concerns.

While the ECOWAS secretariat has so far been unableto make substantial progress in influencing itsmembers to implement the Moratorium, its UNDPp a r t n e r, PCASED, has also faced difficulties inenhancing any sub-regional institutional capacity forcontrolling the flow of small arms and light weaponsin West Africa. ECOWAS and PCASED need to adopt acommon plan of action in implementing key aspects ofthe 1998 Moratorium. ECOWAS could provide PCASEDwith concrete policy direction and guidance about its

role vis-à-vis the Moratorium. ECOWAS needs to takethe lead in shaping and giving weight to the instru-ments necessary to curb the flow of arms in WestAfrica. PCASED should focus on ensuring significantprogress within those countries that have establishedNational Commissions. Further capacity, especiallyexpert advice, should be developed in the NationalCommissions in order to enable them to collect anddestroy surplus and illicit weapons. PCASED also needsto improve its communication strategy in the sub-region by promoting the objectives of the Moratoriumto stakeholders, including sub-regional institutions,NGOs, local communities, policymakers, the privatesector and security agencies.

A key area for progress on the moratorium remains atthe community-based level. More emphasis should beplaced on the role of civil society, local NGOs andcommunity based organizations (CBOs) in workingwith PCASED, especially in mobilizing support toestablish the functions of national commissions in allECOWAS member states. Furthermore, these organiza-tions, drawn from throughout the ECOWAS sub-region,are ideally situated, at the national as well as thegrassroots level, to implement community-basedinitiatives and to broadcast and push forward thepotential and promise of the 1998 Moratorium onsmall arms and light weapons.

Children and Armed Conflicts

The issue of children in armed conflicts represents botha national and regional problem. Its impact is felt notjust by states directly embroiled in war but also bycountries not engaged in formal armed conflicts. Theimpact is felt in several ways: through the socio-economic burden created by the presence of hugerefugee populations in neighboring countries, throughthe threat of insecurity posed by armed elementsmingling with refugee communities, through the riskof the spread of HIV/AIDS by a population adverselyexposed to an environment of unprotected sex,through rape (which is rife during conflicts), throughthe illicit flow of small arms and light weapons, andthrough the illicit trade in natural resources and the

29 Report of the Third Advisory Group Meeting, Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development, Bamako,Mali, 26-27 June 2000, p. 6.


24 From Military Security to Human Security

trafficking of children as child laborers. Consequently,a sub-regional approach that seeks to integratenational policies with regional strategies is required toaddress these problems.

The Liberian civil war illustrated the sub-regional natureof the problem. A link can be made between the use ofchildren during this war, where the phenomenon firstappeared in the sub-region in the 1990s, and its spreadto Sierra Leone where child soldiering also became afeature of the country’s civil war. Significantly, twofactors exacerbated the problem in Liberia: first, thefailure of the international community to address theproblem of impunity during that country’s civil war, andsecond, the flawed and incomplete process of disarma-ment, demobilization, and reintegration which tookplace between 1996 and 1997.3 0

So, what is to be done? The Accra Declaration and Planof Action adopted by ECOWAS member states in April2000 could offer a sound starting point and a goodframe of reference. The Accra meeting set broad princi-ples for the protection of war-affected children andproposed measures that ECOWAS states could take toprevent the use of children in armed conflicts. Onewidely recognized challenge is ensuring that thesebroad guiding principles are translated into policiesthat are harmonized throughout the sub-region.Additionally, experiences and specific policies at thecountry level need to be incorporated into strategies atthe sub-regional level. The Accra Plan of Action callsfor the establishment within the ECOWAS Secretariat ofa desk or focal point dedicated to the protection ofwar-affected children in West Africa. This could be auseful tool for harmonizing sub-regional child protec-tion policies. An ECOWAS Child Protection Unit (CPU),which is currently being established, will be respon-sible for monitoring the status of children in conflictsettings, promoting preventive mechanisms, andsupporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of thesechildren in post-conflict peacebuilding settings. Inaddition, the CPU will deal with emergency assistance,humanitarian and human rights issues, including earlywarning capacity.

The UN Security Council’s decision in 2000 to establisha Special Court in Sierra Leone to address the issue ofjustice – fundamental to the reconciliation process- aswell as a National Commission for War AffectedChildren, was seen by participants in Abuja as positivesteps. However, the UN Secretary-General in his reportto the Security Council of 4 October 2000, proposedthat the Special Court only try crimes committed inSierra Leone after 30 November 1996 - when the firstpeace agreement between the Government and the RUFwas concluded in Abidjan - including mass killings,mutilations, amputations, extra-judicial exe c u t i o n s ,torture, rape and sexual slavery, intentional attacks oncivilian populations, abduction, hostage-taking, forcedrecruitment of children under 15 into military ormilitia forces, and widespread arson. The primarytargets of this proposal are the fighters most responsiblefor these crimes. This raises the issue of whetherchildren or young people between the ages of 15 and 18should be tried for crimes against humanity. As the timeto establish the Special Court draws nearer, ECOWA Smay soon be confronted with this issue, which toucheson the difficulty of harmonizing traditional norms andvalues and international norms and conventions.Furthermore, ECOWAS needs to deliberate seriously onthis issue in order to address the problem of impunityin West Africa, and to deal with the application ofinternational standards in line with local realities.

On the issue of the crisis of youth in West Africa,several participants in Abuja contended that this wasnot a new phenomenon. The crisis of youth, which wasattributed to years of neglect, particularly of ruralyouths, and failed national leaderships, is a feature thatpredates the ongoing conflicts in the sub-region.Several participants also pointed out the need toemphasize more preventive measures in addressing theproblem of children in armed conflicts. Participantsnoted that vision, foresight and political will arerequired, on the part of ECOWAS leaders, to establishconcrete programs that promote the wholesomedevelopment of children in West Africa and therebyprevent them from becoming easy prey for warlordsduring times of conflict.

30 See Funmi Olonisakin, “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in West Africa,” paper presented at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar,Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.


From Military Security to Human Security 25

6) Toward a Pax West Africana:Some Practical Steps

In concluding this report, it is important to note thatE C OWAS has made remarkable progress in

transforming itself from a strictly economic organiza-tion into a sub-regional security umbrella. The effortsto turn ECOMOG into a standing peacekeeping bodygives practical expression to the desire of Africans notonly to keep their own peace, but also to define theirresponses to their own security dilemmas. TheECOWAS security mechanism is the first such sub-regional instrument on the African continent, onewhich other sub-regions and the newly created AfricanUnion can emulate as they strive to respond to issuesof governance, conflict and security.

Yet, important instruments such as the ECOWA Ssecurity mechanism still remain an ideal, moreeffective in theory than in practice. ECOWAS still has along way to go in managing and ultimately buildingpeace in West Africa. The functioning of its newsecurity mechanism could be negatively affected by theabsence or weakness of democratic institutions in somemember states. A key and fundamental concern of theAbuja seminar was how to make ECOWAS and itssecurity mechanism more effective. What doesECOWAS need to do to turn the mechanism into afunctioning reality? A number of critical interven-tions, which focused on operational factors, seemnecessary to consolidate the efforts made by ECOWASin the area of sub-regional peace and security. Theserelate to: streamlining ECOWAS’activities, addressingits resource, logistics and operational problems, anddeveloping strategies for closer collaboration betweenECOWAS and civil society actors in West Africa.

Streamlining ECOWAS’ activities

There is a strong case to be made for ECOWAS tostreamline its current activities. ECOWAS has an overlyambitious agenda as well as structural and manage-ment problems that continually undermine its abilityto deliver tangible results. At present, the organizationfinds itself trying to mediate sub-regional disputes andto devise a security apparatus when its institutions are

still under-developed when it is still vulnerable toexternal political pressure, and when most of itsmember states are among the poorest countries in theworld. In recognition that a majority of the states inWest Africa face economic crises and can not afford tocontinue to undertake expensive peace operations,several participants in Abuja suggested that a systemof burden-sharing and partnerships be developedbetween ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, and civil societyorganizations in the fields of conflict prevention,conflict management, and peacebuilding.

Addressing personnel capacity

Directly related to streamlining ECOWAS’ activities isthe need to ensure that the organization has the capacityto act effectively to implement the decisions of itsleaders. ECOWAS’ lack of capacity in developing itssecurity mechanism is a major stumbling bloc to itssuccessful implementation. A significant issue relates tostaffing. The skills and experience required for thevarious tasks set out in the ECOWAS security mechanismare different from those traditionally available withinE C OWAS. If ECOWAS is serious about mobilizing itscapacity to contribute significantly to improvingsecurity and governance in West Africa, it needs toundergo a thorough job-specification and profilinge xercise to ensure that the right people undertake theright jobs. A more transparent and rigorous selectionprocess should be developed to ensure quality andcompetence at all levels within the ECOWAS secretariat.


26 Toward a Pax West Africana: Some Practical Steps

Major General Martin Agwai , UNAMSIL Deputy Force Commander

In addition and equally importantly, ECOWAS needsto ensure that the adequate number of staff isallocated to its various tasks. For example, thecreation of the ECOWAS security mechanism reliedentirely on its three legal officers, and only recentlyhave officials with security expertise been hired. Butthe secretariat still lacks sufficient staff to perform itssecurity tasks. Finally, adequate training in the areaof conflict prevention and a period of induction anddevelopment of operating procedures should be aprerequisite for all ECOWAS staff members working inthe security area.

Logistics and operational factors – targeting donorresponse

At the heart of ECOWAS’ difficulties in implementingthe goals of its security mechanism are its logisticaland operational weaknesses. The need for externalassistance to strengthen ECOWAS’ capacity in this areacannot be overemphasized. But money needs to beproperly targeted and allocated in a transparent andaccountable manner to ensure significant impact. Aserious needs assessment exercise should beundertaken focusing on areas where assistance isalready on offer. Greater attention should be placed onassessing progress and identifying gaps to be filled.The European Union (EU) has already allocated 2million euros to the Department for Political Affairs,Defense and Security for setting up the four zonalobservation bureaus of the security mechanism. TheGovernment of Japan has contributed $100,000 to thestaffing of two zonal bureaus. The US Agency forInternational Development (USAID) has contributed$250,000 toward capacity-building. Canada hascontributed $300,000 for the establishment of anE C OWAS Child Protection Unit. Germany is alsocontributing funds toward the ECOWAS securitymechanism.

Donors need to engage more actively with ECOWAS’security mechanism. They need to evaluate effectivelythe progress made vis-à-vis areas to which they havecontributed resources. It is not enough to allocateresources to ECOWAS. More important is to conductmissions aimed at tracking progress. Support for thefunding and logistics of sub-regional peacekeeping, aswell as for conflict prevention, is crucial to establishing

an effective security mechanism. At the same time, theECOWAS Secretariat has to be more available to thedonor and research communities.

ECOWAS: Developing a Common Vision andCommon Values

E C OWAS leaders need to confront the charge, madeparticularly by West African civil society actors, thatthey have sometimes sided with impunity over justicein reaching peace agreements. The implementation ofE C OWAS’ sanctions regime challenging leaders whopersistently undermine sub-regional security andmanipulate the internal politics of neighboring stateswould go a long way in building confidence betweenE C OWAS’ leaders and their citizens. In addition,E C OWAS needs to consider its role in tackling warcrimes perpetuated by rebels and politicians. Theatrocities inflicted on innocent Sierra Leoneancivilians by RUF rebels, the Sierra Leone Army, theCivil Defense Forces, and even in some cases ECOMOGsoldiers, must be properly addressed by ECOWAS if itis serious about devising a mechanism that tackles thebasic security fears of ordinary people. An effectivesanctions and justice regime goes to the heart ofgovernance and conflict prevention efforts in the sub-r e g i o n .

If ECOWAS is to build an effective peacekeepingmechanism, then all the countries in the sub-regionshould have a common goal on security priorities aswell as a strategic and coherent vision on how theyplan to tackle insecurity in the sub-region. Thisrequires candid and open dialogue at the highestpolitical level. ECOWAS needs to continue its progressin implementing its security mechanism. Thismechanism is widely recognized as the best frameworkto end the history of ad hoc responses to insecurity inWest Africa and represents a praise-worthy effort toinstitutionalize the experiences and lessons learnedover the last decade.

While ECOWAS is establishing its political and institu-tional organs, it also needs to develop a well-funded,well-trained and well-organized military structure onthe foundations of ECOMOG. Among the problemsconfronting ECOMOG noted at the Abuja seminar are:command and control issues, particularly between field


Toward a Pax West Africana: Some Practical Steps 27

commanders and headquarters, language problemsbetween contingents, logistical and financial deficien-cies, and differences in training practices, militarydoctrines and communication equipment.

ECOWAS and Civil Society

Many civil society actors in West Africa have little orno confidence in ECOWAS’ ability to address conflictsand human rights abuses. Sub-regional leadersurgently need to improve ECOWAS relations with civilsociety actors in West Africa who complain thatgovernments often feel threatened by them and have aprofound distrust of their work. ECOWAS is oftenperceived by many of these actors to be a ‘club ofdictators’ where regime survival is privileged over therights of citizens. That said, ECOWAS is alreadyworking with sub-regional civil society organizationsin developing its early warning system. Civil societygroups are expected to submit reports to the ECOWASsecretariat for use in preventive diplomacy. Suchcollaboration should be encouraged in future.

The role of local civil society actors in various democra-tization efforts in the sub-region is further indication ofthe important role that such actors can play indeveloping a conflict prevention strategy withinE C OWAS. The organization needs to develop a concreteplan of action to work in a more coherent and coordi-nated manner with civil society groups in West Africa.E C OWAS and civil society actors remain suspicious ofeach other. Civil society is often seen by sitting regimesas a front for political opposition groups to mountchallenges against governments, while ECOWAS isoften seen by civil society to be supporting the statusquo and established regimes. Such suspicions can bedissipated through closer collaboration.

Though often seen as a nebulous conglomeration, civilsociety can be enormously useful to ECOWAS inaddressing many of the security dilemmas confronting

the sub-region.31 Over the past decade, the role of civilsociety has become critical in shaping the discourse onresolving West Africa’s security dilemmas. Civil societywas important in efforts to develop ECOWAS’ securitymechanism, especially the emphasis on creating a morecoherent and strategic outlook in developing a coordi-nated response to conflicts in West Africa.

ECOWAS should also focus on using civil societygroups, including local non-governmental organiza-tions, expert research institutes that focus ongovernance and security issues, religious organiza-tions, and community-based organizations, to provideearly warning analysis, and to assist in thinkingthrough its response to conflicts. The monitoring roleof such groups and their links with local communitiescould prove indispensable to ECOWAS as it develops itsown conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies.

In thinking about the way forward and prospects for anenhanced security framework to tackle West Africa’ssecurity dilemmas, some of the other recommendationsthat emerged from the IPA / E C OWAS seminar ofSeptember 2001 focused on: ECOWAS’ relationshipwith the UN and western donors as well as ECOWAS’future collaboration with IPA. Many of theserecommendations were similar to those raised duringIPA’s seminar on security in Southern Africa held inBotswana in December 200032. This signifies a need toensure that Africa’s sub-regional organizations andactors continue to share their experiences and lessonswith each other.

ECOWAS and the UN

The decision by the UN to create a West Africa officein Dakar and to appoint a Special Representative of theSecretary-General to head this office is a welcomeinitiative and recognition that a regionalized approachis needed to tackle the nexus between governance andsecurity in West Africa.33 However, the role of the UN



31 This point was raised by Yasmin Yusu-Sheriff in her presentation “The Role of West African Civil Society in Conflict Managementand Peace Building,” at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.32 See the report by International Peace Academy, in partnership with the Africa Renaissance Institute, the Southern Africa RegionalInstitute for Policy Studies, and the University of Witwatersrand Department of International Relations, “Southern Africa’s EvolvingSecurity Architecture: Problems and Prospects,” December 2000, Gaborone.33 See the report by International Peace Academy/Permanent Mission of Colombia to the UN, Regional Approaches to ConflictManagement in Africa, 8 August 2001, New York.

Special Representative must be more than that of aroving ambassador. The envoy must be tasked topursue a holistic agenda that takes into account theoverlapping and interconnected nature of conflicts inthe sub-region, cross-border concerns and the impactthat poverty continues to have on development andsecurity in West Africa. ECOWAS should work closelywith the UN envoy to ensure that the needs of the sub-region are properly addressed. Specifically, ECOWASshould devise a strategic framework indicating areas ofpriority and steps needed to build effective cooperationbetween itself and the UN in the field of conflictmanagement and monitoring of democratic accounta-bility in the sub-region.

The UN needs to pay particular attention to Liberia,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone, which share asimilar history of instability, weak or repressiveregimes, and an absence of the rule of law, poverty, andhuman rights abuses. Special attention will also need tobe paid to political, ethnic and religious tensions inNigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, and to the problems inSenegal’s Casamance region. Increasing instability andcross-border clashes as well as increased politicaltensions require the UN to deliver a more coherent andcomprehensive response to these crises and conflicts.

ECOWAS and the West

The ECOWAS security mechanism remains largely atheoretical construct because member states have yetto devise a way in which to operationalize its keycomponents. ECOWAS needs help in operationalizingits security mechanism and in making it more effectivein managing conflicts. Specific assistance should focuson capacity-building, mainly the provision of logisticsand finance and not just on training as is often thecase. The role of Western governments like the US,France, and Britain is vital in helping ECOWAS to makeits mechanism more effective and in contributing topost-conflict peacebuilding. However, donors need toengage more closely with ECOWAS and allow it to setits own priorities in identifying areas for assistance andgaps and weaknesses in current programs.

ECOWAS and IPA

Finally, IPA was involved in crafting the ECOWASsecurity mechanism through the former Director of itsAfrica Program, Margaret Vogt, who served as thechair of the group of experts that drafted themechanism. IPA, through its current three-year projecton Developing Regional and Sub-regional SecurityMechanisms in Africa (2000-2003), has taken steps inassisting the strengthening of Africa’s evolvingsecurity mechanisms. For IPA to assist in developing acrisis warning capacity that will benefit ECOWAS, thesub-regional organization needs to develop closer linkswith civil society and community-based organizationsto monitor, analyze, and provide timely information toECOWAS.

ECOWAS should draw on the lessons and experiencesthat the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had inestablishing its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,Management and Resolution between 1993 and 2000.IPA’s assessment of the OAU Mechanism explores whyit has been so difficult to operationalize its mechanism.This seven-year partnership with the OAU could behelpful to ECOWAS. Between 1992 and 1999, IPAundertook research and held five seminars in Africafocusing on conceptualizing and operationalizing theOAU security mechanism. IPA, in an advisory capacityand in close cooperation with ECOWAS, could applysome of the lessons from its experience with the OAUto strengthen ECOWAS’ security mechanism. 34

IPA is in a position to play a role in bridging the divideand fostering cooperation between the UN andECOWAS. In this context, IPA staff briefed the UNInter-Agency Task Force working level group on therecommendations from its Abuja seminar in November2001 and has been invited to attend some meetings ofthe UN task force. At the Abuja seminar, some partici-pants noted that IPA needs to work toward bringingboth ECOWAS and the UN together, not just fordialogue, but also for practical and more coordinatedwork. Some participants also suggested that IPA’sfuture work in consolidating its assistance with


Toward a Pax West Africana: Some Practical Steps 29

34 See Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management andResolution, 1993-2000, New York: International Peace Academy, November 2000.

ECOWAS should aim at targeting groups in West Africathat can help ECOWAS improve its response to crises asthey unfold and in ensuring that speedy andappropriate actions are taken to manage theseconflicts.

It was also suggested at Abuja that future IPA workwith ECOWAS should focus on consolidating its closeworking relationship with ECOWAS personnel,especially in providing training in the areas of conflictassessment. Specifically, it was proposed that IPAcould establish a program to provide contractpersonnel to the ECOWAS Secretariat for periods of 3-

12 months in order to lend technical expertise to thework of ECOWAS’ security mechanism. IPA has alsosuggested the convening of a small Task Force of 15-20 experts to advise the ECOWAS Secretariat onpractical ways of strengthening its securitymechanism. The IPA / E C OWAS seminar suggested thatmore emphasis be placed on training ECOWA Spersonnel to respond to conflicts, improve technicalassistance, and ensure that the ECOWAS secretariat isequipped to design appropriate responses to events asthey unfold. Only through such efforts can a genuinePax West Africana be forged in one of Africa’s mosttroubled sub-regions.



Participants at the IPA/ECOWAS Seminar, Abuja, Nigeria, 27-29 September 2001.


Annex I 31

ANNEX IAgenda

Thursday, 27 September 2001

The Changing Security Landscape in West Africa

9:00 - 10:15 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Ambassador John Hirsch, Vice-President, International Peace Academy

General Cheick Oumar Diarra , ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary for PoliticalAffairs, Defense and Security, “ECOWAS and Regional Security in West Africa”

Opening Address

His Excellency, General Theophilus Danjuma, Minister of Defense of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria, “Nigeria’s Security Role in West Africa”

10:30 - 11:30 Keynote Address

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, African Center for Development and Strategic Studies,Nigeria, “ECOWAS at 26: A Retrospective Journey”

13:30 - 15:30 Session I: The Evolving Security Architecture in West Africa

Chair: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, African Center for Development andStrategic Studies, Nigeria

Panelists: Lt.-General Emmanuel A. Erskine , Former United Nations ForceCommander, Lebanon, “The ECOWAS Security Mechanism”

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, International Peace Academy,“Seamen from Renaissance Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia, Sierra Leoneand Guinea-Bissau”

Dr. Daniel Bach, Association pour le Dévelopment de l’Enseignement etdes Recherches auprès des Universités, des Centres de Recherche et desEntreprises d’Aquitaine (ADERA), France “ECOWAS: Trade,Regionalization and Security in West Africa”

Discussants: General Rufus Kupolati, Former ECOMOG Commander in Liberia; andMr. Roger Laloupo, Chief, Legal Affairs Division, ECOWAS

15:45 - 18:00 Session II: Governance, the Military and Civil Society in West Africa

Chair: Professor Joy Ogwu, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Nigeria

Panelists: Professor Amos Sawyer, Indiana University, United States,“Governance, Democratization and Security in West Africa”paper presented by Dr. Yusuf Bangura, United Nations ResearchInstitute for Social Development, Switzerland

Professor Jimmy Kandeh, University of Richmond, United States,“Reforming the Military in West Africa”

Ms. Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, University of London, United Kingdom,“The Conflict Management Role of Civil Society in West Africa”

Discussant: Colonel Globo Denis Guie , Dirécteur de la Défense, Ministère de laDéfense, Côte d’Ivoire

20:00 Dinner Address

Chair: Senator Ike O.S. Nwachukwu, Chairman, Government Affairs,Nigerian National Assembly, Nigeria

Ambassador James Jonah, Former UN Under-Secretary-General forPolitical Affairs, “Security Co-operation between ECOWAS and the UN”

Discussant: Brigadier-General Henry Anyidoho , Former Deputy Force Commanderof the United Nations Force in Rwanda

Friday, 28 September 2001

9:30 - 12:30 Session III: Global West Africa

Chair: Dr. Domba Jean-Marc Palm, Former Foreign Minister and Secretary-General, Centre National de Recherche Scientifique et Technologique(CNRST), Burkina Faso

Professor Guy Martin, New York University, United States,“Francophone Africa and France: A Changing Relationship?”paper presented by Mr. Kaye Whiteman, Business Media, Nigeria

Mr. Kaye Whiteman, Business Media, Nigeria, and Dr. Douglas Yates,American University, France, “The American, British and FrenchSecurity Roles in West Africa”

Dr. Chris Landsberg, Center for African International Relations (CAIR),University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, “The Fifth Wave ofPan-Africanism: Implications for West Africa’s Security Architecture”

Annex I32


Discussant: Professor Théodore Holo , Agrégé de Droit Publique et de SciencePolitique, Former Foreign Minister, Cotonou, Benin

14:00 - 16:00 Session IV: Child Soldiers, Light Weapons and Small Arms

Chair: Ms. Afiwa Kafui Kuwonu, President, Women in Law and Developmentin Africa, Togo

Panelists: Dr. Funmi Olonisakin, United Nations Office of Children and ArmedConflict, “A Crisis of Youth?: Children and Armed Conflicts in WestAfrica” paper presented by Mr. Augustine Toure, Ruth Young ForbesCivil Society Fellow, International Peace Academy

Dr. Comfort Ero, International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone andMs. Angela Muvumba , International Peace Academy, “Halting the Flowof Light Weapons and Small Arms in West Africa”

Discussant: Dr. Martin Uhomoibhi, Deputy Ambassador of Nigeria to the OAU

16:15 - 18:15 Session V: Rebels, Sobels, and the Political Economy of Conflicts in West Africa

Chair: Hon. Nuwe Amanya-Mushega, Secretary-General, East AfricanCommunity

Panelists: Professor Eboe Hutchful, Wayne State University, United States andDr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana,“The Political Economy of Conflicts in West Africa”

Professor Ibrahim Abdullah, University of Western Cape, South Africaand Professor Ismail Rashid, Vassar College, United States “RebelMovements in West Africa”

Discussants: Lt.-General Arnold Quainoo, Former ECOMOG Force Commander inLiberia and Chief Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defense,Sierra Leone

20:00 Dinner Address

Chair: Ambassador James Jonah, Former UN Under-Secretary-General forPolitical Affairs

Major-General Martin Agwai , UNAMSIL Deputy Force Commander,“The UN Pe a c e keeping Mission in Sierra Leone: Problems and Prospects”

Discussant: Ambassador Joe Blell, High Commissioner of Sierra Leone toNigeria

Annex I 33


Saturday, 29 September 2001

9:00 - 12:00 Session VI: The Way Forward

Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, International Peace Academy

Rapporteur’s Summary:

Rapporteurs:Dr. Comfort Ero, International Crisis Group, Sierra Leone,Dr. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, International Peace Academy andMr. Augustine Toure, International Peace Academy

Follow-On Activities in West Africa and New York:

General Cheick Oumar Diarra , ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretaryfor Political Affairs, Defense and Security and Dr. Adekeye Adebajo,International Peace Academy

Annex I34


Dr. Ibrahim AbdullahUniversity of Western CapeCapetown, South Africa

Colonel Festus Aboagye Organization of African UnityAddis Ababa, Ethiopia

Dr. Adekeye AdebajoInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Professor Adebayo AdedejiAfrican Center for Development and Strategic Studies Ijebu Ode, Nigeria

Major-General Martin AgwaiUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Freetown, Sierra Leone

Rev. Dr. A.A. Akrong Forum of Religious BodiesLegon-Accra, Ghana

Maitre S.A. Alao Cotonou, Benin

Hon. Nuwe Amanya-MushegaEast African CommunityArusha, Tanzania

Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi AningInstitute of Economic AffairsLegon-Accra, Ghana

Major-General Henry AnyidohoFormer Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Force in RwandaAccra, Ghana

Mr. Michel Ben ArrousAfrican Institute of Political Geography Dakar, Senegal

Mr. Ben AsantePan-African NewsLondon, United Kingdom

Dr. Daniel C. BachAssociation pour le Dévelopment de l’Enseignementet des Recherches auprès des Universités (ADERA)Bordeaux, France

Brigadier Dick BalyDepartment for International DevelopmentLondon, United Kingdom

Dr. Yusuf BanguraUnited Nations Research Institute forSocial DevelopmentGeneva, Switzerland

Ambassador Stig BarlyngEmbassy of DenmarkOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Col. Jean Pierre BayalaMinistry of DefenseOuagadougou, Burkina Faso

Ambassador Joe C. BlellSierra Leone High CommissionLagos, Nigeria

General Theophilus DanjumaMinistry of Defense Abuja, Nigeria

Ms. Arielle DankoroWomen, Army and PeaceCotonou, Benin

General Cheick Oumar DiarraECOWAS SecretariatAbuja, Nigeria

Annex II 35


ANNEX IIParticipants

Annex II36


Dr. Adrienne Yande DiopECOWAS Secretariat Abuja, Nigeria

Mr. Robert Dossou Professor Emeritus Faculty of Political Science and LawUniversité Nationale du BéninCotonou, Benin

Ms. Thelma EkiyorConnect SynergyLagos, Nigeria

Ms. Angela EmmanuelAfrican Center for Democracy andHuman Rights StudiesBanjul, Gambia

Dr. Comfort EroInternational Crisis GroupFreetown, Sierra Leone

Lt.-General Emmanuel ErskineFormer United Nations Force Commander in LebanonAccra, Ghana

Mr. Zakaria FofanaMinistry of Foreign Affairs Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Col. Globo Denis GuieMinistry of DefenseAbijan, Côte d’ Ivoire

Mr. Kore GueiUniversity de CocodyAbijan, Côte d’ Ivoire

Ms. Claire HicksonU.K. Department for International DevelopmentAbuja, Nigeria

Ambassador John HirschInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Professor Théodore HoloAgrégé de Droit Publique et de Science Politique Cotonou, Benin

Professor Eboe HutchfulWayne State UniversityDetroit, Michigan

Ambassador Joshua O.B. IrohaMinistry of Foreign AffairsLagos, Nigeria

Dr. Apiribo IyallaScanWater Nigeria Ltd. Lagos, Nigeria

Ambassador James JonahFormer UN Under-Secretary-GeneralNew York

Mr. Emmanuel JoofAfrican Society of International and Comparative LawBanjul, Gambia

Dr. Monica JumaInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Ms. Yasmin Jusu-SheriffUniversity of LondonLondon, United Kingdom

Professor Jimmy KandehUniversity of RichmondRichmond, Virginia

Ambassador Nana Bema Kumi Ghana High CommissionAbuja, Nigeria

General Rufus Kupolati Former ECOMOG Commander in LiberiaLagos, Nigeria

Ms. Afiwa Kafui KuwonuWomen in Law and Development in Africa Lomé, Togo

Annex II 37


Mr. Nathaniel KwaboLiberia Democracy WatchMonrovia, Liberia

Mr. Roger LaloupoECOWAS SecretariatAbuja, Nigeria

Dr. Chris LandsbergUniversity of the WitwatersrandJohannesburg, South Africa

Dr. Mariam Dybrilla Maiga Mouvement National des Femmes pour le Sauvegardede la Paix et de l’Unité NationaleBamako, Mali

Mr. John McNeish Canadian High CommissionAbuja, Nigeria

Ms. Aida MengistuInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Ms. Jilla MoazamiInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Mr. Emmanuel Rene MoiseMinistry of DefenseDakar, Senegal

Mr. David Monyae University of the WitwatersrandJohannesburg, South Africa

Dr. Musifiky MwanasaliOrganization of African UnityAddis Ababa, Ethiopia

Ms. Angela Ndinga-MuvumbaInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Chief Hinga NormanMinistry of Defense Freetown, Sierra Leone

Senator Ike O.S. NwachukwuNigerian National Assembly Abuja, Nigeria

Ms. Ayo ObeCivil Liberties Organization Ikeja, Nigeria

Mr. Frank OfeiECOWAS SecretariatAbuja, Nigeria

Professor Joy OgwuNigerian Institute of International AffairsLagos, Nigeria

Mr. Paul OmachMakerere UniversityKampala, Uganda

Dr. Domba Jean-Marc PalmCentre National de Recherche Scientifique etTechnologique (CNRST)Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Ambassador Karl PrinzMinistry of Foreign Affairs Berlin, Germany

Lt.-General Arnold QuainooCenter for Conflict Resolution Legon-Accra, Ghana

Professor Ismail RashidVassar CollegePoughkeepsie, New York

Colonel Patrice SartrePermanent Mission of France to the United NationsNew York

Dr. Wahegeru Pal Singh SidhuInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Professor John StremlauUniversity of the WitwatersrandJohannesburg, South Africa

Annex II38

Mr. Augustine ToureInternational Peace AcademyNew York

Dr. Martin Uhomoibhi Embassy of Nigeria to the OAUAddis Ababa, Ethiopia

Mr. Batilloi I. WarritayUNICEF Lagos, Nigeria

Mr. Kaye Whiteman Business Media Lagos, Nigeria

Major-General C.B. Yaache Ministry of DefenseAccra, Ghana

Dr. Douglas YatesAmerican University of ParisParis, France


International Peace Academy777 United Nations PlazaNew York, NY 10017-3521Tel: (212) 687-4300Fax: (212) 983-8246www.ipacademy.org

ECOWASExecutive Secretariat60, Yakubu Gowon Crescent,Asokoro District P.M.B. 401Abuja, NigeriaTel: (234) (9) 31 47 647-9Fax: (234) (9) 31 43 005, 31 47 646www.ecowas.int

toward a pax west africana · human security, with specific attention focused on the right of the...

Documents