towards a characterization of colonial power on rapa nui (1917-1936)

7/28/2019 Towards a characterization of colonial power on Rapa Nui (1917-1936)

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5Rapa Nui Journal Vol. 27 (1) May 2013

Introduction

At the beginning o the twentieth century, one o themost important indigenous uprisings in the historyo Rapa Nui occurred in reaction to the oppressiveliving conditions and colonial domination o the islandimposed by the Company in charge o its exploitation,the Compaa Explotadora de Isla de Pascua, orCEDIP.1 The rebellion, commonly reerred to as theAngata Rebellion, occurred between May and July1914 and was described by various sources rom theera, including a report written by the Armada, Proessor

Vives Solars article based on the Rapanui eye-witnessaccounts, and the testimony o Katherine Routledge(Hotus et al. 1988; Routledge 1919; Vives Solar 1917).Although it was brought to an end, the rebellionsatermath included a series o signicant changes inthe political structures o the colonial presence on theisland (Hotus et al. 1988).2

One product o the rebellion, responding to the needto create a new colonial pact between the State, theRapanui community, and the Company, was the Navysdesignation o a Maritime Subdelegate (SubdelegadoMartimo) that was independent o the CEDIP, or

at least nominally so. Likewise, the signing o theTemperamento Provisorio, or Provisional Code, in1917 established a new contract between the Companyand the State, reconguring the ramework o thesocial relations on Rapa Nui. The Provisional Code

had seven points in which the State imposed new rulesand obligations or the Company in exchange or areelease o the island. Only two o these seven points dealtwith the islanders. The rst declared that 2000 hectareso land were to be kept or the use o the Rapanui

people and or public services. The second establishedthe CEDIPs obligation to grant the Rapanui via theSubdelegate access to the Companys land or shing

practices and the collection o animal uel. This newcontract, provisional in theory, lasted eectively untilFebruary 1936.

The rst independent Subdelegate, who becamethe ocial representative o the State on Rapa Nui, wasJos Ignacio Vives Solar (1914-1917). His successorsduring the Provisional Code were Exequiel Acua(1917-1921), Luis Zepeda (1921-1922), ExequielAcua or a second time (1922-1926), CarlosRecabarren (1926-1928), Carlos Milln (1928), CarlosRecabarren or a second time (1928-1931), AlbertoCumplido (1931), Eduardo valos (1931-1933),Hernn Cornejo (1933-1935), and nally, ManuelOlalquiaga (1935-1936).

This article aims to characterize the orms ocolonial power on the island during this key period

o 1917 to 1936, by refecting on and analyzing theactions o both the Chilean State and the Company.We use archival sources rom the Archive o theMaritime Ministry and the Archive o the Intendenciade Valparaso as the oundation o our analysis.3

This paper seeks to characterize the structure o colonial power on Rapa Nui rom 1917 to 1936, the years o the

so-called Temperamento Provisorio (Provisional Code). Based on the analysis o documents acquired rom

the archives o the Naval Ministry and the Administrative Division o Valparaso, this study provides a reection on

the actions o the Chilean State and the Compaia Explotadora de Isla de Pascua during those years.

Este trabajo busca aportar con algunos elementos para una caracterizacin de la situacin del poder colonial en

Rapa Nui durante el periodo 1917-1936, los aos del as llamado Temperamento Provisorio. Teniendo por base

la revisin de documentos provenientes del Archivo del Ministerio de Marina y del Archivo de la Intendencia de

Valparaso, llevaremos a cabo una reexin en torno a la accin del Estado chileno y la Compaa Explotadora

de Isla de Pascua durante estos aos.

Towards a characterization of colonial power on

Rapa Nui (1917-1936)

Miguel Fuentes and Cristin Moreno Pakarati

Miguel Fuentes | Universidad de Chile. [email protected] Moreno Pakarati | Pontifcia Universidad Catlica de Chile. [email protected]


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Towards a characterization o colonial power on Rapa Nui (1917-1936)

The State

In order to characterize the State presence on RapaNui, one must go beyond the most obvious answer:colonialism. The particular nature o this Chileancolonial state is extremely relevant to understandingthe dynamics o its relationships with the Companyand the indigenous Rapanui.

One o the rst issues that surges to the ore whenconsidering these questions is the semi-colonial andsomewhat stunted character o the annexing colonial

power: Chile.4 In contrast to other colonial enterpriseso the era, the Chilean presence in Polynesia stands out

precisely or its precarious nature. During most o theperiod rom 1917 to 1936, Rapa Nui was consideredmerely a legal territory (or territorio fscal) o Chilethat was turned over or exploitation to a privatecompany owned by powerul oreign interests.5 Duringthis time, though deensive o its political sovereignty

over the island, the Chilean government was incapableo certiying public properties on the island, just as theywere unable to require that the CEDIP pay rental eesor the utilization o lands and livestock on Rapa Nui(Vergara 1939; see also Porteous 1981).

However, despite these limitations, the actionso the State apparatus had a tremendous impact onthe island. The existence o permanent governmentinstitutions, charged with regulating o the lives oindigenous islanders, constituted a orce that hada powerul impact on the social relations o theRapanui population. The periodic arrival o militaryunctionaries, civil sta and proessionals, and the

annual arrival o Navy ships, combined with the latentthreats o deportation, gave the State power a strong

presence that was dicult to ignore (Foerster 2010).Overall, this State presence on Rapa Nui

maniested itsel in several dierent orms. One o themost important, according to sources rom the era, wasthe annual arrival o naval missions. These missionsinormed the Maritime Ministry about the situationon the island, while also serving to ensure that localocials and the population obeyed the directives othe government. At the same time, they ullled theagreement between the State and the Company whilecarrying out other needed tasks. For instance, they

helped to resolve conficts that had arisen between thepopulation and authorities by carrying out summaryinvestigations and collecting inormation rom all

parties involved in the conficts. And, generallyspeaking, the decisions o naval commanders, backedup by armed contingents, had a resolute and denitivecharacter, and were respected nearly across the board.

While they were short visits, the arrival o thesenaval missions resulted in a substantial strengtheningo State institutions and power on the island. For

several days, the commanders appeared to have thecapacity to resolve everything, rom questions oadministrative order, to problems o a moral nature,such as the existence o poorly constituted Rapanuiamilies. The ollowing excerpt is rom a visit othe Baquedano, under Captain Felipe Wiegand, inDecember 1921:6

Tan pronto se hubo ondeado en Hanga Roa viene abordo el Sub-Delegado de la Isla y representante de laCasa Williamson Balour [] Los Ociales inicianel cumplimiento de las comisiones recibidas que sedistribuyen as: Capitan de Corbeta Sr. Fernndez:Atencin e investigacin de los reclamos elevados

por los nativos, tanto los escritos como aquellosverbales [] Contador Io. Sr. Astorga: Revisacinde inventarios de los eectos scales y de lasdependencias coneccionadas el ao 1917. CirujanoIo. Sr. Merino: Exmen sobre la propagacin de

la avariosis entre los nativos y el mismo sobre lalepra y s los leprosos recludos en la leproserason atendidos conorme al acuerdo vijente del ao17 por la Comisin consultiva de la isla. CapellnSr. Fermandois: Fuera de la misin propia de suMinisterio, tuvo especial encargo de cerciorarse si secumple con la obligacin respecto a la alimentacinde los nativos y averiguar los nombre de aquellosque no tenan lejitimamente constituida la amilia[] Finalmente, los reclamos recibieron solucincon arreglo a la Ley el mismo da de nuestra salidaen lo que respecta a amilias no lejitimadas y loscasos de amancebamiento.

[As soon as we [the Baquedano] had docked inHanga Roa, the Subdelegate o the Island and therepresentative o the Williamson Balour Co. cameaboard. The ocers began carrying out theirassigned duties which were distributed as ollows:Captain Fernandez, attention to the complaintso the natives, both written and verbal Firstaccountant Astorga, revision o the inventories o

public property and the dependencies created in1917 Surgeon Merino: Examination and studyo disease among the natives, as well as specicallyleprosy and the lepers conned to the leper colony

in order to determine i they are being cared orin accordance with the 1917 agreement o theCommission or the island; Mr. Fermandois, asiderom the requirements o his own ministry, wasspecially charged with veriying the nutrition o the

population and to track those, by name, who did nothave a legitimately constituted amily Finally, allissues regarding illegitimate amilies and childrenreceived resolutions in accordance with the law onthe day o our departure] (AMM 1921a).


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However, State power ound itsel in a very dierentsituation once those naval missions abandoned theisland. In act, the duties o the Maritime Subdelegate,the principal representative o the Chilean governmenton Rapa Nui, appeared very similar to those o thecommanders: periodically inorming the MaritimeMinistry o the situation on the island, ensuringthe implementation o government directives, andensuring that the agreements between the Companyand State established in 1917 were respected. Amongthe various other responsibilities that gured in theduties o the Subdelegate was also the resolutiono conficts that arose between the population o theisland, local authorities, and the livestock company,as well as the administration o the oces o the civilregistry, the police, the school, leper policies, ensuringthe unctioning o roads, public spaces, cemeteries, etc.

As was the case with the commanders during theirbrie visits to the island, the Subdelegate was also

charged with the primary objective o regulating allaspects o the public and private lives o the Rapanuipeople. Among the many tasks included in this objectivewere the carrying out o periodic censuses o the

population and inventories o public holdings, as wellas the enorcement o a series o ordinances aimed atensuring the cleanliness and hygiene o the indigenous

people and at strengthening good and moral habits.7However, the actions o the Subdelegate were

nearly always questioned, especially when no navalcontingents were present on the island. Not only didthe indigenous population resist his authority, butlocal authorities, including CEDIP administrators, also

resisted his decisions and authority on occasion.8 Thesetensions sometimes came to light at certain opportunemoments, which then allowed these authorities toseek solutions rom the visiting naval commanders solutions which were sometimes unavorable to theSubdelegates themselves.

In the mid-1930s, Maritime Subdelegate ManuelArturo Olalquiaga described one o these instances.Upset by the attitudes o naval ocers towards him, hecomplained about them in the ollowing terms:

Todo [esto] lo considero improcedente, y anhasta si se quiere, es [indigno], porque [] estos

procederes rebajan la Autoridad, ponindola ensituacin ridicula, hacindole hacer un papelverdaderamente despreciable, y siento el decirloque esto pasa solo en la Isla de Pascua, pues en elContinente en cualquier Reten de Carabineros, quees atendido solo por un simple Sargento, el capitndel cuerpo, al hacer su visita, no v a interrogar a loshabitantes de alrededor del Reten, para preguntar dela conducta, ni si tienen reclamos en su contra, y siencuentra alguna alta en el Sargento, lo cambia y le

aplica el castigo que merece, pero sin que nadie sed cuenta de ello, esto se hace para no denigrar alSargento, a la Autoridad []; pero aqu sucede locontrario y es por eso que los nativos abusan y nose les quita la mala costumbre, porque los mismosmarinos tienen la culpa. [] habra sido preeribleun puesto de portero de la Moneda, pues eseinsignicante puesto, lo considero mas digno que elde Subdelegado de sta Isla, aunque de todo lo queme ha pasado no me deba extraar, porque en unacomida que me dio de despedida mi hijo, Mayor deCarabineros Jos Manuel Olalquiaga Ibarra, un Sr.Comandante que se encontraba presente, me dijoque el puesto de Subdelegado de la Isla de Pascua noera nada, porque un Sargento de su escuadron tenamas atribuciones, de lo que yo me quise oender, sinsaber que me estaban diciendo toda la verdad.

[All o this I consider out o line, and would go so ar

as to call it undignied Because these proceduresundercut the authorities, putting them in a ridiculoussituation, orcing them to take on a truly despicablerole and it is worth stating that this only happenson Pascua, or at any police station on the continent,that is attended only by one simple sergeant, whenhis superior comes to make his rounds, he wouldntinterrogate the nearby inhabitants to ask about theconduct o the ocial and then re him and punishhim should he nd any complaints about thatsergeant, they wouldnt do this even i he had activecomplaints led against him. This would be seen asa humiliation to the Sergeant, the Authority o the

oce. But here, this happens, and this is why thenatives abuse the law, reuse to let go o their evilhabits, because the navy themselves are guilty othis. Being a doorman at the Moneda [the Palaceo Government] would have been preerable, as eventhat insignicant post I consider more dignied than

being Subdelegate o this island. It now doesntseem that strange that at a arewell dinner hosted bymy son, the Chie o Police Jose Manuel OlalquiagaIbarra, a commander who was present at the event,told me that the position o Subdelegate o this islandwas nothing, because any sergeant o a squadronhad more power. At the time I was oended, without

realizing that what he was telling me was completelytrue] (AMM 1936b:24).

The weakness o the authority o the MaritimeSubdelegate, and thereore the weakness o Statestructures on the island during this period, can be tracedto various causes. On the one hand, it was due to theinexistence o an eective colonial policy rom the Statewhich translated into a near constant abandonment othe inhabitants o the island by the Chilean State. At the



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level o local government institutions, this translatedinto a chronic lack o basic resources like medications,clothing, educational supplies, construction materialsand agricultural implements. In act, or the most part theonly resources readily available to the Subdelegate werethe public animals and lands (oten in poor condition),and the resources that the CEDIP was required to

provide according to the Provisional Code.9For example, during the administration o the

Maritime Subdelegate Carlos A. Recabarren, manyo his petitions to authorities on the continent didnteven receive a response. In the case o the most urgentappeals, like those or medications or or seeds neededor planting, the Maritime Subdelegate himsel endedup taking responsibility to acquire these goods duringhis sporadic journeys to Valparaso. It was preciselyRecabarren who mentioned the long delays, and perhapsthe disinterest, o the government in responding to thevarious needs o the island:

[] Desde que me hice cargo de mis puestos,constantemente h pedido muchas cosas, a laDireccin del Territorio Martimo de Valparaso, paralos habitantes de la Isla de Pascua, primeramente

ped un galpn para los leprosos qu cost 4,000$[la leprosera haba sido destruida por un incendioen 1926] y que lo consegu siendo Jee del TerritorioMartimo Don Santiago Lorca, Capitn de Navo,como tambin consegu con l mismo [] para laPolica y otras cosas ms; nuevamente he escritoal Seor Ministro de Marina, al Seor, Don LuisEscobar Molina, Jee del apostadero naval de

Valparaso, al Seor Visitador de Escuelas deValparaso, para dos galpones para escuelas, qu sonmui necesarios y muchas cosas tiles para la Isla,que poco a poco va llegando, y que mucho se me h

prometido para la Isla de Pascua.

[Since taking charge o my responsibilities, I haveconstantly asked or many things rom the Oceo Maritime Territory in Valparaso, things or theinhabitants o Easter Island. First, I asked or ashelter or the lepers that cost $4,000 [the previousleprosarium was destroyed by re in 1926], thatI received thanks to the act that the chie o that

institution was Don Santiago Lorca. Just as I alsoreceived with his help. [goods] or the police andsome more. I have now written again to the MaritimeMinister, to Mr. Luis Escobar Molina, to the head othe port o Valparaso, and to the Superintendent oSchools o Valparaso or two shelters or the schoolsthat are very necessary and many useul things orthe Island, that little by little arrive, despite having

been most promised or Easter Island] (AIV 1927:Folio 26-27(14)).

Another cause o the structural weakness o theChilean State on Rapa Nui, rom the point o view oState authorities, can be traced to the inexistence o asolid coercive apparatus. The lack o a police orce or

presence o a stable armed orce and the absence openal system that t the needs o the local governmentwere permanent complaints o Chilean unctionaries.10During this era, the only orce the Subdelegate had athis command to use to impose order and authority wasa somewhat squalid police orce comprised entirelyo indigenous Rapanui. And even that orce couldntcount on permanent unding by the Subdelegationand was dependent on the Company, which paid theirsalaries to prevent losses produced by cattle rustling,and on the charity o a ew philanthropists dubbed theAmigos de Pascua:

La actual Polica de la Isla de Pascua, es la mismade 1927. Se necesita ropa y otros elementos ms,

para que sea ms respetada y al mismo tiempotomen ms inters y cumplir con los reglamentosde Polica, que existen en la Republica. He escritosobre ste particular, al Seor Director del TerritorioMartimo y al jee de Carabineros, Seor Don CrlosR. Director, pidiendo, ropa zapatos, monturas, ytodas las dems cosas que son necesarias para steramo. La Polica, actualmente y antes las paga laCia Explotadora Isla de Pascua. Sus sueldos son losmismos que del ao 1925, 1926, 1927 y el actual1928. El ao 1926, mand ropa para la Policia, elSeor Capitn de Navo, Don Santiago Lorca P.

[The Police orce o the island is the same as it wasin 1927. Clothing is needed as well as other things,so that they might be more respected and at the sametime they may take more interest and can ulll therequirements o the police that exist in the Republic.I have written about this issue to the Director o theMaritime Territory and the Chie o Police, as well asto Mr. Carlos R. Director, asking them or clothing,saddles, shoes, and all the other things necessary orthis institution. The police, today as in the past, are

paid by the Company. Their salaries are the sameas they were in the years o 1925, 1926, 1927, andthe current year o 1928. In 1926, the Navy Captain

Santiago Lorca P. sent the clothing or the police](AIV 1928a: Folio 31(16)-32).

At other times, when this police orce was disbandeddue to its inability to combat the thet o livestock romthe Company, the Subdelegate simply lacked any wayo ensuring that his orders were respected. Aware othis, Recabarren wrote a series o urgent petitions tothe police orce on the mainland during 1929:


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Dejo constancia en mi libro de apuntes diarios,los continuos robos de los habitantes de la Isla dePascua; l poco respecto la autoridad de la Isla,a la Cia Explotadora, etc. La Cia Explotadora mecomunica seguido los robos que hay a diarios, sin

poder pillar a los ladrones. Existia aqu una Policiapagada por la Cia Explotadora, se compona estaPolicia, de 7 personas, que sn, Juan Aracki, JuanTepano y Matias Hotus que eran los jees y de cuatroguardianes, sin pillar ningn ladrn; en vista quesiempre continuaban los robos, la Cia Explotadorano pag ms sta Policia, desde el 31 de Enerode 1929. La poblacin no tuvo guardianes, hastael 1. de Abril que nombr uno para la vigilancia,etc, pagado por sta Subdelegacin Maritima, enla actualidad cuento con un solo guardia, siendo lcenso ltimo de 385 habitantes. En stos momentoscrticos para la Isla me h apresurado escribir a mis

jees, Director Jeneral del Territorio Maritimo y otras

personas ms, pidiendo carabineros, para l rdenpblico para evitar robos y castigar los culpables,y que marche por l camino del bien, como tieneordenado el Subdelegado Martimo que suscribe.

[My diary o daily events testies to the continualthets carried out by the inhabitants o Easter Island;the little respect or the authorities on the Island andthe Company. The Company reports to me regularlythat there are daily robberies, without any possibilityo nding the thieves. There used to be a policeorce on this island, paid or by the Company, whichconsisted o 7 men and were equally unable to stop

the robberies. Juan Aracki, Juan Tepano, and MatiasHotus were the leaders and our guardians. In lighto this the Company stopped paying this police orceon the 31st o January, 1929. The population had no

protection until the 1st o April, when I created asingle guard paid or by this oce o the MaritimeSubdelegation. Today that orce is actually made upo one person, as the previous census showed only385 inhabitants o the island. In these moments socritical or the island, I have pushed mysel to writeto my superiors, rom the Director General o theMaritime Territory to others, asking or police,so that public order can be maintained, to stop

these robberies, to punish those responsible, andso that the island can march orward in the rightdirection, responsibilities required by the MaritimeSubdelegation] (AIV 1929:Folio 7538).

This problematic situation generated, in repeatedinstances, a power vacuum that allowed not only theinhabitants o the island to challenge the Subdelegatesauthority, but also allowed State unctionaries toignore his orders, the very same unctionaries who


should have carried them out. Conficts like the bitterdisputes between Recabarren and the Police PreectCupertino Martinez, who had arrived in 1930 tostrengthen the police orce on the island, are a goodexample o this dynamic.11 Likewise, around themid-1930s, a confict along these lines occurred; onethat is worth mentioning. This one occurred betweenOlalquiaga and his predecessor, Hernn Cornejo, whohad dedicated himsel to sowing the seeds o distrustamong the islanders against Olalquiaga; corralled in bythe continual attacks, Olalquiaga lamented this confictin his memoirs:

Como Uds. comprender, desde el primer momentomi antecesor se ensa conmigo, hostilizndomeen lo ms mnimo que pudo, y no contento contodo esto, cre y posesion a todos los nativos deuna psima atmsera a mi persona, atmsera queme ha orijinado un sinnmero de contratiempos y

transtornos, porque como les dijo a los nativos, queyo era un pobre diablo que vena a quitarles lospltanos y camotes, stos no trepidaron en demostrarsu desconanza y desobediencia al suscrito.

[As you will understand, rom the rst moment mypredecessor drew me in, antagonizing as best hecould, and not being content with this, he createdand charged the native population with an acidicatmosphere towards me, which has created anuncountable number o conficts and disorder orme, because he told the natives that I was simplya miserable little devil that had come to steal their

sweet potatoes and plantains, they dont hesitate todemonstrate their distrust and disobedience o me](AMM 1936a:3).

One o the ormulas implemented by the MaritimeAuthority in an attempt to make State institutionsmore eective and legitimate was the inclusion osome islanders within the structures o those sameinstitutions. In a short amount o time, these personscame to ulll an important support role or themechanisms o colonial power, without ully becomingunctionaries o it. The relevance o these gures wasunderlined in 1921 in the report o the captain o the

Baquedano about one o his visits to Rapa Nui:

Al Sub-delegado [se reere al SubdelegadoMartimo Exequiel Acua] se le comunic la rdencablegrca que lo autorizaba a viajar en el buque

para Valparaso y en consecuencia determinonombrar Sub-Delegado Maritimo interino y Ocialdel Rejistro Civil al Sr. Luis Zepeda [] as mismo,nombr jee de los nativos y Comandante de Policiaal ms respetado de ellos, llamado Juan Tepano (ex-


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rey) que es querido y considerado por la mayorade los pascuenses, para que acte entre ellos y losdirija secundado por cuatro ayudantes de su propiaeleccin []

[To the Subdelegate [reerring to ExequielAcua] the order was communicated by cable thatauthorized the trip to Valparaso and as a result, Idecided to name as interim Subdelegate and head othe Civil Registry Mr. Luis Zepeda I also namedas chie o the natives and commander o the policeorce, Juan Tepano, (ormer king) the most respectedamong them. He is loved and well-considered by themajority o the islanders. He is to act among themand will be supported by our helpers o his ownchoosing] (AMM 1921b).

Aside rom Juan Tepano, who occupied severaldierent positions as police ocer and unctionary

o the CEDIP, various other Rapanui participatedactively in the Chilean institutional ramework on theisland, giving active support to State organizations, thelivestock company, and the church.12 Some o thesewere: Juan Araki, Pedro Atn, as well as Mariana Atnand Andrs Chavez (teachers), among others.13

The authorities need to incorporate indigenousinhabitants in Chilean institutional structures was alsoexpressed in some o their eorts to create ormalstructures o indigenous representation. They soughtto not only combat the indierence or resistance othe islanders to the State institutions (something verywidespread), but also to generate spaces within which

the Rapanui had a limited role o participation in localgovernance, even i only or appearances.14In 1921, while attempting to uproot the embedded

antipathy o the islanders, Subdelegate ExequielAcua took up a proposal to create a court, a Juzgadode Paz, on the island comprised o islanders. Theunction o this court was limited to endorsing thedecisions, punishments, and sanctions imposed by theSubdelegate, as well as ensuring the protection anddevelopment o public morality. While the proposalwas rejected on the mainland, because it did not t withinthe established legal norms o Chilean legislation, the

proposal can still be understood as another attempt

by the authorities to increase their legitimacy amongthe indigenous islanders. This same motivation droveSubdelegate Olalquiaga, 15 years later, to designatePedro Atn as the rst Rapanui mayor (alcalde).15

Para eectuar una labor ecaz, como tambin paraintroducir las normas de las ciudades y puebloscivilizados, resolv darles una conerencia sobre laAutoridad Comunal [] Una vez convencido que sehaban posesionado bien de mi explicacin, proced

ha hacer el nombramiento de Alcalde y llevar a cabola eleccin de regidores [] Si bien es verdad quela labor desarrollada por estos hombres ha sido casinula, es menester tomar en cuenta que es la primeravez que se constituye una Municipalidad en la Isla,razn undamental para comprender que ellos no han

podido en 4 meses desplegar todas sus actividadesen su cometido, tanto por no estar perectamenteal corriente de sus deberes, como tambin por nocontar con los medios elementales para ello.

[To make or more ecient work and to introducethe norms o civilized cities and towns, I resolvedto give a conerence about Communal AuthorityOnce I was convinced that they had graspedmy explanation, I proceeded to name a Mayor[Alcalde] and to plan elections or other positions oleadership I it can be said that the labor o thesemen has been nearly entirely negligible, it must

be taken into account that it is the rst time that aMunicipality has been ormed on this island. Thisis a undamental reason that they have not, in thecourse o 4 months, been able to carry out all theactivities in their mission. They are neither ully upto date on their duties nor do they have the resourcesor them] (AMM 1936a:12).

However, neither the weakness o Stateinstitutions nor the creation o these orms o Rapanuirepresentation within ocial institutions impededauthorities rom abusing the indigenous population.Such was the case o Subdelegate Acua in the 1920s,

who aced an investigation or the claims led againsthim by ocers on theBaquedano.

Vuestra seoria se sirve extractar las inormacioneshabidas por los Comandantes de la corbeta JeneralBaquedano en contra del citado Sr. Acua y terminaen que es imposible su permanencia en este puesto.Aprovechando las circunstancias de encontrarseen sta con permiso del inculpado, le he leido loscargos que existen en su contra, contestando losiguiente; [] 3. Respecto al nmero 2, de abusos deadministracin y judiciales, dice que eectivamentehace mucho tiempo hizo azotar algunos indgenas

conesos de robos, pero que no continu con esaprctica cuando se le hizo saber que ello no eracorrecto. 4. Sobre el cargo de usuructo de vveresalimenticios pertenecientes a los indgenas, dice que

jamas ha recibido vveres para suministrarlos a loshabitantes de la isla y que por lo tanto este cargocarece en absoluto de undamento. 5. Niega que hayahecho azotar mujeres y nios y maniesta que esoscargos son emanados de los mismos castigados porestar conesos de robos []


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Allanson Bryan, economist o the CEDIP] and

Skoltheag [sic, perhaps Carl Skottsberg?], who

praise and thank Acua ater their stays on the

island. Because o this, I ask that you warn Acua,

but do not remove him because we would then

be worse o than we are now. Yours respectully,

Raael Edwards] (AMM n.d.).

As the relationship between the State and the

Company consolidated, despite the legal disputes over

lands, and ormed a new alliance o interests oriented

towards the exploitation o the island, the attitude o

State authorities towards the indigenous inhabitants

reproduced a regimen o colonial relations that diered

very little rom those that existed during the beginning

o the 20th century. Along these lines, one o the

things that denitely characterizes the State presence

on the island during this period was nothing less than

the duty and obligation o government authorities to

educate and instruct the indigenous population.From the point o view o the Chilean unctionaries,

the indigenous society was understood to be passive,

a mere receptor o the actions o State institutions, who

were the only bearers o civilization.

However, it is necessary to clariy that while

the internal politics on Rapa Nui were one thing,

the Chilean geopolitical vision during the nebulous

situation that ollowed the crisis o 1929 was another

altogether. These two currents never ell into line

during this period, coming at times to openly contradict

each other. A good example o this contradiction is

seen in the report sent on November 17, 1930 by the

US Naval attach to Chile, I.H. Mayeld, to the Oceo US Naval Intelligence, in which the interest o Chile

in selling the island because o its urgent economic

needs was expressed or the rst time (Attachs Oce

o Naval Intelligence Report 1930). Similar reports

appeared in communications to the US Navy rom the

US Embassy in Chile on June 8th, 1937, and signed by

A.S. Merril, in which he signals that the Commander

o the Navy, Admiral Olegario Reyes del Rio proposed

to the President o Chile, Arturo Alessandri Palma,

and to the Minister o National Deense, Emilio Bello

Codesido, the sale or rental o the island in order

to obtain the nancing needed to build two warships

or the Chilean Navy. The island would be oered,according to the US documents, to the US, Germany,

Great Britain and Japan (Attachs Oce o Naval

Intelligence Report 1937).

In a somewhat contradictory move that perhaps

rejected these sale projects o others within the

government, President Alessandri declared the island

a National Park via decree 103 on January 16, 1935.

On the 23rd o June o the same year, the island was

declared a Historic Monument, via decree 4536,

and the extraction o archaeological remains rom

the island was prohibited. At the end o that year, a

grand reorestation plan was announced, and Danish

agricultural expert Georg Schlatzer was contracted

by Minagri (the Ministry o Agriculture). On the 13th

o February, 1936, the contract between the Company

and Chile was renewed, establishing a new canon or

the relationship nally ending the Provisional Code.

Moreover, this established a new internal regimen o

the regulation o lie and work on the island. These

are only a ew examples o the incoherent geopolitical

position o Chile in regards to the island towards the

end o the 1917-1936 period.

The Compaa Explotadora

In order to clariy the role o the Company during the

years o the Provisional Code, one has to analyze the

conditions under which the CEDIP operated and the

relationships it established with the Chilean State andthe Rapanui community.

Thanks to the signing o the Temperamento

Provisorio in 1917, the Company was exempt rom

the payment o annual rent to the State during these

decades, and was ree to use, at no cost to them, the

lands and livestock on the island. At the same time,

the separation o the roles o CEDIP manager and the

Maritime Subdelegate liberated the Company rom an

important part o the responsibilities and costs o the

local government. All o this made possible, among

other things, a coexistence between the Company

and islanders that was much less confictive than it

had been previously, a relationship that came to beredened as one based primarily on the establishment

o labor contracts and a series o charity policies.16

However, at the same time, a key element o the

Companys development during this era was its

undamental role o support and backup or State

institutions. Those weak State institutions, supported

by the Company, ullled the mission o guaranteeing

(instead o regulating) the development and conditions

o the livestock cycle on the island.

Untied rom many o their previous responsibilities

or the administration o the islands governance, the

CEDIP ocused its energies on production, and in order

to ensure this, on patronizing the Chilean authoritiesand institutions. By nancing the activities o the

Chilean authorities, many o whom were dependent

on the Companys monthly gits o lamb and other

goods, and by paying the salaries o the police orce

and periodically donating to the general populations,

the Company consolidated its infuence over State

unctionaries.17 Olalquiaga described his excellent

and cordial relationship with the administrator o the

Company, Mr. Colin Morrison in 1936:


9/15



Cumpliendo instrucciones superiores con respecto

a las buenas relaciones que era necesario mantener

con la Administracin de la Cia. Explotadora de Isla

de Pascua, debo decir a Uds. que desde mi llegada

a la Isla hemos mantenido una cordial amistad y

una muta comprensin. [] Es as como durante

mi permanencia en sta Isla, jams ha habido una

pequea dicultad entre esa Administracin y sta

Subdelegacin, y para toda medida que he tenido que

tomar relacionada con la Compaa, la he tomado en

completo acuerdo con Mr. Morrison, de manera que

no hubieran inconvenientes y ellas ueran motivos de

tropiezos en nuestra amistad y estrechas relaciones.

[In accordance with instructions regarding the

good relations that were necessary to maintain the

administration o the Cia. Explotadora de Isla de

Pascua, I should report that since my arrival to the

island we have maintained a warm riendship and

mutual comprehension. This is how it has beenduring my time on this island, never has there been

any small diculty between the administration and

this Subdelegation, and or each measure I have had

to take with regards to the Company, it has been

made with the complete agreement o Mr. Morrison,

in this way that there were no inconveniences that

could prove to be a challenge to our riendship and

direct relationship] (AMM 1936b:20).

With this close alliance between the Company and

the State at least within the islands scenario during the

years o the Provisional Code, the CEDIP started

to ocus on the Rapanui community. As mentionedpreviously, that relationship began to revolve around

both the establishment o labor relations, commercial

relations, including the acilitation o exchanges o

corn and livestock with the indigenous population, and

the Companys charity programs that were aimed at the

same population. Because o this shit in relations and

this new margin o maneuverability, the Company was

able to apply new methods o economic exploitation o

the indigenous population, which at least appeared to

be less oppressive, especially in comparison to those

used in previous decades.

The management o salaries, prices o goods brought

rom the mainland, and a monopoly on the sale o thosegoods in the Company store (located in Mataveri), were

some o the orms preerred by the CEDIP that allowed

them to prot rom their relationship with the Rapanui

population.18 These new methods o oppression and

exploitation o the indigenous population might have

appeared kinder at rst glance than those unrolled

under previous administrations, but they required the

compliance o the (less kind) State institutions and

unctionaries as a precondition.

Freed rom the responsibility o directly

conronting the indigenous resistance, the Company

could present itsel as a modern company that

beneted the community by oering permanent

or temporary employment to a great portion o the

population, thereby constructing or itsel the image

o a social institution greatly concerned about the

well-being o islanders. The positive image that the

CEDIP tried to project was reinorced by the important

interchange o products and livestock (especially corn,

horses and cows) that occurred between islanders and

the Company, especially rom the 1930s onwards.19

The Company not only took advantage o the

signing o the Temperamento to use the land

and livestock existent on the island without taking

responsibility or them or paying or them or almost

two decades, but they also ailed to comply with

sections o that very same agreement. In 1936, Chilean

Deputy Carrasco spoke about this issue in the Congress

while trying to intervene in the discussions about a newcontract between the State and Williamson Balour,

and said the ollowing:

A pesar de que en esa ocasin [la rma del

Temperamento] se le imponan a la Compaa

Explotadora muy pocas obligaciones [entre otras, la

construccin del ya mencionado lazareto] no les dio

cumplimiento [] Ese lazareto se instal apenas a

1.000 metros escasos de las casas del pueblo y en

terrenos de los nativos lo que constituye un peligro

inminente de contagio. El artculo 70 obliga a la

Compaa a llevar a la isla como administrador de

sus intereses a un chileno casado que se radiqueall con su amilia, obligacin que tampoco ha

sido cumplida por la Compaa Explotadora. Esta

concesin debi haber durado hasta el 19 de abril

de 1929, echa en que por decreto supremo nmero

946 del Ministerio de Marina se le puso trmino.

Sin embargo, seor Presidente, esta poderosa

rma extranjera que parece disponer de una mano

oculta que paraliza en la sombra lo que dispone ese

decreto, hasta el 12 de noviembre de 1933 y hasta

hoy da [alienta] la prolongacin de una concesin

que es atentatoria para nuestra soberana e intereses

nacionales. [] Si existieran razones morales que

justicaran ciertas contemplaciones, estaran ellas de

ms compensadas con los 40 aos de explotacin de

la isla que ha disrutado esa Compaa con grandes

utilidades pecuniaras, pero nunca se justicara un

nuevo arrendamiento; ya que si l se eecta, se

prolongarn por 20 aos los abusos y explotaciones

que esa rma extranjera ejerce sobre los nativos []

[Despite the act that on this occasion [the signing

o the Code] the Company had very ew obligations


10/15



[among them the mentioned clinic], they did not

ulll any This leper clinic was built only 1000

meters rom the houses o the town and on lands o

the natives, a act which presented an immediate risk

o contagion. Article 70 obliged the Company to

bring to the island or its administration a married

Chilean that would live there with their amily, an

obligation which the Company has also ailed to

ulll. Their lease should have ended in the 19th

o April, 1929, according to the Supreme decree

number 946 o the Maritime Minister. Despite this,

Mr. President, this powerul oreign rm appears to

have a hidden orce which paralyzes this decree in

the shadows, up to the 12th o November o 1933,

and up to this day, prolonging this concession that

threatens our sovereignty and national interests.

I moral reasons existed that could justiy certain

second thoughts, they would still be more than

compensated by the 40 years o exploitation o the

island that have been enjoyed by this Company withgreat nancial capacity. Nothing justies a new

agreement, though, since i that is allowed, it would

prolong by 20 years the abuses and exploitations that

this oreign enterprise carries out on the natives]

(AMM 1936a: 2647-2648).

Once the terms o the Provisional Code expired

in 1929, the CEDIP continued to benet rom the

agreement. This permitted the Company to reap in

abulous prots, at the cost o public interests and the

indigenous community. As a Maritime Ministry report

rom 1935 conrms:

Es de considerar, tambin, que la Compaa

Explotadora de la Isla de Pascua se ha aprovechado

gratuitamente de los terrenos y animales scales,

de todo el aumento obtenido por la reproduccin de

los animales ao tras ao, de la lana, leche y dems

benecios de stos desde el 7 de Noviembre de

1916, echa en que se puso trmino al arrendamiento

otorgado por el Fisco al Sr. Enrique Merlet, o por

lo menos desde el 5 de Mayo de 1917, echa en

que comenz a regir el llamado temperamento

provisorio []

[It is worth considering as well, that the Company

has taken advantage o the animals and public

lands, o all the increases obtained through the

reproduction o animals year ater year, o the

wool, milk and other benets o the island ree o

charge since November 7, 1916, when the rental

agreements authorized by the authorities to Enrique

Merlet were terminated, or at least rom the 5th o

May 1917, the date when the Code went into eect]

(AMM 1935).

In the case o the established relations between the

Company and the Rapanui people, despite the Code

and the new social prole the Company tried to

construct, multiple abuses o the indigenous people o

the island continued (Comisin de Verdad Histrica y

Nuevo Trato 2001). Continental unctionaries typically

took charge o denouncing these occurrences during

and ollowing their periodic trips to Rapa Nui. One

example o this, included in a December 1921 report by

an ocial on theBaquedano, mentioned the ollowing:

Seor Comandante: En cumplimiento de la

comisin que Ud. tuvo a bien conarme, de

averiguar si haba, entre los naturales de la Isla

de Pascua, algunas quejas o cargos contra la Casa

Williamson Balour y Co, e inormarle por escrito,

comunico a Ud. que, noticada las averiguaciones

que el tiempo permiti, no constat ningn cargo

concreto contra de dicha Casa, aunque ue comn y

general la queja de que los jornales estn muy bajosy los precios de la tienda muy subidos, pero sin dar

pruebas claras de ninguna de las dos armaciones.

En cuanto a la primera, creo que la Casa se ajusta

al reglamento aprobado por el Supremo Gobierno;

y en cuanto a la segunda, estimo necesario, para

evitar probables alzas exageradas, que la autoridad

convenga con la Casa una lista anual de precios, para

todas las mercaderas que se venden a los naturales

de la Isla, y que esta lista sea prontamente conocida

por todos los interesados.

[Dear Commander: In order to ulll the mission

that you so greatly entrusted to me, o seeing ithere existed, among the natives o the island,

complaints or charges against the Williamson

Balour and Co., and to inorm you in writing o my

ndings, I write to you that, in the time permitted,

I ound no concrete charge or complaint against

the Company, although the generalized complaint

existed that wages were very low and that prices

in the store very elevated, but without any clear

evidence. In regards to this rst complaint, I believe

the Company adjusts the wages in accordance with

the regulations approved by the Government and in

regards to the second, I deem it necessary that the

Authorities and the Company make an annual list o

prices, or all the goods that are sold to the natives,

and that this list be promptly known to all interested

parties] (AMM 1921c).

Obviously, the complaints o the islanders were

not taken seriously aterwards. Without knowing

whether or not the list o prices mentioned were really

established as such, the salaries o the indigenous

population continued to be as low as they always had


11/15


been.20 It would have to be the Rapanui themselves

who would later demand salary increases.

However, despite the act that tensions between the

Company and the Rapanui had diminished considerably

during this period, this relationship was not ree o

confict. The constant complaints by administrators o

the CEDIP regarding the thet o cattle by islanders, just

like the periodic complaints by islanders regarding their

working conditions and the high prices at the Company

store, grew to develop into important social tensions.

This environment o latent confict brought about

the development o more serious conficts between the

Rapanui and the CEDIP. One o the most signicant

examples was the outbreak o a massive strike o

workers in 1928, where the strikers were later joined

by members o the police orce. As Recabarren (AIV

1928b) relates, most o the strikers demands were

ocused on an improvement in salaries and ood

rations, along with the participation o the islanders in

the prots o the Company.

[] Los nombrados ms arriba [se reere a

los lderes de la huelga] se presentaron sta

Subdelegacin a las 2 P.M. del dia 5 de Agosto

y espusieron los siguientes puntos. 1er Punto.

Mejoramiento de sus jornales, hombres a razon de

4$ diarios y su racin en ca, almuerzo, y comida,

horas de almuerzo 11 A.M. y comidas 5 P.M. 2 Punto.

Mejoramiento de sus jornales para los nios y las

mujeres 3$ diarios y sus raciones y horas como los

dems hombres. 3. No entrarn a trabajar ninguna

persona, si l Seor Administrador n acepta nuestra

peticin. 4 Punto. Para los trabajos de la esquila, quese eecta en el mes de Octubre y Noviembre, del

presente ao, se pide por l ciento de ovejunos 10$

ciento 100$ l mil, con sus respectivas raciones.

5. Punto. Los que quieran trabajar voluntariamente,

los trabajos de la administracin y los del campo se

opondrn, hsta el ltimo hsta que la Cia arregle

denitivamente. 6. Punto. Si la Cia acepta nuestras

condiciones y la de todos los habitantes de sta Isla,

queda arreglado y todo el mundo se ir a trabajar

tranquilos. 7. Punto. Quedan en sta Subdelegacin

las rmas de los representantes de sta guelga

jeneral. Seor Administrador; agradecer a ud

contestar sobre ste particular. Sin otro particular

tiene el agrado de saludar a ud su mui [] y amigo.

Carlos A. Recabarrn.

[Those named above [reerring to the leaders o the

strike] presented themselves at the Subdelegation

at 2 pm o the 5th o August and pronounced the

ollowing demands. First, improvement o their

daily wages, to $4 a day and their rations o coee,

lunch, and ood at 11 am and another ood break at 5

pm. Second, improvements o the wages o women

and children to $3 a day with rations at the same

hours as the men. Third, no one would enter to work

i the Administrator does not accept this request.

Fourth, or the work o shearing that takes place

in October and November they ask, or this year,

$10 every hundred sheep or $100 every thousand

along with their respective rations. Fith, those that

want to work voluntarily, either in administrative

tasks or eldwork will be resisted to the end, till

the company makes denitive arrangements. Sixth,

i the Company accepts our conditions and those

o all the inhabitants o this island, everything will

have been resolved and everyone will go back to

work calmly. Seventh, the signatures o the strike

representatives are let in this Subdelegation, we

ask you to respond to this issue. With nothing else,

I thank you [signed] Carlos Recabarren] (AIV

1928b:Folios 51(26)-52).

This was not the only way in which the Rapanui

tried to conront the unjust conditions o their lives.

Eectively, the development o a series o rebellious

practices on the part o the indigenous population

became a key aspect o the social and political context

during this period. Although these other measures did

not reach the intensity o the indigenous uprisings o

the previous century, these practices o indigenous

resistance among which we should mention various

acts o disobedience, thet, insubordinations, and strikes

came to constitute a true and constant challenge to the

actions o colonial powers on the island, represented by

State institutions and the Company.

Conclusions

Due to the grave conficts that had arisen between the

Rapanui, the Company, and the Chilean State at the

beginning o the twentieth century, both the CEDIP

and the Chilean Government saw the creation o a

series o important reorms on the island as necessary.

In 1914, this impulse brought about the designation

o a Maritime Subdelegate that was independent o

the administrator o the CEDIP. Not long aterwards,

they signed the Provisional Code, an agreement

that laid the groundwork or a new orm o politicalorganization o the island.

From that moment onwards, the apparatus o State

power took on two visible aces. On the one hand, the

indolent political and administrative ace was embodied

by the institution o the Maritime Subdelegate, located

in Hanga Roa, where State institutions like the Civil

Registry and the Public School began to unction.

On the other hand, a second ace emerged, one more

economic in character and located in Mataveri, the



12/15



residence o the Company administrator and the site

o the management o livestock production activities.

While the duties o the Maritime Subdelegate included

taking responsibility or the local government, thereby

taking charge o the work o controlling the public

and private lives o the islanders, the duties o the

Company administrator were directed primarily at the

productive realms o lie, establishing relations with

the indigenous population primarily through wage and

commercial relations.

Even with this, the State presence on Rapa

Nui continued to be precarious. The years between

1917 and 1936 were marked by the unveiling and

implementation o a particular orm o colonialism that

lacked an eective colonial policy. The inexistence o a

consistent State plan or populating and occupying the

island, the extreme weakness o the State organizations

and o the authority o the Maritime Subdelegate,

graphically show us this point.

However, despite this precariousness, the actions othe Chilean State during these years had a signicant and

powerul impact on the island. Indeed, the permanent

presence o institutions charged with implementing

dierent policies aimed at the regulation o the lives o

the indigenous population, in education, urbanization,

and civilization, let a long-standing ootprint in

the indigenous community. Likewise, the constant

application o successive policies o social control and

the disciplining o the Rapanui way o lie had erce

repercussions on the entire indigenous population.

The Company, thanks to the signed agreement,

the Code, was exempt rom the weight o rents they

had previously been required to pay. This allowedthem to reely use, without cost to them, the lands and

livestock o Rapa Nui. On top o that, the separation

o the duties o the Company administrator and those

o the Maritime Subdelegate reed the Company rom

the responsibilities and costs o local governance.

The Company was let then to develop a much less

confictive relationship with the islanders, and establish

relationships with them that were primarily dened by

work, wages and commercial relations, alongside a

series o their own charity projects.

A key element in the development o the Company

during this period was its role o support or State

organizations, with their mission to guarantee theconditions necessary or a healthy economic cycle on

the island. Because o this, the CEDIP took charge o

becoming patrons o the Chilean authorities, nancing

their activities, subsidizing the salaries o the police

orce, and periodically making large donations.

With these dynamics as their oundation, the

Company was able to unroll a series o social controls

and orms o exploitation o the Rapanui, many o which

may appear to have been somewhat riendlier in their

appearances than those used during the shameul and

brutal administrations o Alberto Snchez Manterola

and Horacio Cooper. Control o salaries and prices or

the goods brought rom the mainland, as well as the

Company stores monopoly on the sale o these goods,

became the new preerred methods or taking maximum

advantage o their co-existence with the islanders.

Some mention should be made o the role played

by the groups o Rapanui islanders who collaborated

with the Maritime Subdelegation and the Company.

Although never coming to be unctionaries at the

service o the authorities, these groups exercised an

important infuence on the politics o the island, acting

not just as agents o transmission o one or another

pole o colonial power, but also many times playing an

active role in the resolution o tensions between them

and in changes in the balance o power on the island.

The actions o these groups also tamed the stubborn

colonial powers by diversiying the communitys

approaches towards them. Especially important inthis process o domestication were the marriages

between Rapanui women and State authorities or

Company employees.

During these decades, a system o government

developed, acquiring a certain level o institutional

complexity. In contrast to the preceding period, which

had been characterized by an apparatus o power

centralized in one authority, this period produced a

branching out o this power structure, into two main

spheres: the economic and the political-administrative,

with their respective authorities in the administration

o the CEDIP and the Maritime Subdelegation.

We highlighted here the dynamic o constanteedback between these two spheres o colonial power,

with the Subdelegation acting as an entity charged with

the regulation o social relations and as a guarantor

o the healthy development o the economic cycle,

while the Company exercised patronage over State

institutions and established a powerul infuence over

them. Moreover, while during previous decades the

religious-institutional sphere had been an arena into

which the interests o the indigenous community could

easily permeate, during this period this sphere was

substantially integrated into the ramework o colonial

power.21 The actions taken by Bishop Edwards and the

work carried out by Father Englert in the mid-1930sboth provide good examples o this new dynamic.

In the case o the permanent abuses o the

indigenous population during this period that were

carried out equally by Chilean unctionaries and

the Company, we nd another important example

o concordance between the colonial agents. Both

spheres o colonial power shared a denial o Rapanui

sovereignty over the island, as well as perception

o the indigenous population that reduced them,


13/15


paradoxically, to the condition o oreigners in their

own territory. Virtually corralled into the settlement o

Hanga Roa, orbidden to leave the island, and obliged

to accept the living conditions imposed by the regimen

o livestock exploitation, the Rapanui were imagined

by the colonial agents as a people incapable o ensuring

their own progress.

From the point o view o the Rapanui, the work

o State institutions was a direct exercise o power,

whether it appeared in the orm o actions taken by

the Subdelegation, the naval missions, or the rest o

the State institutions. In contrast, the CEDIP, the true

heart o the colonial apparatus, became the power

behind the power, sheltered behind the actions o State

unctionaries that acted in agreement with the Company,

and seeping through the wage and commercial relations

established between the Company and the community.

This shit only made it more dicult or the

Rapanui to identiy the Company as one o the principal

causes o the intense oppression that victimized them,because the Company morphed its social prole into a

company oering work and commercial opportunities

via exchange. This became a actor inhibiting the

emergence o major uprising like the one that occurred

in 1914, one that could have threatened the social

and political structure on the island. Nonetheless, the

precariousness o the islands institutional structures

and the continuation o important social tensions

between the community and oreign agents made

possible and ueled the development o diverse orms

o indigenous resistance. In some cases, such as the

general strike o 1928, these orms o resistance allowed

the indigenous population to unite and conront bothheads o colonial power that personied the coupling

o State-Company, and thereby threatening one o the

pillars o the colonial presence on Rapanui, the prots

o the livestock operations.

Notes

1. The Compaa Explotadora de Isla de Pascua willhereater be reerred to as either CEDIP or the Company.

2. While it is true that the alliance between the CEDIPand the State dealt an important blow to the indigenousmovement led by Angata, it is necessary to mentionthat the rebellion achieved some strategic gains or the

Rapanui, especially in the decrease o the power o theCompany on the island.

3. For a synthesis o the antecedents o the European andChilean colonization o Rapa Nui, see Cristino et al.1984.

4. For a deeper development o this armation, see Ortega1981 and Salazar 2003.

5. More than simply establishing a greater degree oterritorial integration within the national rameworkduring these moments, this situation is evidenced bythe Governments eorts to rent or sell the island (inresponse to the world crisis o 1929) to some world

powers such as the United States, Great Britain,Germany, or Japan. The rst contacts were made duringthe government o Ibaez (1930), and almost throughto the second government o Alessandri Palma (1937),with the only nations showing interest being the UnitedStates and Japan. In this sense, the transormation othe island into a National Park and Historic Monumentduring the 1930s can be understood to be an attempt to

valorize the island or its later sale (see McCall 1995).6. One o the eects o the arrivals o these missions, and

their threats o deportation and other punishments, wasthe generation o a climate o sel-discipline (and sel-repression) within the indigenous population.

7. For more inormation about this point, see AIV 1926,1927, 1928a.

8. The sel-discrediting o Subdelegates was partially dueto their double-speak on morality. It is worth keepingin mind that they too had extramarital relations withindigenous women that resulted in numerous un-recognized children on the island.

9. The monthly contribution o 50 lambs, alongside theperiodic donation o ood, medicines and other goodsby the Company were nearly the only stable resources

disposable to State authorities.10. During 1937, Subdelegate Olalquiaga revealed the

precarious state o the prison and the inexistence oimplements to prevent jailbreaks while describing hisactivities on Rapa Nui. He stated: In light o the actthat the jail is in no way secure, I made sure it wasreinorced and urthermore saw to it that an iron crossbarwas installed along with the respective rings so that nowthe prisoners cannot escape. I also saw to it that a pair ohandcus was made and 4 shackles (AMM 1937).

11. According to the testimony o Recabarren, Martinez hadbeen guilty o numerous abuses o the island population,the CEDIP, and the State authorities. For details o thissee AIV 1928b.

12. Even when the State and the Catholic Church had beenunited, the latter couldnt be reduced to merely a Stateinstitution. The actions o the Church during the periodo catechist Nicols Pakarati, which were always closerto the church in Tahiti, are a good example. However, theCatholic Church contributed much to the consolidationo the Chilean presence on Rapa Nui. Among otherthings, it collaborated in the omenting o the sentimentor national integration among the indigenous

population. The role played by the Church during theseyears by Bishop Edwards, and the work carried out byFather Englert rom 1935 on, constitute good exampleso this collaboration.

13. On a larger scale, we can also mention Rubn Hotus andNicols Pakomio as being within this group.

14. Nevertheless, it is true that certain personalities, likeJuan Tepano, or at a later point Pedro Atn Pakomio,

came to have a bit o infuence within the structure ocontinental power established during these decades. Onmany occasions, this infuence came to rival that o thetwo successive Maritime Subdelegates.

15. Atn was designated (not elected) as the Rapanui mayorby the Subdelegate Manuel Olalquiaga, almost certainlyin December 1935.

16. Aside rom those obligations established by theTemperamento (donations o 50 lambs a month to theSubdelegation, care o lepers, construction o a lepercolony, and respecting the 2,000 hectares adjudicated tothe indigenous population), the Company also made a



14/15



series o social donations o ood, wood and medicine.They emphasized the giving out o pills imported romabroad or the lepers among these social donations.For details, see AIV 1926:Folios 1, 11(6),12; AIV1927:Folio23(12).

17. For more on this subject, see AIV 1926, 1927, 1928a.18. Regarding this, Fischer (2005) tells us that the indigenous

Rapanui grew accustomed to paying exorbitant prices

or processed oods and other products that they did notneed, especially when considering the previous patternso nutrition and consumption on the island: tubers, tea,

plantains, sh, chicken, lobster, ruits, etc19. As was the case with the groups o islanders that were

close to the Chilean unctionaries, there also existed asector o Rapanui prone to have a better relationshipwith the CEDIP. Among this group we can mentionthe mestizos o the amilies Paoa Bornier, Tuki Kaituoeand later the children o the heads o the CEDIP, PercyEdmunds and Lachlan Mackinnon, with indigenouswomen (rom the amilies Rapahango and Haoa).

20. While the salary o a worker on the continent reachedaround 60 pesos a week, the wages o a Rapanui workerdidnt surpass 100 pesos a year (see Hotus 2011).

21. One example o this can been seen with the indigenousrebellion o 1914 and the role played by the church as a

physical space that articulated the movement. For moreinormation (see Castro 2006).

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the members o this project

or their collaboration in this work and in our larger

research publication: La Compaa Explotadora de

Isla de Pascua: Patrimonio, Memoria e Identidad en

Rapa Nui. (Claudio Cristino and Miguel Fuentes,

FONDART 2010, V Region). We would also like

to thank Alberto Hotus, Felipe Pakarati and RolFoerster, with whom we collaborated in the Archivo

del Ministerio de Marina during 2010. Finally,

anthropologist Riet Delsing must be thanked or her

support during the development o this research.

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This article has been peer-reviewed. Received 10 July

2012; accepted 4 March 2013.


towards a characterization of colonial power on rapa nui (1917-1936)

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