towards a u.s. army officer corps strategy for success developing talent pub977

8/7/2019 Towards a u.s. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success Developing Talent Pub977

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OFFICER CORPS STRATEGY SERIES

TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPSSTRATEGY FOR SUCCESS:

DEVELOPING TALENT

Casey WardynskiDavid S. Lyle

Michael J. Colarusso

March 2010

The views expressed in this report are those of the authorsand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or positionof the United States Military Academy, Department of theArmy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publicationsenjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not discloseclassied information, jeopardize operations security, ormisrepresent ofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedomempowers them to offer new and sometimes controversialperspectives in the interest of furthering debate on keyissues. This report is cleared for public release; distributionis unlimited.

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This monograph is the fth in a series of six monographs thatanalyze the development of an Ofcer Corps strategy. Previousvolumes are:

1 - Towards A U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: AProposed Human Capital Model Focused Upon Talent, by ColonelCasey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, and LieutenantColonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, April 2009.

2 - Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy,by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, andLieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, November2009.


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3 - Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success: RetainingTalent, by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle,and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, January2010.

4 - Accessing Talent: The Foundation Of A U.S. Army Ofcer CorpsStrategy, by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle,and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso, March2010.

ISBN 1-58487-438-4


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FOREWORD

Towards a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy forSuccess: Developing Talent is the fth of six monographsfocused upon ofcer talent management in the U.S.Army. In it, Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major DavidS. Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J.Colarusso argue that while the U.S. Army is quiteaccomplished at developing its many talentedpeople, rapidly changing labor market conditionsand emerging threats to American national securitydemand continued vigilance in this area. The authorsidentify several serious challenges confronting theArmy concerning the development of talent, andthey provide a theoretical framework for overcomingthose challenges. The authors also explain whycontinuing education, genuinely useful evaluations,

and properly valued signals are critical to creating anoutstanding organizational culture that highly valuesthe professional development of its personnel.

Since the ofcer development process presentsthe Army with a dramatic opportunity to increaseproductivity, reduce talent ight, gain depth andbreadth of capability, and mitigate risks, the theoriesdiscussed in this monograph merit close attention.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

CASEY WARDYNSKI is Director of the Ofce ofEconomic and Manpower Analysis and an AssociateProfessor of Economics at the United States MilitaryAcademy, West Point, NY. In addition to creatingthe concepts for the Americas Army game andthe Armys pre-commissioning retention incentives,Colonel Wardynski has published in the area ofmilitary compensation policy and manpower. ColonelWardynski earned a B.S. at West Point, a Masters inPublic Policy at Harvard, and a Ph.D. in Policy Analysisfrom the Rand Graduate School.

DAVID S. LYLE is an Associate Professor of Economicsand Deputy Director of the Ofce of Economic andManpower Analysis at the United States Military

Academy, West Point, NY. He has publications inthe Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of LaborEconomics, the Review of Economics and Statistics,the American Economic Journal: Applied, and theEconomics of Education Review. Major Lyle earned aB.S. at West Point and a Ph.D. in Economics from theMassachusetts Institute of Technology.

MICHAEL J. COLARUSSO is a research analyst inthe Ofce of Economic and Manpower Analysis atthe United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and hasserved in a variety of military positions, to include asan Assistant Professor of History at West Point. Mr.Colarusso earned a B.A. in History from Saint Johns

University and a M.A. in History from the PennsylvaniaState University.


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SUMMARY

The U.S. Army has always touted itself as a capstonedevelopmental experience and still does so todayYou made them strongwell make them Army Strong.The Army is almost universally acknowledged as anorganization that powerfully develops talent in areassuch as leadership, teamwork behavior, work ethics,adaptability, tness, and many others. Yet despite thiswell-earned reputation, the Army must remain vigilant.Authorized strength and inventory mismatches, aninverse relationship between responsibility and for-mal developmental time, and sparse non-operationaldevelopment opportunities are serious challenges thatthe Army must address.

Developing talent is important in all high perform-ing organizations, but it is particularly critical to the

Army for several reasons. First, the mission of ghtingand winning wars requires truly championship-leveltalentAmericas national security depends on it.Second, Americans entrust the very lives of their sonsand daughters to the Armythey deserve to be led bysuperstars. And third, limited lateral entry into mid-career and senior level ofcer positions means theArmy cannot rely upon poaching talent from outsideorganizations as corporate America does. Instead, theArmy must retain and continuously develop its entry-level talent to meet present and future demands.

Army ofcers are hungry for the developmentneeded to reach their full potential and performoptimally. When they do not get it, they seek it in theprivate sector. This is why ofcer developmental pro-

grams must be tailored to the needs of every talentedindividual. In this way, the Army can both deepenand broaden its overall talent distribution, mitigating


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risk in an increasingly uncertain and rapidly changingoperating environment.

Current practice, however, generally shuntsofcers down conventional career paths and throughstandardized gates, regardless of their unique tal-ents, experience, or needs. Meeting future challengesmay well require a new way of doing business, a com-prehensive developmental strategy rooted in soundtheory. Several pioneers in the human capital eldhave provided a ready foundation for such a strategy.Their work demonstrates the criticality of continuingeducation, genuinely useful evaluations, and properlyvalued signals to the creation of an outstandingdevelopmental climate.

Considering ofcer development within this con-text moves the Army beyond a focus upon formaltraining and education. While these are certainly

important, managing the nexus of individual talents andrapidly changing organizational requirements calls forcareful attention to many other developmental factors.These include professional networks, mentorship andpeer relationships, tenure, individual learning styles,as well as diversity of thought, experience, and culture.

Lastly, to reap the full benet of any developmentalstrategy, the Army must capture information onthe multitude of talents that its ofcers possess. Theuniqueness of each individual cannot be captured viaskill identiers and career eld designations alone.Instead, the Army needs a mechanism to track talentdevelopment over time, gauging both its breadth anddepth. Only then will it be able to effectively employtalent, the subject of the next and nal monograph in

this series.


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TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPSSTRATEGY FOR SUCCESS:

DEVELOPING TALENT

INTRODUCTION

Reach out and touch someone. A diamond isforever. When it rains it pours. These catchphrases,and many others, were the work of N. W. Ayer and Son,Americas rst advertising agency. Perhaps their bestknown work, however, was the campaign they devisedfor the U.S. Army in 1981Be all that you can be.1The message could not have been clearer: If you joinour team, youll reach your full potential. A rich mixof educational, training, and leadership experienceswould engender a personal transformation, perhapseven the chance to elevate ones socioeconomic status.

This effort to brand the Army as a crucible ofindividual development continues today. Currentadvertising still touts it as a capstone developmentalexperienceYou made them strongwell make them

Army Strong. The all-volunteer Army is almost univer-sally acknowledged as an institution that powerfullydevelops talent in areas such as leadership, teamworkbehavior, work ethics, adaptability, tness, andmany others. Employers know that the Army investssubstantially in its people and that this investmenttranslates directly into enhanced productivity.

For ofcers in particular, the Army provides mostwith a 4-year college education, initial military train-ing, and an opportunity to lead a platoon of 30 to 50Soldiers immediately upon graduation. Few people

will supervise an organization that size in theirlifetime, let alone at such a young age. With such robustdevelopmental opportunities, it is not surprising that


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corporations aggressively recruit junior Army ofcers.Yet despite its well-earned reputation in this area,

the very nature of talent development requires that theArmy remain vigilant. It must be forward looking,considering whether its current ofcer developmentprograms are equal to tomorrows challenges, whetherit suffers from an imbalance in talent supply versusdemand, and whether there is an effective relationshipbetween its developmental and employment strategies.

To succeed, Army ofcer development programsmust be grounded in a talent management context.Recall that we dened talent as the intersection ofthree dimensionsskills, knowledge, and behaviorsthat create anoptimallevel of individual performance,provided the individual is employed within their talentset. As a companion to this taxonomy, we espousedthe concept that each persons talent set represents a

unique distribution of skills, knowledge, and behaviors,and that each organization in turn requires a uniquedistribution of individuals.2

Considering development within this contextbuilds upon traditional human capital theorieschampioning formal training and education as thetwin pillars of development. While these are certainlyimportant, managing the nexus of individual talentsand rapidly changing organizational requirementscalls for careful attention to many other factors. Theseinclude professional networks, mentorship and peerrelationships, tenure, individual learning styles, aswell as diversity of thought, experience, and culture.

Additionally, the complementary nature of capitaland labor as production inputs requires that they be

developed in mutually reinforcing ways. For example,Army talent development must integrate technologicalinnovations to maximize output. The speed of such


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innovation requires organizations possessing bothbroad and deep talents. This mitigates risk in a rapidly

changing environment, increasing the likelihood that theright people will be available to respond to technology-driven labor requirements. Without sufcient depthand breadth of talent, however, an organization maybe unable to leverage new innovations that can push aproduction possibility frontier higher.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING OFFICERTALENT

Developing talent is important in all high perform-ing organizations, but it is particularly critical to theArmy for several reasons. First, the mission of ghtingand winning wars requires truly championship-leveltalentAmericas national security depends on it.

Second, Americans entrust the very lives of their sonsand daughters to the Armythey deserve to be led bysuperstars. And third, limited lateral entry into mid-career and senior level ofcer positions means theArmy cannot rely upon poaching talent from outsideorganizations as corporate America does. Instead, theArmy must retain and continuously develop its entry-level talent to meet present and future demands.

Development also plays a signicant role inscreening, vetting, and culling ofcer talent. Bysetting the bar for Reserve Ofcer Training Corps(ROTC) scholarships commensurate with challengingadmissions standards at top-tier universities, forexample, the Army uses a key developmental op-portunityundergraduate educationas a screening

tool. As cadets compete within an ROTC program,the Army is able to vet talent. Finally, cadets whoare unable to complete their academic and military


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development programs are culled from the talent poolprior to commissioning.

Additionally, strong developmental programs canhelp reduce talent ight, something that has challengedthe Army since the advent of the information age inthe early 1980s. For example, when college coachesrecruit, they seek players with a certain talent leveland potential for growth. In turn, players seekprograms that will extend their talent, perhaps evenproviding an avenue to a professional career. Thosewho feel they have professional potential but are notgetting the development they need will opt out of theprogram. Likewise, Army ofcers are hungry for thedevelopment needed to reach their full potential andperform optimally. When they do not get it, they seekit in the private sector. This is just one more reason whythe Armys developmental programs must be tailored

to the needs of every talented individual.3

However, tailored career development runscounter to current Army practice, which generallyshunts its ofcers down conventional career paths andthrough standardized gates, regardless of their un-ique talents, experience, or needs. To its great credit,the Army robustly resources these career paths andembraces the need for continuous development of itspeople. As a result, it is better led and more capablethan any of its peer competitors.

As the world transitions from information age toconceptual age, however, those competitors havebecome more than just standing armies. Today, theU.S. Army faces an asymmetric threat environmentthat changes more rapidly than its doctrine or

organizations. Work is increasingly characterized byhigh levels of task interdependence, skill specicity, anduncertainty, requiring people who are agile, inventive,


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and empathetic. Just as this new world necessitateschanges in the way the Army accesses, retains, and

employs ofcer talent, data suggest that it may alsoneed to change how it develops it, and in several areas.

INDICATIONS OF POTENTIALDEVELOPMENTAL SHORTCOMINGS

A primary area of concern is the continuing declinein the Army's training and educational base (theInstitutional Army or "Generating" Force). Accordingto the Army's Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC), the sustained demand for thousandsof uniformed trainers in Iraq and Afghanistan hasincreasingly placed the Army's own developmentalprograms at risk.

Symptoms include: delays in initial instruction

for nearly 500 Army Aviators due to a shortage oftrainers; deep declines in the number of Soldiers andArmy civilians planning and executing institutionaltraining (a combined decline of 11,800 professionalssince September 2001); signicant delays in updatingdoctrine and programs of instruction; an increasingreliance upon contract employee support; a muchhigher number of lieutenants, rather than captains, incommand of Basic Combat Training companies; andpoor ofcer-to-student ratios in ROTC. For example, atve of the nation's six largest ROTC programs, thoseratios now exceed 1 to 45 and in some cases are as highas 1 to 76.4 This is a classic case of time inconsistentbehavior - allowing present operational demands tocrowd out consideration of the Ofcer Corps' future

well-being.Another area of concern is closely linked to the

Army's ofcer Transients, Holdees, and Students


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(THS) account, an authorized overhead of ofcers notassigned to operational or institutional organizations

in the Army. Theoretically, this protects the Armyfrom ofcer inventory shortages. For example, ofcersattending graduate school are accounted for in THS.Were there no THS account, these ofcers could notattend school because pulling them out of operationalassignments could undermine unit readiness. Inother words, the THS account is an investment inthe future, an acknowledgment by the Army thatthere must always be a certain number of ofcers innonoperational, administrative, or developmentalassignments.

There are signicant mismatches, however, be-tween the Army's authorized ofcer strength and theactual inventory throughout the ofcer career model.These overages and shortages at different ranks

present the Army with signicant challenges whenmoving ofcers in and out of the THS account for dev-elopmental purposes. In some cases, this results indeferred development for ofcers who simply cannotbe pulled out of units in time of war. Figure 1 de-scribes this situation with data that depicts theauthorizations and inventories of the Ofcer Corps asof September 2009. Panel A shows authorized ActiveComponent ofcer strength by years of service andrank. In panel B, we smooth these numbers to accountfor year-to-year attrition behavior.

Panel C indicates where targeted THS increases areneeded to meet currently mandated developmentalopportunities at each rank. Panel D shows thecontinuum of operational requirements plus THS

requirements (solid line) smoothed to allow for his-toric attrition behavior. This last panel also presents theactual ofcer inventory by year-group (dotted line),


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Figure 1. THS and Authorized Strength/InventoryMismatches

highlighting the dramatic difference between what theArmy needs and what it actually has at each rank. Suchmismatches between requirements and inventorysignicantly hamper professional development at boththe company and eld grade levels.

For example, as panel D shows, the Army has beenover-accessing lieutenants for almost a decade to makeup for ofcer shortages elsewhere (senior captains andmajors). This created an excess of lieutenants whichnow extends deep into the junior captains inventory aswell. Not surprisingly, developmental time in key jobs

(such as platoon leader) has been compressed to allowsufcient throughput for this growing queue of juniorofcers.5


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Conversely, the shortage of mid-career ofcers(majors) creates tension between meeting current oper-

ational demands and providing ofcer develop-ment time. Understandably, the Army is not goingto assign ofcers to developmental opportunitieswhen it creates warghting unit vacancieshencedevelopment suffers at these ranks. Only whenofcer requirements and inventory align closely(and when THS is appropriately sized) can the Armymeet operational demands without sacricing talentdevelopment.

A second potential challenge is the inverserelationship between the formal developmentaltime afforded ofcers and their increasing levels ofresponsibility across a 20-30 year career. As seen inFigure 2, the Army directs the largest share of its for-mal developmental programs toward the early stages

of an ofcers career.This is not entirely surprising, as most companies

put great effort into on-boarding new people,introducing them to their duties, the organizationalculture, etc. In the Armys case, approximately 20percent of all company grade ofcer man-years arespent in a training status. What is surprising, however,is that less than 10 percent of Army eld grade andgeneral ofcer man-years are spent in a training ordevelopment status. This is in stark contrast to therelationship that exists between responsibility andrank. As the right axis of the gure shows, an ofcersspan of control over people, resources, and outcomesincreases signicantly with rank.6 In short, there is aprecipitous decline in formal development just as job

complexity rapidly increases.


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Figure 2. Development Time is Inversely Related to

Rank

Undoubtedly, on-the-job training compensatesfor some of this gap in senior ranks development.However, much of that development takes place intactical to operational level assignments with veryuneven skill transferability to the strategic levels ofleadership. In other words, aside from relatively shortcourses for ofcers transitioning into new career elds,the Army is tied to a predominantly one-size ts allapproach to ofcer development that short-changes itssenior leaders, those most responsible for successfulenterprise-level outcomes.

The extent of this misalignment can be seen inFigure 3, where the share of ofcer assignments in oper-

ational units declines sharply with increasing rank.Fewer than 25 percent of colonel-and-above ofcerpositions are in the Operating Force, while the remain-ing 75 percent reside in the Generating (institutional)


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Force, where strategic issues predominate. Most seniorofcers assigned there, however, will have spent the

bulk of their on-the-job developmental time focusedupon operational-type matters.

Meanwhile, the formal executive-level educationthat does occur (at institutions such as the U.S. ArmyWar College or the National Defense University)focuses broadly upon strategic artthe knowledgerequired to employ landpower at the theater or na-tional level in time of war.7 While absolutely necessary,this alone cannot prepare senior leaders for the nearly80 percent of their future employment which will be inhighly specialized, enterprise-level assignments. Thisis the business side of the Army: budgets, personnel,weapons systems, training, recruiting, marketing,civil-military relations, etc.8 In fact, the dissonancebetween such responsibilities and formal preparation

Figure 3. Declining Operational Billets WithIncreasing Rank


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is strikingsenior ofcers often nd themselvesemployed in highly specialized enterprise program

areas without having been afforded the executiveeducation needed to excel.9 Often, any depth of talentacquired by ofcers in these areas is ancillary to theArmys broader developmental objectives, and asa result, it is rarely identied, leveraged, or furtherextended.

In sum, to meet future challenges, talent develop-ment must be synchronized with the other componentsof the ofcer human capital model (talent accessions,retention, and employment), tied to requirements acrossthe rank structure, and closely tracked. The Armycan then construct a powerful and effective ofcerdevelopment strategy, provided it rests upon soundhuman capital theory.

OFFICER DEVELOPMENT WITHIN A HUMANCAPITAL THEORY FRAMEWORK

Since the late-1950s, the study of human capital hasbecome one of the largest bodies of academic research,spanning multiple disciplines. With Gary Beckersseminal Human Capital as our start point, we reviewthe literature and highlight those ideas most criticalto talent development within an Army ofcer context.Before doing so, however, we should rst explain therelationship between human capital and our talentconstruct.

The Relationship between Human Capital andTalent.

As we have explained throughout this seriesof monographs, employees gain human capital (theability to produce value in the workplace) through


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education, training, and experience, thus increasingtheir productivity.10 These are additive to the attitudes

and native abilities they bring to the workplace. Withinhuman capital literature, this is often expressed as anequation (EQ.1, where u = other unobserved attributes):

Human Capital = Ability + Education + Experience+ Training + Attitude + u.

Our talent-based construct builds upon humancapital theory. An example helps illustrate the rela-tionship between human capital and talent. Consider John, a carpenter who acquires a business degree.This does not necessarily increase his work-shopproductivity. While Johns college studies willcertainly hone his cognitive abilities, they may alsocreate employment preferences that are no longer

met, reducing his productivity as a carpenter. Johnsnew business degree does not appreciably extend histalent advantage as a carpenter, even though it clearlyrepresents a human capital investment.

Instead, acquiring a business degree has funda-mentally altered Johns talent distribution, which maynow be better suited to another job. Should Johnsemployer align this new talent distribution with aposition requiring business acumen and mechanicaldexterity (say carpentry shop supervisor), Johnsproductivity may soar, his talent advantage extendedby his employment in the right place and time.

The relationship, then, between human capital and talentcenters upon distributionspeople have unique talentdistributions, organizations have uniquely distributed

employment requirements, and these must be alignedto generate optimal productivity and continuousemployee development. Investments in human capital


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shape an individuals talent distributions (their skills,knowledge, and behaviors). Therefore, human capital

investments must be thoughtfully weighed againstthese distributions or they can actually cause talentmismatches, engendering reductions in productivity.

Understanding the linkage between human capitaltheory and our talent-based construct is fundamental toforming a developmental strategy for the Army OfcerCorps. Our conclusions are informed by the work ofseveral Nobel Laureates and other accomplishedscholars. In particular, four theories have helped frameour ideas regarding ofcer talent development. Theyreside in the areas of intelligence, adaptability, attitude,and signaling.

Intelligence.

When we began writing about talent, we made itclear that the work of Howard Gardner was integralto our thinking. A professor of psychology, cognition,and education, Gardner denes intelligence as theability to solve problems, or to create products, thatare valued within one or more cultural settings.11 Inhis Frames of Mind: the Theory of Multiple Intelligences(1983), he identied several native intelligences pos-sessed by all people to varying degrees: linguistic;spatial; musical; bodily-kinesthetic; logical-mathe-matical; interpersonal; and intrapersonal.12

We see clear evidence of Gardners theoriesin our everyday lives. One needs look no furtherthan a kindergarten classroom to see the variety ofintelligences possessed by people, even at a very young

age. Some children can walk a balance beam withlittle effort (bodily-kinesthetic intelligence), othersmake friends quickly (interpersonal intelligence), and


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still others can sing in tune (musical intelligence). Asthese children progress into adolescence, they are very

often drawn towards activities and subjects where theirnatural intelligences help them to perform optimally.

Although we enter the world more intelligent insome areas than others, education, training, and lifeexperience can increase our less-dominant intelli-gences as well. A formal mathematics curriculum, forexample, will develop logical-mathematical skill,although those who naturally possess an abundance ofthis intelligence may progress faster and deeper.

Gardners ground-breaking work contributes theelement of individual uniqueness to our understandingof talent.Each of us in some ways is like an independentnation, and our intelligences are analogous to naturalresources. While some countries may possess similarresources, no two possess them in equal measure, and

those resources necessarily shape the scope, pace, anddirection of development. It is no different with people.

Adaptability.

The award winning work of Nobel LaureateTheodore Schultz supports Gardners contention thatpeople develop talent most rapidly and powerfullyin the elds to which their intelligences draw them.Schultzs research also focuses upon the need for highlyadaptive people in organizations facing constantlychanging requirements.13 The Army has recognizedthis, and virtually all of its ofcer development pro-nouncements call for adaptable leaders to meet to-days challenges. Yet what is the Army doing to create

such adaptability? What should it be doing?Schultz emphasizes the criticality of knowledge

acquisition (particularly education, but also experience


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and training) to the development of mental acuityand agility. He also argues that people are either in

equilibrium (an ideal balance between work capabilitiesand work requirements) or on their way to it.14 Ideally,an employer such as the Army wants workers whorapidly achieve equilibrium, but the employer has apretty critical role in ensuring this.

Consider Major General George Brinton McClellan,Lincolns on-again, off-again commander of theArmy of the Potomac during the American CivilWar. Returning to service in 1861 as a major general(having resigned as a captain in 1857), McClellanrapidly built, trained, equipped, and concentratedthat army for battle. In terms of capability, by mid-1862 it numbered over 168,000 men and was farsuperior in training, discipline, and combat powerto any Confederate force, no mean feat in a country

which had just 20,000 regular Soldiers spread acrossremote frontier posts and coastal fortications a yearor so earlier.

Even President Lincoln credited McClellan withhaving carried off a masterful organizational effort.But in one of the most astute talent assessments of theday, Lincoln characterized McClellan this way: He isan admirable engineer, but he seems to have a specialtalent for a stationary engine.15 In other words, theadaptability required to build an army was clearlywithin McClellans talent set, but the adaptabilityneeded to wield one was not.

Looking back, the appointment of a former Armycaptain and railroad engineer to command all Unionarmies may seem like a foolish decision. Lincoln had

few choices, however. No one had anticipated theneed to lead mass armies in a bitter North Americanconict, and so no ofcers had been educated to the


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purpose. McClellan was asked to gure it out but couldnot do so rapidly enough. His success as an organizer

but failure as a commander illustrates the criticality ofdeveloping adaptable people and employing them inareas commensurate with their talents. It is a lessonworth remembering, particularly when todays Armyasks its senior generals to lead strategic business effortsafter 30 years of tactical and operational assignments,often with little or no formal development in thesebusiness areas.

Attitude.

Understanding attitudes is critical to creating aworkforce whose behaviors align with organizationalculture and objectives. This leads directly to enhancedproductivity and development. Samuel Bowles, an

economist and behavioral scientist, argues that themost important selection feature for a job candidate isattitude.16

We agree that attitude is vitally important. It shapesbehavior, just as values, goals, and beliefs do. Attitudeis conveyed through action, word, facial expression,writing, and gestures. It is infectious, affects the qual-ity of the work environment, and can improve (or re-duce) the productivity of co-workers. It can also setthe rate at which individuals develop and extend theirtalents.

Understanding attitudes requires an appreciationfor how they are formed. While they may have ahereditary genesis, attitudes are also learned and canbe shaped through developmental experiences. These

include upbringing, socio-economic background,education, athletics, peer or mentor relationships,etc. Appreciating the importance of attitude from a


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strategic perspective is imperative for organizationssuch as the Army, which is both teamwork intensive

and routinely confronted by life and death matters.

Signaling.

Spence, Schultz, and Bowles all address theproductive capabilities possessed by workers. NobelLaureate Michael Spence, however, focuses on theproductive capabilities signaled by workers, partic-ularly via credentials such as diplomas and certif-ications. Spence explains that these are central to mostprofessions and vocations, indicating the presence oftalent that might otherwise go unobserved.17 Doctors,for example, routinely display their diplomas toengender patient condence, mechanics post ASCEcertications to validate their expertise, and barbers

hang their training and licensing certicates near thecash register for the same reason.

Professional clothing and accoutrements areequally powerful validation signals. Factory foremenoften wear different colored helmets to signal theirleadership role. At a construction site, one can dif-ferentiate carpenters from plumbers and electriciansby the tools that they carry. And each of us knowsbetter than to ask reghters to apprehend a criminal.

Usually, there are negative costs (sacrices)associated with acquiring positive validation signals(positive because they are valued by employers), suchas studying long hours, writing lengthy dissertations,enduring physical hardships, paying high tuitioncosts, spending time away from recreational pursuits,

enduring separation from family, logging years of onthe-job training, etc. High negative costs communicatesignicant information about an employees skills,


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knowledge, and behavior. Credentials received at lowor no cost, however, communicate very little about the

productive capabilities of an individual. Signicantnegative costs are therefore necessary to provide valueto a credential.

Developing talent through degree and certicationprocesses is vitally important to the Ofcer Corpsbecause lives hang in the balance. Credentials helpthe Army build its talent inventory, signaling whichofcers possess capabilities in which areas. This allowsthe Army to rapidly respond to crises and reveals talentgaps that must be lled via changes to its accessions ordevelopmental systems.

Signal theory has important implications for everyofcer as well. Within the Army, the value of eachsignal (running the gamut from a graduate degree, toairborne wings, to a language prociency test score)

is generally understood, and the incentives to obtainthem are clear and useful. In fact, the loudest signalsin the Army (i.e., its most valued credentials) drive theself-development efforts of its people and say muchabout its overall culture.

For example, in less than a decade, graduate schoolopportunities for Army ofcers dwindled from morethan 7,000 slots per year in the mid-1980s to fewerthan 400 a year by the early 1990s.18 The message tothe Ofcer Corps (sent well before the current conictbegan) was clearcontinuing education is less im-portant to your profession. In any organization, deem-phasizing educational credentials forces those whovalue education to seek it elsewhere and can onlyfoster an anti-intellectual culture, twin developments

that y in the face of todays talent requirements.19Going forward, the Army must continuously evaluatewhether the signals it values are truly incentivizingofcers to develop the talent it needs.


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ESTABLISHING A TALENT FRAMEWORK

GROUNDED IN HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY

To apply these theories practically, and to ensureit continues to develop the talent it needs, the Armyshould consider changes to its ofcer evaluationand education systems, as well as to policies withcounterproductive signaling implications.

Framework for Evaluating Talent.

In a world that increasingly acknowledges thecriticality of ability, learning style, and behavioralscreening to create effective developmental programstoday, the Army stands oddly apart. While it hasimplemented screening measures in the past, its

emphasis upon them has waned over the years. Thelast vestige of such screening was the Ofcer SelectionBattery (OSB), which was discontinued in 1996.20

The Army still requires ofcers to possess collegedegrees, and because it does not dictate areas of study,the degrees obtained by each individual could formthe basis of a diligent screening effort. The Army doesnot use this information, however, nor are individuallearning styles and behaviors considered. Instead,after commissioning and throughout their careers,each ofcer is viewed as being made of the same clay.Through force of culture, tradition, and training, theU.S. Army will form them into the type of ofcer itneedsan interchangeable one.

Evidence for this one-size-ts-all industrial-era

approach can be found in the Ofcer EvaluationReport (OER). The Army has been evaluating ofcerswith annual reports since the 1920s. Its current report


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form (DA Form 67-9) records administrative data,duty description, performance evaluation based on

professionalism metrics, rater comments, senior ratercomments, a forced distribution rating for eld gradeofcers and above, and a listing of best t futureassignments.

One obvious shortfall of this evaluation formatis that each ofcer is assessed against an identicalframework of skills, knowledge, and behaviors. Whilewe would be rst to argue that commissioned servicerequires non-negotiable core attributes, particularlyin the realm of behavior, should an engineer platoonleader be assessed against the exact same measuresas an infantry brigade commander? Evaluating theseofcers, who should have very disparate performanceand potential, against the same generic criteriareduces the Armys ability to understand how current

performance best translates into future talent matches.Additionally, the current evaluation form compares

an ofcer to the peers within his or her unit via forceddistribution. Rules for the forced distribution havechanged over the years, but they currently precludesenior raters from designating more than 50 percent ofofcers above center of mass (ACOM) for any rankat any point in time. A negative consequence of theserules is that for every ACOM rating, another ofcerreceives a center of mass (COM) or below center ofmass (BCOM) rating. This can be interpreted as beingin the bottom half of the performance distributionnot a generally welcomed position. Moreover, it doesnot give promotion boards information as to where anofcer ranks in the top or bottom half of the distribution.

There are better ways to convey informationabout relative performance to both the ofcer andto selection boards, specically by establishing


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equilibrium between positive and negative incentives.As a hypothetical example, consider the difference

between todays bi-modal OER distribution (where anofcer is either above or below a single performancethreshold), and a tri-modal distribution, stratied intothree segments. Each would have a forced ratingpercentage based upon unit density/type, or perhapsannual promotion rate targets.

Let us say, for example, that the Army wanted topromote 10 percent of an ofcer cohort early (belowthe zone), 70 percent on time (the primary zone), andcull 20 percent. It could prescribe performance ratiosof 20 percent ACOM, 60 percent COM, and 20 percentBCOM. Those receiving ACOMs would be consideredfor early selection, those receiving COMs would bepromoted on time, and those receiving BCOMs wouldbe put on notice that they may not be promoted at all.

Such an approach could restore condence inmore than 80 percent of ofcers and provide a clearmechanism for the Army to cull talent mismatchesfrom its ranks. It could also allow the Army to focuson its BCOM population, to see if changing their careerelds might get them in equilibrium elsewhere andmake them optimal performers. Allowing ACOM-COM-BCOM percentages to shift based upon unitrequirements could also introduce the exibility need-ed to account for low density Army organizations,such as Ranger battalions or prime power outts.

Another challenge is that, despite below-the-zonepromotion rates occasionally reaching 6 or 7 percent,ofcer promotions are tied exclusively to time ingrade, not talent. This is surprising in view of the

three principle purposes of commissioned rank:1. To provide authorities consistent with an ofcers

duties and responsibilities;


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2. To signal that authority to others; and,3. To signal the talent of the ofcerthe productive

outcomes that they should be capable of delivering.

If talent truly informed promotion policy, ofcerswould be assigned to positions based upon talentmatch, not rank or time in grade, and then furnishedwith the appropriate rank. OERs received under suchconditions could then serve not just as evaluative toolsbut also as professional certications, validating thecapabilities of the ofcer just as other credentials do.This approach would make the OER far more useful tofuture development and employment decisions.

In past conicts, the Army has demonstratedgreater talent matching exibility. Witness the relief ofBastogne, Belgium during World War II by a newlieutenant colonel named Creighton Abrams, an ofcer

who just 2 years before was a captain and regimentaladjutant. There was no dearth of lieutenant colonels inthe Army in 1944, but the 37th Tank Battalion neededa commander with Abrams particular talents, and hewas given the job. As General George Patton said ofAbrams, Im supposed to be the best tank commanderin the Army, but I have one peer: Abe Abrams. Hesthe world champion.21 In early 1945, Abrams waspromoted to colonel so he would have the authoritycommensurate with leadership of Combat CommandB, 4th Armored Division.

If young Captain Abrams was serving inAfghanistan today and if his commanders recognizedhis abilities to rapidly develop toward battalion andbrigade command, they would be unable to afford him

with those developmental opportunities. Conversely, iftodays time-in-grade promotion requirements existedduring World War II, Captain Abrams would have


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perhaps gone down in history as the best regimentaladjutant in the European Theater of Operations, and

the cost of victory in American blood and treasurewould likely have been higher.

Using Signals to Discern, not Divide.

Earlier in our discussion, we emphasized howvaluable signals can be as talent development incen-tives. They can also help the Army to discern theparticular talents in its ofcer inventory. Spence,however, also notes the potential harm that signalscan cause, particularly if they become status symbols.It is one thing for an individual to earn a certicationand have it displayed in a le, yet quite another towear the credential on their person every day. Suchpractices can actually create barriers to teamwork

behavior (frequent, accurate, timely, relevant, problemsolving communication). It can create cliques, a senseof entitlement, and skewed notions of who belongsand how valuable they are.22

Work attire usually combines three elementsfunctionality (comfort, safety, suitability to the work),internal signaling (clarifying work roles within theworkforce), and external marketing (creating a positiveperception with the public or other key constituencies).Highly successful organizations consider all threevery closely. Southwest Airlines, for example, whichis noted for the excellent teamwork behavior of itsemployees, has uniforms that distinguish ight crewsfrom ight attendants, baggage handlers, operations,and gate personnel, shaped by functional or marke-

ting imperatives. Within each of those groups, how-ever, uniform distinctions between supervisors andother personnel are minimized, reducing barriers


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to teamwork and creating relationships based upontalent, not hierarchy.

W. L. Gore and Associates (producers of Gore-Tex)is another highly successful company that understandsthe ways in which work attire can create or disruptteamwork behavior. Repeatedly identied by FortuneMagazine as one of the 100 best U.S. companies towork for, it is famous for its unique culture, onewhere everyone dresses identically, shares the titleof associate, and where leaders have replacedbosses.23

We are not suggesting that the Army behave asSouthwest or W. L Gore do, but that it should applysignal theory with the same care. In the Armys case,ofcers prominently display airborne, air assault,ranger, sapper, pathnder, and other certications ontheir uniforms. This can cause an undue focus on

status and also foster misinterpretation for severalreasons.

First, people often associate their own accomp-lishments with absolute success. They may surroundthemselves with others who they deem successfulbecause they possess comparable certications. Suchbiases result in thinking such as: I need someone tonegotiate with a local sheik, they need to be as hardcharging as I am, and I have a Pathnder badge.Therefore, I need someone with a Pathnder badge.Unfortunately, completion of Pathnder school haslittle to do with negotiating with a sheik. There isnothing unconventional about this outcome, however.As Spence points out, such behavior is natural, albeitunproductive.24

Another cause of misinterpretation stems fromoutdated signals. For example, most ofcers wearingairborne wings earned them while cadets or shortly


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after commissioning. As a result, most are not on jumpstatus, have never been on jump status, and have never

been assigned to an airborne unit. Even if they are oneday assigned to such a unit, they will need to retrain/recertify before being placed on jump status. TheArmys culture dictates that these ofcers, however,wear their airborne wings each day, even though thecredential no longer signals any real ability to safelyjump from a plane.

In essence, the certication itself (how to participatein an airborne operation) is less valued within theArmy culture than the signal (airborne wings) is.This can cause individuals to seek certications evenwhen they have no real interest in the development itrepresents. They obtain the credential simply to ensureprofessional advancement, rather than to extend theirtalent set. Perhaps evidence for this mind-set is that

when elded in 2005, the Army Combat Uniform(ACU) was meant to display rank, name, and unitafliation, with optional wear of combat/specialskill badges. Today, however, it is rare to nd an ofcerwho feels there is anything optional about wearingskill badges.

To be clearin no way are we recommendingremoval of certication badges from Army blue ordress uniforms, in particular because these uniformsare not worn in daily work settings. Unlike the ACU,these uniforms also serve a very important externalcommunications function. This is why awards are alsoworn on the blue/dress uniforms and not ACUsin formal settings, the Army wants the public torecognize its Medal of Honor and Silver Star winners,

its wounded warriors, etc. The Army rightfully valuesits heritage, traditions, and the sacrices of its Soldiers,and as active and retired military professionals, we doas well.


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A cutting edge talent management system, however,should create a culture in which the most powerful

certications, the ones most valued, signal the talentneeded to succeed in our times. Instead of thoughtssuch as, look at her, shes been to airborne school, airassault school, aviation schoolwhat a great leadershe must be, the Army should create a culture in whichofcer assessments are more along the lines of: look ather, that ofcer knows how to think, works hard, takescare of Soldiers, and is a leader of characterwhat agreat leader she is.

The Importance of Continuing Education.

Most formal training focuses on well-dened tasks,conditions, and standards. This teaches people howto respond to things that are familiar or can be antici-

pated. Adaptability, however, requires developmentalprograms that put people in unfamiliar situations andrequire them to gure things out. Continuing highereducation is a proven way to develop such adapt-ability.

Consider that for decades, agriculture and farmingexperienced little technological change: seasons, fer-tilizers, equipment, and livestock remained relativelyunchanged, and farmers achieved optimal outcomesby making minor adjustments over time. There waslittle need for formal educationroutine practice andtraining were sufcient. However, all this changedwhen technology revolutionized the farming industryin the early 1980s. Studies have shown that farmerswith formal educations were far more likely to rapidly

assimilate and apply these new technologies to theiragricultural operations.25


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The work of Jean Piaget, an early 20th centuryscholar and father of genetic epistemology, helps

explain why formal education is so important toinculcating mental agility and adaptability. He dividedthe development of knowledge into three stages:schema, adaptation, and equilibrium.26 Like Gardner,Piaget acknowledged that even babies have nativeskills that enable them to grab a rattle and thrust it intheir moutha schema. The second stage, adaptation,has two components: assimilation and accommodation.When the baby comes across a new object, such as theTV remote, he assimilates the new object into the oldschema and shoves it into his mouth as well. But whenthe infant comes across the vacuum cleaner, the graband thrust schema fails because the item cannot begrabbed and shoved into his mouth. Therefore, thebaby must accommodate the new object with a new

schemaslap and drool. Through the process ofadaptation, humans eventually reach equilibrium.This ideal state strikes a comfortable balance betweenthe mind and the environment.

Piagets framework of schema, adaptation, andequilibrium extends well beyond infant development.It is a process applied throughout our lifetimes.Even the Nobel Laureates cited in this monographdemonstrate thisthey earned the award for bumpinginto new challenges, studying them, and developingnew schema to explain them.

To create conditions allowing more ofcers tocontinue their educations, the Army must reorder itspriorities in this area and act accordingly. If greatercontinuing education opportunities are created, THS

numbers may need to increase, establishing a talentoverhead that gives the Army time and space tocreate leaders who can succeed across the spectrum oftactical to strategic challenges.


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CONCLUSION

To maintain the Armys excellence as a devel-opmental organization, vigilance is required, as wellas a strategy rooted in sound theory. In particular,because much of the Armys developmental opportun-ities revolve around on-the-job training, a closerelationship between its talent development andemployment strategies is crucial. Successfully syn-chronizing the two will also yield greater success inaccessing and retaining ofcer talent.

As we have seen, Becker, Schultz, Spencer,Bowles, and other pioneers in the human capitaleld have provided a ready foundation for thecreation of a comprehensive and forward-lookingofcer development strategy. Their work helps us to

understand the criticality of continuing education,genuinely useful evaluations, and properly valuedsignals to the creation of an outstanding developmen-tal climate. They also make clear that each individualis unique, and that to maximize their development,the Army needs as many career paths as it has ofcers.In this way, the Army can both deepen and broadenits overall talent distribution, mitigating risk in anincreasingly uncertain and rapidly changing operatingenvironment.

To reap the full benet of current and futuredevelopmental efforts, the Army must begin to captureinformation on the multitude of talents that its ofcerspossess. The uniqueness of each individual demands anew paradigm that moves beyond skill identiers and

career elds. Instead, the Army needs a mechanismto track talent development over time, gauging bothits breadth and depth. Only then will it be able to


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effectively employ talent, the subject of the next andnal monograph in this series.

ENDNOTES

1. Advertising Age ranked it as the second most successfulslogan/jingle of the last century, eclipsed only by McDonaldsYou deserve a break today. Available from adage.com/century/jingles.html.

2. See Vol. 2 in this monograph series, Casey Wardynski,

David Lyle, and Michael Colarusso, Talent: Implications for aU.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic StudiesInstitute, U.S. Army War College, November 2009, p. 5.

3. The unique nature of each persons talent set requiresa paradigm that extends well beyond the Armys use of skillidentiers and career elds. Developmental efforts must supporta situation where there are as many unique career paths as thereare evolving skill requirements.

4. General Martin Dempsey, Commanding General, TRADOC,Erosion of TRADOC's Core Competencies and Functions,Memorandum for General George Casey, Chief of Staff of theArmy, February 16, 2010, as reported by Nancy A Youssef forMcClatchy Newspapers, March 3, 2010, available from www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/03/89799/general-sounds-alarm-on-us-army.html.

5. For data supporting this conclusion, see Vol. 3 in thismonograph series, Casey Wardynski, David Lyle, and MichaelColarusso, Toward a U.S. Army Ofcer Corps Strategy for Success:Retaining Talent, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.Army War College, January 2010, p. 6.

6. To illustrate this point, we use an infantry ofcersprogression through key and developmental positions.

7. Source: 2010 U.S. Army War College Course Catalog, avail-able from www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Registar/pdf/catalogue.pdf.


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8. Failing to provide developmental opportunities for thesenonoperational requirements that dominate senior leaderassignments puts an additional premium on accessing the righttalent who may have a proclivity for quick learning in these areas.

9. Targeted executive-level education is one way to rectifythis, as is matching executive credentials against enterprisetalent requirements. Large, complex enterprises are devotingincreasing time and resources to the specialized development ofsenior leaders. Examples include GEs Welch Leadership Centeror the Wharton Schools Center for Leadership and ChangeManagement.

10. See Gary Becker, Human Capital, Third Ed., Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press, 1993.

11. For a comprehensive overview of Gardners work, see hisMultiple Intelligences after Twenty Years, a paper presentedat the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL,April 21, 2003.

12. Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind: The Theory of MultipleIntelligences, 20th Anniversary Ed., New York: Basic Books, 2004.

13. Theodore W. Schultz, "Investments in Human Capital,"American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1961), pp. 1-17.

14. Theodore W. Schultz, "The Value of the Ability to Dealwith Disequilibria," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 13, No. 3,September 1975, pp. 827-846.

15. Isaac N. Arnold, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, 4th Ed.,New York: Bison Books, 1994, p. 300.

16. Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Melissa Osborne,"The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No. 4, December 2001,p. 1140.

17. Michael Spence, "Job Market Signaling," The QuarterlyJournal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3, August 1973, pp. 355-374


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18. Fewer than 1 in 10 ofcers commissioned in the 1990sthrough 2005 can expect to receive a fully-funded graduateschool program from the Army. Ofcer cohorts in this era rangedfrom 4,000-6,000 per year, and each cohort had roughly 400 fullyfunded graduate school billets available.

19. For an interesting discussion of this anti-intellectualism,see Major General (Ret.) Robert H. Scales, Too Busy to Learn,U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2010, available fromwww.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=2195 .

20. Telephone interview with Dr. Arthur Coumbe, CommandHistorian, U.S. Army Cadet Command, February 17, 2010.

21. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,available from www.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarles/index.cfm?fuseaction=people.details&thisunit=3&peopleid=99.

22. For a useful discussion of how and why people sortthemselves into different groups, see Robert H. Frank, Choosingthe Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. New York,Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 8-12.

23. Wikipedia, available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._L._Gore_and_Associates .

24. Spence, p. 360.

25. In many ways, what occurs in education is akin to whatmost experience when spending time in a different country witha foreign culture. Understanding the customs, behaviors, andpoints of views of others allows for an expanded world view. Themore exercise that people get in expanding their world view, theeasier it will be for them to adapt to new situations and gurethings out.

26. C. George Boeree, "Jean Paiget and Cognitive Deve-lopment," online publication, 2003, available from http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/genpsypiaget.html


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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert M. WilliamsCommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

AuthorsColonel Casey Wardynski

Major David S. LyleLieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso

Director of PublicationsDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

towards a u.s. army officer corps strategy for success developing talent pub977

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