Trade Reform and the Development Deficit Beyond 2015:

Mega-regional Trade Agreements and their Impact on Developing Country Third-Party

Members

Amy Wood1

[Draft Paper—Please do not cite without permission]

Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Global South Caucus Singapore

January 8-10, 2015

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Abstract Mega-regional trade agreements (MRAs) between developed countries will make up the bulk of future trade flows, yet their impact on non-party members, the majority of which are developing and least developed countries, has largely been overlooked. This paper takes as its starting point the observation that mega-regionals will have implications for poor countries. The negotiation of MRAs has taken place alongside the gutting of the development agenda from the multilateral trade system, illustrated by the start-stop nature of the Doha Round of negotiations. However, the consultation process around the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provides an opportunity to advance an agenda of fairer trade and sustainable development. Thus far, these goals have not taken into consideration the fact that MRAs could reshape global trade rules and constrain development opportunities for poor countries. This paper argues that MRAs, if concluded, will undermine development priorities, leaving developing countries with a narrow set of options and little time to respond with appropriate economic and political measures. The paper’s case analysis of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provides insight into the new standards for bilateral agreements with implications for regional economic development abroad. Although a development deficit in global trade is not inevitable, the multilateral trade system must adjust to a new set of emerging development concerns that will arise from MRAs.

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Introduction

The start-stop nature of the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations largely

signaled the removal of development from the international trade agenda. This took place

amidst a rapidly changing landscape of international trade where a “development deficit”2

has emerged. Today, mega-regional trade agreements (MRAs) between developed

countries will rewrite global trade and investment rules, yet their impact on non-party

members, the majority of which are developing countries, has largely been overlooked.3

The development of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—the only

global consultation on poverty reduction and sustainable development—have not taken

into consideration the fact that MRAs, if concluded, will significantly constrain

development opportunities for poor countries. What will the future of trade look like for

developing countries that have been excluded from (or chose not to participate in) these

agreements? Given the removal of development from the multilateral trade system and

the absence of development considerations in MRAs, are prospects for development-led

trade doomed?

This paper seeks to explain why a development deficit is a perennial feature of the

international trade politics. It argues that MRAs, if signed, will undermine development

priorities, leaving developing countries with a narrow set of options and little time to

respond to this changing trade landscape. This argument will be constructed in three parts

as follows: part I provides a brief overview of the current MRA landscape; part II

analyses how the language used to describe MRAs (and who is using it) creates a “fear of

missing out effect” with few reasonable options for developing countries; and part III

explores how the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade

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Agreement (CETA) will become a baseline for future agreements with the EU, namely

the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which will rewrite global

trade and investment rules to the detriment of development for low-income countries. I

conclude with considerations on how the SDGs can better respond to this rapidly

changing trade landscape.

I. The changing trade landscape

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have historically developed alongside the multilateral

trading system (MTS). RTAs began taking off in the mid-1990s while the multilateral

system gained strength but have increased more rapidly over last 10 years,4 parallel to the

stagnation of the Doha Round of negotiations. In 2013, eight new regional agreements

entered into force, in addition to the 14 in 2012. To date, there are 253 active regional

trade agreements.5 While 80 percent of these are bilateral, some are deeper and more

complex, known as mega-regional agreements.6

While twentieth century RTAs were about tariffs and hard preferences, MRAs are

about foreign direct investment (FDI), global value chains (GVCs) and soft preferences,

centered on competition and competitive devaluation,7 investment and government

procurement. Mega-regional agreements are free trade agreements (FTAs) that cover a

broad range of issues and are distinct from other preferential trade agreements (PTAs)

and RTAs because of their size and scope.8 Where FTAs are considered “shallow,”9

MRAs are considered “deep”10 because they involve major players in the economy, cover

a more expansive set of issues and pursue greater levels of liberalization than any

previous FTA. Although there is no agreed upon definition, more specific attempts to set

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boundaries for MRAs suggest that they: i) include three or more countries, ii) collectively

account for 25 percent or more of world trade, and iii) go “well beyond” current WTO

measures.11 The final component is the most relevant for this paper, given that services12

and regulation will have spillover effects for excluded parties.

There are a number of large bilateral agreements such as the EU-Japan FTA and

the CETA between the EU and Canada that are significant but not large enough to be

considered MRAs. The conclusion of the CETA negotiations was re-announced on 26

September 2014, signaling a major step towards the completion of the first major bilateral

agreement. The EU is also negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment

Partnership (TTIP) with the US, which will be an MRA and the world’s largest bilateral

agreement. The seventh round of negotiations concluded in September 2014, and the

agreement may be completed by the end of 2015.13

The most far-reaching MRA—in terms of geography and scope—is the

Transpacific Partnership (TPP), which involves the United States and 11 countries from

the Asia-Pacific. It developed from the 2005 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic

Partnership Agreement between Brunei, Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore,

which was the first preferential trade agreement (PTA) to link Asia, the Pacific and Latin

America.14 The TPP expanded in three waves to include the US, Canada and Japan

among others, and today the negotiating countries make up 40 percent of global GDP.

Although seven of the TPP’s negotiating members are developing countries, the

agreement houses no commitments to regional economic development.

MRAs have drawn significant international attention and stirred public debate

(most often after they have been signed in secret) for their impacts on contracting parties.

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However, relatively little is known about how these agreements will affect non-members.

As Figure 1 illustrates, the majority of MRAs exclusively involve developed countries.

Of the total number of countries involved, sixty-three percent are highly industrialized.

Of the 166 countries that are not involved in MRAs, the majority of which are developing

and least developed countries. Uri Dadush predicts this these excluded countries

comprise over 80 percent of the world’s population. The GDP growth rate of these

countries is three percent faster than developed countries per year, and will soon account

for over half of world trade.15

China, India,

Brazil, Russia and

South Africa (the

BRICS group), have

been largely

excluded from

MRA negotiations.

To some extent,

they have shown no real interest in deep RTAs or MRAs, perhaps because they can

attract enough FDI on their own, and are not dependent on MRAs for growth. However,

geopolitical considerations warrant greater scholarly attention. In the case of TPP, China

was excluded from the negotiation’s onset mainly because the US sought to prevent

economic power consolidation in East Asia. Although China has attracted the most public

attention for its absence in MRAs, several other middle-income countries are developing

regional FTAs in response to the development of MRAs. Most noteworthy is the

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Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and the six countries that have FTAs

with the ASEAN including India and China. The RCEP negotiations16 began in

November 2012 and while at an earlier stage than the TPP, the agreement is stated to be

as comprehensive, particularly in terms of non-tariff barriers.17 Unlike the TPP, the RCEP

includes measures of special and differential treatment and “flexible implementation

schedules” for LDCs.18 This was a direct response to US- and EU-led FTAs. For the

remaining BRICS countries, Brazil can work within the Pacific Alliance (Chile,

Colombia, Mexico and Peru), South Africa is developing an agreement with the Common

Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development

Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) for a Tripartite Free Trade

Area, and Russia is negotiating with the Eurasian customs union.19

What about the rest of the world? By way of illustration, the Pacific Alliance will

continue to engage in economic and trade integration with a focus on developing

relationships with the Asia Pacific, and attempt to insert themselves into global value

chains (GVCs); MRAs with the EU mean that the Mercosur bloc (Argentina, Brazil,

Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) could lose out of the European market because the

agreement has been under negotiation for 10 years with little no ending in sight; likewise,

the US has been negotiating a Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA) since 2003

and after ten years has not made significant progress; and the Pacific Agreement on

Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus with Australia, New Zealand and the Forum

Island Countries builds on the 2002 PACER umbrella agreement, which takes place

alongside a smattering of Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU. However, the

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majority of countries—the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific grouping—have been sidelined by

these negotiations and remain largely silent about the development of MRAs. For

example, African countries are not a part of any MRA and instead are developing inter-

country regional markets like the COMESA—EAC—SADC Tripartite Agreement.20

The exclusion of the smallest and most vulnerable countries, and the neglect of

sensitive issues for included developing countries will undermine global development.

The WTO Director General (DG), Roberto Azevêdo, is generally in support of MRAs,

noting in his recent address to the US Chamber of Commerce in March 2014 that they

have a “clear role to play.”21 Later in the year, however, he made it clear that regional and

mega-regional agreements, although important, are not a substitute for the multilateral

system, noting that big issues, such as trade facilitation, and (unresolved) sensitive issues,

such as export subsidies in agriculture and fishing and support measures, can only be

negotiated at the WTO. As development has been carved out of the Doha Round in any

substantive manner, and development issues have been disregarded because they exclude

the overwhelming majority of small and poor countries, prospects for trade-led

development have all but disappeared (if they every really existed at all).

II. Decoding the discourse of mega-regional agreements

There is a new discourse emerging around the promotion and proliferation of

MRAs, which is distinct from that used by trade experts in the multilateral system over

the last decade. The old MTS language revolved clearly around the Doha Round and

trade experts have employed dramatic terms to describe the situation—“Doha is dead,”

“doomed” and “deadlocked”—and to capture the necessity of concluding the negotiating

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round, or to abandon it completely.22 As Rorden Wilkinson observes, this language has

been characterized by medical terminology, for example, referring to the Round as a

patient being in a “coma” or on “life support, and the subsequent need to “revive” it.23 As

dire and pessimistic as the language around the Doha Round was, the language around

MRAs is equally confident. This section explores who is using this language and why. A

critical review of the literature shows that the type of language used by trade experts

limits the set of policy options deemed reasonable for non-member parties, particularly

developing countries.

Given that MRAs are in a relatively nascent phase, there is a small but quickly

growing body of literature addressing them. A survey of this scholarship reveals that this

is resoundingly dominated by policy and trade experts from think tanks in developed

countries, mainly the US, EU and Canada. The voices that are shaping the debate include

that of Richard Baldwin (Centre for Economic Policy Research [CEPR]), Simon Evenett

(University of St. Gallen), Dan Ciuriak (CD Howe Institute) and Bernard Hoekman

(European University Institute [EUI]). Other notable mentions are Karen Bhatia (General

Electric Company), Uri Dadush (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Anabel

González (World Bank), Peter Draper (South African Institute of International Affairs

[SAIIA]) and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable

Development [ICTSD]). This group forms an epistemic community,24 which provides

“intellectual leadership” 25 in trade knowledge and disseminates ideas about the values of

trade liberalization and the inevitability of MRAs. Of this list, Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz,

former Permanent Representative of Columbia to Geneva, is the only Southern trade

intellectual and NGO representative.26 This socio-geographic imbalance is also reflected

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in the fact that primarily Northern-based think-tanks have published on MRAs. Although

not an exhaustive list, these include: the European University Institute (EUI), the World

Economic Forum (WEF), the European Centre for International Political Economy

(ECIPE), the Wilson Centre, the Inter-American Development Bank, ICTSD,

International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Centre for Global

Development (CGD) and the Commonwealth. The only non-Northern institution actively

engaging this issue is the SAIIA. This obvious concentration of scholarship by Northern-

based institutions narrows the parameters of debate. While, for example, debate over the

future of the multilateral system is contentious,27 there is a shared optimism about the

value and continued expansion of RTAs and MRAs. There is an absence of critical

scholarship on the potential impacts of MRAs which indicates a need for a greater

diversity in sources of knowledge, both from developing countries and by trade

ambassadors that fall outside the traditional cadre of trade liberalization evangelists.28

One of the most repeated phrases associated with the TPP negotiations is that the

agreement is taking place between “like-minded countries.” 29 Yet, six of the 12

negotiating parties are developing countries.30 Despite significant differences in levels of

development and interests, and despite promises of progress, there are serious sticking

points in the negotiations. For example, although both developed and emerging countries

seek market access, developing countries are looking to harmonize existing agreements

on tariff matters, while developed countries are seeking deeper integration with a focus

on NTBs such as regulations, financial and investment standards, services, government

procurement and intellectual property. Developing countries will be expected to make

large concessions in these areas. While these countries may be like-minded in their

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ambition for trade liberalization, the false sameness that the term “like-minded” conjures

artificially narrows the real plurality of trade-led development agendas. Despite

significant differences, these countries have been called like-minded by proponents of the

TPP for the purpose of promoting a new brand of trade liberalization.

Moreover, this “like-minded” narrative has normative implications, wherein

countries included in MRAs have advantages (access to markets and capital,

attractiveness to investors, integration into GVCs etc.) over non-included WTO member-

states, which are non-likeminded participants. This is perpetuated by language such as the

“high quality” rules of the TPP, and its reputation as a “first class agreement,” at least

according to the US.31 This effectively creates a tiered trade system between included and

non-included countries. This is concerning for two main reasons: i) MRAs circumvent

democratic processes and have been immune to transparency when compared to the

MTS, and ii) countries that are not included have few policy options to respond to this

changing trade landscape with appropriate economic and political measures. For

example, the TPP’s intellectual property rules are designed to “prevent knowledge

spillovers”; the regulatory and service chapters will constrain policy space for regional

economic development; and the financial sector regulation will reify a financial

architecture that has produced global instability.32 Regardless, the notion of like-minded

countries can be said to create patterns of inclusivity and exclusivity. MRAs confer

implicit legitimacy to included countries to produce a domino effect for non-included

countries. Given the reasonable assumption that the rules will eventually be

multilateralized,33 these countries must subscribe to the logic of MRAs and GVCs with

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little concern for the initial adjustment costs, as well as the long term uncertainty of

implications from mechanisms like the ISDS, as explored in Part III.

These aforementioned assumptions and the language used to convey them rely, in

large part, on the inability of the Doha Round to be concluded. This provides an easy

scapegoat for developed countries’ ambitious alternative channels of trade, yet this

conjecture remains unsubstantiated. Even though there are a number of factors attributed

to the Doha’s failure,34 this “Doha Excuse” has not been empirically assessed. Proponents

of the Doha Excuse—the US and the EU—place the blame on the intransigence of

developing countries to agree on the negotiated package. Meanwhile, developing

countries blamed the US and EU for their protectionism.35 Yet we know that a plethora of

factors have contributed to the Doha’s slow down, including macroeconomic factors such

as community prices and trade flows, and the fact that each successive round deals with

more and more sensitive issues and thus takes longer to conclude.36 The same academic

treatment has not been afforded to understanding the coinciding rise of RTAs. In 1998,

John Whalley gave a number of potential rationales for RTAs including countries’

strategic concerns, the strength in multilateral system, and the traditional gains of market

access in the post-war era.37 Yet there has been little written since on the proliferation of

RTAs.38 One exception is the interjection by Wang Wong that geopolitical considerations

need greater treatment in this context, given the changing power dynamics between the

US and Asia in the background of the TPP.39 Despite a poor understanding of the rise of

MRAs, the Doha Excuse has become “conventional wisdom” 40 as the explanation for the

vacuum in trade governance, which MRAs have boldly begun to fill. Even if the Doha

Round had concluded in 2008 or 2013, developed countries would not have been satiated,

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given the levels of liberalization they seek today. Developed countries engaged in MRAs

have leveraged the Doha Excuse to justify their pursuit of agreements that will have

unknown global implications outside of a rules-based MTS. These countries use the Doha

Excuse as exogenous factor that has catalyzed MRAs, rather than that fact that these

agreements are fulfilling their economic and political self-interest. The US in particular is

pushing to shape rules on new areas like the environment, the protection of labour rights,

and role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through the TTIP and TPP. Thus it might

appear that MRAs are forward thinking and can meet the demands of the current global

trade landscape. Although social and environmental concerns need a place in the trade

agenda, they have become window dressing to justify the fact that a handful of wealthy

industrialized countries are pursuing an agenda that will benefit them and few others. In

sum, although it is important to acknowledge the Doha Round’s stagnation, it is

necessary but not sufficient for understanding the current trade landscape and the rise of

MRAs. While global trade rules must evolve, countries that are excluded will suffer

because MRAs will damage their terms of trade and weaken their trade preferences.

Just as trade experts used the bicycle metaphor to convey the necessity of

concluding the Doha Round, MRAs requires the “GVC revolution”41 for momentum.

Global value chains are intimately tied to foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade.

According to Peter Draper, Simon Lacey and Yash Ramkolowan, developing countries

must “plug into” GVCs by adopting regulatory reform packages through MRAs.42 This

conditionality is an essential ingredient for countries in the new trade system, but bears

some resemblance to the conditionalities of the 1980s when developing countries were

prescribed structural reforms to integrate into the industrialized trade networks. Today,

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while developed countries have relatively few legal and economic reforms to make in

order to negotiate MRAs, developing countries must undergo significant, unilateral

reforms in order to be allowed into the game. While the International Monetary Fund and

World Bank once espoused the values of structural adjustment programs and developed

countries championed them, today they are similarly proponents of GVCs.43 Their

support lends legitimacy to GVC’s role as the metric for world trade and a necessary

precursor for development. This drastically simplifies the processes and reforms that

developing countries are required to undergo: GVCs requires smooth entry and logistics,

and financial and physical infrastructure, which are service based. This explains the

prominence of services and non-tariff barriers (NTB) for “standard-related disciplines” in

MRAs, which has become their driving force,44 and strengthens the links to trade and

investment through FDI. This triple threat of investment, trade and GVCs is used “to

keep the bicycle moving forward” in order to maintain the particular currency of trade

liberalization.45 Consequently, developing countries are led to believe that they must

become integrated into GVCs in order to industrialize, regardless of their vastly different

socio-economic positions and levels of development.

MRAs are often termed “twenty-first century agreements” because of the range of

new issues being covered.46 This is imbued with the logic that they are an appropriate and

natural development given the complexity of trade and the stagnation of the MTS. This

perceived homogeneity adds weight to the notion that MRAs are inevitable because the

negotiated issues are not contentious. However, these agreements are not the inevitable

development pathway for the rest of the world. If the TTIP and TPP are concluded—

there is a likelihood that they could get hamstrung in the US Congress47—there is little

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evidence to suggest that the BRICS group would eagerly await accession opportunities.

Regardless, the current framing of MRAs and the assumptions they embody effectively

leave developing countries without a reasonable choice. Either they accede to mega-

regionals, namely the TPP, with unreasonably high standards, or they are left waiting for

the Doha Round to conclude, which would not significantly affect their development

prospects. They are thus advised by experts to undergo unilateral reforms such as

increasing regulation and product standards, reducing tariff and NTBs, and developing

infrastructure.48 This is done in order to eventually join an MRA.49 Non-included

developing countries that are able to make unilateral reforms will be rewarded in

subsequent FTAs, thus MRAs like the TPP represent a “giant step forward for developing

countries.”50 According to the prevailing logic, RTAs will expand or merge with other

RTAs such as the Pacific Alliance or the Tripartite Free Trade Area in Africa, non-

included countries will continue building FTAs as a response triggered by a fear of

missing out, agreements will become multilateralized, and the MFN principle expanded.51

However, not only is it highly unlikely that developing countries will lower tariffs on

their own, it is even more unlikely that that will develop higher industry standards,

potentially discouraging FDI, or to adhere to “behind the border regulatory norms.”52

Undertaking unilateral reforms is not only politically untenable, but there is no guarantee

that they will be successful, or that the interested country will be allowed to accede into

mega-regional agreements. This means that many poor countries will never have the hope

of joining MRAs. However, these pressures are unlikely to disappear in the near future.53

This section implicitly asks whether MRA trade diplomacy is driven by Western-

led trade liberalization.54 This has been the outspoken perception of China,55 but it has

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also manifested itself in subtler ways: the geopolitical stalemate in the Doha Round,56

which is a hangover from “generations of Atlanticism” and the elite-driven agenda in the

post-Cold war world order.57 Although slowly waning, this is still exercised through

material power, in the zealous pursuit of MRAs led by the US and EU, but also through

symbolic power in the language used to characterize and justify them by members of the

dominant epistemic community, as evidenced in this section. The sense of inevitability in

the branding of MRAs has discursively reproduced legitimacy in the value of trade

liberalization. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to trace the roots of symbolic

power in RTAs, we must ask about its implications for them, which have and will

become more pronounced through the development of MRAs.58 The first major bilateral

agreement to be signed, the CETA, requires examination because it will act as a template

for future MRAs, as explored in the next section.

III. How the CETA could help undermine global sustainable development

The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement is

arguably the first major bilateral agreement to be signed. Although it is not considered a

mega-regional by the ECIPE, the CETA does represent a historic moment in international

trade because it will form a baseline for future agreements with either Canada or the EU.

The EU is the largest economy in the world with a per capita GDP of 25,000 euros (500

million consumers) in 2013.59 In addition its economic clout, the EU has been leading

several global trade initiatives including the TTIP, which will create the world’s largest

free trade area to date. The CETA is significant because it will act as a floor for

liberalization in the TTIP. Thus, it is important to understand how the CETA’s provisions

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will help shape future global trade and investment rules for non-participating third

parties, the majority of which are developing countries.

But how can we measure development losses from MRAs? As Dan Ciuriak

suggests, this is difficult given limited information about the negotiations, and thus we

can only make “best guesses” about how excluded economies will fair. 60 It is clear

though that large economies (those who are, not coincidently, driving MRAs) will

benefit,61 and that developing countries “consistently suffer welfare losses.” Ciuriak

argues that the TPP and TISA will mean than developing economies will lose 0.05

percent of GDP or $7-8 USD billion.62 Although a similar study has not been conducted

on the CETA, given the conclusion of the agreement in September 2014, we can better

predict its impacts beyond measures of GDP. As described below, the CETA will have

impacts in three areas, explored below: i) rule making, ii) non-tariff barriers, and iii)

enforcement through binding arbitration.

i. Rule taking, rule making & the balance of power

As identified by several trade doyens, developing countries have long been “rule takers”

rather than “rule makers” in the international trade regime.63 However, developing

countries have had comparatively more influence within the multilateral trade system

than outside of it. Notable examples include the concessions made by the EU to APEC

during the Uruguay Round of negotiation, and the influence of Cotton Four countries in

framing the debate around export subsidies for cotton in the Doha Round (although it was

ultimately stifled by the US).64 More recently, India was able to significantly affect the

Doha Round of negotiations in Bali over a debate on public stockholding programmes for

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food security purposes, whilst they drew a perverse response from the US and EU. While

the development of RTAs such as the RECP may act as a “counter-balance,” to US- and

EU-led MRAs,65 the WTO provides a much more equitable and diverse forum for

development-led trade.

Multilateralism makes sense for the global economy: it improves efficiency and

competitiveness, and reduces chances of distortion. It also allows poor countries to have a

voice (however limited) over the rules that affect their collective destinies. By contrast,

critics contend that MRAs will likely breed new global inconsistencies in standards,

provide a competitive advantage for certain countries, and increase trade distortions.66

While there are so-called positive economic benefits from spill-over effects for low-

income countries that are not included in MRAs,67 this must be balanced with trade

diversion68 and the impacts of unresolved sensitive issues.

Multilateralism is required to broach development-sensitive issues such as

agricultural export subsidies and domestic support, fisheries subsidies and anti-dumping

measures.69 Many of these issues were part of the Doha Development Round. Given that

the Doha Round was hung on disagreement over terms like “box of subsidies,” “policy

space,” “special and differentiated treatment” and even “development,”70 it is

inconceivable how MRAs could begin to approach development in a sustainable or

equitable way. Thus, development has been removed from the international trade agenda

to the detriment of developing and least developed countries (LDCs). While MRAs

liberalize most areas of trade, neither the CETA nor the TTIP will touch agricultural

export subsidies, a thorn in the side of world trade for developing countries. Thus

agreements like the CETA will further shift the balance of power that was afforded to

17

developed countries within the MTS and prevent development concerns from being

adequately addressed.

ii. Removing non-tariff barriers

The CETA will contribute to improved international compliance with future

global standards for trade and investment. This will manifest itself most clearly in new

investment standards on a number of issues ranging from scope and coverage to

performance requirements, standards of treatment, investment liberalization and

regulatory cooperation. New standards for some countries and not others—with the

respective availability and mechanisms for compliance—will increase transaction costs

with other countries and undermine regulatory trust and competition. This argument has

been made by the IISD concerning the TPP and TTIP, and is also applicable to the CETA

that it has made commitments on regulatory harmonization.71 It follows that for

developing countries, whose adjustment costs for more stringent standards will be much

higher, must still compete with exports from countries engaged in MRAs and may have

to undergo unilateral regulatory changes to keep pace.

The CETA’s industry-friendly intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions are

also an area of concern for global development interests. Chapter 22 will mean that the

CETA, if fully implemented, will delay the time for generic drugs to enter the market.

This is against the background of decreasing research and development (R&D) spending

in Canada,72 and globally.73 One estimate suggests that the CETA will increase the total

annual costs for patented drugs by seven percent.74 Although these price hikes will have

little effect on the global pharmaceutical market, increasing drug costs and decreasing

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R&D spending could become a dangerous formula in the intellectual property rights

regime. An inroad has already been made through the TPP negotiations where the US is

actively pursuing stringent IPR standards.75 This has costs for development, given the

significant concerns by developing countries about the accessibility of generic drugs

during the negotiations for, and the response to, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects

of Intellectual Property Rights.  

The CETA will increase the risk of “downward harmonization” of standards by

Europe to Canada. Chapter 26 of the CETA text is nebulous and could potentially allow

business lobby a far-reaching hand in to regulatory co-operation. A driving key principle

in this chapter is to “eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade and investment.”76

Determining what level of regulation is necessary is difficult, particularly when the

precautionary principle is under attack, given that regulatory co-operation should

“establish, when appropriate, a common scientific basis.”77 These provisions will not

adequately shield public interest on issues like food safety, and service provision from

foreign corporate interests. This will affect standards in bilateral agreements with the EU,

many of which are being negotiated with the ACP.

Although international aid has been excluded from the CETA’s procurement

chapter, the CETA has granted the EU unlimited market access to all of Canada’s sub-

central government entities which include crown corporations, provinces and territories,

municipalities, universities, school boards and hospitals. Procurement of this kind is

unprecedented. If similar levels of liberalization were sought through the TPP this would

violate the WTO’s protections afforded to developing countries that have signed the

Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) such as Chile, Malaysia and Vietnam. The

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CETA also failed to protect the provinces and marginalized communities’ regional

economic development capacities, even though it had the opportunity to do so.78 If similar

concessions are made by countries in the TPP there will be grave consequences for

development: without developing countries at the negotiating table, development friendly

tools cannot will not be included in MRAs like the TPP, such as Duty-Free-Quota Free

treatment to LDC exports, loosening Rules of Origin on LDC imports, reducing

agricultural export subsidies, and enhancing the General System of Preferences (GSP).79

Despite significant liberalization in all sectors, one area that has not been treated

with the same level of ambition has been the environment. While inclusion of social and

environmental standards has been lauded, chapter 25 on “Trade and Environment” makes

no mention of climate change and lacks enforcement mechanisms. This has led to the

criticism that this chapter serves to legitimize the agreement and Canada’s economic

agenda.80 While this will not directly affect developing countries, it legitimizes the

(poorly managed) integration of environmental concerns into free trade agreements,

which has implications for sustainable development and the treatment of resources in

future FTAs with developing countries.

Finally, Canada has not ratified key labour mobility and temporary foreign worker

rights conventions, which the CETA will ask Canada to implement.81 If the same

approach is taken in TTIP, it must be adjusted for the fact that the US has not signed or

ratified most ILO agreements.

iii. Enforcement—unlimited rights to investors

20

Investment liberalization through ISDS provisions is the most controversial element of

MRAs. Commonly cited are concerns about legitimacy, transparency, high arbitration

and legal costs, and the subjectivity of arbitrators’ decisions.82 Perhaps the largest source

of consternation is that investors have “acquired rights” thorough agreements like the

CETA, which cannot be rolled back.83 Foreign investors can go “treaty-shopping”84 under

the MFN clause for whichever standards are in their best interest, importing higher

standards or benefiting from higher standards in other investment relationships, known as

free-riding. The CETA takes a ratchet approach to the liberalization of investment rules,

meaning that they will be nearly impossible to reverse once agreed upon.85 Although this

is not the first time this method has been used, the CETA will help normalize its use. The

ratchet may also have a “chilling effect,” which would reduce government regulatory

capacity and may encourage other countries seeking FDI to follow a similar path.86

However, the relationship between FDI and RTAs with ISDS provisions is ambiguous,

but some research shows that there is not necessarily a positive correlation.87

Developing countries have historically been the target of the ISDS mechanism.

The most pertinent example is Mexico’s experience with the North American Free Trade

Agreement’s (NAFTA) Chapter 11, which contains the investor-state mechanism. As of

2010, Mexico had lost 11 of their 19 disputes and had paid over $187 million in

damages.88 Both the number of cases lost and the cost in compensation is higher in

Mexico under NAFTA than in Canada and the US89 combined. Foreign investors have

since begun to leverage the ISDS mechanism to attack industrialized states and American

companies will be able to use the investor-state dispute mechanism in Canada. However,

21

developing countries remain easy targets because of they lack robust domestic legal

protection for investment.

The number of ISDS cases globally has risen dramatically over the last 10 years.

In 2013, there were 57 known new cases, 45 of which were brought by developed

countries.90 In total, three-quarters of known ISDS cases were brought against developing

countries, with a concentration in Latin America and the Caribbean. An overwhelming 90

percent of ISDS claims were brought by investors from the EU and the US.91 This is

troubling in light of a recent report by Gus Van Harten, which found that arbitrators’

rulings tend to be more favourable to complainant investors from major Western capital

exporting countries.92 By contrast, in the WTO’s DSB, the EU and US together have been

complainants in only 41 percent of cases.93

Unlike with the ISDS mechanism, developing countries have been the

complainants in approximately one third of all Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) cases.94

However, the growing acceptance and use of the ISDS could eclipse the WTO’s dispute

settlement system: in 2013, there were 568 ISDS cases and 474 DSB cases and the

frequency of ISDS cases is increasing at a faster rate.95 While the DSB will remain

relevant because it is the forum for state-to-state trade disputes, the growth in ISDS

claims warrants greater attention. Although developing countries use the DSB less

frequently than developed countries, there is greater potential for their engagement,

which MRAs would undermine.

According to David Gantz, the ISDS mechanism in the CETA is more “friendly”

to host governments than some bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of the past.96 But

whether this is necessary in developed countries with independent legislatures is

22

debatable. Regardless, once the CETA is ratified with the ISDS, it will become a required

element of the TTIP. The first consequence of this could be US-China BIT negotiations.

In sum, the CETA is not “development friendly.” However, the extent to which

this is true will vary from region to region and must be contextualized with other MRAs

unfolding across the Atlantic. How likely are these concerns to materialize? According to

Werner Wnendt, Germany’s ambassador to Canada, the CETA “is not a blueprint for the

TTIP agreement.” 97 However, by his own admission, the CETA “sets standards” for

similar agreements.98 And, popular opinion sees the CETA as a “template” for the TTIP.99

This must be understood in the context of the current landscape. If the TTIP is signed, it

will have the same ambitious levels of liberalization as the CETA and will set global

standards on trade, investment and intellectual property rights.100 While this agreement

will be difficult to multilateralize, Mexico, Canada, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland

have voiced interest in joining the TTIP, 101 and some trade pundits predict harmonization

with existing FTAs like NAFTA.102 Given that Canada now has an FTA with the EU, this

will make this harmonization process easier. As for the TPP, it will most likely conclude

after the TTIP, which is still slated to conclude in 2015.103 It is unlikely that TTIP will

directly influence TPP but it will contribute to legitimizing the approach, comprehensive

nature and certain provisions, namely in investment and NTBs. Furthermore, the US

might use the TTIP as leverage for TPP. Given that the TPP includes developing

countries, the rules will be extended to non-included developing countries, which must

anticipate what a post-TPP trade might look like. It is uncertain whether acceding

countries would require mutual equivalence and separate agreements, or just to

demonstrate similar standards. Although there are doubts about the conclusion of either

23

the TTIP or TPP, if one is signed it could be a tipping point for future investment

reforms. The signing of the CETA is significant in this regard.

While middle-income and emerging powers have begun to react to MRAs with

their own trade and investment initiatives, developing and least developed countries have

not (with the exception of the Tripartite Free Trade Area). Today, while poor countries

have one vote in the WTO, they have absolutely no ability to influence MRA

developments.104 Even if these countries are able to accede into some mega-regionals and

meet the required conditions, there is no guarantee that the traditional benefits of market

access will outweigh the costs of ascension. But even this option seems incredibly

unrealistic. The more likely scenario is that poor countries will pay hefty costs from

being unprepared to engage with MRAs, and will not be able to meet the demands of

changing global market conditions. 105

Conclusion: the future of trade we need

The development deficit is a perennial feature of the trade system both in the

MTS and in MRAs because developing countries have not had full participation in the

negotiations, and because of a systematic attempt by developed countries to act without

regard for global development objectives. The consultation process taking place around

the Post-2015 Development Agenda provides a tremendous opportunity to facilitate the

advancement of reform policy proposals to pursue an agenda of fairer trade and

sustainable development. However, the current proposal by the High-Level Panel of

Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda falls short in several key areas.

The Zero Draft, a compilation of proposals by the Member States during the 12th session

24

of the Open Working Group (OWG), was released in June 2014. This set of indicators

will become the basis for the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. The final goal

(No. 17) rearticulates the targets from MDG 8, and are much less ambitious then many

proposals. There were several notable changes from the original member proposals, for

example: i) sub-target 17.1 on “reduce[ing] distortions in international trade” was

narrowed to only addressing agricultural subsidies and no reference was made to the

“development” nature of the Doha Round; ii) “technology transfer” was struck in favour

of “international collaboration and access”; and iii) the target on domestic resource

mobilization makes no mention of structural barriers such as tax evasion and malpractices

by multinational corporations. Despite persistent calls for international financial

institution and trade regime reform by developing countries in the OWG, there was no

mention of new financial resources from the international community.106 Making progress

towards these revised targets will be inevitably hamstrung by a fundamentally unequal

international financial and trade architectures that are further legitimized through

MRAs.107

In order for development to be meaningfully incorporated into the global trade

system through the SDGs, the goals must reflect the current landscape. That is, they must

recognize that MRAs could reshape global trade and international investment rules. The

SDGs must: i) protect non-party members from exclusionary policies, ii) protect

developing countries flexibility, procurement, and regional economic development

programs, and iii) provide narrow criterion for the use of ISDS,108 and make the DSB

more accessible for developing countries. Acknowledging the role that MRAs will play

25

in hardening the development deficit is essential to a Post-2015 SDG framework that

reflects current and future challenges facing low-income countries.

This paper attempts to draw attention to the consequence of MRAs for trade’s

development deficit. MRAs, if concluded, will have very real consequences for global

development, leaving poor countries with a narrow set of options and insufficient time to

respond. The case of the CETA illustrates how new standards for MRAs will constrain

regional economic development abroad through NTBs, the ISDS and the broader power

asymmetries in the international trade regime. Although a development deficit in global

trade is not inevitable, the multilateral trade system must adjust to a new set of emerging

development concerns that will arise from MRAs. This must be addressed in the SDGs

for any hope of attracting a global debate. Should this silence continue, MRAs will likely

entrench the development deficit for the world’s smallest and most vulnerable countries.

26

Endnotes                                                                                                                  1 Amy Wood has a Master of Arts in Global Governance from the Balsillie School of International Affairs. 2 See: WTO, “Preparations for the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference: Communication from India,” WTO, November 2001; Sukumar Muralidharan, “Development Deficit Agenda of Doha Round,” Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 52 (2005): 5450-5453; and Bernard Hoekman, “Economic Development and the WTO After Doha,” World Bank and CEPR, 2002. 3 With the notable exceptions of: Peter Draper, Simon Lacey and Yash Romkolowan, “Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Implications for the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Brussels: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) (2014); and Ron Sandrey, “Mega-regional Trade Agreements and South Africa’s Trade Strategy: Implications for the Tripartite Free Trade Area Negotiations,” SAIIA, July 2014. 4 See: WTO, “List of all RTAs in force, by date of entry into force,” last modified 24 December 2014. 5 Ibid. 6 Roberto Azevêdo, “Regional Trade Agreements Cannot Substitute the Multilateral System,” Inter Press Service, 15 October 2014. 7 Wang Yong, “3.2 The Political Economy of the Rise of Mega-regionals,” in Mega-regional Trade Agreements–Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? World Economic Forum (July 2014), 21. 8 World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, Geneva and New York: UNCTAD (2014): 118. 9 Richard Baldwin, “4.2 The Economic Impact,” in Mega-regional Trade Agreements–Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? World Economic Forum (July 2014): 23. Jim Rollo et al. “Potential effects of the proposed transatlantic trade and investment partnership on select developing countries,” Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS), Brighton, UK: University of Sussex, 2013. 10 Ibid. 11 Peter Draper, Simon Lacey and Yash Romkolowan, “Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Implications for the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries,” Occasional Paper, No. 2, Brussels: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) (2014): 8. 12 MRAs do not often include the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), a plurilateral deal aimed at tariff reductions, because it is limited to the services sector. 13 Bryce Baschuk, “Malmstroem Says ‘Full Deal’ on TTIP Not Realistic in 2015,” Bloomberg, 18 December 2014. 14 Elizabeth Sheargold, “‘Mega-Regional’ Agreements and Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific—A Means to Untangle the ‘Noodle Bowl’?” Melbourne School of Government, Issues Paper Series No. 05/14 (May 2014): 10. 15 Uri Dadush, “5.1 Potential Responses to Mega-Regionals by Excluded Countries,” in Mega-regional Trade Agreements–Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? World Economic Forum (July 2014), 28. 16 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership is made up of 16 countries: the 10 members of the Association of South-East Asian nations (ASEAN)–Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; and six states that have free trade agreements with ASEAN–Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. 17 Meredith Kolsky Lewis, “The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths toward Deeper Asian Economic Integration,” Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy no. 8 (2013): 368. 18 IABD, “Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,” Inter-American Development Bank, 2013. 19 Francis A. Kornegay, Jr., “BRICS, Mega-Regional FTAs and South Africa’s Trade Strategy,” South African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper 191 (June 2014): 6. 20 Ibid.

21 ICTSD, “In Washington, Azevêdo Calls for US Leadership in Doha Deal,” 14 March 2014. 22 See for example: Beginda Pakpahan, “Deadlock in the WTO: What is next?” WTO, Research and Analysis, August 2012. Susan Schwab, “After Doha: Why the Negotiations are Doomed and What We Should do About It,” Foreign Affairs, May 2011; Ernesto Zedillo, “The Doha Round Doomed Once Again:

27

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Blame It on the G20,” VoxEU.org, 28 April 2011; Judith Sloan, “Doha Is Dead and There’s No Case for Reviving It,” The Australian, 27 January 2013; and “Doha Talks Are Not Dead: Lamy,” Euronews, 16 July 2013. 23 Rorden Wilkinson, “Talking trade: common sense knowledge in the multilateral trade regime,” in Expert Knowledge in Global Trade, ed. Erin Hannah, James Scott and Silke Trommer, Routledge, forthcoming 2015. 24 Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program,” International Organization 46 no.1, 1992. 25 James Scott, “Southern trade intellectuals in expert knowledge creation,” in Expert Knowledge in Global Trade, ed. Erin Hannah, James Scott and Silke Trommer, Routledge, forthcoming 2015, 2. 26 Ibid. 10. 27 See for example: Bernard Hoekman, “The WTO won’t be killed by all these regional trade deals,” Europe’s World, 15 June 2014; Richard Baldwin, “Multilateralising 21st Century Regionalism,”; Ken Ash and Iza Lejarraga, “Can We Have Regionalism and Multilateralism?” in Tackling Agriculture in the Post-Bali Context—A collection of short essays A collection of short essays, Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Christophe Bellmann, Jonathan Hepburn, ICTSD (27 November 2014): 75-81; and Vinod Aggarwal and Simon J. Evenett, “A Fragmenting Global Economy: A Weakened WTO, Mega FTAs, and Murky Protectionism,” Swiss Political Science Review 19, no. 4 (2013): 550-557. 28 A related proposal by James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson examines how expert knowledge influenced the Doha Development Agenda. See: James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, “Changing of the Guard: expert knowledge and ‘common sense’ in the Doha Development Agenda” Brooks World Poverty Institute, 2012. 29 Deborah K. Elms and C. L. Lim, “An Overview and Snapshot of the TPP Negotiations,” in The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty first- Century Trade Agreement, ed. C. L. Lim, Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 21. 30 TPP members as of December 2014 included: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam. Taken from USTR, “Trans Pacific Partnership,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp. 31 Dan Ciuriak, “Mega Regionals and the Developing Countries,” 10. 32 Ibid. 33 Sinan Ülgen, “Locked In or Left Out?” 34 See for example: Simon J. Evenett, “The Doha Round Impasse: A Graphical Account,” Review of International Organization 9 (New York: 27 May 2014): 143-162; Antoine Bouët and David Laborde, “Why Is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can Be Done? A Computable General Equilibrium–Game Theoretical Approach,” The World Economy 33, no. 11 (2010): 1486-516; Robert Wolfe, “Sprinting During a Marathon: Why the WTO Ministerial Failed in July 2008,” Journal of World Trade 44, no. 1 (February 2010): 81–126; and Robert Wolfe, “First Diagnose, Then Treat: What Ails the Doha Round?,” Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/85, 2013. 35 See for example: Heather Stewart, “Doha: India Accuses US of Sacrificing World’s Poor at Trade Talks,” The Guardian, 31 July 2008. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/31/wto.india; “EU and US Play Doha Round ‘blame Game,’” EurActiv (July 26, 2006); and Ellen Gould, “September 2008: The WTO Doha Round Breakdown,” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (1 September 2008). For analysis see: James Scott, “Southern trade intellectuals in expert knowledge creation,” 13. 36 See Robert Wolfe, “First Diagnose, Then Treat.” 37 John Whalley, “Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?” in The Regionalization of the World Economy, ed. Jeffrey A. Frankel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, January 1998). 38 Robert Wolfe, “First Diagnose, Then Treat.” 39 Wang Yong, “3.2 The Political Economy of the Rise of Mega-regionals,” 20. 40 Alejandro Jara, “Box 5—The Bali Momentum,” in Mega-regional Trade Agreements–Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? World Economic Forum (July 2014): 44.

41 Marcel Timmer, Bart Los, Robert Stehrer and Gaaitzen de Vries, “Rethinking Competitiveness: The Global Value Chain Revolution,” VoxEU.org, 26 June 2013. 42 Peter Draper et al. “Mega-regional Trade Agreements,” 5.

28

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         43 See for example: Olivier Cattaneo, Gary Gereffi and Cornelia Startiz, (eds). Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis World, The World Bank (September 2010); IMF, “Trade Interconnectedness: The World with Global Value Chains,” International Monetary Fund, 26 August 2013. 44 Harsha V. Singh. “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Its Impact on India and Other Developing Nations,” International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (July 2014): 12. 45 Susan Schwab and Karen Bhatia. “Why Mega-regionals?” in Mega-regional Trade Agreements–Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System? World Economic Forum (July 2014): 19. 46 See for example: C. L. Lim, Deborah Kay Elms, Patrick Low (eds), The Trans Pacific Partnership: A Quest for a Twenty First Century Trade Agreement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, November 2012; Atlantic Council, “A Twenty-First-Century Trade Agreement: Who Could Benefit?” 31 July 2014; and WTO. “Session 20: Twenty-first century regional trade agreements: The trans-Pacific partnership and its implications for the multilateral trade system,” 20 September 2012. 47 Elliot J. Feldman, “TPP, TTIP and Congress: the elephant in the room,” Lexology, 5 August 2013. 48 Peter Draper, Simon Lacey and Yash Romkolowan, “Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Implications for the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries,” 47; Uri Dadush, “5.1 Potential Responses to Mega-Regionals by Excluded Countries,” 29. 49 Sinan Ülgen, “Locked In or Left Out? Transatlantic Trade Beyond Brussels and Washington,” Carnegie Europe (June 3, 2014). 50 Peter Draper et al. “Mega-regional Trade Agreements,” 15. 51 See for example Peter Draper, Simon Lacey and Yash Romkolowan, “Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Implications for the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries.” 52 Andreas Freytag, Peter Draper and Susanne Fricke, “The Impact of TTIP—Volume 2: Political Consequences for EU Economic Policymaking, Transatlantic Integration, China and the World Trade Order,” Konrad Adenaeur Stiftung, 20. 53 Ibid., 20. 54 Mzukisi Qobo and Memory Dube, “The Burdens of Multilateral Engagement and Club Diplomacy for Middle-Income Countries: The Case of South Africa in the BRICS and the G-20,” South African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 126 (December 2013): 5, http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/the-burdens-of-multilateral-engagement-and-club-diplomacy-for-middle-income-countries-the-case-of-south-africa-in-the-brics-and-the-g-20. 55 Robert Wolfe, “Canadian trade policy in a G-0 world” (presentation at the IRPP conference on Adaption Canadian Trade and Commerce Policies to New Global Realities, Ottawa, 16-17 June 2014). 56 Robert Wolfe, “Canadian trade policy in a G-0 world,” 4. 57 Ibid., 4. 58 This question was asked in the context of RTAs by Lore Van den Putte in the review of the book: Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 59 European Commission, “Why the European Unions is an essential trade partner,” 2012. 60 Dan Ciuriak, “Mega Regionals and the Developing Countries.” Inkyo Cheong also attempts to quantify the impact of the TPP on non-member states by looking at a percentage change in GDP. He predicts that there will be a negligible impact (less than 1 percent increase) on most countries. See: Inkyo Cheong, “Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Evaluation and Implications for East Asian Regionalism,” ABDI Institute, July 2013. 61 The TTIP will increase the EU economy by 120 billion euros and the US economy by 95 billion euros. European Commission, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Economic Analysis Explained,” Centre for Economic Policy Research (September 2013): 5. 62 Ibid., 3-4. 63 See for example, Thomas T. Bollyky and Anu Bradford, “Getting to Yes on Transatlantic Trade,” Foreign Affairs (10 July 2013); Scott Kennedy and Shuaihua Cheng (eds), From Rule Takers to Rule Makers: The Growing Role of Chinese in Global Governance, Research Center for Chinese Politics & Business, Indiana University and International Centre for Trade & Sustainable Development (September 2012). 64 See: Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, “Chapter 3: The Competing Kings of Cotton,” in Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

29

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         65 Robert Wolfe, “Canadian trade policy in a G-0 world,” 9. 66 Elizabeth Sheargold, “‘Mega-Regional’ Agreements and Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific,” 4. 67 Peter Draper, Simon Lacey and Yash Romkolowan, “Mega-regional Trade Agreements,” 5. 68 The effects of trade diversion and preference erosion are not expected to be substantial overall but may have strong sectoral impacts. There is little research on this with the exception of textiles and clothing in the TPP (see Harsha V. Singh, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Its Impact on India and Other Developing Nations,” 20). How this would affect inter-EU trade has attracted slightly more attention, see for example a case study on trade diversion effects on Swiss inputs on the TTIP Rules of Origin (Emanuela Balestrieri, “Transatlantic Value Chains with Swiss Participation and Rules of Origin: Is Trade Creation Dominating Trade Diversion?” State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO, July 2014, 52-82) and a paper on trade growth effects in North America and Europe (Gabriel Felbermayr, Benedikt Heid and Sybille Lehwald, “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal? Part 1: Macroeconomic Effects,” Global Economic Dynamics and Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2013). 69 Alejandro Jara. “Box 5—The Bali Momentum,” 44. 70 Lore Van den Putte, Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organization. 71 Harsha V. Singh, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” 6. 72 Scott Sinclair, “Pharmaceuticals,” in Making Sense of the CETA: An analysis of the final text of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Ed. Scott Sinclair, Stuart Trew and Hadrian Martins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (September 25, 2014): 57. 73 As Slawomir Dorocki identifies, there are a number of factors contributing to this trend included technological advances, outsourcing, and the relocation of cost inefficient research stages to developing countries. See: Sławomir Dorocki, “Contemporary Trends in the Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry in the World,” Contemporary Issues in Polish Contemporary Geography, No. 25 (2014): 3. 74 Joel Lexchin and Marc-André Gagnon, “CETA and Pharmaceuticals: Impact of the trade agreement between Europe and Canada on the costs of patented drugs,” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 31 October 2013. 75 Scott Sinclair, “Pharmaceuticals,” 58. 76 Government of Canada, “Complete Canada-EU Text Reached,” Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Assistant Deputy Minister Public Affairs, Corporate Communications, E-Communications, 402. 77 Ibid., 406. 78 Aboriginal communities were exempted from the procurement chapter.

79 Bhala, Raj, and Matthew Cooper. Review of David A. Gantz’s Liberalizing International Trade after Doha: Multilateral, Plurilateral, Regional and Unilateral Initiatives, World Trade Review 13, no. 4 (October 2014): 721-24. 80 Harsha V. Singh, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” 7. 81 Angella MacEwen, “Labour Rights,” Making Sense of the CETA: An analysis of the final text of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, ed. Scott Sinclair, Stuart Trew and Hadrian Martins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (September 25, 2014) p. 104. 82 UNCTAD, “Reform of the IIA Regime: Four Paths of Action and a New Way Forward,” IIA Issues Note (June 2014): 2-4. 83 World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, Geneva and New York: UNCTAD (2014): 130. 84 Ibid. 125. 85 Ibid. 86 IISD. “Executive Summary,” 7th Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators, IISD and South Centre, Jakarta Indonesia, 4-6 November 2013. 87 Axel Berger et al. found that ISDS provisions play a minor role in promoting FDI, but additional costs associated with RTAs must also be weighed. See: Axel Berger, Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp and Martin Roy, “Attracting FDI through BITs and RTAs: Does treaty content matter?” Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment No. 75 (30 July 2012): 1-3. 88 Sinclair, Scott. “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes,” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1 October 2010.

30

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         89 To date, the US has not lost a NAFTA case. 90 “Recent Development in Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),” IIA Issues Note, No 1. UNCTAD, April 2014. 91 Ibid.

92 Gus Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 50, no. 1 (1 July 2012): 211–68. 93 WTO, Aid for Trade Statistics, OECD: Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS), 2009. 94 WTO, “Chapter 11: Developing countries in WTO dispute settlement,” in Dispute System Training Module, 2003. 95 WTO, “Chronological list of dispute cases,” last modified November 2014. 96 Gantz, David A. “CETA’s Legal and Political Implications for the TTIP,” presented at the Conference on the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, McGill University, October 31-November 1, 2014. 97 Gordon Isfeld, “CETA a done deal, EU members cannot ‘opt out,’ German ambassador says,” Financial Post, 1 October 2014. 98 Ibid. 99 “New European Commissioners suggest that ISDS may be shut out of the TTIP,” News in Brief | Investment Treaty News, 19 November 2014. 100 Sinan Ülgen, “Locked In or Left Out?” 101 Ibid. 102 Michael J. Boskin, “Transatlantic Trade Goes Global,” Project Syndicate, 16 July 2013. 103 Benjamin Fox, “TTIP by End of 2015, EU Leaders Pledge,” EU Observer, 19 December 2014, 104 World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, Geneva and New York: UNCTAD (2014): 123. 105 Harsha V. Singh. “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” 6. 106 For a greater treatment see: Third World Network (TWN), “SDGs: Means of implementation in latest ‘zero draft’ fall well below expectations,” TWN Info Service on UN Sustainable Development, 4 July 2014 ���. 107 Amy Wood, “The Paradoxes of Cosmopolitanism the Post-2015 Development Agenda Framework: Integrating Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations” (presentation, Transcultural Identity Constructions in a Changing World Conference, Dalarna University, Sweden, 2-4 April 2014). 108 For more ISDS reforms see: UNCTAD, “Reform of the IIA Regime: Four Paths of Action and a New Way Forward”; and Rachel Nicolson, Hilary Birks and Laura Bellamy, “Focus: A Different Roadmap for Investor-State Dispute Settlement?” International Business Obligations (23 July 2013).

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