transboundary water institutions in developing countries: a case … · 2016. 7. 24. ·...
TRANSCRIPT
Transboundary Water Institutions in Developing Countries:
A Case Study in Afghanistan
June 8, 2016
By: Idrees Malyar
Advised by: Dr. Michael E. Campana
Water Resources Pol icy & Management Program
Overview
2
• Introduc+on• Thesis• StudyArea
• Objec+ves
• ResearchQues+ons
• Methods–limita+on
• Results
• Discussion
Introduction -Transboundary Water Institutions
Defini'ons“Ins%tu%onsarepeopleandthepa-ernsofregularrepe''veinterac'onsamongthemthattransforminputsintooutputs”(Ostrometal.,1993)
WhyTransboundaryWaterIns'tu'ons
Availableliterature
AmuDaryaRiver
Introduction -Transboundary Water Institutions Exis%ngTransboundaryWaterIns%tu%ons:Ø Interna%onalFundsforSavingtheAralSea–(TheStructure)
Ø Interna%onalBoundaryandWaterCommissionU.S.Sec%on
Ø DanubeRiverProtec%onConven%onØ MekongRiverCommissionSecretariatOpera%onalStructure
Council of Heads of Central Asian States for the Aral Sea Basin Problems
President IFAS
Inspection Committee IFAS Board
Executive Committee IFAS
Regional Center for Hydrology
Executive Directorate in Kazakhstan
Executive Directorate in Kyrgyzstan
ASBP Agency in Uzbekistan
Branch in Turkmenistan
Branch in Tajikistan
Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development
Kyzylorda Branch
Nukus Branch
SRC ICSD
Secretariats
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
Secretariats
SRC ICWC
BWO “Syrdarya”
BWO “Amudarya”
Coordination Metrology Centre
Introduction – Perceived Risks to Cooperation
PerceivedRisks
“Thepercep%onthatanactofcoopera%onwillexposethecountrytoharm,willjeopardizesomethingofvaluetothecountry,orevenwillthreatenthepoli%calfutureofindividualpolicymakers.”Subramanianetal.(2012)
Introduction – Study Area Afghanistan:
AnnualRenewableWater:75BCM(Qureshi,2002)SurfaceWater 55BCMGroundwater 20BCM
AnnualWaterAvailabilitypercapita:2500CM/Capita
AfghanistanUse:33percentoftheSurfaceWater(GIROA,2008)
RegionalMapofAfghanistan,WorldAtlas
Introduction – Study Area
TransboundaryRiversI. Kabul/IndusRiverBasinII. TheAmuRiverBasinIII. Harirrud&MurghabRiversBasinIV. HelmandRiverBasin
OutFlow:42.22BCM/year
InFlow:10BCM/year
SurfaceCovered:84percent(Watson,2014)
PeopleLive:87percent(Watson,2014)RiverBasinMapofAfghanistan(WatershedAtlas,2007)
Introduction – Study Area
TransboundaryRiversI. Kabul/IndusRiverBasinII. TheAmuRiverBasinIII. Harirrud&MurghabRiversBasinIV. HelmandRiverBasin
OutFlow:42.22BCM/year
InFlow:10BCM/year
SurfaceCovered:84percent(Watson,2014)
PeopleLive:87percent(Watson,2014)RiverBasinMapofAfghanistan(WatershedAtlas,2007)
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Propor%on(%)ofTotalRiverFlowbyRiverBasin
TransboundaryRiversNa+onal
TransboundaryGroundwater
I. TheKabulRiverAquifer
II. Fariman-TorbatjamAquiferIII. TaybadAquiferIV. KaretAquifer
V. AmudaryaAquifer(TransboundaryAquifersoftheWorld2015,IGRAC)
Introduction – Study Area
Interna%onalGroundwaterResourcesAssessmentCenter(IGRAC)
Introduction – Study Area Exis%ngTrea%es
No RiverBasin Co-riparianStates Treaty 1
KabulRiverBasin(IndusRiver)
Pakistan(IndiaandChina)
The1960IndusTreatybetweenIndiaandPakistan;and
2 The1921TreatybetweenAfghanistanandGreatBritainwithlicleWatercoverage.
3 HelmandRiverBasin
Iran The1973Afghan-IranianHelmand-RiverWaterTreaty
4 Harirud&MurghabRiversBasin
IranandTurkmenistan The1926TreatybetweenIranandTurkmenistan
5 AmudaryaRiverBasin
Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Uzbekistan,andTurkmenistan
The1873Fron+erAgreementbetweenAfghanistanandRussia;
6 The1946Fron+erAgreementbetweenAfghanistanandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics;and
7 The1958TreatybetweentheGovernmentoftheUSSRandtheRoyalGovernmentofAfghanistan.
8 RecentAgreementonDataandInforma%onSharingwithTajikistan.
Objectives
Ins%tu%onalArrangements
• Designatransboundarywatermanagementunit;
• Determinethekeystakeholders,andexper+seneededfortheunit.
Objectives PerceivedRiskstoCoopera%on:
◦ Reviewtheexperienceofcoopera+onbetweenAfghanistanandIranovertheHelmandwaters,applyingthe“riskandopportuni%estocoopera%on”frameworkandthesitua+onmappingtool;
◦ Iden+fythecurrent/presentperceivedriskstocoopera+onfromthestandpointoftheAfghanistangovernment;
◦ Recommendriskreduc+onstrategiesfortheiden+fiedrisks.
Research Questions
I. WhatkindoftransboundarywatermanagementunitisneededforthegovernmentofAfghanistan–toini+allyprepareAfghanistanforitstransboundarybasinnego+a+ons,andlatertomanageandfollowupontheinterna+onalagreementsbetweenAfghanistanandco-ripariancountries?
o Basedonthetransboundarywatermanagementunit’sneedsandac%vi%es,whatexper%seisrequired?
o Whoshouldbeinvolvedand,whataretheobstaclestocrea%onandfunc%oningofatransboundarywaterins%tu%on?
II. Whataretheperceivedrisksofcoopera+onovertransboundarywaterresourcesofAfghanistan?Andwhataretheappropriateriskreduc+onstrategies?
Research Design
TheHelmandCaseStudy(1950-1973)
CurrentSitua+onofAfghanistan(2001–2016)
RisksandOpportuni+estoCoopera+on
Postscript–Situa+onMap
TransboundaryWaters
Ins+tu+on
Methods
I. SecondarySources/LiteratureReview:
II. Interviews(Semi-structured)
III. RiskAndOpportuni%esToCoopera%onFramework
Methods Interviews(Semi-structured)
I. InterviewQues+onnaire
II. InterviewPar+cipants
Number Category Affilia%on NumberInterviewed
1 AfghanistanGovernment MinistryofEnergyandWater 4
MinistryofForeignAffairs 2
2 Interna+onalOrganiza+ons FundingAgencies/WorldBank 2
3 Academia 2
Methods Framework:
Ø The framework illustrates how countriesassess theirplace in transboundarywatercoopera+on based on the net benefits,andnetopportuni+es.
Ø FocusedonRiskandOpportunity, ratherthancostandbenefits
Framework – Perceived Risk 1.CapacityandKnowledge:
Confidence in ability to nego+ate a fair deal; having enough and the correct informa+on andknowledgetodoso.
2.AccountabilityandVoice:
Deliverabilityofbenefitsbytheregionalen+tyandco-riparians,omenrelatedtotrust;havingasayindecisionmakinginthegoverningstructuresoftheregionalen+ty.
3.SovereigntyandAutonomy:
Abilitytoactinbestinterestofthecountrywithoutconstraints;makingdecisionsindependently.
Framework – Perceived Risk 4.EquityandAccess:
Fairnessof(rela+ve)benefitstocountry,including+mingofbenefitsandcostsandobtaining/retainingfairaccesstoriver.
5.StabilityandSupport:
Longevityofpoten+alofagreement;in-countrysupportofagreement,includingra+fica+onlikelihood.(Subramanianetal.2012)
Methods
PathstoCoopera+on
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Results – Institutional Arrangements
I. ImportanceoftheUnit/Poli%calWill
Ø Alloftheinterviewpar+cipantsbelievedandratedtheissueasofhighimportance.
“Ibelieveitisreallyclearthatcrea%onofatransboundarywatermanagementunitiscrucial,necessaryandimportant.Othercountrieshaveoil,we[Afghanistan]havecleanwater.Thus,thereshouldbeaunitwhoshouldbeabletomasternego%a%onsskills,studyourbasinaswellasstudyourco-ripariancountriesneed,anddesires.”
Ø Aplacetostoreknowledge
“It isgood tohavean ins%tu%onal structure–becauseyouhaveaphysicalplacewhereknowledgecanbestored,andtransferredtofromonepersontoanother.”
“Icreatedamassivedatabase[ontransboundarywatersofAfghanistan],allIcoulddoistogiveittoindividuals.Buttherewasnoins%tu%ontohandovermywork.”
Results – Institutional Arrangements II. StakeholdersInvolvement
Ø Themajorityoftheinterviewpar+cipants(90%)talkedabouttheStakeholdersinvolvement.
Ø AfghanistanWaterLaw,2009“ManagementandplanningforthetransboundarywatersbetweenAfghanistananditsneighboringcountriesandchangesofwatercoursesaretheresponsibilityoftheMinistryofEnergyandWaterwithagreementsfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs,MinistryofInteriorandtheMinistryofBorderandTribalAffairs”
Ø Alsodiscussedtheprofessionals/exper+setobeinvolvedintheunit.
Results – Institutional Arrangements III. Obstacles
Ø Poli+cal&TechnicalObstacle(CapacityofMEWandMoFA)
“[…]InAfghanistanthereisnosuchfaculty(school)toteachtransboundarywaterresourcesmanagement.”
Ø AbsenceofresearchonAfghanistanwaters
Ø LackofpublicawarenessØ Theproblemofdataandinforma+onsharingamong/betweentheAfghanagenciesandorganiza+ons.
“Wehavetosortoutthedataandinforma%onsharingproblem;Dataisrestrictedwithinorganiza%onsinthecountry.Wearecurrentlyworkingonahub/portaltocollectthedatafromrelevantorganiza%ons.”
Results - Institutional Arrangements IV. Funding&ThirdPartyAssistanceØ AbundantFunding;
“[…]therearelotsofagenciesreadytohelpthewatersectorofAfghanistan.Nowinterna%onalcommunityisawarethatwatersecurityispoli%calsecurity.Forinstance,EgyptontheNilestartedbuildingtheAswanDamwhilethegovernmentbeforethatwascollapsedbecauseofwatersecurity.Therefore,boththegovernmentofAfghanistananddonoragenciescanputthemoneytogethertohelpthissector.”
Ø Donorsaskingthegovernmentforaclearpathonitswatersnego+a+onswithco-riparianstates“Ibelievewe[donoragency]havethemostimpactifwebuildthecapacityandbringintherightexpertsaswehavegoodviewofwhoarethegoodexpertonthefield.Andtheactualdecisionaboutengagingwhathasneedtobediscussedshouldcomefromthegovernment.”
Ø Afghanofficialsandothershadsomeobserva+onsonthedonoragencies’assistancemethods“Their[donors]supportisnotcoordinated.USAIDwantsaprojectontransboundarywaters,aswellasADB,WorldBank,GovernmentofGermany,EUandothers–theyarekindofadhoc.Governmentwantstheirfundinginwell-coordinatedmanner,andwehavemee%ngstoaddressthisissue.”
Results – Perceived Risks
Proponents:Ø “I believe we do need some homework. However,
looking at the situa%on there is a need as well asinten%on,thuswearegoodtogo.Wehavetou%lizetheexistenceandsupportofdonoragencies.”
Opponents:Ø ”As faraswehavesecurityproblems,andweare ina
war – I do not believe we are prepared for waternego%a%ons.Peaceisverycrucialfornego%a%ons.”
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
SupportandOpposi%onfornear-termTransboundaryWaterNego%a%ons
Proponents Opponents
Results – Perceived Risks
I. CapacityandKnowledge:Ø ThemostrepeatedthemebyAfghanofficials,aswellasinterna+onalorganiza+ons.Aprominentriskto
Afghanistancoopera+onwithco-riparianstates
§ Capacity“Inregardstonego%a%oncapacity,IthinkAfghanistanhasthecapacity.Forinstance,ifyouseeTAPI,CASA1000,PeaceNego%a%ons[withTaliban]andotherbigprojects,theyallneedlotsofnego%a%ons,soAfghanistaniscapableofdoingso.”
§ Knowledge“Overall thetransboundarywaterresources issue isanewtopic,andthisfield isnotreallymastered inthispartoftheworld.Firstthing[riskforAfghanistan]isthatwedonothavethetransboundarywaterexpertsasrequired.”Ø Iden+fiedintheHelmandBasinCase-TheestablishmentoftheHelmandRiverDeltaCommission1950
andreportin1951
II. AccountabilityandVoiceCurrentlythereisnoac+venego+a+onsoverwater,therefore,itwasdifficulttodetermineifthisriskispresent.
Ø Amajority(70%)oftheinterviewpar+cipantsbelievethatIrandidnotfollowthe1973treaty,“Inregardstothetreatyimplementa%on,Afghanistanhasalwaysbeenveryhonest,however,Iranhasnotobeyedandimplementedthetreaty(astheyshould).Iranhasabusedthepoli%calinstabilityinAfghanistantotheiradvantage.Forinstance,theyareallowedtotakewaterfromthreepoints,however,theydivert/takewaterfrommore100places.”
Ø Someoftheintervieweesblamedthepoli+calinstabilitysince1970sinAfghanistanasabarriertotheimplementa+onofthetreaty,sta+ng:“[…]inregardstoIran’sroleintheimplementa%onofthistreatywecannotblameIranforitaswell.However,theyusedourinstabilityintheirfavor.Theys%llhaveinfluenceinthewatersectorofAfghanistan,andwanttohavetheirhegemonythroughtheirpoli%calinfluence.
Ø AfghanistanbeingPartofIFAS
Results – Perceived Risks
III. SovereigntyandAutonomyØ Broughtupbythreeofthepar%cipants–Opponentsofnear-termnego%a%ons
“Atthecurrentsitua%onwecannotenternego%a%onswithanyoftheco-riparianstates,becausetheyhavealreadydevelopedtheirwaterresourceinfrastructures,andtheywillnotallowAfghanistantodosobyclaimingtheirrightsbasedonthehistoricaluse.”
Ø AlsoexistedforAfghanistanwhilenego+a+ngthe1973HelmandTreaty-primaryreasonforAfghanistaninini+allydenyingnego+a+ons
IV. EquityandAccessØ Notmen+onedbytheinterviewpar+cipant
Ø ExistedintheHelmandCase
Results – Perceived Risks
V. StabilityandSupport:
Ø Thiswasalsothemostrepeatedthemeintheinterviews.AsignificantconcernforthegovernmentofAfghanistan,aswellasforthepoli+calleadersordecisionmakers.
Ø Waterbury(2002)-Countriesarenotunitaryactors,therearealmostalwaysbothproponentandcri+csofnewna+onalpolicies.Ø TheNa+onalUnityGovernmentofAfghanistan(composedoftwodifferentpoli+calpar+esin2014)andtheNUGopinionon
transboundarywaternego+a+ons
“[…]isthereaunitedstandforwaternego%a%onsinsidethegovernmentofAfghanistan?Do/doesDr.AbdullahandDr.Ghanihavethesamestand [overtransboundarywaternego%a%ons]?”
Ø RisktoTransboundaryWaterExperts“Iamafraidofsugges%onsontransboundarywaters–becausethey[populace]willeasilylabelyouasapro-Iranianor,pro-Pakistani.”Ø ThesameappliedintheHelmandBasincase
§ TreatyRa%fica%on§ MusaShafiq
Results – Perceived Risks
Postscript-Situation Map
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Blurred
Neutral Posi%veArchetype
Nega%veArchetype Opportuni%es
Situation Map ThePosi%veArchetypes:
Afghan-Iran 1973 Treaty
The Helmand Delta Commission MoFA
MEW
Afghanistan
HAVA
World Bank
ADB
Iran
MENA
X
Institutions
MoFA
MEW
World Bank
ADB
International Organizations
USAID
Situation Map TheNega%veArchetypes:
Lack of Trust between two countries
Environmental Problems – Wetlands
Evaporation and Seepage
Population Growth
Climate Change
Floods
Drought
Political Instability in Afghanistan
Security Problems
Lack of a Basin-Wide Approach
No Data Sharing
Weak Water Resources Management
Salma Dam on Harirrud
Lack of Gaging Stations
Poppy Cultivation and Transportation
Iran Interventions
Increasing Water Demands by Farmers
Future Developments
Poppy Mafia and Transporter
Poor Infrastructure = Waste of Water
The U.S. Existence in Afghanistan
Sistan – The poorest state of
Iran
No Groundwater Coverage in 1973 Treaty
Building new Infrastructure
Kamal Khan Dam – To build 5,600 Shallow Wells
near to Afghanistan border (2006)
Situation Map TheNeutrals:
Irrigation in Afghanistan
Infrastructure in Afghanistan
Infrastructure in Iran
Agriculture
Fruit Cotton
Arghandab Reservoir Kajakai Dam
4 Dams Charhnimah 1-4
Manmade Lakes - Hamuns
132,000 Ha Irrigated Land
265,000 Ha Potential
BlurredIssues–TheUnknowns:
The political will to implement the 1973 treaty, particularly by
Iran.
Situation Map Opportuni%es
Afghan Migrants
in Iran
Afghanistan
Harirrud and Murghab Rivers Water
Chah-Bahar Seaport
India’s Interests in the Region –
Connecting to Central Asian
Countries
Poor economy
Sound Economy
Poor engineering
skills
Sound engineering skills
Upstream Riparian
Downstream
Riparian
Iran
Recommendations
1. Trainings&StudyVisitsKnowledgeandskillexpansion,andfacilita+on(thirdpartyassistance)-strategiesforthefirstriskofcapacityandknowledge.2. Facilita'onFacilita+ngexchangebetweencountries,interpre+ngeachother’sinterest,assis+ngtohighlightbeneficialcoopera+onopportuni+esbetweenriparians.
2.1.AddingAfghanistaninIFAS
3. DecisionLegi'macyØ Toensureextensivesupportfordecisionson
transboundarywatercoopera+on.Ø Publicawarenessontransboundarywatersissue
3.1.BroaderAgreementsØ Anydealspecificallytalkingaboutwatersharingwould
notbeoutofthestabilityandsupportriskinAfghanistan.4. Ins'tu'onalDesign Ø TransboundaryWaterResourcesManagementUnit.
Recommendations
Transboundary Water Resources Management Unit
Technical
TWM-UnitTransboundaryWatersExpert/Coordinator
Hydrology RiverBasinDevelopment
Agriculture
Economics
DroughtManagement
Irriga+on
FloodManagementHydrogeology
EnvironmentalProtec+on
WUARepresenta+ve
ClimateChangeAdapta+on
Administra+on
Finance
HumanResources
DataandInforma+onManagement
+M&E
AmudaryaBasinAuthority
LegalAffairs
Communica+on
BorderandTribalAffairs
HelmandRiverBasinAuthority
KabulRiverBasinAuthority
Harirud&MurghabRiversBasinAuthority
Sociology
Nego+a+on
ForeignAffairs
Questions?
ThankYou