transforming global governance with middle power diplomacy: south korea's role in the 21st...

TRANSFORMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE WITH MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

Edited bySOOK JONG LEE

SOUTH KOREArsquoS ROLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy

Sook Jong Lee Editor

Transforming Global Governance with

Middle Power Diplomacy

South Koreas Role in the 21st Century

ISBN 978-1-137-59659-8 ISBN 978-1-137-59359-7 (eBook) DOI 101057978-1-137-59359-7

Library of Congress Control Number 2016943406

copy The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 This work is subject to copyright All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher whether the whole or part of the material is concerned specifi cally the rights of translation reprinting reuse of illustrations recitation broadcasting reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way and transmission or information storage and retrieval electronic adaptation computer software or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names registered names trademarks service marks etc in this publication does not imply even in the absence of a specifi c statement that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the pub-lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty express or implied with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made

Cover illustration copy Sean Pavone Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Nature America Inc New York

Editor Sook Jong Lee East Asia Institute Sungkyunkwan University Seoul Korea (Republic of)

v

Scholars networked together through the East Asia Institute (EAI) have been paying attention to the rise of middle powers in international poli-tics through their research and policy suggestions We formed the Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative to study South Korearsquos middle power diplo-macy from the perspective of national strategy the binding regional and global context and its impact This initiative was possible by the gener-ous two-year funding from the MacArthur Foundation The MacArthur Foundation also supported EAIrsquos efforts to carry out the previous four years of research activities under the banner of Asia Security Initiative We would like to thank ambassadors from Australia Brazil Canada India Indonesia Mexico and Turkey who participated in our roundtable discus-sions to share their experiences with middle power diplomacy Finally EAI research fellows Mr Jin-Seok Bae Mr Young Hwan Shin Ms Hyee Jung Suh Mr Jaesung Ryu and Mr Benjamin Engel were all helpful in prepar-ing materials editing and preparing workshops Without their assistance it would have taken more time to publish this book Finally our thanks go to Palgrave Macmillan for helping us prepare this book for publication

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

vii

CONTENTS

1 South Korea Aiming to Be an Innovative Middle Power 1 Sook Jong Lee

2 East Asian Security and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy 15 Chaesung Chun

3 US Rebalancing Strategy and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy 35 Scott Snyder

4 Chinarsquos Perception of and Strategy for the Middle Powers 61 Dong Ryul Lee

5 East Asian Maritime Disputes and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy 87 Min Gyo Koo

6 The Role of South Korea in the Making of a Regional Trade Architecture Convening Bridging and Designing FTA Networks 109 Yul Sohn

viii CONTENTS

7 South Korearsquos Climate Change Diplomacy Analysis Based on the Perspective of ldquoMiddle Power Diplomacyrdquo 129 Sungjin Kim

8 South Korearsquos Middle Power Roles Implications to Emerging Middle Powers 161 Sook Jong Lee and Hyee Jung Suh

Biographies of Authors 167

Index 171

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 71 South Korearsquos diplomatic position at COPs 140Table 72 Below-BAU mitigation targets by sector 144Table 73 Korearsquos global diffusion of green growth strategy 153

1copy The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016SJ Lee (ed) Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy DOI 101057978-1-137-59359-7_1

CHAPTER 1

11 MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY AS ATTRACTIVE STATECRAFT

As early as 1589 Bartolous of Sassoferrato the Italian post-glossator divided states into three types small city states medium states and great states It is interesting to note that he said ldquomiddle-sized states are the most lasting since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness and the wealth and power being moder-ate passions are less violent ambition[s] fi nd less support hellip than in large state[s]rdquo 1 The idea of linking size to a statersquos behavior is seen in todayrsquos defi nition of a middle power However a middle-size concept is too rel-ative to concisely defi ne a countryrsquos position in the hierarchical power structure How to defi ne a country as a middle-sized state is also diffi -cult since the criteria for measuring middle size varies greatly Moreover a middle-sized state does not translate its middle position to purposeful behavior utilizing this position If being a certain size is a necessary condi-tion to be a middle power the recognition of its diplomacy by the interna-tional society is a suffi cient condition for it to be called a middle power in any substantive meaning It is fair to say that the essential nature of middle powersrsquo power is social in this sense

South Korea Aiming to Be an Innovative Middle Power

Sook Jong Lee

S J Lee ( ) East Asia Institute and Sungkyunkwan University Seoul Republic of Korea

Middle powersrsquo active diplomacy is accompanied by the rise of mul-tilateralism in international politics Needless to say that multilateralism has become more prominent as the end of the Cold War weakened great power politics together with transnational economic interdependency Cooper et al attributed the three following changes in the international system to the rise of middle powers (1) the opening of windows of opportunities due to the relative decline of US resources in responding to greater vulnerabilities (2) change in the post-Cold War global agenda from high policy issues of security agenda to low policy issues of eco-nomic security and social concerns of the environment and human rights and (3) the enmeshing of domestic politics with foreign policy 2 The last quarter century following the end of the Cold War has even complicated these changes with recurring economic crises rising intrastate confl icts and more organized and dangerous terror groups As more multilateral management through institutions or ad hoc forms of coalition becomes necessary to respond to these global problems numerous international venues for middle powers to operate have been created

While commonly recognizing the changing statecraft of some middle powers scholars have emphasized their roles in various fashions Cooper et al divides middle power behavior into three patterns consisting of catalysts facilitators and managers Catalysts provide the intellectual and political energy to trigger an initiative and take the lead in gathering fol-lowers around it Facilitators focus on issue-specifi c agenda-setting and engage in some form of associational collaborative and coalitional activi-ties Managers emphasize institution building creating formal organiza-tions or regimes and developing conventions and norms 3 They argue that this behavior requires the technical skills of specialists and entrepre-neurs It is Oran Young who earlier expressed the entrepreneurial lead-ership of a state in the formation of international regimes All middle power roles can be argued to be entrepreneurial in forming or sustaining international arrangements whether they are informal forums regimes or more established institutions Entrepreneurship involves a combination of imagination in inventing institutional options and skill in brokering the interests of numerous actors to line up support for such options A leader in this context is an actor who undertakes efforts to craft attractive institu-tional arrangements and persuades others to come on board as supporters of such arrangements Middle power does not have to be a supplier of public goods or ethical motivation What it needs is entrepreneurial skills at facilitating contractarian interactions among participants and broker-ing their overlapping interests so that all participants accept international

2 SJ LEE

bargaining as equitable and necessary Higgott characterized this role as the ldquoresult-oriented diplomacyrdquo in the sense that middle powers care about the results of multilateral interactions and accordingly they prac-tice ldquomission-oriented diplomacyrdquo cutting across ideological regional and developmental barriers 4 On the other hand Henrikson defi nes the international management conducted by middle powers as mediationmdashincluding conciliation interconnection and integrationmdashusing tools of communication formulation and manipulation Compared with other middle power theorists he recognizes a larger mediation role taking place not only within institutions but also across or entirely outside them 5

Although the defi nition of a middle power and its diplomacy remain too loose to be qualifi ed as a new theory in international politics middle power debates have liberated power theories in international politics that used to be monopolized by great powers There are several dimensions of state power that are relevant to middle powers A middle power can exercise its ldquoposi-tional powerrdquo that it naturally possesses due to being situated in special geo-graphic locations or intentionally or unintentionally created through state or non-state transnational networks Since a middle powerrsquos positional power can be strategically created in this increasingly globalized world ldquonetwork powerrdquo is becoming an essential source of middle power that is acquired through seeking multilateral ties in economic environmental and diverse nontraditional security areas Kahler argues that a country with more net-works or a country that takes a central position in a network structure can enjoy bargaining power social power and the power to infl uence by exiting 6 In forming and maintaining networks a middle powerrsquos material resources to infl uence or ldquosoft powerrdquo to attract or persuade others are useful While neither positional or network power of any given middle power is not pro-portional to its ldquoresource powerrdquo most middle powers require ldquoenoughrdquo material capability so that other nations consider them important Even set-ting ethical norms and principles in global governance cannot be material-ized if a country is considered weak In this regard the positional power network power and soft power of any middle power diplomacy is based to a great extent on its resource power In this regard the most notable middle powers are economically strong countries within the G20 or G30 Nevertheless one should not forget that even an economically weak country can play use middlepowermanship in some niche area as Malta has done in initiating the movement to build international maritime governance

Middle powers by defi nition function as a collective and as such an individual nation cannot exercise middle power diplomacy unilaterally In this sense there is no use for a country to classify itself as a middle power

SOUTH KOREA AIMING TO BE AN INNOVATIVE MIDDLE POWER 3

unless it is able to defi ne itself within a greater collective Middle powers accrue infl uence as a group and overcome their limitations in affecting and infl uencing the policy directions of hegemonic nations Perhaps the most prominent illustration of this is the G20 where middle power nations are able to contribute to providing a more peaceful international environ-ment in a collective multinational forum For middle powers infl uence is not a given but needs to be created from communication and economic and political interaction The middle ldquopowerrdquo concept is misleading in this regard as it could denote that becoming a middle power in and of itself automatically brings a certain level of infl uence 7 Moreover the role of a middle power is fl uid and constructive in the sense that its role is ever changing contested relative and intersubjective This allows middle powers the ability to defi ne what roles it may choose to play and which issues it may choose to pursue At the same time a middle power does not have to assume a middle power identity in all international issues

12 THE RISE OF SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER ACTIVISM

South Korearsquos sustained economic growth since the early 1960s transformed a once aid-dependent poor country into an economic middle power by the mid-1990s This was internationally recognized when South Korea became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996 With its fast recovery from the 1997ndash1998 Asian fi nancial crisis South Korearsquos nominal GDP became the 11th largest in the world in 2002 Since then the countryrsquos economic size has been ranked between 11th and 15th in the world According to the 2013 World Bank data South Korea with a GDP of 13 trillion US dollars ranks as the 14th largest econ-omy in the world but it is only 28th in terms of per capita income In terms of territorial size South Korea is a relatively small country ranked 108th among the 234 countries of the world However it has a fairly large popula-tion of about 50 million which ranks 23rd in the world in terms of popula-tion Its human capital is competitive as it is ranked 15th in 2013 UNDPrsquos Human Development Index report Stockholm International Peace Research Institute usually ranks South Korea around the 10th greatest military power when weighed by defense spending All these statistics illustrate clearly that South Korea is one of the leading middle powers in the world

It should be noted that South Korea has been a middle power for the past two decades in terms of its resource power However since South Korea is

4 SJ LEE

still caught in the Cold War-type adversarial relationship with North Korea and has been long focused on bilateral diplomacy with surrounding big powers its statecraft has not matched its middle power diplomacy until recently In this sense South Korea is a latecomer to middle power diplo-macy which used to be dominated by a few conventional European middle powers This timing is rather unique since academic and policy discussions on middle powers have been limited over the past decade

Debates on middle power ( jung-gyun-guk ) diplomacy both in gov-ernment and among policy experts began following the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in 2008 Under the slogan of ldquoGlobal Koreardquo the Lee government hosted many international events such as the G20 Seoul Summit the Fourth High-level Forum for Development Effectiveness and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit These global agen-das such as development assistance peacekeeping operations and climate change have been highlighted to a greater degree than under the previous governments As a matter of fact the previous Roh Moo-hyun adminis-tration fi rst introduced South Korearsquos mediating role as a bridge builder and a hub nation under the slogan of a ldquoNortheast Asian Era of Peace and Prosperityrdquo 8 This precocious move under the vision of the Roh govern-mentrsquos pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy backfi red as it resulted in a loss of trust and cooperation from Washington Accordingly the Roh government changed its focus from being a peace broker in Northeast Asia to a trade networker across all the major regions of the world Although the Roh government introduced the concept of middle power roles and established important free trade networks it did not set middle power diplomacy as an umbrella policy vision Under the Lee administrationrsquos ldquogoing globalrdquo foreign policy middle power diplomacy has been adopted strategically to enhance the countryrsquos national status Policymakers view ldquomiddle powerrdquo as a useful term in positioning South Korea as a signifi -cant country between a few great powers and the other weaker countries With the aspiration of playing a bigger role middle power diplomacy has been popularized Soft power network power and public diplomacy are usually employed as useful ingredients in assisting South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy Therefore one can say that the recent efforts to look beyond East Asia and seek a global role are an important turnaround in South Korearsquos foreign policy history

The shift toward a more global role for South Korea has been accom-panied by the parallel development of strengthening its alliance relation-ship with the USA Security ties with the USA have been tightened due


to North Korearsquos ongoing nuclear ambitions and more specifi cally its conventional threat following the sinking of the Cheonan and the shell-ing of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 The ROK-US Free Trade Agreement after being delayed for several years was fi nally ratifi ed in March 2012 Accordingly Seoulrsquos attempts to increase its multilateral activities have been supported by Washington within the framework of US-led multilat-eral cooperation

The current Park Geun-hye government has also carried on the policy of middle power diplomacy in global affairs One notable achievement of her government is the creation of Mexico Indonesia South Korea Turkey and Australia (MIKTA) middle power network in 2013 Primarily existing as foreign ministersrsquo gatherings it is neither a caucus nor an institution This network focuses on cooperating on global agendas such as poverty reduction climate change nuclear disarmament and democratization All the members being part of G-20 they aim at its effective governance as well as UN reforms Snyder suggests that for South Korea the grouping has the potential to play an important role in widening South Korearsquos diplomatic aperture beyond an alliance with the USA and allow it to focus on relations with surrounding major powers such as China Japan and Russia 9 The vision statement was adopted at the Fifth Foreign Ministersrsquo MIKTA meeting held in Seoul in May 2015 Here member countries defi ne themselves as a cross-regional consultative platform composed of like-minded countries that ldquohave the will and the capability to contribute to protecting public goods and strengthening global governancerdquo The self-claimed roles of MIKTA in this vision statement list a bridging role between developed and developing countries and a catalyst or facilitator in launching and implementing global governance reform 10 They are all popular middle power roles Yet to be proved is if carrying out this vision MIKTA as a middle power network has a strong potential since member states have infl uence in each region they belong

13 SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY BY ISSUE AREA

Whether South Korea is fulfi lling her middlepowermanship depends on which issue area is being discussed The purpose of this book is examin-ing the recent performance of South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy Through focusing on issue areas including security maritime governance

6 SJ LEE

trade and climate change chapter authors identify the middle power roles and diplomacy of South Korea analyze performance and discuss the effect of middle power diplomacy in regional and global governance In the case of Asia-Pacifi c or East Asian regional governance they pay seri-ous attention to whether and how the middle power diplomacy of South Korea and her cooperation with other middle powers contribute to build-ing constructive relations between the USA and China At the same time they try to shed light on the complex dynamics of regional and global politics that bind any middle powerrsquos vision planning and implementa-tion of aimed middle power diplomacy

If great powers conventionally exercise great infl uence in a certain secu-rity area it can be hard for middle powers to take on a meaningful role in that In this book Chaesung Chun suggests that South Korea take on the following middle power roles (1) help great powers lessen strate-gic mistrust (2) suggest an issue-specifi c dispute settlement mechanism (3) develop multilateral institutions or actively participate in and further existing institutions (4) preempt and import globally established norms to the region and set up the principle on which East Asia can solve dis-putes (5) create a cooperative network among like-minded middle pow-ers to strengthen their positions vis-agrave-vis great powers and (6) become a co- architect in making and reforming regional security architecture South Korearsquos middlepowermanship appears to be more challenging at the regional level rather than the global level primarily due to two reasons First of all compared with other regions the region lacks an authorita-tive multilateral institution for governing East Asia Second the two great powers the USA and China are competing to establish a regional institu-tion that they alone lead rather than building a stronger one together Countries in the region face the dilemma of participating in both the US-led and China-led institutions or networks This dilemma is most strongly felt by South Korea South Korearsquos national security is based on its close military alliance with the USA On the other hand the trade- dependent Korean economy is increasingly tied to the Chinese market Holbraad argued middle powers can be freer to pursue regional interests and local concerns of their own when two great powers engage in mod-est competition 11 Modest or constructive competition between the USA and China would benefi t most countries in East Asia since they would neither be pushed to choose one side nor be ignored by self-serving con-certs of two great powers However the US-China relationship has been moving toward becoming a rivalry recently as the Obama administrationrsquos


rebalancing strategy to the region is met by President Xi Jinpingrsquos asser-tive foreign policy such as his stance in South China Sea Refl ecting this change Tan recognizes that ASEANrsquos role in guiding the USA and China toward peaceful competition has diminished in recent years facing the ris-ing tensions between two powers 12 This type of role is extremely diffi cult for South Korea to play while owing its national security to its US ally Any premature attempt by South Korea to mediate between Washington and Beijing would be perceived by Americans as a weakening of the alliance relationship

In this book Scott Snyder argues the goals of the US rebalance to Asia and those of South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy initiatives are compatible especially with regard to promoting international norms in Northeast Asia or strengthening regional institutions However in other areas such as the design of regional security architecture the USA sees its alliances with middle powers as a means to further its own objectives whereas South Korea hopes to promote cooperation among middle powers as a leverage against great power domination Recent remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Dan Russel asking South Korea to assume the ldquorole of a major stakeholder in the international orderrdquo in the South China Sea disputes refl ect this point Recognizing that Korea is not directly involved in the dispute he said Seoul has all the more reason to speak out because it is speaking not in self-interest but in support of universal principles This is the fi rst time a senior US offi cial has asked Seoul to get involved 13

Rather than being too cautious in this book Min Gyo Koo advocates that South Korea perform the role of a ldquosafety mechanismrdquo in order to resolve sovereignty disputes in the region He suggests establishing a new international maritime order in the region refl ecting international laws and norms South Korea cannot mediate between China and ASEAN countries that have disputes with China Nevertheless South Korea can develop her middlepowermanship in easing maritime disputes by facilitat-ing multilateral maritime cooperation in both the South and East China Sea and the East Sea encouraging collaborative exploration of maritime resources and building confi dence mechanism to manage possible misun-derstandings surrounding actions of involved countries

The Chinese response to South Korearsquos middlepowermanship appears dismissive In this book Dong Ryul Lee argues that China has more con-cerns than expectations about South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy because from Chinarsquos perspective South Korea supports the status quo in the context of the existing US-led order and South Korearsquos role as

8 SJ LEE

a middle power in this setting might hinder Chinarsquos national interests Therefore Lee suggests that in order for China to support South Korearsquos role as a middle power South Korea needs to expand its independent diplomatic space beyond its identity as a US ally and to participate in China-led economic and nontraditional security networks In a similar vein Rozman argues that South Korearsquos national interest is best served when it strives for a region of equilibrium where the weight of China is balanced by the weight of nearby Japan coupled with that of the distant USA rather than joining a US-led containment against China or acced-ing to a Sino-centric regional order He writes ldquoIt requires calibrating the course of Sino-Japanese relations and making studied choices about possible responses avoiding overreaching by claiming to be a balancer and underachieving by fearing to draw criticismrdquo 14 In an extended fash-ion Spero believes South Korearsquos role as a middle power in Northeast Asian security is pivotal According to him South Korea has bridged the Asian divide since the end of the 1990s through new bilateral diplomatic and economic ties with North Korea the USA China Japan and Russia and also has assisted the latter four countries in focusing their regional efforts more concertedly on North Korea 15 Chun also argues in this book that rather than ldquooverbalancingrdquo among China Japan and Korea amidst power transition main venues for regional cooperation need to be found in mini-lateral settings and South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy lies in making the North Korean problem one of the most important regional issues that requires the concerted action of the bigger powers

South Korearsquos rich trade networks are more favorable for her to take on middle power roles As the 7th largest exporter in the world South Korea has been actively pursuing both bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements Adding two major FTAs with the European Union and the USA which became effective in 2011 and 2012 respectively to the exist-ing FTAs with ASEAN Chile and Peru South Korea is now linked to free trade networks that account for 61 percent of the worldrsquos GDP Only Chile and Mexico have concluded more FTAs with other countries 16 These trade networks can be useful resources for South Korea to play a bridging or mediating middle power role In this book Yul Sohn demands that South Korea implement a grand strategy of becoming a ldquoGlobal FTA hubrdquo harmonizing the China-led and the US-led FTA networks in the Asia-Pacifi c region He argues that the tendency to over-securitize the trade architecture in the region must be resolved so a constructive multi-lateral trade order in East Asia can develop However this FTA hub pursuit


is not easy to implement in the context of the US-China FTA rivalry The Korean governmentrsquos last minute decision to participate in the China led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) illustrates the dilemma Being cautious of US opposition to the AIIB the Park Geun-hye government decided to join in late March of 2015 only after major European countries such as Britain and France had announced their decision to participate After becoming a founding member however South Korea has tried to play middle power roles bridging developed and developing countries and facilitating this new institutionrsquos governance to be more democratic The decision to join the US-led Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) was also late Despite Washingtonrsquos call for South Korea to participate in the TPP Seoul has meticulously calculated how the TPP can bring additional benefi ts to the already formed FTA with the USA Instead South Korea focused on the FTA negotiations with China for three years that resulted in the offi cial signing of the agreement on June 1 2015 The Japanese decision to join the TPP in March 2013 however put Korean bureaucrats in an irksome position Seoul fi nally offi cially announced its decision to join the TPP in April 2015 but was asked by Washington to wait for the next round of negotiations In a nutshell the Korean governmentrsquos decision to participate in both the AIIB and the TPP seems to refl ect its political rela-tions with her two important great power partners the USA and China

Another area in which South Korea has scored international infl uence is the environment In August 2008 the Lee government suggested the low carbon ldquoGreen Growthrdquo agenda as a vision to achieve both growth and environmental conservation And President Lee announced that South Korea would reduce greenhouse gases by 30 of the BAU level by 2020 at the United Nations His government also took the initiative in 2010 of establishing the Global Green Growth Institute as a multilateral institu-tion with an initial contribution of 10 million US dollars In October 2012 South Korea won international support in opening the secretariat of the newly established Global Climate Fund (GCF) of the United Nations Since the GCF is expected to grow as an international fi nancial institution in the area of climate change hosting the GCF secretariat is regarded as a big achievement in multilateral diplomacy Witnessing domestically how the vision of ldquoGreen Growthrdquo has been disseminated to the world South Korea successfully tested its role as an agenda setter using middle power diplomacy In preparation for the post-Kyoto new international climate change treaty in Paris in December 2015 and despite opposition from the business community the current Park Geun-hye government announced

10 SJ LEE

on June 30 2015 a cut of 37 of BAU greenhouse gas by 2030 In this book Sungjin Kim assesses South Korearsquos climate change diplomacy as a middle power to have been successful by being able to utilize four iden-tities of a middle power an early mover a bridge builder a coalitional coordinator and a norm diffuser Kim argues that the Korean govern-ment smartly prioritized ldquoLow Carbon Green Growthrdquo as the foremost national strategy and successfully introduced the National Strategy for Green Growth and the Basic Act on Low Carbon Green Growth Kim suggests that a remaining task for the current Park government is to con-tinue its domestic-level action while expanding Korearsquos existing middle power network

The rise of middle powers in international politics and global gover-nance is becoming more important than ever given the increasing inter-dependency of countries in the world Multilateral diplomacy has emerged as a strong response to common problems and imminent issues that affect multiple countries at the same time As the nature of power in this chang-ing world becomes essentially social countries that communicate and network well with other actors will seize opportunities to enhance their profi les and infl uence in international society South Korea has recently seized the opportunity and engages in strategically conceived middle power roles The prospect for South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy will vary depending on her relative capabilities and position in different issue specifi c networks and coalitions Roles such as a convener facilitator and mediator will be relatively easy Ambitious roles such as an agenda setter or a co-architect will be challenging As South Korea accumulates technical and social knowledge and political skills the prospect for South Korearsquos vigorous middle power diplomacy appears bright

REFERENCES 1 Cooper Andrew Fenton ed 1997 Niche Diplomacy Middle Powers after the

Cold War New York St Martinrsquos Press 2 Cooper Andrew Richard Higgott and Richard Nossal 1993 Relocating

Middle Powers Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order Vancouver UBC Press

3 Higgott Richard A and Andrew Fenton Cooper 1990 Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building Australia the Caims Group and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations International Organizations 44(4) 589ndash632


4 Holbraad Carsten 1984 Middle Powers in International Politics New York St Martinrsquos Press

5 Kahler Miles 2009 Networked Politics Agency Power and Governance In Networked Politics Agency Power and Governance ed Miles Kahler Ithaca NY Cornell University Press

6 Lee Sook Jong 2008 Korean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism In East Asian Multilateralism Prospects for Regional Stability eds Kent E Calder and Francis Fukuyama Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press

7 Pratt Cranford 1990 Middle Power Internationalism The NorthSouth Dimension Kingston McGill-Queenrsquos University Press

8 Rozman Gilbert 2007 South Korea and Sino-Japanese Rivalry A Middle Powerrsquos Options with the East Asia Core Triangle The Pacifi c Review 20(2)

9 Spero Joshua B 2009 Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Power Bridging Contemporary Security Policy 30(1) 147ndash171

10 Stokke Olav 1989 Western Powers and Global Poverty The Determinants of the Aid Polices of Canada Denmark the Netherlands Norway and Sweden Uppsala Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

11 Young Oran R 1989 The Politics of International Regime Formation Managing Natural Resources and the Environment International Organizations 43(3) 349ndash375

NOTES 1 Carsten Holbraad Middle Powers in International Politics (New York St

Martinrsquos Press 1984) 12 2 Andrew F Cooper Richard A Higgott Kim Richard Nossal Relocating

Middle Powers Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver University of British Columbia Press 1993) 21ndash22

3 Cooper Higgott and Nossal Relocating 25ndash26 4 Richard A Higgott ldquoIssues Institutions and Middle-Power Diplomacy

Action and Agendas in the Post-Cold War Erardquo in Niche Diplomacy Middle Powers after the Cold War (ed) Andrew F Cooper (New York St Martinrsquos Press 1997) 37ndash38

5 Alan K Henrikson ldquoMiddle Powers as Managers International Mediation within across and outside Institutionsrdquo in Niche Diplomacy Middle Powers after the Cold War (ed) Andrew F Cooper (New York St Martinrsquos Press 1997) 43 55ndash56

6 Miles Kahler ldquoNetworked Politics Agency Power and Governancerdquo in Networked Politics Agency Power and Governance (ed) Miles Kahler (Ithaca NY and London Cornell University Press 2009) 12ndash14

12 SJ LEE

7 David Chatterson ldquoRoundtable Discussions for Middle Power Diplomacy 1 Middle Power Diplomacy of Canada and Its Implications for South Korearsquos Foreign Policyrdquo East Asia Institute May 3 2013 accessed August 12 2015 httpwwweaiorkrdatabbseng_report2013050818265590pdf

8 While tied into its strong alliance relationship with the USA South Korea has long favored multilateral cooperation since the end of the Cold War For the past three decades a focal regional boundary that each South Korean government has emphasized has varied from the larger Asia-Pacifi c to East Asia or the narrower Northeast Asia Sook Jong Lee ldquoKorean Perspectives on East Asian Regionalismrdquo in East Asian Multilateralism Prospects for Regional Stability ed Kent E Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 2008)

9 blogs cfrorgasia20131001korean-middle-power-diplomacy-the-establishment-of-mikta

10 wwwmiktaorg 11 Holbraad argued under the dualistic system where two great powers domi-

nate middle powers are exposed to intense pressure to link their interna-tional conduct to the central rivalry Middle powers are also subject to a high degree of managerial control when two great powers concert each other Accordingly two great powersrsquo modest competition is the best situ-ation for middle powers to act more freely Holbraad Middle Powers

12 See Seng Tan ldquoFacilitating China-US Relations in the Age of Rebalancing ASEANrsquos lsquoMiddle Powerrsquo Diplomacyrdquo EAI MPDI Working Paper No 1 October 18 2013 accessed August 12 2015 httpwwweaiorkrdatabbskor_report2013101817491034pdf

13 ldquoUS urges Korea to speak out on China sea disputerdquo The Korean Herald June 4 2015 accessed May 18 2016 httpwwwkoreaheraldcomviewphpud=20150604001186

14 Gilbert Rozman ldquoSouth Korea and Sino-Japanese Rivalry A Middle Powerrsquos Options with the East Asia Core Trianglerdquo The Pacifi c Review 20(2)(2007) 200ndash201

15 Joshua B Spero ldquoGreat Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Power Bridgingrdquo Contemporary Security Policy 30(1) (2009) 158ndash160

16 ChosunIlbo March 15 2012



CHAPTER 2

21 POST-COLD WAR WORLD STILL IN FLUX The expectation that the end of the Cold War and the tide of mega-trend transformation of globalization would bring about post-Westphalian tran-sition has gradually faded away Some observers believed that a global gov-ernance in security architecture would form with the relative weakening of state power Others predicted that the USA would create a genuine empire possessing unprecedented power as a single unit in human history creat-ing truly liberal institutions and providing global goods However the triple crisis that haunted the USA after 9ndash11 that is security economic and ideological problems impaired the US ability to produce global impe-rial power Now the phenomenon of ldquoreturn of geopoliticsrdquo is witnessed in many regions and traditional realist great power rivalry seems to domi-nate the international order 1

East Asia refl ecting these global changes still preserves its own char-acteristics With the so-called US rebalancing strategy retrenchment of US power is less felt while rivalry between the USA and China increas-ingly defi ne the nature of the East Asian security order Unlike other regions especially Europe geopolitics has never left the regional scene in security matters and globalization or economic interdependence has not transformed the situation Military competition has worsened even in

East Asian Security and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

Chaesung Chun

C Chun ( ) Seoul National University Seoul Republic of Korea

the post-Cold War period The combination of balancing strategy and the phenomenon of power transition defi es the expectation that great power politics will make way for multilateral cooperation But multilateral institu-tions are being reshaped to refl ect great power politics The rise of nation-alism composed of many different elements haunts the region further complicating the security situation Going through a series of hardships nations in East Asia preserve a high level of suspicions and fears among themselves which aggravates the security dilemma

On the other hand global security environments are in great fl ux One of the main reasons is the change in the US grand strategy which may be termed as retrenchment derived from the relative decline of US power It is true that there is a lively debate on the decline of US hegemony but there is a power vacuum in many regions motivating many powers to take risks to accomplish regional ambitions Rising tensions in Ukraine the Middle East and even in East Asia shows that the hesitance of the USA to intervene with massive military power especially ground forces radically changes the security landscape in these regions

These changes provide South Korea with opportunities and diffi cul-ties At the global level South Korea with its increased national power and status acts as a prominent middle power However at the regional level almost every time geopolitics reinforces itself the Korean Peninsula becomes the focus of serious great powersrsquo rivalry and even military clashes When uncertainty for the future with the changes in power distribution becomes more evident developing South Korearsquos foreign policy strategy becomes highly urgent South Korearsquos main purpose is to contribute to enhancing systemic stability and fl exibility to absorb the impacts of great powersrsquo rivalry and to pave the way for resilient adaptation to new security surroundings Theoretically options beyond the basics of foreign policy include balancing bandwagoning hiding hedging bonding and tran-scending South Korea should develop a future-oriented and advanced regional policy which can solve the dilemma of confl icting bilateral great power policies 2

South Korea has devised and elaborated the concept of middle power diplomacy for the past several years In the area of security strategy it is composed of six elements (1) to help great powers lessen mutual strategic mistrust (2) to develop an issue-specifi c dispute settlement mechanism (3) to develop multilateral institutions or to actively participate in and fur-ther existing institutions (4) to preemptively import globally established norms to the region to set up the principle on which East Asians can solve

16 C CHUN

problems (5) to make a cooperative network among like-minded middle powers to strengthen their positions vis-agrave-vis great powers (6) to be a co-architect in making and reforming the regional security architecture In what follows this chapter will delve into these points in more detail

22 DECLINE OF US UNIPOLARITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MIDDLE POWERS

As the second term of the Obama administration meets midterm elec-tions we can expect a debate over the US grand strategy for the next administration Especially as the world is in the middle of hot clashes in many regions at the same time the US foreign strategy after eight years of democrat leadership will draw a lot of attention The debates are centered on the following points whether US power is on the decline between retrenchmentoffshore balancing and deep global engagement which way the USA should follow which region(s) should receive most intensive attention what level of military preparedness the USA should maintain to defend itself and its allies what kind of defense strategy the USA should adopt to effectively lead the world how the USA should deal with poten-tial competitors such as China and Russia

Some argue that the USA should adopt the strategy of retrenchment where retrenchment is defi ned as ldquoa policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to a decline in relative powerrdquo This strategy means ldquodecreasing the overall costs of foreign policy by redistributing resources away from peripheral commitments and toward core commit-mentsrdquo More concretely ldquodeclining great powers select from a wide menu of policy options but these options may be categorized as econo-mizing expenditures reducing risks and shifting burdensrdquo Then all the resources should be reallocated to only core interests renouncing periph-eral commitments at the same time 3 Republicans in times of stringency have adopted this position which may happen in the next presidential election 4

Others argue that the costs of deep engagement cannot outweigh the merits and benefi ts of continued US leadership Advocates of retrench-ment overstate budgetary cost the systemic costs of hegemonic leadership and the distortion of US interests while underestimating benefi ts of deep engagement Then ldquothe fundamental choice to retain a grand strategy of deep engagement after the Cold War is just what the preponderance of

EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY 17

international relations scholarship would expect a rational self- interested leading power in the United Statesrsquo position to dordquo 5

US response at this time under the Obama administration is an empha-sis on international collective action ldquoThe starting point for that collective action will be our engagement with other countries The cornerstone of this engagement is the relationship between the United States and our close friends and allies in Europe Asia the Americas and the Middle Eastmdashties which are rooted in shared interests and shared values and which serve our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the worldrdquo 6 As global problems become more complex than in the twentieth century collective action is inevitable and the USA holds that ldquoThe United Nations NATO and our Asian alliances were all built on the foundation of American strength and American values American leader-ship established the Bretton Woods system and supported open marketsrdquo 7 This has big implications for middle powers especially allies of the USA in the sense that they now take the role of co-architect of regional and global affairs on the basis of consultation with Washington

In this vein the USA defi nes most signifi cant security purposes as follows Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare Deter and Defeat Aggression Project Power Despite Anti-AccessArea Denial Challenges Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Operate Effectively in Cyberspace Operate Effectively in Space Maintain a Safe Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities Provide a Stabilizing Presence Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations Conduct Humanitarian Disaster Relief and Other 8

South Korea as a robust ally of the USA has contributed to the provi-sion of global goods such as hosting global conferences (G20 Nuclear Summit Meeting etc) dispatching troops to Iraq and Afghanistan send-ing Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) troops to many places in confl ict and contributing to nonproliferation efforts in many cases South Korearsquos growth in both hard and soft power which enables its status as a middle power changes the landscape of the US-ROK cooperation requiring more of a positive role of the latter

The challenge ahead however is that as the fading US unipolarity faces many diffi culties South Korea needs to develop new agendas for ldquogoing globalrdquo under the framework of the ROK-US alliance 9 and to act as an independent middle power trying to realize universal norms in security affairs Sometimes the US initiative in dealing with security mat-

18 C CHUN

ters such as Iranian nuclear problems and Russian annexation of Crimea is not exactly in line with South Korean national interests South Korea has maintained a close economic relationship with Iran and Russia is an indispensable economic and security partner in Northeast Asia

The solution is to confi rm South Korearsquos values in dealing with global matters and take concerted action with like-minded partners The USA may be a natural partner sharing common values such as democracy a mar-ket economy and human rights and in this sense there could be a con-sensus about how to deal with specifi c issues based on close consultation

Also partnership is not confi ned to bilateral alliance relationships South Korearsquos active participation in major international institutions and middle power initiatives will place South Korea in the right place It is true that South Korea has effective security resources such as a well-trained military long-preserved experiences in real combats and PKO operations and a good reputation as a rapidly democratized and economically devel-oped middle power

For this global role there should be a consensus in South Korea that active participation in global affairs will enhance South Korearsquos national interests in the long term At fi rst middle power diplomacy may not seem so benefi cial but growing reputations and evaluation will ultimately ben-efi t South Korean interests Also South Korearsquos reputation as a global normative power will give South Korea a good basis in dealing with great power politics in East Asia As long as South Korea is known as a country that takes care of collective interests great powers will not be able to dis-regard South Korearsquos role

23 SEARCHING FOR SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER ROLES IN EAST ASIArsquoS TRANSITIONAL SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT

231 US-China Rivalry in East Asia and South Korearsquos Middle Power Roles

One of the most signifi cant elements that defi ne the current and the future security architecture of East Asia is power transition The rapid rise of China makes more plausible the prediction that the power gap between the USA and China will narrow and that ultimately China may surpass the US power at least in this region How power transition in international


politics will happen however will be shaped by the nature of change of international politics itself 10

The current power transition between the USA and China contrary to typical power transition theories is different from what has happened in the past such as the two World Wars in the twentieth century In a nar-rower sense China is rising under very different environments from the twentieth century In a broader sense we are witnessing the transforma-tion of global and regional international politics from the ground There are several particular points in current power transition in Northeast Asia which may be indicative of a possible peaceful process of transition First refl ecting modern conditions it is a power transition that is taking place under unipolarity Rising powers should adapt themselves for a certain period of time to the structural frameworks made by the current hege-mon For example China to further its rise needs to conform to secu-rity political and socioeconomic frameworks made by the USA for the time being The need to rise under unipolarity might have the effect of orienting the rising power in line with the existing structural framework lessening the degree of dissatisfaction of rising powers This possibility is optimistic in that it increases the chance of regional peaceful power transi-tion However there are still lingering doubts for the possible cooperation between Washington and Beijing as experienced in many issues in 2010 such as the arms sales to Taiwan military drills in the Yellow Sea and the debate regarding the South China Sea If unprepared for any possible controversial issues these soon degenerate into problems that aggravate the security dilemma between the existing hegemon and the rising power

Second the current power transition is occurring not only in the area of hard power but also in the area of soft power International politics in the era of informatization and democratization works differently from before these megatrends appeared The budding hegemon needs to develop the soft power resources to lead the region inventing a better soft power vision for the region than that of the existing hegemon Then soft power transition occurs during the time of the rise of competing states by which regional identity and normative politics become more compli-cated China tries to strengthen its soft power strategy both to advance a better regional framework than that of the USA and to search for the space of soft balancing against the USA with possible soft power alliances Northeast Asian countries like South Korea in the middle of soft power competition sometimes have a hard time in taking a stance

20 C CHUN

Power transition in the period of democratization globalization and information technology then will be affected not merely by military and economic power In the twenty-fi rst century a rising power cannot accumulate economic power if it violates international economic norms In times of democratization public support and national preference in neighboring countries will decide how rising states will be supported by them Institutions that rising states present as alternatives to established powersrsquo institutions will be under scrutiny in surrounding countries Then power transition in this century will be a transition of normative power and institutional power as well as hard power Countries that are believed to conform to most developed norms and principles will acquire consent from the public and the government of neighboring countries 11

232 New Modes of Rivalry between the USA and China

The rise of China fi rst witnessed in the economic realm now translated into the military one complicates surrounding countriesrsquo China policy Unlike other regions where Washington directs toward retrenchment or offshore balancing the Obama administration takes Asia as a resourceful place in which it can fi nd a platform for regaining hegemonic power Asian markets including China and its rapidly growing economy can give the USA profi table trade partners and based on economic reinvigoration the USA will strive for hegemony in the 2020s 12

The East Asian international relations can be still defi ned as a unipo-lar system at least in military affairs with the US military expenditure military technology and alliance networks still surpassing China The USA is well aware of the narrowing gap between China and itself and pursues several strategic goals (1) trying to engage with China with a view to socializing China into existing international norms now coined in the term ldquonew type of major-power relationshiprdquo (2) balancing against China with its major East Asian allies to cope with the Chinese strategy of so-called anti-access and area denial (3) forming multilateral institu-tions strengthening liberal norms and human rights in several areas such as trade fi nance and human security National security advisor Susan Rice remarked that ldquoWith emerging powers we must be able to collaborate where our interests converge but defi ne our differences and defend our interests where they divergerdquo 13

For these goals the USA to back up its Asian rebalancing strategy purports to strengthen its military preparedness by doing the following


ldquoWe will also increase and more widely distribute our port visits includ-ing in the important Indian Ocean region And by 2020 the Navy will reposture its forces from todayrsquos roughly 5050 percent split between the Pacifi c and the Atlantic to about a 6040 split between those oceans That will include six aircraft carriers in this region a majority of our cruisers destroyers Littoral Combat Ships and submarinesrdquo 14

The USA has the perception that China continues to pursue a long- term comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fi ght and win short-duration high-intensity regional contingencies According to a Pentagon report ldquoChinarsquos leaders describe modernization of the Peoplersquos Liberation Army (PLA) as essential to preserving and sustaining what they view as a lsquoperiod of strategic opportunityrsquo to advance Chinarsquos national development during the fi rst two decades of the twenty-fi rst centuryrdquo 15 It is to be noted that the USA try to read Chinese strategic goals at this particular state of power transition Washington thinks that ldquoChinarsquos leaders see this period as pro-viding an opportunity to focus on fostering a stable external environment to provide the Peoplersquos Republic of China (PRC) the strategic space to prioritize economic growth and development and to achieve lsquonational rejuvenationrsquo by 2049rdquo 16 This perception leads to the analysis of Chinese policies such as to ldquomaintain peace and stability along their countryrsquos periphery expand their diplomatic infl uence to facilitate access to markets capital and resources and avoid direct confrontation with the United States and other countriesrdquo 17 For the regional strategy the USA evaluates that ldquothis strategy has led to a growing Chinese presence in regions all over the world and particularly on its periphery creating new and expand-ing economic and diplomatic interests Chinarsquos expanding interests have led to friction between some of its regional neighbors including allies and partners of the United Statesrdquo 18

Also Washington puts great emphasis on strengthening alliance ties This is coherent with the US global security strategy of collective action and burden-sharing Also the USA needs to repeatedly show its commit-ment to alliance partners when there is a growing doubt in the US power and credibility to intervene and China actively tries to draw neighbor powers on the basis of a mutual relationship For example Japan wants to be sure of the US commitment in dealing with the SenkakuDiaoyu islands when the USA cannot actively restrain Russia from annexing Crimea and had a diffi cult time in criticizing China for its announcement of their aggressive Air Defense Identifi cation Zone

22 C CHUN

Also as the alliance network built by the USA transforms itself from the ldquohub-and-spokerdquo to ldquointer-spokerdquo network to ease the tension between China and its neighbors Americarsquos role in encouraging cooperation among its alliance partners becomes more important For example faced with rising tensions between South Korea and Japan due to territorial dis-putes and historical issues President Obamarsquos role of mediator will draw much attention

China on the other hand tries to strengthen itself for future all-out competition with the USA Just after the 2008 economic crisis China with its remarkably resilient economy tried to challenge the US hege-mony at both a global and a regional level but after a couple of yearsrsquo of standoff with the USA decided to maintain stable relations with them instead Since the Hu Jintao-Obama summit meeting in January 2012 China has paid more attention to normative institutional politics utilizing a charm offensive toward neighboring countries In the area of core inter-ests China was not willing to make concessions to any country and tried to realize its will even with military power But in other areas China actively publicized its principles and norms with elaborate efforts to advance alter-native institutional frameworks to US liberal inventions

In general China is very cautious in coping with the US rebalancing strategy because Beijing is deeply suspicious of the US intention of bal-ancing against China For example Chinese media holds that ldquodealing with the US containment attempts should be one of Chinarsquos diplomatic strategic goals China should unite with all possible forces and keep cer-tain strategic initiatives against the US [hellip] Fast economic development has become the biggest advantage that China has when dealing with the US The US can hardly provoke China in the economic fi eld unlike its developing military strength which gives excuses for the West to sup-press China The more the two focus on economic competition the more the situation will tilt Chinarsquos way The growth and decline in economic strength is the starting point for national competition as well as its desti-nation It refl ects national tendencies But military and politics are often powerful tools to disturb or twist the trend China should try to avoid a new Cold War with the US but by no means should it give up its periph-eral security in exchange for USrsquo ease in Asiardquo 19

As China learns rapidly the nature of the new power transition game taking place on both the hard and the soft power fronts the Chinese leadership endeavors to suggest alternative institutional frameworks President Xi Jinping in an address ldquoKeeping up with the Trend of the


Times and Promoting World Peace and Developmentrdquo at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations On March 23 2013 expounded Chinarsquos view on the current international situation and its position on international relations Xi advanced the idea of building a ldquonew type of international relationsrdquo which posits that win-win cooperation peaceful development is crucial and that people of all nations should combine their efforts to safeguard world peace and promote common development 20

China also plans to assuage their neighbors concernrsquos over the rise of China by coining new principles in dealing with them and hopefully to set up a Chinese version of the ldquoMonroe doctrinerdquo In a conference on the diplomatic work on neighboring countries in Beijing October 25 2013 Xi was reported to have stressed the necessity of good diplomatic work in neighboring countries to realize the ldquocentenary goalsrdquo set by the Eighteenth Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress in November 2012 a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and a pros-perous strong democratic culturally advanced harmonious and modern socialist country by 2049 Xi reportedly said that ldquoCPC leadership in pre-vious generations attached high importance to diplomacy with neighbor-ing countries raising important issues and guiding policy opening up a generally sound environment laying the foundation for diplomatic workrdquo It is notable that Chinese leadership increasingly emphasizes ldquoa three- dimensional multi-element perspective beyond time and spacerdquo As the goal of treating neighbors Xi said that ldquowe must strive to make our neigh-bors more friendly in politics economically more closely tied to us and we must have deeper security cooperation and closer people-to-people tiesrdquo 21

It becomes more interesting that China now tries to propose an alter-native security mechanism to deal with the Asian security architecture At the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confi dence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) President Xi Jinping delivered a key-note speech saying that his country ldquoadvocates a new security concept featuring mutual trust mutual benefi t equality and coordination and supports the Association of Southeast Asian Nations the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the League of Arab States in playing a positive role in regional affairsrdquo Here a new security concept may mean that China now plans to suggest better security norms and principles based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Xi in this address basically mentioned almost all important regional security issues covering the North Korean nuclear issue to Afghanistan and promised

24 C CHUN

ldquounremitting efforts in solving international and regional hotspot issues through dialogue and negotiationrdquo 22

As the all-front competition between the USA and China goes on for the time being US-China relations are expected to go along the line of a ldquonew type of major-power relationsrdquo Both countries attempt to fi nd dimensions of common interests expand the scope of consent and to operationalize cooperation Susan Rice holds that ldquoWhen it comes to China we seek to operationalize a new model of major-power relations That means managing inevitable competition while forging deeper coop-eration on issues where our interests convergemdashin Asia and beyondrdquo 23 Both countries list most impending and easily agreeable issues for the platform such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue a stable and secure Afghanistan and an end to confl ict in Sudan Also the two countries can take con-certed action to ldquobolster peace and development in places like sub-Saharan Africa where sustainable growth would deliver lasting benefi ts to the peoples of Africa as well as to both our countriesrdquo With China Washington tries to enhance the military-to-military relationship and strategic security dialogues and to cooperate on issues like counter-piracy and maritime security 24

233 Overbalancing Northeast Asian Security Environment and South Korearsquos Middle Power Roles

In dealing with security matters in Northeast Asia one signifi cant fac-tor is that Korea China and Japan have not completed modern transi-tion in the sense that the three countries have not accomplished their long- cherished goals of realizing normal modern states Both China and Korea are divided failing to establish a unifi ed modern state based on the traditional concept of one nation Japan also failed to normalize itself having a constitutional restraint in wielding sovereign rights As these three countries have no experience of mutually recognizing each other as normal modern states each still preserves serious doubt that other actors may strive for revisionist policies Korea and Japan fears the revival of tra-ditional Chinese hegemonic expansion whereas Korea and China fear the return of Japanese imperialism in some form These fears historically produced make these states overbalance against each other and become highly sensitive to each otherrsquos interpretation of history They assume that historical consciousness may refl ect each otherrsquos future strategic intention


thereby feeling the need to perform soft balancing acts against each other These fears have been frequently aggravated by the element of domestic politics in which some politicians make full use of these matters for the benefi t of political calculation

One example is Japanese conceptions of the rise of China Frequently Japan remembers the traditional regional order under a Sino-centric world view With the worsening of the relationship between South Korea and Japan the Japanese also use history as grounds to argue that South Korearsquos traditional affi nity with China will be revived in projecting the future regional order in the twenty-fi rst century This means that the tra-ditional regional order still looms large in the perception of East Asians

Augmented by this kind of fear and also furnished by national aims to normalize itself Japan has been taking steps to creating a stronger military Prime Minister Shinzo Abe prefaced on the tenet of proactive pacifi sm approved a new fi ve-year defense plan and the acquisition of drones and amphibious assault vehicles and decided to reinterpret the constitutional clause for collective self-defense It comes from a prolonged rivalry with China over islands in the East China Sea but refl ects Japanese perception on the rise of China in general

234 The Evolving Korean Peninsula and South Korearsquos Middle Power Roles

South Korea surrounded by four great powers will face terrible times if power transition translates into military clashes More than anything else enhancing systemic fl exibility is crucial To do this South Korea needs to (1) prevent war among great powers or military clashes for regional hege-mony (2) peacefully manage diffi cult regional affairs which has implica-tions for great powersrsquo rivalry (3) establish universal international norms in spite of power shift and (4) enhance the role of middle powers to lessen the strategic distrust among great powers especially between the USA and China

This goal is in other words to balance against ldquogreat power politicsrdquo itself rather than any specifi c great power for their specifi c national inter-ests It aims to balance against great power politics not to replace the role of great powers but to transform the logic of power politics with a better logic of multilateral cooperation Then East Asians may advance a new picture of regional governance with more universal value orientation ben-efi ting regional citizens regardless of power distribution

26 C CHUN

Second to cope with the complex nature of power transition and the problem of overbalancing it is crucial to have a common well-developed view on Northeast Asian international politics to trace the origin of the problems different combinations of organizing principles in East Asia international relations to develop customized means for solving different problems

Also South Korea with the help of other middle powers in the region or hopefully of great powers needs to develop knowledge diplomacy among middle powers Here theoretical assumptions are important If a common view on regional history can be developed then the problem of overbalancing will be easy to solve In this case to depoliticize the issue is critical and in doing so there may be hope of developing a regional identity among people in the region

Third the role of middle powers such as South Korea will be crucial in mini- and multilateral mechanisms Northeast Asia-specifi c multilateral security institutions are rare Only Six Party Talks qualify as a Track I net-work confi ned to Northeast Asian countries However the issue area of the Six Party Talks is limited to dealing with North Korean nuclear issues even though there is one working group related to regional multilateral cooperation Also the Six Party Talks has been held at the level of assistant secretaries which is relatively insuffi cient to deal with major regional issues

Under this situation main venues for regional cooperation are bilateral and mini-lateral ones The US-centered alliance network the so-called hub-and-spoke network comprises cooperation among the USA South Korea and Japan China has not pursued alliances as a central venue for cooperation from the Cold War times with the exception of North Korea Russiarsquos tie with North Korea in the form of an alliance does not exist any longer However bilateral networks among China Russia and North Korea are still central Trilateral cooperation refl ects both institutional bal-ancing and institutional cooperation

Anchored on US-China relations the US-centered trilateral coopera-tive mechanism among the USA South Korea and Japan may be viewed to balance against the rise of China As the fi rst line of the US rebalanc-ing strategy is strengthening the relationship with alliance partners mini- lateral mechanisms still looms large China on the other hand endeavors to strengthen ties with neighboring countries especially in the period of the Xi Jinping administration both at the bilateral and the mini-lateral levels ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other multitrack mechanisms are being developed to cope with US


centered mini-lateralism Yet mini-lateral mechanisms can contribute to alleviate competitiveness among great powers The China-Korea-Japan trilateral has been initiated and still continues even though there is serious trouble between China and Japan and between Korea and Japan

Here mini-lateralism helps Mini-lateral mechanisms are effective in that relevant participants focus on impending issues with a higher level of priority fl exible in that the scope of participants is adaptable depending on specifi c issues and constructive in that a web of multiple mini-lateral mechanisms may ultimately end up as a solid multilateral mechanism

In all these processes middle powers do not pursue hegemonic dominance They try to lessen strategic distrust among great powers because hegemonic strife endangers their interests anchor the regional order on nonzero-sum game and normative politics establish stable middle power cooperation to have stronger impact on architectural issues and evade the pitfall of degen-erating mini-lateral venues for institutional balancing among major powers

24 ISSUES OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

Although the middle power diplomacy approach by South Korea in deal-ing with regional matters may seem plausible it will be very diffi cult to per-suade great powers to be fl exible to try multilateral alternatives In this case South Korea needs promising issues to enhance its middle power role and to enlighten the prospect of solving the issues based on South Korearsquos sugges-tions The North Korea problem and the question of unifi cation so far has been dealt with from the perspective of national interests It is certainly true that these problems directly concern the interests of Korean people However we may choose to try and accelerate the process of unifi cation at the same time to strengthen South Korearsquos capability to perform a middle power role and ultimately to enhance regional systemic stability and fl exibility

The core of North Korearsquos problem is how to defi ne its future strategic status with credible guarantees from outside powers The solution itself can be only given through the consent of the Korean people and regional powers North Korea is a country constantly insecure over the chance of being absorbed by the South feels betrayed by China and allegedly is threatened by the USA North Korea will not give up nuclear weapons unless it feels assured of its own survivability

28 C CHUN

First both South Korea and the USA have constantly declared their intention to guarantee North Korearsquos survival However both lack of trust incoherent policy coming from domestic considerations and intran-sient negation strategy prevented both parties from building trust with the North

Second it is also true that recent North Korean behavior to continue provocations in order to raise tensions embarrasses China China so far the most supportive ally of North Korea is in a position to act as a consis-tent responsible stakeholder and to strengthen its soft power as a potential regional and even global leader On the one hand China has to conform to and strengthen universal norms such as nonproliferation which leads to wielding the infl uence to restrain North Korea 25 On the other hand the uncertain future for hegemonic rivalry with the USA especially in the region of Northeast Asia and Western Pacifi c worries China precipitating the need to keep North Korea closer as a useful geostrategic buffer In that sense China just cannot side with South Korea and the USA in raising the level of sanctions against the North which might lead to the fi nal collapse of North Korea and unifi cation by absorption Then the most desirable picture is slowly reforming and a pro-China North Korea which ultimately contributes to the strengthening of a future China

North Korearsquos recent behavior aggravated this dilemma After China participated in international sanctions over North Korearsquos missile test in December 2012 China is forced to watch deeper engagement by the USA in the Northeast Asian military theater based on the alliance with South Korea which might leave the long-term effect of changing the mili-tary balance of power in the region to favor the USA To make matters worse there are common voices urging China to take a more active posi-tion to restrain and coerce North Korea

Under this situation South Korea has the competence to (1) defi ne the nature of the North Korea problem including the nuclear issue (2) make the North Korea issue one of the most important regional issues needing the concerted acts of great powers (3) establish and deepen the mecha-nism of multilateral consultation (4) use this as the platform for a more formidable multilateral institution Also more tactically South Korea can prove itself as highly capable of lessening security dilemmas and perform the function of a networking power

In the example of the North Korea nuclear problem North Korea will not be persuaded only by verbal guarantees or economic assistance short


of full political support to give up nuclear weapons At this stage strate-gic interaction should be complemented by more communicative interac-tion Communicative action is about understanding the preferences of the other party and delivering onersquos preferences in a more credible form It aims at ldquocoming to an understanding over the conditions of interaction rather than an orientation towards achieving immediate self-interestrdquo 26 One way of reinforcing the credibility is to use publicity in communicative action By raising the audience cost and verifi ability through the public realm signaling can be appreciated as more than just cheap talk In this process South Korean dynamic democratic political processes will help send signals to and form North Korean preferences

To convince North Korea of the genuine intentions of South Korea and neighboring countries more public debate and discourses about the future of North Korea needs to be augmented If North Korea witnesses the increase in public debate over its role and status in Northeast Asia it may seek to conform to the expectations of international society not because of its good intentions but because of the will to survive 27 In this process even a slight representation of the intention to absorb North Korea by any government will incite North Korearsquos worry leading to increasing mistrust toward outside powers If South Korea learns how to perform communica-tive action and how to augment its network power as a middle power this experience can be repeated for further problems in the region as a whole

The question of Korean unifi cation requires South Korearsquos highly keen strategic capability Without prior strategic consultation with encompass-ing powers especially the USA and China the process of unifi cation will be more diffi cult The USA offi cially supported the unifi cation of the Peninsula 28 China Japan and Russia altogether bless the future of a uni-fi ed Korea in principle However the strategic stance of a unifi ed Korea assumed by these states will determine how they will react in the actual process of unifi cation The best prospect for a unifi ed Korearsquos diplomacy will be middle power diplomacy which will contribute to regional com-mon goods with the view that unifi ed Korea will not pursue the strategic line of expanding its power as a great power Also as the event of the uni-fi cation of Korea symbolizes the beginning of the completion of modern transition it will inspire China and Japan to accomplish the same goals and mutually respect each other as equal sovereigns

30 C CHUN

NOTES 1 Walter Russell Mead ldquoThe Return of Geopolitics The Revenge of the

Revisionist Powersrdquo Foreign Affairs 93(3) (2014) 69 2 See Robert S Ross ldquoBalance of Power Politics and the Rise of China

Accommodation and Balancing in East Asiardquo Security Studies 15(3) (2006) 355ndash395

3 Paul K MacDonald and Joseph M Parent ldquoGraceful Decline The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchmentrdquo International Security 35(4) (2011) 7ndash44 Steven E Lobell ldquoThe Grand Strategy of Hegemonic Decline Dilemmas of Strategy and Financerdquo Security Studies 10(1) (2000) 86ndash111

4 See also Christopher Layne ldquoThe Unipolar Illusion Why New Great Powers Will Riserdquo International Security 17(4) (1993) 5ndash51 Christopher Layne ldquoThe Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming End of the United Statesrsquo Unipolar Momentrdquo International Security 31(2) (2006) 7ndash41 Christopher Layne ldquoThe Unipolar Exit Beyond the Pax Americanardquo Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24(2) (2011) 149ndash64

5 Stephen G Brooks G John Ikenberry and William C Wohlforth ldquoDonrsquot Come Home America The Case against Retrenchmentrdquo International Security 37(3) (201213) 51

6 The White House Sustaining US Global Leadership Priorities For 21st Century Defense 2012 January

7 The White House Offi ce of the Press Secretary June 11 2014 Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E Rice ldquoThe Strength of American Leadership the Power of Collective Actionrdquo Keynote Address at the Center for a New American Security Annual Conference Washington DC


9 See for example Kurt M Campbell Victor D Cha Lindsey Ford Kazuyo Kato Nirav Patel Randy Schriver and Vikram J Singh Going Global The Future of the US-South Korea Alliance (Center for a New American Security 2009)

10 Randall L Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu ldquoAfter Unipolarity Chinarsquos Visions of International Order in an Era of US Declinerdquo International Security 36(1) (2011) 41ndash72

11 See Steve Chan China The US and Power-transition Theory A critique (London Routledge 2008) Zhiqun Zhu US-China Relations in the 21st Century (New York Routledge 2006)

12 See Aaron Friedberg Contest for Supremacy China America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York WW Norton amp Company 2011)


Jonathan Kirshner ldquoThe Tragedy of Offensive Realism Classical Realism and the Rise of Chinardquo European Journal of International Relations 18(1) (2012) 53ndash75

13 The White House Offi ce of the Press Secretary June 11 2014 Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E Rice ldquoThe Strength of American Leadership the Power of Collective Actionrdquo

14 Leon E Panetta Shangri-La Security Dialogue As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E Panetta Shangri-La Hotel Singapore (June 02 2012)

15 Department of Defense of the United States of America Military and Security Developments Involving the People rsquo s Republic of China 2013 (2014)

16 Ibid 17 Ibid 18 Ibid 19 ldquoPentagon Plan Changes Game in Asiardquo People rsquo s Daily and Global Times

January 6 2012 20 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoplersquos Republic of China Xi

Jinping Calls for the Building of New Type of International Relations with Win-Win Cooperation at the Core in a Speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations httpwwwfmprcgovcnmfa_engtopics_665678xjpcf1_665694t1024781shtml

21 ldquoXi Jinping China to Further Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countriesrdquo Xinhua October 25 2013

22 ldquoPresident Xi Addresses CICA Summitrdquo China Daily May 21 2014 23 Susan E Rice ldquoAmericarsquos Future in Asiardquo As Prepared for Delivery

Georgetown University Gaston Hall Washington DC (November 20 2013)

24 Ibid 25 Reports say that a member of Chinarsquos Politburo Li Jianguo led a small

delegation to Pyongyang North Korearsquos capital in November 2012 He carried a letter from Chinarsquos new leader Xi Jinping which is said to have contained a simple message Do not launch a ballistic missile

26 Marc Lynch ldquoWhy Engage China and the Logic of Communicative Engagementrdquo European Journal of International Relations 8(2) (2002) 192

27 Fearon James D ldquoDomestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputesrdquo American Political Science Review 88(3) (1994) 577ndash92 Fearon James D ldquoSignaling Foreign Policy Interests Tying Hands versus Sinking Costsrdquo Journal of Confl ict Resolution 41 (1997) 68ndash90

28 ldquoThe deep longing for freedom and dignity will not go away So too on this divided peninsula The day all Koreans yearn for will not come easily

32 C CHUN

or without great sacrifi ce But make no mistake it will come And when it does change will unfold that once seemed impossible And checkpoints will open and watchtowers will stand empty and families long separated will fi nally be reunited And the Korean people at long last will be whole and freerdquo Barack Obama ldquoRemarks by President Obama at Hankuk Universityrdquo Seoul Republic of Korea (March 26 2012)

REFERENCES 1 Brooks Stephen G G John Ikenberry and William C Wohlforth 201213

Donrsquot Come Home America The Case against Retrenchment International Security 37(3) 7ndash51

2 Campbell Kurt M Victor D Cha Lindsey Ford Kazuyo Kato Nirav Patel Randy Schriver and Vikram J Singh 2009 Going Global The Future of the US-South Korea Alliance Center for a New American Security

3 Chan Steve 2008 China the US and Power-transition Theory A Critique London Routledge

4 Department of Defense of the United States of America 2014 Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoplersquos Republic of China 2013

5 Fearon James D 1994 Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes American Political Science Review 88(3) 577ndash592

6 Fearon JD 1997 Signaling Foreign Policy Interests Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs Journal of Confl ict Resolution 41(1) 68ndash90

7 Friedberg Aaron L 2011 A Contest for Supremacy China America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia New York WW Norton amp Company

8 Kirshner J 2012 The Tragedy of Offensive Realism Classical Realism and the Rise of China European Journal of International Relations 18(1) 53ndash75

9 Layne Christopher 1993 The Unipolar Illusion Why New Great Powers Will Rise International Security 17(4) 5

10 mdashmdashmdash 2006 The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming End of The United Statesrsquo Unipolar Moment International Security 31(2) 7ndash41

11 mdashmdashmdash 2011 The Unipolar Exit Beyond the Pax Americana Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24(2) 149ndash164

12 Lobell Steven E 2000 The Grand Strategy of Hegemonic Decline Dilemmas of Strategy and Finance Security Studies 10(1) 86ndash111

13 Lynch M 2002 Why Engage China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement European Journal of International Relations 8(2) 192

14 Macdonald Paul K and Joseph M Parent 2011 Graceful Decline The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment International Security 35(4) 7ndash44


15 Mead Walter R 2014 The Return of Geopolitics The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers Foreign Affairs 93(3) 69

16 Panetta Leon E 2012 Shangri-La Security Dialogue As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E Panetta Shangri-La Hotel Singapore (June 2 2012)

17 Rice Susan E 2013 Americarsquos Future in Asia As Prepared for Delivery Georgetown University Gaston Hall Washington DC (November 20 2013)

18 Ross Robert S 2006 Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia Security Studies 15(3) 355ndash395

19 Schweller Randall L and Xiaoyu Pu 2011 After Unipolarity Chinarsquos Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline International Security 36(1) 41ndash72

20 The White House 2012 Sustaining US Global Leadership Priorities for 21st Century Defense (January 2012)

21 The White House Offi ce of the Press Secretary 2014 Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E Rice The Strength of American Leadership the Power of Collective Action (June 11 2014)

22 Zhu Zhiqun 2006 US-China Relations in the 21st Century Power Transition and Peace London Routledge

34 C CHUN


CHAPTER 3

31 INTRODUCTION At the same time that the USA has unveiled its rebalance to Asia South Korean foreign policy strategists have been carefully considering how their country can more effectively use diplomatic economic and military capabilities it has accrued as a result of its own rise to prominence as a G-20 member and top-tier trading economy The discussion within South Korean foreign policy circles regarding its future strategy has been ani-mated primarily by the idea that South Korea is a middle power Therefore a deeper understanding and application of attributes of a middle power to South Korearsquos situation will assist South Korean policymakers by provid-ing a constructive blueprint for South Korearsquos foreign policy

For instance if South Korea applies the attributes of a middle power to its own diplomacy then South Korean strategists must explore how and whether South Korearsquos positioning as a facilitator manager and niche player can provide intellectual leadership on specialized well-chosen issues where it has a comparative advantage In this way South Korea is developing and testing the limits of its geographic behavioral and normative capacity to be a middle power actor on the international stage cognizant of the fact that its capabilities are constrained by its position at the intersection of interests among great powers that often bring differing perspectives to the table

US Rebalancing Strategy and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

Scott Snyder

S Snyder ( ) Council on Foreign Relations Washington DC USA

Over the course of the past few years South Korea has sought to play this role on a variety of international issues most notably as a convener of international meetings and steward of the international agenda on global fi nancial stability international development policy nuclear security and safety and climate change and green growth among others 1 In many cases South Korean effectiveness as a convener of international forums has indirectly benefi ted from the context provided by its close relationship with the USA as well as its status not only as an emerging middle power but also as a US ally 2

Thus far South Korearsquos enhanced capabilities and the US-ROK alli-ance have had positive mutually reinforcing effects In principle South Korean middle power aspirations and a strengthened US-ROK alliance are not opposed to each other and have the potential to work together as com-plementary concepts that generate and take advantage of shared US and Korean foreign policy interests South Korearsquos growing scope of interests and desire to contribute to the international community have benefi ted the US-ROK alliance as South Korea has become a partner in a broader range of functional spheres and the scope of alliance cooperation has broadened both functionally and geographically The emergence of a South Korea with capabilities and attributes of a middle power has enabled the transforma-tion of the US-ROK alliance from a peninsula-focused patron-client secu-rity relationship to a comprehensive political and security The June 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement refl ects this broadened scope showing the impact of both South Korearsquos desires to develop greater capabilities and have a greater impact internationally and the result of the Obama admin-istrationrsquos desire to strengthen the US-ROK alliance 3 But an outstanding question is whether strengthening the US-ROK alliance might also come at the expense of South Korearsquos interests as a middle power

This chapter will explore in further detail the primary themes of the US rebalancing strategy and their implications for South Korea Then the chapter will evaluate South Korearsquos envisioned middle power contri-butions and the extent to which US policymakers see these attributes as complementary or at odds with the US-ROK alliance

32 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE US BALANCE The Obama administrationrsquos unveiling of its rebalance to Asia strat-egy in November 2011 provided a clear articulation of the US desire to strengthen its involvements in the Asia-Pacifi c in recognition of the

36 S SNYDER

regionrsquos sustained economic growth and increasing political impor-tance The strategy posits that Asiarsquos rise justifi es greater US political economic and military attention to and investment in relationships with partners across the region The strategy was built on three principles for Asian diplomacy that were articulated early in the administration that the USA would strengthen its traditional alliances in the region that the USA would improve its relationship with emerging regional powers such as India Indonesia and China and that the USA would support the strengthening of regional application of international norms through active diplomacy and participation in multilateral forums such as the East Asian Summit (EAS) 4

In her announcement of the rebalancing strategy in foreign policy in October 2011 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the case that the Asia-Pacifi c is growing in importance as a result of its economic dynamism and increasing political clout and that ldquojust as Asia is critical to Americarsquos future an engaged America is critical to Asiarsquos futurerdquo 5 Elaborating on the main components of the strategy Secretary Clinton signaled six major ldquolines of actionrdquo along which the policy would proceed ldquostrengthen-ing bilateral security alliances deepening our working relationships with emerging powers including with China engaging with regional multilat-eral institutions deepening our working relationships with emerging pow-ers including with China engaging with regional multilateral institutions expanding trade and investment forging a broad-based military presence and advancing democracy and human rightsrdquo

In its practical implementation the US rebalancing strategy has taken three primary tracks political economic and military The political track has involved stepped-up US diplomatic engagement with Asian allies and efforts to strengthen political cooperation with allies and partners both bilaterally and multilaterally The military track has involved the implementation of a ldquogeographically distributed operationally resilient and politically sustainablerdquo 6 presence that envisions expansion of bas-ing arrangements primarily on a rotational basis to new partners in the Asia- Pacifi c efforts to strengthen military cooperation with existing alli-ance partners and plans for deployment of the Pentagonrsquos most capable and modern military assets in the Asia-Pacifi c The economic track has primarily been focused on the establishment of a multilateral free trade area that sets a new and higher standard for trade and investment lib-eralization among the eleven negotiating partners in the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP)

US REBALANCING STRATEGY AND SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY 37

321 The US Rebalancing Strategy and Implications for US Allies in Northeast Asia

The foundation of the US rebalancing strategy starts with the existing ldquohub-and-spokesrdquo network of US bilateral alliances with Japan South Korea the Philippines Australia and Thailand and has had political mili-tary and economic dimensions This prioritization recognizes the centrality of the US alliance relationships with Japan and South Korea in particular to the broader rebalancing strategy From the US perspective the US alli-ances with Japan and South Korea are important both because they enable US forward deployment and because of the values that South Korea Japan and the USA share as fellow democracies that value the rule of law norms and liberal world order So it is natural that the USA would want to strengthen the alliances with Japan and South Korea as a starting point for the US rebalancing strategy In addition the US rebalancing strategy also seeks to extend more active cooperation to Southeast Asia through an enhanced political relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and through more active participation in ASEAN-led regionwide forums While this emphasis does not detract from the long-standing importance of Americarsquos Northeast Asian alliances it does to a certain extent mean that the USA has tacitly supported strengthening of the relationships of its alliance partners with ASEAN in tandem with US efforts to build a more active relationship with ASEAN partners

(1) Political Under the rubric of the rebalance the Obama administration has inten-

sifi ed policy coordination with South Korea on both political and military issues President Obama has visited Seoul four times in the fi rst six years of his presidency more than any other country in Asia Moreover US-ROK summits have routinely occurred on the sidelines of international gather-ings in Asia and Europe The secretaries of state and defense are regularly in touch with South Korean counterparts for strategic and security consul-tative dialogues and the fi rst ldquo2+2rdquo meeting between the US and South Korean minister-level foreign and defense offi cials was held in 2012 with a second such meeting held in October 2014

In response to the ongoing challenge posed by North Korearsquos nuclear development the USA and South Korea have built a closer political and security partnership with each other The 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement envisions a broader scope for cooperation that extends to regional and global areas as well as a comprehensive political partnership

38 S SNYDER

that extends to nuclear economic and nontraditional areas The closeness of the US-Korea relationship was evidenced by requests to Seoul to host the 2010 G-20 and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit

(2) Military The institutional ties afforded by the two alliance relationships with

Japan and with South Korea has required all sides to maintain close policy coordination including regularized political attention from senior leaders both to manage the close institutional ties that are part of the alliances and to provide constant reassurance of the credibility of US alliance commit-ments to the defense of both Japan and South Korea The alliance frame-works thus provide the backbone for US political and military engagement in the region and require the maintenance of a high operational tempo of communication at all levels to effectively manage issues in the alliances The effective implementation of the US rebalance has resulted in an inten-sifi cation of coordination efforts so as to provide constant assurance and promote close coordination on bilateral and multilateral issues

The intensifi cation of US-ROK security coordination under the Obama administration is consistent with the spirit of the US rebalance but the primary catalyst for intensifi ed coordination has been North Korearsquos persistent efforts to expand its asymmetric nuclear and missile capabili-ties North Korearsquos provocative rhetoric under Kim Jong Un has put both the US and the South Korean militaries on alert and has catalyzed ever-closer defense cooperation through the establishment of a regular Korean Integrated Defense Dialogue to coordinate defense strategy and the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee to discuss the US response to North Korean nuclear threats as well as the negotiation of a joint Counter-provocation Plan in the spring of 2014 to ensure a joint response to future North Korean low-level provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyong Island in November 2010

The USA has sought to strengthen alliances in Northeast Asia while deepening political dialogue and security relationships in Southeast Asia Another signifi cant component of the rebalance has been the extension of the US footprint to Southeast Asia and Australia through regular rota-tional deployments to the Philippines and Australia as well as through stationing of new naval vessels in Singapore Thus it is important for the USA to assure Tokyo and Seoul that the expanded US footprint does not come at the expense of alliance commitments in Northeast Asia but indeed underscores the importance of Japan and South Korea to the US presence in the Asia-Pacifi c


As the USA has attempted to strengthen its political engagement and rotational presence in Southeast Asia the USA has also welcomed the strengthening of lateral relations with US partners in Southeast Asia Japan in particular has strengthened its development assistance and defense rela-tionships with Southeast Asia in essence shadowing the US pivot through a stepped up focus on assistance to countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam South Korea has also provided military vessels to the Philippines and sent ROK military troops to the Philippines for humanitarian relief operations in the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan in the summer of 2013

(3) Economic The main thrust of the US economic policy under the rebalance has

been its effort to promote multilateral trade liberalization negotiations through the TPP The TPP includes 12 founding countries including a number of important Southeast Asian countries as well as Japan While South Korea is not a member of the original negotiation group the TPP negotiations have proceeded on the basis of the template provided by the ratifi cation of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in early 2013 The ratifi cation of KORUS thus played a central role in paving the way for US involvement in the TPP 7 Ratifi cation of KORUS served as the catalyst to draw Japan into TPP negotiations which in turn provides the TPP with suffi cient size and weight economically to represent a mean-ingful step forward toward trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacifi c with Japan in the TPP the agreement would comprise nearly 40 percent of the global GDP and 86 percent of global trade 8 Although South Korea did not join the initial group of countries that are part of the TPP negotia-tions South Korean offi cials have given indications that the country will seek to join the grouping once the negotiations are fi nalized and the TPP is formally launched 9

322 South Korean Views of the US Rebalance

For the most part the US rebalance has been welcomed in the region as evidence of renewed US commitment to Asia But the rebalance announcement has also been interpreted by Chinese analysts as evidence of a US policy of containment toward China Chinese analysts have arrived at this judgment despite continuous assertions by US offi cials that the policy is driven primarily by Asiarsquos rising importance At the same time US offi cials constantly encourage China to abide by global norms and institu-tions Moreover the US rebalancing strategy has been subject to a wide

40 S SNYDER

range of interpretations by various US partners within Asia many of which have their own interest in promoting calibration of US participation in the region against their perceptions of Chinarsquos rising infl uence

As an ally of the USA South Korea has welcomed the US rebalanc-ing strategy as evidence of US desire to sustain its traditional commit-ment and its role as a leader and trusted partner in the Asia-Pacifi c Given that the fi rst priority of the rebalance involves strengthening US alliances this prioritization has had clear benefi ts for the US-ROK alliance South Korea has welcomed US efforts to strengthen the alliance through both the 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement and the 2013 60th Anniversary Statement on the Joint Vision for the Alliance Economically the ratifi ca-tion of the KORUS FTA provided a critical jumpstart and foundation point for efforts to negotiate an even more wide-ranging multilateral FTA through the TPP

Although South Korea has generally welcomed the rebalance South Koreans are watching the US implementation of the rebalancing strategy and making their own assessments about its implications These assess-ments are being made in the context of South Korearsquos own desire to enhance its role and capabilities as a middle power implying a certain dis-tance from the USA Concerns revolve around several areas (1) credibility of the USA both as a military ally of South Korea and the US ability to uphold its security commitments in the region especially in the event of US military dominance being challenged by Chinarsquos military moderniza-tion as a by-product of Chinarsquos rise (2) whether the US rebalance policy and Chinese response might feed an arms race or heighten competition and confrontation in Sino-American relations in which case South Korea might feel greater pressure to choose between its number one trading partner and its primary security guarantor and (3) whether the US rebal-ance and Chinese response might have negative ramifi cations for Korean reunifi cation prospects

Most South Korean concerns revolve around the question of whether the USA in light of its fi scal constraints will be able to continue to play its role as primary guarantor of security in the region especially in light of Chinarsquos sustained and rapid military growth Thus the critical question is whether the USA can sustain the political will necessary to make good on the credibility of its defense commitments in the region Another question is whether the US rebalancing strategy might prematurely or unneces-sarily incite competition between the USA and China At the same time South Koreans see the rebalance primarily through the lens of US policies


and posture toward North Korea and the aims of the rebalance thus far have been fi ltered through outstanding issues in the US-ROK deterrence toward North Korea including questions such as the structure of opera-tional control arrangements between the USA and South Korea

(1) Credibility of the US Rebalance As the rebalance has unfolded some South Korean analysts have

expressed concerns regarding the sustainability of the rebalancing strategy especially as they have watched the US budget debate over sequestration Some of those concerns have been expressed in the context of worries that US fi scal constraints will lead the USA to make greater demands on South Korea to shoulder its own defense burdens or to provide greater fi nancial contributions to the support of US forces deployed there Overhanging these near-term tactical concerns is the question of the extent to which US credibility will be sustained long-term in the context of Chinarsquos rapid military modernization 10

Despite these specifi c concerns South Korea has generally shown great confi dence in the alliance and the commitment of the USA to South Korean security especially vis-agrave-vis North Korea In fact North Korearsquos capacity to provoke limited confl ict near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and its efforts to develop nuclear weapons have provided a catalyst for strength-ening the US and South Korean policy coordination dialogues such as the Korean Integrated Defense Dialogue and the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee These new challenges have had the effect of binding the USA and South Korea together even as they have respectively grappled with the challenges posed by North Korea 11

Moreover negotiation of the Special Measures Agreement defi ning respective fi nancial burdens in support of the US presence in South Korea went relatively smoothly at least on the surface in late 2013 and early 2014 with the main issues revolving around transparency of the US man-agement of funds contributed by South Korea to be used for completion of a consolidated US basing arrangement at Camp Humphreys near Osan and Pyongtaek Contrary to South Korean media expectations driven by concerns over sequestration the USA did not make demands for dramatic increases in South Korean fi nancial support for the alliance

More broadly the challenge for the USA is to show suffi cient strength and reliability to keep its commitments under the alliance credible to South Korea as a security partner while also keeping South Korea invested in expanded cooperation within the alliance South Korearsquos growth in capability as a middle power means that it has some capabilities that it can

42 S SNYDER

contribute to its own defense while also pursuing its own self-strengthen-ing but South Korearsquos indigenous capabilities remain insuffi cient to assure its survival and avoid coercion in the face of larger neighbors The growth of South Korean capabilities also introduces a quiet tension between self- help through indigenization of South Korean capabilities (for instance for economic reasons through development of the military export sector) and internal balancing versus strengthening of alliance-based capabilities that may serve to bind alliance partners even more closely to each other 12 This ambivalence over indigenization of ROK defense capabilities versus making those capabilities available in service to alliance needs can be seen to a certain extent in the debate over the timing and structure of wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer In addition credibility of the US commitments the broadening of the US-ROK cooperation across a wide range of fi elds and South Korearsquos ability to derive political benefi ts from enhanced stature that comes in part from the platform provided by the alliance These are all factors that may infl uence the ldquostickinessrdquo of the alliance relationship as well as the likelihood that third parties could seek to limit or divide alliance-based cooperation

(2) Sino-American Competition The primary South Korean concern regarding the US rebalance has

centered on Chinarsquos negative response to the rebalance as a US effort to contain China South Korean concerns revolve primarily around Chinarsquos interpretation of the rebalance as a factor that could lead to greater Sino- American tension or confrontation South Korea has shown sensitivity to the potential for Sino-American confrontation as a background factor that could limit South Korearsquos options and force it to make an undesirable choice between South Korearsquos largest economic partner and its main secu-rity guarantor Thus South Koreans are sensitive to any factor that appears to induce great power rivalry between the USA and China because such rivalry carries with it constraints on South Korearsquos ability to maneuver between the two larger parties and in the worst case may force South Korea to choose between the USA and China as its primary partner South Korea is actively seeking lessons from middle power behaviors that can be borrowed from other countries in similar circumstances The goal is to increase South Korearsquos strategic space and maintain (admittedly limited) control over its own strategic environment

A component of the US rebalance strategy that should be reassuring to South Koreans despite Chinese protests is the extensive US effort to engage with China as an emerging power This engagement is designed to


strengthen US capacity to coordinate with China on a wide range of issues so as to manage if not to deconfl ict potential areas of competition in the great power relationship 13 The fact that the USA has committed itself to extensive high-level Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SampED) consul-tations and that it has actively sought to deepen its military-to-military exchange with China should be reassuring evidence to South Korea that the USA does not seek to contain China

Park Geun-hyersquos strong rhetorical support for the US rebalancing policy reveals that her China engagement strategy is predicated on the existence of a strong US-ROK alliance But this positive-sum view of the relationship between the US-ROK security alliance and a stronger Sino- South Korean relationship comes into confl ict with Chinese perceptions that the US rebalance may be aimed at containing China 14 To the extent that Beijing is concerned that the US-ROK alliance may one day become focused on China rather than North Korea China will seek to persuade South Korea to marginalize the importance of the alliance or even to abandon the alliance with the USA Thus China has sought ways to limit the scope of the alliance with the USA and potentially to increase the costs that South Korea may incur as a result of continuing the alliance Chinese analysts have already stated that they are carefully examining the US-ROK alliance because they do not want it to have a broader applica-tion beyond the mission of deterring North Korea 15 One example of this desire to constrain the scope of the US-ROK alliance within the region was Chinarsquos objection in late 2013 to South Korean exports of trainer aircraft to the Philippines 16 Another example is Chinarsquos public opposi-tion to South Korearsquos acquisition of Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense capabilities ostensibly on the basis of the fact that THAAD radar arrays could extend into the Chinese mainland but perhaps primarily out of concern that South Korean mid-range missile defense capabilities might someday be integrated into the US-Japan mis-sile defense system 17 China is likely to continue to criticize South Korean defense cooperation in the region with other US allies if they perceive that the goal of expanded cooperation is to apply the US-ROK alliance to other missions within the broader Asia-Pacifi c region

Such efforts to weaken and circumscribe the scope of the alliance by containing the application of US-ROK joint cooperation to the Korean Peninsula will pose a challenge to South Korea Although the Park admin-istration has tried to improve the tone and substance of ChinandashSouth Korea relations it has refused to do so at the expense of the US-ROK

44 S SNYDER

alliance 18 The task of improving relations is enormously diffi cult given the fact that Chinarsquos views of its relationship with South Korea often seem to be mediated by its views of its respective relationships with North Korea and the USA in addition to its perception of the nature and state of inter- Korean relations If Sino-South Korean relations are to improve it will involve a desire by China to gain a direct strategic benefi t from its relation-ship with South Korea but this objective may come into confl ict with or threaten to weaken the US-ROK alliance

At this stage there is little for the USA to be concerned about in Parkrsquos efforts to improve South Korearsquos relationship with China especially since the strategic stakes for South Korea in getting its relationship with China right are much higher than the likely costs to the USA of any South Korean missteps Yet over the long term there is concern in some circles that Seoulrsquos pursuit of a better relationship with Beijingmdashfueled in part by a shared distrust of Japanmdashmight have the effect of weakening the US-ROK alliance 19 Another concern is that South Korearsquos relatively small size and high dependency on China could make it vulnerable to Chinese pressure to limit the scope of Korean coordination with the USA As dis-cussed later Korean reunifi cation could be a game changer for the future of Korearsquos geopolitical preferences and orientation between China and the USA

(3) The Goal of Korean Reunifi cation and the Need for Sino-American Cooperation

The USA and South Korea stated a clear vision for Korean reunifi ca-tion in the June 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement leading to a single democratic market-based unifi ed Korean state that presumably would maintain alliance ties based on common values with the USA 20 For both countries it is easy to agree to such an end state but potentially much more diffi cult to achieve a consensus with neighborsmdashnamely Chinamdashon the process and division of labor necessary to achieve this goal Even within South Korea the debate over the desirability of reunifi cation is col-ored by a generation gap between older Koreans who desire reunifi cation regardless of cost and a younger generation that has grown increasingly wary of the impact of reunifi cation costs on their potential tax burden and quality of life President Park Geun-hyersquos description in her January 2014 New Yearrsquos press conference as a ldquojackpotrdquo or ldquobonanzardquo was widely per-ceived to be directed at such sentiment 21

The US-ROK shared vision regarding the preferred end state of a reunifi ed Korea is an area where US and South Korean policies toward reunifi cation


might come into direct confl ict with Chinese policy preferences regarding the Korean Peninsula Chinarsquos primary interest on the peninsula has been to support stability by shoring up a comprehensive relationship with North Korea To the extent that China sees the Korean Peninsula in geostrategic terms as an object of rivalry with the USA Chinarsquos objective of promoting stability on the peninsula ultimately comes into confl ict with the US-ROK objective of achieving Korean reunifi cation

This circumstance poses a particular challenge to South Korea which seeks to square the circle between the USA and China by making space for dialogue and cooperation with respective major powers so as to open a pathway toward peaceful reunifi cation This sort of effort is behavior that relies on South Korearsquos diplomatic capabilities as a middle power and as the party with the greatest direct interest in achieving the objective of peace-ful reunifi cation on the Korean peninsula Under the Park administration South Korea has made enhanced efforts to bridge the Sino-American gap over North Korea by proposing a trilateral track 15 dialogue the fi rst round of which was successfully held in July 2013 However the failure of the dialogue to continue reveals the scope of the challenge that South Korea faces as a smaller middle power wedged between two major powers There are stark limits to South Korearsquos leverage even as a middle power that requires sustained efforts and special capabilities to bridge even on an issue such as North Korea which both major powers can rationally acknowledge is one where South Korearsquos intensity of interest essential involvement and rights to exercise leadership are clear

At the same time broader regional stability in the Asia-Pacifi c is increasingly dependent on Sino-American cooperation Although confl ict between the US policies toward South Korea and China is not inevitable how the USA prioritizes the objective of Korean reunifi cation in its respec-tive policies toward South Korea and China will infl uence the scope aspi-rations and nature of US-ROK cooperation within the alliance While the USA must avoid an approach to Korean reunifi cation that unnecessar-ily provokes confl ict with China the scope of US-ROK alliance coopera-tion should not neglect the fact that both sides have identifi ed unifi cation essentially on South Korean terms as a main objective of the alliance South Korean policymakers realize that Korean reunifi cation is unlikely to be attained without regional cooperation including with China But they also realize that South Korea will have little leverage to infl uence Chinarsquos stance toward Korean reunifi cation outside the context of strong policy coordination with the USA

46 S SNYDER

Heightened tension surrounding North Korea has provided a moment of opportunity for the USA to press China for greater cooperation vis-agrave- vis North Korea especially given that North Korean provocations are adversely affecting Chinarsquos security environment and are detracting from the regional stability necessary for continued economic growth But the USA also faces a paradox in its efforts to induce stronger cooperation from the Xi Jinping administration to the extent that the USA takes advantage of North Korean provocations to press for increases in missile defense or stronger Chinese cooperation with the USA at a perceived cost to North Korean stability Chinese leaders are reminded of their own geostrategic equities on the Korean Peninsula vis-agrave-vis the USA and distracted from focusing on North Korea as the original instigator and source of instability

On the other hand South Korearsquos perceived need for Chinese coop-eration in order to achieve Korean reunifi cation may provide the biggest temptation for South Korea to make compromises with China that could limit or damage the future effectiveness of the US-ROK alliance In par-ticular the need for cooperation with China may inhibit South Korean cooperation with other US allies such as Japan South Korean progres-sives for example have often cited the emergence of a US-Japan-ROK security triangle as a development that could result in a ldquosecond cold warrdquo The effects of this domestic political division in South Korea suggest that domestic consensus may be one critical prerequisite for South Korea to effectively pursue a middle power diplomatic strategy given its intermedi-ate position between China and the USA

323 Implications of the US Rebalance for US Expectations of South Korea

On the one hand the US rebalance underscores the importance of strong alliances as a foundation for US strategy This means that the USA seeks closer cooperation with alliance partners in the Asia Pacifi c and it makes South Korea more important to the USA as both a capable partner and a ldquolynchpinrdquo of security in the Asia-Pacifi c But alongside the strengthening of the US-ROK alliance comes a higher set of US expectations for how South Korea will perform as a part of the US network of alliances in Asia In addition the US objective of alliance strengthening means that while the USA is grateful for the increased capabilities represented by South Korea as a middle power it primarily views those enhanced capabilities as a sup-port for joint action and cooperation with South Korea and less in terms


of what South Korea can do on its own as a middle power In this respect as the rebalancing strategy unfolds issues such as the relative importance of the North Korean threat and the right balance between cooperation with China and hedging against the negative effects of Chinarsquos rise could produce different priorities in the USA and South Korea If not managed well this priority gap could be fed by differing expectations regarding South Korearsquos role and contributions both within the context of the alli-ance and as South Korea seeks to independently assert itself as a middle power in the region

The fi rst area in which the two countriesrsquo priorities could diverge as a result of the rebalancing strategy is related to the US emphasis on a broader geographic distribution of its forces which might hypothetically draw US attention and resources in the direction of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean at the expense of South Korea 22 The broadening of the scope of US operations and policy to cover the whole of the Asia-Pacifi c rather than a more geographically limited prioritization of Northeast Asia could create new stresses on the US-ROK alliance especially when com-bined with the US budget constraints South Korean defense specialists have already expressed concerns that the USA will seek to extract greater fi nancial support from South Korea to pay for costs related to the US pres-ence on the peninsula 23

Second a broader US strategy that encourages horizontal cooperation among alliance partners has run into some initial roadblocks as a result of South Korean reluctance to establish an agreement for intelligence sharing and pursue closer security cooperation with Japan a country that would be called on to support US-ROK military operations in the event of a confl ict with North Korea US interests in strengthening the combined defense posture toward North Korea include promoting high levels of cooperation with South Korea but also with Japan on many rear-area sup-port issues More effective Japanese involvement in information sharing and logistical support for the USA and South Korea during a crisis would require that South Korea and Japan are able to cooperate with each other a step that has been facilitated through a December 2014 information sharing agreement among the three countries

The USA has made its need for and support of such cooperation clear through efforts to promote greater trilateral coordination includ-ing through maritime exercises on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief The USA has also encouraged South Korean involvement in the US and Japanese joint research on and implementation of advanced missile

48 S SNYDER

defense technologies The US desire for closer cooperation among allies is rooted in a realist calculation that South Korea and Japan as fellow democracies with common values and parallel security ties with the USA are natural partners that should also be able to work with each other But such a view fails to recognize a deeper set of tensions between Japan and South Korea over historical issues and territorial disputes that in fact are tied to identity issues between the two countries 24 Many of these issues are traced to Japanese imperialism the aftermath of the post-World War II settlement and perceived power inequities refl ected in the postwar settlement that have prevented South Korea and Japan from achieving a suffi ciently deep reconciliation to fully embrace a ldquofuture-oriented rela-tionshiprdquo Unless these core issues are addressed satisfactorily the USA faces a situation where the ldquoceilingrdquo of what can be done between South Korea and Japan is well below the full potential that would derive from trilateral cooperation based on a stable and fully functioning Japan-South Korea relationship

In addition to US pressure on South Korea to strengthen horizon-tal relationships with Japan Washington may seek to work together with Seoul to enhance South Korearsquos role in providing security in the region based on its increasing capabilities Thus far US-ROK off-peninsula coop-eration has primarily supported global stability and has occurred outside the Asia-Pacifi c region But there may also be possibilities to enhance the nontraditional and functional roles of the US-ROK within East Asia as wellmdashfor instance in maritime security cooperation

33 SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH THE US REBALANCE

Seoul National University Professor Chun Chaesung identifi es the follow-ing characteristics of South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy (1) to help great powers lessen mutual strategic mistrust (2) to develop an issue- specifi c dispute settlement mechanism (3) to develop multilateral insti-tutions or to actively participate in and further existing institutions (4) to preemptively import globally established norms to the region to set up the principle on which East Asians can solve problems (5) to make a cooperative network among like-minded middle powers to strengthen their positions vis-agrave-vis great powers (6) to be a co-architect in making and reforming the regional security architecture 25


The exposition of these six characteristics of middle power diplomacy is helpful in thinking about US responses to South Korea as a middle power but it is also necessary to acknowledge that there has not been a formal US recognition or policy toward middle powers as a group nor is there evidence that middle powerness as an attribute has been consequential to US foreign policy toward countries that classify themselves in this way In this respect the concept of middle powerness has not yet had practical consequences or impact on the formation of the US policy Therefore it is useful to assess the extent to which these six factors are salient in the US perspectives toward South Korea as a diplomatic partner and ally of the USA

An examination of statements by US policymakers on the rebalance reveals that among those six goals senior offi cials in the Obama admin-istration have embraced some but not all of the objectives that Professor Chun identifi es for South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy Regarding the fi rst objective of helping great powers to lessen mutual strategic mistrust US offi cials argue that one of the purposes of the US rebalance is to lessen mutual strategic mistrust through efforts to improve relations with emerg-ing powers Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clearly expressed this idea in a speech at the United States Institute of Peace at which she stated that the goal of the Obama administration was ldquoto write a new answer to the question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meetrdquo or to avoid what is otherwise known as the Thucydides trap 26 The Obama administrationrsquos support for this idea was also expressed in the wake of the Xi-Obama Sunnylands summit in 2013 as well as through repeated statements by the Obama administration offi cials that they desire to follow a path by which established powers do not inevitably confl ict with rising powers such as China Following the Sunnylands summit both the USA and China embraced the idea of establishing a ldquonew type of relationshiprdquo between these two major powers on the world scene and both countries have engaged in the single most comprehensive annual bureaucratic effort to discuss a wide range of functional and global issues affecting the two countries and the world through the establishment of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 27

The Obama administrationrsquos proactive efforts to manage the relation-ship with China so as to forestall a potential confl ict is in South Korearsquos interest and is consistent with an approach that addresses one facet of President Parkrsquos ldquoAsian paradoxrdquo the concern about negative effects of ris-ing tension between the USA and China However there is little evidence

50 S SNYDER

that the Obama administration has reached out for help to South Korea as part of its efforts to manage the China-US relationship Nor is there evidence that beyond President Parkrsquos declaratory policy South Korea has made tangible contributions in support of Sino-American efforts to man-age bilateral competition between the major powers In this respect South Korearsquos objective of trying to facilitate better relations with great powers is both challenging and somewhat awkward since most great powers are likely to view management of relations with each other primarily as a bilat-eral matter that does not necessarily require the assistance of third parties

To the extent that the USA has pursued consultations with allies regard-ing management of relations with major powers the dominant framework has been the security alliance and has come in the form of defense plan-ning but this is a framework that is primarily focused on how to bolster security against the effects of the rise of a new challenge from emerging powers or alternatively on the need to assure allies regarding the cred-ibility of the US capacity to provide defense As a result these defense- oriented dialogues are not framed in such a way that they provide much opportunity for a country like South Korea to facilitate a better relation-ship between the USA and China

One practical experiment South Korea has undertaken that is arguably designed to facilitate understanding between China and the USA on the specifi c issue of North Korea has been the proposal to establish a trilateral dialogue among the USA China and South Korea on North Korea This proposal resulted in a track 15 dialogue in July 2013 at which offi cials tested the waters with a conversation about the mutual strategic objectives of the three countries but there was no follow-up to this dialogue in 2014 and no evidence of suffi cient enthusiasm on the part of either the USA or China for making the trilateral dialogue a regular subject of offi cial dia-logue among the three parties

With regard to South Korearsquos second objective of promoting dispute settlement among major powers the Obama administration has embraced the need to develop issue-specifi c dispute settlement mechanisms in the region most obviously through the administrationrsquos efforts to strengthen norms for managing maritime confl icts among East Asian countries in the South China Sea and East China Sea While clearly stating that it is not a party to the confl icts over sovereignty in these areas the Obama adminis-tration has repeatedly stated its desire to see the confl icts managed peace-fully according to principles of rule of law and according to the principle of freedom of navigation so that no country might unilaterally exclude


others from peaceful use or transit of maritime areas 28 The Obama admin-istration has repeatedly reiterated its desire for progress in adopting a code of conduct between China and ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea and to promote the strengthening of the EAS as a primary means by which to translate international norms on issues such as nuclear nonproliferation and maritime dispute management into a regional context

In addition the USA China and other parties in the region have made progress laying a framework for managing potential maritime inci-dents through the establishment of principles of conduct under the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea adopted at a maritime symposium in Tianjin in the summer of 2013 Although much remains to be fl eshed out in actual practice the establishment of principles for managing such confl ict in the region constitutes a positive step toward addressing the possibility that an accidental maritime encounter might escalate tensions in the region South Korea also has an interest in strengthening of dis-pute settlement mechanisms in the region and the USA welcomes greater South Korean support for the promotion of measures to strengthen the implementation and application of international norms through the East Asia Summit

The strengthening of the EAS is a US objective as part of the rebal-ance that is directly related to South Korearsquos third and fourth objectives as a middle power of developing multilateral institutions as vehicles for the strengthening of international norms Therefore the US objective of strengthening regional institutions as a vehicle for promoting regional implementation of international norms is an objective that South Korea and the USA clearly share Both the USA and South Korea should be able to work together closely and with common purpose to strengthen the EAS The USA presumably would welcome greater South Korean rhetori-cal and concrete support at the EAS in favor of building mechanisms and accountability to international norms in addition to South Korean support for concrete efforts to strengthen the EAS as an institution

However from South Korearsquos perspective in the absence of prog-ress in six party talks a missing element of this strategy is the absence of a working multilateral mechanism for addressing subregional issues in Northeast Asia For this reason the Park administration has put forward the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) as a multi-lateral institution that can build functional cooperation in Northeast Asia in the absence of progress in the Six Party Talks In essence the NAPCI proposal attempts to keep momentum for multilateral cooperation despite

52 S SNYDER

North Korearsquos noncooperation in Six Party Talks While North Korea would be welcome to participate in NAPCI-sponsored cooperative proj-ects NAPCI efforts work to promote cooperation regardless of progress on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula

Despite the broad convergence between South Korean middle power aims and the US rebalance listed previously there is an element of ten-sion between the fi fth and sixth objectives of South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy and the objectives of the US rebalance The US encouragement for enhanced regional cooperation among middle powers as part of the rebalance has to date been expressed solely in terms of US alliance partners working together with each other to support US objectives including preservation of regional stability while the South Korean concept of pro-moting cooperation of middle power cooperation aims to enhance lever-age as a means to balance against great power domination These two concepts are not necessarily contrary to each other but they do envisage distinctly different positions orientations and security concepts The US envisages alliance partners working together with each other if not to balance against rising threats to regional security at least to preserve char-acteristics of the current environment that they view as favorable to the preservation of regional stability On the other hand the South Korean concept of joining with other middle powers envisages a balancing role among major powers as a form of restraint against unfettered major power rivalry This concept appears to downplay the role of alliances in order to avoid the perception that South Korea is taking sides with one major power against another

The USA does not appear to be concerned with enlisting co- architects in the management of regional security architecture except to the extent that other partners join with the USA in preserving and upholding inter-national norms that have come to be a part of an international order whose dominant architect and infl uencer has been the USA As a result the USA does not see a need to enlist co-architects in the formation of a new regional order given that it seeks to strengthen cooperation among like-minded states to preserve the characteristics of an existing regional order that the USA judges as having been extraordinarily successful in preserving the peace in East Asia

In sum the USA has not yet embraced fully every manifestation of South Korearsquos desire to play a middle power role This is not surpris-ing because the USA is likely to view the relationship with South Korea through the lens of the alliance a concept which emphasizes South


Korearsquos tie to and convergent interests with those of the USA Therefore the USA will naturally be slower to recognize middle power attributes that do not feed into the enhancement of the alliance relationship In addition the USA will have to be convinced of the value of middle power roles processes or functions that do not feed directly into strengthening of the alliance relationship This means that the USA is likely to be slow to recognize the value of South Korea facilitation or management of issues outside of the alliance framework To the extent that the USA recognizes South Korearsquos middle power attributes it will be because South Korea undertakes these roles independently and goes about to prove their utility in strengthening the US-ROK relationship rather than because the USA has given a prior blessing to the concept of South Korea as a middle power or has expectations that South Korea will play such a role

331 Alliance and Middle Power Contending or Complementary Concepts in South Korean Foreign Policy

The USA and South Korea both share an interest in strengthening of insti-tutions and norms within East Asia as well as a more energetic application of existing global norms to the regional environment On the premise that US and South Korean interests are well-aligned and that shared interests have strengthened alliance-based cooperation the USA is likely to wel-come and encourage these sorts of South Korean contributions We can see evidence of this in the US encouragement to South Korea to take an active role in offshore post-confl ict stabilization in Iraq Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden in the US willingness to cooperate with South Korea in international development projects in Africa and in strengthening review and evaluation of existing development projects and in US expectations for South Korea as an advanced nation with shared interests to contribute to international stability through policy coordination on a range of global and nontraditional security issues from counterterrorism to shared objec-tives in global health and implementation of sanctions against Iran and North Korea

South Korearsquos middle power concept has in many respects been a great boon to enhanced US-ROK alliance cooperation and to the idea of building a comprehensive security alliance between the USA and South Korea On many of the subject areas where South Korea has carved out a hosting or catalyst role as a middle power its policies have already been closely aligned with those of the USA On the G-20 South Korea

54 S SNYDER

strongly supported anti-protectionist stances in the midst of the global fi nancial crisis And South Korearsquos development agenda objectives and example are generally in concert with US views South Korea hosted the Nuclear Security Summit a special project of the Obama administra-tion at the behest of President Obama himself and South Korea worked closely with the USA to forward nuclear security objectives defi ned in the fi rst summit despite South Korean interests in broadening the scope of the agenda to also include nuclear safety issues post-Fukushima Given South Korearsquos diplomatic orientation and interest in perpetuation of con-ditions and rules that reinforce the current global order South Korean activism in international affairs would not likely confl ict with US inter-ests through the alliance in most areas although US fl exibility may be required to accommodate creative South Korean contributions to the global order

However there are potential areas andor issues where a middle power concept for framing South Korean diplomacy could come into confl ict with US objectives As South Korea seeks a modicum of balance and seem-ing neutrality as an arbiter among major powers South Korean middle power behavior could potentially deviate from US political objectives to the extent that South Korean facilitation involves compromise or ldquobalanc-ingrdquo efforts to bridge the gap between Chinese and US differences in approach on global issues South Korea has experienced limited success thus far as a facilitator of compromise or broker of differences between the USA and China on specifi c international issues On the one hand South Korean efforts to address differences between the USA and China on global ldquorebalancingrdquo in the run-up to its hosting the 2010 G-20 meet-ing in Seoul were unsuccessful On the other hand South Korearsquos efforts to incorporate new donor perspectives into the OECD-DAC conversa-tion on standards for international development South Korean brokering efforts attempted to bridge gaps between established and emerging donors by broadening and reframing the focus on ldquodevelopment effectivenessrdquo as opposed to the ldquoaid effectivenessrdquo paradigm that established donors had already adopted as the basis upon which to coordinate standards by which to evaluate international development programs 29

Increasingly however South Korearsquos position and infl uence is likely to play an important role in concert with other regional middle powers as a brokering and background infl uence on issues where China sets out to take a greater share of leadership or otherwise challenge the contours of the US-led international order In fact 2014 saw the emergence of


several issues that have the potential to either alter or reinforce inter-national norms and patterns of interaction South Korea might be well positioned to play a brokering role between China and the USA on such issues

First Chinarsquos move to establish the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) as an international institution devoted to fi nancing Asian infrastructure projects has been highlighted as a potential challenge to the roles and practices of existing international fi nancing institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Yet it is also possible to argue that these institutions have dragged their feet in recognizing and revising their own governance structures to refl ect Chinarsquos relative weight as a player in the international fi nancial community Given this background Chinarsquos proposal to establish the AIIB has invited a great deal of scrutiny and mixed regional reactions as its establishment poses a potential challenge to international institutions and a choice to those regional actors who must decide whether to join 30 That sense of choice has been heightened by perceptions that the Obama administration has actively dissuaded others from joining the AIIB because it represents a direct challenge to existing norms of international governance on the one hand while Asian neigh-bors see a clear need for enhanced infrastructure investment in the region and a potentially useful niche role and justifi cation for the establishment of the AIIB In particular decisions of US allies such as Australia and South Korea on whether to join AIIB have come under great scrutiny President Park deferred a response to an invitation from President Xi in July 2014 to join the AIIB with Deputy Prime Minister Choi Kyung- hwan subsequently stating that South Korearsquos decision will be made on the basis of whether or not the AIIB establishes transparent structures of governance consistent with international standards of other international fi nancial institutions 31 Ultimately it is likely to be in South Korearsquos inter-est to participate in the AIIB project but countries like South Korea and Australia that have been benefi ciaries of a US-led international order and know directly the value of promoting good governance as an essential component of development policy will surely seek to use their leverage to convince China to run the organization transparently and in a manner that conforms with best practices in international governance

A second area of apparent confl ict between the USA and China involves how to conceptualize the future of regional security in East Asia In par-ticular China has challenged the role and utility of bilateral alliances as

56 S SNYDER

part of a future regional security structure while Xi Jinping has put for-ward a ldquoNew Security Conceptrdquo that borrows from European concepts of cooperative security and emphasizes inclusion cooperation and win- win outcomes 32 However this security concept has yet to be refl ected in the reality of regional relations especially in the context of Chinarsquos aggressive assertion of maritime claims in the South and East China Seas On this issue South Korea has stood apart from Chinarsquos concept refus-ing to endorse it at the Conference on International Confi dence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) despite Chinese efforts to push it forward In view of the fact that there is so much that must be done to strengthen trust in East Asia as a prerequisite for the effective functioning of a cooper-ative security concept such as the one proposed by President Xi it is clear that South Korea has made the right choice Moreover the ldquoNew Security Conceptrdquo as currently envisioned is directly antithetical to the US-ROK security alliance on which South Korean security depends at present

A third area of where the USA and China appear to be in competi-tion is related to the architecture of regional economic cooperation but Chinarsquos relaxation of opposition to the US-led TPP negotiations and its embrace of the concept of a Free Trade Area in the Asia-Pacifi c (FTAAP) at the November 2014 APEC meeting held in Shanghai appears to have substantially deconfl icted the US and Chinese competitive impulses on trade Nonetheless this is an area where South Korea has a unique role to play at the fulcrum of overlapping concepts for how to effi ciently liberalize regional trade relations On the one hand the starting point and catalyst for meaningful TPP negotiations was the ratifi cation of the KORUS FTA which billed itself as a high-standard comprehensive free trade agreement On the other hand South Korea and China have also agreed to estab-lish a bilateral FTA albeit one that still contains many exclusions South Korea has also stated its willingness to join the TPP at an early date Thus the South Korea-China FTA could in theory be used as a stepping stone toward Chinarsquos eventual move to join the TPP as a platform for the realiza-tion of FTAAP or the idea of FTAAP may prove to require additional time to realize However the South Korea-China FTA appears to be relatively modest at present South Korea will want to push much harder toward a higher-standard and more comprehensive FTA with China to be an effec-tive catalyst to China in preparation for a full-fl edged FTAAP negotiation following the adoption (and South Korearsquos likely joining) of the TPP

The fi nal issue that will no doubt prove to be critical in testing South Korearsquos capability to bridge the gap between the USA and China is the


question of the future of Korean reunifi cation This issue involves strategic interests on both sides and South Korean positions will likely be decisive in infl uencing how the USA and China respond in the event that Korean reunifi cation indeed proves to be achievable For now the US rebalance and the US-ROK Joint Vision Statement provide clear parameters regard-ing combined alliance objectives but it remains to be seen whether China can fi nd the envisioned US-ROK outcome acceptable Instead China and North Korea are likely to remain united in opposition to this vision for as long as possible But despite this assessment there is clear value in South Korearsquos continued efforts to engage with both China and the USA in in- depth conversations that will lay the framework for managing the Korean reunifi cation process more effectively In this respect there is likely to be no more consequential or decisive test of Korearsquos ability to play a middle power role than its future diplomacy between the USA and China respec-tively as it manages specifi c issues in the event of Korean reunifi cation if it proves to be feasible

NOTES 1 Kim Sung-han ldquoGlobal Governance and Middle Powers South Korearsquos

Role in the G20rdquo CFRorg February 2013 httpwwwcfrorgsouth- koreaglobal-governance-middle-powers-south-koreas-role-g20p30062

2 For more on this see my chapter ldquoThe US-ROK Alliance and the US Rebalance to Asiardquo in Strategic Asia 2014ndash2015 US Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power Ashley J Tellis Abraham M Denmark and Greg Chaffi n eds Seattle The National Bureau of Asian Research December 2014

3 White House Offi ce of the Press Secretary ldquoJoint Vision for the Alliance of the United States and the Republic of Koreardquo Washington DC June 16 2009 httpwwwwhitehousegovthe_press_of f iceJoint-v is ion-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic- of-Korea

4 Steinberg James B ldquoRemarks at National Bureau of Asian Research Conferencerdquo Washington DC April 1 2009 httpwwwstategovsdformersteinbergremarks2009169352htm

5 Clinton Hillary ldquoAmericarsquos Pacifi c Centuryrdquo Foreign Policy October 11 2011 httpforeignpolicycom20111011americas-pacifi c-century

6 International Institute for Remarks by Robert M Gates Shangri-la Hotel Singapore June 5 2010 httpwwwdefensegovSpeechesSpeechaspxSpeechID=1483

58 S SNYDER

7 Brock R Williams Mark E Manyin Remy Jurenas and Michaela D Platzer ldquoThe US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) Provisions and Implementationrdquo Congressional Research Service September 16 2014 httpswwwfasorgsgpcrsrowRL34330pdf

8 Meltzer Joshua ldquoJapan to Join the Trans-Pacifi c PartnershipmdashFinallyrdquo The Brookings Institutionrsquos Up Front March 18 2013 httpwwwbrookingsedublogsup-front posts20130318-japan-joins-trans-pacifi c-partnership-meltzer

9 Kim Ji-yoon ldquoIndustry Spokesman Pushes TPPrdquo JoongAng Daily December 4 2014 httpkoreajoongangdailyjoinscomnewsarticleArticleaspxaid=2998092

10 Choi Kang ldquoA Thought on American Foreign Policy in East Asiardquo Pacifi c Forum CSIS PacNet Number 30 May 15 2012 httpcsisorgfi lespublicationPac1230pdf

11 ldquoJoint Communique The 46th ROK-US Security Consultative Meetingrdquo Washington DC October 23 2014 httpwwwdefensegovpubs46th_SCM_Joint_Communiquepdf

12 Snyder ldquoThe US-ROK Alliance and the US Rebalance to Asiardquo 13 Daniel R Russel Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and

Pacifi c Affairs Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington DC June 25 2014 httpwwwstategovpeaprlsrm201406228415htm

14 Joseph A Bosco ldquoWashington and Beijing Need Straight Talk on Containmentrdquo Pacifi c Forum CSIS PacNet February 12 2012 httpcsisorgfi lespublicationPac1212Apdf

15 Lee Sunny ldquoChina Asks Whom South Korea-US Alliance Targetsrdquo Korea Times December 31 2012 httpwwwkoreatimescokrwwwnewsnation201301116_128083html

16 ldquoChina Asked Korea Not to Sell Jets to Philippinesrdquo Chosun ilbo October 21 2013 httpenglishchosuncomsitedatahtml_dir201310212013102101068html

17 Scott Snyder ldquoNorth Korearsquos Missile Threat and Chinarsquos Objections to South Korearsquos Missile Defense Forbes February 13 2015 httpwwwforbescomsitesscottasnyder20150213north-koreas-missile-threat-and-chinas-objections-to-south-koreas-missile- defense

18 ldquoBalancing Act President Xi Goes to South Korea as China Looks to Increase Regional Cloutrdquo Economist July 5 2014 httpwwwecono-mistcomnewschina21606320-president-xi-goes-south-korea-china-looks-increase- regional-clout-balancing-act

19 Wright Tom ldquoSouth Korea Looks to Prosper in China While Staying Close to USrdquo Wall Street Journal November 25 2014 httpwwwwsj


comar t ic lessouth-korea- looks-to-prosper- in-china-whi le-staying-close-to- u-s-1416961717

20 White House Offi ce of the Press Secretary ldquoJoint Vision for the Alliance of the United States and the Republic of Koreardquo

21 Park Geun-hye ldquoAn Initiative for Peaceful Unifi cation on the Korean Peninsulardquo Dresden Germany March 28 2014 httpenglish1presi-dentgokractivityspeechesphpsrh5Bboard_no5D=24ampsrh5Bpage5D=2ampsrh5Bview_mode5D=detailampsrh5Bseq5D=5304ampsrh5Bdetail_no5D=27

22 Robert G Sutter et al ldquoBalancing Acts The US Rebalance and Asia- Pacifi c Stabilityrdquo Sigur Center for Asian Studies George Washington University August 2013 httpwww2gwuedu~sigurassetsdocsBalancingActs_Compiled1pdf

23 Jun Ji-hye ldquoROK USrsquos Defense Cost Sharing Pact Passedrdquo Korea Times April 15 2014 httpwwwkoreatimescokrwwwnewsnation201404116_155431html

24 Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash East Asian Security and the United States New York Columbia University Press 2015

25 See Chap 2 26 Hillary Clinton Remarks at the US Institute of Peace China Conference

Washington DC March 7 2012 httpwwwstategovsecretary20092013clintonrm201203185402htm

27 Press Briefi ng by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon June 8 2013 httpwwwwhitehousegovthe-press-of f ice20130608press-briefi ng-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon

28 Russel Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 29 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs ldquoBusan HLF-4 Offi cially Opens on

November 29 with a Plenary Sessionrdquo November 30 2011 httpwwwmofatgokrENGpressministr ynews201111291_30960jspmenu=m_10_10

30 Cossa Ralph and Brad Glosserman ldquoA Tale of Two Tales Competing Narratives in the Asia Pacifi crdquo Pacifi c Forum CSIS PacNet Number 84 December 1 2014 httpcsisorgfi lespublicationPac1484pdf

31 ldquoThree Major Nations Absent as China Launches W Bank Rival in Asiardquo Reuters November 4 2014 httpwwwreuterscomarticle20141104china-aiib-idUSL6N0SI26S20141104

32 ldquoChina Champions New Asian Security Concept Xirdquo Xinhua May 21 2014 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenglishchina2014-0521c_133350781htm

60 S SNYDER


CHAPTER 4

41 INTRODUCTION After the 2008 global fi nancial crisis Chinese diplomacy became more active and assertive but it retained abstract and normative characteristics Chinarsquos recent assertive diplomacy however is evolving into a new level China has begun to provide and propose concrete agendas and alterna-tives This change is posing a signifi cant and realistic challenge to South Korearsquos diplomacy With Chinarsquos unexpectedly rapid rise and the USA implementing a rebalancing strategy in Asia South Korea has had to grap-ple with the growing possibility of having to choose between the two powers in the midst of competitive and confl ictual relations However now that China has begun to propose a concrete agenda and alterna-tives what has been a possibility for the future is now looming as a reality For example China has taken aim at the US-led Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) by pursuing a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) At the Conference on Interaction and Confi dence-Building Measures in Asia China stated that ldquoAsian security must be protected by Asian peoplerdquo and China is also requesting South Korearsquos participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) an initiative where the USA has not been invited

Chinarsquos Perception of and Strategy for the Middle Powers

Dong Ryul Lee

D R Lee () Dongduk Womenrsquos University Seoul Republic of Korea

With the increased competition between the USA and China placing real pressure on South Korean diplomacy South Korearsquos realization of ldquomiddle power diplomacyrdquo has become more of an imminent task The necessity for South Korea to expand its independent role and prestige as a middle power while avoiding the dilemma of choosing between the USA and China has enlarged The problem is how to induce China to support and cooperate with South Korearsquos role and prestige as a middle power while keeping South Korearsquos alliance with the USA unaffected

Therefore based on the aforementioned issues this chapter fi rst tries to observe the direction of Chinarsquos diplomacy toward middle powers by examining how China recognizes the emergence of the middle powers and where the middle powers are positioned in relation to Chinarsquos diplo-matic strategy This chapter further analyzes Chinarsquos perception of South Korea and its diplomatic policies vis-agrave-vis South Korea based on the fi nd-ings it traces Chinarsquos perception and stance with regard to South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy

42 CHINArsquoS PERCEPTION OF THE MIDDLE POWERS

421 Characteristics of Chinarsquos Rise and Its Multiple Self-Identities

Accelerated by the relative decline of the USA since the global economic crisis in 2008 Chinarsquos rise is still burdened with various tasks such as sociopolitical reform development and integration Chinarsquos rise also displays multiple identities China is not a developed country from the West rather it is a socialist developing country China is a major power in terms of national strength possessing by far the strongest overall national strength among all developing countries However there still exists a con-siderable gap between China and other countries such as the USA those in Europe and even Japan in terms of soft power including science tech-nology education and culture Regionally China is a major power in Asia whose national interests and infl uence are spread around the world but even in Asia it is not yet a dominant leading country Domestically China maintains a socialist styled unique political system and values while still undergoing reforms and suffers from problems of national and territorial integration as well as ethnic separation Lastly in terms of the international system China is a participant and a benefi ciary of the existing international political and economic order while being subject to international regula-tions set by the Western powers and seeks reforms to the existing system 1

62 DR LEE

China on the one hand is in its transition from a regional power to a global power in the international community on the other hand it still has characteristics of a developing country with tasks such as reform and development ahead of it Due to this dichotomy Chinarsquos behavior in the international community has displayed propensities toward a status quo power and revisionist power Among the four categories in Chinese diplomacy Chinarsquos attitude toward the major countries is relatively sta-tus-quo oriented pursuing a stable relationship through mutual respect of each otherrsquos core interests Chinarsquos attitude toward the peripheral countries is both status-quo oriented and revisionist-oriented pursuing a stable peripheral environment favorable to its rise while at the same time strongly expressing willingness to secure its after 2010 expanding core interests Chinarsquos attitude toward developing countries has tradition-ally also been revisionist-oriented calling for reform of the international political and economic order led by the existing major powers However compared to the emerging importance of Chinarsquos diplomacy with major and peripheral countries diplomacy with developing countries is relatively contracted tending to amount to mere diplomatic rhetoric Chinarsquos atti-tude toward multilateral diplomacy is mainly status quo-oriented in that China is perceived as a participant in the current international political order Yet China also suggests revisionist-oriented arguments that the ldquoirrationalrdquo aspects of the current system have to be revised through active participation in the existing international organizations and regime

China has shown traits of both status quo power and revisionist power depending on the differing categories of its diplomacy This complexity in Chinarsquos evaluation of its own status and role affects its perception of middle power China is not only a participant and a benefi ciary of the existing international order but also a country under restriction by the international norm led by Western powers In order for China to over-come such restrictions reforms of the existing international order is nec-essary China looks toward emerging middle powers as new partners in pursuit of such change to the international order This means that China does not foresee the appearance of middle powers within the context of maintaining the status quo rather it expects the middle powers to play the role of catalysts in revising the status quo or of partners in the China- led transformation of the status quo In the regional sphere as well China needs to induce cooperation and support from the middle powers on the periphery in order to become a de facto leading country in Asia

On the other hand because China still possesses unresolved tasks as a developing country in many areas including soft power China is wary

CHINArsquoS PERCEPTION OF AND STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE POWERS 63

of the fact that in certain areas the middle powers may have interests contradictory to those of China and pose as competitors to Chinarsquos growth Because China possesses domestically unresolved tasks of inter-nal reform and development induced by the vulnerability of the regime it considers a stable peripheral environment crucial while at the same time taking a fi rm stance on sovereignty and territorial issues which in turn brings about confl icts with peripheral middle powers 2

422 Chinarsquos Perception of the Middle Powers

It has not been long since China started to take notice of the emergence of middle powers and their role in the international community Since the 2008 global fi nancial crisis however China starting from academic circles began to give more attention to and lead discussion on middle power (中等强国 Zhongdengqiangguo) That is China has been keenly focusing on the rise of the emerging market and the emerging countries since the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century especially after 2008 that marked the advent of the BRICS (Brazil Russia India China and South Africa) and G20

Chinarsquos interest in emerging countries centers around the ongoing shift in existing global economic order triggered by the Western economic powers faltering in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008 and the contrasting rise of some developing countries Discussion on middle power in China fundamentally started from the growth of this emerging market and implies Chinarsquos expectation for the transformation of the exist-ing Western economic order and system Among the emerging countries China has been especially interested in the rise of non-Western emerging countries the so-called emerging middle powers What has been noticed of these key players in the emerging market is that they appear collectively rather than independently While emerging market countries do not have the power to give an impetus to change the existing system individually the impact of their collective efforts is not negligible

As mentioned earlier at the dawn of the twenty-fi rst century China has begun to perceive the emergence of the middle powers as a new phe-nomenon in the same vein with the rise of emerging countries China sees that emerging countries are growing to form a group of middle powers thus enhancing their overall power strengthening its voice to participate in global governance and expanding their ability to change the global as well

64 DR LEE

as regional architecture All these factors lead China to believe that emerg-ing countries will rise as a new major force in creating a multipolar world

Chinarsquos attitude toward the emergence of middle powers is derived from the context of its own rise First China expects that the emergence of the middle powers can help contribute to the multipolarization of the international community which has been Chinarsquos consistent aim since the end of the Cold War As mentioned earlier China has paid attention to the fact that the emergence of the middle powers has been brought about by the relative decline of the USA and Western powers after the global eco-nomic crisis This implies that Chinarsquos expectation of the emerging middle powers is that they will become a partnering force in checking the existing international order led by the USA

China has been emphasizing in its relationship with the ldquoemerging economiesrdquo that an individual countryrsquos path of development should be a self-determined one and individual decisions have to be respected a fact that has been previously emphasized throughout its diplomacy with devel-oping countries Chinese President Xi Jinping has articulated the impor-tance of this through the so-called shoe theory When referring to China and Arab states he has called on each side to respect each otherrsquos choice of development pathway The following remarks were made at the open-ing ceremony of the sixth ministerial conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in Beijing in 2014 ldquoA personrsquos shoes donrsquot have to be identical to those of others but must fi t the personrsquos feet a countryrsquos way of governance doesnrsquot have to be the same with that of oth-ers but must benefi t its own peoplerdquo said Xi Only the people of a country can tell whether the countryrsquos path of development suits them or notrdquo 3

Prior to President Xirsquos attendance at the sixth BRICS Summit 2014 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also reiterated the same argument in a press interview Wang Yi said that emerging markets and numerous developing countries including Latin American countries are exploring the approaches to reform and looking for development paths suitable for their national conditions 4

Chinarsquos decision to take sides with developing countries in emphasizing state sovereignty on choosing a development path is in the same context with its emphasis of ldquomutual respectrdquo in its ldquonew model of major-country relationshiprdquo with the USA In other words Chinarsquos emphasis on mutual respect is intended to shield itself from potential criticism on internal mat-ters such as Chinarsquos political system and the human rights issue In doing so China hopes to secure support from the middle powers on Chinarsquos stance


In short China perceives the emergence of middle powers within the context of Chinarsquos rise and its diplomacy with the USA Chinarsquos perception of middle powers can also be identifi ed in the way that China relates the emergence of middle powers to international organizations and regimes It can be said that China hopes for change in the existing framework estab-lished by the USA and Western powers and furthermore it anticipates the change in the international order and system

For example China focuses on the emergence of new international organizations and regimes in which middle powers are participating China views the launching of the G20 as representative of the elevated status of the middle powers in the international community So far the international order has been set up and led by Western powers however China believes that after the global fi nancial crisis the G20 has become a strong candidate to replace the G8 as a major organization for multilat-eral cooperation Unlike the G8 that mainly comprised Western powers the G20 includes not only the existing major powers but also emerging countries and eight middle powersmdashAustralia Turkey Indonesia Mexico Argentina Saudi Arabia South Africa and South Korea With the middle powers participating in the G20 China looks forward to effecting change on the tradition in which the existing Western powers have initiated the construction of international regimes

China anticipates that the international system will change and develop through mutual interaction between the Western powers and the emerg-ing countries China also thinks after the global fi nancial crisis the mid-dle powers are rapidly rising from their former positions as peripheral or semi-peripheral countries to the new position of central rule-setters It is expected that as middle power countries in non-Western regions grow the center of the global system of authority in the post-economic crisis world is being diffused from the West to the non-Western world The argu-ment is that these non-Western middle powers are imposing signifi cant changes on the existing international system by actively organizing them-selves through cooperation In the process China emphasizes cooperation between the emerging major powers and middle powers As an emerging major power China emphasizes this in order to give a new direction to the existing international system

China in fact still possesses a dual perception of middle power In that middle powers signify an emergence of a new force that can effect change in the existing international order China expects that middle powers will become cooperative partners in forming a new international order For

66 DR LEE

China since the 2008 global fi nancial crisis the role and importance of middle powers in the international community has increased Such change will become a main factor in checking the US-centered power structure and developing a multipolar system as led by China

In terms of bilateral relationships however as Chinarsquos national strength and interests enlarge due to its rapid growth China is expressing concerns about potential competition and confl ict rather than complementary cooperation with middle power countries especially since there remain characteristics of developing countries in certain sectors within China due to the uniqueness of its rise There is concern that some middle power countries might be embroiled in competition with China Subsequently there is a view in China that it should be wary of the possibility that there might be certain groups that would utilize confl icting interests between China and middle powers to counter Chinarsquos rise

Consequently Chinarsquos perception of and attention to middle pow-ers are guided by Chinarsquos national and strategic interests such as its rise check-and-balance vis-agrave-vis established major powers like the USA and the reform of the existing international system and order

43 CHINArsquoS EVALUATION OF MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

China shows a generally positive expectation toward the emergence of middle powers as a key variable capable of bringing about change in the existing international system and order In this sense China thinks that middle powers can exert infl uence in sectors where the infl uence of estab-lished major powers is relatively weak such as foreign aid the environ-ment and human rights it is also expected that cooperation with China will be possible in these issue areas 5

China has given a positive evaluation on middle powersrsquo role as a medi-ator For example the Libyan crisis induced China to renew its percep-tion of Turkeyrsquos diplomacy and role in the international community as a middle power Taking advantage of its unique dual identity as both a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as a Muslim country Turkey led by its prime minister and foreign minister is considered to have created a venue for a peace treaty by actively mediat-ing between the Middle East and Western countries China focuses on the fact that the Libyan case has not been resolved in the traditional way of dealing with Middle Eastern problems in which resolution of these


regional problems depended completely on the wills of major Western powers

Concerning Southeast Asia China is expecting Indonesia to play a considerable role According to Chinarsquos categorization of its object of diplomacy Indonesia is a peripheral country However Indonesia has the fourth largest population in the world is a G20 member and is a ldquomotor powerrdquo for the development of ASEAN Indonesia is evaluated to have played an important role in both international and regional communities However behind Chinarsquos focus on Indonesiarsquos role lies the fact that in the recent South China Sea dispute Indonesia supported Chinarsquos position In drafting the 2011 Chairrsquos Statement of the ASEAN Summit Indonesia as chair included not only a negotiation agenda for Code of Conduct for South China Sea (COC) demanded by the Philippines and Vietnam countries directly involved in confl ict with China but also a bilateral nego-tiation agenda requested by China Regarding this move China believes that Indonesia as a chair has played a discreet and balanced mediator role Based on this new understanding of Indonesiarsquos role and importance as more than a mere peripheral country it was suggested that China should adjust its middle power diplomacy as well 6

China focuses on the formation of small-scale organizations among middle powers within the existing international organization and regime China evaluates that it is a new phenomenon arising after the global fi nan-cial crisis where emerging countries and middle powers formulate organi-zations for cooperation on practical problems and issue areas For instance India Brazil and South Africa cofounded the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India Brazil South Africa) in 2003 with the intention to enhance South- South cooperation Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) China India Brazil and South Africa cofounded BASIC in 2007 to enhance cooperation and share a common position on issues among the four countries

China focuses on the fact that after the global fi nancial crisis middle power countries have played a leading role in establishing and developing regional organizations For example Saudi Arabia is leading cooperation among countries in the Gulf region as the head nation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Indonesia is serving its role as a ldquomotor power in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)rdquo Mexico and Argentina are leading regional economic cooperation in South America Egypt plays a signifi cant role in leading cooperation in the Arab region as does South Africa and Nigeria in Africa as core members of the

68 DR LEE

African Union (AU) Now that middle powers are intensifying their par-ticipation in discussing regional problems and increasing their capacity to establish new regional regimes and systems China believes that the trend is beginning to occur in which a handful of major powers no longer lead regional order as predominantly as they did before

In the same sense China is positively interested in the role of regional organizations such as the AU and the Arab League especially since the Middle East upheaval in 2011 Although existing major countries such as the USA are still in control of the conditions in the Middle East Chinarsquos view is that regional middle powers and regional organizations played a crucial role during the 2011 Middle East upheaval China stresses that the United Nations (UN) humanitarian intervention in Libya was made pos-sible by active requests from the AU and the Arab League

However China does not necessarily have high regard for middle power diplomacy all the time As for Australiamdasha representative middle power to which China pays close attention and also a country positioned in a similar setting to that of South Korea a US allymdashChina expresses both positive expectation and concern

China has expressed criticism of the ldquoCreative Middle Powerrdquo the-ory proposed by a former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd China pointed out that because Ruddrsquos middle power diplomacy relies on China for economic relations but relies on the USA for political and security cooperation it attempts to alleviate the danger of dependency on China through alliance with the USA and Japan 7 Against a backdrop of Chinarsquos criticism of Australiarsquos middle power diplomacy lies Australiarsquos defense white paper published in May 2009 that commented ldquothe pace scope and structure of Chinarsquos military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explainedrdquo which hinted at China threat theory Australia was deeming it necessary that it strengthen its alliance with the USA in order to deal with the uncertainty of Chinarsquos rise At the time responding to the Australian defense white paper a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that ldquo[We hope] neighboring countries will view Chinarsquos military buildup objectively without biasrdquo 8 Recognizing this offi cial response from China Australia indicated in its 2013 defense white paper that it does not see China as an enemy 9

China looks to the US-China relationship for Australiarsquos change of atti-tude It is Chinarsquos evaluation that whereas Australia recognized China as a threat when US-China relations deteriorated after 2009 as the bilateral


relations between the USA and China began to thaw Australiarsquos percep-tion of China also changed for the better

The focus of Chinarsquos interest in middle powers is concentrated on what choices the middle powers will make from a realist perspective during the process of power transition In other words China is deeply interested in whether during the power transition process triggered by Chinarsquos rise and the US relative decline the middle powers would check Chinarsquos rise while relying on the existing hegemon the USA or recognize Chinarsquos rise as an opportunity and ride the new tide

China especially focuses on the reality that since 2008 many coun-tries are faced with a dilemma of strategic choice under the rapidly changing regional political architecture with Chinarsquos rise and the US Pivot to Asia strategy China evaluates that most East Asian countries are relying on the USA or strengthening their military power out of concern for their security At the same time China sees that these coun-tries are not attempting to practice a hostile security strategy against China by siding with the USA Instead China recognizes that the mid-dle powers in the region are likely to try to maintain the most national security interests possible between the USA and China rather than choosing either side 10

Also China sees that middle powers are not voicing calls for reforms of the existing international system and order or pushing for the fundamental revamping of them therefore Chinarsquos view is that despite the growth of middle powers the current international system led by the Western powers may not change signifi cantly Still it is considered that the appearance of middle powers is a natural consequence of historical progress and the inter-national system is expected to become more democratic and multipolar

In short China is paying attention to the roles of middle powers in the following context First the emergence of middle powers sug-gests it is the key to the change in the existing international system and order currently led by the USA and other Western powers Second with the middle powers emerging mostly in non-Western regions the signifi cance and role of the non-Western region formerly neglected by the West-led regional order are increasing Third as middle powers both as individuals and groups actively participated in the discussion of major global problems in 2008 their sphere of infl uence in international affairs is increasing middle powers have appeared as a new variable to the existing decision-making process led by the USA and Western powers

70 DR LEE

44 CHINArsquoS DIPLOMACY TOWARD MIDDLE POWERS

441 The Position of Middle Powers in Chinarsquos Diplomatic Strategy

In China there has been yet no offi cial usage of the term ldquomiddle powerrdquo from either its political leaders or offi cial government documents China classifi es the major objects of its diplomacy into four categories the major countries the peripheral the developing and multilateral diplo-macy Specifi cally it can be said that the developed countries are of crucial concern for China the peripheral the most important and developing countries the basis of Chinese diplomacy Additionally multilateral diplo-macy is defi ned as an important stage for Chinarsquos diplomatic strategy (大国是关键周边是首要发展中国家是基础多边外交是重要舞台 Daguoshiguan jianzhoubianshishouyaofazhanzhongguojiashijichuduo bianwaijiaoshizhongyaowu tai Power is the key Chinarsquos periph-ery is the primary developing countries are the basis multilateral plat-forms are the important stage) 11 This arrangement of priorities and the major objects in Chinese diplomacy was established at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002 and has been main-tained intact through the 17th and 18th National Congresses held respec-tively in 2007 and 2012

As mentioned earlier the countries with which China is concerned in practicing its diplomatic strategy are classifi ed into major countries developing countries and peripheral countriesmdashthere is no separate clas-sifi cation for middle powers Chinarsquos diplomacy once again carried out structural adjustment and level correction and China clearly continued to improve and develop relations with developed countries strengthen good-neighborhood friendships with peripheral countries enhance soli-darity and cooperation with the Third World developing countries and actively participated in multilateral diplomatic exercises thus forming the current foreign policy layout which is widely known According to this classifi cation standard middle power countries are not separately targeted as part of Chinarsquos consideration in foreign policies

As China has begun to rise rapidly since 2008 and changes in interna-tional power relations have occurred it has been suggested that Chinese foreign policy which specifi es the existing four realms as major tar-gets of its diplomatic practices is not effectively responding to the new


changes caused by the rise of middle powers and thus needs correction 12 Nevertheless China still does not offi cially mention middle power coun-tries in its foreign policies the four realms specifi ed back in 2002 con-tinue to be the offi cial classifi cation standard against which its diplomatic policies are practiced This means that since China does not yet classify middle powers as a separate category in its arrangement of foreign strat-egy Chinarsquos middle power diplomacy is currently being constructed and implemented under its existing diplomatic frameworkmdashldquoa new model of major country relationshiprdquo peripheral diplomacy developing country diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy Among these it has to be exam-ined how Chinarsquos middle power diplomacy is being refl ected in periph-eral diplomacy and economic diplomacy including multilateral economic diplomacy the two areas to which middle power diplomacy under active expansion by President Xi is closely connected

442 Chinarsquos Diplomacy Toward Middle Powers as a Part of Its Peripheral Diplomacy

China shares land borders with 14 countries Therefore it traditionally has put more weight on peripheral diplomacy and especially more so since ldquostable peripheral international environmentrdquo has been set as the most important diplomatic goal after China implemented economic reforms

As a result Chinarsquos diplomacy toward middle powers is being framed as a part of its peripheral diplomacy focusing on the roles and strategic importance of countries classifi ed as neither developed nor developing For instance China categorizes South Korea Indonesia and Pakistan as peripheral middle powers and focuses on their strategic roles and signifi cance

However in tandem with Chinarsquos rise there has been a transition in Chinarsquos peripheral diplomacy from that of aiming at economic develop-ment to that of aiming at its rise in the region This is a change from passive diplomacy attempting to construct a stable peripheral security environment through active diplomacy attempting to enhance its infl u-ence and status on the international stage Accordingly Chinarsquos will to actively project its infl uence on peripheral middle powers and incorporate them into Chinarsquos clout is increasing However as the USA has begun to aggressively execute its Pivot to Asia strategy since 2010 peripheral countries are facing a dilemma of having to choose between the USA and China

72 DR LEE

China recognizes that these peripheral middle powers wish to extri-cate themselves from this dilemma and maintain friendly relations with both the USA and China In the end Chinarsquos maximum objective in its peripheral middle power diplomacy is to incorporate them into the infl u-ence of rising China and its minimum objective is to prevent them from participating in the US-led containment of China China recognizes that in order to actualize this goal it needs to let peripheral middle powers per-ceive Chinarsquos rise as neither threatening nor unstable while obtaining from them supportmdashor tacit agreement at the leastmdashfor Chinarsquos rise

In order to prevent the middle powers from facing this dilemma of hav-ing to take sides China seeks to establish a stable US-China relationship under the ldquonew model of major country relationsrdquo At the same time China seeks to enhance economic social and cultural ties with middle powers so that they can formulate a common interest-based community Specifi cally China is promoting the establishment of multilateral economic coopera-tion mechanisms such as bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) and RCEP a formation of a common market through internationalization of the Yuan and advocacy for the unity of humanities and society through epistemic communities For example the former Hu Jintao administration proposed the ldquoHarmonious Worldrdquo concept while the current Xi administration pro-poses the ldquoCommunity of Common Destinyrdquo concept The ldquoHarmonious Worldrdquo concept accepted bilateral axis alliances with the USA from a practi-cal point of view although China may disagree with the USA in many areas in constructing regional and global order 13 The ldquoCommunity of Common Destinyrdquo concept emphasizes that Chinarsquos rise will benefi t not threaten its peripheral countries by highlighting the fact that they are bound by close mutually dependent economic and social relationships

Considering Chinarsquos geopolitical characteristics it is contiguous with major middle powers in the eastern western and southern side of its bor-der Korea in the east Indonesia in the south and Pakistan in the west are all placed in strategically signifi cant locations in Chinarsquos peripheral diplo-macy Because these countries take up important strategic positions in the US U-shaped containment strategy against China relationships with these countries are considered to have more strategic importance than those with other peripheral countries 14

Also as maritime confl icts have increased due to Chinarsquos attempt to advance toward the Asia-Pacifi c China is proposing a ldquowestward advancerdquo strategy toward Eurasia to offset its confl icts in the Asia-Pacifi c The so- called High-speed rail link strategy and Silk Road Initiative are suggested


to promote economic integration with the Eurasian continent Against this background China has put considerable effort into the construc-tion of high-speed railroad oil pipeline and gas pipeline 15 China hopes to not only reaffi rm its traditional and geological identity as a continent- ocean country but also secure a position as a hub connecting the Eurasian continent and the Asia-Pacifi c Also implied in the strategy is Chinarsquos attempt to alleviate confl icts caused by its efforts to become a ldquomaritime powerrdquo and secure diversifi ed routes for an expansion out into the ocean

Regarding this move by China it is also notable that President Xi him-self proposed the ldquoSilk Road Initiativerdquo as a symbol of Chinarsquos westward policy In September 2013 in his speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan he proposed the initiative for the construction of a ldquoSilk Road Economic Beltrdquo with Central Asian countries This proposal intends to stabilize Chinarsquos western border secure energy resources and eventually secure land routes to advance to the Middle East and Europe by enhanc-ing engagement with Central Asian countries

Last October in his speech to the Indonesian Parliament President Xi proposed the concept of a ldquo21st Century Maritime Silk Roadrdquo In this speech he emphasized the common destiny of China and the ASEAN countries Especially President Xi stressed that China is ready and willing to open up its market to ASEAN in order for ASEAN countries to ben-efi t from Chinarsquos rise 16 China made concrete propositions that it would increase its amount of trade with ASEAN up to a trillion dollars by 2020 establish the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and construct the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 17 As for the expansion of Chinarsquos investment in ASEAN countries China focuses on countries traditionally friendly to ChinamdashCambodia and Laosmdashand on neutral countries such as Thailand and Indonesia As illustrated so far Chinarsquos westward advance has sig-nifi cant implications China attempts to circumvent continuous territo-rial disputes in the Asia-Pacifi c and confl ict with the USA and pioneer an alternative route for Chinarsquos rise

443 Chinarsquos Diplomacy to Middle Powers as Its Economic Diplomacy

China now led by the Xi government attempts to fully utilize its economic power in strengthening its relationship with other countries and expand-ing its international infl uence Foreign Minister Wang Yi clarifi ed Chinarsquos

74 DR LEE

such intention in a speech ldquoToday China is the biggest trading partner for 128 countries a major export market with the fastest growth the most popular investment destination and a major importer of energy and resource products 18 rdquo In particular China has become the largest trading partner for Japan Korea and Australia all of which are major allies of the USA in the Asia-Pacifi c region China already surpassed the USA in 2012 to become the largest trading country in the world and is also the fi rst in car manufacturing and sales Utilizing this economic power and prestige China is expanding its economic network with various countries in the world and eventually enhancing its status and infl uence on the interna-tional stage Chinarsquos active economic diplomacy has been induced by its strategic consideration in which it attempts to increase its international infl uence while circumventing confl icts with the USA In other words China pursues a gradual rise starting from the economic realm where China has relative advantage rather than provoke confl ict or direct com-petition with the USA in the sphere of military or national security where the USA has relative advantage

Under the Xi government Chinarsquos strategy that focused on economic diplomacy is unfolding vigorously and in a more diversifi ed way First China tries to construct a system for Asian integration by establishing Asiarsquos infrastructure and network For instance it plans to expand vari-ous forms of investment projects with neighboring countries via high-way construction high-speed railroad construction fi ber-optical cables installation river development and ecological environment construction Representative examples include construction of oil and gas pipelines with Central Asian countries and the development project for the Mekong River area Second China tries to utilize FTA mechanisms such as 10+1 and 10+3 to promote economic integration between Chinese and Asian markets China has been active in not only bilateral FTAs but also mul-tilateral economic cooperation mechanisms such as RCEP It can also be sensed that China is pushing ahead with RCEP while making a negative assessment of the US-led TPP as part of its plan to rise through economic diplomacy China believes that the TPP is a way for the USA to execute its rebalancing strategy in Asia-Pacifi c and to construct a new US-centered political-economic order in the region with an aim to weaken Chinarsquos infl uence in East Asia 19

Third China plans to integrate capital markets with Japan South Korea Singapore Hong Kong and Taiwan through internalization of the Renminbi President Xirsquos agreement with opening direct market for Yuan-


Won convertibility and his request for South Korearsquos participation in AIIB during his in 2014 visit to South Korea are all an extension of Chinarsquos such attempts China also intends to increase its capacity of providing aid to underdeveloped countries in Asia such as Laos Myanmar Afghanistan Central Asian countries and North Korea Fourth China tries to link its Northeast China Revitalization and China Western Development with the development of peripheral countries Utilizing the longest border regions in the world China plans to construct the hub of economic development 20

China is currently working on materializing its plan to develop BRICS into a signifi cant economic network as originally it was merely a rep-resentation of the fi rst letter of each member countriesrsquo name Since 2009 BRICSmdashcomposed of China Russia Brazil India and South Africamdashhave held annual summits every year and thereby made their common areas of interest concrete Especially in the sixth BRICS sum-mit held in Brazil in 2014 the establishment of a New Development Bank (NDB) in Shanghai and the installation of a hundred billion dol-lar crisis-response-fund were offi cially announced By partly playing the roles formerly reserved for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank the two institutions that have led global fi nancial order so far prospects for a possibility of change to the US-led global fi nancial order are raised During the sixth BRICS summit President Xi stressed that ldquothe establishment of NDB can contribute to an enhanced infl uence of BRICS countries in the fi eld of international fi nance and BRICS coun-tries should strengthen the unity and cooperation to further democratize international relationsrdquo 21 Chinese Ambassador to Brazil Li Jinzhang also said ldquoBRICS must enlarge its scope of cooperation to political issues It will help enhance common interest of BRICS countries and democrati-zation of international organizationsrdquo implying what China intends to attain through BRICS 22

China considers Australia as a representative case of economic diploma-cyrsquos success Emphasizing that despite Australiarsquos alliance with the USA Australia bases its international relations on ldquonational interestsrdquo China is active in its relations with Australia China is already Australiarsquos larg-est trading partner the largest export market and a country from which Australia imports most goods For Australia a main exporter of ores and metals China is a desirable and high-priority market The Chinese mar-ket was also a signifi cant factor in helping Australia maintain economic stability during the global economic crisis in 2008 China is strength-ening cooperation with Australia in such areas as economy trade and

76 DR LEE

investment the two countries are processing negotiations on a bilateral FTA RCEP and cooperation regarding payment in Renminbi in trade and investment 23 China believes that Australia can become an important model for middle powers in the Asia-Pacifi c Chinarsquos view is that the way Australia approaches its dilemma of choosing a side between the USA and China can provide important implications for other countries suffering from a similar dilemma 24

45 CHINArsquoS PERCEPTION OF AND STRATEGY FOR ldquoSOUTH KOREA AS A MIDDLE POWERrdquo

China perceives that middle powers normally have the diplomatic aim of securing their national interests within the existing international system and their international prestige within their middle power status There are two concrete strategies for realizing that diplomatic goal The fi rst strategy is to become an important participant or stakeholder within the existing international system by actively partaking in international affairs For example one would position itself as an active global player like EU countries by participating in various international institutions and intergovernmental organizations enhancing economic interdepen-dence and establishing cooperative institutions in the area of diplo-macy security and national defense Another strategy is to consolidate its international status as a middle power by allying with a super power under the existing international system One representative example of the latter strategy is former Australian Prime Minister John Howardrsquos proposition that Australia would position itself as a ldquoDeputy Sheriffrdquo for the USA in Asia 25

China thinks that although South Korea is an OECD member and a middle power in terms of its economic size South Korea has not been able to secure prestige and a role commensurate with its national strength because of its geopolitical environment surrounded by major powers Especially China thinks that South Korea is suffering from a dilemma of strategic choice already plagued with the North Korean nuclear issue South Korea is additionally faced by the overlapping of Chinarsquos rapid rise and the US rebalancing strategy that caused the East Asian regional order to be in fl ux Furthermore South Korean diplomacy is perceived to be in an even deeper dilemma due to the internal disagreement regarding what role the country should take in the international community and which strategy to follow 26


Although China includes South Korea within the category of middle powers it still has not released any notable response to or evaluation on South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy It can be said that this is because South Korea still has not earnestly initiated diplomatic activities as a mid-dle power that China deems noteworthy it is sensible to say that China is currently at a stage where it is merely observing Or as mentioned earlier it is also possible to argue that China thinks South Korea is bound by certain limitations and dilemmas to properly practice middle power diplo-macy Another possibility is that although conceptually China includes South Korea within the category of middle power but because of South Korearsquos uniqueness as a divided country that shares borders with China South Korea has been strongly imprinted in the Chinese mindset as a peripheral country

China is still deferring evaluation on Mexico Indonesia South Korea Turkey and Australia (MIKTA) China pays close attention to all the participants of MIKTA as middle powers possessing important strategic values in respective regions and it is highly interested in solidarity among middle powers China is still not open about its position on MIKTA partly because MIKTA is still in its nascent stage and has not yet exe-cuted any noteworthy activities however another reason may be that all fi ve participants are in either alliance or friendly relations with the USA the condition of which makes it diffi cult for China to form a positive perception

With Chinarsquos stance on South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy remain-ing unclear examining Chinarsquos evaluation of and response to Australian middle power diplomacy provides an important albeit indirect insight China focuses on Australia as a representative country that practices mid-dle power diplomacy Australia like South Korea is an ally of the USA and at the same time an important partner of economic cooperation with China While Australia has to maintain friendly relations with both the USA and China it began to actively advocate middle power diplomacy China evaluates that Australiarsquos middle power diplomacy has been under pressure ever since the USA initiated its rebalancing strategy and would not be able to properly function In other words as Australia positively responds to the US rebalancing strategy it is argued that Australiarsquos prestige and role as a ldquobalanced and constructive middle powerrdquo would weaken This evaluation of Australia in essence refl ects Chinarsquos concern and criticism that Australia is actively participating in the US checking of Chinarsquos rise via its rebalancing strategy in East Asia

78 DR LEE

China under the Hu Jintao government once expressed a certain level of expectation regarding Australiarsquos middle power diplomacy and was eager to improve relations with it However as President Obama in 2011 offi cially announced the Pivot to Asia strategy at the Australian Parliament and Australia positively responded to it China began to harbor suspicion that Australiarsquos middle power diplomacy in the end aims to check Chinarsquos rise through alliance with the USA China also has expressed complaints to South Korea during the Lee Myung-bak administration that attempts to strengthen the alliance with the USA would signify South Korearsquos par-ticipation in checking Chinarsquos rise

For China South Korea is different from Australia in some major aspects South Korea shares a maritime border with China stations US military troops and is a divided country China accepts that being con-tiguous with North Korea which develops nuclear weapons leaves South Korea with no choice but to maintain an alliance with the USA Even so China keenly pays heed to the possibility of South Korearsquos participation in the US checking of China or of the US militaryrsquos continued presence on the Korean peninsula after reunifi cation

As the uncertainty of the East Asian political situation heightened along with the initiation of the Xi Jinping government in China South Korearsquos strategic value to rising China is being newly highlighted Especially the ongoing series of eventsmdashthe US rebalancing strategy the strengthen-ing of US-Japan alliance and the power competition between China and Japanmdashhas shed new light on the Korean peninsularsquos importance as the object of Chinarsquos expansion of infl uence Within this context the impor-tance of Chinarsquos strategic relationship with not only North Korea but also South Korea is being newly recognized

China is wary of South Korearsquos participation in the US checking of China via its rebalancing strategy and US-Japan alliance under this con-text Chinarsquos active diplomatic gesture toward South Korea is being played out It is likely that the underlying reason for Chinarsquos aggressive efforts to improve relations with South Korea and new understanding of South Korearsquos strategic value as a ldquomiddle powerrdquo is due to a change in the inter-national system and environment rather than the result of South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy There is a high possibility that this trend will continue in the future

Chinarsquos recognition and judgment of South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy will depend largely on its recognition and judgment of its own relationship with the USA China wants a stable atmosphere in the


periphery and avoids direct confl ict against the USA in East Asia China also aims to keep the USA neutral in the DiaoyuSenkaku Islands confl ict with Japan 27 To that aim China emphasizes that it would not infringe upon the US core interest in the Asia-Pacifi c region by establishing a ldquonew model of major-country relationshiprdquo China is stressing it will not infringe upon the US established status as a hegemon in the region and will not threaten the safety of USA allies which is the basis of the current US hegemon status It can be said that China is stressing a ldquonew model of major-country relationshiprdquo with the USA because of its strategic con-sideration in preventing peripheral countries allied with the USA such as South Korea from participating in checking Chinarsquos rise

Regarding South Korearsquos role as a middle power China has more concern than expectation As mentioned earlier the background reason for Chinarsquos focus on the emergence of middle powers is related to its diplomatic goal of actualizing Chinarsquos rise and creating an international environment conducive to it First as for China that is currently prepar-ing for its rise as an emergent major power the emergence of middle powers is a positive turn of events in that they can contribute to affect-ing change in the existing international system and norms being led by established powers However because in Chinarsquos perspective South Korea supports the US-led order within the framework of its alliance with the USA and the two countries carry out close policy coopera-tion Chinarsquos view of South Korearsquos role and prestige as an independent middle power is limited Even in terms of economics South Korea is too limited to take a leading role in the region as a middle power because it directly faces competition with the regionrsquos economic major powers such as China and Japan

China in some aspects is wary of South Korearsquos increasing role as a mid-dle power It is staying alert whether South Korearsquos role and prestige as a middle power might limit Chinarsquos infl uence or hinder its national interests Chinarsquos strategic focus in its relations with South Korea is whether South Korea will partake in checking Chinarsquos rise via its alliance with the USA and what can be done to prevent South Korea from doing so China also pays close attention to South Korearsquos diplomacy in Southeast Asia This is also because China recognizes South Korea as its competitor in terms of the economic realm in Southeast Asia and therefore is wary of the possible effect South Korearsquos Southeast Asian diplomacy has on Chinarsquos national interests

80 DR LEE

46 CONCLUSION SOUTH KOREArsquoS DILEMMA With the initiation of the Xi Jinping government in China China has become more active in improving its relations with South Korea and South Korea-China relations seems to have improved outwardly However with South Korea-China relations weakened by international political affairs there also has been no notable improvement in the international environ-ment and structure surrounding the Korean peninsula In fact some of their aspects seem to have deteriorated For example the North Korean nuclear crisis and relationship between South and North Korea is at a standstill confl icts between China-Japan and South Korea-Japan also see no prospect of a resolution and the competitive elements of US-China relations are also continuing

In short although South Korea and China possess common motivation for mutual cooperation such motivation when examined closely is of a differing kind On the surface both South Korea and China support peace and stability on the Korean peninsula China however is newly recogniz-ing the necessity of cooperation with South Korea as a means of check-ing the US rebalancing strategy in Asia and the rightist turn of Japan Particularly as China unlike before begins to propose concrete alterna-tive agenda to take initiative in the process of reshuffl ing the East Asian regional order it is actively seeking South Korearsquos participation or support For instance China expects South Korea to support its claim promulgated at the Conference on Interaction and Confi dence Building Measures in Asia that ldquoAsian security must be protected by Asian peoplerdquo and requests South Korea to participate in the AIIB where the USA is not invited

Considering its alliance with the USA South Korea still fi nds it diffi cult to readily respond positively to these concrete demands but on the other hand it focuses on its expectation of economic cooperation with China and ldquoChinarsquos rolerdquo in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis South Korea and China therefore can be likened to two partners on a journey who believe they are on the same path meanwhile inwardly they are aim-ing at different destinations Unless there is suffi cient understanding of each otherrsquos differing expectations the journey can always lead to confl ict and friction It has to be noted that China is focusing more on making progress with plans for its rise rather than on understanding and consider-ation of its peripheral countries as it rapidly evolves into an independent major power


Considering the developmental trajectory of South Korea-China rela-tions over the past 22 years China to a certain extent endowed strategic value to South Korea a major US ally However if South Korea places emphasis on its alliance with the USA as a way of securing prestige as a middle power Australiarsquos case shows that receiving support from China for South Korearsquos role as a middle power can become diffi cult Furthermore it is highly likely that China will continue to harbor suspicion of South Korearsquos intention China will acknowledge the strategic value of South Korea allied with the USA not necessarily based on its respect for South Korearsquos middle power status but more likely on its perception of South Korea as the US junior partner China will view South Korea as an obsta-cle to China when it plays its role in important international affairs it is possible that China will continuously practice a limited approach to South Korea as a dependent variable in US-China relations Also if South Korea attempts to check China through its alliance with the USA doing so in the long run may result in the negative ramifi cation of bringing US-China competition onto the Korean peninsula Also as a rising China gets involved while harboring negative perceptions of South Korea China in the long run would harbor distrust of South Korearsquos strategic inten-tion and forming trust between South Korea and China could become diffi cult Therefore as South Korea becomes permanently understood by China as an object of caution and check the possibility of chronic tension in South Korea-China relations North Korearsquos increased dependence on China and expansion of Chinarsquos negative infl uence on Korean peninsula increases Furthermore the possibility of China supporting and cooperat-ing with the reunifi cation of Korean peninsula is likely to decrease 28 There is concern that in case a reunifi ed Korea retains an alliance with the USA and continues to station US troops within the country China would end up practically sharing borders with the USA

In order for South Korea to secure prestige and a role as a middle power vis-agrave-vis China it is necessary that South Korea make efforts to expand its independent diplomatic space and arena beyond its existing identity as a US ally Additionally another important task is to jointly seek cooperation mechanisms with other middle powers to induce stability in US-China relations

China also is creating an environment favorable to its rise by circum-venting competition in areas where the USA has relative strategic edge 29 By expanding its infl uence in the areas of trade investment fi nance environmental issues and energy China is building various networks

82 DR LEE

targeting middle powers and emerging major powers As for South Korea participation in China-led economic and nontraditional secu-rity networks could be an alternative to securing its prestige as a middle power all the while alleviating Chinarsquos concern and wariness generated from Korearsquos alliance with the USA

NOTES 1 Wang Jisi The International Positioning of China and the Strategic

Principle of ldquoKeeping a Low Profi le while Getting Something Accomplishedrdquo International Studies No 5 (2009) pp 4ndash6

2 Pew Research Centerrsquos Global Attitudes Project conducted public opinion polls in several regional nations in 2013 to assess the extent of these con-cerns In response to the question ldquoHow big a problem are territorial dis-putes between China and your countryrdquo The proportion that said the disputes are a ldquovery bigrdquo or a ldquobigrdquo problem was 82 percent in Japan 90 percent in the Philippines 62 percent in Indonesia 36 percent in Malaysia and 77 percent in South Korea Richard Wike and Bruce Stokes ldquoWho Is Up Who Is Down Global Views of China and the USrdquo Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project July 18 2013 accessed September 10 2015 httpwwwpewglobalorg20130718who-is-up-who-is-down-global-views-of-china-the-u-s

3 ldquoXi Development Paths Should Be Respectedrdquo Xinhua June 5 2014 4 ldquoSeize New Opportunities Embark on New Path and Write New

ChaptermdashForeign Minister Wang Yi Talks about President Xi Jinpingrsquos Attendance at BRICS Summit and China-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit and Visits to Four Latin American Countriesrdquo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoplersquos Republic of China July 25 2014 accessed September 10 2015 httpwwwfmprcgovcnmfa_engwjdt_665385zyjh_665391t1178527shtml

5 Qian Hao ldquoMiddle Power Nations and Their Approaches to International Affairsrdquo World Economics and Politics 6 (2007)

6 Ding Gong ldquoThe Rise of Middle Powers and Their Impacts on Chinese Foreign Policy Planningrdquo Contemporary International Relations 10 (2011)

7 Yang Xiaohui ldquolsquoMiddle Powerrsquo Australiarsquos Naval Policy and Strength and Its Impact on Chinardquo Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University ( Philosophy and Social Sciences ) 21(4) (2013) 43ndash44

8 ldquoChinarsquos Military Modernization Poses No Threat to Other Countriesrdquo China Daily May 5 2009


9 Australian Government Department of Defence Defence White Paper 2013 May 3 2013 accessed September 10 2015 httpwwwdefencegovauwhitepaper2013

10 Wang Min ldquoEast Asian Security under the Shift in Powerrdquo World Economics and Politics 10 (2012) 132ndash148

11 ldquo新中国外交60年务实成熟全方位外交布局的形成rdquo (60 Years of New China Diplomacy The formation of mature and pragmatic all-round diplomacy layout) China Daily September 10 2009

12 金灿荣 (Jin Canrong) ldquo中国外交须给予中等强国恰当定位 (Chinese middle power diplomacy to be given proper positioning)rdquo World Outlook 5 (2010) 20ndash21

13 Yuan Peng ldquoSino-American Relations New Changes and New Challengesrdquo Australian Journal of International Affairs 1(61) (2007) 107

14 Ding Gong ldquoThe Rise of Middle Powersrdquo 53 15 Yang ldquolsquoMiddle Powerrsquordquo 45 16 ldquoXi in Call for Building of New lsquoMaritime Silk Roadrsquordquo China Daily

October 4 2013 17 ldquo外交部长王毅谈习近平主席出访开创周边外交新局推进亚太区域合作

(The Foreign Minister Wang Yi Talks about Xi Jinpingrsquos visit to Indonesia Malaysia Create a New Bureau of Peripheral Diplomacy and Promoting Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c Region)rdquo 『人民日报』( The People rsquo s Daily ) October 9 2013

18 Wang Yi ldquoExploring the Path of Major-Country Diplomacy With Chinese Characteristicsrdquo Remarks at the Luncheon of the World Peace Forum (27 June 2013 Tsinghua University)

19 (Wang Xue Feng) ldquo TPP RCEP (Chinarsquos per-ception of TPP and RECP)rdquo『』(Sungkyun China Brief) 2(2) (2014) 108ndash111

20 黄仁伟(Huang Renwei) ldquo美国亚洲战略的再平衡与中国战略优势再评估(The Rebalance of US Asian Strategy and Chinarsquos Strategic Advantage)rdquo Contemporary International Relations 8 (2012) 35ndash36

21 习近平(Xi Jin ping) ldquo新起点新愿景新动力mdash在金砖国家领导人第六次会晤上的讲话 (New Departure New Vision and New ImpetusmdashRemarks at the Sixth BRICS Summit)rdquo July 15 2014 accessed September 10 2015 httpwwwfmprcgovcnmfa_chnzyxw_602251t1174958shtml

22 Yonhap News 20140716 23 Yu Lei and Samshul Khan ldquoThe Theoretical Analysis of Middle Power

Strategies at Systematic Global LevelmdashTogether with China-Australia Strategic Partnershiprdquo Pacifi c Journal 22(1) (2014) 49ndash59

24 Xiao Yang ldquoThe Strategic Expansion of A lsquoMiddle PowerrsquomdashAustralian Security Strategy Transformation under lsquoIndo-Pacifi c Strategic Arcrsquo Perspective rdquo Pacifi c Journal 1(22) (2014) 47ndash48

84 DR LEE

25 William T Tow ldquoDeputy Sheriff or Independent Ally Evolving Australian-American Ties in Ambiguous World Orderrdquo Pacifi c Review 17(2) (2004) 271ndash90

26 Han Xiandong ldquoThe Dilemma of Korearsquos Diplomacy Understanding through a General Frameworkrdquo North East Asia Forum 3 (2012) 68ndash70

27 胡德坤(Hu Dekun) ldquo中立美国构建中国海洋周边的睦邻关系 (Neutral United States Building Good-neighborly relations between China and Ocean Surroundings)rdquo『现代国际关系』( Contemporary International Relations ) 8 (2012) 31ndash33

28 (Lee Dong Ryul) ldquo (Global Superpower China and Prospects for Korea`s Future)rdquo in 『

』 (Global Superpower Prospects for Chinarsquos Future) ed (Lee Dong Ryul) (Seoul East Asia Institute 2011) 282

29 黄仁伟(Huang Renwei) 美国亚洲战略的再平衡与中国战略优势再评估 (The Rebalance of US Asian Strategy and Chinarsquos Strategic Advantage『现代国际关系』( Contemporary International Relations ) 8 (2012) 35ndash36

REFERENCES 1 (Wang Xue Feng) 2014 TPP RCEP (Chinarsquos

Perception of TPP and RECP) 『』 (Sungkyun China Brief) 2(2) 108ndash111

2 (Lee Dong Ryul) 2011 (Global Superpower China and Prospects for Korearsquos Future) In 『』 (Global Superpower Prospects for Chinarsquos Future) ed (Lee

Dong Ryul) Seoul East Asia Institute 3 Ding Gong 2011 The Rise of Middle Powers and Their Impacts on Chinese

Foreign Policy Planning Contemporary International Relations 10 47ndash53 4 Han Xiandong 2012 The Dilemma of Korearsquos Diplomacy Understanding

Through a Genera Framework North East Asia Forum 3 68ndash70 5 Peng Yuan 2007 Sino-American Relations New Changes and New

Challenges Australian Journal of International Affairs 61(1) 98ndash113 6 Tow William T 2004 Deputy Sheriff or Independent Ally Evolving

Australian-American Ties in Ambiguous World Order Pacifi c Review 17(2) 271ndash290

7 Wike Richard and Bruce Stokes 2013 Who Is Up Who Is Down Global Views of China and the US Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project July 18 2013 httpwwwpewglobalorg20130718who-is-up-who-is-down-global-views-of-china-the-u-s Accessed 10 September 2015

8 胡德坤 (Hu Dekun) 2012 中立美国构建中国海洋周边的睦邻关系 (Neutral United States Building Good-Neighborly Relations Between China and Ocean Surroundings) 『现代国际关系』 ( Contemporary International Relations ) 8


9 黄仁伟 (Huang Renwei) 2012 美国亚洲战略的再平衡与中国战略优势再评估 (The Rebalance of US Asian Strategy and Chinarsquos Strategic Advantage) Contemporary International Relations 8 35ndash36

10 金灿荣 (Jin Canrong) 2010 中国外交须给予中等强国恰当定位 (Chinese Middle Power Diplomacy to Be Given Proper Positioning) World Outlook 5 20ndash21

11 Wang Min 2012 East Asian Security Under the Shift in Power World Economics and Politics 10 132ndash148

12 Wang Jisi 2009 The International Positioning of China and the Strategic Principle of Keeping a Low Profi le while Getting Something Accomplished International Studies 5 4ndash9

13 Xiao Yang 2014 The Strategic Expansion of A lsquoMiddle PowerrsquomdashAustralian Security Strategy Transformation Under lsquoIndo-Pacifi c Strategic Arcrsquo Perspective Pacifi c Journal 1(22) 41ndash48

14 Yang Xiaohui 2013 lsquoMiddle Powerrsquo Australiarsquos Naval Policy and Strength and Its Impact on China Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 21(4) 34ndash47

15 Yu Lei and Samshul Khan 2014 The Theoretical Analysis of Middle Power Strategies at Systematic Global LevelmdashTogether with China-Australia Strategic Partnership Pacifi c Journal 22(1) 49ndash59

86 DR LEE


CHAPTER 5

51 INTRODUCTION East Asiarsquos maritime issues have evolved within a number of contexts including international politics economics and law Specifi cally they form a multilayered structure of issues involving territorial sovereignty resource development delimitation of maritime boundaries and protection of the environment The danger of confl ict escalation at sea has grown particu-larly large over the past couple of years and there seems to be no end in sight to the tensions arising from maritime disputes in the region A char-acteristic shared by the past 3-4 years maritime disputes in the region is that they have all occurred simultaneously and behind this phenomenon is the shifting regional balance of power 1

From more general and normative perspectives East Asian maritime dis-putes have been inextricably interrelated with the issue of boundary delim-itation concerning territorial waters exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) The UNCLOS regime can be defi ned as a set of ldquoimplicit and explicit principles norms rules and decision- making procedures around which actorsrsquo expectations convergerdquo 2 The global UNCLOS regime needs to be supplemented by regional institutions

East Asian Maritime Disputes and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

Min Gyo Koo

M G Koo () Seoul National University Seoul Republic of Korea

Yet from a comparative regional perspective East Asia has the most pro-nounced ldquoinstitutional gaprdquo in maritime issue areas

This chapter is structured as follows First this chapter critically reviews the evolution of East Asian maritime

disputes with a focus on the three bones of contention (1) contested sovereignty over offshore islands (2) overlapping claims to EEZ and con-tinental shelf boundaries and (3) resource development particularly since the UNCLOS came into force in 1994 South Korearsquos positions on these thorny issues are reviewed accordingly

Second this chapter systematically analyzes the new maritime rivalry between the USA and China and its implications for international and regional maritime regimes as well as South Korearsquos middle power diplo-macy In the past East Asiarsquos maritime disputes tended to occur sporadi-cally The past 3-4 years however they seem to be occurring at the same time At the center of this phenomenon is the rising Sino-US competition over the sea As history before has shown and the present continues to show the future will also prove that the state that dominates the world will also dominate the sea This observation neatly summarizes the nature of the current Sino-US maritime rivalry The volatile nature of East Asian maritime disputes puts a lot of constraints on South Korearsquos room for dip-lomatic maneuver

Third this chapter explores the road to regime-based multilateral reso-lutions of East Asian maritime disputes To build a new regional maritime order the parties involved must decide to what extent their new institutional efforts will be nested within the global UNCLOS regime Then the issues of territorial sovereignty maritime boundaries and resource development should be tackled multilaterally rather than bilaterally In maritime East Asia no regime-based resolutions can be established without the cooperation and concessions of all the parties concerned This study examines the conditions under which and the ways in which South Korea can draw many players in the region into regime-based multilateralism toward which foreign leaders seem to have an ambivalent if not hostile attitude at the moment

52 THREE BONES OF MARITIME CONTENTION The three most prominent bones of contention at sea include contested sovereignty over offshore islands overlapping claims to EEZ and conti-nental shelf boundaries and resource development A confl uence of these issues has caused and escalated the latest maritime confrontations between

88 MG KOO

China and its neighbors including the USA The continued tensions refl ect the limitations of global and regional maritime regimes

521 Sovereignty Disputes

Sovereignty disputes raise questions of national identity and pride thereby feeding territorial nationalism The territories in dispute need not cover the entire soil of a particular state as in the cases of the two Chinas and the two Koreas in order to seriously strain interstate relationships Even small barely habitable offshore islands can serve as the most persistent and explosive bone of contention Examples of unresolved island disputes include competing sovereignty claims to the DokdoTakeshima Islands in the East Sea the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands in the East China Sea the Northern TerritoriesKurile Islands in the Northwest Pacifi c Ocean the Islands of Sipadan Sebatik and Ligitan in the Celebes Sea and the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea

Most notably China and Japan have forged closer economic ties since their diplomatic rapprochement in 1972 and a pragmatic consideration of national interests would suggest more cooperative behavior Yet the reality in the East China Sea does not bode well for a joint effort by these two neighbors to promote mutual cooperation as the SenkakuDiaoyu dis-pute continues to serve as a persistent and explosive bilateral irritant 3 The diplomatic spat in fall 2010 due to the Chinese fi shing trawler incident near the disputed islands proved the point that any mishandling of maritime issues can hijack the subtle balance of power and interests in the region 4 As Japan lost its upper hand to China Tokyo has accelerated its shift toward the right This shift is currently being manifested in the buildup of its mili-tary and pursuit of the right of collective self-defense In a vicious action-reaction cycle China began to frequently send surveillance vessels to the nearby sea areas and conduct military training which in turn has led Japan to tighten its security in the area Thus tensions in the area still persist 5

Equally divisive are matters in the South China Sea where Chinarsquos growing assertiveness provokes not only its Southeast Asian neighbors but also the USA The Southeast Asian countriesrsquo increasing economic dependence on China on the one hand has mitigated the political and diplomatic tensions On the other hand however now that restraint such as the strategic control of the Cold War era no longer exists China has declared its intent to become a maritime power and is seeking to pursue a bold maritime policy to maximize its own interests without being too con-

EAST ASIAN MARITIME DISPUTES 89

cerned about how it would be viewed by its neighbors 6 Renewed tensions in this areamdashespecially the Paracel Islands between China and Japan and the Scarborough Shoal between the Philippines and Chinamdashillustrate the point 7 Judging from the current circumstances as China fl exes its muscles directly and indirectly the USA and the Southeast Asian neighbors are highly likely to take the measures to maintain the balance of power against Chinarsquos gradually looming threats

522 Boundary Delimitation

Turning to the second parallel the already complex maritime space has become much more complicated as the claimant countries began ratifying the UNCLOS in the mid-1990s The major innovation in the UNCLOS was the creation of EEZ which combines sovereign rights to the con-tinental shelf with sovereign rights over the water column beyond the territorial sea It resulted from a compromise between those who wanted more control over offshore areas and those who wanted to retain as large an area as possible as high seas 8

Along with the widespread adoption of the UNCLOS East Asian coastal states recognized that disputes that had once been limited to the sovereignty of disputed islands now included overlapping maritime jurisdictional claims over EEZs and continental shelves In addition the adoption of straight rather than normal baselines for territorial seas and other maritime zones has made the already daunting task of delimiting maritime boundaries much more diffi cult The letter if not the spirit of the UNCLOS provisions for straight baselines is ambiguous at best This ambiguity has in turn encouraged many coastal states to adopt straight baselines even where the basic conditions are not met

On top of this there has been a constant tension between the ldquoequi-distancerdquo approach and the ldquoequitablerdquo principle in the history of the law of the sea The UNCLOS chose to avoid any clear reference to either principle thus providing insuffi cient guidance for delimiting maritime boundaries 9 Boundary delimitation disputes may become as intractable as sovereignty disputes because state elites are equally constrained by domestic players who hold veto power if elites chose to pursue coopera-tive approaches to solving these issues

For instance China and Japan differ fundamentally on basic principles of boundary delimitation Although there is no explicit mention of the Japanese median line concept in the UNCLOS International Court of

90 MG KOO

Justice delimitation decisions increasingly favor an equidistance line based on ldquorelevant factorsrdquo such as the comparative lengths of the coastlines In contrast China points to the 1969 North Sea case which argued that length of coastline and continental shelf are the most important factors in delimitation Thus in the Chinese view delimitation should consider factors such as the length of the Chinese coastline and the natural prolon-gation of the continental shelf China indeed views Japanrsquos median line as against the spirit of the UNCLOS because it was not only declared unilat-erally but also divides the East China Sea in half 10

523 Sovereign Rights Disputes

Finally the existence of islands in the disputed areas complicates not only the task of delimiting maritime boundaries but also the issue of marine resource development The energy-hungry coastal states all eye the high potential for oil and gas deposits near disputed islands They also rely on contested offshore areas to provide a large portion of their marine diets It is notable that East Asian countries have been able albeit only occasion-ally to cooperate on jurisdictional issues as well as joint development of resources by overcoming nationalist pressures Yet the danger of confl ict escalation looms particularly large during a global shortage of energy and marine resources 11

The rising tension between China and Japan illustrates this point As popular sentiments between China and Japan have become more hos-tile mutual grievances have been aired not only with regard to the dis-puted islands but also against the exercise of sovereign rights in EEZs and continental shelves including Chinarsquos unilateral development of the Chunxiao gas fi eld Many analysts agree that the September 2010 trawler incident was not an isolated irritant given Chinarsquos more provocative and overconfi dent efforts to secure its maritime interests The incident took place against the background of Japanrsquos thinning patience and growing anxiety regarding Chinarsquos suspicious activities near the Chunxiao fi eld in violation of the spirit if not the letter of the 2008 agreement which now looks in jeopardy

In sharp contrast to its challenger position in the East China Sea China has aggressively arrested fi shermen from its Southeast Asian neighbors for their allegedly illegal fi shing activities near the disputed islands in the South China Sea The Philippines and Vietnam have been the principal targets in recent years


Since 2009 China has challenged the Philippinesrsquo claim to the fi sher-ies by relying on growing naval prowess backed by coercive diplomacy In spring 2012 this challenge led to a tense two-month standoff between Philippine and Chinese civilian vessels in the Scarborough Shoal 12 To compensate for its disadvantages in military power the Philippines fi led a statement of claim against China in the Arbitral Tribunal of the UNCLOS in January 2013 challenging Chinarsquos ldquoexcessiverdquo claim to the South China Seamdashespecially the nine-dashed line that covers nearly the entire resource-rich waters 13

Much to Vietnamrsquos dismay a drilling rig owned by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was set up near the disputed Paracel Islands in MayndashJune 2014 This led to a series of anti-China protests and violent riots across Vietnam Although China stopped exploration work more than a month ahead of schedule observers believe that China will probably come back to the area because signs of oil and gas were found Despite the rising number of complaints by its neighbors China has also been constructing artifi cial islands in the Spratly chain to cement its claims 14

53 SOUTH KOREArsquoS POSITIONS ON KEY MARITIME ISSUES


The territorial question between South Korea and Japan emerged and escalated into a crisis in the fi rst half of the 1950s when South Korea reestablished its de facto control over Dokdo In the fi rst half of the 1960s the island question continued to serve as one of the most intrac-table bilateral problems threatening to wreck the conclusion of the nor-malization treaty in its fi nal stage of negotiations After a relatively calm interlude the sovereignty question fl ared up again in 1996 when the two neighbors demonstrated unusually hard line territorial and maritime pol-icies In 2004ndash2005 the island question proved itself again capable of immediately straining the bilateral relationship as demonstrated by the controversies over South Korearsquos Dokdo postage stamps and Japanrsquos des-ignation of ldquoTakeshima Dayrdquo Grave bilateral tensions surfaced again after the former President Lee Myung-bak visited Dokdo in August 2012 Relations have recently been aggravated as the Japanese government sent vice- ministerial-level offi cials to the Takeshima Day ceremony hosted by the Shimane Prefecture two years in a row in 2013 and 2014 15 There

92 MG KOO

seems to be no diplomatic room for South Korea to play a more proactive role vis-agrave-vis sovereignty issues as long as politicians on both sides remain captured by ultranationalist sentiments


South Korearsquos Territorial Sea Act of 1977 adopted straight baselines as well as normal baselines for measuring the breadth of its territorial sea With regard to the validity of the straight baselines of South Korea none of its neighbors have challenged them except for the area between the mainland Korea and Jeju Island which lies between the Korea Strait and the northern East China Sea 16 In August 1996 the South Korean government promul-gated the Exclusive Economic Zone Act in accordance with the UNCLOS 17

There is no prominent dispute over islands between South Korea and China However it has not been easy at all for the two neighbors to agree on each otherrsquos valid base points as there are several problematic islets and submerged features situated far from the shores As both South Korea and China proclaimed EEZs and the continental shelf in the Yellow Sea and in the East China Sea where the width between the nearest coasts of the two countries is less than 400 nautical miles (nm) the need for delimitation of EEZ boundaries has arisen In 1996 the two parties launched bilateral negotiations for delimiting their EEZs and continental shelves And the negotiation is yet to be completed They have not narrowed down their differences over the principle of delimitation South Korea insists upon the ldquoequidistance-relevant circumstancesrdquo principles for the boundaries in the Yellow Sea whereas China argues for the application of ldquoequitablerdquo prin-ciples 18 More specifi cally the South Korean government has proposed that an equidistance line should be drawn fi rst in the Yellow Sea and then adjustment and modifi cation should be followed where appropriate Yet China has refused such a proposal arguing that the fi rst step in delimiting maritime jurisdiction is to list and balance all the relevant factors and then the next step of drawing the boundaries is to be followed 19

In the meantime the delimitation of maritime zones between South Korea and Japan has revolved around two separate areas the East China Sea with hydrocarbon potentials and the East SeaSea of Japan with thorny fi shing and territorial issues In 1974 South Korea and Japan signed an agreement concerning the establishment of a boundary in the northern part of the continental shelf adjacent to the two parties They thus agreed on the delimitation in the western channel of Korea StraitTsushima


Channel that is the north of the East China Sea and the south of the East SeaSea of Japan on the basis of the equidistant line In the meantime the boundary line leaves vast areas of the East SeaSea of Japan undelimited The Dokdo issue is the main reason for the incomplete delimitation 20


As noted above South Korea and Japan agreed on a joint development zone (JDZ) in the northern continental shelf of the East China Sea Since 1974 South Korea has asked Japan to jointly explore hydrocarbon poten-tials in this area only to no avail It is believed that Japan would wait until 2024 when the joint development agreement will expire because it believes that the current agreement favors South Korea To make matters more complicated Japan submitted a formal report on June 6 2008 to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) claiming its continental shelf in the East China Sea that over-laps with the joint development zone with South Korea In response South Korea also submitted a formal report on December 26 2012 to the UNCLCS claiming its continental shelf in the East China Sea that extends as far as the Okinawa Trough 21 Therefore it is unlikely that the two neighbors will implement the JDZ agreement any time soon

The fi shing issues in the East SeaSea of Japan have been much more complicated than the joint development in the East China Sea The 1965 fi shery agreement between South Korea and Japan defi ned 3 nautical miles territorial waters around the Dokdo Islands the 12 nautical miles exclu-sive fi shing zone and jointly controlled waters In the 1970s however the new global trend toward mare clausum outdated the practice under the 1965 fi shery agreement that allowed foreign fi shing immediately outside a coastal countryrsquos 12 nautical miles exclusive fi shing zone 22

In August 1996 the two states opened negotiations aimed at drawing EEZ delimitation lines but the negotiation process was rocky at best Because the existing maritime regime in the East SeaSea of Japan favored her South Korea had no intention of replacing the 1965 fi shery agree-ment Japanese offi cials proposed separating EEZ delimitation from the revision of the fi shery agreement in order to promptly conclude the latter Also they suggested setting up a temporary joint fi shing zone around Dokdo and shelving the sensitive problem of delimiting each otherrsquos EEZs around the islands After hard negotiations the two parties reached a new fi shery agreement in September 1998 on the basis of modifi ed 35 nauti-

94 MG KOO

cal miles exclusive fi shing zones of each country and the establishment of joint fi shing zones outside the exclusive fi shing zones An important consideration in shaping the joint fi shing zones was the equitable prin-ciple Yet a more important implication of establishing a joint fi shing zone in the East SeaSea of Japan is whether this provisional arrangement can be considered as a precedent where Dokdo is not used as a base point for either party 23

In the meantime South Korea and China agreed to bring a new fi shery agreement into force in June 2001 It shares some key properties with the new South Korea-Japan fi shery agreement (1) both agreements are con-sistent with the exclusive fi shing regime as defi ned by the UNCLOS and (2) both are provisional fi shery agreements pending the ultimate delimita-tion of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries There is no EEZ bound-ary drawn between South Korea and China and joint fi shing zones were established 24

54 NEW SINO-US RIVALRY AS A CONSTRAINT ON SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

During the Cold War and the post-Cold War years maritime order in East Asia had been maintained by US hegemony However in the tran-sition period regional maritime order is growing ever more unstable due to the constantly changing geopolitical and geoeconomic condi-tions At the center of the structural shift lies a rising China that is increasingly becoming a signifi cant maritime power What makes the matter even more complicated is the recent US change of attitude from being passive to showing active intent to reengage itself in the maritime issue area

Maritime East Asia has become a much more volatile place as a result of its fl uid geopolitics and geoeconomics at the center of which are a rising and more assertive China and a reengaging but ambivalent USA In the post-Cold War era many would agree that two major trends have opened a new horizon of regional peace and security The fi rst trend has been associated with the overall reconfi guration of the Asian regional system from the Cold Warrsquos (quasi-) bipolar confrontation to unipolar US domi-nance Many experts agree that the US Cold War military structure still dominates in matters of regional security The second and more important feature of the post-Cold War Asian order is the rise of China To many


observers Chinarsquos economic and military might has already established bipolarity within the region Although not all draw worst-case scenarios a good deal of uncertainty about the ways in which a more capable China would project its power has alarmed its neighbors including the USA and prompted them to scramble to balance against China 25

In the new millennium China has transformed itself from a land-based power centered on a vast ground force to a maritime one capable of mounting operations beyond its maritime borders China aims to be capa-ble of pushing the US carrier groups beyond what it calls the ldquofi rst island chainrdquo sealing off the Yellow Sea East China Sea and South China Sea inside an arc ranging from the Aleutians in the north to Borneo in the south It is projected that China will become the worldrsquos largest military spender in about 20 years or so 26

China has made no secret of its intention to challenge the way things are done in maritime East Asia It has made it very clear in island and maritime disputes that ldquosovereignty belongs to Chinardquo It is a message to its neighbors that China will not yield or compromise when it comes to territorial sovereignty Such an unreserved expression of Chinese national-ism is deep-rooted in ldquothe hundred years of national humiliationrdquo Chinarsquos navy seems to be well-prepared to go beyond its traditional role of coastal defense and engage in far-sea defense to protect its economic and strategic interests 27

To be sure Chinarsquos aggressive entrance into East Asian waters was an extended invitation to the USA to do the same The thrust of the US Pivot to Asia has been on its military dimension While the Obama administra-tion has endeavored to project the ldquorebalancerdquo to Asia as a ldquowhole of gov-ernmentrdquo endeavor it is the ldquomaritime pivotrdquo that has received the lionrsquos share of offi cial attention This is partly the result of a perception of the US ineffectiveness in dealing with Chinese aggression in East Asian seas 28

China thinks that active intervention by the USA has been behind the intensifi ed maritime disputes and is responding rather sensitively Thus Chinarsquos adoption of hard-line policy in a series of recent disputes can be interpreted as its rejection of the US Pivot to Asia and containment strat-egy against China China believes that Japan is using the recent US-China frictions to attract the USA into the East China Sea disputes Also China thinks that the Obama administrationrsquos active intervention in the South China Sea refl ects the US fear of decline a fear manifested in the process of containing Chinarsquos rise and reengaging in East Asia 29

96 MG KOO

However China is caught in a dilemma in which its sensitive and strong opposition against the US engagement would invite even greater scope of the US engagement Chinarsquos stringent responses to prevent US interven-tion would call for its counterparts in the disputes―Japan Vietnam and the Philippines―to form a tighter alliance with the USA Therefore China is also making conciliatory gestures For example at the Foreign Ministersrsquo Meeting of the Eighteenth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bali Indonesia in 2011 China against expectations expressed a shift in its position as it announced ldquothe importance of navigational freedom and safety in the South China Sea is self-evidenthellip all countries both inside and outside the region should benefi t from itrdquo At the China-ASEAN Foreign Ministersrsquo Meeting China adopted the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that was concluded in 2002 thus easing its position over the disputed area 30

As noted earlier Chinarsquos renewed assertiveness has given the USA an opportunity to reassert itself in a region where its eclipse by China had been considered inevitable In the wake of the escalating feud between China and Japan over the SenkakuDiaoyu Islands and despite Chinarsquos ldquodeep dissatisfactionrdquo with the US intervention the USA has reaffi rmed that the disputed islands fall under a treaty that enables the superpower to protect Japanrsquos security interests 31 In a similar vein Vietnam has a rapidly warming rapport with the USA in large part because its archenemy China makes broad territorial claims in the South China Sea Hanoirsquos strategy has been to try to internationalize the dispute by bringing in other play-ers for multilateral negotiations Partly in response to Hanoirsquos diplomatic effort Washington has repeatedly stressed that it remains neutral on which regional countries have stronger territorial claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands but that it would step into tangled disputes between China and its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors over the islands in order to preserve its freedom of navigation 32

A new rivalry between the USA and China over the Seas of East Asia is directly linked to the controversy concerning international law about the types of military activities a third party could undertake in the EEZ of a coastal state As it was seen in the midair collision between a US Navy EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese F-8 fi ghter jet in 2001 and the 2009 incident where China provoked the US naval surveillance ship Impeccable the Chinese governmentrsquos response to US military activities


conducted over what China claims is its EEZ could drive the two major powers toward a critical confrontation

The UNCLOS stipulates that a state that has jurisdiction over the EEZ has full control over all living and nonliving resources and the right to restrict scientifi c research by another state However the US claims that it has the right to conduct research activities in the EEZs of other countries according to the principle of freedom of navigation under the UNCLOS China of course refutes the claim having designated such activities as ldquomarine scientifi c researchrdquo and asserting that such research requires the consent of the coastal state to which the EEZ belongs Chinarsquos assertion however is out of line with the arbitrary investigation and sur-veillance activities that it conducts within the EEZs of Japan and Vietnam Thus this issue is highly controversial 33

55 MOVING BEYOND BILATERALISM AND PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM

In the area of maritime jurisdiction and boundary delimitation unilateral approaches might have become more feasible with the incorporation of vast new areas within national control In reality a geographically focused regional approach has been adopted widely albeit unevenly and such a trend seems to accelerate as states have expanded their maritime jurisdic-tion for the past decades

As Saunders notes it is likely that states are turning to the region because many ocean resources are inherently transboundary in nature and that not all of these are functionally manageable at a global level 34 To be sure the global level serves an indispensable function in creating blueprints for action and in defi ning general principles but in many cases it requires gigantic collective energy to smoothly run global multilateral institutions Such diffi culty is the most evident in the case of ambitious multisectoral lawmaking efforts such as the UNCLOS In response to this problem the region can play an important mediating role between broadly defi ned global regimes and narrowly implemented national responses 35 The creation or expansion of regional institutions itself would also be an expensive experiment requiring signifi cant amounts of energy and time from individual member states Therefore the relationship between the UNCLOS and regional maritime institutions would better be a nested one rather than horizontal or overlapping

98 MG KOO

Regional maritime regime building has been successful in Europe as seen in reasonably successful and comprehensive multilateral institutions for the Baltic the North and the Mediterranean Sea 36 In sharp contrast no comprehensive multilateral maritime regime has been initiated in East Asian Seas Compared with Europe the process of regional maritime dia-logue in East Asia is indeed very young

In East Asia the delimitation of maritime space has evolved as a bilat-eral bargaining game since the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 The fi shery relationship has served as a catalyst in fostering regional cooperation in maritime East Asia It is remarkable that at a time before the legal regime of maritime zones was established many East Asian countries were able to reach an agreement on fi shery management in the 1950s and 1960s Yet an uncoordinated web of bilateral agreements on fi sheries cooperation can adversely affect third parties and more broadly the region as a whole For instance as the joint fi shing zone agreed between Japan and China over-laps with the one between South Korea and Japan in the East China Sea the need arises to address this problem not only at the bilateral level but also at the trilateral one At the same time a regional fi shing organization is needed to regulate overfi shing a problem that has plagued the region over the past decades

The delimitation of EEZ and the continental shelf boundaries is much more complicated than fi sheries negotiations Krasner highlights fi ve causal variables to explain the development of regimes (1) egoistic self-interest (2) political power (3) norms and principles (4) habit and custom and (5) knowledge 37 Not all of these conditions are currently present in mari-time East Asia Building a sustainable maritime order may thus be easier said than done However it does no harm to the legitimacy of seeking regime-based multilateralism 38

Seeking a multilateral solution does not mean third party arbitration by the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Instead such a solution requires multilateral regionalism what former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described as ldquoa col-laborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various ter-ritorial disputes without coercionrdquo It was in this context that the Obama administration has pointed to opening multilateral meetings as a way of tackling East Asiarsquos maritime disputes

No regime-based multilateral solution can be found without the coop-eration and concessions of China the common denominator of many maritime disputes China however has insisted on bilateral negotiations


to resolve these disputes China is waging a type of diplomatic offensive in which it uses all possible channels to actively assert its position of ldquoresolu-tion through dialogues with the claimants and non-intervention by the USrdquo so as to prevent the tensions over the maritime disputes from rising to surface However resolution either by the unilateral efforts of a single state or bilateral efforts is nearly impossible because the maritime issues of East Asia are complexly interwoven

Establishing an effective regional maritime order could not be done without the full engagement of all parties involved the USA China Japan South Korea and ASEAN As for China it has successfully avoided appearing too dominant or assertive for the past decade Yet it still has to make additional efforts to alleviate the concerns of its neighbors with respect to its irredentist ambition As for Japan it simply lacks the politi-cal will and credibility to serve as a leading goose in forming a multilat-eral maritime regime South Korea (and ASEAN countries as well) could assume a key role perhaps by offering a bridge role between the two regional giants In East Asia the perfect storm of opportunity for more effective regional cooperation in East Asian Seas may have not arrived yet but winds of consensus are slowly but steadily blowing in the direction of the promotion of stronger regional maritime cooperation which is vital to the common prosperity of the region

56 POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

Amidst the newly emerging dynamics and challenges South Korea should assume the role of a safety mechanism between the USA China and Japan It would not be wise for South Korea to depend excessively on the USA in the face of Chinarsquos rapid expansion of power so as to keep the balance between the two superpowers Neither should South Korea be absorbed into Chinarsquos orbit At the same time South Korea needs to have a stronger voice in maritime issues Instead of fi nding itself in the midst of an exorbitant arms race South Korea would need to strengthen its roles and capacity as a bearer of regime―because even though establishing a new maritime order which includes issues of maritime territory resource development and boundary delimitation boils down to a highly refi ned political activity it also consists of an immensely normative activity which should cover legal and fair foundations acceptable to all parties concerned

100 MG KOO

South Korearsquos middle power diplomacy at sea should be something more than simple national egoism

In this regard President Park Geun-hyersquos Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) can serve as a useful platform The NAPCI is an extension of her trustpolitik that pursues comprehensive indirect cooperation in the region The initiative still lacks detailed action plans in order for South Korea to become a maritime middle pivot and might potentially confl ict with the US Pivot to Asia because its success depends on how to effectively accommodate China However it offers South Korea an important trust-building mechanism through agenda- setting in maritime disputes

In seeking to establish a sustainable maritime order in East Asia the issues of territorial sovereignty delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf resource development and protection of maritime environment should each be approached separately Then based on cooperation built in dealing with each issue a multilateral consensus or a meta-regime should be created to deal with overall maritime issues within the region In contrast to ldquohegemonic statesrdquo such as the USA China and Japan South Korea as a ldquovalue staterdquo should and can propose a roadmap for a new regional maritime order which can be summarized as follows 39

First the regime should include a declaration of ldquostandstillrdquo in the cur-rently ongoing island disputes This is a very basic measure taken to pre-vent any threats or interruptions from further aggravating the disputes during the transition period until the fi nal agreement is reached Parties concerned must put an end to citing new historical and legal evidence to claim their territorial sovereignty over the disputed islands South Korea should convince its neighbors that regional maritime cooperation should not be hijacked by ultranationalists and opportunistic politicians Of course the standstill declaration cannot solve the sovereignty issue or the maritime delimitation issue but it can certainly dampen the tensions in the disputed areas Reduced political tensions and accumulated experi-ences of cooperation could eventually provide the cornerstone for resolv-ing the broader issues

Second delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf is more than the simple bilateral negotiation games In addressing East Asian maritime disputes signing a multilateral agreement similar to the 2002 DOC con-cluded between China and the ASEAN states can be a fi rst step toward


enhancing multilateral understanding while maintaining the status quo at the same time 40 Unlike bilateralism multilateral approaches can help policymakers overcome the potentially zero-sum nature of sovereignty and sovereign rights issues by allowing the balance of interests among multiple participants if not maximizing the utility of individual actors at the expense of others Multilateralism can also increase the reputational costs of norm violations

Third the next step would be to work out an agreement on the princi-ples regarding the base points and the baselines through multilateral nego-tiations And then the parties must work on the delimitation principles The bottom line is that both the equitable solution and the median line principles would create a zero-sum game particularly between China and Japan Therefore it would be more desirable to apply the ldquoequidistance-relevant- circumstancesrdquo principle as proposed by South Korea This idea suggests fi rst drawing a tentative equidistance line and then making adjust-ments about the details where necessary This principle can become a uni-versally accepted delimitation standard in the East Asian region

Fourth parties concerned can proceed to fi xing the tentative boundar-ies and zones beginning with relatively less contentious areas The tenta-tive boundaries and zones can be adjusted and revised in consideration of ldquohistoric title or other special circumstancesrdquo through additional negotia-tions In consideration of the sensitive political and social environment in the region issues such as territorial waters and jurisdiction joint develop-ment of natural resources and environmental protection would need to be governed in a loose form of agreement based on existing mechanisms such as provisional measures related to fi sheries For instance South Korea has proposed a multilateral regime to govern fi sheries and environment issues in the region

NOTES 1 Sun Pyo Kim Maritime Delimitation and Interim Arrangements in

Northeast Asia (The HagueLondonNew York Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) Choon-ho Park East Asia and the Law of the Sea (Seoul Seoul National University Press 1983) Ralf Emmers Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia (London Routledge 2009) Min Gyo Koo Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York Springer 2009) Jon M Van Dyke ldquoDisputes over Islands and Maritime Boundaries in East

102 MG KOO

Asiardquo in Maritime Boundary Disputes Settlement Processes and the Law of the Sea ed Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M Van Dyke (The HagueLondonNew York Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 39ndash75

2 Stephen D Krasner ldquoStructural Causes and Regime Consequences Regimes as Intervening Variablesrdquo International Organization 36(2) (1982) 185ndash205

3 Koo Island Disputes 4 David Pilling ldquoWhy China and Japan Are Oceans Apartrdquo Financial Times

November 10 (2010) 5 Min Gyo Koo ldquoNew Maritime Rivalry between the US and China and

Korearsquos Maritime Security Policyrdquo IFANS BRIEF 2013-271 (October 23 2013)

6 Koo Island Disputes Chap 6 7 Renato Cruz De Castro ldquoThe Philippines in the South China Sea Disputerdquo

Australian National University National Security College 2013 accessed July 1 2014 httpnscanueduaudocumentsoccasional-5-brief-6pdf Teddy Ng ldquoOil Rig Stops Exploration Work Near Disputed Paracel Islands a Month Earlyrdquo South China Morning Post July 16 2014) accessed July 1 2014 httpwwwscmpcomnewschinaarti-cle1555221china-says-oil-rig-fi nishes-mission-waters-vietnam

8 Kim Maritime Delimitation 9 For instance UNCLOS Article 15 specifi es that in the absence of ldquohistoric

title or other special circumstancesrdquo a maritime boundary between adjacent states will follow ldquothe median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measuredrdquo However this equidistance prin-ciple only applies to the delimitation of the 12 nautical miles territorial sea The equidistance line is not referred to at all in either Article 74 or 83 which defi nes delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf respectively Instead they simply state that delimitation ldquoshall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in order to achieve an equitable solution

10 In effect the median line presented the most signifi cant barrier to conclud-ing the Consensus on Resource Development reached in June 2008 between China and Japan Neither party could agree on where to locate the joint development zone From the Chinese perspective it needed to be located beyond the median line in the area of overlap From the Japanese perspective the zone should bisect the median line since it represented the equidistance point between the two coastlines In the end China agreed to a zone that includes space on the Chinese side of the median line While there is no doubt that this was integral to concluding the agreement this concession drew severe criticism from hardliners within China and explains


Beijingrsquos ambivalence in implementing the agreement Koo ldquoNew Maritime Rivalryrdquo Koo Island Disputes John Donaldson and Alison Williams ldquoUnderstanding Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes The East China Sea and Beyondrdquo Journal of International Affairs 59(1) (2005) 135ndash156

11 Koo Island Disputes Chaps 1 and 2 12 The Scarborough Shoal standoff began when a Philippine Air Force (PAF)

reconnaissance plane spotted eight Chinese fi shing boats around the shoal On the morning of April 10 2012 the Philippine Navy reported that large amounts of illegally collected corals giant clams and live sharks were found inside the compartments of the fi rst Chinese fi shing vessel that they investigated But then two Chinese marine surveillance vessels positioned themselves between the arresting Philippine warship and the Chinese fi sh-ing vessels effectively preventing the Philippine ship from arresting the Chinese fi shermen Castro ldquoThe Philippines in the South China Sea Disputerdquo

13 Castro ldquoThe Philippines in the South China Sea Disputerdquo 14 Ng ldquoOil Rigrdquo Shannon Tiezzi ldquoVietnam China Clash over Oil Rig in

South China Searsquo The Diplomat May 7 2014 accessed July 1 2014 h t t p t h e d i p l o m a t c o m 2 0 1 4 0 5 v i e t n a m - c h i n a -clash-over-oil-rig-in-south-china-sea

15 Koo Island Disputes Chap 4 Koo ldquoNew Maritime Rivalryrdquo 16 Park East Asia 139ndash142 17 The 1996 Act provides ldquothe EEZ boundary shall be established by agree-

ment with the relevant States on the basis of international lawrdquo However Article 5(2) of the Act indicates that the South Korean government would use a ldquomedian linerdquo as a geographical limit in exercising its sovereign rights in the absence of delimitation agreed on with its neighbors It is not clear whether and to what extent a unilateral median line pending an ultimate delimitation of the EEZ or continental shelf boundary is consistent with the UNCLOS provision of Article 74(3) which remains silent in this regard Kim Maritime Delimitation 171ndash176

18 From South Korearsquos standpoint the Chinese argument would seem a tac-tic for delaying the ultimate delimitation of EEZ and continental shelf in the Yellow Sea and thus for maintaining its own nationalsrsquo sometimes pred-atory fi shing practices as long as possible Interestingly China does not always stick to the equitable principles as illustrated by its adoption of equidistance lines for delimitation in the Bay of Korea with North Korea and in the Gulf of Tonkin with Vietnam Ironically South Korea would still have some diffi culty in consistently endorsing the equidistance princi-ple because it might undermine its national interest in the East China Sea

104 MG KOO

where it competes for maritime jurisdiction with China and Japan Park East Asia 114ndash116 Kim Maritime Delimitation 208

19 Kim Maritime Delimitation 206 20 Park East Asia 131ndash133 Kim Maritime Delimitation 190ndash192 21 See httpwwwunorgdeptslosclcs_newcommission_submissions

htm 22 As of 1965 few distant water fi shermen of South Korea were technically

capable of operating within the coastal and offshore waters of Japan but in the 1970s the South Korean fi shing vessels became much more active in the waters off the Japanese coast with improved power and fi shing equip-ment Park East Asia 146ndash147

23 Kim Maritime Delimitation 251ndash257 24 Kim Maritime Delimitation 266ndash267 25 TJ Pempel ldquoMore Pax Less Americana in Asiardquo International Relations

of the Asia-Pacifi c 10(3) (2010) 465ndash490 26 The Economist ldquoChinarsquos Military Riserdquo April 7 2012 27 After years of denials China launched an aircraft carrier in 2012 China is

also developing a sophisticated submarine fl eet that could be used to pre-vent foreign naval vessels from entering its strategic waters if a confl ict took place in the region Reportedly the Chinese navy gets more than one-third of the overall Chinese military budget refl ecting the priority Beijing cur-rently places on the navy as a backbone of national security The Economist ldquoThe Dragonrsquos New Teethrdquo April 7 2012

28 SD Muni and Vivek Chadha eds (2014) Asian Strategic Review 2014 US Pivot and Asian Security Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses New Delhi India 50

29 Koo ldquoNew Maritime Rivalryrdquo 30 Koo ldquoNew Maritime Rivalryrdquo Koo Min Gyo ldquoBetween a Rock and a

Hard Place The Future of the East Asian Maritime Orderrdquo EAI Issue Briefi ng No MASI 2010-08 (December 27 2010) accessed July 1 2014 httpwwweaiorkrdatabbseng_report2010122814501165pdf

31 US offi cials have repeatedly said ldquoAmerica has a treaty obligation to defend Japan hellip Although the US takes no position on who has sovereignty over the Senkakus Americarsquos guarantee covers themrdquo The Economist ldquoBanyan Thunder out of Chinardquo May 4 2013

32 Nicole Gaouette ldquoClinton Tells East Asia Summit to Have Active Agenda for Maritime Disputesrdquo Bloomberg October 30 2010 Mark Landler ldquoOffering to Aid Talks US Challenges China on Disputed Islandsrdquo New York Times July 23 2010

33 It was around this time that the Hainan Peoplersquos Congress of China approved the revised regulations that allow the provincial authorities to seize foreign ships and its personnel conducting ldquoillegalrdquo activities in the


provincersquos waters The new regulations came into force in 2013 and autho-rize public security units to legally board inspect detain expel and force the offending vessels to change or reverse course Chinarsquos Foreign Ministry in efforts to stop the revised regulations from creating diplomatic turmoil with its neighbors announced that China attaches a strong importance to the belief ldquoall countries have freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in accordance with international lawrdquo However the Hainan provincersquos establishment of legal grounds to enforce actions against foreign vessels has led to rising tensions in the South China Sea M Taylor Fravel ldquoHainanrsquos New Maritime Regulations An Updaterdquo The Diplomat January 3 2013 accessed July 1 2014 httpthediplomatcom201301hainans-new- maritime-regulations-an-updateallpages=yes Also see Koo ldquoBetween a Rock and a Hard Placerdquo

34 Phillip Saunders ldquoMaritime Regional Cooperation Theory and Principlesrdquo in Maritime Regime Building Lessons Learned and Their Relevance for Northeast Asia ed Mark J Valencia (The HagueLondonNew York Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 4

35 In the UNCLOS the call for regionalization of various functions is clearly expressed in Article 123 ldquoStates bordering an enclosed or semi- enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention To this end they shall endeavor directly or through an appropriate regional organization (a) to coordinate the management conservation exploration and exploi-tation of the living resources of the sea (b) to coordinate the implementa-tion of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment (c) to coordinate their scientifi c research poli-cies and undertake where appropriate joint programs of scientifi c research in the area (d) to invite as appropriate other interested States or interna-tional organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provi-sions of this articlerdquo

36 For background analysis and proposals for cooperation in European Seas see United Nations Environment Program ldquoActivities for the Protection and Development of the Mediterraneanrdquo in Ocean Yearbook 1 ed Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton S Ginsburg (Chicago The University of Chicago Press 1978) 584ndash597 Andresen Steinar ldquoThe Environmental North Sea Regime A Successful Regional Approachrdquo in Ocean Yearbook 7 ed Elisabeth Mann Borgese et al (Chicago The University of Chicago Press 1989) 378ndash401 Sven Andersen and Brit Flostad ldquoSea Use Planning in Norwegian Waters National and International Dimensionsrdquo Coastal Management 16 3 (1988) 183ndash200 Mathew Auer ldquoProspects for Environmental Cooperation in the Yellow Seardquo Journal of East and West Studies 21(2) (1992) 15ndash57 Ton Ijlstra

106 MG KOO

ldquoDevelopment of Resource Jurisdiction in the ECrsquos Regional Seas National EEZ Policies of EC Member States in the Northeast Atlantic the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Seardquo Ocean Development and International Law 23(2ndash3) (1992) 165ndash192

37 Krasner ldquoStructural Causesrdquo 195ndash204 38 Vinod K Aggarwal ldquoReconciling Multiple Institutions Bargaining

Linkages and Nestingrdquo in Institutional Designs for A Complex World Bargaining Linkages and Nestings ed Vinod K Aggarwal (Ithaca Cornell University Press 1998) Pempel T J ldquoMore Pax Less Americana in Asiardquo International Relations of the Asia-Pacifi c 10(3) (2010) 465ndash490

39 Koo Island Disputes Chap 7 40 Recently there has been some positive progress between China and ASEAN

toward a Code of Conduct (COC) agreement to seek ldquogradual progress and consensus through consultationsrdquo though no deadlines or details about the joint working group that will carry out the task are not available as of yet (Pal 2013 Tiezzi 2014b) Deep Pal ldquoA Code of Conduct for the South China Seardquo The Diplomat September 25 2013 accessed July 1 2014 ht tp thedip lomat com201309a-code-of-conduct- for-the-south-china-sea Shannon Tiezzi ldquoWhy China Isnrsquot Interested in a South China Sea Code of Conductrdquo The Diplomat February 26 2014 accessed July 1 2014 httpthediplomatcom201402why-china-isnt-interested-in-a-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct

REFERENCES 1 Aggarwal Vinod K 1998 Reconciling Multiple Institutions Bargaining

Linkages and Nesting In Institutional Designs for A Complex World Bargaining Linkages and Nesting ed Vinod K Aggarwal Ithaca Cornell University Press

2 Andresen Steinar 1989 The Environmental North Sea Regime A Successful Regional Approach In Ocean Yearbook 7 eds Elisabeth Mann Borgese Norton S Ginsburg and Joseph R Morgan 378ndash401 Chicago The University of Chicago Press

3 Andersen Sven and Brit Flostad 1988 Sea Use Planning in Norwegian Waters National and International Dimensions Coastal Management 16(3) 183ndash200

4 Auer Mathew 1992 Prospects for Environmental Cooperation in the Yellow Sea Journal of East and West Studies 21(2) 15ndash57

5 Castro Renato Cruz De 2013 The Philippines in the South China Sea Dispute Australian National University National Security College httpnscanueduaudocumentsoccasional-5-brief-6pdf Accessed 1 July 2014


6 Donaldson John and Alison Williams 2005 Understanding Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes The East China Sea and Beyond Journal of International Affairs 59(1) 135ndash156

7 Emmers Ralf 2009 Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia London Routledge

8 Ijlstra Ton 1992 Development of Resource Jurisdiction in the ECrsquos Regional Seas National EEZ Policies of EC Member States in the Northeast Atlantic the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea Ocean Development and International Law 23(2ndash3) 165ndash192

9 Kim Sun Pyo 2004 Maritime Delimitation and Interim Arrangements in Northeast Asia The Hague Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

10 Koo Min Gyo 2009 Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia Between a Rock and a Hard Place New York Springer

11 mdashmdashmdash 2010 Between a Rock and a Hard Place The Future of the East Asian Maritime Order EAI Issue Briefi ng No MASI 2010-08 (December 27 2010) httpwwweaiorkrdatabbseng_report2010122814501165pdf Accessed July 1 2014

12 mdashmdashmdash 2013 New Maritime Rivalry between the US and China and Korearsquos Maritime Security Policy IFANS BRIEF 2013-271 (October 23 2013)

13 Krasner Stephen D 1982 Structural Causes and Regime Consequences Regimes as Intervening Variables International Organization 36(2) 185ndash205

14 Muni SD and Vivek Chadha eds 2014 Asian Strategic Review 2014 US Pivot and Asian Security Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses New Delhi India

15 Park Choon-ho 1983 East Asia and the Law of the Sea Seoul Seoul National University Press

16 Pempel TJ 2010 More Pax Less Americana in Asia International Relations of the Asia-Pacifi c 10(3) 465ndash490

17 Saunders Phillip 2001 Maritime Regional Cooperation Theory and Principles In Maritime Regime Building Lessons Learned and Their Relevance for Northeast Asia ed Mark J Valencia The Hague Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

18 United Nations Environment Program 1978 Activities for the Protection and Development of the Mediterranean In Ocean Yearbook 1 eds Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton S Ginsburg 584ndash597 Chicago The University of Chicago Press

19 Jon M Van Dyke 2009 Disputes over Islands and Maritime Boundaries in East Asia In Maritime Boundary Disputes Settlement Processes and the Law of the Sea eds Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M Van Dyke 39ndash75 The Hague Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

108 MG KOO


CHAPTER 6

61 INTRODUCTION As described in the introductory chapter the concept of middle power diplomacy has drawn considerable attention in South Korea since the late 2000s Numerous works have been published and conferences held over the role of South Korea as a middle power in the changing international environment 1 This debate was provoked by a variety of theoretical and policy-related questions largely related to the fundamental changes in the international system in general and the decline of US leadership in particular

One potential opportunity for middle powers like South Korea comes from another source of changes in the international system The global trend toward greater interdependence among states and non-state actors particularly in the international economic system has created networked structures Proliferation of trans-governmental networks and NGO net-works or hybrids has led some to promote them as a new form of global and regional governance 2 States also produce networks whose structures both empower and constrain themselves Here structural relations in

The Role of South Korea in the Making of a Regional Trade Architecture

Convening Bridging and Designing FTA Networks

Yul Sohn

Y Sohn () Yonsei University Seoul Republic of Korea

the networks are as important as attributes of individual units (states) for determining international outcomes 3 In other words state power is no longer derived solely from material capabilities but from its position in the network ldquoPositional advantagerdquo grants middle powers wide-ranging opportunities to exercise international infl uence regardless of material resources constraints The notion that we live in a networked world and that onersquos ability to capitalize on this connectivity impacts onersquos global standing is highly infl uential among key foreign policy players

The network concept generates new theoretical understandings of power in three ways 4 The ability of actors to connect with many oth-ers increases their power because connectedness allows easier access to resources and information Middle powers are often enthusiastic in con-necting with others in trade arrangements or entering international institu-tions Whether increased connections will increase the countryrsquos infl uence depends on issue areas Middle powers can hardly compete with the net-work of military arrangements and alliances made by the great powers like the USA but they would be able to connect to more than just the USA by forging economic agreements

Second a network actor can gain infl uence when it connects partners that are otherwise weakly connected to the network It plays infl uential roles by bridging structural gaps For example great powers may establish dense networks of military and economic ties but they divide the system in ways that creates critical structural holes or weak ties between them Middle powers like South Korea can benefi t from low connectedness between the US-centered cluster and the China-centered cluster linking countries to different segments of networks that might be set apart

Finally individual actors may seek to design whole or part of the net-work structure in ways that provide norms and values to the system Middle powersrsquo infl uence depends on their knowledge and specialization which help to create new networks or subnetworks or make seemingly incompatible clusters compatible

As noted earlier while network power may grant middle power coun-tries possibilities of increasing infl uence beyond their distributed national capabilities the world is not uniformly networked Actors in some issue areas are more networked than others Typically trade networks are denser than security networks where traditional international relations based on distributed capabilities prevails But at the same time trade networks are more or less securitized because trade policy often is used as a foreign pol-icy tool 5 It involves strategic considerations as is frequently understood

110 Y SOHN

by an economics-security nexus In that sense playing a middle power role in trade areas requires prudent statecraft that meets complexity in a world that mixes networked politics with realpolitik This differentiation allows South Korea to exploit an opportunity to play a middle power role in economic areas and ultimately contribute to assuaging great power competition over security architecture

The following section fi rst narrates the profound challenges South Korea faces in the region and then analyzes its attempts to engage in the new trade diplomacy games that a middle power plays The fi nal section illus-trates the role of South Korea as a middle power broker and its potential contribution to the building of network-based regional trade architecture

62 RIVAL VISIONS OF A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE As the international system changes middle power behavior is modifi ed Two developments need mentioning First global power shift matters Tight bipolarity constrained middle power diplomacy to a reactive quality With the international system dominated by geopolitical-security issues middle powers had little room for maneuvering Likewise unipolarity pow-erfully induced middle powers to bandwagon with a hegemon They were often left to be mere bystanders Now it is clear that the unipolar system has eroded From the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century the long-term decline of the USA combined by the rise of BRICS and by Japanese and European stagnation has dramatically shifted the global balance of power It is creating a fl uid international space in which more than a few states are becoming dominant players as global or regional actors Accordingly mid-dle powers like Korea may fi nd room (or a niche) to play a meaningful role

But this very shift is what is creating tensions in East Asia driven by the logic of power transition between the USA and China China is increasingly assertive while the USA is responding by complex strategies of engagement and balancing With its sustained high-speed growth China has moved into the hub of East Asian economies that has now become the key engine of the global economy It then skillfully used eco-nomic might to increase political leverage in the region emerging as the leading actor in many regional frameworks and institutions 6 Further it increasingly challenges the US military supremacy in the Asia-Pacifi c by enhancing its military capabilities commensurate with soaring economic power and narrowing the gap vis-agrave-vis the USA that cut their own defense budget by USD$487 billion over the following decade China pursues an

CONVENING BRIDGING AND DESIGNING FTA NETWORKS 111

anti- accessarea-denial strategy developing capabilities to deny the US freedom of movement in the region

The ldquoAsia rebalancerdquo announced by the Obama administration in the fall of 2011 and early 2012 appears to have been provoked by several developments Washington realized that the regionrsquos growth and dyna-misms is central to US security and economic interests It needs to respond to an increasing perception among Asian people that the US commitment to the region will wane as US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down 7 But it is essentially a response to the rising Chinese infl u-ence in the region New troop deployments to Australia and Singapore new areas for military cooperation with the Philippines the strengthening of the military presence in the region making it ldquomore broadly distrib-uted more fl exible and more politically sustainablerdquo The enlargement of the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) being a prime example This strategic turn underscores US concerns over the growing economic importance of China to its economic future and over Chinarsquos growing military capabili-ties and diplomatic assertiveness 8

The US rebalancing efforts have been centered on the concept of ldquoregional architecturerdquo As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton puts it it is ldquoa network of alliances and partnerships regional organizations and institutions that is durable and dynamic enough to help us meet todayrsquos challenges and adapt to threats that we cannot even conceive of just as our parents never dreamt of melting glaciers or dirty bombsrdquo 9 Here build-ing of a regional architecture requires a complex approach that deals with multiple issue areas including security economy and values In imple-menting it she provides fi ve principles fi rst new strategy emphasizes alli-ance relationships as a fi rm foundation second it is based on clear and increasingly shared objectives (ie security stability economic growth democracy and human rights) third it should be motivated by con-crete pragmatic considerations and focus on deliverable results fourth it fl exibly uses informal and mini-lateral forums and fi nally it needs to be more actively committed with regional institutions 10 In sum the US-led regional architecture is largely sustained by twin pillars the security archi-tecture fi rmly founded on extended and fl exible alliances and partnerships and the economic architecture founded on trade-based comprehensive economic partnership arrangements Further strategic and economic dia-logue these two are intertwined to be a security-economics complex as Clinton puts it ldquoeconomic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic tiesrdquo 11

112 Y SOHN

However this complex architecture appears to provide a relatively small space for a giant China In the security architecture it is given to share a space for partnership states while allies are given priority In the eco-nomic architecture a bilateral framework (ie US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue) is sidelined while the entry barriers for a key mul-tilateral mechanism the TPP are at too high a bar for China to enter as explained later Given a more integrated approach in which various tools of power and infl uence are utilized to restrain China it is no wonder that China is not accommodating this architecture but is attempting to provide an alternative

Back in 2010 Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi suggested a Chinese ver-sion of a regional architecture a nuanced one that in essence counters the US version 12 The objective of building a regional architecture is a ldquohar-monious worldrdquo based on peace prosperity and harmony (but neither democracy nor human rights) while it is to be built under four principles cooperation development new security concept and respect for diver-sity (in contrast to concrete result-based principles) In contrast to the so-called Washington Consensus and US pursuit of high-level liberaliza-tion President Hu Jintao advocated ldquoinclusive developmentrdquo that gave respect for diverse developmental models coming along with balanced growth All this represents Beijingrsquos Asia-only regionalism that competes with Washingtonrsquos Asia-Pacifi c networks Likewise the 2013 slogan of a ldquoChina Dreamrdquo a concept that President Xi Jinping has been promoting reverberates through Asian regionalism The renaissance of the Chinese nation is to return China to the position it held in the premodern ages the most advanced and civilized center in Asia 13

In his October 2013 speech at a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conference on diplomatic work Xi made known explicit Chinese strat-egies for friendly relations with its Asian neighbors In order to ldquomake our neighbors more friendly in politics economically more closely tied to us and deeper security cooperation and closer people-to-people tiesrdquo he claims ldquothe basic tenet of diplomacy with neighbors is to treat them as friends and partners to make them feel safe and to help them developrdquo Xi suggests that ldquofriendship is the consistent principle of Chinarsquos diplomacy with its neighbors and sincerity is the way to cultivate more friends and partners cooperation with neighbors should be based on mutual benefi t and create a close network of common interestsrdquo 14

This speech attempts to present a new type of neighbor-country relation-ship following Chinese attempts at fostering a new type of ldquogreat- power


relationshiprdquo with the USA Soon after Beijing presented new proposals for regional security and economy First it ambitiously called for a new regional security cooperation architecture centered on security multilater-alismmdashthe Conference on Interaction and Confi dence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) Criticizing military alliance as ldquothe outdated thinking of the Cold Warrdquo Xi in turn offered an alternative vision for Asia one based on an all-inclusive regional security framework that he advocated in the 2013 October speech that proposed a new set of norms on security featur-ing mutual trust reciprocity equality and coordination and reiterating Chinarsquos push for comprehensive common and cooperative security

Likewise China has proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) a ldquomultilateralrdquo development body that counterbalances the infl uence of the World Bank and ADB which Beijing views as too domi-nated by the USA and Japan respectively This is another strategic move As Keck puts it China is seeking to build up infrastructure throughout the greater Asian region to more tightly tie its smaller neighborsrsquo economic livelihoods to trade with China And as China has already made clear in its territorial disputes with countries like Japan and the Philippines Beijing is quite willing to exploit other nationsrsquo economic dependencies on it to force them to comply with its political mandates 15

Such developments make it more diffi cult for Korea to pursue its own goals The fate of the Korean peninsula located in the fault line drawn by the two superpowers is steadily falling again into the realm of great power politics Given the rivalry over leadership in building a regional architecture South Korea might be mired into an ldquoeither-orrdquo situation But at the same time greater economic interdependence between China and the USA gives breathing space ldquoa new type of major-power relationshiprdquo with the USA its leaders hope will allow China to avoid destabilizing competition while sus-taining its economic growth reaching a moderately prosperous society ( sha-okang ) when the party celebrates its hunderedth birthday in 2021 The USA welcomes Chinese determination and works to avoid the tragedy of a great clash between the rising and established great powers But this new type of great-power relationship applies to bilateral issues while they continue to compete in regional affairs such as competition over regional architecture

63 KOREArsquoS TRADING STATE AS A MIDDLE POWER Under the superpower contest over the shaping of the regional architec-ture of East Asia trade policy has drawn particular attention As stated

114 Y SOHN

earlier trade is the engine of growth for the regional economy In East Asia most states have successfully pursued export-led growth Equally important it is a means of foreign policy Because FTAs have the value of increasing onersquos political infl uence and international status strategic rea-sons for choosing trading partners are numerous Trade policy is driven by as much political and strategic interests as business interests In East Asia proliferation of FTAs has been driven by what Ravenhill terms a ldquopolitical domino effectrdquo with governmentsrsquo primary concern being their potential exclusion from a new dimension of regional economic diplomacy 16 Once the FTA bandwagon starts rolling rival countries competitively rush for trade agreements Of particular importance has been the rivalry between China and Japan for leadership in the economic sphere 17 At the dawn of the new century Japan then the largest Asian economy fi rst concluded an FTA with Singapore (2002) which in turn pushed China aggressively who moved forward and concluded FTAs with ASEAN (CAFTA) It was in part designed to assuage ASEAN fears of losing competitiveness from a Chinese rise It then served to push Tokyo to move toward negotiating the Japan-ASEAN FTA And then South Korea followed suit

Increasingly at the center stage of the FTA dominos has been China Bolstered by its phenomenal economic growth and increasing economic leverage vis-agrave-vis neighboring countries China became the largest trading partner for almost all signifi cant economies in the region As neighbor-ing countries have depended more on China trade than vice versa so has asymmetrical interdependence in Chinarsquos favor granted it a foreign policy advantage As Albert Hirschman 18 astutely points out such asymmetry would lead weaker (or more vulnerable) states to reorient their economies and foreign policies to the preference of the stronger (or less vulnerable) states This development altered strategic calculations of the USA that had been heavily mired in the war on terror By the mid-2000s US strategists increasingly felt that China was stepping into the void left by Americarsquos increasing disengagement in Asia In other words there were structural holes where connections were sparse or weakened between the East Asian and US markets The existence of such holes provided opportunities for actors to play a bridging role Invigoration of APEC as well as bilateral FTAs with South Korea and Japan emerged as an idea of bridging 19

While South Korea was eager to reach an FTA deal with the USA the latter was largely uninterested because together with the weak commer-cial value of the Korean economy they questioned Seoulrsquos ability to have big commercial deals concluded By the mid-2000s US policymakers


recognized the strategic signifi cance of an FTA with South Korea as a way to engage in a region which was increasingly becoming centered on China The offi ce of the US Trade Representative (USTR) stated clearly A ldquoKORUS FTA will strengthen a strategic alliance forged in war and growing in peace hellip will serve the US vital interest in maintaining and expanding [US] partnerships in Asiardquo 20 Despite the fact that the com-mercial value of the Korean economy had changed little the US interests dramatically increased as a result of a Chinese rise and Japanese inaction

For the USA Japan was naturally the fi rst choice as a security- embedded FTA partner The USA urged Japan to move toward bilateral FTA negotia-tions for a combination of commercial and strategic reasons A US-Japan FTA would constitute a critical part in an emerging web of FTAs that the USA had worked on in the region Armitage and Nye 21 urged both govern-ments to sign an ldquoeconomic alliance agreementrdquo that would send a power-ful message to the region particularly to China But Japanese exporters showed tepid support for this proposal because US tariff rates to Japanese exports were already very low More importantly the countryrsquos politically powerful agricultural sector was vehemently opposed to such a trade agree-ment Although the farming population in Japan today is no more than 5 percent of the labor force it wields large political power Overrepresented in the national Diet the farmers organized agricultural cooperatives or Nokyo and have used it to protect Japanese agriculture particularly Japanese rice producers against competition from foreign producers 22

As a result Korea was left alone and was able to exploit its advantage by occupying bridging positions Although Korea had no intention of creat-ing bridging structures that benefi ted itself now it was Korearsquos prerogative to make use of such advantages when possible And it seemed Korea was prepared to respond Back in 2003 the Roh government setup an aggres-sive FTA policy the so-called simultaneous multifaceted FTA promotions that aimed to quickly catch up and fi ll the lag from its late adoption of the global trend toward the proliferation of FTAs To this end Minister for Trade Kim Hyun-chong was instrumental His offi ce sought out the opportunity to drive KORUS FTA negotiations forward Seoul believed that a KORUS FTA would boost South Korearsquos economy and help bal-ance the security areas of difference between Seoul and Washington and provide a new ground for the alliance It was also hoped that success-ful FTA negotiations would help boost South Koreas status as a middle- power balancer by ensuring that the USA would remain a strategic and economic counterbalance to China and Japan

116 Y SOHN

Just as Seoul concluded its 2006 KORUS FTA in Beijing the European Union (EU) and Tokyo almost immediately expressed interests in nego-tiating an FTA with Korea It was the KORUS FTA effect Korea was granted further opportunities because its positional power increased as it linked itself to the USA The EU desired to link itself to a vastly grow-ing East Asian economy via Korea a country that had proven itself to be able to secure big trade deals The KORUS FTA pushed China to speed up its counterbalance measures against the US infl uence in Korea Japan also approached Korea so as to not fall behind as well In other words Korea sat in a strategically advantageous position within the newly emerg-ing FTA networks Soon Seoul made another outstanding achievement in concluding an FTA with the EU becoming so far the only country con-nected with the two giant economic blocs of the USA and the EU

64 VYING FOR A REGIONAL TRADE ARCHITECTURE The Lee Myung-bak government presented a new FTA roadmap in August 2008 to fi nd a breakthrough in the worsening economic environment (portending the upcoming global fi nancial crisis) that led to the decreasing of exports and the stagnation of potential growth rates The ldquoglobal FTA hubrdquo strategy was proposed as the country would establish a hub-and- spokes trade network by successfully promoting FTAs with China Japan Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) The new government considered the FTA hub strategy particularly attractive because the USA China and Japan were less likely to conclude FTAs with each other in the near future The hub country gets greater economic advantages than other countries (ie spokes) because it as a hub gains preferential access to more markets than other participating countries or spokes do It also can take advantage in attracting investment as the only location with access to all the others because such trade networks tend to favor locations of fi rms in the hub that has preferential access to all spoke markets 23

Korean trade offi cials expected greater access to the US market and hoped to overturn the existing situation where Korearsquos market share had been stag-nant due to export rivals from China Japan and Taiwan Likewise the con-clusion of a China FTA would give Korea a greater advantage over the USA and Japan that have virtually little chance of concluding FTAs with China Korea also expected that increased inward foreign direct investments would revitalize the struggling domestic economy and create jobs Bark remarked that ldquoas a global FTA hub Korea will emerge as the gateway for a multitude


of American European and Chinese investors seeking access to enormous and dynamic [Asian] marketsrdquo 24 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade envisioned a three-stage FTA strategy that started bilateral negotiations with China and possibly Japan followed by China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA and then the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

Korean offi cials were hoping that once an FTA with China was con-cluded their economy should benefi t enormously from the hub-and- spokes FTA before a major step into regional multilateral FTAs by regional actors are taken They anticipated that positional advantage driven by Korearsquos status being the only country in the world having concluded FTAs with both the USA and China should empower the country to play a lead-ing role in the regional multilateral FTA negotiations

Suddenly and unfortunately for Korea world trends shifted toward multilateralization of FTAs before it could fully prepare and materialize its ldquohub strategyrdquo It was the USA that pushed for a multilateral FTA in the TPP as a primary means to engage Asia and the Pacifi c By late 2010 the TPP became a key trade issue in the region There were reasons why the TPP suddenly drew attention One reason was changes in the mar-ket where proliferation of FTAs and the presence within them of restric-tive rules of origin (RoO) prevent companies from optimizing their value chains causing them to pressure governments to remove discriminatory provisions in their trade agreements They ask for multilateral rules that help in facilitating cross-border business activities In essence Baldwin claims that the twenty-fi rst-century FTAs are not primarily about prefer-ential market access but about rules that underpin the trade-investment- service nexus of corporate activity 25

The TPP is riding on the demands for multilateralization whose mem-bership has already been extended beyond that of its original foundersmdashChile New Zealand Singapore and Bruneimdashand later joined by the USA followed by Australia Peru and Vietnam and then Mexico Canada and Japan The TPP aims for a ldquohigh standardrdquo because it aims to liberalize nearly all goods and services and include commitments beyond those cur-rently established in the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules The TPP chapters are ldquocomprehensiverdquo competition cooperation and capac-ity building cross-border services customs e-commerce environment fi nancial services government procurement intellectual property invest-ment labor legal issues market access for goods rules of origin sanitary and phytosanitary standards technical barriers to trade telecommunica-tions temporary entry textiles and apparel trade remedies

118 Y SOHN

By 2010 the TPP has been driven by the US initiative as ldquothe strongest vehicle for achieving economic integration across the Asia-Pacifi c region and advancing American economic interestsrdquo 26 It is seen as the best way to (1) increase its economic engagement in East Asia and a central pil-lar of the economic architecture in the region as well as (2) counteract Chinarsquos economic sway in the region 27 Together at a time when Secretary Clinton formulated the US ldquorebalancerdquo to Asia-Pacifi c the TPP was used to develop effective transpacifi c linkages and institutional ties for security as well as economic reasons The TPP coupled with KORUS FTA fi nally concluding renegotiations in November 2010 could begin to reverse the advent of the China-led Asia-only regional trend by reasserting meaning-ful US economic engagement in Asia

The US sought partners that help to enlarge this TPP network Japan responded positively as an ideal candidate a key military ally and third- largest economy in the world Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto indi-cated Japanrsquos participation in the TPP negotiations when he hosted an APEC meeting in October 2010 six months after the fi rst TPP negotiation was held After spending two years in taming domestic opposition led by the agricultural sector Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to enter the TPP negotiations This move became a game changer stimulating many countries to consider entering Mexico and Canada were infl uenced by Japanrsquos lead and decided to join

Although regulatory emphasis of the TPP arrangement makes China less likely to join the country is keeping a close eye on the TPP develop-ment because the TPP agenda is regarded by many Chinese experts as a force that would divide East Asian economic integration pursued by China It is also viewed as a US strategy to economically contain China 28 Worse those negotiating membership of the TPP has been increased In particular Japanrsquos decision to enter the TPP negotiations gives the TPP an image of a containment system Xinhua asserts that Japanrsquos successful entry into the TPP negotiations means that the USA has taken a step for-ward in encircling China 29 Li Xiangyang Director of the Institute of Asia- Pacifi c Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) contends that Sino-US competition should be considered an important element when analyzing the TPP and that for the USA the main political objective in joining is to contain Chinarsquos rise in East Asia Similarly Yang Jiemian president of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies sug-gests that the US strategy ldquodilutesrdquo and ldquoreducesrdquo Chinarsquos infl uence in the Asia-Pacifi c region 30


To counter such an initiative China made an FTA with Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and is negotiat-ing with South Korea With Beijingrsquos initiative the China-Japan-Korea FTA negotiation was launched Beneath the surface there is a deep-seated political motivation vis-agrave-vis the USA More ambitious Beijing demon-strated a stronger stance than ever in favor of a regionwide FTA called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) It has worked closely with ASEAN worried about marginalization by the USA pushing the TPP At the same time China aims to further integrate with other economies such as in Latin America and Europe President Xirsquos visit to Europe in March 2014 signaled that Beijing seeks to promote economic cooperation and strategic partnerships via FTAs

China will most likely elevate the RCEP as counter to the TPPrsquos high- standard model Already in the aforementioned November 2013 speech Xi promised to make great efforts to ldquomake use of Chinarsquos advantages in economy trade technology and fi nance and actively tak-ing part in regional economic cooperationrdquo Xi continued along with a Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road for the twenty-fi rst century ldquoChina should accelerate establishment of free trade zones with neighbors as the foundation stone expand trade and investment and create a new pattern of regional economic integrationrdquo Likewise the Third Plenum of the eighteenth CCP Congress in November 2013 called for China to boost cooperation with countries and regions through FTAs

Viewed from regional trade architecture the dynamics of the TPP including the USA and not China competing with the RCEP includ-ing China but not the USA easily slips into a view of strategic competi-tion between the USA and China extending to trade areas Clearly these two are different Besides the membership composition the TPP aims at high-level liberalization with few exemptions and extensive regulatory harmonization in areas such as labor law environmental protection and intellectual property rights In contrast the RCEP by far sets a low bar on market access with a gradual and fl exible approach to reduce trade barriers especially among less developed members and makes limited demands for regulatory harmonization These differences are not mutually exclusive however Many Asian countries can enter both Japan Australia Malaysia New Zealand Singapore and Vietnam are currently members of both negotiations

120 Y SOHN

65 SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER ROLE South Korearsquos FTA hub strategy is increasingly challenged by multilater-alization of FTAs including the TPP Trade offi cials believed that partici-pating in the TPP was not urgent because Korea has already concluded FTAs with most TPP negotiating members 31 The TPP deal seemed rela-tively easy because the country already accomplished the high-standard KORUS FTA But the Japanese decision to enter the TPP negotiations made Korearsquos calculation complicated Now participating in the TPP meant that Korea should enter negotiations with a diffi cult Japan talks that had been stalled for eight years due to the formerrsquos hesitation On the other side the US geopolitical pressure was felt strongly as Japan entered the negotiations State offi cials pushed Seoul to accept the TPP as evidence of supporting the US rebalance to Asia 32 Korea was put in a diffi cult position Its successful pursuit of a global FTA hub strategy was being undermined by the progress of the TPP A former high-rank-ing trade offi cial confessed that Korearsquos best interest is capitalizing on bilateral FTAs with major partners including the USA while the TPP negotiations are being delayed It was hoped that an FTA with China completion of the global FTA hub strategy would give Korea a central place in CJK FTA as well as a regional FTA But the unexpected prog-ress of the TPP deals would most likely dilute the expected outcome of Korearsquos hub strategy

One side effect from the Park Geun-hye government launched in February 2013 is the reorganization of trade negotiation functions Trade negotiation functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade were detached and submerged into the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (pre-viously the Ministry of Industry and Energy) renamed as the Ministry of Trade Industry and Energy (MOTIE) Such reorganization was aimed to foster closer relations between industries and trade in dealing with trade issues and negotiations This move has been criticized as an inward-looking approach at a time when the global trading regime has shifted toward the making of multilateral FTAs which in turn requires an outward-looking complex approach to trade affairs There is an increasing need of middle power diplomacy in multilateral settings Given the undeniable geopoliti-cal competition between the USA and China in the region Korearsquos trade policy requires a critical understanding of the complex nature of trade issues and a balanced approach in a turbulent region


South Korea can fi nd room to play a middle power role in East Asia It is still well-positioned in the new FTA environment Korea will fi nd that both the TPP and the RCEP will be relatively easy to conclude because it already has concluded or is negotiating FTAs with most of the members Even better the government and national assembly have already approved high-quality agreements with the USA and EU Korea-China FTA nego-tiations are well in progress both parties hope to conclude negotiations by the end of 2014 This unusual position gives South Korea an advantage to play a proactive role The New Park

Geun-hye government has responded positively Its new trade roadmap issued June 2013 calls for South Korearsquos role as a ldquolinchpin in regional economic integrationrdquo Specifi cally it aims to link the US-driven TPP and the China-driven RCEP but the roadmap does not explore how this will be achieved

There are several areas in which South Korea can play a middle power role in contributing to regional stability and prosperity First it can seek ways to assuage ldquoover-securitizationrdquo of trade relations The TPP seems politically divisive because China is not included The TPP might cause trade diversion effects against China but it will not critically affect the seemingly ever-expanding Chinese economy Risk to the US economy caused by RCEP would be minimal In fact as long as the USA concludes the TPP deal fi rst it will hardly feel threatened by the RCEP It does not matter whether the RCEP materializes or not The question is about how threatened China feels by the TPP In this regard the speed by which RCEP negotiations proceed is important If RCEP negotiations make progress China will not feel isolated by the US-led TPP network 33 As the RCEP moves forward and eventually more dual membership countries come out it will decrease Chinarsquos fear and its tendency to over-securitize the trade architecture South Korearsquos role is to help promote the RCEP in parallel with the TPP negotiations

Equally important Korea should lead a middle power network to prop-agate against the view that sees the regional free-trade agenda reduced to a Sino-US relationship China or the USA having veto power on any regional agreement Where opportunities exist for middle power countries to make a deal to their mutual benefi t they should grasp those opportu-nities and do so by convening middle powers sharing common interests

The most important task is designing new regional trade architecture A comparable example is a China-proposed infrastructure investment bank the AIIB seen as a threat to the Japanese-led Asia Development Bank

122 Y SOHN

(ADB) and the US-led World Bank Some view the AIIB as a political tool designed to marginalize the US and Japanese infl uence in the region and to challenge the ADBrsquos regional hegemony But others note that the huge demand for infrastructure building in Asia and China can provide these resources At the very least there is plenty of room for both to coex-ist What is needed is designing an architecture where the two organiza-tions can evolve to coexist Likewise in order to have two FTA networks coexist functional differentiation is desirable Given the TPP is already identifi ed as a high-quality comprehensive FTA whatrsquos left is identifying RCEP separately 34 While already presenting a different approachmdashfl exible and gradual approach to negotiations regional players including China have yet to provide new trade rules and norms and other contents com-mensurate with Asian experiences Korea will have to take the initiative in providing architectural ideas helping to design two rival visions evolved to functionally differentiate with each other It starts with elaborating the RCEPrsquos objective that supports and contributes to regional economic integration equitable economic development and strengthening eco-nomic cooperation between advanced industrial and developing countries

Current circumstances in which to pursue a new architecture would be positive in terms of timing The TPP seems to be nearing the fi nal stage of negotiations but there is increasing skepticism over the Obama administrationrsquos capability of pushing it through Congress That means it is not likely that the TPP if concluded soon will critically shape the follow-ing process of RCEP negotiations While the TPP negotiation terms have largely been set the RCEP process remains open for setting its own trade rules and norms Depending on how they are shaped countries are able to choose to enter into either one or both

Finally Seoul can play a broker role in the CJK FTA negotiations Given the extensive cross-border production networks or supply chains among the tree economies trade needs complex rules rather than tariff reduc-tions 35 In this regard South Korea will need to take prudent action that puts less weight on tariff concessions than trade rule making This is partly because many hurdles coming from the confl icting interests exist in nego-tiations over tariff concessions Japan is reluctant to open its agriculture markets and Korea wants to protect its auto manufacturing markets while China has advantages in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors It will be a smart strategy to lead the other two rivals to stay focused on nego-tiating trade rules including RoOs Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) competition policy and regulatory rules while keeping a tariff concession


level that is not too high In the end Seoul can help shape the deal as a standard for the future rules in RCEP In doing so the three-way standard should be designed for plasticity and scalability

To conclude trade is a fi eld that easily extends toward many other economic areas including development fi nance environment labor and technology It also involves strategic considerations as it frequently is understood to be an economics-security complex On this score build-ing of regional trade architecture by harmonizing two different networks is not an easy task But given the networked nature of trade in East Asia middle powers like South Korea can fi nd a space to actively work in This chapter has highlighted the potential role of a middle power as a bro-ker With successful brokerage a harmonious regional economic architec-ture would be able to emerge and ultimately help to establish regional complex networks that can assuage potential confl icts in the making of a regional security architecture rivaled by two superpowers

One last point is concerned with the new trade roadmap of the Park government that emphasizes stronger relations between industries and trade in dealing with trade issues and negotiations As stated earlier the new MOTIE (previously the Ministry of Knowledge Economy) received trade negotiation functions transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013 This merger might weaken a complex approach to trade as an economy-security nexus The government needs to address these concerns and proactively engage with trade diplomacy in order to secure prosperity and peace in a turbulent region

REFERENCES 1 Armitage Richard L and Joseph S Nye 2007 The US-Japan Alliance Getting

Asia Right Through 2020 CSIS Report February 2007 httpcsisorgfi lesmediacsispubs070216_asia2020pdf Accessed 9 September 2015

2 Baldwin Richard 2011 21st Century Regionalism Filling the Gap Between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rules CEPR Policy Insight No 56 April 2011 httpswwwwtoorgenglishres_ereser_eersd201108_epdf Accessed 9 September 2015

3 Bark Taeho 2012 KORUS FTA Korearsquos Trade Policy and Dynamics of East Asian Regional Integration Presented at the Peterson Institute for International Economics May 16 2012

4 Capling Ann and John Ravenhill 2011 Multilateralizing Regionalism What Role for the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership Agreement The Pacifi c Review 24(5) 553ndash575

124 Y SOHN

5 Clinton Hilary 2010 Remarks on United States Foreign Policy Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations September 8 2010 httpwwwstategovsecretaryrm201009146917htm Accessed 9 September 2015

6 mdashmdashmdash 2010 Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia Remarks at the East- West Center Honolulu January 12 2010 httpwwwstategovsecretary20092013clintonrm201001135090htm Accessed 9 September 2015

7 Fergusson Ian William Cooper Remy Jurenas and Brock Williams 2013 The Trans-Pacifi c Partnership Negotiations and the Issues for Congress CRS Report for Congress R42694 March 19 2013

8 Gowa Joanne and Edward D Mansfi eld 1993 Power Politics and International Trade The American Political Science Review 87(2) 408ndash420

9 Hafner-Burton Emilie Miles Kahler and Alexander Montgomery 2009 Network Analysis for International Relations International Organization 63(3) 559ndash592

10 Hirschman Albert O 1945 National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade Berkeley CA University of California Press

11 Kahler Miles ed 2009 Networked Politics Agency Power and Governance Ithaca Cornell University Press

12 Kim Sangbae 2014 Rise of Middle Power in East Asia A Korean Perspective EAI MPDI Working Paper

13 Manyin Mark Stephen Daggett Ben Dolven Susan V Lawrence Michael F Martin Ronald OrsquoRourke and Bruce Vaughn 2012 Pivot to the Pacifi c Administrationrsquos Rebalancing Toward Asia CRS Report for Congress March 28 2012

14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea) 2013 lsquoGukmin Haengbok Heemangui Sae Sidaereum Yeoneun Sinraewaegyorsquo 2013 Waegyobu Eobmubogo ( 2013 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on Trust Diplomacy for a New Era of Happiness and Hope ) March 27 2013 httpnewsmofagokrenewspapermainviewphpmvid=1488 Accessed 9 September 2015

15 Mulgan Aurelia George 2006 Power and Pork ndash A Japanese Political Life Canberra ANU E Press

16 Ravenhill John 2010 The New East Asian Regionalism A Political Domino Effect Review of Political Economy 17(2) 178ndash208

17 Shambaugh David 2004 China Engages Asia Reshaping the Regional Order International Security 29(3) 64ndash99

18 Sohn Yul and Mingyo Koo 2011 Securitizing Trade the Case of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement International Relations of the Asia-Pacifi c 11(3) 433ndash460

19 Song Guoyou and Wen Jin Yuan 2012 Chinarsquos Free Trade Agreement Strategies Washington Quarterly 35(4) 107ndash119


20 Terada Takashi 2006 Forming an East Asian Community A Site for Japan- China Power Struggles Japanese Studies 26(1) 1ndash13

21 US Trade Representative (USTR) 2006 Remarks by USTR Portman and Korea Trade Minister Kim at the launch of US-Korea Free Trade Agreement Negotiations February 2 2006 httpsustrgovarchiveassetsDocument_Librar yTranscr ipts2006Februar yasset_upload_fi le804_8935pdf Accessed 9 September 2015

22 USTR 2010 The Presidentrsquos 2010 Trade Policy Agenda 2010 Trade Policy Agenda and 2009 Annual Report httpsustrgov2010-trade-policy- agenda Accessed 10 September 2015

23 Wonnacott Ronald J 1996 Trade and Investment in a Hub-and-Spoke System Versus a Free Trade Area The World Economy 19(3) 237ndash252

24 Yang Jiechi 2010 Shape the Future of Asia Pacifi c with Confi dence and Cooperation Address at the First Lanting Forum December 1 2010 httpwwwfmprcgovcnmfa_engtopics_665678lantingluntan_665724t773516shtml Accessed 15 September 2015

25 Yuan Wen Jin 2012 The Trans-Pacifi c Partnership and Chinarsquos Corresponding Strategies A Freeman Briefi ng Report CSIS June 2012

NOTES 1 Middle power diplomacy is now regarded as a viable option for a countryrsquos

long-term strategic goals Korearsquos Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) prepared a mid-and long-term strategic plan that adopts middle power diplomacy as one of the key strategic concepts guiding Korearsquos foreign policy for the coming decade This concept also appears in the policy brief-ing to the President Park Geun-hye by MOFA (March 27 2013)

2 Anne-Marie Slaughter A New World Order (Princeton Princeton University Press)

3 Miles Kahler Networked Politics Agency Power and Governance (Ithaca Cornell University Press 2009)

4 Emmily Marie Hefner-Burton et al ldquoNetwork Analysis for International Relationsrdquo International Organization 16(3) (July 2009)

5 Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfi eld ldquoPower Politics and International Traderdquo American Political Science Review 87(2) (1993)

6 David Shambaugh ldquoChina Engages Asia Reshaping the Regional Orderrdquo International Security 29(3) (Winter 20045)

7 Hilary Clinton ldquoAmericarsquos Pacifi c Centuryrdquo Foreign Policy November 10 2011

8 Mark Manyin et al ldquoPivot to the Pacifi c Administrationrsquos Rebalancing toward Asiardquo CRS Report for Congress March 28 2012

126 Y SOHN

9 Hilary Clinton ldquoRemarks on United States Foreign Policyrdquo Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations September 8 2010 accessed September 9 2015 httpmstategovmd146917htm

10 Hilary Clinton ldquoRemarks on Regional Architecture in Asiardquo Remarks at the East-West Center Honolulu January 12 2010 accessed September 9 2015 httpwwwstategovsecretary20092013clintonrm201001135090htm

11 Clinton ldquoAmericarsquos Pacifi c Centuryrdquo 12 Jiechi Yang ldquoShape the Future of Asia Pacifi c with Confi dence and

Cooperationrdquo Address at the First Lanting Forum December 1 2010 accessed September 9 2015 httpwwwfmprcgovcnmfa_engtop-ics_665678lantingluntan_665724t773516shtml

13 CEG Commentary ldquoXi Jinpingrsquos lsquoChina Dreamrsquo an Attempt at Chinese Soft-powerrdquo March 28 2013 accessed September 9 2015 httpchi-naelectionsblognetp=21316

14 ldquoXi Jinping China to further friendly relations with neighboring coun-triesrdquo Xinhuanet October 26 2013 accessed September 9 2015 httpnewsxinhuanetcomenglishchina2013-1026c_125601680htm

15 Zachary Keck ldquoChinarsquos Growing Hegemonic Bentrdquo The Diplomat June 26 2014

16 John Ravenhill ldquoThe lsquonew East Asian regionalismrsquo A political domino effectrdquo Review of International Political Economy 17(2) (2010) 199ndash200

17 Takashi Terada ldquoForming an East Asian Communityrdquo Japanese Studies 26 (2006)

18 Hirschman Albert National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley CA University of California Press 1945)

19 Yul Sohn and Mingyo Koo ldquoSecuritizing Trade the Case of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreementrdquo International Relations of the Asia- Pacifi c 11(3) (2011) 433ndash460

20 The US Trade Representative (USTR)ldquoRemarks by USTR Portman and Korea Trade Minister Kim at the launch of US-Korea Free Trade Agreement Negotiationsrdquo February 2 2006 accessed September 9 2015 httpsustrgovarchiveassetsDocument_LibraryTranscripts2006Februaryasset_upload_fi le804_8935pdf 14

21 Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye The US-Japan Alliance Getting Asia Right Through 2020 CSIS 2007 17ndash18

22 Aurelia George Mulgan Japan rsquo s Agricultural Policy Regime (London Routledge 2006)

23 Ronald Wonnacott ldquoFree Trade Agreements For Better or Worserdquo The American Economic Review 86(2) (1996)


24 Taeho Bark ldquoKORUS FTA Korearsquos Trade Policy and Dynamics of East Asian Regional Integrationrdquo Presented at the Peterson Institute for International Economics May 16 2012

25 Richard Baldwin ldquo21st Century Regionalism Filling the Gap Between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rulesrdquo CEPR Policy Insight No 56 April 2011 accessed September 9 2015 httpswwwwtoorgenglishres_ereser_eersd201108_epdf

26 The United States Trade Representative ldquoThe Presidentrsquos 2010 Trade Policy Agendardquo 2010 accessed September 9 2015 httpsustrgov2010-trade-policy-agenda 8

27 Ann Capling and John Ravenhill ldquoMultilateralizing Regionalism What Role for the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership Agreementrdquo The Pacifi c Review 24(5) (2011) IanFergusson William Cooper Remy Jurenas and Brock Williams ldquoThe Trans-Pacifi c Partnership Negotiations and the Issues for Congressrdquo CRS Report for Congress March 20 2011

28 Wen Jin Yuan ldquoThe Trans-Pacifi c Partnership and Chinarsquos Corresponding Strategiesrdquo A Freeman Briefi ng Report (CSIS June 2012) 1

29 Article on Japanrsquos move to join TPP negotiations See ldquo日本加入TPP谈判美ldquo对华包围圈rdquo前进一步rdquo Xinhua March 17 2013 accessed September 9 2015 httpnewsxinhuanetcomworld2013- 0317c_124468170htm

30 Recited from Guoyou Song and Wen Jin Yuan ldquoChinarsquos Free Trade Agreement Strategiesrdquo Washington Quarterly 35(4) (2012) 108

31 Bark ldquoKORUS FTArdquo 32 Interview with an unidentifi able US offi cial (December 2012) 33 By 2013 Chinese concerns over isolation have eased and some Chinese

observers now see the TPP as a tool to help drive Chinese reforms In practice both the US and Chinese governments understand that the TPP will contain provisions that China would fi nd diffi cult to accept and the reconciliation of the tracks while desirable and likely may take time

34 Korearsquos leverage would have been greatest when the KORUS and K-EU FTA were concluded while TPP negotiations were still in its infancy

35 Baldwin ldquo21st Century Regionalismrdquo

128 Y SOHN


CHAPTER 7

71 INTRODUCTION Before 2008 South Korearsquos interest in climate change diplomacy was practically nonexistent The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established in 1992 and most post- 1992 Korean administrations assumed the position of developing country and maintained a passive stance as an observer of international climate change issues The Kim Dae-jung administration responded actively to the UNFCCC with launching ldquothe Committee for Climate Change Conventionrdquo and establishing a comprehensive national plan on climate change Even these efforts however led to no noteworthy diplomatic accomplishments Although Korea retained developing country status in relation to the UNFCCC it was an economically advanced middle power with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) membership it was also at the time one of the worldrsquos largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters Nevertheless Korearsquos pre-2008 climate

South Korearsquos Climate Change Diplomacy Analysis Based on the Perspective

of ldquoMiddle Power Diplomacyrdquo

Sungjin Kim

S Kim ( ) Korea University Seoul Republic of Korea

change diplomacy was still passive and did not leverage or refl ect the nationrsquos position internationally

From 2008 however Korearsquos climate change diplomacy made remark-able strides Upon declaring Low Carbon Green Growth (LCGG) as the national vision Korea built a national brand image around the concept of green growth becoming a recognized ldquogreenrdquo leader on the global stage For instance Korearsquos Minister of Environment Young-sook Yoo became the fi rst Korean chair of the OECD meeting at the Tenth Meeting of the OECD Environment Policy Committee at Ministerial Level that took place in Paris from March 29 to 30 2012 which attests to OECDrsquos rec-ognition of Korearsquos global leadership in advancing green growth 1

Korea which had been a passive observer in global climate change poli-tics suddenly took on a leadership role in the diffusion of the concept of green growth around the world How can Korearsquos remarkable transforma-tion be interpreted This chapter offers an analysis from the standpoint of ldquomiddle power diplomacyrdquo The Lee Myung-bak administration discov-ered a niche in the specialized area of climate change and made diplomatic efforts for Korea to take on a leadership role and this process exhibited various behavioral patterns of middle power diplomacy

Then what is middle power diplomacy Research on middle power took off with the end of the Cold War in 1989 Works by Stokke Pratt and Cooper and his colleagues laid the foundation for the study of middle power diplomacy 2 Cooper Higgott and Nossalrsquos research in particu-lar made signifi cant contributions to delineating the concept of middle power through a detailed analysis of the diplomatic behavioral patterns of middle powers According to them middle powers tend to engage in ldquomiddlepowermanshiprdquo It is defi ned as ldquo[the] tendency to pursue mul-tilateral solutions to international problems [the] tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes and [the] tendency to embrace notions of lsquogood international citizenshiprsquo to guide its diplo-macyrdquo 3 Middle powers thus engage in unique behavioral patterns that make them catalysts facilitators and managers Catalysts trigger and pro-mote special global issues while facilitators build coalitions based on coop-eration and managers develop and advance international institutions and norms Cooper Higgott and Nossal posit that these three types of middle power behavioral patterns are linked to niche diplomacy which involves ldquoconcentrating resources in specifi c areas best able to generate returns worth havingrdquo 4

130 S KIM

John W Holmes in the meantime asserts that the most distinguish-ing characteristic of middle power diplomacy is the ldquoreduction of ten-sions between the two politico-strategic combatants of a bipolar cold warrdquo based on his analysis of Canadarsquos diplomacy 5 Although Holmesrsquo argument stresses a middle powerrsquos role as mediator it is contextually limited to the Cold War age of the US-Soviet rivalry and focuses only on a middle pow-errsquos role in security economy and other areas of hard politics Wang and French defi ne middle powers as ldquocountries that are neither at the apex nor the bottom of the international power structurerdquo and contend ldquolsquoMiddle powersrsquo are not so much defi ned by their size as by their behavior hellip Active involvement in global governance would be a natural characteristic of middle powersrdquo 6 That is for them middle powers are characterized by their active involvement in upholding international standards and norms

Based on a critical and comprehensive review of existing studies this chapter provides that the following four identities exemplify the distinctive characteristics of middle power diplomacy (1) early mover (2) bridge (3) coalition coordinator (4) norm diffuser Korea found a niche for itself in the area of climate change and carried out diverse diplomatic actions to gain prominence in that niche These four behavioral patterns effectively coincide with the behavioral patterns exhibited by Korea in its climate change diplomacy The purpose of this chapter is to thoroughly analyze these patterns

The chapter begins with an examination of the developments that led to the politicization of the issue of climate change in international soci-ety Section 7 2 thus details the process by which GHG emissions rose to prominence as an international norm requiring a political solution and the confl icting interests of diverse countries ultimately resulted in the forma-tion of an incomplete climate change regime Section 7 2 closes with a discussion on a niche wherein middle power diplomacy can make mean-ingful contributions to breaking the deadlock in which the global climate change regime fi nds itself Section 7 3 provides an analysis of Korearsquos cli-mate change diplomacy from the standpoint of middle power diplomacy It starts out with a discussion on Korearsquos diplomatic approach to climate change identifying the distinguishing traits of Korearsquos climate change diplomacy by era This is followed by an analysis of the specifi c aspects of Korearsquos climate change diplomacy drawing on the four behavioral pat-terns that defi ne middle power diplomacy Finally Section 7 4 offers a discussion on the implications and meaning of Korearsquos middle power cli-mate change diplomacy

SOUTH KOREArsquoS CLIMATE CHANGE DIPLOMACY 131

72 POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

721 Historical Development and Characteristics

Climate change among numerous environmental challenges is the most recent issue to have gained prominence The destabilizing trend of car-bon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentration in the atmosphere was discovered in the mid-twentieth century but the discovery remained confi ned to the scientifi c community Humankind began taking note of the problem of climate change in the early 1970s with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm Sweden in 1972 serving as the catalyst Climate change was the key issue on the agenda Talks led to the founding of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and large-scale conferences on climate change hosted by the United Nations came to be held regularly Nevertheless the idea that the international society needed to enact a political resolution to the issue of climate change did not take hold until the 1980s

It was in the 1980s that the world started to take notice of just how seri-ous climate change was By the late 1980s the need for a political response by the international society was put under the spotlight as a growing body of scientifi c evidence underscored that climate change was indeed real and caused by human activities The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) cofounded by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP in 1988 played a pivotal role in proving the actual-ity and seriousness of climate change as well as its anthropogenic nature The second assessment report by the IPCC in 1995 stated that evidence pointing to human activities as one of main causes of climate change was positive and that the observed trend of global warming was not a naturally occurring phenomenon The report also stated that the sustainability of the ecosystem would be put at serious risk if GHGs continue to increase at the existing rate thus serving as a wakeup call for the world The second IPCC report is also the scientifi c basis of the Kyoto Protocol

The UNFCCC the most important organizational foundation for overseeing global climate change issues offi cially kicked off at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro Brazil in June 1992 when 154 nations became signatories After the establishment of the UNFCCC the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) was held in Tokyo Japan in December 1997 It resulted in the adoption of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol which clearly stipulates

132 S KIM

the GHG emissions reduction targets and periods for the 39 nations of Annex B and method of mitigation The crux of the Kyoto Protocol is that Annex B nations must work to curb GHG emissions and that each nationrsquos total GHG emissions during a specifi ed reduction period must not exceed the designated percentage of base year (generally 1990) emis-sions In effect the Annex I nations of the UNFCCC had to pledge to cut GHG emissions by 52 or lower on average by 1990 levels during the fi rst commitment period (2008ndash2012)

The greatest structural fl aw of the Kyoto Protocol is that it does not require any mitigation commitments from non-Annex I developing nations Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol which has to do with develop-ing countries stipulates ldquoAll Parties taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specifi c national and regional development priorities objectives and circumstances without introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex Irdquo Thus based on the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle the Kyoto Protocol imposes rigorous emissions reduction obligations only on developed countries This roused strong opposition from the USA and other industrialized countries from the get-go and played the most deci-sive role in the US refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and eventual with-drawal from it

The crisis caused by the US withdrawal was ultimately overcome and the Kyoto Protocol went into effect in 2005 on the back of the EUrsquos leadership However the fundamental problem of developed-country- only emission commitments remained unresolved As such with the fi rst commitment period (2008ndash2012) around the corner revisions had to be made to the Kyoto Protocol It was this awareness that led to the Bali Action Plan at COP13 in 2007 and the resulting adoption of the Bali Roadmap under which the parties agreed to come up with a new regime based on long-term cooperative action by COP15 in Copenhagen

The Bali Roadmap stipulates that developing countries unlike their developed counterparts are to discuss nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) regarding GHG emissions In other words developing countries would come up with mitigation actions for voluntary implemen-tation but not be subjected to legally binding reduction commitments Furthermore it was stipulated that actions to reduce GHG emissions for both developed and developing countries would be undertaken in mea-surable reportable and verifi able (MRV) manners


However COP15 at which an agreement on the post-2012 regime was to be arrived at came to a close with no major breakthroughs The USA and other developed nations were dissatisfi ed that no binding emis-sion commitments were stipulated for developing countries China and G77 on the other hand were strongly opposed to legally binding emis-sion obligations for developing countries citing the historical responsi-bility of developed countries Thus reaching an agreement became ever more elusive

In the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action announced at COP17 in 2011 it is stated that ldquoParties have agreed to develop a protocol another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Partiesrdquo That is an agreement was reached to develop a new legally binding protocol ldquoapplicable to all signatoriesrdquo However there was no agreement on when and in what manner develop-ing countries would participate

At COP18 in Doha in 2012 the Kyoto Protocol was extended to 2020 and a deal was reached to come up with a post-Kyoto post-2020 regime in accordance with the Durban Platform by 2015 at COP21 in Paris However it is projected that a substantive agreement will be diffi cult to conclude even at COP21 if the discord between developed and developing countries over the issue of binding emission commitments for developing countries especially advanced developing countries remains unresolved

722 Deadlock

COP17 held in 2011 in Durban South Africa brought both hope and despair to the international community The cause for hope came from the agreement to set up a new regime that was ldquoapplicable to all partiesrdquomdashall parties would be subject to binding emission targets commensurate with their respective capabilities It meant the dissolution of the CBDR prin-ciple which had brought the Kyoto Protocol to an impasse

However there was despair too as it proved to be very diffi cult to build a binding GHG mitigation regime applicable to all parties At Durban Canada became the fi rst developed country to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol while Japan Russia and New Zealand declared that they too would withdraw at the start of the second commitment period unless dra-matic improvements are made to the existing regime Hope and despair at Durban both centered on the issue of binding GHG emission com-mitments for developing countries especially the advanced developing

134 S KIM

countries such as China India Brazil and Korea Durban thus served to clearly demonstrate the deadlock at which the global climate change regime currently fi nds itself

This deadlock brought the Kyoto Protocol regime to breaking point toward the end of the fi rst commitment period The fi rst and most impor-tant cause was the CBDR principle Thanks to scientifi c evidence sup-porting that climate change has been triggered by the large amounts of historic GHG emissions by industrialized countries even developed coun-tries hardly opposed the CBDR principle and agreed that developed coun-tries must spearhead global emissions reduction efforts and pay for related costs 7 However for developed countries to take the lead is one thing to be exempt is something else completely

The USA withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol when its insistence on binding commitments by developing countries was not accepted While the USA agreed with the principle that developed countries must take on a relatively larger share of the burden it demanded that all parties must par-ticipate in the GHG mitigation efforts in some capacity citing the fact that developing countries bear partial responsibility for climate change given their rapid industrialization and population growth 8 The crux of the US argument was that while developing countries need not fulfi ll the same commitments as developed countries they as members of the interna-tional community should still share some of the burden by setting binding mitigation targets and devising a detailed plan for meeting these targets in line with their respective levels of development

Moreover the USA and EU position at earlier COPs was that the advanced developing countries whose actual level of development is close to that of developed countries must commit to binding emissions tar-gets 9 Binding commitments were applicable only to developed countries while the same obligation was deferred for advanced developing countries which are also some of the worldrsquos largest CO 2 emitters (China [largest] India [third largest] Korea [seventh largest] Indonesia [ninth largest]) This was met with the fi ercest opposition from developed countries The USA was very clear from the get-go that it would not join if advanced developing countries particularly China and India did not participate Even the EU which has led the Kyoto regime insisted on a new agree-ment ldquoapplicable to all Partiesrdquo starting with the second commitment period and spearheaded the adoption of the Durban Platform However major advanced developing countries continue to insist on nonbinding voluntary participation citing the historical responsibility of developed


countries Accordingly international negotiations that aim at the creation of a new global regime to combat climate change fi nd themselves amid choppy waters

The second limitation of the Kyoto regime involves the issue of scale The 192 signatory nations that comprise the regime meet once a year over a period of two or so weeks to discuss issues and seek solutions It has become evident that this large-scale and short-term operational scheme is not effi cient given the divergent and opposing interests that are rep-resented Accordingly some are voicing the need for ldquoclub politicsrdquo 10 In other words there are calls for an attempt to effi ciently reach agree-ments through a small gathering of key countries responsible for most of the worldrsquos GHG emissions rather than rely on a regime like that of the Kyoto Protocol wherein all countries of the international society partici-pate The US-led Major Economies Forum (MEF) is a notable example of club politics at work Addressing climate change as the main agenda at G20 G8 G8+5 and other gatherings of worldrsquos leading nations can also be regarded as a form of club politics However there is also strong opposition to such an approach Some question the legitimacy of a new regime founded outside the UN framework as well as the legitimacy of the rules agreed upon by a small handful of nations that do not include mem-bers of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which are most directly impacted by climate change

To resolve these problems developing countries should make legally binding mitigation commitments commensurate with their respective capabilities So far however China and other G77 countries are refus-ing to commit agreeing only to voluntary nonbinding participation in the regime Another resolution would be for the USA and other devel-oped countries to accept the deferment of commitments for developing countries into the second commitment period However most devel-oped countries of the Umbrella Group have expressed their intention to withdraw unless there are binding emission commitments by developing countries Furthermore without meaningful participation of advanced developing countries there is no practical way to combat the global crisis of climate change

Therefore the very possibility of a post-Kyoto regime hinges on the question of developing country participation Against the backdrop of this standoff what if an advanced developing country declares that it will actively curb emissions and encourage its neighbors to do the same It is unlikely that developed countries will change their stance However

136 S KIM

with a change in position of an advanced developing country a niche might be created for a possible breakthrough in the deadlock Korearsquos cli-mate change diplomacy detailed in the following section demonstrates the appropriate identity a middle power must assume and the actions it must take in such a situation

73 SOUTH KOREArsquoS CLIMATE CHANGE DIPLOMACY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

731 Historical Development From Passive Observer to Active Leader

The discussion on climate change diplomacy began in Korea dur-ing the Roh Tae-woo administration in 1992 upon the founding of the UNFCCC Korearsquos position at the time was typical of a developing country Korea supported the CBDR principle and insisted that devel-oped countries must transfer technology and offer fi nancial assistance to developing countries in order to tackle climate change Domestically the Ministerial Meeting on the Global Environment chaired by the prime minister was set up to respond to international discussion Nevertheless it can be said that Korearsquos overall awareness on addressing climate change was lacking at the time

Three main developments are found in Korearsquos climate change diplo-macy during the President Kim Young-samrsquos ldquoCivilian Government ( MunminJeongbu )rdquo inaugurated in February 1993 First Korea ratifi ed the UNFCCC without much debate on December 14 1993 The treaty was cited as a means for Korea to voice its position in the global stage tran-sition to an energy-saving industrial structure and minimize related costs and responsibilities by leveraging Korearsquos status as a developing country

Second Korea made it clear that it would maintain its ldquodeveloping countryrdquo status when it joined the OECD Korea became an offi cial mem-ber state of the OECD in December 1996 and withdrew from G77 in April 1997 It was a de facto declaration that Korea had entered the ranks of industrialized countries However Korea had joined the UNFCCC as a developing country and there was also consent from OECD members that Korea would maintain its developing country status even upon its accession to the OECD


Third the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP3 toward the end of the Kim Young-sam administration on December 11 1997 However Korea did not come up with any specifi c diplomatic strategies and held fast to its passive position of merely supporting the argument that binding emis-sion commitments were only applicable to developed countries and that Korea and other developing countries were exempt from making such commitments Korea was at the brink of sovereign insolvency due to the Asian Financial Crisis and had just signed an agreement for an IMF bail-out program on December 3 1997 As such the nation did not have the wherewithal for the UNFCCC Furthermore there were concerns that GHG emissions reduction could exacerbate the severe economic crisis the country was facing In sum while the international society took important steps to tackle climate change Korea did not devise any special strategies and was merely a passive observer

President Kim Dae-jungrsquos ldquoPeoplersquos Government ( Gungmin- uiJeongbu )rdquo took offi ce on February 25 1998 and Korea signed the Kyoto Protocol later that year on September 25 During the Kim Dae-jung administration several institutional frameworks were set up to effectively respond to the Kyoto Protocol First the Pan-governmental Organization for Climate Change Convention headed by the prime minister was estab-lished in April 1998 Then in September 2001 the bodyrsquos status was ele-vated from a mere ldquomeetingrdquo of relevant ministers to a committee and was named the Committee for Climate Change Convention chaired by the prime minister and comprised the representatives from several rele-vant ministries and agencies such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy and Ministry of Environment The committee was founded to serve as an integrated coordinating body However it became mired in the confl icts and rivalries of bureaucratic politics and is assessed to have failed in carrying out its intended function

Second comprehensive national plans to address UNFCCC were devised The fi rst plan of February 1999 and the second plan of June 2000 outline the following as the main tasks strengthening negotiation competencies curbing GHG emissions and developing technologies for energy effi ciency bolstering emission mitigation measures building the basis for statistical tabulation and analysis and inducing public participa-tion Third efforts were made to enact comprehensive law legislation on climate change On December 21 and December 27 2011 bills for global warming prevention and on GHG mitigation measures were respectively proposed The two bills represented the very fi rst proposals for framework

138 S KIM

legislations on climate change However they were met with strong oppo-sition from the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy which rep-resent the interests of the industrial sector The Environment and Labor Committee of the National Assembly ultimately failed to mediate the clashes and the bills were subsequently discarded

The Kim Dae-jung administration did make a lot more progress than its predecessors on the diplomatic front as well COP5 in 1999 was meaning-ful in that the Korean government put forth a more active diplomatic posi-tion than in the past Korea expressed its intention to make ldquovoluntary and nonbindingrdquo GHG emissions reduction efforts if a sweeping agreement is reached on a new means of participation for developing countries When pressure from developed countries later mounted for developing countries to partake in emission mitigation efforts Korea pondered the best course of action for safeguarding Korean national interests while not compromis-ing the nationrsquos international stature The resulting outcomes were the proposal for unilateral CDM and the establishment of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) at COP6

During President Roh Moo-hyunrsquos Participatory Government ( ChamyeoJeongbu ) inaugurated in February 2003 no notable climate change policy was adopted apart from the third comprehensive national plan to address UNFCCC in February 2005 and the revised and expanded version of the third plan in March 2006 after the Kyoto Protocol went into effect The Kyoto Protocol which was on the verge of dissolution due to the US withdrawal went into force in dramatic fashion with Russiarsquos rati-fi cation Korea in the meantime still did not have GHG mitigation tar-gets and related policies were being formulated by the business-friendly Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy Due to this lack of response capabilities concerning climate change the country maintained its passive diplomatic stance

It was with the Lee Myung-bak administration starting in 2008 that Korea shed its passivity and began taking the lead in active middle power climate change diplomacy President Lee Myung-bak took offi ce in February 25 2008 and under the guiding principle of LCGG made noteworthy strides on the issue of climate change On the domestic front the Presidential Committee on Green Growth was founded the National Strategy and Five-Year Plan for Green Growth were announced Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth Smart Grid Promotion Act and Green Building Construction Support Act were enacted and sector-specifi c GHG emissions reduction targets were set In the inter-


national arena Korea pledged GHG mitigation targets founded the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) expanded green overseas direct assistance drafted the Declaration on Green Growth proposed a green growth strategy at Rio+20 and came to host the Green Climate Fund (GCF) secretariat For its signifi cant achievements Korea was recognized as a foremost leader and benchmark case in climate change response by the UNEP and OECD When it comes to the issue of climate change Korea as a middle power state was never more diplomatically active and its global leadership role never more notable than during the Lee admin-istration (Table 71 )

Table 71 South Korearsquos diplomatic position at COPs

COP YearLocation South Korearsquos diplomatic position

1 1995Berlin Stressed the strengthening of developed countriesrsquo pledges and the importance of technology transfer to developing countries

2 1996Geneva Underscored the necessity of fi nancial assistance and technology transfer to developing countries

3 1997Kyoto Explained the diffi cult situation Korea was facing due to the Asian Financial Crisis publicized Korearsquos work on transitioning to an eco-friendly industrial system and other voluntary efforts at combatting climate change

4 1998Buenos Aires Regarding binding commitments for developing countries highlighted the principle of CBDR and the need for a set grace period to alleviate related burden

5 1999Bonn Expressed for the fi rst time Korearsquos willingness to participate in voluntary and nonbinding GHG mitigation efforts

6-1 2000The Hague Proposed and spearheaded the founding of EIG proposed unilateral CDM expressed willingness to partake efforts at global Kyoto Protocol ratifi cation by 2002

6-2 2001Bonn Maintained existing position on CDM technology transfer to developing countries and other main issues pertaining to Kyoto Protocol implementation and undertook negotiations to muster support for unilateral CDM

7 2001Marrakesh Pushed forward national registration system project built cooperative ties at fi rst-ever Asia Group Meeting maintained concrete cooperative ties with Brazil Mexico and other developing countries

(continued)

140 S KIM

Table 71 (continued)


8 2002New Delhi Joined EIG talks closely collaborated with Mexico declared Korearsquos Kyoto Protocol ratifi cation

9 2003Milan On behalf of EIG proposed joint RampD to promote technology transfer

10 2004Buenos Aires On behalf of EIG called for the development of new GHG emissions reduction method that take into consideration developing countriesrsquo circumstances and requested technology transfer to developing countries by developed countries

11 2005Montreal Expressed intention to participate in efforts on countering climate change in a manner that does not impede sustained economic growth reviewed post-2012 voluntary and nonbinding emissions mitigation method stressed developed countriesrsquo greater weight of responsibility pursued entry of Korean experts into the newly established Compliance Committee and other relevant bodies welcomed adoption of unilateral CDM

12 2006Nairobi Set forth opinion that binding mitigation commitments should only be applicable to developed countries even after 2012 raised the need for securing the continuity of the Kyoto Protocol and improvements to relevant processes in order to spur CDM held the position that it is premature to revise the Kyoto Protocol

13 2007Bali Presented Korearsquos fourth national comprehensive plan on countering climate change expressed active interest in taking part in talks regarding the post-2012 regime held the position that developed countries should make binding commitments for deeper emission cuts while developing countries should make voluntary mitigation efforts

14 2008Poznan Confi rmed interest in taking part in talks regarding the post-2012 regime maintained position set forth at COP13

15 2009Copenhagen President Lee Myung-bak presented Korearsquos ldquoLow Carbon Green Growthrdquo policy in keynote address declared voluntary emissions target (30 below BAU levels by 2020) proposed NAMA Registry for registering developing countriesrsquo voluntary GHG mitigation activities declared establishment of GGGI announced Korearsquos intention to serve as a bridge between developed and developing countries by adopting the ldquome fi rstrdquo approach proposed hosting COP18 in Korea

(continued)




16 2010Cancun Confi rmed intention to serve as a bridge between developed and developing nations and champion the position of middle powers expressed desire to host COP18 stressed establishment of NAMA Registry proposed setting up a body for joint technology development and transfer publicized Korearsquos Framework Act on Green Growth and GHGEnergy Target Management scheme reported founding of GGGI presented the G20 Seoul Declaration

17 2011Durban Expressed desire to host GCF secretariat stressed that requiring identical binding commitments from all parties could result in the level of commitments being standardized downward supported voluntary emissions reduction for developing countries welcomed establishment of NAMA Registry

18 2012Doha Selected as the offi cial host of GCF secretariat 19 2013Warsaw Declared determination to have GCF up and running as

quickly as possible urged contributions from developed nations in raising funds for GCF announced talks to raise long-term climate fund for developing countries

20 2014Lima Announced launching a new roadmap 2020 and a nationwide Emission Trading Scheme reconfi rmed 100 million dollar contribution to the GCF called on participation of all members in the new agreement

732 Characteristics and Behaviors of South Korearsquos Middle Power Climate Change Diplomacy

(1) Early Mover As detailed earlier there are two schisms that characterize the global

landscape with regard to climate change The fi rst division is among developed country groups It stems from industrialized countriesrsquo differ-ing respective positions on national interest and developing country par-ticipation The second division is that between developed and developing countries over responsibility and developing countriesrsquo participation in GHG mitigation efforts Active emissions reduction by advanced develop-ing countries is one of the best ways to alleviate these two divisions and break the deadlock Both schisms owe themselves to the issue of emis-sions reduction by developing countries China India Korea and other

142 S KIM

advanced developing countries in particular which are in the ranks of the worldrsquos ten largest GHG emitters are the very cause of the divisions as well as the key to undoing them Under these circumstances Korea has been building up its international standing on the climate change issue by tak-ing initiatives and voluntary actions both domestically and internationally

Korearsquos ldquoearly moverrdquo strategy was an appropriate means of tackling the two schisms The expression early mover was fi rst used by President Lee Myung-bak as follows at the 34th G8 Summit held in Japan in July 2008 ldquoKorea will not hesitate to become an lsquoearly moverrsquo in the inter-national community regarding climate change and energy problemrdquo 11 In the following year on December 17 he underscored Korearsquos early- mover approach as a middle power in the keynote address at COP 15 in Copenhagen ldquoIf we wish to make any real difference the only way is to take action together Instead of saying lsquoyou fi rstrsquo we should start by saying lsquome fi rstrsquo Tackling climate change must begin with each of us doing our own part and once we do we can start a truly positive cycle around the worldrdquo 12 In stressing the ldquome fi rstrdquo approach in the speech he declared that Korea an advanced developing country will curb GHG emissions and lead by example

So what was Korea going to ldquodo fi rstrdquo and how First Korea made a pledge to the international society to meet the most rigorous emissions targets for a developing country Until then Korea which was exempt from binding commitments on curbing GHG emissions had not pro-posed any mitigation targets whatsoever

As promised Korea announced its own mid-term mitigation goal As a non- annex I country we made a voluntary and unilateral pledge that satisfi es the highest demand recommended by the international community As you know the Korean economy has always been very energy-intensive For the last fi fteen years our GHG emissions almost doubled For such a country meeting this pledge is no easy task at all But Korea chose to be an early- mover when it comes to tackling climate change Various stakeholders met numerous times to listen to each otherrsquos concerns and needs And in the end we came to an agreement We all agreed that we must do this because acting fi rst is good for us and good for the world Yes I believe a ldquoMe fi rst attituderdquo is the fastest way to save our planet 13

The ldquohighest demand recommended by the international communityrdquo here refers to 30 below BAU level by 2020 (4 cut from 2005 emissions


levels) as the mitigation target for developing countries recommended by IPCC is in the range of 15ndash30 Despite economic diffi culties at home South Korea demonstrated its determination to be an early mover Then in July 2011 the Korean Government came up with a draft proposal for curbing GHG emissions and devised detailed emission mitigation goals and roadmaps for seven sectors (Table 72 )

The second action taken was setting up a domestic institutional frame-work (policies and laws) In his fi rst year in offi ce President Lee Myung- bak declared LCGG as the new administrationrsquos national vision in a speech delivered on August 15 2008 to celebrate the sixty-third anniversary of national liberation and the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea He defi ned green growth as sustainable growth which helps reduce GHG emission and environmental pollution and at the same time a new development paradigm that creates new growth engines and jobs with green technology and clean energy This was followed by poli-cies and laws that were put in place to realize LCGG On the policy front the Presidential Committee on Green Growth was founded to serve as a control tower On July 6 2009 the Presidential Committee on Green Growth announced ldquothe Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009ndash2013)rdquo and declared Korearsquos goal of becoming one of the worldrsquos top seven and top fi ve green nations by 2020 and 2050 respectively The plan delin-eates the following three strategies to reach this goal (1) Adapt to cli-mate change and realize energy independence (2) Develop new growth engines (3) Enhance the quality of life and elevate Korearsquos international standing

On the legislative front the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth a comprehensive legal basis for responding to climate change was enacted in April 2011 The act stipulates overarching measures to combat climate change including the establishment of the Presidential Committee on Low Carbon Green Growth mandatory formulation and implementa-

Table 72 Below-BAU mitigation targets by sector

Industry Generation Transport Buildings Agriculture forestry and fi shery

Waste Public and other

Nation as a whole

182 267 343 269 52 123 25 30

Source Greenhouse Gas Inventory amp Research Center of Korea ldquoGHG Mitigation Targetsrdquo

144 S KIM

tion of a basic plan on countering climate change every fi ve years and provision of support for the development of green technologies and new renewable energy The Lee administration thus institutionalized measures for Korea to combat climate change through domestic legislations This sets the Lee government apart from its predecessors whose focus was more on responding to the UNFCCC rather than climate change 14

(2) Bridge ldquoBridgerdquo is a keyword in middle power diplomacy Conceptually a

middle power is at a position between that of a great power and a small power Accordingly a middle power as a bridge serves as a link between a great power and a small power playing the role of mediator when the two sides are at odds and of a channel for communication when there is a breakdown in dialogue With regard to the issue of climate change a middle powerrsquos role as a bridge is essential for breaking the deadlock the international society currently fi nds itself in There is China and other developing countries on one side standing in sharp opposition to the USA and other developed countries of the Umbrella Group on the other To resolve this standoff a middle power sides with neither groups and continues to propose ideas that opposing sides can accommodate

As of 2011 China was the worldrsquos biggest CO 2 emitter followed by the USA Upon overtaking the USA in 2005 China is currently responsible for some 30 of the worldrsquos GHG emissions At this rate Chinarsquos emis-sions volume is projected to be double that of the USA by 2015 and equal to the combined emissions of the USA and EU by 2020 Nevertheless China maintains that developed countries should continue to be subject to binding emission targets while refusing to hold any international responsi-bility for GHG emissions necessary for its own national economic growth As such Chinarsquos position is likely to not only shape the global climate change regime but also determine the regimersquos very survival

The USA the second largest CO 2 emitter whose emissions account for around 15 of the global total in the meantime is refusing to be part of the Kyoto regime and is determined to go solo unless China participates Ever since President Obama took offi ce his progressive-leaning adminis-tration has expressed its strong determination to make deep GHG emis-sion cuts However citing the erosion of the US national competitiveness and the absence of developing country participation the Congress is blocking the passage of a bill to federally mandate GHG mitigation In the USA an international treaty is not ratifi ed unless it is domestically legis-


lated through an agreement reached by various stakeholders 15 Therefore it is diffi cult to expect the USA to take on a leadership role in combating climate change both globally and domestically on the back of the execu-tive branchrsquos efforts alone

Diffusing this standoff holds the key to building a post-Kyoto regime and bolstering the global regime for countering climate change The EU has taken on a leadership role on various fronts to break this deadlock but its range of actions is limited given that it too is a developed country bear-ing the historical responsibility for climate change Against this backdrop Korea took on the self-designated role of a bridge The very fi rst task listed in the diplomatic action plan for ldquothe Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009ndash2013)rdquo is as follows ldquoServe as a bridge between developed and developing countries by making constructive proposals at climate change negotiationsrdquo This is indicative of the foremost priority of Korearsquos cli-mate change diplomacy at the time serving as an effective bridge to raise Korearsquos stature in the international community

Korea even though of developing country status did try to put forth proposals that both developed and developing countries would fi nd accept-able even before the Lee Myung-bak administration A case in point is unilateral CDM 16 Korea devised the scheme and proposed it to the inter-national society at COP6 in 2000 CDM awards a developed country with emission reduction credits when its investments in a developing country lead to GHG emission cuts As developing countries are not subject to emission reduction commitments according to the Kyoto Protocol there were no provisions for emission mitigation activities between develop-ing countries Homing in on this point South Korea proposed unilateral CDM an instrument that would extend credits to a developing country for domestic investments or investments in another developing country that result in GHG mitigation Unilateral CDM is benefi cial to develop-ing countries as they can get credits for making investments within their respective borders For developed countries it is an incentive to encourage emissions mitigation efforts by developing countries At fi rst the proposal was met with opposition from both sides developed countries regarded it as a means for advanced developing countries to evade responsibility while developing countries considered it an indirect form of a binding emission commitment Nonetheless the proposalrsquos validity and importance were eventually recognized and unilateral CDM was adopted by the parties to the UNFCCC 17

146 S KIM

The NAMA Registry proposed by the Lee Myung-bak administra-tion also illustrates South Korearsquos understanding of its role as a bridge between developed and developing countries NAMA Registry is a scheme wherein developing countries can register voluntary efforts to curb emis-sions with the UNFCCC and receive credits for certain mitigation actions Developing countries can thus get international recognition for domestic emission reduction actions and thus participate in the global effort to curb GHG emissions in a meaningful manner And based on this they are also rewarded with fi nancial and technological assistance For developed coun-tries the registry ensures MRV mitigation efforts by developing coun-tries thus securing the transparency of the relevant assistance they provide to developing countries It also promotes voluntary developing country participation

The Korean government has thus endeavored to devise and propose measures for the international community that would satisfy both oppos-ing sides However the tour de force of South Korearsquos ldquobridge diplo-macyrdquo was its winning bid to host the GCF secretariat a feat that went beyond the mere proposal of ideas GCF is an international climate change fund founded to support developing countries with GHG emissions miti-gation and climate change adaptation GCF can be regarded as an inter-national apparatus with bridge-like features as it is where funds are pooled from developed countries and fi nancial assistance extended to developing countries It would not be farfetched to say that the Korean government applied all its capabilities to achieve the remarkable feat of winning the bid to host the GCF secretariat

It was decided at the 112th Ministers Meeting for International Economics on November 25 2011 that Korea would make a bid to host the GCF At COP17 in Durban the environment minister who headed the Korean delegation expressed Korearsquos desire to host the GCF in his keynote address Korea was the fi rst nation to announce such a bid At the unoffi cial talks Korea also proposed to host the second GCF board meeting fi nance the operations of the interim secretariat and host a GCF- related international forum South Korearsquos active and engaging approach was welcomed by both the developed countries including the USA Canada Japan Australia Germany and Switzerland as well as the devel-oping countries such as Mexico Saudi Arabia the Philippines Egypt and Indonesia 18

Six nations made their bids to host the GCF Germany Mexico Namibia Poland South Korea and Switzerland 19 Winning the bid


required votes from at least 13 out of the 24 member states of the GCF board Korearsquos odds were very slim 20 as the nine European nations on the board (seven EU nations Norway and Georgia) had decided to sup-port Germany and the developing nation votes were expected to be split among Korea (Asia) Mexico (South America) and Namibia (Africa) 21 Under the circumstances not only the president but also the prime min-isterrsquos offi ce Ministry of Strategy and Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Ministry of Environment as well as the city of Incheon and even the National Assembly focused all their capabilities into winning the bid to host the GCF secretariat

Korea presented six main reasons that it would be the best host for the secretariat First Korea is optimized for the role of a bridge between developing and developed countries as it understands both the diffi culties facing the former and the concerns of the latter Second Korea which designated green growth as the national vision is a benchmark case in the effort to combat climate Third most of the major international environ-mental organizations are in Europe and North America and even Africa has the UNEP but Asia is not home to any Fourth while South Korea is of a developing country status it still made a voluntary pledge of $40 million in funding support to the GCF Fifth Incheonrsquos Songdo is a conveniently located eco-friendly city Fifth the I-Tower in Songdo was available to the CGF for permanent rent-free and immediate residence 22 Korea also stressed its national competencies and determination as a strong middle power citing its active role as a bridge in the global arena and its early- mover approach at home regarding the efforts to counter climate change

The USA Spain Czech Republic Belize Egypt and Philippines were the six nations appointed to comprise the GCF secretariat Host Country Evaluation Committee The GCF board would vote based on the report from the Evaluation Committee which assessed the bids in the following four categories (1) legal status (2) privileges and immunities (3) fi nancial arrangements administrative and logistical support (4) local facilities and conditions Mexico (yellow light rating in (4)) Poland (red light rating in (2)) and Namibia (yellow light rating in (1) and (4)) did not make the cut Switzerland Korea and Germany in the meantime received green light rat-ings in all the evaluation categories 23 Through a secret ballot at the second meeting of the GCF board Korea won the bid to host the GCF secretariat 24

There were four main reasons behind the GCF boardrsquos decision to award the bid to Korea First Korea had pledged a GCF corporate entity status for the GFC and $2 million in funding the fi rst large fi nancial

148 S KIM

pledge by a country without binding emissions commitments Second the overwhelming consensus was that it would be preferable to establish the GCF secretariat at a location distant from the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn Germany Third Korea is in a region of the world projected to show the highest rate of economic growth and in turn the highest increase in GHG emissions Fourth Korea had founded GGGI and the 18 member states of this international organization on climate change were also mem-bers of the GCF board Furthermore the shift to the LCGG paradigm which Korea had continued to champion is one of the most important principles held by the GCF 25 In sum the outcome owed itself not only to Korearsquos geographical location and willingness to make fi nancial contribu-tions but also represented the international societyrsquos recognition of the countryrsquos domestic and foreign efforts

(3) Coalition Coordinator It is not easy for a middle power to go up against opposing large powers

to lay down its demands and win the international societyrsquos approval even if the validity of the demands are partially recognized Accordingly middle power diplomacy requires building a cooperative network of nations of similar international stature or with common interests on a given issue A noteworthy example of a coalition of middle powers is the EIG founded at COP6 in 2000 on the back of Korearsquos proposal

Understanding EIGrsquos uniqueness requires an examination of the power confi guration of the UNFCCC There are six offi cial UNFCCC negotia-tion groups in the UNFCCC (United Nations Convention on Climate Change ldquoParty Groupingsrdquo) EU and the Umbrella Group make up the developed country bloc with binding emissions obligations and G77 AOSIS and the LDCs form developing country bloc Within this devel-oped countries-versus-developing countries negotiation structure Korea was part of G77 and supported coalitionrsquos negotiation positions when COP was fi rst launched However as Korea became a member of OECD and also one of the worldrsquos top ten GHG emitters Korearsquos developing country status no longer seemed fi tting and Korea faced pressure to make emission mitigation commitments Against this backdrop Korea opted for a strategy of creating a negotiation group comprising the middle powers that were neither developing nor developed countries and of building a coalition of countries with common interests to take collective action

Korea established EIG with Switzerland Mexico Lichtenstein and Monaco 26 and began participating in negotiations to advance EIGrsquos inter-


ests and concerns With the recognition of EIG as an offi cial negotiating group at COP6 Korea could have participated in formal and informal negotiation meetings Given that most UNFCCC negotiations take place at negotiation group sessions forming the EIG and being granted access to these sessions was a major diplomatic feat for Korea

Since its establishment in 2000 the EIG has adhered to its position of neutrality striving to maintain an appropriate balance between the devel-oped countries and developing countries negotiation groups The open-ing statements of the negotiation groups at COP17 in Durban effectively demonstrate their respective positions 27 As for the two developed coun-try groups the EU called for a comprehensive framework to which all members of the international community could agree while the Umbrella Group urged China India and other advanced developing countries to take on binding mitigation commitments The developing countries on the other hand emphasized the balance in having those that have polluted the most take responsibility for their actions EIG in the meantime main-tained its neutrality and adhered to fundamental principles siding with neither of the developed countries

Then at the meeting of the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in June 2014 EIG expressed sup-port for a legally binding instrument that subjects all member nations to emission reduction commitments However it also stated that the com-mitments must be at ldquodifferent depthsrdquo thus stressing that the respective circumstances of the nations be taken into consideration 28 In short EIG has continued to maintain the basic position that it respects the agreements of the UNFCCC and that it supports the creation of a post-Kyoto global regime to combat climate change At the same time the group has remained strictly neutral not expressing clear support for neither the CBDR prin-ciple nor the idea of binding commitments commensurate with respective capabilities As a nation of developing country status but with developed country capabilities Korea is assessed to have effectively leveraged EIG a partnership network bound together by common interests and concerns to secure the nationrsquos unique standing and in so doing advance its interests

Another coalition-building effort by Korea is the Korean-Danish Green Growth Alliance that was signed in May 2011 It was a strategic partner-ship between ldquofi rst moverrdquo Denmark and ldquofast moverrdquo Korea for the lat-terrsquos realization of LCGG 29 The two nations signed 20 MOUs which included those on hydrogen-powered vehicles fuel cells energy effi ciency and wind power industry at the two meetings held in 2011 and 2012

150 S KIM

Particularly noteworthy is that Korea and Denmark sought to generate a synergy effect by signing ten MOUs in science and technology and marine shipping the two areas of forte for both nations

Leveraging this bilateral environmental partnership Korea and Denmark also agreed to strengthen cooperation on the global stage on issues of common interest including turning GGGI into an international organization and declaring support for green growth at the Rio+20 con-ference It appears that for Korea this partnership will be used as a spring-board to enter into alliances with diverse fi rst ldquogreenrdquo movers with the goal of elevating Korearsquos standing in international society

(4) Norm Diffuser Middle power diplomacy is always shaped in part by the establishment

and diffusion of international norms As stated before Cooper Higgott and Nossal classify middle powers as catalysts facilitators and managers based on their diplomatic behavioral patterns Managers are described as follows ldquoManagers emphasize institution-building creating formal orga-nizations or regimes and developing conventions and normsrdquo 30 That is to say one of the defi ning characteristics of middle power diplomacy is its contribution to building international institutions or developing interna-tional norms with regard to global issues On the climate change front Korea has not been a norm creator or norm entrepreneur like the EU (Germany and the UK in particular) but as a middle power it has carried out the role of a norm diffuser

In terms of norms it was with the idea of ldquogreen growthrdquo that Korea fi rst stepped to the fore and played an active role in its diffusion The concept of green growth which made its debut in January 2000 began circulating in the international community through the World Economic Forum in Davos 31 The adoption of Seoul Initiative for Green Growth at the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacifi c (MCED-5) held in Seoul in March 2005 triggered an active discussion on the green growth in all corners of the world and green growth appears frequently in documents issued by global organiza-tions including the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifi c (UNESCAP) UNEP OECD and G20 32

The UNESCAP defi nes green growth as economic progress that fosters environmentally sustainable low carbon and socially inclusive develop-ment 33 Green growth does not appear all that different from sustainable development which is defi ned as ldquodevelopment that meets the needs of the


present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needrdquo 34 Between the two words that comprise it sustainable development is a norm that focuses more on ldquosustainabilityrdquo over ldquodevel-opmentrdquo Green growth as a norm in the meantime stresses ldquogrowthrdquo over ldquogreenrdquo Green growth like sustainable development advocates the position that environmental protection need not come at the expense of economic prosperity Unlike sustainable development however green growth clearly highlights the issue of economic development Green growth is aimed at preserving energy and resources while also using them effi ciently to prevent climate change and mitigate environmental damage It also stipulates the creation of new national growth engines through research and development on clean energy and green technology and through green job creation Therefore if sustainable development is the discourse of environmentalists green growth is that of policymakers And if the former is the mother the latter is the formerrsquos offspring with the same genetic makeup but differing traits 35

By designating green growth as a national strategy of the highest order the Lee Myung-bak administration secured Korearsquos global leadership on norm diffusion pertaining to green growth Upon declaring the adoption of the LCGG strategy in 2008 South Korea has been an active diffuser of green growth on the global stage Consequently green growth has come to be considered a concept to which Korea has exclusive ownership and control Korearsquos efforts at green growth norm diffusion can be summa-rized as follows (Table 73 )

Particularly noteworthy is the founding of GGGI Korea devised an excellent strategy to disseminate the green growth model It set up an international organization specializing in green cooperation on Korean soil GGGI was the fi rst-ever international organization established under Korean leadership to be housed in Korea GGGI was founded on June 16 2010 as a nonprofi t organization with 18 member nations under Article 32 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Korea It was made an interna-tional organization on October 18 2012 (Global Green Growth Institute ldquoOrganizationrdquo) GGGIrsquos goal is the global diffusion of the green growth strategy The institutersquos activities aimed at capacity-building for the domes-tic implementation of green growth in developing countries include the establishment of the National Council on Green Growth development of green growth policies and provision of funding assistance GGGIrsquos mis-sion to disseminate the green growth model kicked off in 2010 in Brazil Ethiopia and Indonesia Its work expanded to Kazakhstan the United

152 S KIM

Arab Emirates and Cambodia in 2011 and then to the Amazon Basin China India Jordan Mongolia Peru Philippines Rwanda Thailand and Vietnam in 2012 (Global Green Growth Institute ldquoProgramsrdquo) In recognition of these efforts GGGI in less than a year of its status change to international organization was awarded ODA Eligibility Status 36 at the OECDmdashDevelopment Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) meeting on June 13 2013 (Global Green Growth Institute ldquoGGGI Receives ODA Eligibility Statusrdquo)

74 CONCLUSION This chapter looks at the kinds of diplomatic activities South Korea has carried out to attain its unique role as a middle power in the specialized niche of climate change Early mover bridge coalition coordinator and norm diffuser were identifi ed as the four roles played by middle powers in world politics and this chapter attempts to show how the specifi c actions and attitudes Korea adopted in its climate change diplomacy exhibited the characteristics of these roles

Korea had long maintained a passive observer position on the issue of climate change even upon joining the UNFCCC However when the global climate change regime entered into a deadlock situation due to the opposing interests and views of the parties to the UNFCCC this impasse created a special opportunity or niche in which Korea could take on a leading role Developed countries were insisting that developing countries make binding GHG emissions mitigation commitments while develop-ing countries were refusing to do so citing the historical responsibility that developed countries have to bear for triggering climate change It was between these two opposing sides that Korea could carve out a place

Table 73 Korearsquos global diffusion of green growth strategy

Year Events

2009 Spearheaded adoption of ldquoDeclaration on Green Growthrdquo at the Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level

2010 Led adoption of ldquoSeoul Action Planrdquo at the G20 Seoul Summit Founded GGGI

2011 GGGI hosted fi rst annual Global Green Growth Summit in Seoul 2012 President Lee Myung-back proposed the concept and strategy of green growth at

UNCSD (Rio+20)


to shine on the global stage With developing country status Korea was exempt from legally binding emission mitigation commitments However Korea was also an OECD member state and the worldrsquos seventh largest CO 2 emitter In short Korea found itself somewhere between the two opposite blocs not quite belonging to either China India and other developing countries were in positions similar to that of Korea However while these fellow advanced developing countries held fast to the develop-ing country blocrsquos position Korea abandoned its passive stance as of 2008 and turned itself into a leading champion of green growth in the global community The standoff between developed and developing countries centered on the question of the developing countriesrsquo meaningful partici-pation in global efforts to address climate change Against this backdrop Korearsquos ldquoconversionrdquo to more active engagement came as a surprise to both sides and served as a wakeup call helping to diffuse some of the ten-sion in the global climate change regime Korearsquos role as a green growth norm diffuser in particular was welcomed by developed countries and developing countries alike as the concept and practice of green growth not only justifi es the importance of environmental preservation but also underscores its economic benefi ts

There were four behavioral patterns Korearsquos middle power diplomacy exhibited in the climate change area a niche in international politics that Korea homed in on at an opportune moment First Korea was an early mover setting climate change response as the foremost national strat-egy and setting up a control tower national plan and comprehensive law to implement this strategy Second Korea played the role of a bridge between developed and developing countries siding with neither and pro-posing measures that would satisfy both sides The crowning achievement of Korearsquos bridge diplomacy was the nationrsquos winning bid to host the secretariat of the GCF the largest green fund that serves as a contact point between funds from developed countries and assistance for devel-oping countries Third as a coalition coordinator Korea served as a hub to rally like-minded states With other states whose respective national interests did not coincide with the positions set forth by the EU the Umbrella Group or the developing country bloc Korea formed the EIG and has been advancing the unique position of this independent negotia-tion group The Green Growth Alliance with Denmark can be regarded as another coalition-building activity Fourth Korea succeeded in taking the initiative on the concept of green growth and has undertaken the role of norm diffuser in the global arena GGGI the fi rst international organi-

154 S KIM

zation founded under Korearsquos leadership made signifi cant contributions in the diffusion of the green growth model in developing countries For this Korea is now recognized as a global green growth leader and green growth has come to be known in the international society as a distinctive emblem of Korean diplomacy

In short Korearsquos middle power climate change diplomacy can be assessed to have been successful Korea saw the issue of climate change as a niche where it could spread its diplomatic wings and went for it with full force leveraging all relevant national capabilities And the strategy proved to be effective Korea which had shown no particular forte in the issue of climate change used diplomacy to build a national brand image as a green leader and even won the bid to host the GCF secretariat Korearsquos case is expected to be the subject of many studies as an important example of niche diplomacy

The question now is whether Korearsquos climate change diplomacy will be assessed merely as a diplomatic accomplishment of a single adminis-tration or come to be representative of Korea as a middle power For the latter to happen Korea must be able to demonstrate to the interna-tional society its continued and wholehearted commitment to addressing climate change To this end domestic-level action is essential Building international credibility through rigorous internationalization rather than engaging in diplomatic rhetoric will be the key to securing middle power leadership in global climate change politics Furthermore Korea should present a detailed blueprint regarding its role as a bridge and contribute to creating and expanding a network of like-minded nations from both sides of the current standoff in order to overcome the current deadlock These are some of the tasks that lie ahead for Korearsquos middle power diplomacy

NOTES 1 Rahn Kim ldquoEnvironment Minister Yoo Chairs OECD Meeting in Parisrdquo

The Korea Times April 1 2012 accessed August 25 2015 httpwwwkoreatimescokrwwwnewsnation201204117_108148html

2 Olav Stokke Western Powers and Global Poverty The Determinants of the Aid Polices of Canada Denmark the Netherlands Norway and Sweden (Uppsala Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 1989) Cranford Pratt Middle Power Internationalism The North-South Dimension (Kingston McGill- Queenrsquos University Press 1990) Richard A Higgott and Andrew Fenton


Cooper ldquoMiddle Power Leadership and Coalition Building Australia the Caims Group and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiationsrdquo International Organizations 44 4 (1990) 589ndash632 Cooper Higgott and Nossal Relocating Middle Powers Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver UBC Press 1993) Andrew Fenton Cooper Niche Diplomacy Middle Powers after the Cold War (Houndmills Macmillan 1997)

3 Cooper Higgott and Nossal Relocating 19 4 Ibid 25ndash26 5 Kim Richard Nossal The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough

Ontario Prentice-Hall 1989) 50 6 Hongying Wang and Erik French ldquoMiddle Range Powers in Global

Governancerdquo Third World Quarterly 34 6 (2013) 985ndash986 7 Stephen M Gardiner ldquoEthics and Global Climate Changerdquo Ethics 114 3

(2004) 578ndash579 8 Chukwumerije Okereke ldquoThe Politics of Interstate Climate Negotiationsrdquo

in The Politics of Climate Change ed Maxwell T Boykoff (London and New York Routledge 2010) 49ndash50

9 Harley Stevenson ldquoIndia and International Norms of Climate Governance A Constructivist Analysis of Normative Congruence Buildingrdquo Review of International Studies 37 3 (2011) 1000

10 Robert O Keohane and David G Victor ldquoThe Regime Complex for Climate Changerdquo Perspectives on Politics 9 1 (2011) 9

11 Sun-young Park ldquoPresident Lee Vows to be lsquoEarly Moverrsquo in Climate Change Combatrdquo MK News July 9 2008 accessed August 25 2015 httpnewsmkcokrnewsReadphpyear=2008ampno=430780

12 ldquoFull Text of S Korean Presidentrsquos Keynote Speech at UN Climate Conferencerdquo Yonhap News December 17 2009 accessed August 25 2015 httpenglishyonhapnewscokrnational20091216880301000000AEN20091216007600315FHTML

13 Ibid 14 It was during the Lee administration that all the so-called Four Major Laws

on Climate ChangemdashFramework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth Smart Grid Promotion Act Act on Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances and Green Building Construction Support Actmdashwere enacted

15 Elizabeth R DeSombre Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy Industry Environmentalists and US Power (Cambridge MIT Press 2000)

16 Investment in a developing country by a developed counterpart is called ldquobilateral CDMrdquo Given that investment in a developing country by

156 S KIM

another developing country involves only developing nations it is thus referred to as ldquounilateral CDMrdquo

17 On April 23 2005 the CDM Executive Board authorized the registration of Cuyamapa hydroelectric project in Honduras as the fi rst unilateral CDM project thereby giving the offi cial green light to unilateral CDM As of 2009 unilateral CDM projects accounted for some 70 of all CDM projects

18 Ministry of Strategy and Finance White Paper on Hosting the Green Climate Fund Sejong Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2013

19 Green Climate Fund ldquoSelection of the Host Country of the Fundrdquo GCFB01-1209 August 3 2012 accessed August 25 2015 httpgcfundnetfi leadmin00_customerdocumentspdfB101-1209_Selection_of_host_country_FINAL_6Augpdf 6ndash7

20 The board was composed of 24 nations 12 developed and 12 developing The 12 developed nations were seven EU nationsmdashUK Sweden Denmark France Germany Poland and Spain the USA Australia Japan Russia and Norway The 12 developing nations were China Indonesia and India (3 Asia) Mexico Belize and Colombia (3 South America) Benin Egypt South Africa (3 Africa) Zambia (1 LCDsAfrica) Barbados (1 AOSISSouth America) and Georgia (Other)

21 Ministry of Strategy and Finance White Paper on Hosting the Green Climate Fund (Sejong Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2013) 38

22 Ibid 40ndash41 23 Green Climate Fund ldquoReport of the Host Country Evaluation

Committeerdquo GCFB02-1204 October 5 2012 accessed August 25 2015 httpwwwgcfundnetfi leadmin00_customerdocumentspdfB02_Report_of_the_Host_Country_Evaluation_Committee_5_Octpdf 7 10 13 16 17 20 23

24 Green Climate Fund ldquoReport of the Second Meeting of the Board 18ndash20 October 2012rdquo GCFB02-1213 March 14 2013 accessed August 25 2015 httpwwwgcfundnetfi leadmin00_customerdocumentspdfB_02-12_13__Report_of_the_Meeting_13March2013pdf 7

25 Liane Schalatek Setting the Course The Third Meeting of the Green Climate Fund Board Lays the Groundwork for Key Decisions later This Year (Washington DC Heinrich Boll Stiftung 2013) 14

26 Switzerland and Lichtenstein are non-EU European countries while Mexico like Korea is an OECD member state with a developing country status in the UNFCCC

27 Earth Negotiations Bulletin ldquoDurban Highlights Monday 28 November 2011rdquo November 29 2011 accessed August 25 2015 httpwwwiisdcavol12enb12524ehtml


28 United Nations Convention on Climate Change ldquoParty Groupingsrdquo accessed August 25 2015 httpunfcccintparties_and_observerspar-tiesnegotiating_groupsitems2714php

29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark ldquoStrategic Partnership and Green Growth Alliancerdquo accessed August 25 2015 httpsydkoreaumdkenabout-koreastrategic-partnership-and-green-growth-alliance

30 Cooper Higgott and Nossal Relocating 1993 19 31 ldquoGreen Growthrdquo The Economist January 27 2000 accessed August 25

2015 httpwwweconomistcomnode328735 32 UNEP is the only exception preferring the use of ldquogreen economyrdquo 33 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifi c

ldquoGreen Growth Resources and Resilience Environmental Sustainability in Asia and the Pacifi crdquo January 1 2012 accessed August 25 2015 httpwwwunescaporgresourcesgreen-growth-resources-and-resilience- environmental-sustainability-asia-and-pacifi c 17

34 United Nations General Assembly ldquoReport of the World Commission on Environment and Developmentrdquo ARES42187 December 11 1987 accessed August 25 2015 httpwwwunorgdocumentsgares42ares42-187htm

35 Michael Jacobs ldquoGreen Growthrdquo in The Handbook of Global Climate and Environmental Policy ed Robert Falkner (West Sussex Wiley- Blackwell 2013) 199

36 Status of international organizations whose contributions from donor nations are considered ODA

REFERENCES

ARTICLES AND BOOKS

1 Cooper Andrew F ed 1997 Niche Diplomacy Middle Powers After the Cold War New York St Martinrsquos Press

2 Cooper Andrew F Richard A Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal 1993 Relocating Middle Powers Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order Vancouver University of British Columbia Press

3 DeSombre Elizabeth R 2000 Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy Industry Environmentalists and US Power Cambridge MIT Press

4 Gardiner Stephen M 2014 Ethics and Global Climate Change Ethics 114(3) 555ndash600

5 Higgott Richard A and Andrew Fenton Cooper 1990 Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building Australia the Cairns Group and the

158 S KIM

Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations International Organization 44(4) 589ndash632

6 Jacobs Michael 2013 Green Growth In The Handbook of Global Climate and Environmental Policy ed Robert Falkner West Sussex Wiley-Blackwell

7 Keohane Robert O and David G Victor 2011 The Regime Complex for Climate Change Perspectives on Politics 9(1) 7ndash23

8 Nossal Kim Richard 1989 The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy Scarborough Ontario Prentice-Hall

9 Okereke Chukwumerije 2010 The Politics of Interstate Climate Negotiations In The Politics of Climate Change ed Maxwell T Boykoff London Routledge

10 Pratt Cranford ed 1990 Middle Power Internationalism The North-South Dimension Kingston McGill-Queenrsquos University Press

11 Schalatek Liane 2013 Setting the Course The Third Meeting of the Green Climate Fund Board Lays the Groundwork for Key Decisions later This Year Washington DC Heinrich Boll Stiftung

12 Stevenson Harley 2011 India and International Norms of Climate Governance A Constructivist Analysis of Normative Congruence Building Review of International Studies 37(3) 997ndash1019

13 Stokke Olav ed 1989 Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada Denmark the Netherlands Norway and Sweden Uppsala Scandinavian Institute of African Studies

14 Wang Hongying and Erik French 2013 Middle Range Powers in Global Governance Third World Quarterly 34(6) 985ndash999

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

15 Green Climate Fund 2012 Selection of the Host Country of the Fund GCFB01-1209 August 3 2012 httpgcfundnetfi leadmin00_cus-tomerdocumentspdfB101-1209_Selection_of_host_country_FINAL_6Augpdf 6ndash7 Accessed 25 August 2015

16 mdashmdashmdash 2012 Report of the Host Country Evaluation Committee GCFB02-1204 October 5 2012 httpwwwgcfundnetfi leadmin 00_customerdocumentspdfB02_Report_of_the_Host_Country_Evaluation_Committee_5_Octpdf 7 10 13 16 17 20 23 Accessed 25 August 2015

17 mdashmdashmdash 2013 Report of the Second Meeting of the Board 18ndash20 October 2012 GCFB02-1213 March 14 2013 httpwwwgcfundnetfi lead-min00_customerdocumentspdfB_02- 12_13__Report_of_the_Meeting_13March2013pdf 7 Accessed 25 August 2015


18 Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2013 White Paper on Hosting the Green Climate Fund Sejong Ministry of Strategy and Finance

19 United Nations Convention on Climate Change 2014 Session 25 of the ADP 4ndash15 June 2014 EIG Opening Statement June 3 2014 httpsunfcccintfi lesdocumentationsubmissions_from_partiesadpapplica-tionpdfadp2-5_statement_by_eig_20140604pdf Accessed 25 August 2015

20 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifi c 2012 Green Growth Resources and Resilience Environmental Sustainability in Asia and the Pacifi c January 1 2012 httpwwwunescaporgresourcesgreen-growth-resources-and-resilience-environmental-sustainability-asia-and- pacifi c Accessed 25 August 2015

21 United Nations General Assembly 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development ARES42187 December 11 1987 httpwwwunorgdocumentsgares42ares42-187htm Accessed 25 August 2015

160 S KIM


CHAPTER 8

The importance of Korearsquos positioning as a middle power comes as the international environment has undergone major changes where the tra-ditional US-led hierarchical power structure has given way to emerging horizontal transnational networks focused on diverse issues and diffusing power 1 This change in the global structure of relations has allowed middle power diplomacy to rise in prominence and has meant that the middle power diplomacy lens has focused squarely on multilateralism However the inevitable rise of China coupled with an assertive rebalance to Asia by the USA has complicated the foreign policy question for Korea and others in the region Contextual changes may have allowed middle powers to take on greater roles but uncertainty and complexity in power relations between the worldrsquos two major powers has forced middle power nations to examine closely how network power derived from this new environment can be used to advance its own foreign policy goals Pursuing middle power roles in the realm of security is challenging for South Korea since she is a close ally of the USA North Korearsquos unprecedented provocations in 2010 including the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel and the shelling of Yeonpyeong

South Korearsquos Middle Power Roles Implications to Emerging Middle Powers

Sook Jong Lee and Hyee Jung Suh

S J Lee () East Asia Institute and Sungkyunkwan University Seoul Republic of Korea

H J Suh East Asia Institute Seoul Republic of Korea

Island as well as the continuous nuclear threat from Pyongyang push South Korea toward the US to guarantee her national security Although South Korea is likely to play a facilitating role in US-China cooperation across a wide range of differing issues it still remains to be seen how this will play out in the long term and in which contexts specifi cally Additionally on the global front issue complexity has dramatically increased as areas that were once separated have become intertwined and interlocked via complex link-ages calling for fresh thinking in how to approach these proliferating and delicate issue areas It is within this backdrop that the rise of middle power diplomacy as a viable foreign policy strategy has attracted much warranted scholarly and practitioner attention

From experiences gained since Korea began pursuing a middle power diplomacy strategy in the late 2000s we can draw some thoughts that can be useful to other middle powers First of all fi nding linkages between regional and global cooperation seems to be very important Middle powers should not only employ multilateralism as a policy tool but also pursue it as a goal in itself To do this taking a two-step approach starting from the region to the global stage is a useful strategy since the relative infl uence of middle powers is bigger at the regional level rather than on the global level When the region is crowded with big-ger powers however like in the case of South Korea in Northeast Asia the opposite step starting from actively participating in global mecha-nisms can strengthen their position in the region Sequencing this link-age between regional level and global level will depend on the specifi c power dynamics of the region or the subregion a middle power country is located MIKTA is an interesting case MIKTA is an association con-sisting of fi ve leading middle powers representing different regions and they have formed a loose network to address global issues So far their activities are limited to shared global issues rather than linking regional concerns to the global arena However if this global middle power net-work can successfully amplify their imminent regional issues as in the case of North Korearsquos nuclear threat and human right issues MIKTA can be a bench mark to other trans-regional middle power networks

Second minilateral cooperation mechanisms can be a good comple-ment to larger multilateral ones in areas where multilateral institutions are weak A web of multiple trilateral mechanisms is developing such as the one among South Korea Japan and the USA and another among South Korea China and Japan With dual membership in these two tri-lateral mechanisms South Korea can contribute to building a constructive

162 SJ LEE AND HJ SUH

relationship between China and Japan For example South Korea can help shape the FTA between South Korea China and Japan (CJK) as a three- way standard for future rules in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) In the CJK FTA South Korea can focus less on tariff concessions and more on trade rule-making by keeping the focus on nego-tiating trade rules including Rules of Origin (RoO) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) competition policy and regulatory rules

Third when facing challenging complex issues it is worthwhile to dis-entangle unrelated issues and fi rst tackle issues that are more suitable to stakeholders In maritime disputes for example middle powers may pro-pose a roadmap separating confl ict ridden territorial sovereignty issues and consequential disputes over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and the continental shelf from softer issues of resource development and protec-tion of the maritime environment Then countries can fi rst work together on a joint development zone for oil and gas exploration After building trust through the easier tasks more challenging issues such as the delimi-tation of EEZs and the continental shelf and ultimately contentious terri-torial issues can be tackled Finding workable sequence also applies to the task of harmonizing domestic rules to international ones International agreements are often denied or compromised when facing strong domes-tic opposition In order to maintain their good citizenship as a responsible follower of global governance rules middle powers need to work smartly to accomplish this task of harmonization In many economic negotiations middle powers work out the most agreeable principles and regulations and domestically apply them while minimizing distributional confl icts

Fourth middle powers need to reconfi gure alliances with great powers to strengthen the liberal international order The increasingly networked world and the accompanying power devolution is transforming the hier-archical international order to a more liberal one More frequent security threats from non-state actors require solutions among networked actors of public and private spheres At the same time old powers like Russia and rising powers like China behave more assertively beyond a legitimate governance framework To stabilize this transitional period middle pow-ers need to reconfi gure their strategic positions in their alliances with the great powers to cope with the imminent threats in their surrounding region and to stabilize an uncertain global future in a desirable fashion

In the Asia-Pacifi c region confl icts between the existing power in the USA and the rising power in China are emerging US allies such as Australia and South Korea view the continuous strong US presence as functional

SOUTH KOREArsquoS MIDDLE POWER ROLES 163

to the regionrsquos stability At the same time with market integration they need to expand economic and political ties with China This complexity illustrates that alliances with a great power in todayrsquos modern world order are more resilient compared to the past Cold-War period Middle power US allies in the Asia-Pacifi c region are reconfi guring their ally relationship with the USA to accommodate Chinese interests The USA and China should utilize these middle powers linkages to cushion their rivalry

Fifth owning some niche issues and building networks in these issues are critical for successful middle power diplomacy performance In order for middle powers to effectively carry out robust diplomacy on the inter-national stage it is necessary to increase their ability to creatively formulate policy ideas and nurture a policy network with international organizations This policy network will eventually lead to a local as well as a regional epistemic community Middle power roles require neither great scientifi c knowledge nor great resources to enable network building Rather own-ing a specifi c issue and building an international network is important Working closely with the United Nations Canada is well known for send-ing and training peace-keeping forces Norway and Sweden have a good reputation in the international society for practicing universal values and norms With increasing nontraditional security threats middle power and even weak countries can take innovative roles in related areas of disaster reliefs refugee rescue among other niche areas South Korea is trying to play an entrepreneurial role in enhancing development effectiveness and integrating environmental policy into economic growth

Lastly middle powers can fi nd different roles and adapt to the given international environment There are four main roles that a middle power can play bridge builder designer and leader Being a bridge refers to the ability of a middle power to assuage mutual distrust between differ-ent nations and major powers over existing issues As a builder a middle power can help to facilitate the manifestation of the designs of other par-ties who have established an accepted international norm in real world settings At times a middle power can also identify areas it can design an institutional framework of multilateral cooperation A middle power may also target a more ambitious leadership role by convening like-minded members effectively driving the development of an international norm and constructing an architecture together with a great power

In the issue areas of hard security where great powers compete the role of a middle power is that of a bridge One of the roles of middle pow-ers in security is to establish stable middle power cooperation to have a


stronger impact on architectural issues and lessen strategic distrust among great powers In economic issue areas middle powers can protect eco-nomic cooperation from being unnecessarily securitized so that economic interdependency can continue to lessen potential security confl icts In the emerging issue areas the role of middle powers varies depending on the scope of the middle powersrsquo involvement and whether or not there is an existing system Where the issue is not comprehensive enough to bring uncommitted nations into an existing governance system middle powers can play an innovative role as South Korea has done in the climate change area In areas where newly created regimes and surrounding developments quickly outgrow and overshadow the existing governance framework such as in the case of trade or fi nance a middle power can be a builder by pro-viding useful complementary patch programs for the entire system oper-ated by great powers

The most important lesson from South Korearsquos recent middle power diplomacy experiences is that middle power diplomacy needs to be stra-tegically planned but fl exible enough to seize opportunities in fl uid and constructive multilateral settings Without a conscious vision and strate-gies from the government middle power state craft cannot be earned Trials and errors are inevitable in learning how to conduct middle power diplomacy in an appropriate manner If one hopes to reduce learning cost nurturing internationally minded public elites and securing public support for international contributions is critical Without human capital to create good ideas plan strategies and design innovative methods middle power diplomacy will not be substantiated If South Korea can continue to carry out her experiment actively despite the recurring conventional security threat from North Korea prospects for other middle powers in the world are bright as long as their government aligns with this worthy diplomatic strategy

NOTES 1 See Chap 1


167copy The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016SJ Lee (ed) Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy DOI 101057978-1-137-59359-7

Chaesung Chun is the chair of the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at East Asia Institute He is a professor of the department of political sci-ence and international relations at Seoul National University and director of Center for International Studies at Seoul National University Dr Chun is also serving as an advisory committee member for the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unifi cation He received his BA and MA from Seoul National University and PhD in international relations from Northwestern University His research interests include international relations security studies South Korean foreign policy and East Asian security relations His recent publications include Theory of East Asian International Relations (2011) Is Politics Moral Reinhold Niebuhr rsquo s Transcendental Realism (2010) and ldquoThe Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countriesrdquo (2008)

Sungjin Kim is a research professor of the Green School (Graduate School of Energy and Environment) at Korea University Prior to this he was a researcher at the Science and Technology Policy Institute He has also spent time teaching at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Kookmin University and the University of Seoul He received his BA MA and PhD in international relations from Seoul National University His work focuses on global environmental politics and infl uence of tech-nology in politics

BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS

168 BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS

His recent publications include ldquoTheories and Cases of Environmental Peace-Building Application to the Korean Peninsulardquo (2014) ldquoAn Exploratory Study on Determinants of Allocation of the Adaptation Fund for Climate Change Adaptationrdquo (2015) and ldquoChanges in East Asiarsquos Energy Security Landscapes and Energy Diplomacy of South Koreardquo (2015)

Min Gyo Koo is an associate professor in the Graduate School of Public Administration Prior to obtaining his PhD from the University of California Berkeley he received his BA and MA from Seoul National University He also holds an MA from Johns Hopkins University His research interests include East Asian political economy and maritime affairs Among his many publications is Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia Between a Rock and a Hard Place (2010 Springer)

Dong Ryul Lee is a professor at the Department of Chinese Studies of the Dongduk Womenrsquos University since 1997 He is now a chair at China Research Center of East Asia Institute (EAI) Previously he served as a policy advisor to the Republic of Korea Ministry of Unifi cation and an executive committee member in the Joint Committee of Experts for Korea-China Strategic Cooperative Partnership He was also an editor of The Journal of Contemporary China Studies in Korea (2010ndash2011) He was a visiting scholar in the Weatherhead East Asian Institute Columbia University from August 2005 to August 2006 He received his PhD in the Department of International Politics from Peking University in 1996 He has published many scholarly articles monographs and edited books including Global Superpower Prospects for Chinarsquos Future (2011) ldquoChinarsquos Policy and Infl uence on the North Korea Nuclear Issue Denuclearization andor Stabilization of the Korean Peninsulardquo in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (2010) Chinarsquos Territorial Dispute (2008) and ldquoChinese Diplomatic Behavior in the United Nationsrdquo (2007) His research area includes Chinese foreign policy international relations in East Asia Chinese nationalism and minority

Sook Jong Lee is the president of the East Asia Institute an independent nonprofi t think tank based in Seoul She is also a professor of public admin-istration at Sungkyunkwan University Currently Dr Lee holds a num-ber of advisory positions in the South Korean government including the

BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS 169

Presidential National Security Advisory Group Presidential Committee for Unifi cation Preparation and councils for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Ministry of Unifi cation and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) Dr Lee also participates as member of the Trilateral Commission Council of Councils and many other transnational networks on research and policy studies Her research interests include multilateral-ism democracy and civil societies focusing on South Korea Japan and other East Asian countries Previously Dr Lee was a research fellow at the Sejong Institute a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution a profes-sorial lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University and a visiting fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies Her recent publications include Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed 2013) ldquoSouth Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacyrdquo (2012) Korea rsquo s Role in Global Governance for Development Cooperation (ed 2012) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (eds 2011) Japan and East Asia Regional Cooperation and Community Building (eds 2011) and Toward Managed Globalization The Korean Experience (eds 2010) Dr Lee received her BA from Yonsei University and MA and PhD in sociology from Harvard University

Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of US-Korea policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Snyderrsquos pro-gram examines South Korearsquos efforts to contribute on the international stage its potential infl uence and contributions as a middle power in East Asia and the peninsular regional and global implications of North Korean instability Snyder is the coeditor of North Korea in Transition Politics Economy and Society (2012) and the editor of Global Korea South Korea rsquo s Contributions to International Security (2012) and The US-South Korea Alliance Meeting New Security Challenges (2012) He also served as the project director for CFRrsquos Independent Task Force on policy toward the Korean Peninsula He currently writes for the blog ldquoAsia Unboundrdquo Prior to joining CFR Snyder served as The Asia Foundationrsquos represen-tative in Korea (2000ndash2004) He was also a senior associate at Pacifi c Forum CSIS Mr Snyder has worked as an Asia specialist in the research and studies program of the US Institute of Peace and as acting director of Asia Societyrsquos contemporary affairs program He was a Pantech visiting fellow at Stanford Universityrsquos Shorenstein Asia-Pacifi c Research Center during 2005ndash2006 and received an Abe fellowship administered by the Social Sciences Research Council in 1998ndash1999 His published work


includes China rsquo s Rise and the Two Koreas Politics Economics Security (2009) Paved With Good Intentions The NGO Experience in North Korea (coeditor 2003) and Negotiating on the Edge North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999) He has provided advice to NGOs and humanitarian organizations active in North Korea and serves on the advisory council of the National Committee on North Korea and Global Resource Services Snyder received a BA from Rice University and an MA from the regional studies East Asia program at Harvard University and was a Thomas G Watson fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea

Yul Sohn is dean and professor of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University Seoul Korea Before joining at Yonsei Sohn taught at Chung-Ang University Seoul Korea and was a visiting scholar at institutions in the University of Tokyo Waseda University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Currently Sohn serves a number of government advisory committees including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Korea National Diplomacy Academy and the Northeast Asian History Foundation He has also served as president of the Korean Studies of Contemporary Japan Sohn has written extensively on Japanese and East Asian political economy East Asian regionalism and global gov-ernance His most recent publications include ldquoAttracting the Neighbors Soft Power Competition in East Asiardquo ldquoSecuritizing Trade The Case of US-Korea FTArdquo and ldquoJapanrsquos New Regionalism China Threat Universal Values and the East Asian Communityrdquo Sohn received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago Illinois USA


INDEX

A Abe Shinzo 26 119 alliance relationship 5 8 19 38ndash9

43 54 112

B boundary delimitation 87 90 93

98 100 BRICS 64ndash5 76 111

C climate change 5ndash7 10ndash11 36 68

129ndash32 135ndash55 165 Clinton Hillary 37 50 99

112 119 coalition 2 11 130ndash1 149ndash50

153ndash4 156 158

D democracy 19 37 112ndash13

E early mover 11 131 142ndash4 148

153ndash4 156 economic diplomacy 72 75ndash76 115 emerging economies 65 exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 87ndash8

90ndash1 93ndash5 97ndash9 101 103ndash4 106 108 163

F free trade agreement (FTA) 6 9ndash10

40ndash1 57 73 75 77 115ndash23 163

G global governance 3 6ndash7 11 15 64

131 163 great power politics 16 19 26 114 green growth 10ndash11 36 130

139ndash42 144 146 148 150ndash6 158ndash60

172 INDEX

H hard power 20ndash1 hub strategy 117ndash18 121 Hu Jintao 23 113

administration 73 79 human rights 2 19 21 37 65 67

112ndash13

I international norm(s) 8 21 26 37

52ndash3 56 63 131 151 156 159 164

L Lee Myung-bak 5 92 141 143ndash4

administration 79 117 130 139 146ndash7 152

M MIKTA 6 78 162 military power 4 16 23 70 92 mini-lateral 5 9 11 31 33 46 55

57 100 131 141ndash2 145ndash8 153ndash6 158 164

multilateral diplomacy 10ndash11 63 71ndash2

multilateralism 2 12ndash13 88 98ndash9 102 114 161ndash2 168

N network power 3 5 30 110 161 New Type of Great Power Relations

21 25 50 113ndash14 niche diplomacy 130 155 norm diffuser 11 131 151 153ndash154 nuclear weapons 28 42 79

O Obama Barrack 23 38 50 55 79

145 administration 7 17ndash18 21 36

38ndash9 50ndash2 55ndash6 96 99 112 123

overbalancing 9 27

P Park Geun-hye 44ndash5 101

administration 6 10 121ndash2 peripheral diplomacy 72ndash3

R rebalancing strategy 8 15 21 23 27

36ndash44 48 61 75 77ndash9 81 112 regime 2 12 63ndash4 66 68ndash9 87ndash8

94 98ndash102 106ndash8 121 127 131 133ndash6 141 145ndash6 150ndash1 153ndash4 156 159 165 168

regime building 99 102 106 108 168

regional architecture 65 111ndash14 125 127

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 61 73 75 77 118 120 122ndash4 163

regional institution(s) 7ndash8 52 87 98 112

S soft power 3 5 18 20 23 29 62ndash3 South China Sea 8 20 51ndash2 68 89

91ndash2 96ndash7 South Korea-Japan relations 81 95 sovereignty 8 51 64ndash5 87ndash90 92

96 101 105 163

INDEX 173

T trade network 5 9 110 117 Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) 10

37 40ndash1 57 61 75 112ndash13 118ndash23

U unipolarity 17ndash20 111 United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 87ndash8 90ndash3 95 98 103ndash4 106

US-China relations 7 25 27 69 73 81ndash2 96 162

US hegemony 16 23 95 US-ROK alliance 18 36 41 44ndash45

47 54 57

V values 18ndash19 38 45 49 62 78

110 112 164

X Xi Jinping 8 23ndash24 57 65 113

administration 27 47 79 81

Acknowledgments

Contents

List13of Tables

Chapter 1 South Korea Aiming to Be an Innovative Middle Power

11 Middle Power Diplomacy as Attractive Statecraft

12 The Rise of South Korearsquos Middle Power Activism

13 South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy by Issue Area

References

Chapter 2 East Asian Security and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

21 Post-Cold War World Still in Flux

22 Decline of US Unipolarity and Its Implications for Middle Powers

23 Searching for South Korearsquos Middle Power Roles in East Asiarsquos Transitional Security Environment





24 Issues of the Korean Peninsula and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

References

Chapter 3 US Rebalancing Strategy and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

31 Introduction

32 Main Characteristics of the US Balance




33 South Korearsquos Middle Power Concept and Its Compatibility with the US Rebalance


Chapter 4 Chinarsquos Perception of and Strategy for the Middle Powers

41 Introduction




43 Chinarsquos Evaluation of Middle Power Diplomacy

44 Chinarsquos Diplomacy Toward Middle Powers




45 Chinarsquos Perception of and Strategy for ldquoSouth Korea as a Middle Powerrdquo

46 Conclusion South Korearsquos Dilemma

References

Chapter 5 East Asian Maritime Disputes and South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

51 Introduction

52 Three Bones of Maritime Contention




53 South Korearsquos Positions on Key Maritime Issues




54 New Sino-US Rivalry as a Constraint on South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

55 Moving Beyond Bilateralism and Prospects for Regional Multilateralism

56 Policy Implications for South Korearsquos Middle Power Diplomacy

References

Chapter 6 The Role of South Korea in the Making of a Regional Trade Architecture Convening Bridging and Designing FTA Networks

61 Introduction

62 Rival Visions of a Regional Architecture

63 Korearsquos Trading State as a Middle Power

64 Vying for a Regional Trade Architecture

65 South Korearsquos Middle Power Role

References

Chapter 7 South Korearsquos Climate Change Diplomacy Analysis Based on the Perspective of ldquoMiddle Power Diplomacyrdquo

71 Introduction

72 Political Landscape of Climate Change


722 Deadlock

73 South Korearsquos Climate Change Diplomacy From the Perspective of Middle Power Diplomacy



74 Conclusion

References

Articles and Books

Official Documents

Chapter 8 South Korearsquos Middle Power Roles Implications to Emerging Middle Powers

Biographies of Authors

Index

Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy












v


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

vii

CONTENTS







viii CONTENTS




Index 171

ix

LIST OF TABLES



CHAPTER 1




Sook Jong Lee




2 SJ LEE









4 SJ LEE









6 SJ LEE








8 SJ LEE






10 SJ LEE























12 SJ LEE













CHAPTER 2




Chaesung Chun






16 C CHUN












18 C CHUN






ENVIRONMENT







20 C CHUN










22 C CHUN









24 C CHUN












26 C CHUN













28 C CHUN










30 C CHUN






























32 C CHUN


























34 C CHUN


CHAPTER 3




Scott Snyder






36 S SNYDER










38 S SNYDER












40 S SNYDER












42 S SNYDER









44 S SNYDER










46 S SNYDER










48 S SNYDER









50 S SNYDER










52 S SNYDER










54 S SNYDER








56 S SNYDER













58 S SNYDER





























60 S SNYDER


CHAPTER 4



Dong Ryul Lee







62 DR LEE










64 DR LEE











66 DR LEE












68 DR LEE












70 DR LEE












72 DR LEE











74 DR LEE








76 DR LEE









78 DR LEE










80 DR LEE








82 DR LEE



























84 DR LEE

























86 DR LEE


CHAPTER 5




Min Gyo Koo








88 MG KOO













90 MG KOO












92 MG KOO












94 MG KOO












96 MG KOO










98 MG KOO











100 MG KOO












102 MG KOO




















104 MG KOO



















106 MG KOO



























108 MG KOO


CHAPTER 6





Yul Sohn







110 Y SOHN









112 Y SOHN










114 Y SOHN








116 Y SOHN









118 Y SOHN








120 Y SOHN









122 Y SOHN













124 Y SOHN
































126 Y SOHN




























128 Y SOHN


CHAPTER 7




Sungjin Kim






130 S KIM










132 S KIM









722 Deadlock



134 S KIM










136 S KIM











138 S KIM

















(continued)

140 S KIM











(continued)












142 S KIM













Nation as a whole

182 267 343 269 52 123 25 30


144 S KIM










146 S KIM










148 S KIM











150 S KIM











152 S KIM





Year Events




UNCSD (Rio+20)




154 S KIM






















156 S KIM






















REFERENCES

ARTICLES AND BOOKS






158 S KIM











OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS









160 S KIM


CHAPTER 8






















NOTES 1 See Chap 1


















INDEX


43 54 112


98 100 BRICS 64ndash5 76 111




153ndash4 156 158






40ndash1 57 73 75 77 115ndash23 163




172 INDEX



112ndash13


52ndash3 56 63 131 151 156 159 164












overbalancing 9 27












96 101 105 163

INDEX 173







47 54 57

V values 18ndash19 38 45 49 62 78

110 112 164



Acknowledgments

Contents

List13of Tables





References










References


31 Introduction








41 Introduction











References


51 Introduction












References


61 Introduction





References


71 Introduction



722 Deadlock




74 Conclusion

References

Articles and Books

Official Documents



Index












v


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

vii

CONTENTS







viii CONTENTS




Index 171

ix

LIST OF TABLES



CHAPTER 1




Sook Jong Lee




2 SJ LEE









4 SJ LEE









6 SJ LEE








8 SJ LEE






10 SJ LEE























12 SJ LEE













CHAPTER 2




Chaesung Chun






16 C CHUN












18 C CHUN






ENVIRONMENT







20 C CHUN










22 C CHUN









24 C CHUN












26 C CHUN













28 C CHUN










30 C CHUN






























32 C CHUN


























34 C CHUN


CHAPTER 3




Scott Snyder






36 S SNYDER










38 S SNYDER












40 S SNYDER












42 S SNYDER









44 S SNYDER










46 S SNYDER










48 S SNYDER









50 S SNYDER










52 S SNYDER










54 S SNYDER








56 S SNYDER













58 S SNYDER





























60 S SNYDER


CHAPTER 4



Dong Ryul Lee







62 DR LEE










64 DR LEE











66 DR LEE












68 DR LEE












70 DR LEE












72 DR LEE











74 DR LEE








76 DR LEE









78 DR LEE










80 DR LEE








82 DR LEE



























84 DR LEE

























86 DR LEE


CHAPTER 5




Min Gyo Koo








88 MG KOO













90 MG KOO












92 MG KOO












94 MG KOO












96 MG KOO










98 MG KOO











100 MG KOO












102 MG KOO




















104 MG KOO



















106 MG KOO



























108 MG KOO


CHAPTER 6





Yul Sohn







110 Y SOHN









112 Y SOHN










114 Y SOHN








116 Y SOHN









118 Y SOHN








120 Y SOHN









122 Y SOHN













124 Y SOHN
































126 Y SOHN




























128 Y SOHN


CHAPTER 7




Sungjin Kim






130 S KIM










132 S KIM









722 Deadlock



134 S KIM










136 S KIM











138 S KIM

















(continued)

140 S KIM











(continued)












142 S KIM













Nation as a whole

182 267 343 269 52 123 25 30


144 S KIM










146 S KIM










148 S KIM











150 S KIM











152 S KIM





Year Events




UNCSD (Rio+20)




154 S KIM






















156 S KIM






















REFERENCES

ARTICLES AND BOOKS






158 S KIM











OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS









160 S KIM


CHAPTER 8






















NOTES 1 See Chap 1


















INDEX


43 54 112


98 100 BRICS 64ndash5 76 111




153ndash4 156 158






40ndash1 57 73 75 77 115ndash23 163




172 INDEX



112ndash13


52ndash3 56 63 131 151 156 159 164












overbalancing 9 27












96 101 105 163

INDEX 173







47 54 57

V values 18ndash19 38 45 49 62 78

110 112 164



Acknowledgments

Contents

List13of Tables





References










References


31 Introduction








41 Introduction











References


51 Introduction












References


61 Introduction





References


71 Introduction



722 Deadlock




74 Conclusion

References

Articles and Books

Official Documents



Index