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TRANSMISSION INVESTMENTAND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
WILLIAM W. HOGAN
Center for Business and GovernmentJohn F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard UniversityCambridge, Massachusetts 02138
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ECONOMICS OF A COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Competitive Market Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Short-Run Market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Transmission Congestion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Long-Run Market Contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Equivalent Transmission Interpretations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Scheduling and Balancing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Long-Term Market Investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Evaluating the Market Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Comparable Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Obligation to Serve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Security Concerns and Capacity Reserves.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Firm versus Interruptible Transmission and Generation. . . . . . 21Opportunity Cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Two-Part Prices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Secondary Markets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Other Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
ALLOCATING TRANSMISSION BENEFITS AND COSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Economies of Scale and Free-Rider Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Inefficient Transmission Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
CONTRACT NETWORK MODELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
TRANSMISSION INVESTMENTAND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
William W. Hogan1
A short-term electricity market coordinated by a system operator providesa foundation for a competitive electricity market. In this setting,transmission congestion contracts are equivalent to perfectly tradeablephysical transmission rights. With such contracts to allocate transmissionbenefits, it would be possible to rely more on market forces, partly if notcompletely, to drive transmission expansion.
Electricity market restructuring emphasizes the potential for competition in generationand retail services, with the operation of transmission and distribution wires as a monopoly.Network interactions and economies of scale both complicate the extension of market incentivesto investment in the wires business. Two broad approaches suggest themselves for dealing withthese network problems in a manner compatible with a competitive generation market.
There could be monopoly management of transmission operations and investment, withincentive pricing for the monopoly. Transmission would be like a large "black box" run by themonopoly that takes on an obligation to provide unlimited transmission service for everyone.With the appropriate price cap or other incentive regulation, the monopoly would make efficientinvestments or contract with market participants to remove or manage the real transmissionlimitations. This approach results in a powerful monopoly with the familiar problems of findingthe right level and form of incentive regulation. This approach is, for example, found in the
1 Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Public Policy and Administration, John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, Harvard University, and Senior Advisor, Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, Inc. This paper draws on workfor the Harvard Electricity Policy Group and the Harvard-Japan Project on Energy and the Environment. Manyindividuals have provided helpful comments, especially Robert Arnold, John Ballance, Jeff Bastian, Ashley Brown,Michael Cadwalader, Judith Cardell, John Chandley, Doug Foy, Hamish Fraser, Geoff Gaebe, Don Garber, ScottHarvey, Stephen Henderson, Carrie Hitt, Jere Jacobi, Paul Joskow, Susan Kaplan, Maria Ilic, Laurence Kirsch, JimKritikson, Dale Landgren, William Lindsay, Amory Lovins, Rana Mukerji, Richard O’Neill, Howard Pifer, SusanPope, Grant Read, Bill Reed, Joseph R. Ribeiro, Brendan Ring, Larry Ruff, Michael Schnitzer, Hoff Stauffer, IrwinStelzer, Jan Strack, Steve Stoft, Richard Tabors, Julie Voeck, Carter Wall and Assef Zobian.. The author is or hasbeen a consultant on electric market reform and transmission issues for British National Grid Company, GeneralPublic Utilities Corporation (working with the "Supporting" PJM Companies), Duquesne Light Company, ElectricityCorporation of New Zealand, National Independent Energy Producers, New York Power Pool, New York UtilitiesCollaborative, Niagara Mohawk Corporation, PJM Office of Interconnection, San Diego Gas & Electric Corporation,Trans Power of New Zealand, Williams Energy Group, and Wisconsin Electric Power Company. The viewspresented here are not necessarily attributable to any of those mentioned, and any remaining errors are solely theresponsibility of the author.
market in England and Wales with the National Grid Company.2 Although some elements of thismonopoly approach may be found in any practical framework for transmission investment, it isnot the focus here.
An alternative approach would lean more in the direction of market mechanisms withtradeable transmission property rights.3 A workable system that provides an equivalent totransmission property rights could be used by market participants to match the actual flow ofpower or traded in a secondary market. Acquisition of these transmission benefits would providea market incentive for transmission investment. This approach stands behind policy proposalsat the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)4 and influences market restructuringdevelopments around the world. A central problem is in defining a workable notion of propertyrights for transmission.
A pool-based, short-term electricity market coordinated by a system operator providesa foundation for building a system that includes tradeable transmission property rights in the formof transmission congestion contracts. Coordination through the system operator is unavoidable,and spot-market locational prices define the opportunity costs of transmission that woulddetermine the market value of the transmission rights without requiring physical trading andwithout restricting the actual use of the system. In this setting, these transmission congestioncontracts are equivalent to perfectly tradeable physical rights. Hence, this organization of themarket defines a context where it would be possible to rely more on market forces, partly if notcompletely, to drive transmission expansion. Here we review the main ideas and summarize therequirements of a transmission investment approach with maximum reliance on the competitivemarket. An outline of the structure of the spot market coordinated by the system operator andsupported by a system of transmission congestion contracts sets the stage for an overview of thetransmission investment incentives.
ECONOMICS OF A COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET
A general framework that encompasses the essential economics of electricity marketsprovides a point of reference for evaluating market design elements. This framework can beapplied to the analysis of the institutional elements needed to support transmission pricing andinvestment.
2 David M. Newbery, "Privatization and Liberalization of Network Utilities," European Economic Review,Vol. 41, 1997, pp. 357-383.
3 James B. Bushnell and Steven E. Stoft, "Grid Investment: Can a Market Do the Job?", The ElectricityJournal, January-February, 1996, pp. 74-79. Eric C. Woychik, "Competition in Transmission: It’s Coming Sooneror Later," The Electricity Journal, June 1996, pp. 46-58.
4 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Capacity Reservation Open Access Transmission Tariffs,"Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, RM96-11-000, Washington DC, April 24, 1996.
Competitive Market Design
Genco Genco Genco Genco Genco Genco
Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market Structure
Disco Disco Disco Disco Disco Disco
Cust. Cust. Cust. Cust. Cust.Cust.
electricity markets typicallyemphasizes functionalunbundling of the verticallyintegrated system. Theusual separation intogeneration, transmission,and dis t r ibu t ion isinsufficient. In anelectricity market, thetransmission wires and thepool dispatch are distinctessential facilities. Thespecial conditions in theelectricity system stand asbarriers to an efficient,large-scale bilateral marketin electricity. A pool-based market coordinated by a system operator helps overcome these barriers.
Reliable operation is a central requirement and constraint for any electricity system.Given the strong and complex interactions in electric networks, current technology with a free-flowing transmission grid dictates the need for a system operator that coordinates use of thetransmission system.5 Control of transmission usage means control of dispatch, which is theprincipal or only means of adjusting the use of the network. Hence, open access to thetransmission grid means open access to the dispatch as well. There must be a system operatorcoordinating use of the transmission system. That this system operator should also beindependent of the existing electric utilities and other market participants is attractive in itssimplicity in achieving equal treatment of all market participants. The independent systemoperator provides an essential service, but does not be compete in the energy market. In theanalysis of electricity markets, therefore, a key focus is the design of the interaction betweentransmission and dispatch, both procedures and pricing, to support a competitive market.
To provide an overview of the operation of an efficient, competitive wholesaleelectricity market, it is natural to distinguish between the short-run operations coordinated by thesystem operator and long-run decisions that include investment and contracting. Under thecompetitive market assumption, market participants are price takers and include the generatorsand eligible customers. For this discussion, distributors are included as customers in the
5 For further details on power flows and coordination, see Scott M. Harvey, William W. Hogan and SusanL. Pope, "Transmission Capacity Reservations and Transmission Congestion Contracts," Harvard-Japan Project onEnergy and the Environment, Harvard University, February 1997.
wholesale market, operating at arm's length from generators. The system is much simpler in thevery short run when it is possible to give meaningful definition to concepts such as opportunitycost. Once the short-run economics are established, the long-run requirements become moretransparent. Close attention to the connection between short- and long-run decisions isolates thespecial features of the electricity market.
Short-Run Market. The short run is a long time on the electrical scale, but short on humanscale – say, half an hour. The short-run market is relatively simple. In the short run, locationalinvestment decisions have been made. Power plants, the transmission grid, and distribution linesare all in place. Customers and generators are connected and the work of buyers, sellers, brokersand other service entities is largely complete. The only decisions that remain are for deliveryof power, which in the short-run is truly a commodity product.
On the electrical scale, much can happen in half an hour and the services provided bythe system include many details of dynamic frequency control and emergency response tocontingencies. Due to transaction costs, if nothing else, it would be inefficient to unbundle allof these services, and many are covered as average costs in the overhead of the system. Howfar unbundling should go is an empirical question. For example, real power should be identifiedand its marginal cost recognized, but should this extend to reactive power and voltage controlas well? Or to spinning reserve required for emergency supplies? The costs associated withdelivery of electric energy include many services. The direct fuel cost of generation is only onecomponent. In analyses of energy pricing, there is no uniformity in the treatment of these other,ancillary services.6 The typical approach formulates an explicit model approximating the fullelectricity system, computing both a dispatch solution and associated prices for the explicitvariables. Everything that is not explicit is treated as an ancillary service, for which theassumption must be that the services will be provided and charged for in some way other thanthrough the explicit prices in the model. Given the complexity of the real electric system, suchapproximations or simplifications are found in every model, and there is always a boundarybetween the explicit variables modeled and the implicit variables that will be treated as separateancillary services. Payment for the ancillary services may be through an average cost upliftapplied to all loads. Development of a full description of the interactions with ancillary servicesis beyond the scope of the present discussion. For the sake of the present discussion, focus onreal power and assume that further unbundling would go beyond the point of diminishing returnsin the short-run market.
Over the half hour, the market operates competitively to move real power fromgenerators to customers. Generators have a marginal cost of generating real power from eachplant, and customers have different quantities of demand depending on the price at that half hour.The collection of generator costs stacks up to define the generation "merit order," from least tomost expensive. This merit order defines the short-run marginal-cost curve, which governs powersupply. Similarly, customers have demands that are sensitive to price, and higher prices produce
6 E Hirst and B. Kirby, “Creating Competitive Markets for Ancillary Services,” ORNL/CON-448, OakRidge National Laboratory, OakRidge, TN, October 1997.
lower demands. Generators and customers do not act unilaterally; they provide information tothe dispatcher to be used in a decision process that will determine which plants will run at anygiven half hour. Power pools provide the model for achieving the most efficient dispatch giventhe short-run marginal costs of power supply. Although dispatchable demand is not alwaysincluded, there is nothing conceptually or technically difficult about this extension. The systemoperator controls operation of the system to achieve the efficient match of supply and demand.
This efficient central dispatch can be made compatible with the market outcome. Thefundamental principle is that for the same load, the least-cost dispatch and the competitive-marketdispatch are the same. The principal difference between the traditional power pool and themarket solution is the price charged to the customer. In the traditional power pool model,customers pay and generators receive average cost, at least on average. However, marginal costimplicitly determines the least-cost dispatch, and marginal cost is the standard determinant ofcompetitive market pricing.
An important distinction between the traditional central dispatch and the decentralizedmarket view is found in the source of the marginal-cost information for the generator supplycurve. Typically, the cost data come from engineering estimates of the energy cost of generatingpower from a given plant at a given time. However, relying on these engineering estimates isproblematic in the market model since the true opportunity costs may include other features, suchas the different levels of maintenance, that would not be captured in the fuel cost. Replacementof the generator’s engineering estimates (that report only incremental fuel cost) with thegenerator’s market bids is the natural alternative. Each bid defines the minimum acceptable pricethat the generator would accept to run the plant in the given half hour. And these bids serve asthe guide for the dispatch.
As long as the generator receives the market clearing price, and there are enoughcompetitors so that each generator assumes that it will not be determining the marginal plant,then the optimal bid for each generator is the true marginal cost: To bid more would only lessenthe chance of being dispatched, but not change the price received. To bid less would create therisk of running and being paid less than the cost of generation for that plant. Hence, with enoughcompetitors and no collusion, the short-run central dispatch market model can elicit bids frombuyers and sellers. The system operator can treat these bids as the supply and demand anddetermine the balance that maximizes benefits for producers and consumers at the marketequilibrium price. Hence, in the short run electricity is a commodity, freely flowing into thetransmission grid from selected generators and out of the grid to the willing customers. Everyhalf hour, customers pay and generators receive the short-run marginal-cost price for the totalquantity of energy supplied in that half hour. Everyone pays or receives the true opportunity costin the short run. Payments follow in a simple settlement process.
Transmission Congestion.This overview of the short-run market model is by now familiar andfound in operation in many countries. However, this introductory overview conceals a criticaldetail that would be relevant for transmission pricing. Not all power is generated and consumedat the same location. In reality, generating plants and customers are connected through a free-
flowing grid of transmission and distribution lines.
In the short-run, transmission too is relatively simple. The grid has been built andeveryone is connected with no more than certain engineering requirements to meet minimumtechnical standards. In this short-run world, transmission reduces to nothing more than puttingpower into one part of the grid and taking it out at another. Power flow is determined byphysical laws, but a focus on the flows – whether on a fictional contract path or on moreelaborate allocation methods – is a distraction. The simpler model of input somewhere andoutput somewhere else captures the necessary reality. In this simple model, transmissioncomplicates the short-run market through the introduction of losses and possible congestion costs.
Transmission of power over wires encounters resistance, and resistance creates losses.Hence the marginal cost of delivering power to different locations differs at least by the marginaleffect on losses in the system. Incorporating these losses does not require a major change in thetheory or practice of competitive market implementation. Economic dispatch would take accountof losses, and the market equilibrium price could be adjusted accordingly. Technically this wouldyield different marginal costs and different prices, depending on location, but the basic marketmodel and its operation in the short-run would be preserved.
Transmission congestion has a related effect. Limitations in the transmission grid inthe short run may constrain long-distance movement of power and thereby impose a highermarginal cost in certain locations. Power will flow over the transmission line from the low costto the high cost location. If this line has a limit, then in periods of high demand not all thepower that could be generated in the low cost region could be used, and some of the cheap plantswould be "constrained off." In this case, the demand would be met by higher cost plants that,absent the constraint, would not run, but due to transmission congestion would be then"constrained on." The marginal cost in the two locations differs because of transmissioncongestion. The marginal cost of power at the low cost location is no greater than the cost ofthe cheapest constrained-off plant; otherwise the plant would run. Similarly, the marginal costat the high cost location is no less than the cost of the most expensive constrained-on plant;otherwise the plant would not be in use. The difference between these two costs, net of marginallosses, is the congestion rental.7
This congested-induced marginal-cost difference can be as large as the cost of thegeneration in the unconstrained case. If a cheap coal plant is constrained off and an oil plant,which costs more than twice as much to run, is constrained on, the difference in marginal costsby region is greater than the cost of energy at the coal plant. This result does not depend in anyway on the use of a simple case with a single line and two locations. In a real network, theinteractions are more complicated – with loop flow and multiple contingencies confrontingthermal limits on lines or voltage limits on buses – but the result is the same. It is easy toconstruct examples where congestion in the transmission grid leads to marginal costs that differ
7 Losses are not always negligible and could be treated explicitly. However, it would add nothing to thediscussion here.
by more than 100% across different locations.
If there is transmission congestion, therefore, the short-run market model anddetermination of marginal costs must include the effects of the constraints. This extensionpresents no difficulty in principle. The only impact is that the market now includes a set ofprices, one for each location. Economic dispatch would still be the least-cost equilibrium.Generators would still bid as before, with the bid understood to be the minimum acceptable priceat their location. Customers would bid also, with dispatchable demand and the bid setting themaximum price that would be paid at the customer’s location. The economic dispatch processwould produce the corresponding prices at each location, incorporating the combined effect ofgeneration, losses and congestion. In terms of their own supply and demand, everyone wouldsee a single price, which is the locational marginal cost based price of power at their location.If a transmission price is necessary, the natural definition of transmission is supplying power atone location and using it at another. However, the corresponding transmission price would bethe difference between the prices at the two locations.
This same framework lends itself easily to extensions including bilateral transactions.If market participants wish to schedule transmission between two locations, the opportunity costof the transmission is just this transmission price of the difference between spot prices at the twolocations. This short-run transmission usage pricing, therefore, is efficient and non-discriminatory. In addition, the same principles could apply in a multi-settlement framework,with day-ahead scheduling and real-time dispatch. These extensions could be important inpractice, but would not fundamentally change the outline of the structure of electricity markets.
This short-run competitive market with bidding and centralized dispatch is consistentwith economic dispatch. The locational prices define the true and full opportunity cost in theshort run. Each generator and each customer sees a single price for the half hour, and the pricesvary over half hours to reflect changing supply and demand conditions. All the complexities ofthe power supply grid and network interactions are subsumed under the economic dispatch andcalculation of the locational prices. These are the only prices needed, and payments for short-term energy are the only payments operating in the short run, with administrative overheadcovered by rents on losses or, if necessary, a negligible markup added to the cost of ancillaryservices and applied to all load. The system operator coordinates the dispatch and provides theinformation for settlement payments, with regulatory oversight to guarantee comparable servicethrough open access to the pool run by the system operator through a bid-based economicdispatch.
With efficient pricing, users have the incentive to respond to the requirements ofreliable operation. Absent such price incentives, the system operator would be required to restrictchoice and limit the market, in order to give the system operator enough control to counteractthe perverse incentives that would be created by prices that did not reflect the marginal costs ofdispatch. A competitive market with choice and customer flexibility depends on getting the
usage pricing right.8
Long-Run Market Contracts. With changing supply and demand conditions, generators andcustomers will see fluctuations in short-run prices. When demand is high, more expensivegeneration will be employed, raising the equilibrium market prices. When transmissionconstraints bind, congestion costs will change prices at different locations.
Even without transmission congestion constraints, the spot market price can be volatile.This volatility in prices presents its own risks for both generators and customers, and there willbe a natural interest in long-term mechanisms to mitigate or share this risk. The choice in amarket is for long-term contracts.
Traditionally, and in many other markets, the notion of a long-term contract carrieswith it the assumption that customers and generators can make an agreement to trade a certainamount of power at a certain price. The implicit assumption is that a specific generator will runto satisfy the demand of a specific customer. To the extent that the customer’s needs change,the customer might sell the contract in a secondary market, and so too for the generator.Efficient operation of the secondary market would guarantee equilibrium and everyone wouldface the true opportunity cost at the margin.
However, this notion of specific performance stands at odds with the operation of theshort-run market for electricity. To achieve an efficient economic dispatch in the short-run, thedispatcher must have freedom in responding to the bids to decide which plants run and whichare idle, independent of the provisions of long-term contracts. And with the complex networkinteractions, it is impossible to identify which generator is serving which customer. Allgeneration is providing power into the grid, and all customers are taking power out of the grid.It is not even in the interest of the generators or the customers to restrict their dispatch andforego the benefits of the most economic use of the available generation. The short-term dispatchdecisions by the system operator are made independent of and without any recognition of anylong-term contracts. In this way, electricity is not like other commodities.
This dictate of the physical laws governing power flow on the transmission grid doesnot preclude long-term contracts, but it does change the essential character of the contracts.Rather than controlling the dispatch and the short-run market, long-term contracts focus on theproblem of price volatility and provide a price hedge not by managing the flow of power but bymanaging the flow of money. The short-run prices provide the right incentives for generationand consumption, but create a need to hedge the price changes. Recognizing the operation ofthe short-run market, there is an economic equivalent of the long-run contract for power that doesnot require any specific plant to run for any specific customer.
Consider the case first of no transmission congestion. In this circumstance, except for
8 William W. Hogan, "Independent System Operator: Pricing and Flexibility in a CompetitiveElectricity Market," Harvard-Japan Project on Energy and the Environment, Harvard University, March 1998.
the small effect of losses, it is possible to treat all production and consumption as at the samelocation. Here the natural arrangement is to contract for the deviation from the equilibrium pricein the market. A customer and a generator agree on an average price for a fixed quantity, say100 MW at five cents. On the half hour, if the pool price is six cents, the customer buys powerfrom the pool at six cents and the generators sells power for six cents. Under the contract, thegenerator owes the customer one cent for each of the 100 MW over the half hour. In the reversecase, with the pool price at three cents, the customer pays three cents to the system operator,which in turn pays three cents to the generator, but now the customer owes the generator twocents for each of the 100 MW over the half hour. Familiar in other commodity industries, thisis known in the electricity market as a "contract for differences."
In effect, the generator and the customer have a long-term contract for 100 MW at fivecents. The contract requires no direct interaction with system operator other than for thecontinuing short-run market transactions. But through the interaction with system operator, thesituation is even better than with a long-run contract between a specific generator and a specificcustomer. For now if the customer demand is above or below 100 MW, there is a ready and anautomatic secondary market, namely the pool, where extra power is purchased or sold at the poolprice. Similarly for the generator, there is an automatic market for surplus power or backupsupplies without the cost and problems of a large number of repeated short-run bilateralnegotiations with other generators. And if the customer really consumes 100 MW, and thegenerator really produces the 100 MW, the economics guarantee that the average price is still fivecents. Furthermore, with the contract fixed at 100 MW, rather than the amount actually producedor consumed, the long-run average price is guaranteed without disturbing any of the short-runincentives at the margin. Hence the long-run contract is compatible with the short-run market.
The price of the generation contract would depend on the agreed reference price andother terms and conditions. Generators and customers might agree on dead zones, different up-side and down-side price commitments, or anything else that could be negotiated in a free marketto reflect the circumstances and risk preferences of the parties. Whether generators paycustomers, or the reverse, depends on the terms. However, system operator need take no noticeof the contracts, and have no knowledge of the terms. Such contracts for differences havebecome common in restructured electricity markets.
In the presence of transmission congestion, the generation contract is necessary but notsufficient to provide the necessary long-term price hedge. A bilateral arrangement between acustomer and a generator can capture the effect of aggregate movements in the market, when thesingle market price is up or the single market price is down. However, transmission congestioncan produce significant movements in price that are different depending on location. If thecustomer is located far from the generator, transmission congestion might confront the customerwith a high locational price and leave the generator with a low locational price. Now thegenerator alone cannot provide the natural back-to-back hedge on fluctuations of the short-runmarket price. Something more is needed.
Transmission congestion in the short-run market raises another related and significant
matter for the system operator. In the presence of congestion, revenues collected from customerswill substantially exceed the payments to generators. The difference is the congestion rent thataccrues because of constraints in the transmission grid. At a minimum, this congestion rentrevenue itself will be a highly volatile source of payment to the system operator. At worse, ifthe system operator keeps the congestion revenue, incentives arise to manipulate dispatch andprevent grid expansion in order to generate even greater congestion rentals. System operationis a natural monopoly and the operator could distort both dispatch and expansion. If the systemoperator retains the benefits from congestion rentals, this incentive would work contrary to thegoal of an efficient, competitive electricity market.
A convenient solution for both problems – providing a price hedge against locationalcongestion differentials and removing the adverse incentive for the system operator – is to re-distribute the congestion revenue through a system of long-run transmission congestion contractsoperating in parallel with the long-run generation contracts. Just as with generation, it is notpossible to operate an efficient short-run market that includes transmission of specific power tospecific customers. However, just as with generation, it is possible to arrange a transmissioncongestion contract that provides compensation for differences in prices, in this case fordifferences in the congestion costs between different locations across the network.
As illustrated in
DEFINE TRANSMISSION CONGESTION CONTRACTS BETWEEN LOCATIONS.
FOR SIMPLICITY, TREAT LOSSES AS OPERATING COSTS.
RECEIVE CONGESTION PAYMENTS FROM ACTUAL USERS; MAKECONGESTION PAYMENTS TO HOLDERS OF CONGESTION CONTRACTS.
Bus Price = Generation Cost + Marginal Losses + Congestion Costs
Pa = 5.15
Pc = 5.00
Pb = 5.30 + 1.95 = 7.25
TRANSMISSION CONGESTION CONTRACTS PROVIDE PROTECTION
Pcb = Pb - Pc = Marginal Losses + Congestion Costs = 0.3 + 1.95 = 2.25
AGAINST CHANGING LOCATIONAL DIFFERENCES.
NETWORK TRANSMISSION CONGESTION CONTRACTSthe figure, a transmissioncongestion contract definesa hedge for differences inl o c a t i o n a l p r i c e s .Everyone who uses thetransmission system paysaccording to the spot-market locational prices.For example, generation atA receives 5.15 cents.Load at B pays 7.25 cents,with the price includingmarginal losses andcongestion. Transmissionbetween C and B wouldpay 2.25 cents. Includedin this transmission chargewould be a congestion payment of 1.95 cents. A transmission congestion contract between C andB would result in a payment of the 1.95 cents to the holder of the contract.9 Hence, if theparticipant actually transported the power, the transmission congestion contract would just balance
9 For an expanded discussion of transmission congestion contracts, see Scott M. Harvey, William W.Hogan and Susan L. Pope, "Transmission Capacity Reservations and Transmission Congestion Contracts," Harvard-Japan Project on Energy and the Environment, Harvard University, February 1997.
the congestion charge for the quantity covered by the contract. And if the holder of thetransmission congestion contract does not transport power, the result is the same as selling thetransmission right to the actual user.
The transmission congestion contract for compensation would exist for a particularquantity between two locations. A generator at location C might obtain a transmission congestioncontract for 100 MW between the generator’s location and the customer at location B. The rightprovide by the contract would not be for specific movement of power but rather for payment ofthe congestion rental. Hence, ignoring losses, if a transmission constraint caused prices to riseto 6.95 cents at the customer’s location, but remain at five cents at the generator’s location, the1.95 cents difference would be the congestion rental. The customer would pay the pool 6.95cents for the power actually taken. The pool would in turn pay the generator five cents for thepower supplied in the short-run market. As the holder of the transmission congestion contract,the generator would receive 1.95 cents for each of the 100 MW covered under the transmissioncongestion contract. The generation and the load would see the right incentives on the margin.The transmission congestion contract revenue would allow the generator to pay the differenceunder the generation contract so that the net cost to the customer is five cents as agreed in thebilateral power contract. Without the transmission congestion contract, the generator would haveno revenue to compensate the customer for the difference in the prices at their two locations.The transmission congestion contract completes the package described as a "contract network."
Note that the transmission congestion contract is defined as a point-to-point comparisonof locational prices. There is no reference to the individual transmission links or the path bywhich the power may move between two points. This is an important distinction that separatesthe transmission congestion contract from "link-based" rights that otherwise confront difficultanomalies and perverse incentives. For example, it is entirely possible to construct examples ofvaluable transmission links that have no net power flow, making them appear worthless for manydefinitions of link-based rights. But this condition would not impact the definition or the valueof transmission congestion contracts.
There are alternative interpretations of contract network rights defined as transmissioncongestion contracts, with various advantages for implementation and interpretation. As above,the contract could be defined as the right to the difference in congestion costs; the contract holderreceives the difference in congestion costs between two buses for a fixed quantity of power. Thisis equivalent to the ability to purchase at a distant location; the contract holder at B can purchasea fixed quantity of power at B but pay the price applicable at a distant location, C. Or we coulddescribe the transmission congestion contract as providing for dispatch with no congestionpayment; the transmission congestion contract holder can inject and remove a fixed quantity ofpower without any congestion payment.
The allocation of transmission congestion contracts among market participants couldarise in many ways. For a market in transition during a restructuring process, the allocationmight be intended to reflect explicit or implicit historical rights. For new transmission, therecould be a negotiation process to select and award one of the many possible combinations of
feasible contracts. In
Concurrent Auction of Transmission Congestion Contracts
TCCs from 1 -> 3 awarded for 480 MW at price 3.6TCCs from 2 -> 3 awarded for 840 MW at price 1.8
addition, some or all of thetransmission congestioncontracts for the grid couldbe defined and awardedthrough an open auction.The collective bids woulddefine demand schedulesfor contracts. Theconcurrent auction wouldrespect the transmissionsystem constraints to assuresimultaneous feasibility.F o r e x a m p l e , t h eaccompanying figureillustrates a hypotheticalauction with two demandcurves for transmissioncongestion contracts on a simple network with three locations. The optimal award thatmaximizes the benefit10 of the contracts includes 480 MW from bus 1 to bus 3 and 840 MWfrom bus 2 to bus 3.
With spot market
Constraints with Out-Of-Merit Costs
locational prices, thetransmission congestioncontracts provide priceprotection. Even withchanging load patterns, thecongest ion revenuescollected by the systemoperator will be at leastenough to cover theobligations for all thecontracts. Consider atypical dispatch with thetransmission constraintbinding. Suppose thesolution is as in theaccompanying figure, witha total load of 3000 MW at
10 The benefit is defined as the consumer welfare, the area under the demand curves. Note this is not thesame as the value of the transmission congestion contracts at the market clearing price. The model is the simplifiedDC-Load model.
bus 3. The generation at bus 3 accounts for 2100 MW, with the balance of 900 MW comingfrom bus 1. The assumed market clearing prices at buses 1 and 3 are 2 cents and 2.6 cents,respectively. From these prices, and the knowledge that there is only one binding transmissionconstraint, we can compute the implied equilibrium prices at all other buses.11 In this case bus2 has a price of 2.3 cents. Note that the market equilibrium for this dispatch is quite differentfrom the pattern of flows envisioned in the allocation of the transmission congestion contracts.However, the different pattern of use, and the associated spot prices, present no difficulty for thesystem operator. As along as the allocation of the transmission congestion contracts defines aset of inputs and outputs that would be simultaneously feasible, then the revenue collected fromthe spot prices for congestion will be sufficient to compensate the holders of the contracts for theobligations at the same set of spot prices.12
The resulting calculation is illustrated in the accompanying table. The paymentobligations for the inputs and outputs at the spot prices define a set of net payments for the actualloads. The payment obligations for the transmission congestion contracts equal the net revenues.
System Operator Revenues
Quantity Price $
Bus 1 900 2 ($1,800)
Bus 2 0 2.3 $0
Bus 3 2100 2.6 ($5,460)
Bus 3 -3000 2.6 $7,800
TCC 1-3 480 0.6 ($288)
TCC 2-3 840 0.3 ($252)
Net Total $0
In effect, the system operator collects the congestion rents from the users of the systemand distributes these same rents to the holders of the transmission congestion contracts. In thiscase, with the simplified assumptions and the same binding constraint, the payments exactlybalance. In general, excess congestion rents may remain after paying all obligations under thetransmission congestion contracts. These excess rentals should not remain with the system
11 William W. Hogan E. Grant Read, and Brendan J. Ring, "Using Mathematical Programming forElectricity Spot Pricing," International Transactions in Operational Research, Vol. 3, No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 209-221.
12 For a further discussion of power flows and spot pricing, see William W. Hogan, "Contract Networksfor Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 4, 1992, p. 214.
operator, but could be distributed according to some sharing formula to those paying the fixedcosts of the existing grid or along with the payments under transmission congestion contracts.13
Many variants are possible, allowing great flexibility in developing and trading contracts. Thecontract network can allow great commercial flexibility while respecting the reality of the actualnetwork in determining the locational prices.
When only the single generator and customer are involved, this sequence of exchangesunder the two types of contracts may seem unnecessary. However, in a real network with manyparticipants, the process would be far less obvious. There will be many possible transmissioncombinations between different locations. There is no single definition of transmission gridcapacity, and it is only meaningful to ask if the configuration of allocated transmission flows isfeasible. However, the net result would be the same. Short-run incentives at the margin followthe incentives of short-run opportunity costs, and long-run contracts operate to provide pricehedges against specific quantities. The system operator coordinates the short-run market toprovide economic dispatch. The system operator collects and pays according to the short-runmarginal price at each location, and the system operator distributes the congestion rentals to theholders of transmission congestion contracts. Generators and customers make separate bilateralarrangements for generation contracts. Unlike with the generation contracts, the system operator'sparticipation in coordinating administration of the transmission congestion contracts is necessarybecause of the network interactions, which make it impossible to link specific customers payingcongestion costs with specific customer receiving congestion compensation. If a simplefeasibility test is imposed on the transmission congestion contracts awarded to customers, theaggregate congestion payments received by the system operator will fund the congestion paymentobligations under the transmission congestion contracts. Still, the congestion prices paid andreceived will be highly variable and load dependent. Only the system operator will have thenecessary information to determine these changing prices, but the information will be readilyavailable embedded in the spot market locational prices. The transmission congestion contractsdefine payment obligations that guarantee protection from changes in the congestion rentals.
Equivalent Transmission Interpretations. The transmission congestion contract can berecognized as equivalent to an advantageous form of point-to-point “physical” transmission right.Were it possible to define usage of the transmission system in terms of physical rights, it wouldbe desirable that these rights have two features. First, they could not be withheld from themarket to prevent others from using the transmission grid. Second, they would be perfectlytradable in a secondary market that would support full reconfiguration of the patterns of networkuse, at no transaction cost. This is impossible with any known system of physical transmissionrights that parcel up the transmission grid. However, in a competitive electricity market with abid-based economic dispatch, transmission congestion contracts are equivalent to just suchperfectly tradable transmission rights.
With a competitive market and tradable physical transmission capacity reservations,
13 The allocation of excess congestion rentals is part of the specification of the transmission congestioncontracts. Although important in practice, it would have little impact on the present analysis.
any use of the system not
Transmission Congestion Contracts
Transmission Capacity Reservations & Congestion Contracts
matched by a reservationwould be settled atopportunity cost pricesdetermined by the finaldispatch or actual use ofthe system. Trading ofphysical transmissioncapacity reservations mustbe coordinated through thesystem operator. Undercompetitive conditions, theprice that would be paidfor transmission capacitywould be the opportunitycost, which is the same asthe difference in thelocational prices. If therewere no transaction costs, therefore, this physical perspective would be indistinguishable fromthe financial perspective of transmission congestion contracts based on the same opportunity cost.
Genco Genco Genco Genco Genco Genco
Disco Disco Disco Disco Disco Disco
Cust. Cust. Cust. Cust. Cust.Cust.
Coordinated Transmission Trading Is Economic Dispatch
perspective may be moreintuitive. The financialp e r s p e c t i v e w i t htransmission congestioncontracts as perfectlytradeable rights is easier toimplement and has lowertransaction costs. Hence,w e c a n d e s c r i b etransmission congestioncontracts either as financialcontracts for congestionrents or as perfectlytradable point-to-pointphysical transmissionrights. If the capacity fortransmission congestioncontracts has been fully allocated, then the system operator will be simply a conduit for thedistribution of the congestion rentals. The operator would have no incentive to increasecongestion rentals: any increase in congestion payments would flow only to the holders of thetransmission congestion contracts. The problem of supervising the dispatch monopoly would begreatly reduced. And through a combination of generation contracts and transmission congestion
contracts, participants in the electricity market can arrange price hedges that could provide theeconomic equivalent of a long-term contract for specific power delivered to a specific customer.
Further to the
Contract Network Connects with Real Network
Determine Locational Prices for Real Network; ImplementTransmission Congestion Contracts and Trading on Contract Network
application of these ideas,locational marginal costpricing lends itself to anatural decomposition. Forexample, even with loopsin a network, marketinformation could betransformed easily into ahub-and-spoke frameworkwith locational pricedifferences on a spokedefining the cost of movingto and from the local hub,and then between hubs.This would simplifywithout distorting thelocational prices. Asshown in the figure, a contract network could develop that would be different from the realnetwork, without affecting the meaning or interpretation of the locational prices.14
With market hubs, the participants would see the simplification of having a fewlocations that capture most of the price differences of long-distance transmission. Contracts coulddevelop relative to the hubs.15 The rest of the sometimes important difference in locational priceswould appear in the cost of moving power to and from the local hub. Commercial connectionsin the network could follow a configuration convenient for contracting and trading. Theseparation of physical and financial flows would allow this flexibility.
The creation or elimination of hubs would require no intervention by regulators or thesystem operator. New hubs could arise as the market requires, or disappear when not important.A hub is simply a special node within a zone. The system operator still would work with thelocational prices, but the market would decide on the degree of simplification needed. However,everyone would still be responsible for the opportunity cost of moving power to and from thelocal hub. There would be locational prices and this would avoid the substantial incentive
14 For further details on long-run transmission congestion contracts, see Scott M. Harvey, William W.Hogan and Susan L. Pope, "Transmission Capacity Reservations and Transmission Congestion Contracts," Harvard-Japan Project on Energy and the Environment, Harvard University, February 1997.
15 For a similar argument, see S. Walton and R. Tabors, "Zonal Transmission Pricing: Methodology andPreliminary Results form the WSCC," Electricity Journal, November 1996, pp. 40.
problems of averaging prices. The hub-and-spoke approach appears to give most of the benefitsattributed to zones without the costs, and it implies that the system operator works within alocational pricing framework.
A version of this hub-and-spoke system appeared in the discussions among marketparticipants in the Pennsylvania-New jersey-Maryland (PJM) system in January 1998. Althoughthe market participants could create hubs without the participation of the system operator, therewas a popular request that the system operator identify and post hub prices. In order to reducethe price volatility that might be present in selecting a single location as a hub, the systemoperator responded to the request to create hubs consisting of a fixed-weight average of a numberof underlying locations. Hence, purchases and sales at the hub are equivalent to a portfolio ofpurchases and sales at the underlying locations, with the portfolio composition in terms of thefixed weights. Likewise, transmission between any location and the hub is the equivalent oftransmission between the given location and the portfolio of locations that make up the hub. ThePJM system operator began posting prices for such hubs in the preliminary price reporting systemthat began operation in February 1998.16 This system became operational in the beginning ofApril 1998. If the market participants find these hubs convenient, then contracts would bewritten using the composite hub prices as references, and futures contract could be constructedrelative to the same spot-market hub prices. However, nothing limits the markets to the hubsselected by the system operator, and anyone is free to utilize another hub and organize tradesrelative to this hub price.
Scheduling and Balancing. Implementation of the short-run dispatch market could take manyforms. In principle, the coordinated dispatch might be left to only the final hour, with all othercommitments and trades developed through decentralized transactions, notifying the systemoperator of the schedules only in time to complete the final balancing. At the other extreme,with long lead times for changing the configuration of generation or the patterns of loads, itmight be preferred to include unit commitment decisions over weeks or even longer periods.
In practice, most countries or regions adopt or recommended a procedure that fallssomewhere in between these alternatives. The system operator accepts bids and nominations forscheduled dispatch, say for a day ahead, and determines an appropriate market clearingequilibrium and associated payment settlements. This schedule then defines a set ofcommitments for delivering and taking power in the short-run dispatch. In the event, the actualdispatch will differ from the scheduled commitments, and appropriate balancing settlementswould be arranged.
These connected scheduling and balancing settlements present no major difficulties,but there are a few points that need clarification to maintain consistent payments and incentives.The basic schematic appears in the accompanying figure. Participants in the market submitscheduling bids for the day ahead for both supply and demand. These bids may include start up
16 The Internet address is "www.pjm.com/ferc/filings/19971231/lmp_info.html".
costs, ramping rates and
Start up Costs +
P, Q, T
p, q, Q
A Structure for Spot Market Dispatch & Settlements
any of range of plant andload characteristics.17 Thesystem operator utilizes allthis information to define aleast-cost dispatch over theday that matches scheduledload and generation. Theresults is a set of marketclearing prices (P) andquantities (Q) that definethe schedule. In addition,the system operatorarranges for any necessaryreliability commitments,such as for spinning andstandby reserves to meetany expected deviations inload from the day ahead schedules.
The equilibrium prices and quantities differ by location and represent immediate firmcommitments. Based on these commitments, payments would be made through a settlementsprocess. Conceptually these settlements could occur the minute the schedule is determined; inpractice, the settlements would occur after the fact. However, to preserve the consistency of theincentives and payments, the settlements must be based on the scheduling prices and quantities.These settlements will include payments under long-term transmission congestion contracts shownby the symbol "T" in the schematic. Holders of transmission congestion contracts would receiveor pay the appropriate amounts of congestion cost differentials between locations for thecontracted quantity under the transmission congestion contract. Under some fixed sharing rule,the transmission congestion contract holders, or the presumptive parties responsible for payingthe fixed charges of the transmission grid, would also share in any excess congestion paymentsafter settlement of the locational differences.
The schedule and the associated dispatch commitments (Q) would provide the referencepoint for the actual dispatch. In principle, bids in the scheduling market could be revised tocreate balancing bids for increments and decrements against the dispatch commitments. Againthe system operator would find the least-cost dispatch, hour by hour, based on the actualconditions and the final balancing bids. The result would be an actual dispatch with associatedequilibrium prices (p) and quantities (q). These prices and quantities would differ to a degreefrom the schedules, with the "imbalances" (q-Q) settled at the balancing price of "p". In thisbalancing settlements, the dispatch commitments are conceptually similar to the transmission
17 NGC Settlements Limited, An Introduction to the Pool Rules, Electricity Pool of England and Wales,April 1993.
congestion contracts that apply in the scheduling settlements. And just as for the transmissioncongestion contracts, after settling all the imbalances at the market clearing price "p", there couldbe some excess congestion payments that would be disbursed to the users and not kept by thesystem operator. In part, this excess would be used to reduce user payments for overhead andancillary services, not shown in the schematic, or rebated again to those who bear the fixed costsof the grid.
The precise treatment of the excess congestion rentals is not important, other than todisburse them to the users and not the system operator in a way that creates no incentives for aninefficient dispatch. What is important, however, is to settle the scheduling markets andbalancing markets with their own internally consistent prices (P,p) and quantities (Q,q). This isrequired, for example, to avoid the initial over-the-day gaming problems created in England andWales by settling based on scheduled prices (P) and actual quantities (q).
Long-Term Market Investment. Within the contract environment of the competitive electricitymarket, new investment occurs principally in generating plants, customer facilities andtransmission expansions. In each case, corresponding contract-right opportunities appear that canbe used to hedge the price uncertainty inherent in the operation of the competitive short-runmarket.
In the case of investment in new generating plants or consuming facilities, the processis straightforward. Under the competitive assumption, no single generator or customer is a largepart of the market, there are no significant economies of scale, and there are no barriers to entry.Generators or customers can connect to the transmission grid at any point subject only totechnical requirements defining the physical standards for hookup. If they choose, new customersor new generators have the option of relying solely on the short-run market, buying and sellingpower at the locational price determined as part of the half-hourly dispatch. The system operatormakes no guarantees as to the price at the location. The system operator only guarantees openaccess to the pool at a price consistent with the equilibrium market. The investor takes all thebusiness risk of generating or consuming power at an acceptable price.
If the generator or customer wants price certainty, then new generation contracts canbe struck between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The complexity and reach of thesecontracts would be limited only by the needs of the market. Typically we expect a new generatorto look for a customer who wants a price hedge, and for the generators to defer investing in newplant until sufficient long-term contracts with customers can be arranged to cover a sufficientportion of the required investment. The generation contracts could be with one or morecustomers and might involve a mix of fixed charges coupled with the obligations to compensatefor price differences relative to the spot-market price. But the customer and generator wouldultimately buy and sell power at their location at the half-hourly price.
If either party expects significant transmission congestion, then a transmissioncongestion contract would be indicated. If transmission congestion contracts are for sale betweenthe two points, then a contract can be obtained from the holder(s) of existing rights. Or new
investment can create new capacity that would support additional transmission congestioncontracts. The system operator would participate in the process only to verify that the newlycreated transmission congestion contracts would be feasible and consistent with the obligationto preserve any existing set of transmission congestion contracts on the existing grid. Unlike theambiguity in the traditional definition of transmission transfer capacity, there is a direct test todetermine the feasibility of any new set of transmission congestion contracts forcompensation–while protecting the existing rights–and the test is independent of the actual loadsthat may develop. Hence, incremental investments in the grid would be possible anywherewithout requiring that everyone connected to the grid participate in the negotiations or agree tothe allocation of the new transmission congestion contracts.
Evaluating the Market Design
The basic outline of a competitive market preserves certain features of the traditionalsystem, such as reliability and economic dispatch. However, it changes other elements that areeither unnecessary with opportunity cost pricing or are left to the choices of the marketparticipants. A review of the prominent features sets the stage for a further discussion oftransmission pricing and expansion issues.
Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch.Security-constrained economic dispatch is preservedin the competitive market based on coordinated dispatch with customer bids. The systemoperator manages this dispatch to protect against multiple contingencies and achieve the least-costdispatch and determine the market-clearing locational prices based on short-run marginal costs.With many competitors on both the supply and demand side, implying there is no chance for anysingle player to affect the market price, and the resulting bidding incentives align the bids withopportunity costs. Hence the dispatch is the efficient economic dispatch in the short-run.
Comparable Service. In the unbundled competitive market, the regulatory obligation to defineand require comparable service is limited to those services provided by the residual monopolies.With free entry in buying, brokering, billing, and so on, a competitive market can discipline andguide the selection and pricing of products and services in the competitive segments. Theresidual monopolies are the system dispatch and the lines. Here the principal services are inproviding full participation in the dispatch and connections to the wires. Once this access isavailable, the customers and suppliers can compete in the competitive segments of the market.Since there is a separation of the regulated monopoly function from all other services, there islittle difficulty in defining or enforcing comparability.
Of course, comparability does not mean that all services or all prices are the same.For example, customers are at different locations and purchase or supply power at different times.Each of these – different locations and different times – leads to different marginal costs thatshould be reflected in competitive prices. Price differences do not imply undue discrimination;price differences imply only the discrimination inherent in marginal costs.
Obligation to Serve. Under a competitive market design, the obligation to serve differsdramatically from the traditional regulatory regime. In the case of regulated, average-cost pricingand service, central decision makers must make the choices that provide the appropriate balanceof supply and demand. Most notably, the electric utility is obliged to serve the customer at theaverage cost of supply, even though the marginal cost of meeting that demand may be differentand perhaps much higher than the average cost. With the marginal cost greater than the averageprice, it is necessary to impose a legal obligation to make sure that the demand will be met.
In the competitive market, however, with customers paying the marginal cost ofelectricity, there is no imbalance at the margin. With the proper definition of marginal cost, anycustomer can have as much or as little electricity as demanded at that price. Hence, there is nonecessity to impose an obligation on an electric utility to provide electricity or any other serviceavailable in the competitive spheres of the market. In these competitive domains, wherecustomers have choices and pay marginal costs, the market balances supply and demand.
The only requirement for an obligation to serve, therefore, arises in the non-competitive, regulated portion of the market. Here the obligation to serve takes on a special andrestricted meaning to accept and include as part of the dispatch pool all parties on a comparablebasis, and to allow these parties to buy and sell power at locational marginal-cost prices in thepool. For the line owners, the obligation is to connect customers and negotiate in good faith anyrequested enhancements of "wires" capacity with appropriate creation of new transmissioncongestion contracts. The regulated segments have no obligation to review or be responsible forresulting investments or their subsequent economic consequences.
Security Concerns and Capacity Reserves.Secure economic dispatch coordinated through thesystem operator respects the current contingency limits on power flows and generation limits.In the short-run, the effect of security constraints in the system is to limit transmission and forceout-of-merit generation which gives rise to short-run congestion costs. These short-run marginalcosts are the true opportunity costs of "security," and in the competitive market customers facethese opportunity costs. In the long-run, investment in the grid is undertaken when customersfind it economic to reduce these congestion costs and the cost of losses. In this sense, evolutionof the grid would be determined by the market. Since all demand is always met, at the short-runlocational marginal cost, there is no non-price curtailment of demand and no need to build excesscapacity to provide a reserve margin. There may be high prices at times, and price will rise untildemand can be met at marginal cost. But there is no separate or additional security or reliabilityproblem. Hence, security in the short-run is maintained through the security constrained dispatch,and security in the long-run is priced and provided through the market for long-run investmentsto increase generation and transmission capacity.
Firm versus Interruptible Transmission and Generation. Firm versus interruptible service isanother traditional institution that evolved of necessity in the world of average-cost pricing.When not all demand could be met, there was a value in distinguishing between "interruptible"uses that were of lower value and "firm" uses that were of higher value. In the competitivemarket, this distinction vanishes in the short run. At the margin, all uses are equally firm or
interruptible. If the customer or supplier is just indifferent at the margin, then a change in priceleads naturally to some change in supply or demand. There is no obligation to serve, no long-runrequired capacity margin, and no distinction between different types of demand or supply.
The protection that came traditionally from "firm" rights reappears in the competitivemarket in long-run contracts for compensation for price differences. The compensation ariseseither for marginal generation costs or for transmission congestion. In the case of generationcosts, the "firm" compensation contracts can be arranged independently through negotiationsbetween buyers and sellers. In the case of transmission congestion, long-run contracts can bearranged through investment in the grid with congestion compensation administered by systemoperator.
Opportunity Cost. Under traditional regulatory rules, it is difficult to define and utilize conceptssuch as opportunity cost and incremental cost. Especially in the case of transmissioninvestments, where economies of scale and network interactions loom large, there may be nosatisfactory definition of long-run variants of these concepts. At a minimum, application of theseideas appears to require analyses of supply and demand conditions over a horizon of years ordecades, to evaluate alternative possible uses of the transmission grid and long-term powerexchanges. Given the complexities of network interactions, such analyses imply requirementsfor long-run forecasts of both the timing and the location of supply and demand for power.
Someone may prepare such forecasts, but the competitive market model moves thisresponsibility from the central planner and the regulator to the customer preparing to make aninvestment. The only "opportunity" cost arising with any form of regulatory supervision is inthe system operator calculation of the short-run locational marginal cost of power. And theregulator needs only supervise the process to guarantee the integrity of pool operations as theyunfold and the availability of information for customers to analyze the market. In the absenceof market failure, there is no need for the regulator to prepare or endorse forecasts of futureopportunity costs. These risks are left to the customers to absorb in the market place. If thecustomer anticipates a market with high short-run opportunity costs, the customer can purchaseexisting contracts or invest to create new contracts that provide compensation for and protectionfrom changing and volatile short-run opportunity costs. But the benefits and the risks remainwith the customers; the regulator’s only guarantee is that the customer will have access to thecompetitive market at the short-run market price.
Two-Part Prices. There are substantial economies of scale in transmission expansion.18 The total
18 Ross Baldick and Edward Kahn, "Network Costs and the Regulation of Wholesale Competition inElectric Power," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 5, 1993, pp. 37-384. The problems created by economiesof scale are addressed in the context of transmission pricing in the New Zealand by E. G. Read and D. P. M. Sell,"Pricing and Operation of Transmission Services: Short Run Aspects," Report to Trans Power, Canterbury Universityand Arthur Young, New Zealand, October 1988; E. G. Read, "Pricing of Transmission Services: Long RunAspects," Report to Trans Power, Canterbury University, New Zealand, October 1988; E. G. Read and D. P. M.Sell, "A Framework for Transmission Pricing," Report to Trans Power, Arthur Young, New Zealand, December 1988.
congestion revenue from transmission usage charges, therefore, generally would be less than thecost of the grid. This means that transmission pricing cannot rely solely on congestion paymentsto recover the full costs of the existing transmission grid. The incentive of avoiding futurecongestion payments may prompt transmission investment, but the ex post congestion paymentscould be lower after the investment. Hence, the competitive market model outline here relies onpricing according to two-part prices including a fixed and variable charge. This approachcontrasts with the alternative of a one-part transmission charge with a single price based onusage. Application of two-part prices is especially apt in the case of transmission, where it isdifficult to produce an acceptable definition of use that is tied to any subset of the network. Anyattempt to recover all or some of the fixed costs of the network based on variable chargesconfronts the problem of defining who is using which facility, and why. In a free-flowingelectrical transmission grid, power may flow in ways that are beyond the control or intent of theuser. And if as can be the case, the short-run opportunity costs are significantly different thansome pro-rata allocation of the long-run capital costs, a one-part tariff that averages fixed costsalong with variable costs can produce inefficient incentives and contentious debate over complexand changing allocations. However, in the competitive market model outlined here theseproblems for transmission are handled through the effective application of a two-part price.Short-run variable costs of transmission use are paid through the automatic pricing of the pooloperations. Long-run fixed charges are agreed to under contract as part of the process ofdeciding on new investments in the grid.
Secondary Markets. Availability of a secondary market is essential in maintaining priceefficiency for long-lived assets under changing conditions. The existence of such a secondarymarket, with the freedom to trade, is usually sufficient to guarantee workably efficient prices.The initial allocation of asset rights is important, as a matter of the distribution of wealth, butonce allocated the market will operate to determine the opportunity value of assets.
In the competitive market model, there is an active secondary market. The principallong-run assets that can be traded are the unregulated facilities and contracts for compensation.Facilities such as generating plants can be bought and sold in the market for whatever price canbe negotiated between willing buyer and seller. The same applies to trade in any long-runcontracts for price differences that have developed between generators and customers. Thesetrades take place without regulatory oversight, or even knowledge, as the market responds tochanging conditions and customer preferences.
The only secondary market that requires central participation, if not regulatoryoversight, is the market for trades in transmission congestion contracts. Although in principlethis too could evolve as an arms-length market without participation by the system operator, otherinformation economies may require participation by the transmission entities. In particular, thephysical "terms-of-trade" between two transmission congestion contracts are far from obvious.It may well be that 100 MW between locations A and B could be exchanged for 200 MWbetween C and D, or 150 MW between E and F. The network interactions are nonlinear, andonly the central dispatch operator has the information required to know which exchanges arefeasible.
Other Features. The list of additional features could be expanded much further, and the pricingmodel compared. Problems of free-riders remain in any system that includes the inescapableeconomies of scale of transmission expansion. If there is market power in generation or load,then the dispatch and transmission pricing model can be manipulated by the dominant player;however, the problems here are no more severe than in any other system that includes marketpower. To a limited extent, the use of locational prices and transmission congestion contractscan help mitigate market power and reduce incentives for inefficient investment. In addition, thecompetitive model does nothing in itself to internalize environmental externalities or facilitateother social policies.
ALLOCATING TRANSMISSION BENEFITS AND COSTS
The economies of scale and scope in transmission construction present a number ofissues in long-run transmission pricing. Transmission investments and upgrades tend to comein large increments that can have a significant effect on market prices. The facilities are capitalintensive, require long investment lead times, and are long lived. Any change in theconfiguration of the transmission grid can alter the extensive network interactions, therebyaffecting virtually all users of the transmission grid. Furthermore, most of the costs for theexisting transmission system are sunk. Hence, there is a marked difference between the problemsof determining the allocation of the costs for the existing system and the task of defining theallocation for system expansion.
The incentive for transmission investment would come from those who did not alreadyhave transmission congestion contracts. These market participants would be relying on the spotmarket. When the anticipated congestion cost and losses become large enough, there would bean economic motivation for investing in transmission. However, the motivation for theinvestment assumes, at a minimum, that those making the investment would then reduce the costof the losses and avoid the corresponding congestion payments.
The discussion of the economics of competitive electricity markets emphasizes theimportance of defining and allocating benefits of the transmission grid. If there is no method toallocate the benefits of transmission, the strong network interactions exacerbate the difficulty ofallocating costs. Without some form of transmission rights, there could be substantial incentivesto shift costs to others (i.e., free-riding), it would be difficult to define a standard of performancefor transmission providers, and the normal operation of market principles would founder becauseof the lack of property rights. By contrast, where it is possible to define the equivalent ofproperty rights, free-riding and these difficult allocation problems could be substantially reduced,if not eliminated.
Consider the allocation of the costs for short radial connections from plant to a nearbytransmission grid. In the simplest of cases, when connecting a single generator or a singlecustomer, the benefits of the connection seem clear. The benefits would accrue to the facilityconnected to the grid, and the costs would naturally be allocated to the same facility. The close
match between benefits and costs would allow for investment charges that would be consistentwith operation of a market. It is for this reason that transmission pricing often treats suchinvestments separately.
When we turn from simple radial connections to the main transmission grid, however,the obvious allocation of costs and benefits is no longer available. This is closely related to thecomplicating fact of network interactions that make it difficult or impossible to define the totalcapacity of a network. The simple reality is that in any sufficiently interconnected network, itis not possible to define the capacity of the network without also defining the pattern of usage.Except for truly radial systems, transmission congestion can change the capacity of the griddepending on the configuration of load and generation.
This difficulty in defining the capacity of the grid without specifying the pattern of usedoes not mean that no definition of capacity or property rights would be available. For example,it is always possible to test easily to determine if a particular pattern of usage of the transmissiongrid would be within the security constrained dispatch limits dictated by the requirements ofreliable operation. The system operator makes just such judgments on a regular basis, with anaffirmative conclusion implicit in every dispatch. Hence, it would be legitimate to define anyfeasible pattern of system use as within the capacity of the system, and the associated input levelscould be defined as transmission rights. With these hypothetical property rights, we would becloser to a method for allocating the benefits of transmission grid to support the allocation of thecosts.
One difficulty of this approach in terms of physical property rights would be in theconstant need to redefine and reconfigure transmission usage to conform to the actual loadpatterns. In effect, we would like those who have paid for transmission property rights to be ableto sell those rights in a secondary market to support the actual dispatch. Were this possible,many of the most perverse incentives and logical puzzles in transmission pricing would beremoved. With well-defined, tradable property rights, the transmission regime could operatemore according to market principles. However, a literal system of physical rights traded to matchactual use would be impractical as a means to control system dispatch.
This is where the transmission congestion contracts fit into the long-run picture. Atransmission congestion contract provides payment equal to the congestion price differentialbetween two locations. These financial contracts are equivalent to perfectly tradable transmissionrights. Hence, these transmission congestion contracts can be the embodiment of the benefits oftransmission investment. Ownership of the transmission congestion contract can be defined asthe benefit that comes with paying for transmission investment. The transmission congestioncontract provides a perfect hedge against changes in the transmission usage charges arising in theform of congestion costs. The transmission congestion contract internalizes the complicatednetwork interactions, and allows the market to operate with simple point-to-point arrangementsthat act like property rights.
In some cases, the transmission congestion contracts alone could support market
decisions for transmission investment. Faced with transmission congestion and persistentdifferences in locational prices, market participants could come forward to negotiate a contractfor transmission expansion. In exchange for a long-term agreement to pay the costs of theexpansion, they would receive a set of transmission congestion contracts that would reflect theincremental transfer capability created by the investment. In general, there would be no uniqueset of potential transmission congestion contracts, as many patterns of increased flow could beaccommodated by the incremental investment. However, the participants would agree on thepreferred collection of new transmission congestion contracts, and the assignment of both thecosts and the benefits would be established by contract before the investment was made. Thesystem operator would participate to certify the feasibility of the incremental transmissioncongestion contracts in combination with any other existing rights. The transmission providerwould build the transmission enhancement, the customer would pay the investment costs asdictated by the contract, and the system operator would administer the transmission congestioncontracts providing the hedge against congestion costs.
The transmission congestion contracts could also provide the definition of the futureobligations of the transmission provider. Absent some later change in the explicit contracts, theobligation of the transmission provider would be to maintain the feasibility of the collection oftransmission congestion contracts. This could be achieved either by literally maintaining thewires and other facilities to preserve the feasibility of the power flows as specified in thecontracts, or by assuming the financial responsibility to make up any payment deficits under thetransmission congestion contracts. Hence, the set of transmission congestion contracts couldserve as the cornerstone for an incentive pricing scheme for the transmission provider.
If there were no market power present, the value of the opportunity costs under thetransmission congestion contracts would define the opportunity costs of any reduction of systemcapacity. This would set a framework for any payment obligations by the transmission provider.In the presence of market power in generation or load, including the important special case ofa radial connection for a single entity, the transmission congestion contract obligation could beadapted to specify obligations of the transmission provider. For example, in case of the loss ofa radial line, there would be no observed market clearing price at the plant to define theopportunity cost of the reduced capacity caused by a line outage. However, in the context of aspot market, a pattern of bids from previous periods might establish a workable estimate of theincremental cost of the plant. The difference relative to the grid price at the point of connectioncould be used as the estimate of the opportunity cost in the rare event of line outage. In thiscase, the opportunity cost estimate would serve as the implied obligation under the transmissioncongestion contract. The typical contract might include some limited periods or maximumpayments to account for normal outages and maintenance, with any excess payments resting inwhole or in part as the responsibility of the transmission provider.
In circumstances with multiple owners of the transmission grid and substantial parallelflows, there would be a requirement to define a sharing mechanism of responsibility among thetransmission providers. In the case of a significantly interconnected system, the capacity on onepart of the system could affect the capacity everywhere, and not all transmission providers would
be able to control these impacts. This allocation of responsibility would be similar to the jointcost allocation problem, for which a number of practical solutions would be available.
This contract network approach with spot market locational prices and transmissioncongestion contracts is a "conforming" pricing proposal under the FERC criteria. Thetransmission grid owner receives embedded costs for the existing grid or investment costs fornew increments. The payment for the existing grid or new grid investments can be cost basedaccording to traditional regulation, or allowed to adjust to market prices. Those paying theregulated fixed charges for transmission receive the transmission congestion contracts.
The spot market participants pay locational prices which include transmissionopportunity costs. The difference in locational spot prices defines the opportunity cost of short-term transmission usage. Everyone has access to use the grid and pays the transmissionopportunity cost. The transmission congestion contract holders receive the congestion payments.Through the settlement payments, the system operator collects the congestion payments from thesystem users and disburses the congestion payments to the holders of the transmission congestioncontracts. The system operator keeps nothing; the grid owner receives the regulated fixedcharges; the transmission congestion contract holder receives compensation for out-of-meritdispatch costs; and the transmission user pays the true opportunity cost.
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
Complete reliance on market incentives for transmission investment would be unlikelyas a practical matter and is subject to a number of theoretical deficiencies. The tradeoff will bebetween imperfect markets and imperfect regulation. The existence of a viable system of long-term transmission congestion contracts changes the balance, however, to rely more on marketforces.
Economies of Scale and Free-Rider Effects
The locational opportunity cost pricing system would not pay for the grid. The fixedcharges of the grid reflect investments that, in principle, have been made to avoid paying theopportunity costs of congestion, losses, and more expensive generation. Typically, because ofeconomies of scale and scope, the fixed charges would be greater than the congestion opportunitycosts after the investment was made. It follows that fixed cost recovery for grid investmentswould be through a combination of access charges and long-term contracts. The transmissioncongestion contracts would be the embodiment of the long-term guarantee that would be obtainedin exchange for the fixed charge payments. Transmission congestion contracts would providea way to untangle the network and convert short-run opportunity cost prices into long-termtransmission arrangements.
This happy resolution of the puzzle of transmission expansion and pricing throughvoluntary market forces alone is subject to at least two other important caveats. First, there still