TRANSMUTATION OF KENYA

SUPERIOR COURT JURISDICTION:

FROM PYRAMIDAL TO HOUR-GLASS

JURISDICTIONAL SYSTEM

By

Hon. Justice (Prof.) James Otieno-Odek,

J.A., SJD, EBS

Paper presented at the Annual LSK

Conference

Leisure Lodge, Mombasa, 15th

August, 2014

PYRAMIDAL STRUCTURE OF SUPERIOR COURTS

HIGH COURT

COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT

Introduction

1. The Constitution is the constant North that determines the jurisdictional

question in Kenya’s legal system. Jurisdiction is everything and without it, a

court must lay down its tools. (See Nyarangi J. in Owners of the Motor

Vessel “Lillian S” v. Caltex Oil,(Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1).

2. The Supreme Court in the cases of In Re The Matter of the Interim

Independent Electoral Commission, S.C., Constitutional Application No. 2

of 2011; [2011] eKLR, and in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v.

Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others, S.C. Application No. 2 of

2012; [2012] eKLR, held that the assumption of jurisdiction by Courts in

Kenya, is a subject regulated by the Constitution, statute law, and judicial

precedent. It was stated:

“A Court’s jurisdiction flows from either the

Constitution or legislation or both. Such a Court

may not arrogate to itself jurisdiction through the

craft of interpretation, or by way of endeavours to

discern or interpret the intentions of Parliament,

where the wording of legislation is clear and there is

no ambiguity”.

3. On 27th

August, 2010, a new Constitution was promulgated in Kenya and

with it came a new definition of the phrase superior courts. Article 162 (1) of

the Constitution defines superior courts as the Supreme Court, the Court of

Appeal, the High Court as well as the Land and Environment Courts and the

Industrial Courts. Prior to the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, there

was the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

Pyramidal structure of Superior Court Jurisdiction in Kenya prior to

27th

August 2010

4. The structure of the superior court jurisdiction prior to promulgation of the

2010 Constitution can aptly be described as pyramidal in nature. The

penultimate court was the Court of Appeal whose jurisdiction was appellate

in nature. For second appeals to the Court of Appeal, the jurisdiction was

narrow and limited to points of law. On the other hand, the High Court has

always had unlimited original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters.

The High Court also has an appellate jurisdiction as provided for in the Civil

and Criminal Procedure Acts (Caps 21 and 75 of the Laws of Kenya

respectively). The combined jurisdiction of the High Court and Court of

Appeal can be described as pyramidal in nature. The base of the pyramid

represents the unlimited original jurisdiction of the High Court while the

apex of the pyramid encapsulated the narrow appellate jurisdiction of the

Court of Appeal.

5. Subsequent to the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution and in view of the

jurisprudential exposition by the Supreme Court, the jurisdictional

competence of the superior courts in Kenya has now metamorphosed into

what can aptly be depicted as an hour-glass jurisdictional system with the

High Court at the base, the Court of Appeal at the narrow centre and the

Supreme Court at the broad apex of the glass. Analysis of the constitutional

provisions and the emerging interpretative jurisprudence clearly illustrates

the metamorphosis.

Normative Jurisdiction of the Superior Courts

6. The following constitutional provisions set the jurisdictional competence of

each of the superior courts.

(A) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Article 163 (3) of the Constitution lays down the jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court as follows:

a) Exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes

relating to elections to the office of the President.

b) Appeals from Court of Appeal as of right in any case

involving the interpretation or application of the Constitution

or in any other case in which the Supreme Court or the Court

of Appeal certifies that a matter of general public importance

is involved.

c) The Court has an advisory jurisdiction to given an opinion at

the request of the national government, any State organ or

any county government with respect to any matter concerning

county government.

d) Under Section 24(1) of the Supreme Court Act, 2011, “In any proceeding before the Supreme Court, any judge of the Court may

make any interlocutory orders and give any interlocutory directions as the judge thinks fit, other than an order or direction that determines the proceeding or disposes of a question or issue before the Court in the proceeding.”

e) On the question whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to grant interlocutory orders, and more particularly, orders of stay of execution of decrees issued by other superior Courts; this question was laid to rest in the case of The Board of Governors of Kabarak High School – v- Macolm Bell & Daniel Toroitich arap Moi Sup. Ct. Petitions Nos. 6 and7 of 2013 where it was stated:

Where the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction derived from the Constitution and the law, it is equally empowered not only to exercise its inherent jurisdiction, but also to make any essential or ancillary orders such as will enable it to sustain its constitutional mandate as the ultimate judicial forum. A typical instance of such exercise of ancillary power is that of safeguarding the character and integrity of the subject-matter of the appeal, pending the resolution of the contested issues.

(B) Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal

Article 164 (3) of the Constitution stipulates that the jurisdiction of the Court

of Appeal shall be:

a) to hear appeals from the High Court and

b) any other court or tribunal as prescribed by an Act of

Parliament. The Appellate Jurisdiction Act has introduced

one qualification for the exercise of the court‘s jurisdiction,

that is, that the law must specifically provide for the right of

appeal.

c) As regards, appeals arising from election petitions, the

Court of Appeal is empowered to hear such appeals by

dint of section 85A of the Elections Act 2011.

d) In Richard Ncharpi Leiyagu v Independent Electoral

Boundaries Commission & 2 Others,[2013] eKLR (Civil

Appeal No. 18 of 2013) it was stated that a Court of Appeal

will not interfere with the exercise of the trial Judge's

discretion unless it is satisfied that the Judge in exercising

his discretion misdirected himself in some matters and as a

result arrived at a wrong decision, or unless it is manifest

from the case as a whole that the Judge has been clearly

wrong in the exercise of his discretion and that as a result

there has been a miscarriage of justice.

e) In the case of Maina vs Mugiria, [1983] KLR 78, it is stated

that on a second appeal, only matters of law may be taken.

If the High Court upholds a resident magistrate on a

question of whether or not he exercised his discretion

judicially, the issue as to whether he was right or wrong to

do so is a question of law.

f) The Court of Appeal has an original and discretionary

jurisdiction to grant orders for stay under Rule 5 (2) (b) of

the Court of Appeal Rules. In Ishmael Kagunyi Thande v

Housing Finance of Kenya Ltd Civil Application No. Nai

157 of 2006 the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal was

stated in the following manner: “The jurisdiction of the

court under rule 5(2) (b) is not only original but also

discretionary.” That the Court of Appeal has original

jurisdiction was reiterated by Githinji JA in Equity Bank

Limited vs. West Link Mbo Limited Civil Application No.

NAI 78 of 2011 wherein he stated that: “It is trite law in

dealing with 5(2) (b) applications the Court exercises

discretion as a court of first instance. … ; that rule 5(2)(b)

is a procedural innovation designed to empower the Court

entertain an interlocutory application for preservation of

the subject matter of the appeal in order to ensure the just

and effective determination of appeals.” In Githinji v Amrit

& Another [2004] eKLR it was stated that the principles

applicable in an application under rule 5(2) (b) of the Court

of Appeal Rules are now well settled. The applicant must

demonstrate that he has an arguable appeal which is not

frivolous. Secondly, he also needs to show that the result of

such appeal, if successful, would be rendered nugatory if

the application for stay was refused.”

(C) Jurisdiction of the High Court

Pursuant to Article 165 (3) of the Constitution, the High Court has the

following jurisdiction:

a) unlimited original jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters;

b) jurisdiction to determine the question whether a right or

fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied,

violated, infringed or threatened;

c) jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of a tribunal

appointed under the Constitution to consider the removal of a

person from office;

d) jurisdiction to hear any question respecting the interpretation of

the Constitution;

e) supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and over any

person, body or authority exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial

function.

f) special jurisdiction in electoral matters to determine any

question as to whether a person has been validly elected as a

Member of Parliament (Article 105(1)(a) of the Constitution).

Hour glass jurisdiction of superior courts

6. The learned Deputy Chief Justice and Vice-President of the Supreme Court,

K.H. Rawal in her concurring opinion in Anami Silverse Lisamula v. The

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Two Others, Sup.

Ct. Petition No. 9 of 2014 [at paragraph 135] made the observation that the

peculiar nature of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 informs the peculiarity of

the Judiciary in the new dispensation, and more so, that of the Supreme Court.

7. In the case of Hon. Lemanken Aramat –v- Harun Meitamei Lempaka, SC

Petition No. 5 of 2014,it was stated that the Supreme Court as the penultimate

court is not in the more constrained position in which the Court of Appeal had

been, at the time of “Lillian S”.

The Supreme Court of Kenya: A Substantially-enlarged Jurisdiction

under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010

8. The following principles are discernible from the jurisprudence of the Supreme

Court particularly as stated in the case of Hon. Lemanken Aramat –v-

HarunMeitameiLempaka, SC Petition No. 5 of 2014.

I. Under the Supreme Court Act, 2011 (Act No. 7 of 2011), the

Supreme Court is the formal custodian of the interpretive process

for Constitution, and in this context it is not possible to detract

from the Supreme Court’s authority to hear and determine all

the relevant constitutional questions.

II. Kenya’s Constitution directs the Supreme Court to take no rest,

until all unsettled issues of its interpretation and application are

resolved.

III. A question whether a particular Court has the jurisdiction to

determine an issue coming up before it, crystallizes in the

Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 163(4)(a) and/or

(b). The Supreme Court is, thus, required to delve into issues of

application or interpretation of the Constitution and, indeed,

those of general public importance. Therefore, the Supreme

Court cannot close its mind to the evaluation of even a single

provision of the law or the Constitution.

IV. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in relation to electoral disputes

is broader than that of the other superior courts. While the

Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction is based on Section 85A of the

Elections Act, with its prescribed timelines, that of the Supreme

Court is broader and is founded on the generic empowerment of

Article 163 of the Constitution, which confers an unlimited

competence for the interpretation and application of the

Constitution; and this, read alongside the Supreme Court Act,

2011 (Act No. 7 of 2011) illuminates the greater charge that is

reposed in the Supreme Court, for determining questions of

constitutional character.

V. Article 163(7) of the Constitution specially empowers the

Supreme Court to give stewardship to the terms of the

Constitution, in particular, safeguards for individual rights and

for the scheme of just redress to all matters in dispute. The

Constitution’s prescription is carried further in the Supreme

Court Act, 2011 which requires the Court to “assert the

supremacy of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the people

of Kenya” [Section 3(a)]; to “provide authoritative and impartial

interpretation of the Constitution” [Section 3(b)]; and to

“develop rich jurisprudence that respects Kenya’s history and

traditions and facilitates its social, economic and political

growth” [Section 3(c)].

VI. The Supreme Court’s special jurisdiction as the final interpreter

of the Constitution entrusts the Court with the responsibility of

assuring sanctity to its declared principles. The Court’s mandate

in respect of such principles cannot, by its inherent character, be

defined in restrictive terms. Questions that come up in the course

of dispute settlement especially those related to governance, are

intrinsically issues importing the obligation to interpret or apply

the Constitution – and consequently, issues falling squarely

within the Supreme Court’s mandate under Article 163(4)(1)(a),

as well as within the juridical mandate of the Court as prescribed

in Article 259(1)(c) of the Constitution, and in Section 3(c) of the

Supreme Court Act, 2011 (Act No. 7 of 2011).

VII. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is not restricted by long-

standing conventions (See concurring opinion of Mutunga, C.J.

& P. in Jasbir Singh Rai and Three Others v. Tarlochan Singh

Rai and Four Others, Sup. Ct. Petition No. 4 of 2012),

[paragraph 81].

VIII. The Supreme Court, by virtue of its status as the ultimate Court

in the settlement of the course of jurisprudence, holds a crucial

place in the determination of questions of ‘pure law’ bearing on

matters of public interest.

9. Unlimited appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to interpret the

Constitution in historical context

I. In Gatirau Peter Munya v. Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others

S.C. Petition No. 2B of 2014; [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court

stated that Article 87 (1) grants Parliament the latitude to enact

legislation to provide for timely resolution of electoral disputes.

This provision must be viewed against the country‘s electoral

history.

II. Section 3 of the Supreme Court Act vests the Court inter alia with

power to develop rich jurisprudence that respects Kenya‘s history

and traditions and facilitates its social, economic and political

growth.

III. The Hon. Chief Justice in his concurring opinion in Gatirau Peter

Munya v. Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others, S.C. Petition No.

2B of 2014; [2014] eKLR citing his dicta In Re the Speaker of the

Senate &Another – v- Attorney General & 4 others, (2013) eKLR

expressed himself as follows:

“In my opinion, this provision (Section 3 of the Supreme

Court Act) grants the Supreme Court a near-limitless and

substantially elastic interpretative power. It allows the

Court to explore interpretative space in the country’s

history and memory that, in my view, goes beyond the

minds of the framers whose product and appreciation of

the history and circumstances of the people of Kenya, may

have been constrained by the politics of the moment”.

IV. In Hon. Lemanken Aramat –v- Harun Meitamei Lempaka, SC

Petition No. 5 of 2014, the Supreme Court observed that issues of

merit as may have come up before lower Courts that lacked

jurisdiction are not beyond competence and jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court.

V. The inherently enlarged competence of the Supreme Court is an

element not shared with any of the lower Courts. (See concurring

opinion of Ojwang SCJ in Anami Silverse Lisamula v. The

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Two

Others, Sup. Ct. Petition No. 9 of 2014.

VI. It is a responsibility vested in the Supreme Court to interpret the

Constitution with finality and the Supreme Court carries the

overall responsibility [The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article

163(7)] for providing guidance on matters of law for the State’s

judicial branch and it follows that its jurisdiction is an enlarged

one, enabling it in all situations in which it has been duly moved,

to settle the law for the guidance of other Courts.

10. It is not fatal to fail to cite a constitutional provision to invoke the

Supreme Court’s jurisdiction

In Gatirau Peter Munya v. Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others, S.C.

Petition No. 2B of 2014; [2014] eKLR, at para. 69; the Supreme Court has

held that where specific constitutional provisions cannot be identified as

having formed the gist of the cause at the Court of Appeal, the very least an

appellant should demonstrate is that the Court’s reasoning, and the

conclusions which led to the determination of the issue, put in context, can

properly be said to have taken a trajectory of constitutional interpretation or

application.

11. New criterion for grant of stay orders – Public Interest to safeguard waste

of public resources

The emerging jurisprudence from the Supreme Court points to an additional

and new criterion for grant of stay orders. (See Mary Wambui Munene v

Peter Gichuki King'ara & 2 others. Supreme Court Civil Application No.

12 of 2014; see also Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dickson Mwenda Kithinji& 2

Others, SC Application No. 4 of 2014.

The new criterion is whether the grant of stay orders is in public interest.

The emerging jurisprudence shows that public interest includes the need to

avoid possible waste of public funds.

In Gatirau Peter Munya vs Dickson Mwenda Kithinji& 2 Others, SC

Application No. 4 of 2014 the Supreme Court expressed itself as follows:

…against the background of the public cause, we have focused our

perception on the public interest, and the concept of good

governance, that runs in tandem with the conscientious deployment

of the scarce resources drawn from the public. Proper husbandry

over public monetary and other resources, we take judicial notice, is

a major challenge to all active institutions and processes of

governance; and the Courts, by their established attribute of line-

drawing, must ever have an interest in contributing to the

safeguarding of such resources.

In the case of Zachary Okoth Obado – v- Edward Okongo Oyugi & 2

others, Supreme Court Civil Application No. 7 of 2014, the Supreme Court

expressed itself as follows:

“As to whether grant of such stay would be in the public

interest, we note that the applicant cited the dictum in the

Munya case in his submission that public funds are at risk of

being expended for an election when there is an impending

appeal that has a high probability of success. He asked that

this Court safeguards this public interest. If this Court had any

doubt as to this argument, our anxieties are allayed by the 2nd

respondent’s submission. The 2nd

respondent, IEBC, is a

constitutional body charged with conducting elections in this

Republic. In so doing, it expends public funds. The

Constitution decrees under Article 201(d) of the Constitution

that public money shall be used in a prudent and responsible

manner. The IEBC has cited cases where it had expended

public funds to prepare for elections that finally never

materialized, because of the outcome of Court decisions. There

can be no better reason for grant of stay than in this case

where the IEBC itself is calling out loud for grant of stay so as

to safeguard public funds”.

12. Conclusion: Unlimited Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The emerging jurisprudence from the Supreme Court and the doctrine of

stare decisis depicts a fundamental metamorphosis of the jurisdictional

competence of the superior courts in Kenya from pyramidal to an hour-glass

jurisdictional structure. The current thread and trend in the jurisprudence

leads one to conclude that the Supreme Court has evolved to become a Court

with unlimited appellate jurisdiction coupled with powers to interpret history

and make determinations on un-pleaded issues. The difference between the

High Court and the Supreme Court is that the High Court has unlimited

original jurisdiction while the Supreme Court has unlimited appellate

jurisdiction. The word “original” is the distinguishing factor and for the

High Court it implies the power to receive evidence and consider facts in the

first instance. For the Supreme Court, the power to receive evidence in the

first instance is lacking except in Presidential Petitions where it has original

and exclusive jurisdiction. A litigant has no locus standi to directly file suit

before the Supreme Court unless he/she is seeking an advisory opinion. A

litigant who wants to benefit from the substantially enlarged unlimited

appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must first litigate before the

Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal has a significant role to play in

evaluating and narrowing down the legal issues for consideration by the

Supreme Court. The Hon. Chief Justice aptly captures the transformation of

the superior court jurisdictional competence when he stated In Re The

Speaker of the Senate & another – v- Attorney General & 4 Others, (2013)

eKLR that the Supreme Court has a near-limitless and substantially elastic

interpretative power… that, goes beyond the minds of the framers of the

Constitution. In so far as the jurisdictional competence of the Supreme Court

is concerned, the era of the “Lillian S” case is over – the Supreme Court as

the penultimate court is not in the more constrained position in which the

Court of Appeal had been, at the time of “Lillian S”.

THE CONCEPT OF CIVILISED NATIONS AND DISOBEDIENCE

TO COURT ORDERS

13. Introduction

In the case of Hadkinson – v- Hadkinson, (1952) 2 All ER 211, it was

stated that it is a plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or

in respect of whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to

obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature

of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the

person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. A party

who knows of an order, whether null and void, regular or irregular cannot be

permitted to disobey it. The validity of a court order is not to be tested by

litigants or the person to whom it is served. It would be dangerous if parties

would start to judge whether an order was null and void, regular or irregular.

14. Pacific and Forcible resolution of disputes

In every society, differences in opinion, perspectives and disputes are bound

to arise. Even in a marriage, one ofthe guarantees to a successful and long

lasting marriage is the ability of two different people to amicable resolve

their differences. There are two ways of resolving disputes: by use of force

or peacefully.

Use of force to resolve disputes are short term and sow the seed for future

dispute and cyclical use of force. Use of force is premised on the concept of

might is right. The grievance of the subjugated party is neither addressed nor

resolved; it is buried and simmers; the routed party resorts to measures that

will enable it to acquire force and alter the balance of power.

On the other hand, peaceful settlement of disputes addresses the grievances

of both parties. Peaceful settlement of disputes is a process through which

the balance of rights and obligations are restored.

15. Role of Court orders in civil, economic, social and political stability

When a public officer or any person promotes disobedience to court orders,

that person does not understand the role of the courts in socio-economic and

political stability of a country. Disobedience to court orders is recipe for

anarchy and breakdown in the rule of law, it encourages citizens to take the

law into their hands; it whittles down the confidence of the citizenry in the

judicial system. The absence of an effective judiciary is one of the indicators

of a failed state.

Arbitral and judicial systems is the cornerstone for peaceful or pacific

settlement of disputes. One of the attributes of a civilized society is the

ability to generally resolve dispute in a peaceful manner. The legitimacy of

the judicial system is derived from sovereignty and acceptance of its

decisions by the disputants. In a national context, the legitimacy of the

judicial system stems from the constitutional order and deference to court

orders. Disobedience of court orders undermines the legitimacy and dignity

of the courts.

There is a direct and linear relationship between disobedience to court orders

and impunity which progresses into social and political instability that

culminates into breakdown in the rule of law. He who disobeys a court order

is courting anarchy, civil disobedience, social and political instability and

promotes economic uncertainty because rights as determined by the courts

cannot be enforced. In other words, disobedience to court order promotes the

adage that let every man take the law into his/her own hands; and ultimately

might is right.

16. Separation of powers and disobedience to court orders

Disobedience to court orders has been anchored on the concept of separation

of powers. In the Mumo Matemu case – v- Trusted Society of Human

Rights Alliance, (2013) eKLR, the Court of Appeal stated that separation of

powers does not proscribe organs of government from interfering with the

other’s functions. It also entails empowering each organ of government with

countervailing powers which provide check and balances on action taken by

other organs. The Supreme Court in the case of Speaker of National

Assembly –v- Attorney General & 3 Others, (2013) eKLR stated:

“Parliament must operate under the Constitution which is the

supreme law of the land…Where the Constitution decrees a

specific procedure to be followed …both houses of Parliament

are bound to follow that procedure. If Parliament violates the

procedural requirements of the supreme law of the land, it is

for the courts of law, not least the Supreme Court to assert the

authority and supremacy of the Constitution. It would be

different if the procedure in question were not constitutionally

mandated. This Court would be averse to questioning

Parliamentary procedures”.

17. Personal service and disobedience to court orders

In Basil Criticos – v- Attorney General & 8 Others, (2012) eKLR, and in

Kenya Tea Growers Association – v – Francis Atwoli & 5 Others, Petition

No. 64 of 2010, it was stated that where a party clearly acts and shows that

he had knowledge of a court order, the strict requirement that personal

service must be proved is rendered unnecessary. In Hadkinson – v-

Hadkinson, (1952) 2 All ER 211 it was stated that a party who knows of an

order, whether null and void, regular or irregular cannot be permitted to

disobey it.

18. Nullity of actions done in disobedience to court orders

In Clarke & Others - v – Chadburn & Others,(1985) 1 All ER 211, it was

emphasized that an act done in willful disobedience of a court order was not

only contempt of court but also an illegal and invalid act which cannot not

effect any change in the rights and liabilities of others. An act done in

disobedience of a court order is null and void ab initio and is a nullity in law.

19. Civil and criminal measures to enforce obedience to court orders

Contempt of court is the traditional mechanism to ensure compliance with

court orders. Contempt of court refers to actions which defy a court's

authority, cast disrespect on a court, or impede the ability of the court to

perform its function. Contempt of court may be "direct" or "indirect". Direct

contempt occurs in the presence of the court - during a court proceeding, for

example. Indirect contempt occurs outside the presence of the court.

Contempt takes two forms: criminal contempt and civil contempt. Actions

that one might normally associate with the phrase "contempt of court," such

as a party causing a serious disruption in the courtroom, yelling at the judge,

or refusing to testify would often constitute criminal contempt of court. Civil

contempt of court most often happens when someone fails to adhere to an

order from the court, with resulting injury to a private party's rights.

Sections 96 and 131 of the Penal Code (Cap 63 of the Laws of Kenya)

espouse provisions that enforce obedience to court orders and promote the

dignity of the courts.

Section 96 of the Penal Code provides that any person who, without lawful

excuse, the burden of proof whereof shall lie upon him, utters, prints or

publishes any words, or does any act or thing, indicating or implying that it

is or might be desirable to do, or omit to do, any act the doing or omission of

which is calculated—

(a) ……

(b) …

(c) to prevent or defeat by violence or by other unlawful means the

execution or enforcement of any written law or to lead to

defiance or disobedience of any such law, or of any lawful

authority, is guilty of an offence and is liable to imprisonment

for a term not exceeding five years.

Section 131 of the Penal Code provides that everyone who disobeys any

order, warrant or command duly made, issued or given by any court, officer

or any person acting in any public capacity and duly authorized in that

behalf, is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable, unless any other penalty or

mode of proceeding is expressly prescribed in respect of the disobedience, to

imprisonment for two years.

……. END ……