transparency and the location of assets: evidence from fatca...compels foreign banks to register...
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Transparency and the Location of Assets: Evidence from FATCA
Lisa De SimoneStanford Graduate School of Business
Becky LesterStanford Graduate School of Business
Kevin MarkleUniversity of Iowa
September 2017
Motivation
If U.S. citizen compliant with U.S. tax rules:$100M of wealth invested in U.S. equities
Earn $5 million in investment income(dividends and gains)
Pay U.S. tax at 23.8% = $1.19M in U.S. tax
If non-compliant with U.S. tax rules$100M of wealth invested in U.S. equities
Earn $5 million in investment income(dividends and gains)
*REQUIRED to report this income to the U.S. and pay tax, but
*Choose not to report (evade); pay $0 in tax
Approximately 8% of global personal wealth is hidden in tax havens (Zucman, QJE, 2013).
The US has a large annual βtax gapβ of which $40-$125 billion is estimated to be from individual offshore tax evasion (TIGTA).
A simplified example:
Moves $ Offshore
Research Question
RQ: What is the effect of increased reporting on the worldwide location of
investment assets?
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
βΊ Several reasons (legal and illegal) to have an offshore account.
βΊ Prior to FATCA, U.S. citizens had to self-report:β’ Foreign income on U.S. tax returnβ’ Foreign bank account (U.S. tax return and Treasury form).
βΊ Prior literature demonstrates:β’ Low evasion on third-party-reported incomeβ’ Higher evasion (lower detection risk) on self-reported income (Kaplow,
1990; Slemrod, 2007; Kleven et al., 2011)
βΊ βVoluntary compliance rates are the highest where there is third-party reporting, but this reporting was largely absent for U.S. owned offshore accountsβ¦β - Emily McMahon, former Asst. Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy (2012)
βΊ ββ¦Moreover, identifying U.S. taxpayers who earn foreign source income through offshore accounts would require the cooperation of foreign financial institutions.β
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
βΊ To address the growing tax gap, Congress passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act in 2010.
βΊ Primarily a reporting regime β FATCA requires:β’ Automatic exchange of information (βAEOIβ)β’ By Foreign Financial Institutions (βFFIsβ)β’ To U.S. tax authoritiesβ’ Of payments from the U.S. (i.e., dividends, proceeds from sales of
stock)
βΊ Compels foreign banks to register with the IRS and comply with FATCA by imposing punitive withholding taxes for non-compliance.
βΊ As of August 2017, over 290,000 entities registered as FFIs.
βΊ Over 100 countries have agreed to cooperate with FATCA information exchange by signing βIntergovernmental Agreementsβ with the U.S.
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
βTo paint an extreme case, when a farmer in Sichuan province walks into the bank office near his home to open an account for the proceeds from sale of his crop, the bank will have to take steps to ensure that he is not an American citizen or resident. On the amazing coincidence that he is, the bank will have to provide regular information to the IRS about his account activity. On a careful and considered view, this seems a bit extreme.β
- Michel and Rosenbloom (2011)
Prior Evidence on Offshore Evasion
βΊ Optimal tax evasion = f(detection risk, size of penalty, and risk aversion) (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972)
βΊ FATCA is intended to increase detection:β’ Converts self-reported income into third-party-reported incomeβ’ Analytically predicted to lead to a lower level of U.S. offshore tax
evasion (Dharmapala, 2016)β’ Observed reduction in the number of offshore shell incorporations
post-FATCA (Omartian 2017)β’ Observed increases in the number of individuals filing under IRS
amnesty programs (Johannesen 2017)
Prior Evidence on Offshore Evasion
However:
βΊ Cost of relocating assets or shifting to alternative investment classes may be lower than paying back taxes and incurring penalties (Langenmayr, 2015)
βΊ Individuals engaging in evasion likely have different risk preferences and view tax compliance process differently (Slemrod et al., 2001; Alstadsaeter et al., 2017)
βΊ Prior programs (EU Savings Directive; TIEAs) have had limited success in reducing evasion (Caruana-Galizia and Caruana-Galizia, 2016; Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2004; Johannesen, 2014; Johannesen and Zucman, 2014; Omartian, 2017)
Hypothesis: The level of offshore tax evasion by U.S. individuals does not change after FATCA.
Research Design#1: Test of Change in FPI into US
1. Exploit the round-tripping phenomenon (following Hanlon et al., 2015):Does the amount of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) into the United States from tax haven countries change, post-FATCA?
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI)
into U.S.
Implicit assumption: Non-U.S. investors in other countries should be unaffected by and indifferent to FATCA regulation, to which they are not subject.
πΏπΏπΏπΏπΏπΏ πΉπΉπΉπΉπΉπΉππ,π‘π‘ = πΌπΌπππππππππ‘π‘ππππ + πΌπΌπππ¦π¦π¦π¦ππ + π½π½1π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»ππ β πΉπΉπΏπΏπππππΉπΉπππππππππ‘π‘ + πΎπΎπππππΏπΏπ»π»πππΆπΆπΏπΏπΆπΆππππ,π‘π‘ + ππππ,π‘π‘
- Measure inbound FPI using U.S. Treasury International Capital System data- Year and country fixed effects- PostFATCA is an indicator equal to 1 for years 2012 and later
Move $$ Offshore
Table 3: Inbound Investment to the U.S.
Reduction in equity FPI into the U.S. (relative to other FATCA-signing countries) of 22%.
Table 4: Inbound Investment to the U.S.
Table 5B: Falsification Test of FPI after 2010
Research Design#2: Test of Change in Worldwide FPI from Havens
2. Expand the potential investee countries: does the amount of worldwide foreign portfolio investment (FPI) from tax haven countries change, post-FATCA?
πΏπΏπΏπΏπΏπΏ πΉπΉπΉπΉπΉπΉππ,π‘π‘ = πΌπΌπππππππππ‘π‘ππππ + πΌπΌπππ¦π¦π¦π¦ππ + π½π½1π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»ππ β πΉπΉπΏπΏπππππΉπΉπππππππππ‘π‘ + πΎπΎπππππΏπΏπ»π»πππΆπΆπΏπΏπΆπΆππππ,π‘π‘ + ππππ,π‘π‘
- Measure country-pair data on FPI using IMF data on the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS)
Table 6A: Worldwide FPI Data from IMF
βΊ Equity FPI out of FATCA haven countries declined by 30.7%βΊ Effect is not only confined to reduced investment into U.S.: see
significant effect in other countriesβΊ Results robust to excluding 2014 and 2015
Research Design#3: Test of Change in Level of Hidden Assets
Directly examine the estimated level of hidden assets following Zucman (2013)
For Example:Amount Other Countries Report is Owned in Switzerland
Less: Amt. Switzerland Reports Reports is Owned by ForeignersEstimated βGapβ
πΏπΏπΏπΏπΏπΏ πΊπΊπ»π»πΊπΊππ,π‘π‘ = πΌπΌπππππππππ‘π‘ππππ + πΌπΌπππ¦π¦π¦π¦ππ + π½π½1π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»π»ππ β πΉπΉπΏπΏπππππΉπΉπππππππππ‘π‘ + πΎπΎπππππΏπΏπ»π»πππΆπΆπΏπΏπΆπΆππππ,π‘π‘ + ππππ,π‘π‘
Table 7: Level of Hidden Assets (βGapβ)
- The gap reported by haven countries declined by 29 percent in 2012.
Where did the money go?
βΊ Did the hidden assets move to a non-signing haven?β’ Weak evidence of some increase in non-signing
havens
βΊ Additionally, evidence of increases in inbound FPI from non-signing countries (not just havens)β’ Includes Argentina, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Lebanon,
Morocco, Russia, and Uruguay
Where did the money go?
βΊ Did the hidden assets move into alternative investments?β’ Real Estate investmentsβ’ Art work and other luxury goodsβ’ Freeports
Findings
β’ The reporting regime imposed by FATCA is associated with significant, economic effects on cross-border fund flows, consistent with tax-evasion-motivated investment flowsβ’ Reduction in inbound FPI to the U.S. from tax haven countries of 22
percentβ’ Heterogeneity within haven countries: not all FATCA havens are
alikeβ’ Reduction in total FPI out of tax havens of 23-30 percentβ’ Reduction in gap (proxy for hidden assets) of 29 percent
β’ Evidence consistent with assets moving from FATCA-signing tax haven jurisdictions to other jurisdictions that have not signed onto FATCA
Contribution
β’ Contribute to the literature studying tax evasionβ’ Provide additional evidence on the round-tripping phenomenaβ’ Show some of the economic effects of a far-reaching reporting
regime and provide evidence to evaluate regulationβ’ Provide evidence on relative economic significance of FATCA (as
compared to events of 2008 and 2010) and on worldwide cross-border flows
β’ Contribute to the policy discussions regarding FATCAβ’ Significant opposition to the lawβ’ Legislation introduced on April 6 to repeal FATCAβ’ Congressional hearings in April 2017β’ Current appeal to Supreme Courtβ’ Inform expectations about responsiveness to worldwide FATCA β
βCommon Reporting Standardsβ
Thank you!