G.R. No. 147079 December 21, 2004A.F. SANCHEZ BROKERAGE INC., petitioners, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:Before this Court on a petition for Certiorari is the appellate courts Decision1 of August 10, 2000 reversing and setting aside the judgment of Branch 133, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 93-76B which dismissed the complaint of respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU Insurance) against petitioner A.F. Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. (Sanchez Brokerage).On July 8, 1992, Wyeth-Pharma GMBH shipped on board an aircraft of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines at Dusseldorf, Germany oral contraceptives consisting of 86,800 Blisters Femenal tablets, 14,000 Blisters Nordiol tablets and 42,000 Blisters Trinordiol tablets for delivery to Manila in favor of the consignee, Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories, Inc.2 The Femenal tablets were placed in 124 cartons and the Nordiol tablets were placed in 20 cartons which were packed together in one (1) LD3 aluminum container, while the Trinordial tablets were packed in two pallets, each of which contained 30 cartons.3Wyeth-Suaco insured the shipment against all risks with FGU Insurance which issued Marine Risk Note No. 4995 pursuant to Marine Open Policy No. 138.4Upon arrival of the shipment on July 11, 1992 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),5 it was discharged "without exception"6 and delivered to the warehouse of the Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI) located also at the NAIA for safekeeping.7In order to secure the release of the cargoes from the PSI and the Bureau of Customs, Wyeth-Suaco engaged the services of Sanchez Brokerage which had been its licensed broker since 1984.8 As its customs broker, Sanchez Brokerage calculates and pays the customs duties, taxes and storage fees for the cargo and thereafter delivers it to Wyeth-Suaco.9On July 29, 1992, Mitzi Morales and Ernesto Mendoza, representatives of Sanchez Brokerage, paid PSI storage fee amounting to P8,572.35 a receipt for which, Official Receipt No. 016992,10 was issued. On the receipt, another representative of Sanchez Brokerage, M. Sison,11 acknowledged that he received the cargoes consisting of three pieces in good condition.12Wyeth-Suaco being a regular importer, the customs examiner did not inspect the cargoes13 which were thereupon stripped from the aluminum containers14 and loaded inside two transport vehicles hired by Sanchez Brokerage.15Among those who witnessed the release of the cargoes from the PSI warehouse were Ruben Alonso and Tony Akas,16 employees of Elite Adjusters and Surveyors Inc. (Elite Surveyors), a marine and cargo surveyor and insurance claim adjusters firm engaged by Wyeth-Suaco on behalf of FGU Insurance.Upon instructions of Wyeth-Suaco, the cargoes were delivered to Hizon Laboratories Inc. in Antipolo City for quality control check.17 The delivery receipt, bearing No. 07037 dated July 29, 1992, indicated that the delivery consisted of one container with 144 cartons of Femenal and Nordiol and 1 pallet containing Trinordiol.18On July 31, 1992, Ronnie Likas, a representative of Wyeth-Suaco, acknowledged the delivery of the cargoes by affixing his signature on the delivery receipt.19 Upon inspection, however, he, together with Ruben Alonzo of Elite Surveyors, discovered that 44 cartons containing Femenal and Nordiol tablets were in bad order.20 He thus placed a note above his signature on the delivery receipt stating that 44 cartons of oral contraceptives were in bad order. The remaining 160 cartons of oral contraceptives were accepted as complete and in good order.Ruben Alonzo thus prepared and signed, along with Ronnie Likas, a survey report21 dated July 31, 1992 stating that 41 cartons of Femenal tablets and 3 cartons of Nordiol tablets were "wetted" (sic).22The Elite Surveyors later issued Certificate No. CS-0731-1538/9223 attached to which was an "Annexed Schedule" whereon it was indicated that prior to the loading of the cargoes to the brokers trucks at the NAIA, they were inspected and found to be in "apparent good condition."24 Also noted was that at the time of delivery to the warehouse of Hizon Laboratories Inc., slight to heavy rains fell, which could account for the wetting of the 44 cartons of Femenal and Nordiol tablets.25On August 4, 1992, the Hizon Laboratories Inc. issued a Destruction Report26 confirming that 38 x 700 blister packs of Femenal tablets, 3 x 700 blister packs of Femenal tablets and 3 x 700 blister packs of Nordiol tablets were heavily damaged with water and emitted foul smell.On August 5, 1992, Wyeth-Suaco issued a Notice of Materials Rejection27 of 38 cartons of Femenal and 3 cartons of Nordiol on the ground that they were "delivered to Hizon Laboratories with heavy water damaged (sic) causing the cartons to sagged (sic) emitting a foul order and easily attracted flies."28Wyeth-Suaco later demanded, by letter29 of August 25, 1992, from Sanchez Brokerage the payment of P191,384.25 representing the value of its loss arising from the damaged tablets.As the Sanchez Brokerage refused to heed the demand, Wyeth-Suaco filed an insurance claim against FGU Insurance which paid Wyeth-Suaco the amount of P181,431.49 in settlement of its claim under Marine Risk Note Number 4995.Wyeth-Suaco thus issued Subrogation Receipt30 in favor of FGU Insurance.On demand by FGU Insurance for payment of the amount of P181,431.49 it paid Wyeth-Suaco, Sanchez Brokerage, by letter31 of January 7, 1993, disclaimed liability for the damaged goods, positing that the damage was due to improper and insufficient export packaging; that when the sealed containers were opened outside the PSI warehouse, it was discovered that some of the loose cartons were wet,32 prompting its (Sanchez Brokerages) representative Morales to inform the Import-Export Assistant of Wyeth-Suaco, Ramir Calicdan, about the condition of the cargoes but that the latter advised to still deliver them to Hizon Laboratories where an adjuster would assess the damage.33Hence, the filing by FGU Insurance of a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against the Sanchez Brokerage.The trial court, by Decision34 of July 29, 1996, dismissed the complaint, holding that the Survey Report prepared by the Elite Surveyors is bereft of any evidentiary support and a mere product of pure guesswork.35On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court, it holding that the Sanchez Brokerage engaged not only in the business of customs brokerage but also in the transportation and delivery of the cargo of its clients, hence, a common carrier within the context of Article 1732 of the New Civil Code.36Noting that Wyeth-Suaco adduced evidence that the cargoes were delivered to petitioner in good order and condition but were in a damaged state when delivered to Wyeth-Suaco, the appellate court held that Sanchez Brokerage is presumed negligent and upon it rested the burden of proving that it exercised extraordinary negligence not only in instances when negligence is directly proven but also in those cases when the cause of the damage is not known or unknown.37The appellate court thus disposed: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of the Appellant is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court a quo is REVERSED. Another Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the Appellant and against the Appellee as follows:1. The Appellee is hereby ordered to pay the Appellant the principal amount of P181, 431.49, with interest thereupon at the rate of 6% per annum, from the date of the Decision of the Court, until the said amount is paid in full;2. The Appellee is hereby ordered to pay to the Appellant the amount of P20,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and3. The counterclaims of the Appellee are DISMISSED.38Sanchez Brokerages Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate courts Resolution of December 8, 2000 which was received by petitioner on January 5, 2001, it comes to this Court on petition for certiorari filed on March 6, 2001.In the main, petitioner asserts that the appellate court committed grave and reversible error tantamount to abuse of discretion when it found petitioner a "common carrier" within the context of Article 1732 of the New Civil Code.Respondent FGU Insurance avers in its Comment that the proper course of action which petitioner should have taken was to file a petition for review on certiorari since the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and does not include correction of the appellate courts evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon.On the merits, respondent FGU Insurance contends that petitioner, as a common carrier, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence, it being documented that petitioner withdrew from the warehouse of PSI the subject shipment entirely in good order and condition.39The petition fails.Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.40The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 8, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration of its Decision of August 10, 2000 was received by petitioner on January 5, 2001. Since petitioner failed to appeal within 15 days or on or before January 20, 2001, the appellate courts decision had become final and executory. The filing by petitioner of a petition for certiorari on March 6, 2001 cannot serve as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. In another vein, the rule is well settled that in a petition for certiorari, the petitioner must prove not merely reversible error but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Petitioner alleges that the appellate court erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court based on its finding that petitioner is liable for the damage to the cargo as a common carrier. What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.Where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.41 The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to issue a cert writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of lower courts as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case.42Procedural technicalities aside, the petition still fails. The appellate court did not err in finding petitioner, a customs broker, to be also a common carrier, as defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, to wit:Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.Anacleto F. Sanchez, Jr., the Manager and Principal Broker of Sanchez Brokerage, himself testified that the services the firm offers include the delivery of goods to the warehouse of the consignee or importer.ATTY. FLORES:Q: What are the functions of these license brokers, license customs broker?WITNESS:As customs broker, we calculate the taxes that has to be paid in cargos, and those upon approval of the importer, we prepare the entry together for processing and claims from customs and finally deliver the goods to the warehouse of the importer.43Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.44 The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration.In this light, petitioner as a common carrier is mandated to observe, under Article 173345 of the Civil Code, extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it transports according to all the circumstances of each case. In the event that the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.46The concept of "extra-ordinary diligence" was explained in Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals:47The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires."48In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner received the cargoes from the PSI warehouse in NAIA in good order and condition;49 and that upon delivery by petitioner to Hizon Laboratories Inc., some of the cargoes were found to be in bad order, as noted in the Delivery Receipt50 issued by petitioner, and as indicated in the Survey Report of Elite Surveyors51 and the Destruction Report of Hizon Laboratories, Inc.52In an attempt to free itself from responsibility for the damage to the goods, petitioner posits that they were damaged due to the fault or negligence of the shipper for failing to properly pack them and to the inherent characteristics of the goods53; and that it should not be faulted for following the instructions of Calicdan of Wyeth-Suaco to proceed with the delivery despite information conveyed to the latter that some of the cartons, on examination outside the PSI warehouse, were found to be wet.54While paragraph No. 4 of Article 173455 of the Civil Code exempts a common carrier from liability if the loss or damage is due to the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers, the rule is that if the improper packing is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for the resulting damage.56If the claim of petitioner that some of the cartons were already damaged upon delivery to it were true, then it should naturally have received the cargo under protest or with reservations duly noted on the receipt issued by PSI. But it made no such protest or reservation.57Moreover, as observed by the appellate court, if indeed petitioners employees only examined the cargoes outside the PSI warehouse and found some to be wet, they would certainly have gone back to PSI, showed to the warehouseman the damage, and demanded then and there for Bad Order documents or a certification confirming the damage.58 Or, petitioner would have presented, as witness, the employees of the PSI from whom Morales and Domingo took delivery of the cargo to prove that, indeed, part of the cargoes was already damaged when the container was allegedly opened outside the warehouse.59Petitioner goes on to posit that contrary to the report of Elite Surveyors, no rain fell that day. Instead, it asserts that some of the cargoes were already wet on delivery by PSI outside the PSI warehouse but such notwithstanding Calicdan directed Morales to proceed with the delivery to Hizon Laboratories, Inc.While Calicdan testified that he received the purported telephone call of Morales on July 29, 1992, he failed to specifically declare what time he received the call. As to whether the call was made at the PSI warehouse when the shipment was stripped from the airport containers, or when the cargoes were already in transit to Antipolo, it is not determinable. Aside from that phone call, petitioner admitted that it had no documentary evidence to prove that at the time it received the cargoes, a part of it was wet, damaged or in bad condition.60The 4-page weather data furnished by PAGASA61 on request of Sanchez Brokerage hardly impresses, no witness having identified it and interpreted the technical terms thereof.The possibility on the other hand that, as found by Hizon Laboratories, Inc., the oral contraceptives were damaged by rainwater while in transit to Antipolo City is more likely then. Sanchez himself testified that in the past, there was a similar instance when the shipment of Wyeth-Suaco was also found to be wet by rain.ATTY. FLORES:Q: Was there any instance that a shipment of this nature, oral contraceptives, that arrived at the NAIA were damaged and claimed by the Wyeth-Suaco without any question?WITNESS:A: Yes sir, there was an instance that one cartoon (sic) were wetted (sic) but Wyeth-Suaco did not claim anything against us.ATTY. FLORES:Q: HOW IS IT?WITNESS:A: We experienced, there was a time that we experienced that there was a cartoon (sic) wetted (sic) up to the bottom are wet specially during rainy season.62Since petitioner received all the cargoes in good order and condition at the time they were turned over by the PSI warehouseman, and upon their delivery to Hizon Laboratories, Inc. a portion thereof was found to be in bad order, it was incumbent on petitioner to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of the goods. It did not, however. Hence, its presumed negligence under Article 1735 of the Civil Code remains unrebutted.WHEREFORE, the August 10, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.Corona, J., on leave.G.R. No. 161833. July 8, 2005PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs.UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V "NATIONAL HONOR," NATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SERVICES, INC., Respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision1 dated January 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57357 which affirmed the Decision dated February 17, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 95-73338.The AntecedentOn November 5, 1995, J. Trading Co. Ltd. of Seoul, Korea, loaded a shipment of four units of parts and accessories in the port of Pusan, Korea, on board the vessel M/V "National Honor," represented in the Philippines by its agent, National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP). The shipment was for delivery to Manila, Philippines. Freight forwarder, Samhwa Inter-Trans Co., Ltd., issued Bill of Lading No. SH94103062 in the name of the shipper consigned to the order of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company with arrival notice in Manila to ultimate consignee Blue Mono International Company, Incorporated (BMICI), Binondo, Manila.NSCP, for its part, issued Bill of Lading No. NSGPBSML5125653 in the name of the freight forwarder, as shipper, consigned to the order of Stamm International Inc., Makati, Philippines. It is provided therein that:12. This Bill of Lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt of the Carrier in apparent good order and condition except as, otherwise, noted of the total number of Containers or other packages or units enumerated overleaf. Proof to the contrary shall be admissible when this Bill of Lading has been transferred to a third party acting in good faith. No representation is made by the Carrier as to the weight, contents, measure, quantity, quality, description, condition, marks, numbers, or value of the Goods and the Carrier shall be under no responsibility whatsoever in respect of such description or particulars.13. The shipper, whether principal or agent, represents and warrants that the goods are properly described, marked, secured, and packed and may be handled in ordinary course without damage to the goods, ship, or property or persons and guarantees the correctness of the particulars, weight or each piece or package and description of the goods and agrees to ascertain and to disclose in writing on shipment, any condition, nature, quality, ingredient or characteristic that may cause damage, injury or detriment to the goods, other property, the ship or to persons, and for the failure to do so the shipper agrees to be liable for and fully indemnify the carrier and hold it harmless in respect of any injury or death of any person and loss or damage to cargo or property. The carrier shall be responsible as to the correctness of any such mark, descriptions or representations.4The shipment was contained in two wooden crates, namely, Crate No. 1 and Crate No. 2, complete and in good order condition, covered by Commercial Invoice No. YJ-73564 DTD5 and a Packing List.6 There were no markings on the outer portion of the crates except the name of the consignee.7 Crate No. 1 measured 24 cubic meters and weighed 3,620 kgs. It contained the following articles: one (1) unit Lathe Machine complete with parts and accessories; one (1) unit Surface Grinder complete with parts and accessories; and one (1) unit Milling Machine complete with parts and accessories. On the flooring of the wooden crates were three wooden battens placed side by side to support the weight of the cargo. Crate No. 2, on the other hand, measured 10 cubic meters and weighed 2,060 kgs. The Lathe Machine was stuffed in the crate. The shipment had a total invoice value of US$90,000.00 C&F Manila.8 It was insured for P2,547,270.00 with the Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) thru its general agent, Family Insurance and Investment Corporation,9 under Marine Risk Note No. 68043 dated October 24, 1994.10The M/V "National Honor" arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) on November 14, 1995. The International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated (ICTSI) was furnished with a copy of the crate cargo list and bill of lading, and it knew the contents of the crate.11 The following day, the vessel started discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the ICTSI,12 the exclusive arrastre operator of MICT.Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the surveyor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo.13 They inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition.14 Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. 1.15 No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauzs experience, this was a normal procedure.16 As the crate was being hoisted from the vessels hatch, the mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about five feet high from the vessels twin deck, sending all its contents crashing down hard,17 resulting in extensive damage to the shipment.BMICIs customs broker, JRM Incorporated, took delivery of the cargo in such damaged condition.18 Upon receipt of the damaged shipment, BMICI found that the same could no longer be used for the intended purpose. The Mariners Adjustment Corporation hired by PCIC conducted a survey and declared that the packing of the shipment was considered insufficient. It ruled out the possibility of taxes due to insufficiency of packing. It opined that three to four pieces of cable or wire rope slings, held in all equal setting, never by-passing the center of the crate, should have been used, considering that the crate contained heavy machinery.19BMICI subsequently filed separate claims against the NSCP,20 the ICTSI,21 and its insurer, the PCIC,22 for US$61,500.00. When the other companies denied liability, PCIC paid the claim and was issued a Subrogation Receipt23 for P1,740,634.50.On March 22, 1995, PCIC, as subrogee, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 35, a Complaint for Damages24 against the "Unknown owner of the vessel M/V National Honor," NSCP and ICTSI, as defendants.PCIC alleged that the loss was due to the fault and negligence of the defendants. It prayed, among others WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly or in the alternative, the following:1. Actual damages in the amount of P1,740,634.50 plus legal interest at the time of the filing of this complaint until fully paid;2. Attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00;3. Cost of suit.25ICTSI, for its part, filed its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim against its co-defendant NSCP, claiming that the loss/damage of the shipment was caused exclusively by the defective material of the wooden battens of the shipment, insufficient packing or acts of the shipper.At the trial, Anthony Abarquez, the safety inspector of ICTSI, testified that the wooden battens placed on the wooden flooring of the crate was of good material but was not strong enough to support the weight of the machines inside the crate. He averred that most stevedores did not know how to read and write; hence, he placed the sling cables only on those portions of the crate where the arrow signs were placed, as in the case of fragile cargo. He said that unless otherwise indicated by arrow signs, the ICTSI used only two cable slings on each side of the crate and would not place a sling cable in the mid-section.26 He declared that the crate fell from the cranes because the wooden batten in the mid-portion was broken as it was being lifted.27 He concluded that the loss/damage was caused by the failure of the shipper or its packer to place wooden battens of strong materials under the flooring of the crate, and to place a sign in its mid-term section where the sling cables would be placed.The ICTSI adduced in evidence the report of the R.J. Del Pan & Co., Inc. that the damage to the cargo could be attributed to insufficient packing and unbalanced weight distribution of the cargo inside the crate as evidenced by the types and shapes of items found.28The trial court rendered judgment for PCIC and ordered the complaint dismissed, thus:WHEREFORE, the complaint of the plaintiff, and the respective counterclaims of the two defendants are dismissed, with costs against the plaintiff.SO ORDERED.29According to the trial court, the loss of the shipment contained in Crate No. 1 was due to the internal defect and weakness of the materials used in the fabrication of the crates. The middle wooden batten had a hole (bukong-bukong). The trial court rejected the certification30 of the shipper, stating that the shipment was properly packed and secured, as mere hearsay and devoid of any evidentiary weight, the affiant not having testified.Not satisfied, PCIC appealed31 to the CA which rendered judgment on January 19, 2004 affirming in toto the appealed decision, with this fallo WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, dated February 17, 1997, is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.32The appellate court held, inter alia, that it was bound by the finding of facts of the RTC, especially so where the evidence in support thereof is more than substantial. It ratiocinated that the loss of the shipment was due to an excepted cause "[t]he character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers" and the failure of the shipper to indicate signs to notify the stevedores that extra care should be employed in handling the shipment.33 It blamed the shipper for its failure to use materials of stronger quality to support the heavy machines and to indicate an arrow in the middle portion of the cargo where additional slings should be attached.34 The CA concluded that common carriers are not absolute insurers against all risks in the transport of the goods.35Hence, this petition by the PCIC, where it alleges that:I.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT COMMON CARRIER IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE SHIPMENT IN THE POSSESSION OF THE ARRASTRE OPERATOR.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN NOT APPLYING THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF FAULT AND NEGLIGENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISCOMPREHENDED THE FACTS IN FINDING THAT THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE [SHIPMENT] WAS DUE TO ITS DEFECTIVE PACKING AND NOT TO THE FAULT AND NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS.36The petitioner asserts that the mere proof of receipt of the shipment by the common carrier (to the carrier) in good order, and their arrival at the place of destination in bad order makes out a prima facie case against it; in such case, it is liable for the loss or damage to the cargo absent satisfactory explanation given by the carrier as to the exercise of extraordinary diligence. The petitioner avers that the shipment was sufficiently packed in wooden boxes, as shown by the fact that it was accepted on board the vessel and arrived in Manila safely. It emphasizes that the respondents did not contest the contents of the bill of lading, and that the respondents knew that the manner and condition of the packing of the cargo was normal and barren of defects. It maintains that it behooved the respondent ICTSI to place three to four cables or wire slings in equal settings, including the center portion of the crate to prevent damage to the cargo: [A] simple look at the manifesto of the cargo and the bill of lading would have alerted respondents of the nature of the cargo consisting of thick and heavy machinery. Extra-care should have been made and extended in the discharge of the subject shipment. Had the respondent only bothered to check the list of its contents, they would have been nervous enough to place additional slings and cables to support those massive machines, which were composed almost entirely of thick steel, clearly intended for heavy industries. As indicated in the list, the boxes contained one lat[h]e machine, one milling machine and one grinding machine-all coming with complete parts and accessories. Yet, not one among the respondents were cautious enough. Here lies the utter failure of the respondents to observed extraordinary diligence in the handling of the cargo in their custody and possession, which the Court of Appeals should have readily observed in its appreciation of the pertinent facts.37The petitioner posits that the loss/damage was caused by the mishandling of the shipment by therein respondent ICTSI, the arrastre operator, and not by its negligence.The petitioner insists that the respondents did not observe extraordinary diligence in the care of the goods. It argues that in the performance of its obligations, the respondent ICTSI should observe the same degree of diligence as that required of a common carrier under the New Civil Code of the Philippines. Citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 it posits that respondents are liable in solidum to it, inasmuch as both are charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to its consignee, BMICI.Respondent NSCP counters that if ever respondent ICTSI is adjudged liable, it is not solidarily liable with it. It further avers that the "carrier cannot discharge directly to the consignee because cargo discharging is the monopoly of the arrastre." Liability, therefore, falls solely upon the shoulder of respondent ICTSI, inasmuch as the discharging of cargoes from the vessel was its exclusive responsibility. Besides, the petitioner is raising questions of facts, improper in a petition for review on certiorari.39Respondent ICTSI avers that the issues raised are factual, hence, improper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It claims that it is merely a depository and not a common carrier; hence, it is not obliged to exercise extraordinary diligence. It reiterates that the loss/damage was caused by the failure of the shipper or his packer to place a sign on the sides and middle portion of the crate that extra care should be employed in handling the shipment, and that the middle wooden batten on the flooring of the crate had a hole. The respondent asserts that the testimony of Anthony Abarquez, who conducted his investigation at the site of the incident, should prevail over that of Rolando Balatbat. As an alternative, it argues that if ever adjudged liable, its liability is limited only to P3,500.00 as expressed in the liability clause of Gate Pass CFS-BR-GP No. 319773.The petition has no merit.The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.40We have reviewed the records and find no justification to warrant the application of any exception to the general rule.We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.41 The Court has defined extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods as follows:The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires."42The common carriers duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them.43 When the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable.44 To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence.45However, under Article 1734 of the New Civil Code, the presumption of negligence does not apply to any of the following causes:1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;5. Order or act of competent public authority.It bears stressing that the enumeration in Article 1734 of the New Civil Code which exempts the common carrier for the loss or damage to the cargo is a closed list.46 To exculpate itself from liability for the loss/damage to the cargo under any of the causes, the common carrier is burdened to prove any of the aforecited causes claimed by it by a preponderance of evidence. If the carrier succeeds, the burden of evidence is shifted to the shipper to prove that the carrier is negligent.47"Defect" is the want or absence of something necessary for completeness or perfection; a lack or absence of something essential to completeness; a deficiency in something essential to the proper use for the purpose for which a thing is to be used.48 On the other hand, inferior means of poor quality, mediocre, or second rate.49 A thing may be of inferior quality but not necessarily defective. In other words, "defectiveness" is not synonymous with "inferiority."In the present case, the trial court declared that based on the record, the loss of the shipment was caused by the negligence of the petitioner as the shipper:The same may be said with respect to defendant ICTSI. The breakage and collapse of Crate No. 1 and the total destruction of its contents were not imputable to any fault or negligence on the part of said defendant in handling the unloading of the cargoes from the carrying vessel, but was due solely to the inherent defect and weakness of the materials used in the fabrication of said crate.The crate should have three solid and strong wooden batten placed side by side underneath or on the flooring of the crate to support the weight of its contents. However, in the case of the crate in dispute, although there were three wooden battens placed side by side on its flooring, the middle wooden batten, which carried substantial volume of the weight of the crates contents, had a knot hole or "bukong-bukong," which considerably affected, reduced and weakened its strength. Because of the enormous weight of the machineries inside this crate, the middle wooden batten gave way and collapsed. As the combined strength of the other two wooden battens were not sufficient to hold and carry the load, they too simultaneously with the middle wooden battens gave way and collapsed (TSN, Sept. 26, 1996, pp. 20-24).Crate No. 1 was provided by the shipper of the machineries in Seoul, Korea. There is nothing in the record which would indicate that defendant ICTSI had any role in the choice of the materials used in fabricating this crate. Said defendant, therefore, cannot be held as blame worthy for the loss of the machineries contained in Crate No. 1.50The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, thus:The case at bar falls under one of the exceptions mentioned in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, particularly number (4) thereof, i.e., the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers. The trial court found that the breakage of the crate was not due to the fault or negligence of ICTSI, but to the inherent defect and weakness of the materials used in the fabrication of the said crate.Upon examination of the records, We find no compelling reason to depart from the factual findings of the trial court.It appears that the wooden batten used as support for the flooring was not made of good materials, which caused the middle portion thereof to give way when it was lifted. The shipper also failed to indicate signs to notify the stevedores that extra care should be employed in handling the shipment.Claudio Cansino, a stevedore of ICTSI, testified before the court their duties and responsibilities:"Q: With regard to crates, what do you do with the crates?A: Everyday with the crates, there is an arrow drawn where the sling is placed, Maam.Q: When the crates have arrows drawn and where you placed the slings, what do you do with these crates?A: A sling is placed on it, Maam.Q: After you placed the slings, what do you do with the crates?A: After I have placed a sling properly, I ask the crane (sic) to haul it, Maam.Q: Now, what, if any, were written or were marked on the crate?A: The thing that was marked on the cargo is an arrow just like of a chain, Maam.Q: And where did you see or what parts of the crate did you see those arrows?A: At the corner of the crate, Maam.Q: How many arrows did you see?A: Four (4) on both sides, Maam.Q: What did you do with the arrows?A: When I saw the arrows, thats where I placed the slings, Maam.Q: Now, did you find any other marks on the crate?A: Nothing more, Maam.Q: Now, Mr. Witness, if there are no arrows, would you place slings on the parts where there are no arrows?A: You can not place slings if there are no arrows, Maam."Appellants allegation that since the cargo arrived safely from the port of [P]usan, Korea without defect, the fault should be attributed to the arrastre operator who mishandled the cargo, is without merit. The cargo fell while it was being carried only at about five (5) feet high above the ground. It would not have so easily collapsed had the cargo been properly packed. The shipper should have used materials of stronger quality to support the heavy machines. Not only did the shipper fail to properly pack the cargo, it also failed to indicate an arrow in the middle portion of the cargo where additional slings should be attached. At any rate, the issue of negligence is factual in nature and in this regard, it is settled that factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and, in fact, accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence.51We agree with the trial and appellate courts.The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to counter that of respondent ICTSI. The petitioner failed to rebut the testimony of Dauz, that the crates were sealed and that the contents thereof could not be seen from the outside.52 While it is true that the crate contained machineries and spare parts, it cannot thereby be concluded that the respondents knew or should have known that the middle wooden batten had a hole, or that it was not strong enough to bear the weight of the shipment.There is no showing in the Bill of Lading that the shipment was in good order or condition when the carrier received the cargo, or that the three wooden battens under the flooring of the cargo were not defective or insufficient or inadequate. On the other hand, under Bill of Lading No. NSGPBSML512565 issued by the respondent NSCP and accepted by the petitioner, the latter represented and warranted that the goods were properly packed, and disclosed in writing the "condition, nature, quality or characteristic that may cause damage, injury or detriment to the goods." Absent any signs on the shipment requiring the placement of a sling cable in the mid-portion of the crate, the respondent ICTSI was not obliged to do so.The statement in the Bill of Lading, that the shipment was in apparent good condition, is sufficient to sustain a finding of absence of defects in the merchandise. Case law has it that such statement will create a prima facie presumption only as to the external condition and not to that not open to inspection.53IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.G.R. No. 150403 January 25, 2007CEBU SALVAGE CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent. D E C I S I O NCORONA, J.:May a carrier be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting from the sinking of a ship it does not own? This is the issue presented for the Courts resolution in this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the March 16, 2001 decision2 and September 17, 2001 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 40473 which in turn affirmed the December 27, 1989 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145, Makati, Metro Manila.5 The pertinent facts follow.On November 12, 1984, petitioner Cebu Salvage Corporation (as carrier) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter6 wherein petitioner was to load 800 to 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo7 at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for transport to and discharge at Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc.8 Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984, petitioner received and loaded 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo which left Ayungon for Tagoloan the next day.9 The shipment never reached its destination, however, because the M/T Espiritu Santo sank in the afternoon of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol, Misamis Oriental, resulting in the total loss of the cargo.10 MCCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer, respondent Philippine Home Assurance Corporation.11 Respondent paid the claim in the amount of P211,500 and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII.12 Thereafter, it filed a case in the RTC13 against petitioner for reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ordered petitioner to pay respondent P211,500 plus legal interest, attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the award and costs of suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.Petitioner and MCCII entered into a "voyage charter," also known as a contract of affreightment wherein the ship was leased for a single voyage for the conveyance of goods, in consideration of the payment of freight.14 Under a voyage charter, the shipowner retains the possession, command and navigation of the ship, the charterer or freighter merely having use of the space in the vessel in return for his payment of freight.15 An owner who retains possession of the ship remains liable as carrier and must answer for loss or non-delivery of the goods received for transportation.16Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC finding that the voyage charter it entered into with MCCII was a contract of carriage.17 It insists that the agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its owner, ALS Timber Enterprises (ALS).18 Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner did not have control and supervision over the vessel, its master and crew.19 Thus, it could not be held liable for the loss of the shipment caused by the sinking of a ship it did not own.We disagree.Based on the agreement signed by the parties and the testimony of petitioners operations manager, it is clear that it was a contract of carriage petitioner signed with MCCII. It actively negotiated and solicited MCCIIs account, offered its services to ship the silica quartz and proposed to utilize the M/T Espiritu Santo in lieu of the M/T Seebees or the M/T Shirley (as previously agreed upon in the voyage charter) since these vessels had broken down.20There is no dispute that petitioner was a common carrier. At the time of the loss of the cargo, it was engaged in the business of carrying and transporting goods by water, for compensation, and offered its services to the public.21From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to the circumstances of each case.22 In the event of loss of the goods, common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove that this was brought about by the causes specified in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.23 In all other cases, common carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.24 Petitioner was the one which contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control over what vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a common carrier. The MCCII (respondents subrogor) could not be reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it is very difficult and often impossible for the general public to enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should be required to know who the actual owner of the vessel is.25 In fact, in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated petitioner as the "owner/operator" of the vessel.26Petitioner next contends that if there was a contract of carriage, then it was between MCCII and ALS as evidenced by the bill of lading ALS issued.27 Again, we disagree. The bill of lading was merely a receipt issued by ALS to evidence the fact that the goods had been received for transportation. It was not signed by MCCII, as in fact it was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS.28 This is consistent with the fact that MCCII did not contract directly with ALS. While it is true that a bill of lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties,29 it cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and petitioner executed:[I]n cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a carrier covering goods shipped aboard a vessel under a charter party, and the charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading, "the bill of lading operates as the receipt for the goods, and as document of title passing the property of the goods, but not as varying the contract between the charterer and the shipowner." The Bill of Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and not the contract of carriage in a charter of the entire vessel, for the contract is the Charter Party, and is the law between the parties who are bound by its terms and condition provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. 30Finally, petitioner asserts that MCCII should be held liable for its own loss since the voyage charter stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterers account.31 This deserves scant consideration. This simply meant that the charterer would take care of having the goods insured. It could not exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage. The law, in fact, prohibits it and condemns it as unjust and contrary to public policy.32To summarize, a contract of carriage of goods was shown to exist; the cargo was loaded on board the vessel; loss or non-delivery of the cargo was proven; and petitioner failed to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or that it was due to some casualty or force majeure. The voyage charter here being a contract of affreightment, the carrier was answerable for the loss of the goods received for transportation.33 The idea proposed by petitioner is not only preposterous, it is also dangerous. It says that a carrier that enters into a contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper if it does not own the vessel it chooses to use. MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for reimbursement for its loss. Certainly, to permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it employed) would radically derogate from the carrier's duty of extraordinary diligence. It would also open the door to collusion between the carrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of liability from the carrier to one without any financial capability to answer for the resulting damages.34WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 161745 Petitioner, Present Panganiban, J., Chairman, - versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ Promulgated:MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,* Respondent. September 30, 2005x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- xDECISIONPANGANIBAN, J.:C

ommon carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods entrusted to them, as required by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. Consequently, the law presumes that common carriers are at fault or negligent for any loss or damage to the goods that they transport. In the present case, the evidence submitted by petitioner to overcome this presumption was sorely insufficient.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 9, 2002 Decision[2] and the December 29, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66028. The challenged Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The December 7, 1999 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 92-63159 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [Petitioner] is ordered to pay the [herein respondent] the value of the lost cargo in the amount of P565,000.00. Costs against the [herein petitioner].[4] The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The FactsIlian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at P565,000.[5] Consigned to Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to Manila. On October 25, 1991, the silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge leased by Lea Mer.[6] During the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo.[7]Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo.[8] To recover the amount paid and in the exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer, which refused to comply. Consequently, Malayan instituted a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on September 4, 1992, for the collection of P565,000 representing the amount that respondent had paid Vulcan.[9] On October 7, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Complaint, upon finding that the cause of the loss was a fortuitous event.[10] The RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of the bad weather condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. The court ruled that petitioner had no advance knowledge of the incoming typhoon, and that the vessel had been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to Manila.[11]Ruling of the Court of Appeals Reversing the trial court, the CA held that the vessel was not seaworthy when it sailed for Manila. Thus, the loss of the cargo was occasioned by petitioners fault, not by a fortuitous event.[12]Hence, this recourse.[13]The IssuesPetitioner states the issues in this wise: A. Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor, Jesus Cortez, who had not been presented as a witness of the said report during the trial of this case before the lower court can be admitted in evidence to prove the alleged facts cited in the said report.B. Whether or not the respondent, Court of Appeals, had validly or legally reversed the finding of fact of the Regional Trial Court which clearly and unequivocally held that the loss of the cargo subject of this case was caused by fortuitous event for which herein petitioner could not be held liable.C. Whether or not the respondent, Court of Appeals, had committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the testimony of the witness from the MARINA, Engr. Jacinto Lazo y Villegal, to the effect that the vessel Judy VII was seaworthy at the time of incident and further in disregarding the testimony of the PAG-ASA weather specialist, Ms. Rosa Barba y Saliente, to the effect that typhoon Trining did not hit Metro Manila or Palawan.[14] In the main, the issues are as follows: (1) whether petitioner is liable for the loss of the cargo, and (2) whether the survey report of Jesus Cortez is admissible in evidence.The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue:Liability for Loss of CargoQuestion of Fact The resolution of the present case hinges on whether the loss of the cargo was due to a fortuitous event. This issue involves primarily a question of fact, notwithstanding petitioners claim that it pertains only to a question of law. As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review.[15] The present case serves as an exception to this rule, because the factual findings of the appellate and the trial courts vary.[16] This Court meticulously reviewed the records, but found no reason to reverse the CA. Rule on Common Carriers Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or both -- by land, water, or air -- when this service is offered to the public for compensation.[17] Petitioner is clearly a common carrier, because it offers to the public its business of transporting goods through its vessels.[18] Thus, the Court corrects the trial courts finding that petitioner became a private carrier when Vulcan chartered it.[19] Charter parties are classified as contracts of demise (or bareboat) and affreightment, which are distinguished as follows:Under the demise or bareboat charter of the vessel, the charterer will generally be considered as owner for the voyage or service stipulated. The charterer mans the vessel with his own people and becomes, in effect, the owner pro hac vice, subject to liability to others for damages caused by negligence. To create a demise, the owner of a vessel must completely and exclusively relinquish possession, command and navigation thereof to the charterer; anything short of such a complete transfer is a contract of affreightment (time or voyage charter party) or not a charter party at all.[20]The distinction is significant, because a demise or bareboat charter indicates a business undertaking that is private in character. [21] Consequently, the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.[22] The Contract in the present case was one of affreightment, as shown by the fact that it was petitioners crew that manned the tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII.[23] Necessarily, petitioner was a common carrier, and the pertinent law governs the present factual circumstances. Extraordinary Diligence Required Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods and the safety of the passengers they transport, as required by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy.[24] Extraordinary diligence requires rendering service with the greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage and destruction to the goods entrusted for carriage and delivery.[25]Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently for loss or damage to the goods that they have transported.[26] This presumption can be rebutted only by proof that they observed extraordinary diligence, or that the loss or damage was occasioned by any of the following causes:[27](1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;(5) Order or act of competent public authority.[28]Rule on Fortuitous Events Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Thus, if the loss or damage was due to such an event, a common carrier is exempted from liability.Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous event as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have been independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.[29]To excuse the common carrier fully of any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss.[30] Moreover, it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event.[31]Loss in the Instant Case There is no controversy regarding the loss of the cargo in the present case. As the common carrier, petitioner bore the burden of proving that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to avoid the loss, or that the loss had been occasioned by a fortuitous event -- an exempting circumstance.It was precisely this circumstance that petitioner cited to escape liability. Lea Mer claimed that the loss of the cargo was due to the bad weather condition brought about by Typhoon Trining.[32] Evidence was presented to show that petitioner had not been informed of the incoming typhoon, and that the Philippine Coast Guard had given it clearance to begin the voyage.[33] On October 25, 1991, the date on which the voyage commenced and the barge sank, Typhoon Trining was allegedly far from Palawan, where the storm warning was only Signal No. 1.[34]The evidence presented by petitioner in support of its defense of fortuitous event was sorely insufficient. As required by the pertinent law, it was not enough for the common carrier to show that there was an unforeseen or unexpected occurrence. It had to show that it was free from any fault -- a fact it miserably failed to prove.First, petitioner presented no evidence that it had attempted to minimize or prevent the loss before, during or after the alleged fortuitous event.[35] Its witness, Joey A. Draper, testified that he could no longer remember whether anything had been done to minimize loss when water started entering the barge.[36] This fact was confirmed during his cross-examination, as shown by the following brief exchange:Atty. Baldovino, Jr.: Other than be[a]ching the barge Judy VII, were there other precautionary measure[s] exercised by you and the crew of Judy VII so as to prevent the los[s] or sinking of barge Judy VII?x x x x x x x x xAtty. Baldovino, Jr.: Your Honor, what I am asking [relates to the] action taken by the officers and crew of tugboat Ayalit and barge Judy VII x x x to prevent the sinking of barge Judy VII?x x x x x x x x xCourt:Mr. witness, did the captain of that tugboat give any instruction on how to save the barge Judy VII?Joey Draper: I can no longer remember sir, because that happened [a] long time ago.[37]Second, the alleged fortuitous event was not the sole and proximate cause of the loss. There is a preponderance of evidence that the barge was not seaworthy when it sailed for Manila.[38] Respondent was able to prove that, in the hull of the barge, there were holes that might have caused or aggravated the sinking.[39] Because the presumption of negligence or fault applied to petitioner, it was incumbent upon it to show that there were no holes; or, if there were, that they did not aggravate the sinking.Petitioner offered no evidence to rebut the existence of the holes. Its witness, Domingo A. Luna, testified that the barge was in tip-top or excellent condition,[40] but that he had not personally inspected it when it left Palawan.[41] The submission of the Philippine Coast Guards Certificate of Inspection of Judy VII, dated July 31, 1991, did not conclusively prove that the barge was seaworthy.[42] The regularity of the issuance of the Certificate is disputably presumed.[43] It could be contradicted by competent evidence, which respondent offered. Moreover, this evidence did not necessarily take into account the actual condition of the vessel at the time of the commencement of the voyage.[44]Second Issue:Admissibility of the Survey Report Petitioner claims that the Survey Report[45] prepared by Jesus Cortez, the cargo surveyor, should not have been admitted in evidence. The Court partly agrees. Because he did not testify during the trial,[46] then the Report that he had prepared was hearsay and therefore inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of its contents. The Survey Report Not the Sole Evidence The facts reveal that Cortezs Survey Report was used in the testimonies of respondents witnesses -- Charlie M. Soriano; and Federico S. Manlapig, a cargo marine surveyor and the vice-president of Toplis and Harding Company.[47] Soriano testified that the Survey Report had been used in preparing the final Adjustment Report conducted by their company.[48] The final Report showed that the barge was not seaworthy because of the existence of the holes. Manlapig testified that he had prepared that Report after taking into account the findings of the surveyor, as well as the pictures and the sketches of the place where the sinking occurred.[49] Evidently, the existence of the holes was proved by the testimonies of the witnesses, not merely by Cortez Survey Report.Rule on Independently Relevant Statement That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial,[50] and that their testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence, from which we quote:Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.[51] On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortezs Affidavit, which respondent had offered as evidence.[52] Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay.[53] An exception to the foregoing rule is that on independently relevant statements. A report made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements.[54] Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply.[55] In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only as part of the testimonies of respondents witnesses. The referral to Cortezs Report was in relation to Manlapigs final Adjustment Report. Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey Report that was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part of the testimonies of the witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial court. At any rate, even without the Survey Report, petitioner has already failed to overcome the presumption of fault that applies to common carriers.WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.SPOUSES DANTE CRUZ andLEONORA CRUZ, Petitioners, - versus - SUN HOLIDAYS, INC., Respondent. G.R. No. 186312 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, ABAD,[footnoteRef:2]* and [2: ]

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: June 29, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:Spouses Dante and Leonora Cruz (petitioners) lodged a Complaint on January 25, 2001[footnoteRef:3][1] against Sun Holidays, Inc. (respondent) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages arising from the death of their son Ruelito C. Cruz (Ruelito) who perished with his wife on September 11, 2000 on board the boat M/B Coco Beach III that capsized en route to Batangas from Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro where the couple had stayed at Coco Beach Island Resort (Resort) owned and operated by respondent. [3: ]

The stay of the newly wed Ruelito and his wife at the Resort from September 9 to 11, 2000 was by virtue of a tour package-contract with respondent that included transportation to and from the Resort and the point of departure in Batangas. Miguel C. Matute (Matute),[footnoteRef:4][2] a scuba diving instructor and one of the survivors, gave his account of the incident that led to the filing of the complaint as follows: [4: ]

Matute stayed at the Resort from September 8 to 11, 2000. He was originally scheduled to leave the Resort in the afternoon of September 10, 2000, but was advised to stay for another night because of strong winds and heavy rains.On September 11, 2000, as it was still windy, Matute and 25 other Resort guests including petitioners son and his wife trekked to the other side of the Coco Beach mountain that was sheltered from the wind where they boarded M/B Coco Beach III, which was to ferry them to Batangas. Shortly after the boat sailed, it started to rain. As it moved farther away from Puerto Galera and into the open seas, the rain and wind got stronger, causing the boat to tilt from side to side and the captain to step forward to the front, leaving the wheel to one of the crew members. The waves got more unwieldy. After getting hit by two big waves which came one after the other, M/B Coco Beach III capsized putting all passengers underwater. The passengers, who had put on their life jackets, struggled to get out of the boat. Upon seeing the captain, Matute and the other passengers who reached the surface asked him what they could do to save the people who were still trapped under the boat. The captain replied Iligtas niyo na lang ang sarili niyo (Just save yourselves).Help came after about 45 minutes when two boats owned by Asia Divers in Sabang, Puerto Galera passed by the capsized M/B Coco Beach III. Boarded on those two boats were 22 persons, consisting of 18 passengers and four crew members, who were brought to Pisa Island. Eight passengers, including petitioners son and his wife, died during the incident.At the time of Ruelitos death, he was 28 years old and employed as a contractual worker for Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Arabia, Ltd. in Saudi Arabia, with a basic monthly salary of $900.[footnoteRef:5][3] [5: ]

Petitioners, by letter of October 26, 2000,[footnoteRef:6][4] demanded indemnification from respondent for the death of their son in the amount of at least P4,000,000. [6: ]

Replying, respondent, by letter dated November 7, 2000,[footnoteRef:7][5] denied any responsibility for the incident which it considered to be a fortuitous event. It nevertheless offered, as an act of commiseration, the amount of P10,000 to petitioners upon their signing of a waiver. [7: ]

As petitioners declined respondents offer, they filed the Complaint, as earlier reflected, alleging that respondent, as a common carrier, was guilty of negligence in allowing M/B Coco Beach III to sail notwithstanding storm warning bulletins issued by the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) as early as 5:00 a.m. of September 11, 2000.[footnoteRef:8][6] [8: ]

In its Answer,[footnoteRef:9][7] respondent denied being a common carrier, alleging that its boats are not available to the general public as they only ferry Resort guests and crew members. Nonetheless, it claimed that it exercised the utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of its passengers; contrary to petitioners allegation, there was no storm on September 11, 2000 as the Coast Guard in fact cleared the voyage; and M/B Coco Beach III was not filled to capacity and had sufficient life jackets for its passengers. By way of Counterclaim, respondent alleged that it is entitled to an award for attorneys fees and litigation expenses amounting to not less than P300,000. [9: ]

Carlos Bonquin, captain of M/B Coco Beach III, averred that the Resort customarily requires four conditions to be met before a boat is allowed to sail, to wit: (1) the sea is calm, (2) there is clearance from the Coast Guard, (3) there is clearance from the captain and (4) there is clearance from the Resorts assistant manager.[footnoteRef:10][8] He added that M/B Coco Beach III met all four conditions on September 11, 2000,[footnoteRef:11][9] but a subasco or squall, characterized by strong winds and big waves, suddenly occurred, causing the boat to capsize.[footnoteRef:12][10] [10: ] [11: ] [12: ]

By Decision of February 16, 2005,[footnoteRef:13][11] Branch 267 of the Pasig RTC dismissed petitioners Complaint and respondents Counterclaim. [13: ]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Order dated September 2, 2005,[footnoteRef:14][12] they appealed to the Court of Appeals. [14: ]

By Decision of August 19, 2008,[footnoteRef:15][13] the appellate court denied petitioners appeal, holding, among other things, that the trial court correctly ruled that respondent is a private carrier which is only required to observe ordinary diligence; that respondent in fact observed extraordinary diligence in transporting its guests on board M/B Coco Beach III; and that the proximate cause of the incident was a squall, a fortuitous event. [15: ]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 16, 2009,[footnoteRef:16][14] they filed the present Petition for Review.[footnoteRef:17][15] [16: ] [17: ]

Petitioners maintain the position they took before the trial court, adding that respondent is a common carrier since by its tour package, the transporting of its guests is an integral part of its resort business. They inform that another division of the appellate court in fact held respondent liable for damages to the other survivors of the incident.Upon the other hand, respondent contends that petitioners failed to present evidence to prove that it is a common carrier; that the Resorts ferry services for guests cannot be considered as ancillary to its business as no income is derived therefrom; that it exercised extraordinary diligence as shown by the conditions it had imposed before allowing M/B Coco Beach III to sail; that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event without any contributory negligence on its part; and that the other case wherein the appellate court held it liable for damages involved different plaintiffs, issues and evidence.[footnoteRef:18][16] [18: ]

The petition is impressed with merit.Petitioners correctly rely on De Guzman v. Court of Appeals[footnoteRef:19][17] in characterizing respondent as a common carrier. [19: ]

The Civil Code defines common carriers in the following terms:Article 1732.Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.So understood, the concept of common carrier under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of public service, under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, public service includes:. . . every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services . . .[footnoteRef:20][18] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) [20: ]

Indeed, respondent is a common carrier. Its ferry services are so intertwined with its main business as to be properly considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of respondents ferry services in its resort operations is underscored by its having its own Coco Beach boats. And the tour packages it offers, which include the ferry services, may be availed of by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These services are thus available to the public. That respondent does not charge a separate fee or fare for its ferry services is of no moment. It would be imprudent to suppose that it provides said services at a loss. The Court is aware of the practice of beach resort operators offering tour packages to factor the transportation fee in arriving at the tour package price. That guests who opt not to avail of respondents ferry services pay the same amount is likewise inconsequential. These guests may only be deemed to have overpaid. As De Guzman instructs, Article 1732 of the Civil Code defining common carriers has deliberately refrained from making distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carriers principal business, whether it is offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. The intent of the law is thus to not consider such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many other distinctions may be concocted by unscrupulous businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in order to avoid the legal obligations and liabilities of common carriers.Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.[footnoteRef:21][19] They are bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.[footnoteRef:22][20] [21: ] [22: ]

When a passenger dies or is injured in the discharge of a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or negligent. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.[footnoteRef:23][21] [23: ]

Respondent nevertheless harps on its strict compliance with the earlier mentioned conditions of voyage before it allowed M/B Coco Beach III to sail on September 11, 2000. Respondents position does not impress. The evidence shows that PAGASA issued 24-hour public weather forecasts and tropical cyclone warnings for shipping on September 10 and 11, 2000 advising of tropical depressions in Northern Luzon which would also affect the province of Mindoro.[footnoteRef:24][22] By the testimony of Dr. Frisco Nilo, supervising weather specialist of PAGASA, squalls are to be expected under such weather condition.[footnoteRef:25][23] [24: ] [25: ]

A very cautious person exercising the utmost diligence would thus not brave such stormy weather and put other peoples lives at risk. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers demands that they take care of the goods or lives entrusted to their hands as if they were their own. This respondent failed to do.

Respondents insistence that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event does not impress either. The elements of a "fortuitous event" are: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations, must have been independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.[footnoteRef:26][24] [26: ]

To fully free a common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. And it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event.[footnoteRef:27][25] [27: ]

Respondent cites the squall that occurred during the voyage as the fortuitous event that overturned M/B Coco Beach III. As reflected above, however, the occurrence of squalls was expected under the weather condition of September 11, 2000. Moreover, evidence shows that M/B Coco Beach III suffered engine trouble before it capsized and sank.[footnoteRef:28][26] The incident was, therefore, not completely free from human intervention. [28: ]

The Court need not belabor how respondents evidence likewise fails to demonstrate that it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the squall. Article 1764[footnoteRef:29][27] vis--vis Article 2206[footnoteRef:30][28] of the Civil Code holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2) indemnity for loss of earning capacity and (3) moral damages. [29: ] [30: ]

Petitioners are entitled to indemnity for the death of Ruelito which is fixed at P50,000.[footnoteRef:31][29] [31: ]

As for damages representing unearned income, the formula for its computation is:Net Earning Capacity = life expectancyx(gross annual income - reasonable and necessaryliving expenses).Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula:2 / 3 x [80 age of deceased at the time of death][footnoteRef:32][30] [32: ]

The first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.[footnoteRef:33][31] [33: ]

The second factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.[footnoteRef:34][32] The loss is not equivalent to the entire earnings of the deceased, but only such portion as he would have used to support his dependents or heirs. Hence, to be deducted from his gross earnings are the necessary expenses supposed to be used by the deceased for his own needs.[footnoteRef:35][33] [34: ] [35: ]

In computing the third factor necessary living expense, Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja[footnoteRef:36][34] teaches that when, as in this case, there is no showing that the living expenses constituted the smaller percentage of the gross income, the living expenses are fixed at half of the gross income. [36: ]

Applying the above guidelines, the Court determines Ruelito's life expectancy as follows:Life expectancy = 2/3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]2/3 x [80 - 28]2/3 x [52]Life expectancy = 35Documentary evidence shows that Ruelito was earning a basic monthly salary of $900[footnoteRef:37][35] which, when converted to Philippine peso applying the annual average exchange rate of $1 = P44 in 2000,[footnoteRef:38][36] amounts to P39,600. Ruelitos net earning capacity is thus computed as follows: [37: ] [38: ]

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living expenses). = 35 x (P475,200 - P237,600) = 35 x (P237,600)Net Earning Capacity = P8,316,000Respecting the award of moral damages, since respondent common carriers breach of contract of carriage resulted in the death of petitioners son, following Article 1764 vis--vis Article 2206 of the Civil Code, petitioners are entitled to moral damages. Since respondent failed to prove that it exercised the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, it is presumed to have acted recklessly, thus warranting the award too of exemplary damages, which are granted in contractual obligations if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.[footnoteRef:39][37] [39: ]

Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to award petitioners the amount of P100,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages.[footnoteRef:40][38] [40: ]

Pursuant to Article 2208[footnoteRef:41][39] of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may also be awarded where exemplary damages are awarded. The Court finds that 10% of the total amount adjudged against respondent is reasonable for the purpose. [41: ]

Finally, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[footnoteRef:42][40] teaches that when an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, subject to the following rules, to wit [42: ]

1.When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.2.When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.3.When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. (emphasis supplied).Since the amounts payable by respondent have been determined with certainty only in the present petition, the interest due shall be computed upon the finality of this decision at the rate of 12% per annum until satisfaction, in accordance with paragraph number 3 of the immediately cited guideline in Easter Shipping Lines, Inc. WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of August 19, 2008 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is rendered in favor of petitioners ordering respondent to pay petitioners the following: (1) P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Ruelito Cruz; (2) P8,316,000 as indemnity for Ruelitos loss of earning capacity; (3) P100,000 as moral damages; (4) P100,000 as exemplary damages; (5) 10% of the total amount adjudged against respondent as attorneys fees; and (6) the costs of suit.The total amount adjudged against respondent shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the finality of this decision until full payment. SO ORDERED.SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC., INDUSTRIAL