No.1 september 2011 free distribution

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Translating evidenceinto policies:two cases in Ecuador

Orazio BellettiniAndrea Ordóñez

No.1 September 2011 free distribution

Wor

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g P

aper

Translating evidenceinto policies:two cases in Ecuador

Orazio BellettiniAndrea Ordóñez

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TRANSLATING EVIDENCE INTO POLICIES: TWO CASES IN ECUADOR

Orazio Bellettini and Andrea Ordonez

It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life I have been searching for evidence which could support this.

- Bertran Russell I. INTRODUCTION Evidence-based policy has become the new mantra. Policy-makers, think tanks, international institutions and even politicians agree that policies are better when they are also based on solid research that prevents public decisions to be based just on political interests, ideology or misunderstandings. In this paper, we will describe two cases in which evidence played an important role in the policy process in a country where this is still the exemption. We analyze the factors that seem to affect the use of evidence in both cases. At the end of the paper, we will argue that evidence, however, is not enough. It needs to be communicated in a way that it speaks both to politicians and policy advisors (the top-down view of the policy process) as well as to journalists and ordinary citizens (the bottom-up view). Neither of these groups use just data; both politicians and citizens need arguments to promote policy change. Consequently, evidence needs to be transformed into stories and narratives that capture political and social imagination. II. CASES In this paper, we will analyze two cases in which evidence has played an important role in the policy process in Ecuador: i) Fighting Political Clientelism at Social Pograms; and, ii) The Yasuni ITT Initiative Proposal. 1. Fighting Political Clientelism in Social Programs1 This case depicts the efforts that Grupo FARO, a think-and-do tank that promotes public policies in Ecuador, carried out to reduce and prevent political clientelism in social programs, which concluded as a concrete agreement signed by nine social programs in 2006. As showed in figure 1, in Colonel Lucio Gutierrez’s presidency (2003 - 2005) there was a general perception of corruption, especially in the social sector; furthermore, many investigations by the media depicted the use of social programs for political gain. In April 2005, Lucio Gutierrez’s exit opened a window of opportunity since the Ecuadorian society had just witnessed widespread practices of manipulation of social programs in favor of a

1This case is based on the initiative’s final report (Grupo FARO, 2007), a previous case study (Carrión y Bellettini, 2008) as well as the authors participation during the process.

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political party. One month later, and with a new government in place, Grupo FARO began researching the topic and cooperating with two programs (Aliméntate Ecuador – a nutrition program and Maternidad Gratuita – a health program) to implement concrete measures to prevent clientelism. The initial research, an index on the opportunities for clientelism depicted the programs’ weaknesses when it came to clientelism such as, the the lack of compliance with the transparency law, the absence of mechanism to receive complains of manipulation at the local level and incipient mechanisms for citizen participation. Figure 1. Political Clientelism timeline

Grupo FARO considered that the presidential elections in 2006 were a concrete window of opportunity to bring the topic of clientelism back to the public agenda, since in periods of political campaign, clientelistic practices may increase through manipulation of candidates at the national or local level. On July 14, 2006 after Grupo FARO’s lobbying process with managers of social programs and other civil society organizations (CSO’s), the coordinators of the nine social programs and six CSO’s, including Grupo FARO, signed the "Agreement for the Transparency and Protection of Public Funds of Social Programs during Electoral Campaign." With the implementation of this agreement Grupo FARO was aiming to set the topic in the public agenda as well as piloting concrete mechanisms to prevent clientelism. Therefore, the agreement included concrete actions as:

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● Sensitizing the programs’ staff on the concept and consequences of clientelism and the importance of denouncing possible cases.

● Rescheduling the program’s delivery dates and events during the political campaign without affecting the programs’ beneficiaries.

● Establishing rules on the use of vehicles to prevent their use for political campaign. ● Strengthening citizens’ oversight programs already in place. ● Activating complaint mechanisms to receive reports on clientelism cases. ● Publicly disseminate the agreement and its implementation mechanisms. ● Make the results of the implementation of the agreement accessible to CSO’s. ● Denouncing any act of political pressures received by the programs. ● Strengthening and improving the transparency and access to information in

programs in accordance with the Transparency Law. (Agreement, 2006) The agreement stated that, on behalf of signatory Civil Society Organizations, Grupo FARO would develop an assessment of the results of its implementation by the end of the 2006 presidential elections. Monitoring the implementation of the Agreement had two objectives: to inform social programs on their performance along the implementation of the agreement as well as generating some evidence on the middle-term impact of the initiative. Probably the most innovative tool was to generate a ranking of compliance by the participating programs. The signatory CSOs were actively engaged during the process, both promoting the agreement, monitoring it at the local level as well as accompanying the programs during the implementation. Grupo FARO played a particular role at working with the social programs’ management teams in designing communications material that included posters, radio spots, as well as joint press releases and conference. In this way Grupo FARO was not only engaged in promoting the idea with the public officials but also translating it to a wider public. One concrete aspect that Grupo FARO monitored was the compliance with the Transparency Law, which states that certain information must be made public through the programs’ websites. Grupo FARO had elaborated a methodology to evaluate compliance with these requirements and informed the programs at baseline, during the political campaign and one year after, in June, 2007. With this monitoring it was evident that the majority (6 out of 9) of programs improvd their compliance with the law even after the agreement had finalized; this, however was not the case in all aspects of the agreement. As the final report concludes, “it is not possible to to assure that signing the agreement produced structural changes within the social programs. However, what one can assure is that the main objective was achieved: setting the topic in the public agenda” (Grupo FARO, 2007). Furthermore, the implementation of these concrete actions to prevent clientelism gave Grupo FARO insights into the problems that social programs face when implementing

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reform, and was able to recommend on improvements in the general management of the programs to the new government (Grupo FARO, 2007). 2. The Yasuni ITT Initiative This case summarizes the birth of the Yasuní ITT Initiative, which proposes to leave approximately 944 million barrels of oil reserves untapped, that are located in the Yasuní National Park (a 983.000 ha. area in the Ecuadorian Amazon region) in an exchange for compensation. This initiative is currently being debated in Ecuador, and its deliberation has grown to increase multiple dimensions. However, this case presents the birth of the initiative, meaning the public commitment of the government to leave the reserves untapped, and the development of a compensation scheme. As we will see, there is not only one compensation scheme, and those will be analyzed. However, this case will not touch upon the events that happen after the proposal by the official committee was finalized to be able to focus on how evidence impacted on the adoption of the initiative rather that on the role it is currently playing on the public discussion. In the 1970’s the oil boom began in the Ecuadorian Amazon region as major reserves were found by international companies. For the specific area of what today is the Yasuni National Park, successful exploration began in the seventies when the National Oil Company, conducted seismic studies to determine initial reserves with additional wells drilled during the nineties that further outlined the characteristics of the Ishpingo - Tambococha - Tiputini (ITT) fields, that contain heavy crude oil (Petroecuador, 2004). “Since then, the possible extraction of the ITT oil fields has figured in the project catalogue of the state’s oil company PetroEcuador.” (Imesch, 2009). However the operation presents significant technical challenges which are one of the reasons why it did not prosper in those years. “There is nothing new in the idea of drilling the ITT oil fields, but the ideal strategy has not been encountered yet.” (Imesch, 2009). On the other hand, the Yasuni National Park was created in 1979, and declared a Biosphere Reserve by the UNESCO in 1989. During the 90s and 2000 several studies measured amphibian, bird, mammal and plants diversity in the Amazon rainforest which has gain attention from scientists worldwide. Two scientific stations are based within the National Park, and have attracted much attention from the scientific community. At the same time, a significant portion of the area around the park has been contracted with oil companies generating an environment of constant threat to the boundaries of the National Park. As showed in figure 2, in 2004 around fifty scientists grouped under the collective “Scientists Concerned for the Yasuní" have systematized much of the findings of scientific research that point to the rich diversity and conservation significance of the park, as in their letter to the ex-president Lucio Gutierrez when a plan to build a road was put forward:

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“Our first conclusion is that Yasuní National Park protects a region of extraordinary value in terms of its biodiversity, cultural heritage, and largely intact wilderness. This region — the Napo Moist Forests of the Western Amazon — has levels of diversity of many taxonomic groups that are locally and globally outstanding. For example, with an estimated 2,274 tree and shrub species, Yasuní protects a large stretch of the world's most diverse tree community. In fact, there are almost as many tree and shrub species in just one hectare of Yasuní’s forests as in the entire United States and Canada combined. Yasuní has 567 bird species recorded — 44% of the total found in the Amazon Basin — making it among the world’s most diverse avian sites. Harboring approximately 80 bat species, Yasuní appears to be in the world’s top five sites for bat diversity. With 105 amphibian and 83 reptile species documented, Yasuní National Park appears to have the highest herpetofauna diversity in all of South America. Yasuní also has 64 species of social bees, the highest diversity for that group for any single site on the globe. Overall, Yasuní has more than 100,000 species of insects per hectare, and 6 trillion individuals per hectare. That is the highest known biodiversity in the world.”(Scientists Concerned for the Yasuni, 2004)

Figure 2. Yasuni ITT Initiative’s timeline

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Using the evidence portrayed in all these research, civil society organizations (CSO) developed a policy proposal to protect this area. The first proposal was a moratorium on the project envisioned by the national oil company, Petroecuador, to drill the ITT fields, meaning a prohibition to carry-on any exploration or extraction presented in June 2006 to the government of Alfredo Palacio. Although the project was not carried out, there was not an official statement endorsing the moratorium. In January 2007, Rafael Correa became the new president, and some of the supporters of the moratorium became part of his government’s cabinet. Most importantly, Alberto Acosta, a promoter of the moratorium became Minister of Mines and Oil and promoted the initiative within the government, until it was officially adopted. “As stated during the interview, Mr. Acosta encountered various difficulties during the negotiation process with the other ministries, above all with the former president of Petroecuador, who continued the negotiations for a possible concession with the Brazilian and Chinese oil companies.” (Imesch, 2009) The initiative was officially launched in June 2007 by President Correa, who announced that conserving the national park intact was the first option although drilling was still the second option. “At this occasion, the President clearly presented the idea of a non-extraction of the ITT oil fields as a priority, keeping nevertheless the option of extraction in case the compensation amount is not reached. In the original strategy, the state was supposed to call upon the International Community to support the initiative with a financial contribution. Concretely, for the government this compensation mechanism would represent an investment of 350 million dollars annually funded by the International Community, an amount that corresponds to 50% of the potential revenues that the government would earn if the oil was extracted.” (Imesch, 2009) This initial proposal was unsuccessful in attracting funds, and a new political commission called “Consejo Administrativo y Directivo de la Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT” and a technical secretariat in February 2008. This commission made a substantial change to the proposal as it created the concept of the Yasuni Guarantee Certificates (CGY). These certificates would account for the avoided CO2 emissions by the non-extraction of the oil. Investors therefore would pay for CO2, not for oil. The idea of this commission was to introduce these certificates in the carbon markets worldwide, to insert those resources in a fund which would be used to generate a more sustainable energy matrix for Ecuador.

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III. FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE USE OF EVIDENCE 1. Political context The research-policy linkages are shaped by the political context which we understand as the environment where these decisions were adopted by the policymaker. Both cases portray the importance of finding a window of opportunity to introduce a proposal in the public debate. In the case of political clientelism, Grupo FARO pointed to two opportunities linked with the political context. First, given that the previous government had been heavily attacked for clientelistic practices, the current administration was motivated to show that things had changed (Carrión and Bellettini, 2009). The Secretario del Frente Social, in charge of social programs stated:

“obviously we came from a given government, there was a common characteristic among those working with Palacio, which was a general rejection to clientelistic practices, there was significant questioning of this topic; around social programs were many technical people that were not looking to work on a clientelistic way (...)”(Interview to the ex Secretario del Frente Social) (Carrión and Bellettini, 2009)

This enthusiasm was key to engage actors with the initiative. Secondly, the elections became a unique opportunity to pilot concrete actions to fight political clientelism: it was a relatively short period of time where concrete actions were carried out, systematized and later evaluated which gave visibility to the work done by the management teams of the social programs. In the case of Yasuni ITT, the political context was also crucial, at both the national and international level. Although civil society organizations and scientists had been advocating protecting the National Park, their impact had been marginal with the previous governments. In 2007, the political context had dramatically changed, and in June, the government announced for the first time that its first option was to preserve the National Park. Furthermore, in September, Ecuador was electing representatives for the Constitutional Assembly that was summoned by the President Correa. The government aimed to change the constitution to reflect its new vision of development for the country, which was based on the “sumak causay” ("good living" in Kichwa) a framework that aims to prioritize human rights as well sustainability, that was exposed in the government’s development plan (Correa, 2007). The elections for the representatives to the Constitutional Assembly took place on September 30th, five days after the president Rafael Correa had officially launched the initiative at the 62nd United Nations General Assembly.

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Internationally, the discussion on climate change had been of particular interest at the moment the Initiative was launched. One day before the UN General Assembly, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General had convened a high-level event on climate change looking forward on the next United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change meeting (Ban Ki-moon, 2007). In this context, it was relevant for the government of Ecuador to portray itself as a new progressive government with innovative ideas that could change policy not only nationally but internationally as well showing that Ecuador has a particular way of understanding development, as he stated on his speech at the UN General Assembly.

“We advocate then for building solutions and commitments that allow us to search for better lives and organize a different global society. Our concept of development forces us then to recognize, understand and value each other, so as to enable self-realization and the construction of a shared future” (Correa, 2007).

With this proposal, the government of Ecuador was able to present an innovative idea, gain presence in the international arena and show concrete steps towards a new development model as the President stated:

“This extraordinary initiative should set an example to be followed by the international community in order to reduce global warming in our planet at the sale time inaugurating a new economic logic in the XXI century that is to compensate for the generation of value and not only on the generation of commodities”(Correa, 2007).

However, both cases also show that the windows of opportunity can only be taken advantage of when the proponents present the evidence to the ‘right’ policymaker. In the case of clientelism, Grupo FARO had previously worked with the social programs and the coordinating agency Frente Social. It had detected that within the current management one could identify “champions of reform” who played a key role in adopting and implementing the initiative against political clientelism. The nature of the proposal allowed the management team, with aid from the coordinating agency to carry-on the initiative. In this sense, Grupo FARO selected proper interlocutors, both interested and able to carry on the reforms. In the case of the Yasuni ITT Initiative ideas reached the highest levels of policymakers in the government in the matter, the President and the Minister of Mines and Oil, since it required the government to adhere to a plan that would be presented internationally.

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2. Linkages and networks Although the political context sets the scene for the implementation of policy reforms or initiatives, the actual linkages between the stakeholders involved in the process are equally important. As it will be analyzed in this section, both cases portray the importance that networks, of different characteristics, have to promote the use of evidence in a policy process. Jones (2009) identifies an array of ‘policy network’ models that can be useful to understand the complex role that knowledge can play in the policy process. From these, three are seen of particular importance for the cases analyzed in this paper, the policy communities concept (Kingdon, 1984), the epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), the knowledge brokers (Nutley, Walter y Davies 2007) as well as the advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The clientelism case portrays the existence of a particular policy community understood as a network of professionals with experience in a particular domain, and actively involved in the policy process. As mentioned earlier, Grupo FARO identified that the coordinators of social programs were “champions of reform,” many had previously been part of civil society organizations or had experience in social policy. However, the initiative to sign a common agreement strengthened the concept of a policy community among the nine signatories, who started sharing a unified discourse on political clientelism, its negative impacts as well as on the possible tools to reduce it during the electoral processes. This policy network also strengthened the initiative and empowered the management teams of the social programs as “owner” or active participant of the ideas and initiative. This was exemplified by the fact that some social programs expanded the actions promoted by the initiative by printing more posters or designing specific ones for their beneficiaries. In the Yasuni ITT proposal, both the epistemic communities as well as the advocacy coalitions may help explain the relationship between evidence and policy. The Scientists Concerned for Yasuni, is a group of fifty scientists, both from Ecuador and abroad, that actively communicated with the Ecuadorian governments as new extractive projects and road became threats to the park’s existence. In a letter wrote in 2004 to the former President, Lucio Gutierrez, they present themselves in the following way:

“We represent leading scientists of Yasuní National Park, and other tropical researchers concerned for the future of Yasuní. We come from Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Denmark, England, Germany, Greece, Scotland, Spain, and from across the United States including Puerto Rico. Together we have well over 100 years of experience conducting research in the park. We have studied many aspects of its biodiversity — plants, amphibians, insects, birds and mammals — as well as the impacts of the Maxus Road, which was built in 1994 into northwest Yasuní for

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petroleum activities. We have also studied the cultural, economic, and hunting systems of peoples living in the area.” (Scientists concerned for Yasuni, 2004)

They are clearly an epistemic community, described as “networks of professionals with recognised expertise in a particular domain…and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain” (Haas 1992, p.3). They were essential in promoting the relevance of the Yasuni National Park through scientific research; they also share common values since they value conservation. This alliance was crucial since, joining values and knowledge, they were able to accumulate significant evidence from a variety of sources on the relevance of the national park. This network of scientist gained relevance by joining experts from across the world, including Ecuador. It is relevant to mentioned that, the existence of such a significant number of scientists interested in the Yasuni National Park is probably highly related to the fact that the park hosts two scientific stations run by national universities that were the spaces where this epistemic community was born. This network had a clear strategy of direct communications with the governments, but they were intertwined with an advocacy coalition that actively promoted the same ideas in the wider public agenda in Ecuador with campaigns such as “Amazonía por la Vida”2. This campaign was born in 1989, joining many environmental activists who had an active role in promoting the idea through more concrete proposals based on the scientific evidence available. In 2006, they presented to the Palacio government the proposal for a Moratorium on the ITT project, which would prevent any new extraction project in the National Park which starts building the argument for what would later become the Yasuni ITT Initiative (Carta presentando la propuesta de Moratoria al Proyecto ITT, 2006). Furthermore, for the actual implementation of the initiative, the direct linkages between civil society organizations, universities and the government were crucial. In fact, in a review of the relationship between political parties and think tanks in Ecuador portray the background of Alianza País, the governing party as containing “a group of intellectuals, researchers and activists some of whom participated in the project Jubilee 2000, while others came from NGO’s, universities like FLACSO and research centers such as ILDIS, who formed the initial structure of what today is the Alianza País Movement” (Bellettini and Carrión, 2009). In this context, some of the members of the advocacy joined the government and were able to carry-on the ideas from within government. In fact, the co-existence of these multiple actors had left the proposal without one intellectual owner. “On the contrary, it is the result of a long process in which many different stakeholders have participated” (Imesch, 2009)

2 For more details visit: http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/

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Both cases portray the relevance of networks in the process of making evidence relevant in the policy to give validity to the evidence, to create a common language among policymakers and to introducing it in the government’s agenda. In both cases, the fact that the initiatives are perceived as common to various stakeholders benefited its implementation. In the clientelism case, the agreement of various social programs created more commitment for its implementation. In the Yasuni ITT initiative, the fact that the proposal had no one intellectual owner facilitated its transition into a ‘national proposal’ presented by the government but backed by a significant number of local stakeholders. Both cases also portray the importance of champions within government, whether those are identified by the external promoters of initiatives or members of advocacy coalition become part of the government. 3. Evidence: nature, source, presentation and use The discussion on the relationship between evidence and policy must take a close look at the evidence being used. More generally, we could refer to the knowledge or the research which dialogues with the policy process. Specifically, we focus on its nature, sources and presentation as characteristics of the research process that are highly dependent of researchers or research institutions seeking to influence policy. However, it is also important that we analyze the extend that and the way research is used; this dimension is less in control of researchers, since it also depends on the policymakers and the context. Nonetheless, this dimension is crucial in further understanding why, when and for what evidence is used in a complex setting of the policy process. 3.1 Nature of evidence Reimers and McGinn (1997) establish four general categories of research. The distinction of the types of evidence used is relevant since the different frameworks, designs, and methodologies generate different types of knowledge applicable to different extends throughout the policy cycle. These categories include the following: academic research, planning research, instrumentation research and action research. Academic research is understood as that which helps us understand the current reality we encounter through the lenses of models, conceptual frameworks and theory (Reimers and McGinn, 1997). In both cases, this academic research and knowledge is key in the development of the proposals, its functions are to frame and expose the problem and to be the bases for a narrative or discourse. Both cases ratify that “scientific knowledge in itself does not have intrinsic normative authority, nor are research-based judgements value neutral.” (Reimers and McGinn, 1997). In the clientelism case, the academic review is biased by a belief that a political system is better when actors are independent, when

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decisions are taken democratically and when social programs are more effective when they are devoted to the most vulnerable instead of political supporters . In the case of the Yasuni ITT Initiative, the bias is on favoring sustainability and social and cultural rights. Both cases show that despite the relevance of this research, it needs to be accompanied by additional types of research to be inserted in the public agenda. The second category, planning research, includes looking forward and asking what are the possible results from implementing a policy. A clear example may include cost-benefit analysis (Reimers and McGinn, 1997). Both cases make use of this type of evidence, in both to turn the frameworks from academic research into more concrete ideas and evidence. In the clientelism case, Grupo FARO carried on research on the weaknesses found in the programs that could raise clientelism. More than pointing at direct cases of clientelism, it informed nine social programs on the existing mechanisms used in certain programs, as well as other possible measures to limit chances of clientelism. In the case of the Yasuni ITT Initiative, the actual proposal used several technical reports and data on oil and reserves to be able to develop the concept and mechanisms of the certificates (YGC). In both cases, this evidence is more specific, and more oriented to generating the proposals. The evidence from academic and planning research is translated through instrumentation research, which is the one focused on making specific proposals for change (Reimers and McGinn, 1997). This research usually puts together different pieces of research into new ideas and plans. In the clientelism case, the components of the proposal to prevent clientelism were designed based on a variety of evidence previously discussed, as well as the instruments used in other countries. The Yasuni ITT YGC’s were a result of all the previous information. The generation of these new ideas is probably the one that requires the most creativity and ingenuity; these are probably the spaces where policy entrepreneurs play a distinct role, being able to make academic research dialogue with politics and the current context to come up with concrete viable proposals. Finally, only the clientelism case depicts use of what Reimers and McGinn (1997) call actions research, that which is used during the implementation of policy and that seeks to inform its performance primarily in the short term. The clientelism case included a component which followed the implementation of the agreement constantly, and that allowed for the presentation of a final report on the initiative. This action research was particularly useful to motivate compliance, and to give early alerts on lack of compliance. It was an essential part of Grupo FARO’s proposal. This type of research has not been applied in the Yasuni ITT Initiative since the proposal is not yet implemented. Both cases show that they use a variety of research and evidence in their proposal, each with different objectives, but that jointly create a stronger argument (Table 1).

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Table 1. Research categories applied to case studies

Research Categories

Political Clientelism Case Yasuni ITT Initiative Case

Academic Conceptual framework of political clientelism, transparency and citizens’ participation

Scientific research on biodiversity. Conceptual framework for indigenous social and cultural rights. Sustainable development analysis.

Planning Index of opportunities for clientelism. Grupo FARO’s previous work with the social programs

Research on oil reserves and project viability.

Instrumentation Previous experiences in other countries on techniques to combat clientelism.

Economic proposal for CO2 Certificates.

Action Monitoring of compliance with transparency law and the agreement. Handbook to reduce opportunties for clientelism in social programs.

In addition, both cases show that there is a complex interaction of different types of research for the development of the proposals, each being employed for distinct goals; neither of the cases is based only on one source of research, opinion or expert. Furthermore, one could argue that an idea that is more complex requires more research in terms of quantity and of scope.

3.2. The source of the evidence

The source of the evidence is sometimes as important as the evidence itself. As Mendizabal (2006) states “it is very difficult for policymakers to check all the evidence available to them therefore, they often rely on the reputation of its source as a proxy for its accuracy”. Reputation, however, is subjective and it depends on the decision maker. The two cases use research-based evidence which comes from multiple sources that are well respected, increasing the legitimacy of its use designing and implementing public policies. In the political clientelism case the evidence came from a CSO that was considered independent and non-partisan. Carrión and Bellettini (2009) in interviews done after the implementation of the agreement identify that some program coordinators valued Grupo FARO's independence and technical approach, compared to other CSO’s that are more activist. At the same time, Grupo FARO used previous academic research on clientelism to develop its narrative and analysis tools.

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The Yasuni ITT case shows a wider variety of sources of evidence, ranging from purely theoretical to the practical research carried out by companies for commercial purposes. As stated previously, the evidence on Yasuni’s conservation significance was significantly backed by Scientists Concerned for the Yasuni, who had significant experience on the park’s biodiversity. There is little opposition to its accuracy in the public domain. Nonetheless, the actual economic value of such diversity, compared to the proven value of oil in international markets is still debated. This controversy is accentuated by the fact that the Yasuni ITT proposal is based on the limited - and to a certain extend uncertain - information on oil reserves. Information on oil reserves is always uncertain, however, the fact that is was collected decades ago, and with limited technologies has opened a debate on whether the Initiative’s numbers are correct or if more oil could be extracted from the ITT fields3. 3.3 The presentation of the evidence Mendizabal (2006) suggests that the way that it is communicated can be as, or even more important than the dimensions analyzed before. "Policy influence is affected by both topical relevance and, equally importantly, the operational usefulness of an idea; hence it helps if a new approach has been piloted and the document can clearly demonstrate the value of a new option. The other key set of issues here concern communication" (Mendizabal, 2006). Both cases show that evidence should be communicated in accordance to its main audience, and when possible, making it context specific. For example, the clientelism case exemplifies how information was communicated to different audiences with different levels of detail. The objective for the general public was to inform on the ‘concept’ of clientelism. Therefore, posters and radio spots which portrayed possible ways in which clientelism can occur during electoral campaign were used. On the other hand, program managers were directly informed on their compliance with the Transparency Law through a letter that detailed every consideration taken in the analysis as well as concrete recommendation for improvement. Scientists in the Yasuni ITT case also used direct letters to the president, that contained, annexed to their statements, detailed reports on scientific evidence. Additionally, in all the cases the letters were context specific, referring to particular decisions that were being made by the government at the time.

3 See www.saveamericasforests.org/Yasuni/News/Articles/2008/01.11.08-MoreOilInYasuni.htm?story_id=9366138#EnEspanol)

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On an interview with Roque Sevilla, the president of the Initiative’s commission, he commented on the promotion of the CGY’s internationally. He argued that the technical and commercial information was crucial for foreign governments to understand and value the proposal. At the same time, internationally, the proposal was linked to the direct commitments on countries with climate change. In this case, the arguments were framed in accordance to those policymakers particular context.

Cases exemplify how there is not one method of communicating or presenting evidence, but it exemplifies that these evidence can be contextualized and presented in accordance with the researchers objective as well as its audience. Generally, an initiative to influence policy will not have only one audience, it may be necessary to present evidence differently to each one.

4. The political economy of the use of evidence Evidence is not politically neutral. It affects power relationships as much as power shapes the knowledge-policy interface. Since policy is produced by the interaction between actors, institutions and narratives, the role that evidence plays in that process affects these interactions. Consequently, it is important to take into account the impact of evidence on the way how power and wealth are distributed between different groups and individuals, and its influence on the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. In the case of the final Yasuni - ITT proposal included the concept of the Yasuni Guarantee Certificates (CGY) under which investors would pay for CO2, not for oil. This new concept, however, split the coalition promoting the Yasuní’s conservation because some of its members did not agree with using market mechanisms. This case proves that research is not carry out in a ideological vacuum; on the contrary, values and ideas, including political ideologies, religion and cultural beliefs affects the way that evidence is used use of evidence in the policy process as well as in political behaviour. In the clientelism case, the ranking of opportunities for clientelistic practices at social programs created strong incentives for public officials to collaborate with a civil society organization as well as among them in order to reduce their chances to be at the bottom of the list and receive social and political consequences. IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS The two cases analyzed in this document present some lessons to those who look to influence policy through research and use of evidence. Both cases show that these endeavors take time to conceive, communicate and implement; whether ideas are concrete

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and time-constrained or wide and encompassing of various policies, researchers should not expect impact immediately. However, some lessons from these cases may inform those who endure this process. 1. The importance of windows of opportunities Political context should be analyzed carefully to identify windows of opportunity as well as interested stakeholders. However, those windows of opportunity do not necessarily occur spontaneously and can be framed with ingenuity. Some of the aspects that can aid researchers at framing a window of opportunity include:

● Identifying hidden or unexposed needs in policymakers. Both cases show that the ideas presented to policymakers where aligned with their needs and objectives, even though these where not clearly exposed in the public agenda.

● Connecting research with social or public motivation. Both cases show the

relevance of linking research with public concerns. The Yasuni research was linked to the concerns of the previous Texaco oil spills in the Amazon region. The political clientelism research was linked to concrete scandals in the previous government. It is, however, unclear in both cases if researchers purposefully linked their research to the public concerns or if they were themselves influenced by these concerns.

Both cases identify the importance of relationships between stakeholders and networks in the use of evidence and the ability of an idea to be considered by policymakers. These networks are complex and constantly shifting. To get these networks working to promote a given idea, researchers should be willing to ‘give-up’ sole property of an idea. The Yasuni ITT case shows strongly the importance of the lack of an owner to turn a proposal into a public policy that public in general can relate too. This complex setting, however, makes it difficult for researchers to identify the extent to which research was influential and should be taken into account when such endeavors are analyzed. In these examples, it is also clear that the kind of evidence that is presented matters significantly and is used for different purposes in the political or public debate. Both cases exemplify how academic research is fundamental at creating and supporting a narrative, while other more applied research is more influential as the policy debates becomes more concrete and actual policy options are debated. This should be carefully considered by researchers when analyzing the context or timing to present their research. Finally, being able to respond to windows of opportunities requires flexible, innovative and learning organizations. It requires the capacity to learn from context and adapt strategies without losing the goals and values that are the bases of the organizations. Even when

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windows of opportunity are found, the process may be long. In this context, the Yasuni ITT initiative shows that an idea needs time to evolve; therefore, promoters should constantly work to increase their capacity to enrich proposals and increase their political, institutional and social feasibility. 2. Policy as a multiple way process Policy influence using evidence is the result of a dialogue between several communities, among them, policy-makers and researchers. In these sense, the different perspectives, from policymakers, researchers, civil society organizations and others, are equally relevant in the process. Frequently, there is a perception of a lack of understanding among these communities, leading to stagnant situations. Sometimes "knowledge brokers" can play an important role reducing these apparent ‘gap’ that may exist between these two communities. This was the role played by Grupo FARO in the political clientelism case presenting complex arguments regarding the negative consequences on the quality of democracy and the effectiveness of social policies due to political use of social programs. It was key to be closely related to social programs, but at the same time, keep strategies to evaluate and monitor its implementation independently. As the saying states, for researchers seeking to influence. it is important to be “close enough to light, not enough to burn”. However, sometimes the most direct way to influence a government, is to participate from within, as the Yasuni ITT case portrays where a member of civil society promoting the idea became part of the Cabinet. These strategy, although may have a strong and direct influence, may affect the perception of independence of the proponent. This should be considered by those seeking to influence. Lewis Coser (1965) points out: “Knowledge may bring power, but, even so, men of knowledge have only rarely been men of power.” He portrays the clear distiction among both communities, where researchers usually lack the power to generate change. But sometimes it is different. The Yasuni-ITT case shows the power of researchers and knowledge brokers to influence the public agenda with ideas that politicians could consider against their political interests. 3. Evidence or narratives? The two cases show that evidence is not enough to capture social and political imagination. As Fox (2010) states,

“(t)oday we are offered the thin gruel of ‘evidence-based policy’. When we are told that scientific research demands particular courses of action, ever increasing areas

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of politics are ruled out-of-bounds for democratic debate; ideas and morality are sidelined by facts and statistics. Historically, what has moved millions to act upon the world and change things for the better has been big ideas, such as freedom, progress, civilisation and democracy.”

In the political clientelism and Yasuni ITT cases, evidence was just part of a bigger narrative. It enabled the promoters of a new policy to create a story that introduced in the public agenda a hidden issue such as clientelism and promote a new development paradigm in the Yasuni ITT proposal. Narratives are particularly useful to put together data, details and other information in a sequential form, making the dissemination of concepts or ideas simpler. Both cases exemplify how narratives were crucial to get a wider audience engaged in the discussion. In this sense, researchers should develop capacities to see evidence in a broader perspective so that they can connect facts and statistics with a bigger story that can be used by politicians and policy-makers (top-down), journalists as well as ordinary citizens (bottom-up) to participate in the policy process. In other words, researchers that aim at influencing public policy should be willing to get closely involved with the public debate and engage in discussions that can exceed the theoretical or scientific discussions and touch on current events, values and philosophy. V. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ban Ki-moon Secretary-General of the United Nations. (2007). Addressing the Leadership Challenge of Climate Change, Chair’s Summary High-Level Event on Climate Change, 24 September. Bellettini O. & Carrión M. (2009). Partidos Políticos y think tanks en Ecuador. In Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral & Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Dime a quien escuchas… Think Tanks y Partidos Políticos en América Latina (pp. 157-208). Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. Carrión M. & Bellettini O. (2009). Realizando los derechos sociales, económicos y culturales mediante el ataque al clientelismo político en programas sociales en el Ecuador. In Acercando la investigación a las políticas públicas en América Latina: repensando los roles y desafíos para los institutos de investigación de políticas (pp. 217-268). Coser L. (1997). Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View. Free Press Paperbacks. A Division of Simon and Schuster Inc. New York.

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Fox (2010) About Why the Battle of Ideas 2011. Institute of Ideas 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.battleofideas.org.uk/index.php/2011/about/5514/ Grupo FARO. (2007).“Ni regalitos, ni chantajes a cambio de tú voto: Acuerdo de uso de los Fondos Públicos en Programas Sociales”. Llave ciudadana No. 1. Quito, Ecuador. Harry J. (2009) Policy-making as discourse: a review of recent knowledge-to-policy literature. A Joint IKM Emergent– Overseas Development Institute. Working Paper No. 5. August. Imesch, C. (2009). The Case of the Yasuní National Park. Thesis Submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the Master in Development Studies. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. Kingdon, J. (1984). Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston Toronto: Little Brown & Company. Klimoski, R. & Palmer, S. (1993) The ADA and the hiring process in rganizations. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 45(2), 10-36. Letter to the Presidente (2004) Proposed Petrobras road into Yasuní National Park , Scientists Concerned for Yasuní National Park, November, 2004 Letter to the Presidente (2006) Proyecto de Desarrollo y Producción del Bloque 31: Campo Apaika Nenke , Scientists Concerned for Yasuní National Park, September, 2006. Mendizabal E. (2006) Good News for Troubled Contexts: Lessons learned from case studies on how civil society organisations influence policy processes (Draft). Overseas Development Institute. London, United Kingdom. Ministerio del Ambiente & Ministerio de Realaciones Exteriores Comercio e Integración, Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT, La gran propuesta de un país pequeño. Retrieved from http: http://opsur.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/yasuni-itt.pdf Moratoria al Proyecto ITT y Bloque 31, Proyecto en el Parque Nacional Yasuní, 19 de junio de 2006. Retrived from: http://www.llacta.org/textos/yasuni001.html Permanent Mission to the United Nations Ecuador (2007) Statement by his Excellency Economist Rafael Correa President of the Republic of Ecuador at the Sixty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 26 September.

Grupo FARO is a think-and-do tank, which promotes social change through a plural dialogue, evidence- based research, citizenship participation and interaction of global networks dedicated to promote the wellbeing of people.

Contact us:Gregorio Bobadilla N38-88 y Granda CentenoPhone: (593)2 245 6367 Fax: (593)2 226 4719info@grupofaro.org www-.grupofaro.org

AUTHORS: Orazio Bellettini, Andrea OrdóñezGRAPHIC DESIGN: Diego Corrales D.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Orazio Bellettinni RESEARCH DIRECTOR: Andrea Ordóñez COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR: Liseth Estévez

Working papers are Grupo FARO's preliminary research results shared to stimulate discussion and critical comments.

In this edition, Grupo FARO demonstrates that evidence-based policy has become the new mantra; there is a growing con-sensus that policies are better when they consider solid research. By analyzing two cases of policy processes in Ecuador the authors argue that evidence although relevant, is not enough.

They unfold the necessity to transform facts into stories and narratives that capture political and social imagination.

Working Paper

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