tribes and rule of law in yemen

8/3/2019 Tribes and Rule of Law in Yemen

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Tribes and the Rule of Law in Yemen

Daniel Corstange

Assistant Professor

Department of Government and Politics

University of Maryland, College Park

[email protected]

http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/corstange/

November 2008

1 Why Tribes?

A cursory inspection of news reports from the last several years suggeststhat tribes are important political actors in a number of developing societies,several of which are venues within which the war on terror is being, or may

soon be, fought. Stories focus on not only the tribal Anbar Awakeningin Iraq, but also tribal councils and militias in the remote regions of bothAfghanistan and Pakistan, two decades of tribal anarchy and clan fighting inSomalia, tribal violence over Kenyas disputed 2007 elections, the kidnappingof tourists in the Egyptian desert allegedly perpetrated by tribesmen orbandits, and an off-and-on insurgency in the mountains of northern Yemencentered on religious leaders fighting with (and against) the local tribes.

Are tribes bad for development? Is tribal law an impediment to, or asubstitute for, the rule of law? Are tribes barriers to, or promoters of, eco-nomic and political development? Conventional wisdom suggests that tribeshinders development by resisting the states efforts to impose uniform state

law over all its territory, impeding attempts to rationalize politics in society,and obstructing development planning. In effect, such accounts claim thattribes cause underdevelopment. This paper digresses and makes the inverse

Paper prepared for delivery at the 2008 Annual Conference of the Middle East StudiesAssociation, Washington, D.C., 2225 November, 2008.

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claim: underdevelopment causes tribes. Tribes, whatever else they may do

and however else they may be valued by their members, act as second-bestsubstitutes for an absent or weak state. They supply a modicum of securityand the rule of law via the semi-private provision of tribal law, which servesas an imperfect substitute for state law, an undersupplied public good.

To evaluate these claims, I utilize original mass attitude survey data col-lected in Yemen in the spring of 2006 to my knowledge, the first suchdata to be collected there that are nationally-representative in scope. I usethese data to examine the perceptions and attitudes of ordinary Yemeni menand women. This is a marked change from most existing studies of tribes ingeneral and Yemen in particular. My focus is on mass attitudes rather thanelite views: I study what the tribesmen (and non-tribesmen!) themselves

say rather than what elites say about or on behalf of them. Further, I lookfor systematic and generalizable patterns rather than study a particular vil-lage or tribe exclusively and exhaustively, making this work a long-overduecomplement to (not substitute for) prior ethnographic studies.1 These datasuggest that the weaker are state courts, the more positive are evaluationsof tribal law a relationship that is prominent among retribalizing ShafaiSunnis rather than among traditionally tribal Zaydi Shiites, strengtheningthe claim that these findings reflect rule of law rather than identity consider-ations. Further, and regardless of sect, the more positively people evaluatetribal law, the less likely they are to view tribes as an impediment to Yemensdevelopment.

2 Tribes, Tribesmen, and Tribal Law

Tribes, it appears, are back, or and this is not the same thing we havenoticed them more over the past decade or so than in the first half-centuryafter the second world war. Long unfashionable in the social sciences out-side of anthropology and largely treated in policymaking circles as a nuisancefactor, both scholars and policymakers are now, sometimes grudgingly, ac-knowledging the relevance of tribes to their work given the difficult-to-ignoresalience of tribalism in several theaters and potential theaters of the war onterror. Yet what we know about tribes, at least outside of anthropology,has not yet caught up with this renewed interest in tribalism: our supply of

1A sampling of book-length studies include Caton (1990), Dresch (1989), and Weir(2007). Although tribes have long been the particular bailiwick of anthropologists, therelationships I study here between tribes, the rule of law, and development puts tribesand tribalism squarely within the purview of political science and economics as well.

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understanding has not yet caught up to demand.

Perhaps the most salient, or at least the most publicized, example oftribalism in contemporary politics is Iraqs Anbar Awakening, in which tensof thousands of Iraqi tribesmen mostly Sunni and many of whom areformer insurgents have allied with the U.S. military to fight al-Qaida in-surgents and provide security in their own localities in exchange for salariesand public works projects.2 Historical examples of this form of fragile ac-commodation between foreign forces, weak sitting governments, and tribalgroups are not difficult to find compare the 19621970 civil war in NorthYemen3 but these pragmatic alliances continue to gain favor as the ideo-logical fervor with which U.S. democratizing missions were first pursued inthe initial stages of the war on terror gives way to more modest goals of ba-

sic stability and security. Rumors of Saudi-hosted p eace talks between thegovernment of Afghanistan and the Taliban, once considered unthinkable,have led to allegations by hardline al-Qaida supporters that Saudi Arabiais attempting to transfer the Awakening project from Iraq into Afghanistanand Pakistan.4 Pakistani plans to encourage the formation of tribal mili-tias continue to develop, with the government arming and training tens ofthousands of tribal fighters attempting to evict the Taliban and al-Qaidafrom the countrys largely autonomous tribal areas in what the governmentand the U.S. military hope will be a replication of the tribal Awakeningmovement in Iraq.5

2US buys concerned citizens in Iraq, but at what price? Agence-France Presse, 16October 2007. Alissa J. Rubin and Damien Cave, In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds ofConflict, New York Times, 23 December 2007. The Sons of Iraq Keep the Peace,U.S. News and World Report, 5 February 2008. Greg Bruno, The Role of the Sons ofIraq in Improving Security, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 April 2008, www.cfr.org.Iraq tribal clashes leave 15 dead, BBC, 21 October 2008, news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7682511.stm. Face to face with the insurgency, BBC, 22 October2008, news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7684866.stm.

3In that civil war, Egyptian forces fighting on behalf of North Yemens new and weakrepublican government against the ousted royal family regularly used various Yemenitribes as auxiliaries. Egyptian and Yemeni government officials faced analogous concernsto those in the Anbar Awakening about tribal loyalties switching repeatedly and going tothe highest bidder, leading to the exasperated claim that the tribesmen were republicanby day and royalist by night (Corstange 2007, OBallance 1971).

4Thought of Taleban deal alarms jihadists, BBC, 23 October 2008, news.bbc.co.

uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7687539.stm. Greg Bruno, The Unthinkable inAfghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 October 2008, www.cfr.org. New at-tempt to seek Taleban peace, BBC, 28 October 2008, /news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7695256.stm.

5Suicide bomb hits Pakistan elders, BBC, 10 October 2008, news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7663574.stm. Karen DeYoung, Pakistan Will Give Arms to

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Whereas previously tribes had largely been something to ignore, their

sudden salience in the context of geostrategic calculations in the war on ter-ror transforms them from eccentric curios into problems with which to bedealt, or, sometimes more optimistically, potential solutions to those prob-lems. Yet outside of anthropology, where disciplinary interests sometimesoverlap with the other social sciences and sometimes diverge markedly, therehas been relatively little discussion of why the tribes are there at all. Jour-nalistic accounts of tribes and tribalism often present either caricatures andgrossly distorted images of backwardness, or else romanticize the purity oftribal life in miniature Lawrence of Arabia-like fantasias. Although sym-pathetic and well-researched accounts appear on occasion,6 the non-trivialcosts of putting together such stories in terms of time, resources, lan-

guage, access, personal privation, and physical danger, not to mention wordcounts make them the notable exceptions rather than the norm. Whereasdismissive pieces gawk smugly at the tribes and their members as little morethan savages,7 even sympathetic accounts tend to present them as anachro-nisms or the curious remnants of a pre-modern era, newsworthy becausethey continue to exist in spite of the accepted wisdom that they should havedisappeared long ago.

2.1 Institutions, the Rule of Law, and Development

Early proponents of modernization theory attempted to study the grand pro-cesses of both economic and political development that were occurring

or at least were purported to be occurring in developing countries, manyof which had recently obtained their formal independence after the end ofthe second world war. After the initial enthusiasm for modernization theorywaned in light of subsequent theoretical and methodological critiques which

Tribal Militias, Washington Post, 23 October 2008.6Compare David Finkels well-regarded 2005 Pulitzer Prize-winning three-part story

in the Washington Post on a failed conflict-resolution and democracy-promotion programamong the tribes of Yemen: U.S. Ideals Meet Reality in Yemen, 18 December 2005,A Struggle for Peace in a Place Where Fighting Never Ends, 19 December 2005, Inthe End, a Painful Choice; Program Weighs Leaders Edict, Tribes Needs, 20 December2005. Also see Howard Kurtz, Post Wins 4 Pulitzer Prizes; 2 Go to New Orleans Paper,Washington Post, 16 April 2006.

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Tribes and tribalism also serve as colloquial pejoratives, found not only in journalisticpieces but also popularly-oriented books about politics and world affairs. Huntington(1996, 207), for example, refers to the clash of civilizations as tribal conflict on a globalscale with civilizations the ultimate human tribes, and Barber (1995) subtitles hisprovocatively titled Jihad vs. McWorld with how globalism and tribalism are reshapingthe world.

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brought into question its explanatory power,8 both economists and polit-

ical scientists have attempted to reformulate research agendas that mademore modest claims and sought to provide partial theories of development,a major strain of which has focused on the role of government institutionsin the process of economic development.9 In particular, a growing emphasisin the institutional literature shifts the focus away from particular regimetypes democracy versus autocracy, presidents versus parliaments andtoward institutional quality: the protection for contracting and propertyrights, the scope of corruption, strengths of judiciaries, and related con-cerns, all of which fall under the general heading of the provision of the ruleof law.10 More precisely, institutions that provide secure environments forcontracting, protect property rights, prevent corrupt activities, provide ba-

sic physical security more broadly, provide coherent law as well as applythat law in a predictable manner have been shown to encourage produc-tive activity, increase growth rates, and underpin economic development inmore general terms.11

Institutions, in other words, provide the rule of law, and variation ininstitutional quality explains variation in the provision of the rule of law.People desire the rule of law for its own sake insofar as it satisfies demands for(among many other things) justice, stability, personal security, predictabil-ity, and certainty, given most reasonable definitions of those ideas. Yet thereis also a derived demand for the rule of law in its capacity to provide anenvironment conducive to economic development. Given that demand forthe rule of law is presumably high both because it is desired for its own

sake as well as for what else it brings we might wonder, prima facie, whysupply of the rule of law varies markedly from society to society. Yet thepublic goods aspect of the rule of law implies that it will be undersuppliedin most contexts, making low supply the norm rather than the exception.

8For a sample of some of the early works, compare Deutsch (1961), Huntington (1968),and Lipset (1960). For a review of subsequent critiques and reformulations, compareAlmond (1987), Hagopian (2000), and Inglehart (1997).

9See, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Boix (2003), Keefer (2004), North(1981, 1990), Przeworski et al. (2000), and van de Walle (2001).

10One could argue that early works by scholars such as Huntington (1968) previewedthis later emphasis on institutional quality when they attempted to delineate between typeof government and degree of government.

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For the impact of the rule of law on development outcomes, compare Acemoglu,Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Alesina (1998), Collier (1998), Feng (1997), Haggard,MacIntyre, and Tiede (2008), Keefer (2004), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, andVishny (1999), Mauro (1995), Rodrik (1999), Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1998), Shleifer andVishny (1993), and Weingast (1997).

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The rule of law, in the abstract, maps closely onto the concept of a true

public good, with the well-worn principle of justice for all indicating thateveryone may access benefit from it.12 In principle, the rule of law is bothnon-rival and non-excludable. By non-rival, I mean that one individualsuse of the rule of law does not make it less available to others it is nota good whose consumption reduces quantity, i.e., it is not subject to beingused up. By non-excludable, I mean that it is not feasible (or possible)to prevent individuals from benefiting from the rule of law, when they donot contribute to its provision, e.g., via an expenditure of time, effort, orresources. To the extent that the rule of law is indeed a true public good,however, this implies that it is subject to the litany of public goods problemsthat mean it is undersupplied relative to demand, perhaps marginally so and

perhaps dramatically so.When considering the rule of law, it is usually the case that we elidethis concept with state institutions and the states court system. This isunsurprising given that we commonly expect that it is the state that providesthe rule of law, at least in an approximate form. The idealized state mayin fact do so via its monitoring and enforcement mechanisms which,if viewed by the states citizens as legitimate, increase their capacity andreduce the cost of using them to provide disincentives for people to engagein opportunistic behavior by breaking laws and to punish those who do.There are numerous conceivable motives for the state to provide the rule oflaw, but whatever the motive the key point here is that state institutionsplay a critical role in the provision of this particular public good and are

commonly justified on those grounds.13

In application, of course, achieving the rule of law that is both non-rivaland non-excludable is only approximated even by the most well-functioningof state institutions. It is, for example, subject to crowding, as is evident

12See Hardin (1982), Marwell and Oliver (1993), and Olson (1965).13Several interpretations for why the state provides the rule of law are available. For

example, one version based on accountability and a vote-market mechanism holds thatelected officials wishing to retain office follow the wishes of voters, who demand the rule oflaw. Another version based on encompassing interest holds that the state as a corporateentity wishes to maximize tax revenue and does so by encouraging taxable economicactivity by providing security and secure contracting. Yet another version based on theconcept of club goods or selective incentives holds that key constituents or power-holders

themselves benefit far more from the provision of the rule of law than do the populace ingeneral, and consequently the provision of the rule of law is intended to satisfy these keyconstituents, with a positive externality that enables the rest of the population to utilizethe good as well. Whether some, any, or all of these narratives are in fact applicable in agiven society is beside the point I am attempting to make here.

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by the considerable backlog of cases on even the most well-functioning of

court systems dockets and the length of time required to receive a hearingin court here, the rule of law is only partially non-rival in the sense thatuse of limited court resources by one individual delays their use by anotherindividual. Further, the rule of law is only imperfectly non-excludable, asit is well-established that wealthy individuals capable of hiring expensiveattorneys are better able to win their court cases than are poor individu-als being represented by understaffed and underresourced public defendersoffices in this situation, the rule of law may indeed apply to all, but inpractice it applies to some more than others. In other words, even in wealthycountries such as the United States where we commonly view state institu-tions and the court system as functioning reasonably well particularly in

comparison to what obtains in many developing countries the resource-constrained state nonetheless undersupplies the rule of law in practice ascompared to principle.14

Yet this begs an important question: although well-functioning state in-stitutions may be able to provide an approximation of the idealized versionof the rule of law, what happens in poor societies where state institutionscannot reasonably be described as well-functioning? In some respects, thisremains the proverbial white elephant in the room for most economists andpolitical scientists who study institutions. The modal answer appears tobe that such societies rely on informal institutions in place of formal in-stitutions, or else that informal institutions strongly influence how formalinstitutions function in practice rather than as written. Yet informal insti-

tutions, conceptually, is usually treated as a residual category that appearsto include a grab-bag of the leftovers: culture, customs and traditions, kin-ship networks, customary law, patron-client relationships, and whatever elsedoes not fit with contemporary conceptions of institutions as defined in con-stitutions and legal codes. Further, compared to the lengthy treatises andwell-defined research agendas that focus on formal institutions, informal onesat best receive only passing mention, and more often receive no mention atall.15 To provide a sense of proportion, a recent, comprehensive review of

14Further examples and evidence of undersupply are not difficult to provide. Low judi-cial salaries are only partially offset by the social prestige attached to the offices, reducingthe talent pool of individuals willing to take those positions and lowering the overall av-

erage quality of sitting judges. Similarly, salaries for public defendents are dramaticallylower than what a similarly credentialed lawyer could earn in private practice, which againis only partially offset by ideological or altruistic benefits public defenders earn, again im-plying a reduction of the talent pool and the lowering of the overall average quality ofpublic defenders.

15Although North (1981, 1990), for example, acknowledges informal institutions in his

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scholarship on the rule of law and economic development managed to fill

one of 29 pages on informal institutions comprising a mere eight citationsout of 171 total (i.e., less than five percent of total citations).16

In many countries, formal state institutions such as the court systemare weak or nonexistent sometimes due to severe resource constraintsand sometimes by design and cannot or will not provide the rule oflaw even in approximate form. Weak and resource-constrained court sys-tems are common in emerging democracies where governments must choosebetween spending scarce financial resources on development projects or oninstitution-building, and development projects, whose benefits are more tan-gible and immediate, not to mention at least partially targetable to support-ers, are potentially more politically attractive to politicians with short time

horizons. Similarly underdeveloped court systems are also common in coun-tries ruled by autocratic governments, where barriers to the rule of law mayin fact be partially purposive as elites seeks to maintain considerable discre-tionary power for themselves to provide both the rule of law and exemptionsto it in a targeted fashion to supporters. Yet this does not mean that thereis no demand for the rule of law among the populations of such countries,but rather only that there is no credible state supplier of it.

Consequently, especially in the absence of a credible supply of the rule oflaw by formal state institutions such as the courts, people look for alterna-tive providers to meet demand, at which point informal institutions becomeparticularly salient in both practical and analytical terms by providing im-perfect, second-best substitutes to formal state institutions by providing an

approximation of an approximation of the rule of law.17

2.2 Tribal Law as Second-Best Rule of Law

Conceptually, tribal law becomes particularly salient in the context of infor-mal institutions providing some semblance of the rule of law in the absence

seminal studies of institutional development, he rarely does more than cite them as what-ever remains when formal institutions have already been considered. Works by Greif(1994, 2006) provide a rare and welcome alternative in which informal institutions arecentral rather than peripheral concerns.

16See Haggard et al. (2008): of the eight published works cited, three are by Greif andcolleagues (see fn. 15). Although the authors make a point of acknowledging the relevance

of informal institutions, they also acknowledge that we know comparatively little aboutthem.

17Although this is presumably familiar ground for many anthropologists and those whomake special study of developing societies, it is comparatively less researched in economicsand political science. For examples, see Bates (1983, 2001), Bates et al. (2002), Dixit(2004), Fearon and Laitin (1996), and Haggard et al. (2008).

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of well-functioning state institutions. Although some studies of customary

tribal law focus on the content of the law and practices,18

my focus here israther on tribal law as a means to achieve the rule of law what it pro-vides rather than the details of the legal corpus. In this view, utilizationof tribal law becomes something other than a stubborn refusal to embracethe modern world, as is often alleged by political detractors of the tribesand by puzzled academics, and is comprehensible as goal-directed behaviorby individuals attempting to improve their lives under daunting constraints.Tribal law, in other words, is not utilized by tribesmen in order to weakenthe central state or to remain independent of it, but rather persists becausestate institutions are weak.

2.2.1 Are Tribesmen Irrational?Standard views of tribesmen are rarely complementary. In the Yemeni con-text and presumably in most societies in which tribalism continues tohold salience the tribesmen are often stylized as uneducated, backwards,ignorant, uncultured, tradition-bound, irrational, uncivilized, and violent.These views are often strongest among city-dwellers, the educated elite, andthose who strongly oppose the current governing regime in Yemen, which isassociated with tribalism and tribal traditions. Unflattering jokes aboundabout the ignorance and stupidity of tribesmen, and the epithet tribal isnot infrequently used as a synonym for backwards.19

The tribesmen are commonly depicted as violent and irrational, clinging

to outmoded tribal traditions that are clearly self-destructive and yet persistdue to ignorance (patronizingly) and sheer stubbornness (vindictively). Incontemporary discourse, the tribes factor as sources of instability and law-lessness, as well as anarchy and barbarism, with two prominent examples ofthis alleged irrational destructiveness coming in the form of the continuedprominence of tribal wars and feuds that lead to revenge killings

.20

Figure 1, which depicts two editorial cartoons from a Yemeni newspaper,

18See, e.g., Posner (1980) and Stewart (1987), as well as Alimi (nd), bin Yahya binAli Sadami (1993), and bin Ali Sayyad (1993) in the Yemeni context.

19One mean-spirited joke holds that tribesmen do not know what soap is, and conse-quently when being introduced to soap cakes attempt to them. Another holds that, withthe introduction of the republic (jamhuriyya) in the 1960s, tribesmen came down to the

capital from the mountains to see this beautiful new jamhuriyya (a female noun, meaningthe tribesmen thought the republic was a woman). Yet another makes a play on wordsbetween doctor (duktur) and constitution (dustur) to suggest that tribesmen cometo the city upon hearing that there is a new dustur that will solve all of their problemsand health ailments. The list goes on.

20On revenge killings in Yemen, see Hadrani et al. (2005) and SABA (2004), which are

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illustrates these themes by identifying revenge killings with rough-looking,

violent, unthinking tribesmen, programmed to act irrationally in pursuit ofvengeance and destroying themselves in the process.

Although tribal wars and revenge killings, prima facie, appear self-destructive and the product of people irrationally clinging to historical grie-vances and motivated by passions and emotions, research on conflict regu-lation and conflict resolution under conditions of anarchy or semi-anarchysuggest otherwise.21 Under such conditions, when there is no third-partymonitor or enforcer of law a position usually filled by the state in con-temporary societies parties to conflict must provide their own means toregulate relations and provide security. The destructiveness of tribal warsas well as running feuds and vendettas should not be ignored, but neither

should it be exaggerated. Although the salience of such events makes themnewsworthy and Yemeni newspapers frequently report the start of yetanother tribal war or yet another victim of a revenge killing judgingtheir overall destructiveness by the number of events cited in the media orby word-of-mouth obscures the far larger number of tribal wars that do notoccur. Put another way, there is a far greater prevalence of tribal peacethan tribal war, and examining only instances of tribal war hopelessly bi-ases whatever we may wish to infer about inter-tribal relations and triballaw.22

Tribal conflicts and the use of tribal law as a conflict regulation andresolution mechanism do not occur in a vacuum. They occur, rather, inthe context of pervasive weakness on the part of Yemeni state institutions.

Yemen is a prototypically weak state characterized by poverty, underdevel-opment, and poorly functioning state institutions. It is among the poorestcountries on earth and in recent years has experienced at best minusculeeconomic growth in per capita terms, with roughly half the population liv-ing below the poverty line and one-third unemployed. Average educationalattainment is low, and illiteracy rates hover around 50 percent of the pop-ulation, growing markedly worse in the rural areas where 75 percent of the

specialized volumes on the subject, the Yemeni tribal law exegeses in fn. 18, as well asmore general accounts in Abu Ghanim (1985, 1990) and Zahiri (1996, 2004).

21Compare Bates (1983, 2001), Bates et al. (2002), Fearon and Laitin (1996), Hardin(1995), and Olson (1993, 2000).

22

An analogous point can be made about deterrence theory in international relations:for years, a great many scholars argued that deterrence did not work in practice, a claimbased almost entirely on cases where deterrence schemes did in fact break down. Yet whenthese cases of failure are compared to the far greater number of potential conflicts that didnot occur, the concept of deterrence receives exceptionally strong empirical confirmation.See Achen and Snidal (1989) for details.

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Figure 1: Vengeance

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population continues to reside. Basic infrastructure and services in the form

of education, health, roads, electricity, and water are provided at only avery low and variable level outside of the main cities, and even in the majorcities cannot be taken for granted. On this note, Figure 2, depicting an-other Yemeni editorial cartoon (translation mine), illustrates the bemusedfrustration of many Yemenis by highlighting the states chronic undersupplyof basic services, especially in the rural areas.

Figure 2: Minimal Infrastructure and Services

In addition to achieving underwhelming development outcomes, Yemenalso suffers from very low institutional capacity, with highly personalizedparties and bureaucracies, endemic corruption, weak courts and rule of law,and a state whose writ does not extend far into the countryside and which

lacks a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The persistence of seem-ingly anachronistic tribal wars, the kidnapping of tourists, an on-again, off-again insurgency simmering in the northern province of Saada, and the openand largely unpoliced countryside that allegedly provides a safe haven formilitant groups all combine to place Yemen consistently near the top of the

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Failed States Index, one composite measure to describe state capacity and

basic governance outcomes.23

Many of these problems appear to be tribal inorigin: the tribes are the ones engaging in tribal wars, kidnapping touristsfor ransom (usually development projects for their regions), fighting in theSaada war, and providing the safe havens for militants. These contempo-rary problems, and analogous ones that preceded them throughout Yemenihistory, have led to the frequently-made claim that the tribesmen are thecause rather than the actors in the events, which is not precisely the samething.24 That the tribesmen involved are culpable for their actions is notdebatable the individuals shooting their guns are ultimately responsiblefor their own actions but the more important point I wish to make is thatthe tribesmen involved are responding to their constraints and incentives,

perhaps the largest of which is the largely absent state and its low capacityto provide the rule of law in the areas where these tribally-based problemsoccur most frequently.

2.2.2 What Tribal Law Provides

The common claim throughout Yemeni history, and particularly since theadvent of the republican era as elites have attempted to break with the much-maligned backwards past of the imamate in the north and colonial/sultanicrule in the south, has been that the tribes have resisted and retarded theextension of the state into their territories. These tribes frequently de-scribed as fiercely independent or something similar to denote their aver-

sion to a civilizing state thereby prevent the development of viable stateinstitutions, a situation which they allegedly prefer because it allows themto administer their own affairs. This basic narrative is wrong. The receivedwisdom holds that the state is weak because the tribes resist it, whereas Imake the inverse claim here: the tribes persist because the state is weak,a view backed by a number of prominent tribal shaykhs and political ac-tivists, as well as numerous Yemeni academics.25 This claim reverses the

23See the Fund for Peace, www.fundforpeace.org/.24See, for example, Abd al-Salam (1988) and Bakr (1995), two leftist writers opposed to

tribalism and what they see as the tribal regime of the northern (and later unity) republic.See also the debates in Saqqaf (2002a, 2002b).

25Corroborating evidence comes in part from elite interviews with tribal shaykhs and

political party leaders conducted in Yemen in 2005/6. For additional corroborating viewsfrom members of the most prominent shaykhly families in Yemen those that wouldpresumably be best positioned to benefit the most from tribal independence from thestate see Saqqaf (2002b) and Yahya (2004). For academic treatments, see Abdali(2007), Abu Ghanim (1985, 1990), Sharjabi (1986, 1990), and Zahiri (1996,2004).

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causal arrow of the received wisdom. It states that tribes continue to exist

as relevant social and political entities in part because they perform func-tions that contemporary observers usually associate with a state and itsinstitutions. As state institutions become increasingly weak, whether dueto mismanagement or to exogenous shocks, tribes become more salient, tothe point that even previously non-tribal or weakly-tribal segments of thepopulation begin to retribalize. Hence, the continued salience of tribalism,and the recourse to tribal law, indicates not an attempt to weaken the state,but an attempt to survive given the preexisting weakness of that state.

Given the constraints Yemenis face, tribal law is, I suggest, not an imped-iment to the rule of law, but rather an imperfect substitute for it: a second-best alternative when an idealized provision of state-based law is absent or

weak. It represents the use of an informal institution to achieve desiredoutcomes security, predictability, and development the achievement ofwhich we normally attribute to formal state institutions. It is imperfect inthe sense that providing the rule of law via customary tribal law is costly tothe participants as well as less efficient and less capable in achieving thoseoutcomes than an well-functioning set of state institutions would be, yetthe second-best alternatives provided by tribal law are clearly preferable tonothing.

In this context, customary tribal law, as an informal institution, takeson particular salience. In its capacity as an alternative to weak or absentstate institutions, support for its use becomes comprehensible as somethingother than a supposed irrational clinging to tradition by the ignorant or

uncivilized and an impediment to development and the spread of state writ,as is sometimes alleged. Tribal law, whatever else it does and for whateverother reasons people view it positively, also serves as an imperfect substitutefor nonfunctioning state institutions. It represents the semi-private provisionof the rule of law: plaintiffs may pay the shaykhs and judges to considercases and, rather than rely on a third-party enforcer, the tribes themselvesbear the cost of enforcing the rulings. Hence, it is imperfect in the sensethat tribal law is certainly rival and excludable in a way that an idealizedvision of the rule of law is not, and is also inefficient in the sense that itis difficult to take advantage of economies of scale and division of labor. Itmay provide some security and predictability, but only imperfectly and in

a costly fashion. Yet despite its limitations, tribal law does in fact providethese desired outcomes at least at a basic level. Tribal law, in other words, isa second-best alternative to a well-functioning state in providing the rule oflaw. It is costly, inefficient, and only partially capable of meeting demand,but it is considerably better than nothing.

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If the above is true, we should expect peoples attitudes about tribal

law, and the tribes in general, to vary for systematic reasons. Views ontribal law should vary according to perceptions of state capacity. If triballaw is a substitute for state-provided rule of law, people should be morefavorably inclined toward tribal law when they perceive the state to befailing in its duties and see tribal law as taking up the slack. Whetherpeople view the tribes as playing a positive role in, or acting as barriers to,development in the country should, in turn, vary according to perceptions oftribal law. If peoples attitudes toward tribes and tribalism reflects the ideasdeveloped above, people should be most favorably inclined to a role for tribesin development precisely when they see tribal law providing something theywant and which is necessary for development: a basic degree of security,

stability, and certainty.

3 Data and Measures

3.1 Empirical Focus

The empirical investigation I conduct here is based primarily on mass atti-tude public opinion data rather than on government data, whether in theform of the census or on cross-sectional infrastructure and service provisiondata collected by the various government ministries. In part this empiricalstrategy is a recognition of data limitations insofar as government statisticsare not necessarily reliable, either as incidental casualties to resource scarcity

that prevent data from being collected rigorously, or systematically due todata sensitivity and manipulation of figures.26 Yet beyond practical con-straints, this also reflects the research focus in substantive terms: individualperceptions of and attitudes toward tribes, tribal law, and development. Inparticular, to examine who supports and who opposes the use of tribal law and why we must examine individuals as the units of analysis ratherthan tribes as aggregates or tribal law as elites conceive of it.

26Several foreign diplomatic interviewees in the fall of 2005 urged me to ask my surveyrespondents if they had ever encountered a government official asking questions for acensus, while several activists alleged that government data, even on topics as mundaneas tomato production, were often subject to manipulation for political purposes. As

a relevant example of this problem, Yemens central statistical bureau reports InteriorMinistry tabulations of the number of tribal wars (vaguely defined) on a yearly basisbeginning in the mid-1990s. These figures tend to hover in the 50150 per year range until,not coincidentally, 2001, when they plunge into the single digits, and shortly thereafterare not reported in annual statistical abstracts.

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This, in turn, means focusing on mass attitudes rather than elite percep-

tions or, in the specific context of Yemen, tribesmen rather than shaykhs.This focus is a complement to studies of elites rather than a substitute forthem. It is also a neglected and missing piece of the overall puzzle, which forreasons of both practicality and research interests have tended to focus onshaykhs, shaykhly families, and political elites outside of the tribal system.In addition to shifting the focus to tribesmen, it also entails a comparison oftribesmen to non-tribesmen or, more generally, people for whom tribesand tribal identities are of varying degrees of importance so that we havesome grounds on which to gauge the importance of tribalism itself.

This is not to imply that all or even most prior studies ignored the tribes-men or focused solely on elites. On the contrary, many ethnographic studies

mixed both mass and elite analysis, studying both tribesmen and shaykhs.Although this research methodology has numerous strengths internal va-lidity in the inclusive sense of the term as well as measurement validity it is difficult to generalize beyond the subjects of the ethnography if forno other reason than explicit comparisons are not made or available withinthem. Thus, patterns found in one tribe or one village may or may not berepresentative of a more generalizable pattern, but we are in no positionto judge given the method employed. Further, we are in no real positionto determine the effects of tribalism or tribal membership if we do not ex-plicitly examine non-tribesmen as well. In other words, we have difficultieswith generalization and making rigorous ceteris paribus inferences given thelack of comparisons based on key variables as well as lack of measures of

uncertainty. Again, this makes analysis of survey data complementary toethnographic studies rather than a substitute: surveys and ethnographiesare each far better at answering different aspects of our research questions.Yet again, the wealth of ethnographic data compared to the paucity of surveydata implies that the value-added of survey analysis is particularly strikingat this juncture.

The survey itself comprises 1,440 interviews with respondents drawnfrom a random sample stratified geographically across Yemen and includ-ing individuals from approximately half of the countrys provinces.27 After a

27The provinces in the sample were chosen approximately randomly with their probabil-ity of inclusion in the sample a product of their population weights in the country, subject

to the constraints that a) at least one province from the former southern republic wasincluded, and b) the province of Saada was excluded due to security constraints imposedby the governments response to the Houthi insurgency. Although the latter is unfortu-nate and detracts somewhat from the representativeness of the overall survey itself, thisdifficulty is mitigated somewhat by the fact that a) the population of Saada province is

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100-person pretest of the questionnaire, the survey was administered face-to-

face with respondents by trained interviewers from the Yemen Polling Cen-ter.28 This survey, to my knowledge, is the first such nationally-representativemass attitude survey conducted in the country, certainly for the purposes ofscholarly research.

3.2 Summary Statistics

3.2.1 Dependent Variables

Here, I present the basic summary statistics related to the two survey ques-tions I use as indicators of the two key dependent variables. The firstoutcome I study is respondents assessments of tribal law as a useful or

problematic way to resolve conflicts in Yemeni society, whereas the subse-quent outcome I study is respondents assessments of the role, positive ornegative, that tribes play in Yemens development process. I discuss thequestions below and then provide summary statistics in graphical form ofresponses to those questions. In doing so, I present comparison of responsesbetween Zaydi Shia and Shafai Sunni respondents given that tribalism andthe tribal system has long been particularly strongly associated with theformer community. Community median responses are marked with red Ms.

Assessments of tribal law. To examine Yemenis perceptions of and at-titudes toward tribal law and its impact on the rule of law in Yemeni society

(Tribal Law), I asked respondents the following forced-choice question:Some people say that using tribal law to resolve conflicts is goodfor Yemeni society, while others say that the tribal system ishindering the spread of the rule of law. Which of these twostatements do you agree with most?29

small to begin with and its inclusion in the survey sample would have introduced onlya relatively small number of Yemenis whose weight in the analyses would be unlikely todramatically change findings, and b), several other provinces with strong tribal tradi-tions are included in the sample. The provinces that were ultimately sampled are: Adenand Hadramawt (both from the former southern republic), Taiz, Ibb, Hajjah, Hudayda,Dhamar, Amran, Marib, and Sanaa city.

28On the Yemen Polling Center, see http://yemenpolling.org/ (for an English version,

see http://yemenpolling.org/english/).29The Arabic wording of the question is:

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Interviewers then read the following two statements to respondents:

Using tribal law to resolve conflicts is good for Yemeni so-ciety.

The use of tribal law is hindering the spread of the rule oflaw in the country.30

Respondents stated, first, which of the two statements they agreed withmore (an unread but accepted answer was that they agreed with neitherstatement), and second, if they agreed strongly with that statement, or justsomewhat. The forced-choice format (rather than a standard agree-disagreeformat) was chosen in part to encourage respondents to think harder aboutthe question rather than provide top-of-the-head answers, and in part to

avoid acquiescence bias, in which less educated individuals have been shownto agree to statements systematically regardless of their content. I reportthe distribution of responses graphically in the top panel of Figure 3.

Assessments of the role of tribes in development. To examine Yeme-nis perceptions of and attitudes toward the role of tribes in Yemens de-velopment (Tribes Dev.), I asked respondents an additional forced-choicequestion similarly structured to the one on tribal law:

Some people say that tribes and the tribal system play a positiverole in Yemens economic and political development, while others

disagree and say that the tribes are holding Yemen back. Whichof these two statements do you agree with most? 31

Interviewers then read the following two statements to respondents:

The tribes play a positive role in the development of thecountry.

30The Arabic wording for the two statements is:

31The Arabic wording of the question is:

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The tribes are holding back the development of the coun-

try.32

As before, respondents stated first which of the two statements they agreedwith more (accepting neither answers when given), and second, whetherthey agree strongly or just somewhat. I report the distribution of responsesgraphically in the bottom panel of Figure 3.

Figure 3 reveals two broad points of interest. First, and consistent withprior studies of tribalism in Yemen, Zaydi Shia respondents are, on aver-age, more supportive of the use of tribal law and sympathetic to the role oftribes in development than are their Shafai Sunni counterparts. For b othquestions, the Zaydi Shia median response is somewhat supportive of both,whereas the Shafai Sunni median response is somewhat opposed to both.

Yet the average responses are not the whole story, which is the second point.There is significant variation in the answers given within both communities:sizable numbers of Zaydis and Shafais are against tribal law and the roleof the tribes in development, just as there are sizable numbers who are infavor of tribal law and a role for the tribes in development. This variationis an interesting substantive finding in its own right insofar as it belies theoversimplified stories sometimes forwarded that Zaydis are all tribal andShafais are all modern and civilized narratives sometimes put forwardin journalistic pieces and sometimes put forward to advance a particularpolitical or policy p osition. From a methodological standpoint, the consid-erable variation found in answers to these questions provides rich grounds

to assess causes of the variation in these answers. It is not the case thatmost people are for (or against) tribal law and the tribes with just a fewcranks and outliers, but rather than there is considerable gradation of viewsavailable to analyze.

3.2.2 Explanatory Variables

Ultimately, I am attempting to explain two outcomes. First, I am attempt-ing to account for variation in attitudes toward the use of tribal law: who isparticularly in favor, who is particularly opposed, and why? Second, I amattempting to explain assessments of the role of tribes in development: whosees their role as mostly positive, who see it as mostly negative, and why?

32The Arabic wording for the two statements is:

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Zaydi Shia Shafai Sunni

Tribal Law

Within

CommunityProportion

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

Very

Bad

Somewhat

BadNeither

Somewhat

Good

Very

Good

M M

Zaydi Shia Shafai Sunni

Tribes and Development

Within

CommunityProportion

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

Very

Negative

Somewhat

NegativeNeither

Somewhat

Positive

Very

Positive

M M

Figure 3: Dependent Variables Summary Statistics

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To explain attitudes toward tribal law, I use assessments of the state court

system as the principle explanatory variable. To explain assessments of therole of tribes in development, I use attitudes toward tribal law, previouslyan outcome variable, as the principle explanator.

Confidence in the state courts. To examine Yemenis perceptions ofthe trustworthiness of Yemens state and non-state institutions, I asked thema series of questions about their confidence in various entities such as theparliament, p olitical parties, and the police. One of the items that respon-dents considered was on the courts and legal system (Courts), for whichthey were asked the following question and responded on a five-point scale:

I am going to name a number of public and civic institutions.For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you havein it: a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, a little,too little, or none at all? . . . The courts and legal system?33

There is considerable variation in the answers to this question, with 29percent of the respondents saying they have no confidence in the courts, 19percent saying they have very little confidence, 24 percent responding thatthey have little, 22 percent saying they have much, and 7 percent saying theyhave very much confidence. In other words, there is considerable variationon this key explanatory variable, which can b e used to help explain theconsiderable variation in attitudes toward the use of tribal law.

Rule of law in the country and the province. Whereas confidence inthe state courts is the principle explanatory variable used to explain varia-tion in attitudes toward the use of tribal law, I make the additional claimthat the explanatory power of perceptions of the courts should vary accord-ing to perceptions of the overall level of the rule of law i.e., the courteffect is conditional on the rule of law effect. I consequently asked respon-dents to rate the degree of the rule of law both in the country overall and

33The Arabic wording of the question is:

The five response options are none

, very little

,

little , much

, and very much

.

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area (Rural), and whether or not the respondent lives in a province of the

former southern republic (South).

4 Analysis

4.1 Tribal Law

4.1.1 Basic Model

The first model I present is a basic one that seeks to accomplish two things.First, from a methodological standpoint, I attempt to validate the use of thesurvey data as a viable means to capture important aspects of Yemeni socialreality. To the degree that the inferences that may be drawn from these data

accord with our basic expectations, we may have greater confidence both inthe data as well as in the subsequent inferences I draw from a more complexmodel. Second, from a substantive standpoint, I attempt to indicate thedegree to which there is a difference between Zaydi Shia and Shafai SunniYemenis in their views on tribal law given that the tribal system has tra-ditionally been strongest among members of the Zaydi community. Hence,the finding on the Zaydi variable is of substantive interest once controllingfor the effect of the basic socioeconomic, educational, and demographic con-trols on responses. The results of this basic model, estimated via an orderedprobit procedure due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, arepresented in Table 1.

b se(b)p

Zaydi 0.251 (0.085)0.00

T ribesman 0.578 (0.074)0.00

Education 0.451 (0.108)0.00

Understand 0.207 (0.114)0.07

Female 0.261 (0.071)0.00

Rural 0.147 (0.084)0.08

Electricity 0.017 (0.021)0.43

South 0.632 (0.126)0.00

A1 0.559 (0.133)0.00

A2 0.072 (0.068)0.29

A3 0.144 (0.105)0.17

A4 0.840 (0.058)0.00

Table 1: Tribal Law Zaydi vs. Shafai

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Table 1 yields little that is truly surprising, with the basic findings largely

consistent with what an overview reading of the qualitative literature onYemen would suggest. This lack of surprises, in turn, implicitly validatesthe survey questionnaire and survey data insofar as they yield inferencesthat are consistent with the findings of numerous other researchers utilizingdifferent research methodologies, which in turn gives us greater confidencein the inferences to be drawn subsequently from the more filled-out models.Tribesmen are more sympathetic to the use of tribal law than are non-tribesmen, whereas southerners view tribal law more negatively than donortherners. The better educated are less supportive of tribal law thanare the less well-educated, and similarly so for city-dwellers and those whounderstand politics better, although these latter two findings are weaker and

less certain. Women view tribal law more negatively than men, althoughthe magnitude of the gender effect is not large. Finally, material well-being(as measured by Electricity with a square-root transformation) appears tohave no influence on attitudes toward tribal law, which is mildly surprising.

Finally, consistent with expectations but somewhat surprising due to themildness of the effect, Zaydi Shiites are more supportive of tribal law thanare Shafai Sunnis, but only marginally so. Figure 4 plots as first differences39

the Zaydi premium: the additional support for tribal law attributable to be-ing a Zaydi rather than a Shafai. As the figure indicates, Zaydis are morelikely to assess tribal law positively being less likely to say that it is veryor somewhat bad for dispute resolution and more likely to say that it is verygood but the differences between the two communities are small. Hence,

the biggest shift between the two makes Zaydis an additional 10 percentmore likely than Shafais to say that tribal law is very good: a statisticallysignificant but substantively marginal effect. Hence, after controlling forother plausible factors the most relevant in this case likely to be tribalmembership and rural residency the broad differences between commu-nities is relatively modest, and certainly more modest than is sometimesalleged by both researchers and political activists.

4.1.2 Courts Model

I now present a more elaborate model that builds off of the basic model by

considering directly respondents assessments of the state court system as a39The first differences are calculated as the difference in predicted probability of re-

sponses between a Zaydi Shia and a Shafai Sunni respondent when the control variablesare set to their relevant measures of central tendency (i.e., means, medians, or modes asappropriate).

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Tribal Law

Zaydi Shia premium compared to Shafai Sunni

ChangeinProbabilityofResponse

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

Tribal

LawBad Good

Figure 4: Attitudes Toward Tribal Law Zaydi vs. Shafai Differences

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means to explain their views on the use of tribal law. As previously argued,

if Yemenis view tribal law as a substitute (however imperfect) for state law,negative perceptions of the courts should translate into higher regard fortribal law. This effect is likely to be conditional, however, on perceptions ofthe existing degree of the rule of law (here, at both the country and provincelevel). Perceptions of strong rule of law may in principle be attributed toeither state law or tribal law, and hence we might expect that those whoperceive strong rule of law and weak courts will be most favorably disposedto tribal law. To assess this expectation, I modify the basic model fromabove in the following ways. First, the logic of this claim implies the use ofinteractive terms in the model, in this case, a threeway interaction betweenCourts, the key variable of interest, and Country ROL and Province ROL,

the conditioning variables that help indicate when p erceptions of the courtswill have particularly strong explanatory power. Second, given the inclusionof a threeway interaction, I split the sample between Zaydi Shia and ShafaiSunni respondents for b oth substantive and methodological reasons.40 Ipresent the results in Table 2.

Table 2 reveals two key points of note. First, p erceptions of the courtsfollow the expectation described above: low trust in the courts in the con-text of perceived strong rule of law leads to higher regard for tribal law.Second, there is an important caveat to this finding: it only occurs amongShafai Sunnis, and there is no observable effect among Zaydi Shiites. Inter-preting interactive effects is simpler when done graphically: Figure 5 doesso for Shafai respondents. In particular, it reports predicted probabilities

for three key combinations of variables: individuals reporting very weak ruleof law and no confidence in state courts (left panel), those reporting verystrong rule of law and no confidence in state courts (middle panel), andthose reporting very strong rule of law and high confidence in state courts(right panel). There are two important issues to note. First, and most ob-viously, respondents in the middle category are clearly much more stronglypredisposed to tribal law than those on either end: they view the rule of lawas strong and, given that they have little trust in the state courts, they at-tribute it to the positive role that tribal law plays in conflict resolution, thusexplaining their positive views on tribal law. Second, responses between re-

40In substantive terms, this enables me to examine whether similar patterns exist con-ditional on being Zaydi or Shafai. In methodological terms, this enables me to achieve theimplicit fourway interaction without the exponential increase in complexity that wouldmake interpretation of the model ponderous. A threeway interaction requires the inclusionof 7 constituent terms in the model, whereas a fourway interaction requires 15 constituentterms.

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spondents on either end are virtually indistinguishable from one another. In

other words, perceptions of weak rule of law and weak state courts yield thesame views on tribal law as do perceptions of strong rule of law and strongstate courts. This finding reinforces the claim that tribal law is viewed as asubstitute for state law: attitudes toward tribal law hardly vary when ruleof law and court perceptions go together, but are notably more positivewhen the rule of law is perceived to be strong when the courts are weak.Shafais, in the latter case, are particularly predisposed to tribal law becauseit provides them with something they want when the state cannot or willnot provide it: basic security and predictability.

The second finding that the courts dynamic is observable amongShafais but not Zaydis was unanticipated, but is of substantive signif-

icance. In effect, this implies that attitudes toward tribal law vary amongShafais for qualitatively different reasons than they do among Zaydis. Spec-ulatively, given that the tribal system has traditionally been less stronglyembedded among Shafai Sunnis, we might expect the logic of pragmatismimplied by the courts argument to be particularly prominent among Shafais,who would be more inclined to view tribes and tribal law in functional termsthan would Zaydis. Such an interpretation is consistent with the widely re-ported attempts of Shafai Sunnis across Yemen to retribalize in the contextof Yemens deteriorating institutions. Nonetheless, this speculation is hardlydefinitive, and more research is required to understand these qualitative dif-ferences between the communities.

4.2 Tribes and Development

Having first examined determinants of support for the use of tribal law inYemen, I turn now to Yemenis assessments of the role of tribes in devel-opment whether the tribes are a positive influence for development orare holding the country back. In modeling Yemenis views on tribes anddevelopment, the principle explanatory variable is the one examined as anoutcome variable in Section 4.1: assessments of tribal law. To the degreethat people approve of the tribes because the tribes provide something thatpeople want security and the rule of law we should expect that theirviews on the tribes overall should be strongly conditional on their views

toward tribal law. Put another way: support for tribal law explains supportfor the tribes more generally. Conversely, if views on the tribes primarily re-flect other interests, such as social identity concerns or traditionalism, thenviews on tribal law should have little explanatory power once we control forvariables that could account for identity and tradition concerns.

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Very BadSomewhat

Bad MiddleSomewhat

Good Very Good

Assessment of Tribal Law

Very Weak Rule of Law, No Confidence in State Judiciary

Pre

dictedProbabilityofResponse

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Very BadSomewhat

Bad MiddleSomewhat

Good Very Good

Assessment of Tribal Law

Very Strong Rule of Law, No Confidence in State Judiciary

Pre


0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Very BadSomewhat

Bad Middl

Assessment of

Very Strong Rule of Law, Very Muc

Pre


0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Figure 5: Shafai Assessments of Tribal Law (Predicted Probabilities)

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Tribal Law is the main explanatory variable in this model, but I antici-

pate that the strength of its effect varies according to sect and education. Interms of the former, Zaydi Shiites, among whom the tribal system has tradi-tionally been strongest, are more likely to derive social identity benefits froma positive evaluation of tribalism than are Shafai Sunnis. In terms of the lat-ter, better educated individuals have more familiarity with alternative legalframeworks and are more likely to comprehend the imperfections of triballaw, whereas people with minimal access to education lack the comparativeframework that highlights the imperfections of tribal law. As before, I alsoinclude the same core set of control variables. The results of this model,again estimated via an ordered probit procedure given the ordinal nature ofresponses to the question on the role of tribes in development, is presented

in Table 3.b se(b)p

Tribal Law 2.259 (0.179)0.00

Education 0.057 (0.193)0.77

Zaydi 0.203 (0.251)0.42

Tribal Law Education 0.783 (0.298)0.01

Tribal Law Zaydi 0.684 (0.348)0.05

Education Zaydi 0.025 (0.446)0.96

Tribal Law Education Zaydi 0.034 (0.645)0.96

Tribesman 0.164 (0.078)0.04

Understand 0.026 (0.118)0.83

Female 0.354 (0.074)0.00Rural 0.114 (0.087)0.19

Electricity 0.031 (0.022)0.15

South 0.220 (0.132)0.09

A1 0.543 (0.169)0.00

A2 1.310 (0.060)0.00

A3 1.671 (0.094)0.00

A4 2.600 (0.058)0.00

Table 3: Tribes and Development

Table 3 allows us to draw a few unsurprising inferences, as well as sev-eral more interesting ones. Unsurprisingly, tribesmen are more positivelyinclined toward the role of tribes in development, whereas southerners viewthe tribes more negatively (although the latter is of marginal statistical sig-nificance). These findings accord well with our expectations derived from

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prior studies of Yemen, and are useful in the current context insofar as they

implicitly verify the survey datas capacity to supply us with valid inferencesabout Yemeni social reality. Substantively, these two variables also captureelements of the social identity issues that motivate peoples attitudes: tribes-men derive social identity benefits from positive evaluations of the tribes,whereas southerners, for whom tribalism is largely associated with the rulingnorthern regime, derive social identity benefits from negative evaluations ofthe tribes.

More interesting, and as hypothesized, views on tribal law strongly in-fluence views on the tribes more generally, even net of other plausible ex-planators such as social identity concerns. First, as expected, Tribal Lawhas a very strong, positive effect that is significant in both substantive and

statistical terms: the more favorably predisposed one is to tribal law, themore favorably disposed one is toward a tribal role in development. Put an-other way, the more one sees tribal law contributing to the rule of law in thecountry, the more likely one is to view the tribes themselves as contributingto, rather than hindering, Yemens development.

Yet, as anticipated, this relationship is a conditional one: its strengthdepends in part on ones level of education and whether or not one is Zaydi.This result is easiest to observe when displayed graphically as in Figure 6,which reports the first differences in outcome (views on tribes and devel-opment) associated with the difference between a positive and a negativeassessment of tribal law. Each set of four bar graphs denotes whether atypical respondent becomes more likely to cite a tribal role in development

negatively (leftmost bars) or positively (rightmost bars) according to a pos-itive assessment of tribal law: positive values on the y-axis indicate whatsuch a respondent is more likely to answer, and negative values on the y-axisindicate what such a respondent is less likely to answer. This effect is con-ditional on sect Shafai Sunnis on in the two left graphs (blue) and ZaydiShiites in the right two (green) and education, with low education in thefirst and third sets of bars and high education in the second and fourth setsof bars.

Figure 6 reveals that positive evaluations of tribal law have a strongpositive impact on evaluations of a tribal role in development in all cases the rightmost bars associated with a positive tribal role are all in positive

territory and the leftmost bars associated with a negative tribal role aresharply into negative territory and that the magnitude of this effectis reduced somewhat among better educated individuals.41 Put another

41The latter is evident in Table 3 in the statistically significant negative coefficient on

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way, enthusiasm for tribal law translates into enthusiasm for a tribal role in

development regardless of education, but the enthusiasm is somewhat milderamong the better educated who are more aware of the defects of tribal law.

Another aspect of the model, also visible in Figure 6 but easier to observein Figure 7, is that a Zaydi premium the extra support Zaydis give toa tribal role in development on top of what Shafais give exists only incircumscribed set of circumstances: among low-education respondents whoview tribal law extremely positively. Figure 7 plots the effect of being Zaydigiven negative (left two sets of bars in blue) and positive views (right twosets of bars in green) on tribal law given low and high levels of education. NoZaydi premium is evident among respondents with negative views of triballaw, and a Zaydi premium is only statistically discernible (i.e., sufficiently

unlikely to happen by chance) among the least educated proponents of triballaw. In other words, simply being Zaydi does not, by itself, indicate anythingone way or another about an individuals views on the role of tribes indevelopment except under very specific conditions. This finding, in turn,reinforces the claim that Yemenis view tribes pragmatically and with aneye toward functionality. They approve of tribes when the tribes providesomething socially desirable basic rule of law in the form of a means ofconflict regulation and resolution and disapprove of them otherwise.

5 Discussion

This paper argues that, rather than causing the state to weaken, tribespersist when the state is weak. A state with weak institutions is unable orunwilling to provide the rule of law, a true public good, and people turn toalternatives suppliers to meet their demand for it. The informal institutionof customary tribal law is one such mechanism, serving as a second-bestalternative to functioning state institutions. Tribal law amounts to a semi-private means to provide the rule of law, making it an imperfect substituteto formal state institutions such as the judiciary: inefficient, but clearlybetter than nothing. Whatever other reasons p eople may have for positiveor negative evaluations of tribal law and the tribes in general, one wouldexpect a pragmatic component to be evident in those assessments: peopleapprove of tribal law and the tribes at least in part for what they canprovide: a modicum of security, stability, and predictability. In this view,the tribes are less an impediment to development than they are a productof its absence.

T ribal LawEducation.

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Loweducation

Higheducation

Loweducation

Tribes and Development

(Zaydi Premium)

Effect of being Zaydi on evaluations of the effect of tribes on devel

ChangeinProbabilityofResponse

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

Tribal Tribal Tribal

Effect Effect Effect Bad Bad Bad Good Good G

Tribal Law Negative Trib

Figure 7: Attitudes Toward Tribes and Development Zaydi v. Shafai Differen

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Substantively, this paper demonstrates that peoples assessments of tribal

law as a conflict-resolution mechanism vary for predictable reasons. Al-though Zaydi Shiites, given the traditional strength of the tribal system inthat community, are more supportive of tribal law than are Shafai Sunnis,they are only marginally so. Further, Shafai Sunnis, who plausibly look totribal law with a stronger eye to practicality, are particularly likely to favorit when they view state courts as week even though they perceive strong ruleof law, which they attribute to tribal law. Further, as expected, views ontribal law strongly predict views on the role of tribes in development, evennet of other factors that could explain attitudes toward the tribes in general.A strong dynamic of pragmatism exists among both Zaydis and Shafais, inwhich tribes are viewed favorably in the development process when tribal

law is seen to provide a viable means for conflict regulation and resolution an enthusiasm which is particularly strong among the less well-educatedwho are less cognizant of the demerits of tribal law.

Methodologically, this paper demonstrates (hopefully) the utility of sur-vey research in the Arab world for studying social processes of substan-tive import and interest to scholars whose own predilections run to differ-ent methodologies. Scholars of Arab societies have long looked askance atquantitatively-oriented research in general and survey research in particu-lar, and for good reason. In years past the data needed to perform suchanalyses were unavailable or untrustworthy. Governments published datathat was clearly subject to political manipulations, and it was frequentlyinfeasible from an administrative standpoint (when not impossible from a

political one) to collect reliable data oneself. Yet recent years have seen asmall but growing number of Middle East scholars basing their research onnew surveys the most well-know of which now include six Arab coun-tries in the World Values Survey along with the Arab Barometer project which have become increasingly sophisticated and reliable sources of data.Although many issues remain on the table with respect to the difficultiesof administering of surveys in societies where surveys are a novelty (andthe care with which data analysis must be undertaken as a result of thatnovelty), this paper has attempted to show that survey analysis provides uswith a useful complement to more traditional ethnographic and elite-basedstudies, filling in blanks where such methods are weakest and drawing on

their insights where survey methodology by itself could not supply answers.

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