trimming the fat, triangulating flnlinguist/gordon2009ling632.pdf · a roadmap big question: what...
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Multiple sources of language universals
Bryan James GordonUniversity of Arizona
5 de mayo de 2009LING632
Trimming the Fat, Triangulating FLN
A roadmap● Big question: What is the responsibility of syntactic
theory with respect to accounting for “universals” of the Greenbergian sort?– More specifically, I will focus on the Minimalist Program, and its distinction between three
factors:● 1st factor: the common genetic endowment of humans● 2nd factor: experience, history● 3rd factor: principles not specific to FL: performance, constraints on symbolism, natural
forces, etc.– Importantly, MP seeks a minimal set of 1stfactor principles sufficient to explain language.
Thus, the identification of 2nd and 3rdfactor principles is instrumental in “trimming the fat” from the “core” of language, FLN.
– MP has abandoned Chomsky's (1964) notion of explanatory adequacy being satisfied by the appeal to innateness, and nowadays we expect to identify the cause of given candidates for inclusion in UG, be it 2nd or 3rd factors, or logical succession from the character of FLN. UG is no longer, or should no longer be, the first explanatory recourse in generative syntax.
– MP has had a modicum of success in collapsing the false dichotomy between formal and functional explanations, by admitting that they may both be at play for given phenomena.
– However, the spirits of reductiontoFLN and formbeforefunction are alive and well in generative grammar, and much of contemporary debate over syntactic universals proceeds as if the 1st factor were the only one.
A roadmap● I will discuss three areas of syntactic universals,
arguing in each case that it doesn't make sense to refer to the universals in question as following solely from “formal properties of language”, viz., FLN.– The Binding Theory is in large part explicable by the synchronic activity of performance
constraints (e.g. Accessibility) and by the grammaticisation of these pressures over time. Neither of these components belongs in FLN.
– Head Directionality is in large part explicable by Hawkins' Performance Theory of Order and Constituency, and by its role in grammaticisation.
– Nominal Superstructure doesn't appear to have much universality at all.● I do not propose to reduce any of these phenomena to
“nonlinguistic” pressures, but to suggest that a hybrid approach, taking each of the three factors in view, is both superior to any such reduction, either formalist or functionalist, and consonant with the aims of both MP and functional theories.
A roadmap● I will additionally consider disciplinesociological
factors. Rather than building a synthesis of theories of function, diachrony, a narrow UG and the interfaces, we perpetually and nauseatingly recycle old ideas, because of:– (a) endemic disrespect and suspicion across fractally recursive disciplinary lines; – (b) unfamiliarity or caricaturistic familiarity with the primary goals of alternative theories; – (c) unfamiliarity with alternative theories' literature; and – (d) the conservative desire to continue to use one's own theoretical tools, to the exclusion
of others, on a phenomenon to which they have been applied in the past.● At this point, you will be convinced:
– (if you are a Minimalist) that I'm a raving heretic.– (if you are remotely functionalist in outlook) that I'm a craven coward.
Typology and Syntactic Universals● Typology reveals “universals” within variation. But where is variation
allowed in MP? One view:– UG is concerned with the invariant principles of S
0 and the range of permissible variation.
Variation must be determined by what is 'visible' … that is, by the PLD. It is not surprising, then, to find a degree of variation in the PF component, and in aspects of the lexicon … . Variation in the overt syntax or LF component would be more problematic, since evidence could only be quite indirect. A narrow conjecture is that there is no such variation: beyond PF options and lexical arbitrariness … variation is limited to nonsubstantive parts of the lexicon and general properties of lexical items. (Chomsky 1995:16970)
● On this view, we can distinguish between several roles for syntactic universals in MP:– universals deriving from the structure of FLN, strictly invariant;– other 1stfactor universals, potentially variant, resulting from the evolution of UG under
pressure from 2nd and 3rd factors; and– universals not represented in UG at all.
● MP, therefore, does not admit statistical generalisations into FLN, and additionally looks askance at the second sort of appeal to UG unless its internal explanation is buttressed with external principles.
The Binding Theory● Stipulated separate syntactic domain in GB Ymodel, operant at S
structure (Chomsky 1981)– A: Anaphora must be bound in their domains.
● *The boy saw herself.– B: Pronouns must be free in their domains.
● *The boyi saw him
i.
– C: Rexpressions must be absolutely free.● *The boy
i saw the boy
i.
The Binding Theory● Claims relevant to MP:
– Principles A & B operant in Narrow Syntax (Hicks 2008).– Principles A & B emerge from facts about A and Āmovement plus QR at LF (Chomsky 1992,
Hornstein 2001, i.a.).– Principle B a “local version” of C (Chomsky 1981).– Principle C is a special case of Grice's maxim of quantity (Reinhart 1986).– Pragmatics is universal (!!); therefore crosslinguistic variation in PrincipleC effects is
counterevidence to Reinhart (Lasnik 1991).● Each claim (other than Reinhart) has in common the assumptions that:
– the binding principles are, in some sense, some caveats excepted, universal;– whatever part of them demands a syntactic account must be in UG;– their syntactic component will be represented either in NarSyn, at LF, or both.
● Note that NarSyn and LF are precisely the components assumed in MP not to admit variation!– Attempts to reduce Binding to e.g. LF principles are undermined both by variation and by
available pragmatic explanations.
The Binding Theory● Accessibility (Ariel 1990): Distance, Competition, Saliency and Unity of
referents; Informativeness, Rigidity of semantics and Attenuation of forms.– LowAccessibility markers: names, rexpressions, etc.– MidAccessibility markers: stressed pronouns– HighAccessibility markers: unstressed pronouns– ExtremelyHighAccessibility markers: anaphora, PRO
● Each sort of marker can refer only to entities at at least their respective level of Accessibility; so Accessibility predicts categorical effects of the use of toohighAccessibility forms for toolowAccessibility referents.
● The other sort of mismatch, on the other hand, does not produce categorical effects: LowAccessibility forms are often used in marked contexts to refer to HighAccessibility referents.
The Binding Theory● Consider Principle A. Ariel notes that various syntactic relations – command, height in
the clause, locality – are associated with extremely high Saliency, possibly because the processor still has the antecedent in the focus of attention when it reaches the anaphor. Since these syntactic relations are categorical – they either obtain or do not obtain – we might expect a similar modal change in Saliency, producing Principle A as a simple byproduct of a synchronic pragmatic principle:
– *The girl was upset, so the boy comforted herself.– OKThe girl was upset with the boy and comforted herself.
● PrincipleA exceptions might be expected in certain contexts where a referent is highly Salient, as, for instance, 1stperson pronouns tend to be crosscontextually, allowing prodrop even in English. In the following example, myself appears to be bound by 1stperson pro, despite the necessity of topicshift between the clauses; both pro's licensed by an implicature, “What's up with our plans tomorrow?”
– OKWhat's up tomorrow? Find yourself an outfit, get myself packed, ...● Is it a problem for this explanation that it refers, essentially, to the notions of “command” and
“domain” also present in the Binding Principles?– Not if we see Binding Principles as phenomena which can fall out from more than one sort
of principle! We should be excited about triangulating just which part of Binding is “purely” syntactic, rather than continuing to reduce it to LF and NarSyn. That both Accessibility and an LF account of Principle A might adopt the same strategy to explain this case is precisely the problem.
The Binding Theory● Principle A falls out from Accessibility?! What about B and C?
– B and C concern LowerAccessibility markers: no categorical predictions.– But PrincipleB and C effects are notoriously fuzzy! As bad as it gets:
● *? Johni got him
i dressed.
● *? Hei got John
i dressed.
– If these forms are syntactically (or semantically) illformed, why are they both acceptable in marked contexts? Coercion? QR? Schlenker (in prep.) advocates reducing Principle C to pragmatic principles and distinguishing pragmatic from syntactic/semantic PrincipleB effects.
– Needless to say, pragmatics doesn't fit in FLN, and I am not aware of any explicit argument for its redundant representation in a more broadly construed UG.
The Binding Theory● Lasnik and Schlenker, however, point out that pragmatic principles are
insufficient for e.g. QRinteractions and do not predict the discreteness of PrincipleB and C effects.– But discreteness can emerge out of more than just the syntax, as I hope the case on Principle A will
have convinced you.– Furthermore, even syntactic representations (outside of NarSyn and LF at least) can emerge out of
grammaticisation, which certainly has little to do with any variant of UG that is useful for the aims of MP. Accessibility can certainly put pressure on historical change, giving rise to a statistical tendency for languages to observe Principles B and C categorically as a result of lexical features, and enabling NarSyn and LF to exploit these features to produce the effects that so preoccupied Lasnik.
– Ariel for one does not believe that Accessibility solves everything: if it did, then only crosscultural variation in attention practices and semantic relatedness could account for variation, but Ariel is well aware that there are grammaticised Binding rules in particular languages. The only question is, can a grammaticised process affect the content of FLN (or LF)? By definition, NO!
● We do not have to choose between derivation and use (false dichotomy) as the source of the Binding Principles! Functional motivations shed light on the role of the CI interface, and reduce the burden of formalisms that must be invoked, directing attention to those explicanda which apparently remain without functional motivation.
Head Directionality● HDP still figures in discussions of parameters, because featural
interpretability is not a satisfying solution for many.– Chomsky & Lasnik (1993:518) still wanted “a few parameters”, including HDP.– Baker (2001): Macroparameter which can be invoked to explain Greenbergian universals.– Haspelmath (2005): If HDP is in UG, exceptional combinations (e.g. headfinal VP and
AdjP and headinitial everything else in German) should be unlearnable.– Baker's response: rarity of particular “multiple coin tosses” bespeaks joint probability.– Newmeyer (2005:§3.2.2.4): Polysynthesis and Configurationality are the two highest
parameters. Both are strictly on/off, and yet neither is 50/50.● (but see Mithun (2007): Fusion cycle: configurational – polysynthetic – nonconfigurational – agreement –
configurational, replete with intermediate types. These parameters are not on/off.)– Haspelmath: Maybe UG is a “preference structure”, in which case exceptional
combinations are learnable, but difficult.– Newmeyer (1998:§3.3): nope, no evidence that rare HD types are harder to learn.
● All this confusion appears a poor candidate for strict universals, but Kayne (1994), Carnie (1995) and McCloskey (1991) beg to differ: fixed SpecHeadComp order prior to PF demands movement to explain alternative orderings! (Note: Carnie (2005) has changed his tune, while Mahajan (1990, 1997, 2003) has gone in the opposite direction.)– Not allowing ordering to transpire in NarSyn (or very close to NarSyn in BPS) threatens to
allow forbidden contact between SM and CI to explain informationstructural ordering principles.
Head Directionality● A third factor: Hawkins' (1994) Performance Theory of Order and
Constituency.– Minimize Domains (MiD): Items which coselect are easier to process adjacently.
● ⇒ VPO is easier than VOP former likelier to grammaticise⇒– Maximize Online Processing (MaOP): Dependent (e.g., filler/gap, antecedent/anaphor,
topic/comment, restrictive/appositive, quantifier/variable) are easier to process if the thing they depend on is already available.
● V and O are mutually dependent Head Dependency is 50/50⇒– Dryer (2005): 41.5% of languages OV, 44.4% VO– cf. debate over SVO and SOV among antisymmetrists
● S is frequently topical or dropped, O new or an instance of a variable SO order ⇒likelier to grammaticise than OS
– Dryer (2005): 82.8% of languages SO, 3.2% OS● Walkden (2009): Just because this thirdfactor account exists doesn't
preclude a UG explanation.– UG evolved under pressure from factors such as PTOC.– “some structures are disallowed in all languages, which indicates that something like [a
PIC/LCAbased variant of the FinaloverFinal Constraint] is required as a UG principle.”– This is a myopic argument, resting on the supposition that discrete distributions must be
innate, and based on a straw man, viz., no language has VO and SComp, a generalisation which can easily emerge dynamically in a statistical PTOC typology.
– However, Walkden's proposal is useful and has merit regardless of this particular fallacy.
Head Directionality● MP has seen shift towards lexical explanation of wordorder typology.
– Kayne (1994) and Chomsky (1995) argue for featural variation and strict linearisation universals, but
– Chomsky (1998) and Baker (2001) argue for parameters in linearisation itself. – Meanwhile, in keeping with Chomsky (1965), Lightfoot (1999) and Newmeyer (2004) argue
against the leap from wordorder typology to UG.● On the basis of Hawkins' theory (and its endorsement by Newmeyer),
as well as Walkden's response, it would appear that neither the strict LCA approach nor the parametric approach is fully free of 2nd and 3rdfactor “baggage”.
● Do we, then, not need a syntactic representation of Head Directionality?– Again, false dichotomy! The (PF) syntax can represent things without explaining them.– Including the processor in UG doesn't appear very meaningful in MP terms.– However, Walkden notes that UG can redundantly express aspects of the processor.– Appeals to UG in Head Directionality demand more of the explicit argument that
Walkden exemplifies, and less oldfashioned “explanatory adequacy”.
Nominal Superstructure● Nominal superstructure is supposed to fit into a 3way typology
(Chierchia 1998)– +arg pred languages: Chinese, Japanese‒
● NP refers to a kind● free bare arguments● all nouns are mass● classifiers required for individuation
– +pred arg languages: Romance‒● NP is a predicate whose extension is a set of individuals● bare arguments prohibited (French) or have null articles (Italian)● count/mass distinction is purely semantic and therefore malleable (cf. Sera 2007)
– +pred+arg languages: Germanic (article languages), Slavic (typeshifting languages)● some NP's are predicates (count nouns), others are kinds (mass nouns)● latter may be bare, former may not; or, as in Slavic, null shifters type count arguments● count/mass distinction divides the lexicon
● I have argued elsewhere (Gordon 2009) that this typology is bad, and also cast doubt on whether any such featural typology is possible. The range of variation reflects secondfactor principles.
Nominal Superstructure● Mississippi Valley Siouan (MVS) is a family whose NP's may be either
arg or pred, but which is not a +arg+pred family.– +pred: Unlike Romance or Germanic, in fact, MVS speakers actually use all of their nouns
as predicates; and as in these language families, MVS determiners cause agreement (albeit not for traditional φfeatures).
– +arg: However, nouns are freely argumenttyped, and also refer to kinds. Only in limited cases (headless relative phrases with internal arguments) is a determiner obligatory; elsewhere, determiners are sufficient but unnecessary for argumenttyping. +pred nouns are associated with obligatory number marking, which is unattested in MVS.
– +pred+arg? Any MVS noun may be freely typed count or mass, so count/mass distinction does not occur in lexicon.
– MVS determiners work neither like articles nor like classifiers, but share aspects of the semantics of both. Their use is driven by cognitivepragmatic considerations orthogonal to the usual definiteness/specificity considerations, and not by syntactic/semantic considerations such as those enumerated on the previous slide.
● We at least have to demand that Chierchia's typology be expanded to admit languages which freely type arguments, freely individuate and freely assign count/mass status (in violation of the allegedly universal Blocking Principle don't typeshift in semantics if D can do it). But if we expand the typology in this way, it loses its neat, binary orderliness and therewith its generative raison d'être – we are traipsing down the same path macroparameters once betrod.
Discipline Sociology● I have argued that the places of Binding, Head Directionality and Nominal
Superstructure “universals” in UG are confounded by both second and thirdfactor principles. But of course others have argued these points before me. (My substantive contributions have been in the third (Gordon 2009) and second (Gordon 2008) areas.)
● Why are so many people not listening?– Chomsky, Uriagereka, Hornstein, Boeckx and the manufactured consent of synecdochic use of
“syntax”, “grammar”, “language”, “linguist”, etc. to refer to proper subsets of themselves– Differences in opinion on what constitutes “elegance” or “minimising the environment”– “last resort” arguments frequent in functionalists such as Bybee, Tomasello, Evans, Levinson– parallel “first resort” arguments frequent in formalists – the “linguistic” explanation should come first– The “jump to UG”, cf. Wexler: Broca's area lights up, so it must be UG!– Tobias Scheer: “Representations do not emerge, they are.” No serious formal theorist believes this, but
there are enough statements to this effect that functionalists believe this is a tenet of formalism.– Lakoff: Syntax cannot be autonomous. (new incarnations in Cartography, de Vos, etc., although at least
de Vos aims to demonstrate nonautonomy rather than invoke selfevidence)– Haspelmath (2005), Bybee (2009): questions of architecture, acquisition, symbolic cognition, and UG
are all either irrelevant, trivial or premature– Deacon (2003): question whether universals are acquired or hardwired is premature– Chomsky (2002): question of emergence of syntax is premature– Hurford (2009): “narrow” goals lead to “blinkered vision”
● Pyrrhonic problem, viz., to say this is to narrow the discipline's choice of goals to broad ones– Formalists believe functionalists reject autonomy, innateness, symbolic primacy, usage/grammar
distinction, but even Construction Grammar is largely compositional and architecturally nativist, and most of pragmatics, socio and psycholinguistics uses syntax. Functionalists believe formalists are swallowing KoolAid but apparently have missed the KoolAid in their own midst. (cf. Bever (2009) on “two schools” myopia)
Trimming the Fat● There's nothing more Minimalist than functional
explanation?!– Chomsky (2005:6): Generative grammar is about the gap between secondfactor principles
(experience) and attained competence. The Minimalist Program, on the other hand, is about the gap between first and thirdfactor principles.
● What parts of UG are independent of language or even organism, deriving from acquisition or the neurological substrate (cf. Bever 2009) or symbolism and information themselves (cf. Deacon 1998, de Vos 2008)?
● Research outside of firstfactor/FLN principles, then, is an integral component of Minimalist research into the “fine structure” of UG. But we don't get anywhere by saying that these principles are still “syntactic” in the same sense as FLN. Time for the synecdochists to reap what they have sown!
– Gundel (2003): focus on the question of which aspects of information structural concepts and their properties are grammatically constrained and which are constrained by general cognitive and communicative principles that are independent of grammar.
– Bever (2009): Excluding such performancebased universals isolates the computational processes involved in describing linguistic knowledge.
– Bever (1975): [Specifically syntactic] formalisms must be reluctantly accepted rather than apocalyptically embraced.
– Newmeyer (2007): The “specialness” of syntax is at the root of the theory of Universal Grammar. If you give up the Autonomy of Syntax, the arguments for innateness disappear.
Am I being disingenuous?● I'm not reputed to be an innatist, so why am I using the MP at all?
– (Well, if Newmeyer can cite Haspelmath, maybe we're in the Age of Aquarius.)● I've suggested that MP's “object” is obscured by attempts to explain the
effects of 2nd and 3rdfactor principles via specifically linguistic principles. My objection presupposes that I think this “object” is worthy of nonobfuscatory attention.
● But even that “object” is being challenged, to the core of NarSyn:– Carnie, Medeiros & Boeckx (2005), PiattelliPalmarini (2008): much of NarSyn falls out
from nature (extrabiological)– Carnie, Medeiros & Boeckx (2005), de Vos (2008): vP phase is an epiphenomenon– Jackson (2008), Gordon (2008): phases are conditions of the use of syntax– de Vos (2008): all of NarSyn (Merge, Move
α) and LF is an epiphenomenon of information
(Relational Theory)– Composition (Merge) as languagespecific is under serious fire in cognitive science.– Deacon (1998), Haspelmath (2002): Symbolic computation is a selforganising, dynamic
system which emerges over a Pearcean trajectory (icons, indices, symbols).– Chomsky (Fitch, Hauser & Chomsky 2005:181): FLN … could possibly be empty.
An apology for generative syntax● If it's entirely possible there's nothing special about syntax, am I just
singing a siren's song, “piedpiping” us all along into functionalism?● What's at stake here is reduction. Chomsky argues, with analogy to
chemistry and physics, that it is the case both that – (a) we have known for hundreds of years that our consciousness and language and the rest
of higher cognition are emergent phenomena; and – (b) a theory of higher and a theory of lower phenomena are mutually informing. – That is, reductionism is false. (I wonder how many anthropologists know he says that.)
● It is not necessary to inure NarSyn from the facts of its own constitutedness in order to investigate the phenomenon of its autonomy. Otherwise put, regardless of whether Merge, Move
α, etc.,
are primitives (and regardless of whether it's presumptuous or patronising of me to say this), they are useful and influential both on the theory of the rest of language outside of NarSyn and on the theories of cognition and brain; and their primitivity has nothing to do with their capacity for accurate and replicable, empirical prediction.
Parting shots● MP assumes innateness, universality, autonomy, economy, etc., as theoretical primitives,
without the necessity that they be primitive. Yet functionalists persist in attacking, and formalists in utilising and arguing for, a caricatured version of UG. With MP's demand for accounts of 2nd and 3rdfactor principles, it is sublimely compatible with functional inquiry. and UG is no longer the bumbling, unsophisticated target it used to be, and will remain relevant even if FLN does not exist:
– Finlay (2009), Müller (2009): dynamic complex system based on neurological, genetic and other primitives will be the end result of reductionist biolinguistics
– Clark & Misyak (2009) call for a weak, “minimally nativist” UG compatible with emergence, innateness and minimality all at the same time.
– Chomsky is opposed to emergentist theory not because he finds it conceptually lacking, but because it is premature: “One of the few things that I can say about [language and the brain] is that I do not begin to know enough to approach it in the right way. With less confidence I suspect it may be fair to say that current understanding falls well short of laying the basis for the unification of the sciences of the brain and higher mental faculties, language among them, and that many surprises may lie along the way to what seems a distant goal … .” (2002:612)
● Note that this is all a reassuring consolation for sad UG theorists in case FLN should turn out to be empty. We are still far from that finding, but I think we'd know what was going on a little better if we got over our petty disciplinary boundaries and started reading each other's papers.
– Formalism/functionalism? With the exception of folks like Bybee and Tomasello, most “functionalists” presuppose the autonomy of syntax just like everyone else.
– Connectionism/computationalism? Both are about computation, both are about emergence; they just have a different story about what emerges and how. (Look at any computer and tell me its work “does not emerge” but “is”, cf. Scheer.)
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