trinity and the wall

GEO-MARINE

GEO-MARINE, INC.

LOOKINGBETWEEN

TRINITY

ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND COLD WAR MATERIAL CULTUREWITHIN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1945-1989

ANDTHE WALL

Front Cover Images:

Upper Right—Historical photograph of the Gadget, the nuclear devicedetonated at Trinity Site, location of the first atomic test. Photo courtesy ofthe Public Affairs Office, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.

Center Left—After a portion of the Berlin Wall is removed in November1989, soldiers from East and West Berlin meet to shake hands. BrandenburgGate can be seen in the background. Photo available via FTP from theGerman Information Center, New York at ftp:\\ftp.usasa.af.mil\pub/language/german/gic.

Background—The Davy Crockett atomic mortar was developed for use bythe infantry. It was deployed between 1961 and 1963; it could loft itsminiature atomic warhead only about a quarter mile. Photo courtesy of theMissile Command Historical Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

Back Cover Image:

Known as the Redstone Rocket Test Stand, this structure was used in thedevelopment of the Jupiter C and Mercury-Redstone rocket engine systems.It was the first test stand in the United States that could accommodate not justthe engine, but also the launch vehicle. It is located at the Marshall SpaceFlight Center at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completingand reviewing the collection of information . Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services Directoratefor Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

May 1997 Final Report January 1995-May 1997

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

Looking Between Trinity and the Wall: Army Materiel Command Cold War Material Culture within the Continental United States,1945 - 1989 Contract No. DACA63-93-D-0014

Delivery Order No. 0089

6. AUTHOR(S)

Steve Gaither

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

Geo-Marine, Inc.550 East 15th StreetPlano, Texas75074

REPORT NUMBER

U.S. Army Materiel Command Historic Context SeriesReport of Investigations

Number 11

9. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCY NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth DistrictPO Box 17300Fort Worth, Texas76102-0300

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Approved for public release

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This report presents a national historic context for the United States Army Materiel Command and its predecessor Technical Service organizations, covering their operationsin the continental United States during the Cold War, defined temporally as between the years 1945 and 1989. The objective of this document is to present the themes and eventsthat brought about the construction, modification, and use of buildings and structures by the AMC and its predecessor organizations in a manner by which the significanceof associated properties can be assessed according to the appropriate National Register of Historic Places guidelines. This report accomplishes these goals by presenting a globaland national perspective of the Cold War era; by outlining the organization and evolution of the AMC and its predecessor organizations throughout the Cold War; and bypresenting the various themes associated with the AMC’s operations during the Cold War. In addition, a field methodology presenting criteria for the assessment of propertiesfor inclusion in the NRHP and guidelines for the inventory and assessment of individual installations and facilities has been proposed. Specific attention is paid to NRHP CriteriaConsideration G (which must be met for a property under 50 years of age to be considered eligible for inclusion in the NRHP) and the level of integrity necessary for arecommendation of eligibility.

Name of Federal Technical Responsible Individual: Joseph MurpheyOrganization: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District, CESWF-EV-ECPhone #: (817) 978-6386

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

National context for Army Materiel Command Cold War properties in the continental United States 180 + Appendices

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT

Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified ULStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) (EG)

LOOKING BETWEEN TRINITY AND THE WALL:ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND COLD WAR MATERIAL

CULTURE WITHIN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES1945 - 1989

bySteve Gaither

Principal InvestigatorDuane E. Peter

underU.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Fort Worth DistrictContract No. DACA63-93-D-0014

Delivery Order No. 89

U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND HISTORIC CONTEXT SERIESREPORT OF INVESTIGATIONS

NUMBER 11

Geo-Marine, Inc.550 East Fifteenth Street

Plano, TX 75074

May 1997

ii

CONTRACT DATA

This document was prepared under Contract No. DACA63-93-D-0014, Delivery Order No. 89 (GMI project#1114-089—F), with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District, P.O. Box 17300, Fort Worth,Texas, 76102-0300.

iii

MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

This report provides a national historic context for the properties within the inventory of the Army MaterielCommand (AMC) at the end of the Cold War. Research for this project was conducted by Geo-Marine, Inc.,under contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District. The objective of thenational historic context is to investigate and document the themes and events which brought about theconstruction, modification, and use of buildings and structures by the AMC and its predecessor organizationsthroughout the Cold War period (1945 through 1989) and to present these themes and events in a manner bywhich the significance of associated properties can be assessed. Throughout the document, particularemphasis is placed on the material culture of the research and development, testing, and industrial productionprograms, and specific examples of notable buildings and structures are discussed in terms of their place andsignificance in the history of the Army and the nation, the evolution of technology, and the developmentof architecture and engineering design.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MANAGEMENT SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. OBJECTIVES AND METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Methods and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

3. COLD WAR GLOBAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5The End of World War II, the Groundwork of the Cold War, 1945-1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Korea and the Expansion of Nuclear Production, 1950-1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10The Interwar Years and the Formation of the Pentomic Army, 1955-1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Creation of the AMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Nuclear Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Missile Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Space Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Chemical and Biological Weapons Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Vietnam Period, 1964-1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Global Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Communications Infrastructure Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

The Final Years, 1973-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34The Post-Cold War Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

4. ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE ARMY MATERIEL COMMANDDURING THE COLD WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39The Technical Services, 1946-1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

The Office of the Chief of Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39The Office of the Chief Chemical Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41The Office of the Chief Signal Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42The Office of the Chief of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43The Office of the Chief of Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

v

Table of Contents(cont’d)

New Order—the Army Materiel Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Electronics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Missile Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Mobility Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Munitions Command and Weapons Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Supply and Maintenance Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Test and Evaluation Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Depot Systems Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Safeguard Logistics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56United States Army International Logistics Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

5. THEMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY DURING THE COLD WAR . . . . . 59Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Army Dependence on Technology During the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Development of a Technology Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Environmental Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Missile Flight Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Nuclear Effects Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Digital Battlefield Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Other Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Army Weaponry During the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74Biological and Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74Cold War Chemical and Biological Warfare Agent Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75The Binary Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Chemical and Biological Warfare Agent Testing Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Chemical and Biological Warfare Agent and Weapons Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Missile Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88Missile Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90Missile Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Missile Maintenance and Disassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106Storage, Maintenance, and Demilitarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Survivability in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Cold War Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Toward the Ubiquitous Battleground—Military Infrastructure Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Command, Control, and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Extension to Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

vi

Table of Contents(cont’d)

Intelligence and Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Turning Toward Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Initial Efforts to Place the Army in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Eyes and Ears of the Upper Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

The Cold War Economic Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

6. ASSESSING THE COLD WAR MATERIAL CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Introduction and Statement of Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Cold War Property Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Eligibility Criteria and Methodology for Field Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Basic Guidelines and Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144Methodology for Field Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

7. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

REFERENCES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

APPENDICESA: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1B: AMC COLD WAR INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

1. The 280-mm Atomic Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112. Army, Air Force, and Navy appropriations, 1951-1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153. Defense allocations to research and development, 1947-1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234. ARMCOM installations and activities, 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525. AMCCOM installations and activities, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536. TECOM installations and activities, 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557. DESCOM depots and depot activities, 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578. Building 212, Detroit Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699. The Electro-Optical Test Facility at Fort Huachuca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7010. The 10-story Production Development Laboratories facility originally part of

Pine Bluff Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7711. The BZ load, assemble, and pack facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8212. One portion of the Integrated Binary Munitions Production Facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal . . . . . . 8513. Dugway Proving Ground, 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8614. Example of the biological and chemical storage facilities at Pine Bluff Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8915. Supersonic wind tunnel built at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9216. Configuration of the launch complexes at White Sands Missile Range, 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9917. Pershing II Test Stand at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in which Pershing rocket

motors were destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10018. Illustration of Pershing Ia and Pershing II missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10419. Comparable components of the first four computers at BRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11420. The command, control, and subordinate system concept of the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12221. Dymaxion Deployment Units at Fort Monmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

viii

LIST OF TABLES

1. Nuclear Weapons in the United States Stockpile, 1945-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72. Army Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323. Army Cold War Property Types, Thematic Associations, and Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1344. Firms Involved in the Architectural and Engineering Design of Cold War-Era Army Facilities . 1415. Classes of Cultural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Completion of this report would not have been possible without the assistance of many persons. Mr. JosephMurphey, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District, provided guidance and focus for thedevelopment of this document and patiently answered questions, offered advice, and suggested informationsources throughout the course of the work, ensuring that it would meet the needs of those it was intendedto serve. Dr. Karen J. Weitze, Architectural Historian at Geo-Marine, Inc. (GMI), conducted extensiveresearch at the history offices of most of the important Army subcommands, as well as answered manyquestions regarding the development of this context. The participation of the historians and other partieswho contributed to the research efforts of Dr. Weitze through their interviews, discussions, and otherassistance is appreciated. Those persons who were especially helpful include: Dr. Dale R. Prentiss,Command Historian, and Ms. Ann M. Bos, Historian, both with the Tank-Automotive Command, Warren,Michigan; Mr. Jeffrey K. Smart, Historian, Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Edgewood Area,Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Dr. J. Britt McCarley, Command Historian, Test and EvaluationCommand, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Dr. Richard B. Bingham, Historian, Communications andElectronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Mr. Michael E. Baker, Command Historian, and Dr.Kaylene Hughes, Senior Historian, Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Dr. William Moye,Command Historian, Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, Maryland; Dr. Robert G. Darius, Chief Historian,and Ms. Kim B. Holien, Historian-Archivist, Army Materiel Command, Army Materiel CommandHeadquarters, Alexandria, Virginia; and Mr. Tom Slattery, Command Historian, Industrial OperationsCommand Historical Office, External Affairs, Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois.

Thanks are also due GMI Environmental Scientist Thomas A. Ball, MAJ USAR, U.S. Army SeniorExplosive Ordnance Disposal Technician. Mr. Ball provided answers to several questions about ordnanceand Army operations. Mr. Steven M. Hunt, GMI Field Supervisor, whose knowledge of a wide range ofmilitary weapons and operations has been garnered over many years of avocational interest in the subject,also assisted in the compilation of this report by answering questions and suggesting sources for furtherresearch. Other GMI employees that contributed to the successful completion of this report were Ms. SandraJ. Carr, who generated the graphics; Ms. Sharlene Allday, Editor; Ms. Denise Pemberton, Report ProductionSpecialist. Special acknowledgment is due Ms. Allday for contributions to Chapter 6 of this report.

1

CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION

This report provides a national historic context Most of the field research was conducted by GMIfor the Cold War material culture of the Army between January 1995 and May 1996, withMateriel Command, encompassing the years 1945 research conducted at the Tank-Automotivethrough 1989. In September 1994, the United Command Historical Office Archives in JuneStates Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Fort 1994 concurrent with other research at theWorth District, contracted with Geo-Marine, Inc. facility. The text of the context was compiled(GMI), to complete this context. The objective of and written between May and August 1996. Thethe national historic context is to investigate and Principal Investigator for the project was Duanedocument Cold War-era buildings and structures E. Peter, Director of the Cultural Resourcesunder the jurisdiction of the AMC in order to Management Division at GMI. The majority ofgather existing but dispersed data into one the field research was undertaken by Karen J.succinct document that facilitates the assessment Weitze, the GMI Architectural Historian; Steveof the significance of these properties. Gaither served as the project Archivist/Historian.Throughout the document, particular emphasis is The project was undertaken as part of Contractplaced upon the material culture of the AMC No. DACA63-93-D-0014, Delivery Order No. 89.research and development, testing, and productionprograms, including the buildings and structures This context was completed through the1

at the installations. This was done to better development of three subcontexts concerning theprovide an evaluation of the military, national and international history of the period,technological, and architectural and engineering the history of the Army’s Technological Servicessignificance of the properties in the AMC and Army Materiel Command during the period,inventory. The chronological focus covers the and the important themes of Army activity relatedyears from 1945 through 1989, but data preceding to materiel production during the period. Chapterthe earlier date are presented when doing so 2 presents the objectives and methods of thehelped provide context. study. The national and international setting is

presented in Chapter 3. This chapter establishesthe global and national context for the Army’sactivities during the Cold War, illustrates themotives for its actions at the international level,and provides examples and discussions of similaractivities by other nations. The evolution of thevarious Army elements related to the topic ofstudy is presented in Chapter 4. This chapter is

Manufacturing and other mechanical equipment1

at AMC facilities, such as aircraft, nuclear pulsegenerators, radar antennas, and environment simulationchambers, are classified as structures within theNational Register taxonomy of property types (NationalPark Service [NPS] n.d.:4).

Looking Between Trinity and the Wall

2

not meant to be a definitive history of the of Army materiel during the Cold War that mayorganizational structure of the Army as it evolved have resulted in the creation of historic propertiesfrom 1945 through 1989, and so is greatly that need to be evaluated for possible inclusion insimplified. Its purpose is primarily to serve as a the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP).reference showing the relations between the Guidelines for evaluation are presented inmajor organizational elements of the Army during Chapter 6, along with a recommended fieldthe Cold War. Chapter 5 discusses the AMC application of those guidelines at the installationCold War materiel culture from a thematic and facility level. Conclusions are summarized inperspective, providing discussions of all major Chapter 7.themes related to the development and production

3

CHAPTER 2OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this report is to provide a nationalhistoric context for properties in the inventory ofthe AMC at the end of the Cold War. Theobjective of the project was to investigate anddocument the themes and events that broughtabout the construction, modification, and use ofbuildings and structures by the AMC and itspredecessor organizations throughout the ColdWar period (1945 through 1989 ) and to present2

these themes and events in a manner by which thesignificance of associated properties can beassessed according to NRHP guidelines. Existingbut dispersed data were to be compiled into onedocument that emphasized the material culture ofthe AMC properties where activities wereconducted during the Cold War. The documentwas to place particular emphasis on propertiesassociated with research and development, andthe creation of a technology base. More

specifically, the context was to: “synthesize thepolitical history of the cold war [sic] in a mannerthat illuminates the significance of AMCproperties in a broad, national cold war context,”“[t]race the evolution and changing missions oftoday’s AMC from 1945-1989, with emphasis onthe development of the facility infrastructure,”while concentrating “on the role of developmentof a critical technology base and research & [sic]development efforts in the framework of ColdWar material culture which centered aroundresponses to nuclear threat and total war with theSoviet Union” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,Fort Worth District [USACE, Fort Worth]1994:9). In addition, the context andmethodology were to address several centralresearch and development and technology basethemes—intelligence and electronic warfare(IEW); nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)missions; battlefield nuclear weaponry;command, control, and communications (C )3

systems; survivability in NBC and IEWenvironments; and the Strategic Defense Initiative(USACE, Fort Worth 1994:9-10).

The accompanying methodology, mentionedabove and comprising Chapter 6 of this report,was to “include specific primary property typesand a clear, precise eligibility criteria for historicproperties and a methodology for field applicationof the context at a[n] installation level forevaluation of its cold war material culture”(USACE, Fort Worth 1994:10).

The precise moment the Cold War ended is2

debated among scholars since there was never an actualdeclaration of war, and, likewise, there was no treaty tospecifically signal its end. For the purposes of thisreport, the temporal boundaries suggested by theDepartment of Defense for historic preservation-relatedwork and research involving resources related to theDepartment of Defense have been used. Theseboundaries place the beginning of the Cold War asMarch 1946, when Winston Churchill made his IronCurtain speech, and place the end as November 1989,the month the Berlin Wall fell (Center for Air ForceHistory 1994:63).


4

METHODS AND SOURCESHuntsville, Alabama; the Tank-Automotive

Research methods focused upon obtaining and Command (TACOM) Historical Office Archives,analyzing the information in the sources required Detroit Arsenal, Warren, Michigan; and the Testby the scope of work for this project. A and Evaluation Command (TECOM) Historyconcerted effort was made to obtain data on all Office at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.aspects of Army research and development The history office at the headquarters of theprograms during the Cold War era, with particular AMC, in Alexandria, Virginia, was also visited,attention paid to technology base research. It as was the IOC Real Property and Naturalshould be noted that there are areas where Resources Division at Rock Island Arsenal, Rocknational security considerations mean access to Island, Illinois. Information obtained from thesedata is limited, thus a full picture of the scope of offices includes many installation and laboratoryresearch and development efforts is not possible. histories that discuss operations, facilities, andThe most likely area for which data are lacking is programs at the installations and at the officesin the chemical and biological warfare theme. under their jurisdiction. Information from theThe amount of public attention given to nuclear AMC Headquarters and IOC Historical Officewarfare and nuclear weapons means a substantial provided data on overall organization andamount of data is available on this topic, despite evolution of the AMC and related technicalthe secretive nature of nuclear programs. Gaps in services. In addition to the writteninformation are not considered to have seriously documentation, interviews with commandaffected this context since they are relevant more historians were conducted. Dr. Weitze conductedto production methods than to the location of telephone interviews with each of thefacilities associated with these themes. subcommand historians and with the AMC ChiefAvailability of this information could, however, Historian.seriously affect the proper documentation ofspecific facilities. Many information sources widely available

The primary sources of information for thedevelopment of this context were the historyoffices and archives of the subcommands thatcurrently exist under the AMC. Offices visitedinclude those at the Army Research Laboratory(ARL) History Office, Adelphi, Maryland; theChemical and Biological Defense Command(CBDCOM) History Office, Edgewood Area,Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; theCommunications and Electronics Command(CECOM) History Office at Fort Monmouth,New Jersey; the Industrial Operations Command(IOC) Historical Office, External Affairs, at RockIsland Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois; the Missile

Command (MICOM) History Office at

through university and other library systems werealso consulted. Notable sources were NuclearBattlefields, Global Links in the Arms Race(Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985), The Pentomic Era:The United States Army Between Korea andVietnam (Bacevich 1986), Nuclear WeaponsDatabook (Cochran 1984), and A Higher Form ofKilling (Harris and Paxman 1982). In addition,sources available via the Internet were alsoresearched, including the on-line resources of theHarvard-Sussex Program (concerning chemicaland biological weapons), the Department of theArmy, the relevant subcommands, and selectindividual installations and facilities.

5

Immediate Post-WWII Period—Important Installations

Aberdeen Proving Ground, location of thefirst computer

Fort Monmouth, from which the first radiosignals were sent into space

Redstone Arsenal, home of early Army missiles

White Sands Missile Range, where the firstatomic device was detonated and the firstmissiles to penetrate space were launched

CHAPTER 3COLD WAR GLOBAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Cold War presented in thischapter is intended as a framework for the contextpresented in Chapters 4 and 5. The themescovered in this chapter are very broad, necessarilyso due to the number and scope of activitiesconducted by the AMC and its parentorganizations during the period beinginvestigated. Rather than present this frameworkin a simple time line of global and national itemsof significance, this chapter has been organized asa narrative in an effort to group events accordingto common themes arranged according to majorchronological shifts in international relations.Due to the increased complexity of national andinternational events, the two sections dealing withperiods following the end of the Korean War aredivided into relevant subtopics. As an aid to theuse of this chapter, the AMC installations thatplayed particularly important roles during theperiod under discussion are listed in a text box atthe beginning of each section.

THE END OF WORLD WAR II,THE GROUNDWORK OF THE COLD

WAR, 1945-1949

Although it predates the end of World War II, theCold War arrived with the dawn of 16 July 1945,when at 5:29 a device called the Gadget wasdetonated by scientists working on the ManhattanProject. The Gadget was exploded at the top of

a 100-foot (30-m) tower erected in an area calledTrinity Site at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Thedetonation of this new explosive marked anunprecedented improvement in weaponry, both inthe extent and suddenness of impact. The Gadgetwas the prototype for a bomb called Fat Man,which was basically the same device embellishedwith stabilizing fins and an egg-shaped outershell.

Three weeks after the Trinity Site test, on 6August, an Army Air Forces plane dropped LittleBoy on Hiroshima, Japan. The bomb was of adifferent design than the Gadget, using the gunassembly technique of detonation, and itsestimated 12- to 15-kilotons of force surprisedeven the Manhattan Project scientists. On 9August, Fat Man was dropped on Nagasaki,Japan. The United States did not announce eitheraction until three days after Nagasaki wasbombed. Japan formally surrendered on 2September, ending World War II (Cochran1984:31-32; Historical Office, Headquarters, U.S.Army Materiel Command [HOHQAMC]


6

1969:51; Schlesinger 1993:501-502). These specifications of the American bomb acquiredevents initiated over four decades of research,development, and deployment of devices andweapons vastly more powerful than any ever3

before brought into existence. The delayedannouncement that civilian targets had been notjust bombed but devastated far in excess ofanything previously witnessed hinted at the moralquandary, and at times widespread publicindignation, that formed a backdrop for the ColdWar era—a period when weapons of massdestruction stood as ready instruments to fulfillstrategies of massive retaliation or attack againstwhat was predominantly a civilian front.

The Manhattan Project began on 13 August 1942,when the Army Corps of Engineers ManhattanEngineering District was formed to work on thedevelopment of an atomic weapon. BrigadierGeneral Leslie R. Groves was in charge ofoverseeing all district activities (HOHQAMC1969:51). The project was not at that timeexpected to become a long-term effort—whentime came to establish a test facility, the Armydecided temporary mobilization buildings thathad been constructed by the CivilianConservation Corps at Sandia Base, nearAlbuquerque, could adequately house a portion ofthe project activities. Construction of theManhattan Project test facilities near Alamogordobegan in June 1945 (White Sands Proving Groundca. 1956:20). Far from temporary, these facilitieshave grown into what is today the importantWhite Sands Missile Range.

The other main Cold War contender, the SovietUnion, did not detonate an atomic weapon until1949, but research in the Soviet Union begansoon after the bombing of Hiroshima andNagasaki. In late August 1945, the SpecialCommittee on the Atomic Bomb was establishedthere, with development to be modeled on

through their intelligence activities. The firstSoviet Five-Year Plan called for priority to begiven to radar, rockets, and atomic weaponsresearch and development (Holloway 1994:134-135, 149). The Joint Chiefs of Staff preparedtheir first list of nuclear targets in the SovietUnion in early November 1945. By the end of1946, scientist Soviet scientist AndreiDmitrievich Sakharov had developed the basicdesign for a more powerful layered fission-fusion-fission thermonuclear device. UnitedStates scientist Edward Teller had proposed asimilar thermonuclear bomb in September 1946(Boyer 1985:102; Hewlett and Anderson1962:632; Holloway 1994:227-228, 298-299).

The first international effort to restrict the powerof atomic energy to peaceful endeavors was takenin 1946, when the United Nations established theInternational Atomic Energy Commission, but inspite of the effort the world’s only nuclear powerat that time began atomic weapons testing in theMarshall Islands (Schlesinger 1993:514-515).The United States established its own AtomicEnergy Commission in August 1946, which wasto have control of all nuclear developments in theUnited States (Borklund 1991:151).Congressional discussions leading up to thewriting of the bill, named the McMahon Act afterConnecticut Senator Brien McMahon, had begunin September 1945 (Hewlett and Anderson1962:422-530; Schlesinger 1993:514-515). By theend of June the United States had nine bombs inits fledgling nuclear stockpile (Holloway1994:228; Table 1).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated in early 1948that the Soviet Union possessed 200 Tu-4 long-range bombers, and that the number was likely toincrease to at least 1,000 by 1949. These couldeasily deliver the 20 to 50 atomic bombs that theSoviet Union was expected to possess by 1952.As a preemptive measure, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff proposed a massive attack of the SovietUnion in 1948 called Joint Emergency War PlanHalfmoon. It was rejected by President Truman(Holloway 1994:238; Jockel 1987:32-33; Schaffel1991:91-92).

According to nuclear weapons researcher Thomas3

Cochran (1984:2), a nuclear device is “an assembly ofnuclear and other materials and fuzes which could beused in a test, but generally cannot be reliably deliveredas part of a weapon. A nuclear warhead implies furtherrefinement in design and manufacture resulting in amass produced, reliable, predictable nuclear devicecapable of being carried by missiles, aircraft, or othermeans. A nuclear weapon is a fully integrated nuclearwarhead with its delivery system.”

Chapter 3: Cold War Global and National Perspective

7

Table 1Nuclear Weapons in the United States Stockpile, 1945-1983

Year Number Year Number

1945 2 1965 31,500

1946 9 1966 31,500

1947 13 1967 32,000

1948 50 1968 31,000

1949 250 1969 29,000

1950 450 1970 27,000

1951 650 1971 27,000

1952 1,000 1972 27,500

1953 1,350 1973 28,500

1954 1,750 1974 29,000

1955 2,250 1975 28,500

1956 3,550 1976 27,500

1957 5,450 1977 26,000

1958 7,100 1978 25,500

1969 12,000 1979 25,000

1960 18,500 1980 25,000

1961 23,000 1981 25,000

1962 26,500 1982 25,000

1963 29,000 1983 26,000

1964 31,000Source: Cochran 1984:15

During the Cold War, international alliances that had military significance. The agreement didexpanded greatly, as did their impact on the global much to increase research, development, and testingsituation. Canada and the United States set up the capabilities by pooling resources (Harris andMilitary Co-operation Committee in May 1946 to Paxman 1982:174).discuss what became initial Cold War strategies forNorth America, to make assumptions about the An effort that helped foster international relationsdevelopment of atomic weapons in the Soviet was the Treasury Department’s EuropeanUnion, and to determine the degree of threat that Recovery Program, which began soon after thenation could then pose to the North American end of World War II. In the spring of 1947,continent (Jockel 1987:17-18). England, Canada, President Harry S. Truman proposed investingand the United States came to an understanding over $400 million in an aid program to benefitknown as the Tripartite Agreement in 1947, under European recovery. The focus at that time waswhich they shared discoveries and developments on Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and it was hoped


8

that the program would help “free peoples who blockaded the western sectors of Berlin, denyingare resisting attempted subjugation by armedminorities or outside pressures” (Borklund1991:152). The program, which became knownas the Truman Doctrine, was approved byCongress in May (Schlesinger 1993:515-516).Later in the year, 16 nations met in Paris todiscuss the Marshall Plan, the U.S.-proposedprogram for economic aid to Europe that hadbegun at the end of World War II. The SovietUnion and her allies declined an invitation to beinvolved (Schlesinger 1993:516).

Efforts to expand international cooperation, andUnited States influence, expanded not only to theeast but to the south as well. In September 1947,President Truman flew to Petropolis, Brazil, tosign a mutual defense pact at the Inter-AmericanDefense Conference (Schlesinger 1993:516). Inhis inaugural address of January 1949, PresidentTruman emphasized that United States aid fortechnological and economic development in othercountries played a vital role in promoting worldpeace (Schlesinger 1993:520). In the spring of1949, a group of 12 nations—including France,England, Canada, and the United States—signedthe North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, layingthe foundation for the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) (Schlesinger 1993:521).The treaty was strengthened in September by thepassage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act,under which the United States would providemilitary assistance to NATO allies (Schlesinger1993:522).

Although these efforts helped to unify the UnitedStates and Western Europe, East Europeannations were increasingly separated from theWest during the initial half decade of the ColdWar. After Czechoslovakia became a communiststate in the spring of 1948, Lieutenant LuciusClay, American Military Governor of Germany,announced that war with the Soviet Union wasimminent. In March, President Truman toldCongress that the Soviet Union was an enemy ofthe United States, and the National SecurityCouncil published its report NSC-7, whichpresented arguments for a hard lineanticommunist position. The Air Force alsoplaced units on the first 24-hour alert of the ColdWar in 1948 (Schaffel 1991:77-87; Whitaker andMarcuse 1994:124). In June, the Soviets

residents access to food and fuel. On 26 June,U.S. B-29 bombers began airlifting supplies toBerlin. Notably, these craft were not modified tocarry atomic bombs. The blockade was not lifteduntil May 1949 (Holloway 1994:228; Schlesinger1993:518, 521).

It was during the late 1940s that the House Un-American Activities Committee began its effortsto uncover a communist threat from within theUnited States. The investigations began with theentertainment industry and expanded toencompass accusations of communist influence inthe Truman administration, the latter used torationalize the “loss” of China to Mao Tse Tungand his communist forces in 1949 (Schlesinger1993:524).

In Asia, the first forebodings of war in Koreawere becoming evident. The Republic of SouthKorea declared itself independent from thenorthern portion of the country in August 1948.This was followed by the establishment of thePeople’s Republic of Korea in the north, whichclaimed jurisdiction over the entire peninsula andopposed the United States presence in the south(Schlesinger 1993:519). At the beginning of1949, Under-Secretary of State-designate DeanAcheson stated that Korea was not within thedefensive perimeter of the United States.Military security to that region was, he went on tosay, the responsibility of the United Nations(Schlesinger 1993:519). Although the UnitedStates had announced in late 1946 its intention toremain in Korea until the north and south wereunited, by the end of June the United States hadremoved the last of its troops stationed in thecountry, leaving only about 500 advisors(Schlesinger 1993:515, 521).

The United States came to view the Soviet Unionspecifically and communism in general as theprime adversary of the United States during thepost-World War II era, and the greater the SovietUnion was looked upon with enmity, the more theU.S. government prepared to defend its borders(much more vulnerable with the development ofatomic weapons and the means of deliveringthose weapons across the large distances that hadmade America seem relatively secure) andincrease its capabilities to retaliate against an


9

attack. The National Security Council, Joint development of the Corporal, all underway duringChiefs of Staff, and U.S. Air Force were all or prior to 1947. As the Army establishedcreated by the National Security Act of 1947, distance, altitude, and velocity records, it becamewhich also made an attempt to unify the “national a leader in the nation’s space program (Hughesmilitary establishment as one body under a 1992:2). In the Soviet Union, Stalin also orderedcivilian Secretary of Defense” (HOHQAMC military engineers and German rocket scientists1969:5). But this level of unification in the to develop rockets that could cross the Atlanticmilitary met with limited success since the (Borklund 1991:153).Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force allretained their full cabinet rank. Amendments in In 1948, the Army Ordnance Department chose1949 made the three Secretaries subordinate tothe Secretary of Defense and revoked theircabinet rank in an effort to achieve greatercohesiveness of the three branches and reachcloser to the goal of keeping ready a thoroughnational defense (HOHQAMC 1969:5).

At the same time the United States was takingsteps to better protect its traditional boundaries, itwas also expanding those boundaries towardspace through the development of radartechnology. In January 1946 Signal Corpsscientists at Fort Monmouth, in Belmar, NewJersey, used a radar antenna known as Diana,located at the Evans Signal Laboratory, totransmit radar pulses to the moon and to receivethe echos on their return from the lunar surface,demonstrating that communication via relays inouter space was possible (Bingham ca. 1979:305;Historical Office, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command [HOCECOM] 1985:32).

Missile development in the United States receiveda boost in 1946 when 16 Liberty ships broughtrocket and missile research equipment used in theV-2 program from Germany to the United Statesduring a post-war shuttle of equipment calledOperation Paperclip. A few German scientistsdecided to accompany the equipment and beganconducting research for U.S. missile programs(Yates n.d.:n.p.). Early missile work includedORDCIT (the Ordnance Department’s first missileproject [Hughes 1992:1]; the acronym was formedby combining ORD [Ordnance Department] withCIT [California Institute of Technology] which wasawarded the research and development contract),Project Hermes, the Bumper Program, and the4

Redstone Arsenal, a World War II government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) facility, asthe center for its missile and rocket research anddevelopment efforts. Other facilities also hadmissions related to rocket and missiledevelopment—for example, propellant wasmanufactured and packed at Picatinny Arsenal,and Thiokol Corporation was developingperchlorate propellant at its facility at Elkton,Maryland (Quinton 1948:1; Rocket Branch,Research and Development Division, OrdnanceDepartment 1948:4-5). A study concerning theuse of missiles as delivery vehicles for atomicwarheads was initiated by Secretary of DefenseLouis A. Johnson in June 1949 and led byLieutenant General John E. Hull. The committeeconducting this study found that four missilesthen under development would likely beoperational by 1954, at which time the greateravailability of fissionable materials would makeatomic missiles a possibility (Neufeld 1990:60,64). Army scientists fired Bumper Round 5 atWhite Sands Missile Range (then called WhiteSands Proving Ground) on 24 February 1949,marking the first penetration of space by a UnitedStates missile (Hughes 1992:2).

The Cold War material culture was linked by apervasive infrastructure that involvedcommunications, surveillance, logistics,guidance, and early warning systems, as well asresearch, development, and testing in institutionsboth public and private. One of the basic toolsthat made the Cold War infrastructure possible,and determined the direction of infrastructuredevelopment, was being researched during WorldWar II, known then by its code name—ProjectPX. The machine lost that appellation after theend of the war and became known as ENIAC, theElectronic Numerator, Integrator, Analyzer, andComputer. Generally considered to be the

Project Hermes was renamed Project Major in4

1950, then renamed the Redstone in the spring of 1952(Redstone Arsenal ca. 1952a:21-22).


10

Korean War Period—Important Installations

Aberdeen Proving Ground’s Edgewood area forchemical and biological weapons development

Dugway Proving Ground for chemical andbiological agent testing

Fort Detrick for biological agent development

Fort Monmouth, site of the Hexagon laboratory

Pine Bluff Arsenal for chemical and biologicalagent production

Picatinny Arsenal for atomic munitionsdevelopment

Redstone Arsenal for missile development

Rocky Mountain Arsenal for chemical agentproduction

world’s first true digital computer, ENIAC wasinstalled at the Ballistic Research Laboratory(BRL), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in1947. Among ENIAC’s first tasks was thecomputation of firing tables. Other tasksinvolved the analysis of warhead models, missiledesign, and an array of other complexcomputations. ENIAC was the first generation ofwhat has now become a basic tool of the military(Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1957:40; Lessels1986:n.p.), one without which the technologyincorporated into Cold War-era weapons wouldnever have been possible.

The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear teston 29 August 1949. At the end of the year itannounced that the United States was shelteringfrom war crimes Japanese scientists who hadconducted extensive research into biologicalweapons during World War II (Harris and The United States nuclear stockpile had surpassedPaxman 1982:140). During these five years after 1,300 by the end of 1953 (see Table 1), afterthe end of World War II, the two main President Truman several times authorizedadversaries of the Cold War had developed increases in the production of nuclear weaponsatomic weapons, made great advances in the (Holloway 1994:230). Dwight D. Eisenhowermeans of delivering these weapons, and was inaugurated in January 1953, and his hard-established basic technology that would develop line anticommunist views, and faith that the threatinto an enormous communications and of massive atomic attack or retaliation wouldsurveillance infrastructure. The atmosphere of force peace, further encouraged increase of theconfrontation, distrust, and a shaky balance of nuclear stockpile. In a 1953 speech, Presidentpower that characterized the Cold War period was Eisenhower proposed his “Atoms for Peace”also established, helping to put in place a setting program, which called for placing all fissionablethat “[s]ome in the military call . . . the ‘pre- material suitable for use in nuclear weaponsattack phase;’ most of us refer to it as peace” under the control of the United Nation’s(Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:xvii). International Atomic Energy Commission. When

KOREA AND THE EXPANSION OFNUCLEAR PRODUCTION, 1950-1954

The nuclear arms race began in earnest during the nuclear weapons was developed by the Army.first half of the 1950s. President Truman ordered The 280-mm cannon (Figure 1), developed atthe development of a hydrogen bomb in January Picatinny Arsenal, was the United States’ first1950 (Schlesinger 1993:523). By the middle of nuclear artillery weapon; it was first fired at thethe year, the United States atomic weapons Nevada Test Site on 23 May 1953. Several otherstockpile had grown to 298 bombs. A July sizes of atomic weapons followed, including theGallup poll showed that three-fourths of the Davy Crockett atomic mortar, created for theAmerican public supported the use of atomic infantry; all these were developed under theweapons in a future war (Boyer 1985:339; direction of Picatinny Arsenal (SchlesingerHolloway 1994:230; Schlesinger 1993:523). 1993:534; U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and

the proposal was brought before the U.N., theSoviets vetoed the proposal (Bacevich 1986:11;Borklund 1991:156; Schlesinger 1993:536).

In the early 1950s, the first of several tactical

11

Figure 1.The 280-mm Atomic Cannon (photo courtesy the Ordnance Museum, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland).


12

Chemical Command [USAAMCCOM] 1987:2). (DEW) Line. Construction began in 1955, andIn general, however, these munitions and the system was completed in 1957 (Schaffelweapons were impractical because they had 1991:209-217; Whitaker and Marcuse 1994:145).limited range and were difficult to transport. This early system was a major component of theMost were obsolete as soon as they were Cold War infrastructure. In the Pacific theater,deployed. the United States, Australia, New Zealand,

The first long-range nuclear missile also went Philippines formed the Southeast Asian Treatyinto development during this period, the Organization (SEATO) in September 1954development contract let to Convair in January (Schlesinger 1993:540). The United States also1951. Initial plans were for Project MX-1593, signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan inlater renamed Project Atlas, to carry an atomic December, a response in part to threatenedwarhead weighing 7,000 to 8,000 pounds and invasion from the Chinese mainland Schlesingerhave a range of approximately 15,000 miles 1993:540). Across the Atlantic, the surveillance(24,135 km) with an accuracy of one mile (1.6 component of the infrastructure had extended tokm). After the United States successfully tested Turkey by 1954, where the United States had setits first hydrogen fusion device called Mike Shotin October 1952 at Eniwetok Atoll in theMarshall Islands, proving the feasibility of lightermore powerful thermonuclear weapons, themissile was redesigned for a 3,000-poundwarhead (Cochran 1984:34).

Experiments concerning the effects of nuclearweapons in battlefield situations increased in theearly 1950s. A group of U.S. and Canadianscientists estimated in 1952 that a Soviet attackwith nuclear weapons could kill as many as 150million persons in North America, about seventimes the number of deaths worldwide duringWorld War II (Jockel 1987:65). Tests during theKorean War era included Operation Buster-Jangleand Operation Tumbler-Snapper in 1952,Operation Upshot-Knothole in 1953, OperationCastle in 1954, and Operation Teapot in 1955(Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1957:91).Operation Flashburn, held at Fort Bragg, NorthCarolina, during April and May 1954,incorporated Honest John and Corporal missilesin the first large training exercise planned aroundthe atomic battlefield (Hughes 1994:51).

Alignments between the U.S. and her alliescontinued to expand during the Korean War. In1953, U.S. fighter squadrons were givenpermission to cross the Canadian border toinvestigate possible hostile intrusions of Canadianair space—and to shoot without Canadianapproval. The National Security Council gave itsapproval for the establishment of a line of radarfacilities from Alaska across northern Canada andinto Greenland, called the Distant Early-Warning

Pakistan, Thailand, Great Britain, and the

up radar posts (Neufeld 1990:103). And, the U.S.pledged military and economic aid to Spain inexchange for allowing naval and air bases in itsterritory (Schlesinger 1993:536). Great Britaindetonated her first atomic weapon on 3 October1952, and late in 1954 the U.S. agreed to furnishthat country with 113 Type II Corporal missiles,the first United States guided missiles to besupplied to a foreign power (Hughes 1994:48).

Another alignment, of limited duration, alsobegan in this period. China and the Soviet Unionsigned a 30-year mutual defense pact on 15February 1950, but China severed the relationshipdue to ideological disagreement nine years later(Borklund 1991:155).

In Vietnam, a conflict that would have animmense impact on the U.S. during the next twodecades began to attract the attention, and thesupport, of the U.S. government as the nationalist(and pro-communist) forces of Ho Chi Minh roseagainst French rule in that country. The U.S.provided limited support initially, butcongressional discussion in the spring of 1954revealed reluctance to commit additional forces toIndochina in support of French forces unlessEngland increased its support as well. PresidentEisenhower argued that support should continueon the premise that if one area fell others wouldfollow like a “row of dominoes.” Called theDomino Theory, this argument would often beused to justify involvement in Indochina andelsewhere (Schlesinger 1993:537, 572). Withsimilar reasoning, the State Department expressedits concern over the shipment of arms from


13

Czechoslovakia to Guatemala in May 1954. The working on the world’s first IntercontinentalGuatemalan government was overthrown in June1954 with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) aid(Schlesinger 1993:538-539).

Early Soviet research and development in nuclearweapons was furthered by information providedby at least two important western scientists.Klaus Fuchs, a German scientist involved inBritish atomic weapons development and in theManhattan Project, was arrested as a spy for theSoviet Union in 1950, accused of transferringinformation on the development of plutoniumweapons to the Soviets during World War II.Another former Manhattan Project employee,David Greenglass, was also arrested. Greenglassand chemist Harry Gold then accused JuliusRosenberg, a former Signal Corps employee, andhis wife Ethel of leading a spy ring in the UnitedStates. The couple were sentenced to death in thespring of 1951, and executed in 1953 (Schlesinger1993:527-528). Soviet research and developmentefforts were also aided when Bruno Pontecorvo,a scientist who had worked at Canada’s secretChalk River atomic energy plant and on Britishatomic energy projects, defected to the SovietUnion late in 1950 (Holloway 1994:83, 222;Whitaker and Marcuse 1994:44-46, 176, 449).

It was in 1953 that the first nuclear projectile wasfired by an artillery gun. Development ofnuclear-capable artillery began shortly after theend of World War II, and efforts eventuallyfocused on developing a nuclear projectile for anexisting experimental 280-mm gun. In May1953, the 280-mm gun became the first artillerypiece to successfully fire an atomic round. Thatyear several were deployed in Europe, but theyremained in the field only a short time. The gunwas too heavy (83 tons) to be moved practically,and its range of 17 miles (27 km) was too limited.The closer it was moved to the front, the greaterit became a magnet for nuclear fire from theenemy. The Army hoped to replace the gun bydeveloping nuclear rounds for its 8-inch gun and155-mm howitzer (Bacevich 1986:82-84).

The first Cold War leader of the Soviet Union,Joseph Stalin, who had led the Soviet Union since1928, died in March 1953. Later that year, on 12August 1953, the Soviet Union detonated its firsthydrogen bomb, and Soviet scientists began

Ballistic Missile, called the R-7, or semiorka,5

which was approved for carrying a nuclearwarhead later that year. In expectation of similarAmerican development, military leadersrecommended that research into antiballisticmissiles commence. The Soviet militaryconducted its first exercises designed to simulatenuclear confrontation in the fall of 1953, theemphasis on defense. In September 1954, Sovietmilitary training exercises, observed by topChinese military leaders, included dropping amedium-yield atomic bomb three to five miles (8km) away from personnel engaged in maneuvers.Subsequent maneuvers took place within theradiation zone, up to and including ground zero.The exercises became the basis for new Sovietmilitary field manuals (Holloway 1994:326-328).

The first Cold War battle took shape in Korea inJune 1950 when North Korean troops, providedwith Soviet tanks, drove south of the 38thparallel—the temporary division of the countryset up at the end of World War II, with the northcontrolled by the Soviet Union and the south bythe United States. President Truman authorizedthe U.S. Air Force and Navy to aid South Koreantroops and signed a bill extending the effectivedate of the Selective Service Act into July 1951.At a June meeting, the United Nations SecurityCouncil called for armed intervention in theconflict, and three days later the United States sentground troops to Korea and ordered a Navalblockade of the peninsula. By the end ofNovember, United Nations forces had pushed theNorth Korean Army to the Yalu River (theChinese border), prompting China to send its owntroops. With the massive reinforcement ofapproximately 200,000 Chinese troops, the Northquickly removed all United Nations presenceabove the 38th parallel. In the first week ofJanuary 1951, North Korean forces capturedSeoul for the second time in this “limited” war.Peace negotiations began in July, but the warcontinued its see-saw progression for two moreyears (HOCECOM 1985:34; Schlesinger

An Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)5

has a range of about 1,500 nautical miles (2,778 km); anIntercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) has a rangeof at least 5,000 nautical miles (9,260 km) (Borklund1991:153).


14

1993:524-525; 535). In 1953 the Joint Chiefs of weapons, and use them for a massive retaliatoryStaff evaluated whether it would be advisable to strike, would bring about a stalemate betweenuse nuclear weapons in North Korea and China. the primary world powers and could thusThe Joint Chiefs determined that doing so would maintain peace through a strategy of deterrence.be of limited military value. However, a leak of However, NSC 162/2 noted one problem with theinformation that the United States was strategy was that the growing nuclear capabilitiesconsidering such action may have helped bring of the Soviet Union, and their ability to pose aChina and North Korea to the negotiating table direct threat to the United States, limited the(Borklund 1991:156). ability of the United States to deter minor

The Korean War greatly influenced Army minor battles from growing into major conflictsdevelopment during the Cold War. The and possibly atomic war, NSC 162/2 advised theprotracted conflict helped oust President Truman United States to take all “feasible political,and encouraged the election of Dwight D. economic, propaganda, and covert measures”Eisenhower to the presidency, and the negotiated (Bacevich 1986:13-15) to inhibit or arrest localend confirmed the impression that “ . . . we [had] aggression, and to “make clear to the USSR thestruck a bargain with the devil [as noted by many kind of actions which will be almost certain topeople concerning the signing of a treaty that did lead to . . . general war” (Crockatt 1995:143).not present a U.S. victory]. Such a distastefuland embarrassing compromise seemed un- The strategy of massive retaliation proposed byAmerican” (Bacevich 1986:8), and made it more Eisenhower and NSC 162/2 resulted in an effortdifficult to “accept Truman’s policy of limited to redefine the roles of the services, shifting alsowar. Instead they turned against the party that their relative importance. Since the Air Forceespoused it and chose a military hero to replace was seen as the key to retaliating with nuclearthe outgoing President” (Schlesinger 1993:522). weapons, funding began to be shifted away fromTruman was blamed in part because it was felt the Army to the Air Force (Figure 2). AllocationsAmerican technology could have won the war and to all the services began slipping in 1953, butprevented the squandering of American lives to allocations for the Air Force began increasing onachieve ambiguous ends (Bacevich 1986:10). an impressive scale in 1955. By the end of theThrough these impacts, the Korean War decade, the Air Force allocations were nearlycontributed to “major changes in basic American twice those of the Army; among the threenational security policy and military strategy” services, the Army was then receiving the(Bacevich 1986:8), including changes in roles and smallest share of the defense budget. Some atstructure of the defensive forces (Bacevich that time even called the Army obsolete. The1986:8). President Dwight D. Eisenhower was distribution remained about the same throughoutinaugurated in January 1953; the Korean War the Eisenhower presidency.ended the following July (Schlesinger 1993:522,532). To counter the accusation of obsolescence, the

One of the most important documents of the development; it further promoted its spaceNational Security Council (NSC), and of the Cold program and projects involving high technologyWar, was presented in October 1953. NSC 162/2 to capture public imagination (Bacevich 1986:16-“posited an essential link between security and a 17, 20-21). Army leaders also countered the losshealthy economy” (Bacevich 1986:12) and of status and perceived obsolescence by attackingadvised frugality in defense spending. The NSC Eisenhower’s “New Look” for the militaryfelt the cheapest way to counter the Soviet threatwas through an “American military policy [that]would rest on a ‘capability of inflicting massiveretaliatory damage by offensive striking power’”(Bacevich 1986:13, quoting from NSC 162/2).The newly elected Eisenhower administrationbelieved that a willingness to use nuclear

6

instances of Soviet aggression. To keep the

Army began to place more emphasis on missile

Eisenhower may have viewed massive retaliation6

as primarily rhetoric rather than practical strategy. Hereportedly complained that Army objections to massiveretaliation were objections to a contingency “tooremote to merit serious consideration” (Bacevich1986:31).

Army (Y2) Air Force (Y1) Navy (Y1)

1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 19630

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000


15

Figure 2. Army, Air Force, and Navy appropriations, 1951-1963 (from Borklund 1991).

beginning in 1953, portraying massive retaliation at White Sands Missile Range (Hughes 1994:4;as “ineffective, unrealistic, and immoral” White Sands Proving Ground ca. 1956:45).(Bacevich 1986:26). A draft of the National Research facilities were also expanded atSecurity Council’s report NSC 5410/1 provided a Redstone Arsenal with the installation ofgood opportunity for attack since the U.S. supersonic wind tunnels and the construction ofmilitary objective of a full-scale war therein the Josiah Gorgas Laboratory. The wind tunnelsdescribed entailed the near total destruction of supplemented one tunnel already at themuch of Eastern Europe, China, and the Soviet facility—brought over from Peenemuende,Union. In this scenario the Army role would Germany, in 1946 during Operation Paperclip—asimply be that of occupation and control of what tunnel that had been used in Germany’s V-2was for the most part a nuclear wasteland; and, inthe Army’s view—forwarded to the Joint Chiefsof Staff in December 1953—the United Stateswould be confronted with the “mind bogglingproblem of establishing ‘economically viablepostwar successor states’ out of the ashes”(Bacevich 1986:25-29).

The Korean War, the promulgation of NSC 162/2,and the threat perceived from the spread ofcommunism all helped encourage the expansionof the Army’s missile program. RedstoneArsenal was instructed to study the feasibility ofdeveloping a surface-to-surface missile with a500-mile (800-km) range, and additional missiletesting and instrumentation facilities were set up

development program (The Huntsville Times1953:n.p.). These tunnels and others located atthe Ballistic Research Laboratory, AberdeenProving Ground, Maryland (two of which hadbeen built by 1945), were very important indetermining the design characteristics of manyArmy missiles (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.1957:34; Silirie n.d.:n.p.). The Josiah GorgasLaboratory, completed in 1952, was a $1 millionfacility built specifically to conduct research onguided missiles (Hill 1952:1). Test facilitieswere also expanded at Redstone Arsenal in 1952,when a static firing stand, test laboratory, andblockhouse designed by Parsons-AerojetCompany were built (Redstone Arsenal ca.1952b:35).


16

In November 1951 the first successful test of a forward commanders into a single team and addNike guided missile against a ground target was up to the payoff in battle” (Signal Corpsconducted at Redstone Arsenal (Hughes Engineering Laboratories [SCEL] ca. 1952:7).1994:21), and the first Nike I battalion was Although the source gave no specifics about thesedeployed in the spring of 1954 (Hughes 1994:51). systems, they were probably broad concepts usedThe Corporal missile was also being tested at the to help determine the direction in which researchend of 1951. In the second week of December, a and development should focus.contract for 200 Type I Corporal missiles wasawarded to Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, A very important laboratory complex forthe first contract of its kind in the U.S. (Hughes electronics research and engineering was1994:21). The first ballistic missile units to be dedicated in September 1954 at Fort Monmouth.activated in the United States were Corporal That complex, the Albert J. Myer Research andbattalions, activated in 1952 (Hughes 1994:24). Development Center (Building 2700), wasExploratory work begun by Army and Air Force located in the Charles Wood Area (CECOMcontractors on IRBMs and ICBMs was sharply Historical Office 1994:5; HOCECOM 1985:35).reduced in 1949 due first to budget constraints Commonly called the Hexagon, that shape wasand technological difficulties, and from 1950 never fully completed, giving the structure athrough 1953 to the costs of the Korean War as unique angular “U” shape. Developments atwell. But in mid-1954, the administration Hexagon laboratories would make manyestablished the development and deployment of important contributions to space, missile,land-based IRBMs and ICBMs as a top priority battlefield simulation, meteorology, and other(Borklund 1991:159). programs in the ensuing years (CECOM

The Redstone missile figured prominently in theArmy’s space program, serving as its vehicle for Until the end of World War II the equipment andplacing satellites in orbit. In 1954, the Guided training of United States military forces focusedMissile Development Division of the Army on battle conditions in a temperate zone overOrdnance Missile Laboratories at Redstone average terrain. Little was known about theArsenal published a document by Dr. Wernher functionality or applicability of equipment invon Braun that proposed using the Redstone as extremes of climate and terrain. As possiblethe main booster of a four-stage rocket capable of venues of future wars expanded due to greaterlaunching satellites into space. The plan mobility, the need for equipment that couldexpanded to become the joint Army-Navy Project function in “all climatic and terrain conditionsOrbitor, but was shelved in 1955 in favor of likely to be encountered in future warfare” (WarProject Vanguard, based on the Navy’s Viking Department Equipment Board 1946:n.p.) grew.missile (Hughes 1992:3). To curb expenses, atmospheric and climatic

Advances being made in infrastructure conditions and test equipment. One Signal Corpsdevelopment included achievements in elec- document noted that during Fiscal Year 1951tronics and communications. The first anechoic research emphasis was on arctic regions (SCELchamber at Fort Monmouth, and perhaps the first ca. 1951:34), in part because of the constructionof its kind in the United States, was constructed of the DEW line across northern Canada, Alaska,in 1951 in the Evans Area (Bingham, interview and Greenland, and the increased military activity1995). An anechoic chamber is an acoustically in arctic regions engendered by the expectationdead room that absorbs certain frequencies of that nuclear attack from the Soviet Union wouldradio waves, especially microwaves. Electronics likely be directed to the North Americanwere important as they were at “the heart of the continent via the Arctic Circle. Research relatedArmy’s great Global Signal Systems whichinterconnect the U.S. with its troops and basesoverseas; of its Theater Signal Systems whichinterlace communications zones; and the plexusof its all-important Combat Systems which tie

Historical Office 1994:5).

laboratories were developed to duplicate

to the upper reaches of the atmosphere was alsobeing conducted to determine development andoperational parameters for communications andradar equipment (SCEL ca. 1951:33). Thisresearch established data bases of information


17

that would be used and added to throughout the component needed for the production of GB. TheCold War. The Signal Corps Engineering plant was in operation by 1953. The dichloro wasLaboratories directed Experiment Aurora in 1951, to be shipped to Rocky Mountain Arsenal, nearwhich was conducted at the Alaskan Denver, Colorado, also known as Site B, whereCommunication System’s Arctic Ionospheric chemical and incendiary munitions had beenResearch Detachment and investigated radio produced during World War II. The Rockysignal propagation in arctic atmospheres. The Mountain Arsenal GB manufacturing and fillingUniversity of Alaska also conducted similar plants were constructed, and the facility was inresearch for the Signal Corps during this period experimental production by the summer of 1952(SCEL ca. 1951:33). (Harris and Paxman 1982:257; Midwest Research

In computer development, ORDVAC was built 1980:3; USADARCOM 1986:1).by the University of Illinois and installed at theBallistic Research Laboratory in 1952. Also in 1952, Dr. Ranajit Ghosh discovered aORDVAC was “BRL’s fastest digital computer new nerve agent while researching pesticides induring the 1950’s [sic] capable of performing10,000 operations per second” (Aberdeen ProvingGround ca. 1957:73). The Soviets beganoperating their advanced computer, thebystrodeistvuiushchaia elektronnaia schetnaiamashina, or BESM (translated as High-SpeedElectronic Calculating Machine) in 1952. Thecapabilities of the BESM nearly matched those ofthe U.S. counterparts by 1954 (Holloway1994:314, 436).

The United States policy for engaging inchemical and biological warfare (CBW) had beenone of retaliation in kind only through World WarII, when no chemical or biological weapons areknown to have been used on a large scale in acombat situation. This did not change during the7

Korean War (Smart 1991a:18-19), but a greateremphasis was placed on the construction ofproduction facilities beginning in the late 1940sand 1950s, and an “extremely high priority [was]placed on the over-all GB [code name for a nervegas also known as sarin] program during theKorean action” (U.S. Army Development andReadiness Command [USADARCOM] 1986:1).Construction on the Phosphate DevelopmentWorks (also known as Muscle ShoalsDevelopment Works), Muscle Shoals, Alabama,known also as Site A, began in December 1950.The facility was to produce methyldichlorophosphine oxide, commonly called dichloro, a

Institute n.d.:61-62, 73; Rocky Mountain Arsenal

England. He passed on information about thesubstance to the main British chemical andbiological weapons facility at Porton Down.Research at that facility determined the chemicalwas many times more potent that GB, and sinceit was more viscous it evaporated more slowly(GB evaporated relatively quickly), so it couldcontaminate a battlefield for weeks, renderingoperations in selected areas nearly impossible.The discovery was shared with United Statesscientists, as per the terms of the TripartiteAgreement, and soon chemists working inEdgewood Arsenal’s laboratories refined avariant, which they named VX (Harris andPaxman 1982:184).

The United States Army Chemical Corps formeda biological warfare division in the fall of 1953.The primary research, development, andproduction facilities were located at Pine BluffArsenal, Arkansas, and Fort Detrick, Maryland(named Camp Detrick prior to 1953). Researchinto vaccines against the Fort Detrick-produceddiseases was conducted at Ohio State University(Harris and Paxman 1982:163). Additionallaboratories were set up to assess biologicalweapons at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, nearthe end of 1953, but this activity wasdiscontinued in January 1956 (Dugway ProvingGround 1967:ix).

It should be noted that Germany’s use of the gas7

chambers could be considered use of a chemicalweapon, although this would not generally beconsidered use in a combat situation.


18

Pentomic Era—Important Installations

Fort Monmouth, where the first satelliteswere developed

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, nuclearweapons production site

Nevada Test Site for nuclear weapons testing

Pantex Plant, nuclear weapons production site

Redstone Arsenal for missile development

THE INTERWAR YEARS AND THE 1986:33, quoting from Brief of Plan of Action forFORMATION OF TH E PENTOMIC ARMY,

1955-1963

The decade following the Korean War wascharacterized by increased international alliances,as well as increased tension, culminating for theUnited States in the Cuban missile crisis. Thestand-off at Cuba was perhaps the closest theU.S. and the Soviet Union came to direct conflictduring the Cold War. If the rhetoric of the daycan be taken as an indication of intent, thatconflict would probably have involved nuclearwar. The close call may have marked a turningpoint in the Cold War, leaving to the past, at leastin part, the intensely competitive atmosphere thathad existed between the United States and theSoviet Union since shortly after the end of WorldWar II, opting instead to make an effort at mutualcoexistence.

At the end of 1954, General Matthew B.Ridgeway, Army Chief of Staff between 1953and 1955, asked the National Security Council“‘to reject emphatically any policy ofpreventative war’ as ‘devoid of moral principle’”(Bacevich 1986:37). His remarks were taken aslittle more than an effort to increase theimportance of traditional ground warfare so theArmy would not be left with the role of simplycleaning up the mess of an atomic conflict.During the remainder of his short two years asArmy Chief of Staff, Ridgeway presented hisappeal in public, much to the embarrassment ofthe Eisenhower administration (Bacevich1986:38-43). In 1955, Air Force officialsproposed that the United States attack the SovietUnion if it became “‘clear that the intentions ofthe communist bloc are to control military alliednations and destroy the United States’” (Bacevich

the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan by the JointStrategic Plans Committee, dated 23 November1955). The President felt that such action wouldnot only be prudent but was perhaps his duty tothe future since he feared the cost of an indefinitearms race would be detrimental to democracy inthe United States. In March of that year,Eisenhower made it known that he would usenuclear weapons in the event of war (Bacevich1986:33; Schlesinger 1993:542).

Arguments against the next war becoming a stagefor massive atomic confrontation were heard in1957 by Harvard University’s Dr. HenryKissinger, who saw warfare in the future astaking place on a limited scale. Similararguments came from John Foster Dulles andSecretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, bothof whom felt the United States should not relysolely on massive nuclear deterrent (HOHQAMC1969:48). These arguments reflected the feelingof many in the Army, who for a variety of reasonswere against the idea of massive retaliation. Thisbegan also the effort of the Army in the area ofthe controversial “dual capability”—the ability tofight both conventional and nuclear battles—andinitiated the reorganization into the PentomicArmy, or Pentomic Division, discussed below.

International relations were moving in twodirections: the United States, the Soviet Union,and each of their allies testing the limits of whatwas acceptable intrusion in the affairs of theother—while at the same time efforts to fosterinternational accord and cooperation weremeeting with some success. On the positive side,70 countries sent representatives to attend thesigning of the Statute of the International AtomicEnergy Agency in 1956 (Schlesinger 1993:546-547). Overtures of agreement between thesuperpowers began in 1957, when the SovietUnion’s Nikita Khrushchev stated that worlddisarmament should begin with the Soviets andthe Americans; Eisenhower in turn proposed atwo-year nuclear test ban (Schlesinger 1993:548).The Signal Corps Engineering Laboratoriesparticipated in the International Geophysical Year(IGY), an 18-month cooperative research effortinvolving 96 countries. The Signal Corpsconcentrated its efforts on upper-atmospherestudies (using missiles to launch theirinstruments) and on supplementing satellite


19

programs (HOCECOM 1985:40). The U.S. last three months of the year, garnered only smallsigned a pact with the Soviet Union encouraging gains in the reduction of atomic tests andeducational, cultural, and technological weapons (Schlesinger 1993:553). A 1960 summitexchanges (Schlesinger 1993:551). And the meeting between Eisenhower and KhrushchevUnited States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and was canceled by Khrushchev because of the U-2six other nations met again in Geneva to discuss incident (Borklund 1991:162). Premierdisarmament in March 1960, but again could not Khrushchev also declared that the Soviet Unionreach an agreement (Schlesinger 1993:556-557). had a “wage and win” policy regarding nuclear

On the negative side, in June 1955 Soviet fighterplanes shot down a Navy patrol plane off the In his State of the Union speech in January 1958,coast of Alaska (Schlesinger 1993:543). The Eisenhower had warned that the safety of thefollowing year, the United States Strategic Air United States had become increasingly perilousCommand began sending U-2 surveillance (HOHQAMC 1969:48). Secretary of Stateaircraft over the Soviet Union; over the next four Christian Herter made a similar commentyears, a total of 24 missions would be flown regarding Europe in mid-1959 when he stated that(Broad 1995). One of the U-2s went down in the Soviet Union “appears intent on dominatingSoviet territory in May 1960, and pilot Francis West Berlin and absorbing all Germany into theGary Powers was captured (Borklund 1991:162). Communist bloc” (Schlesinger 1993:555). ThePresident Eisenhower publicly admitted the threat to United States forces in southeast Asiamission of the surveillance plane was not weather was felt a month later when two Americanresearch, as had been previously stated, but soldiers were killed in South Vietnam. Anphotographic reconnaissance (Schlesinger increase in the military supplies being sent to1993:556). Along a similar vein, the world’s first southeast Asia was announced the followingsystem of surveillance satellites sent its first month (Schlesinger 1993:555).exposed film to earth for pickup by U.S. forces inAugust 1960. These Corona satellites received Technological advances during this periodauthorization in 1958, were tested in 1959, and included the development of the nation’s firstwere deployed in 1960. Over the next 12 years, nuclear reactor, installed at Fort Belvoir,95 Corona satellites were used in the surveillance Virginia, in April 1957; and the successful testingsystem (Broad 1995). of the nation’s first intercontinental ballistic

In 1956, the Soviets began installing an extensive December (Schlesinger 1993:548, 550). Theair defense system and radar network around Soviet Sputnik I was also launched in 1957,Moscow and began constructing an antiballistic challenging U.S. assumptions of technologicalmissile (ABM) test ground in Kazakhstan superiority (HOHQAMC 1969:48). When(Holloway 1994:325). In 1957 the Soviet Union Sputnik II was launched, the astro-observationannounced the successful testing of its first center at Fort Monmouth was the first U.S.intercontinental ballistic missile. The Air Force’s station to pick it up (Sullivan 1961:8). And theAtlas was not scheduled for its first full-range U.S. Army launched the first American satellite,flight for a full year thereafter (Borklund the Explorer I, from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on1991:160). Also in 1957, the Nevada Test Site the last day of January 1958. The Navy launchedwas used for the nation’s first underground its Vanguard I about six weeks later. The Pioneernuclear tests, atomic testing began at Eniwetok rocket, launched 12 October 1958, failed in itsAtoll in the Marshall Islands, and the United attempt to circle the moon but did set an altitudeStates-Canadian North American Air Defense record of 79,193 miles (127,422 km). TheCommand (NORAD) was established nuclear-powered Nautilus submarine made the(Schlesinger 1993:549, 552). Although first submerged crossing of the North Pole in theEisenhower had called for a two-year nuclear test summer of 1958, and the world’s first laser wasban in 1957, he rejected the permanent ban demonstrated by American Theodore Maiman inproposed by the Soviets in November 1958 at an 1960 (Schlesinger 1993:551-553, 557).international meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, onthe subject. The meeting, in session during the

war (Hubbs and Zielinski 1995:26-27).

missile by the United States Air Force in


20

At the beginning of 1959, Fidel Castro came to fears, and perceptions (Borklund 1991:163; Kanepower in Cuba, and the United States recognized 1995:67). Nevertheless, the implication ofthe new government the same month. However, collusion between industry and the military wouldby the end of the year the CIA and Eisenhower influence several areas of militaryadministration officials were issuing cautions endeavor—including relationships betweenabout Castro’s communist ties and growing contractors and the federal defense establishment,relationship with the Soviet Union. By May congressional reactions to appropriation and1960, Cuba was receiving weapons from the materiel requests by the military, and the light inSoviet Union and the two nations had established which the media presented the military-industrialformal diplomatic relations. Increasingly hostile relationship—for the remainder of the Cold Warrhetoric from Fidel Castro prompted the U.S. to (Borklund 1991:163).cut its sugar imports from the island nation by 95percent, then to break diplomatic ties with the John F. Kennedy became president of the Unitedcountry in January 1961 (Crockatt 1995:194-197; States in 1961. Shortly thereafter, the U.S.Schlesinger 1993:554, 557-558). In April, Cuban changed its basic policy of nuclear deterrence.refugees trained in the United States by the CIA The Eisenhower presidency had operated frominvaded the island, landing at the Bay of Pigs. the position of the Assured Destruction of theThey were defeated in two days (Schlesinger Soviet Union, but during 1961 the equation was1993:559). altered to what was termed Mutual Assured

In his 1961 farewell speech at the end of his sides could destroy the majority of the other’spresidency, Eisenhower issued a warning that population and industrial bases (Borklundwould reverberate for the remainder of the Cold 1991:164). The ability of the Soviet Union toWar concerning the increasing power and deliver that destructive force was called intoinfluence of cooperative military and industrial question, though, when Kennedy announced inefforts. 1961 that the number of Soviet ICBMs was only

This conjunction of an immense militaryestablishment and a large arms industry isnew in the American experience. We mustguard against the acquisition of unwarrantedinfluence, whether sought or unsought, bythe military-industrial complex. Thepotential for the disastrous rise of misplacedpower exists and will persist [Kaplan1992:678].

Although it has been said that Eisenhower’sintent was only to bring about a more equabledistribution of federal funding among domesticand military programs (Borklund 1991:163), thewords had a far more ominous impact on thegeneral public. Some listeners thoughtEisenhower was hinting at the existence of amilitary-industrial plot among interested persons(military personnel, defense contractors,congressional members from states in whichdefense contracts were held, scientists, engineers,labor unions, and others) who wished to keep theCold War alive for reasons of personal gain, butmost scholars have concluded the “conspiracy”was less a deliberate effort than a condition thatevolved out of the interplay of common interests,

Destruction (MAD) in the understanding that both

about 10 percent the number that had previouslybeen made public. Eisenhower had known of thediscrepancy but had refrained from making itpublic, believing that doing so would escalate thearms race. Kennedy’s announcement didapparently have the effect Eisenhower hadexpected (Crockatt 1995:150).

European confrontation also escalated in 1961with the construction of the Berlin Wall.Separating East and West sectors of the city, thewall was intended to keep East Germans fromfleeing to the west. Kennedy implied that theUnited States might go to war over the newsituation in Berlin, which became a much morephysically divided city after a barbed wire barrier,the wall’s forerunner, was erected through Berlinon the night of 13 August (Borklund 1991:164;Crockatt 1995:136). Soon thereafter, the SovietUnion began atmospheric nuclear tests, its firstsince 1958. The United States beganunderground tests the following month,countering the Soviet action while adhering to aU.S.-British agreement not to conductatmospheric tests (Crockatt 1995:135, 150;Schlesinger 1993:560). However, in an attempt


21

to pressure the Soviets into halting their tests, soon dismantled and withdrawn; a telephoneKennedy announced in May the United Stateswould resume atmospheric nuclear tests(Schlesinger 1993:561).

Confrontation continued in Cuba as well. Duringthe summer of 1962, a steady movement ofSoviet troops and weapons into Cuba began toraise concerns in the United States. On 14October 1962, a U-2 photographed fully equippedmissile bases on the island, equipped withintermediate and medium range ballistic missiles.From such a base, the Soviet Union could attackthe United States with nuclear missiles. Afterbeing informed of the existence of these bases,Kennedy assembled his security advisors todeliberate on a strategy for action. The JointChiefs of Staff suggested air strikes and aninvasion; Attorney General Robert Kennedyargued that doing so would adversely affect theUnited States’ moral standing. PresidentKennedy agreed, and ordered a Naval blockade ofthe island. He revealed the U-2 photographs andhis intent to blockade the island on 22 October;Soviet ships were dispatched to the island. Armyunits throughout the U.S. were placed on alert orrepositioned, and more than 30 AMC depots wererequested to give immediate logistical support.But before the Soviet ships reached Cuba, aSoviet diplomat proposed that the bases bedismantled in exchange for United Statespromises not to invade Cuba and to removeJupiter IRBMs from Turkey (AMC ca. 1972:4;Borklund 1991:165; Crockatt 1995:158-166).

It is likely that nuclear confrontation was onlyjust avoided. This crisis was in some ways thedenouement of the first period of the Cold War, aperiod of nearly 20 years in which escalatingtensions and a race for newer, more powerful,more accurate technology and weapons had beena hallmark of military operations, a period inwhich the two most powerful nations in the worldencouraged the use of the weapons theyostensibly hoped most to deter.

The confrontation had been averted but themissile crisis had graphically demonstratedthe ease with which the two super-powersmight slip into nuclear war. The realization,however, awakened both sides to adetermination to prevent a similar incidentin the future. The Cuban missile bases were

hotline was installed between Moscow andWashington guaranteeing instantcommunication between the twogovernments; and in July 1963 the twonations signed a nuclear Test Ban Treaty[Schlesinger 1993:562].

Another development probably prompted by thecrisis in Cuba was the signing of an agreementbetween Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, and the UnitedStates pledging to resist Soviet aggression in thewest (Schlesinger 1993:564).

On 22 November 1963, President Kennedy wasassassinated in Dallas, Texas.

Creation of the AMC

The military in general, and the Army inparticular, experienced many changes during thisperiod. In addition to facing increasing Cold Wartension, the Army was undergoing extensiveorganizational change and was witnessing thetransformation of its troops into the moreimpersonal technicians the leadership felt wereappropriate to a modern military service thatdepended heavily on the technologicalachievements of its research and developmentdepartments.

Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, DeputyChief of Staff for Research and Development,expressed the sentiments of the Army leadershipin a 1955 article published in the November issueof the Army Combat Forces Journal by statingthat land warfare had not been made obsolete bynuclear weapons, and that the military forces ofthe United States should be prepared to winbattles both large and small, both atomic andconventional (Bacevich 1986:33). The sentimentwas furthered by General Maxwell D. Taylor,Army Chief of Staff from 1955 through 1959,who told Congress in 1956 that both the U.S. andthe Soviet Union would tend to avoid all-outnuclear war, but small-scale wars along theSoviet periphery would be on the rise. The replyby the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that nuclearweapons could still be a deterrent in small scaleconflicts because they would be “no lessavailable in limited wars than in general ones”


22

(Bacevich 1986:44). It should be pointed out that functions” (HOHQAMC 1969:5). Thethe Army’s attack on nuclear weapons was more reorganization was prompted by doubts in thespecifically an attack on strategic nuclear legislative and executive branches of theweapons capable of massive destruction. Tactical government about the defense establishment’snuclear weapons, on the other hand, would be of ability to manage its own affairs (HOHQAMCgreat utility in winning the next war (Bacevich 1969:4). Concern in the area of research and1986:54). This, along with a desire for bigger development was sharp, especially in light of theand better firepower and expectations about increasing amount of funding going to this area,Soviet tactics, influenced the Army to pursue although the increase to 1958 was less than whattactical nuclear capacity at the same time that would be seen in the ensuing five years (Figure 3)they fought against the development of a strategic and far below the huge increase of the late 1970s.nuclear capability (Bacevich 1986: 57). The changes in the defense establishment as a

So the Army of the 1950s pursued a dual services. Office of the Secretary of Defensecapability—preparing to fight with both (OSD) Project 80 was conducted by a group ofconventional and tactical nuclear weapons—but Army officers and civilians working under thecontinued to focus their attention on ground direction of Leonard W. Hoelscher, Deputycombat (Bacevich 1986:60-61). To effectively Comptroller of the Army, to determine how theoperate on a battlefield where there was a changes would affect the Army. They conductedpossibility of nuclear weapons being used, the their investigations and published the “Study ofArmy felt it would need to disperse its troops to the Function, Organization, and Procedures of theavoid providing a convenient target for enemy Department of the Army, OSD Project 80nuclear offenses. Future battles would take place (Army)” in 1961.in a battle area rather than along a front—a front,planners felt, could be easily shattered by a single The study, which was known as the Hoelschernuclear weapon (Bacevich 1986:67). The new Report, “became the basis for one of the mostdivisional organization for the atomic battlefield, sweeping reorganizations in the history of thebased on groups of five, was called the Pentomic Department of the Army” (HOHQAMC 1969:8).Division. Each division was made up of five The report resulted in the abolishment of thecombat groups, five mortar batteries, five seven technical services (offices of thehowitzer batteries, and five headquarters and Quartermaster, Chief of Ordnance, Chief ofservice companies (Bacevich 1986:104-107). The Engineers, Surgeon General, Chief Signaldesired mobility of the units or cells of the Officer, Chief Chemical Officer, and Chief ofPentomic Division influenced the designs of Transportation) and the creation of the Armyweapons and weapons platforms. For instance, Materiel Development and Logistics Command,although the initial Honest John fielded in 1954 latter renamed the Army Materiel Commandcould not be airlifted onto the battle area, (AMC ca. 1972:4). The reorganization, and thenecessary for the effective function of the end of the technical services, was officiallydispersed Army, at least the experimental XM33 announced on 6 December 1961 (HOHQAMClauncher for the missile, designed by the 1969:3). In 1962, when the reorganization tookOrdnance Weapons Command in 1957, was place, the missions of the technical services weredesigned with helicopter transport capability in distributed between the AMC and the Defensemind (Johnson and Zobrist ca. 1958:30). Logistics Agency (DLA). The AMC was given

Of more importance to this context than the of weapons and munitions, and the DLA forPentomic concept of organization, however, was procurement of common supply items (Bouilly etthe Defense Reorganization of 1958, which al. 1984:3). The AMC was officially establishedremoved the departments of the Army, Navy, and by Department of the Army General Order 23 onAir Force from the chain of command and 8 May 1962 (AMC ca. 1972:4). The functions“limited [them] to administrative and logistics are more fully discussed in Chapter 4.

whole prompted investigation into the separate

responsibility for development and procurement

Research and Development (Y1)Research and Development Percent of Total (Y2)

1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

0

2

4

6

8

10


23

Figure 3. Defense allocations to research and development, 1947-1967 (from Borklund 1991).

Nuclear Developments In testing nuclear weapons, Operation Plumb Bob

The period between 1955 and 1963 was alsosignificant in terms of nuclear weapondevelopments. In July 1958 a Redstone missilewas sent to an altitude of 200,000 feet (60.8 km),where a one-megaton nuclear device wasdetonated, the first such test by the United States(Baker et al. 1994:40). As mentioned earlier, the280-mm atomic gun was deployed during thisperiod, and research was underway for theconversion of other conventional rounds tonuclear capabilities. The Army also begandeveloping its Davy Crockett (DACRO) weaponin 1958, the research being conducted atPicatinny and Watervliet arsenals. The weaponwas first deployed in 1961, but its use wasterminated in August 1963 (Bacevich 1986:95;Johnson and Zobrist ca. 1960:11; U.S. ArmyWeapons Command [USAWECOM] ca. 1964:6).The projectiles were produced at the PantexOrdnance Plant and probably at the IowaOrdnance Plant—both installations beganrehabilitation and construction programs for thatpurpose in late 1958 or early 1959, but theprogram appears to have been canceled at theIowa facility (Johnson and Zobrist ca. 1959:37).

took place in 1957. The 1958 moratorium onatmospheric tests encouraged the Army to lookfor means of simulating nuclear explosions to testthe effects on equipment (U.S. Army SignalResearch and Development Laboratory[USASRDL] 1960:74). Other tests during theperiod included Operation Hardtack, OperationSunbeam, and Shot Small Boy (U.S. ArmyElectronics Research and DevelopmentLaboratories [USAERDL] 1963:44; USASRDL1961:79). Nuclear effects studies were mainlyconcerned with the impact atomic explosions hadon electronic components, hardware, and signalpropagation (USAERDL 1963:87).

Missile Developments

Great strides in missile development were alsomade during this period. In the 1950s there were“radical improvements in range, accuracy,reliability, and, when combined with nuclearwarheads, in destructive potential” (Bacevich1986:73). The Army’s missile program wasconcentrated in three areas: air defense, tacticalsurface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and space


24

exploration (Bacevich 1986:75). In developing missiles 1A and 1B were fired in March andair defense weapons, which included surface-to- April 1957, but both failed. Then on 31 May,air missiles (SAMs), the Air Force felt the Army Jupiter Missile AM-1 was successfully fired,was intruding into what was rightfully Air Force marking “the initial U.S. flight of an IRBM”responsibility. In part because of the Army’s (Baker et al. 1994:23). And on 27 August 1958,technological lead over the Air Force, the Army Missile AM-7—complete with its guidancewas allowed to proceed with the development of system, warhead, and fuzing—was launched.its radar-directed automatic cannon called the The Army delivered Jupiter Missile 101, the firstSkysweeper, for use by air defense battalions. missile ready for deployment, to the Air Force theNevertheless, the Army and Air Force vied next day (Baker et al. 1994:43).strongly for the air defense mission.Development was shifted to SAMs in the early Although Secretary of Defense Wilson had1950s, as the Air Force worked on its Bomarc requested in 1956 that the Army restrict itsand the Army developed the Nike Ajax. The development of SSMs to units with ranges of 20Nike was fielded in 1954, but its limited range miles (32 km) or less, the Army asked for anand conventional warhead quickly made it exemption in 1957 to allow limited studies for aobsolete. The much more able, nuclear-capable 500-mile (800-km) missile. The exemption wasNike Hercules was under development by 1956 granted and the Army soon began full-scale(Bacevich 1986:77-78). development of what would be deployed as the

The Air Force proposed acquiring the Navy’sTalos as a Nike competitor and, in 1956, began a Much of the work on missile development for thecampaign to prove the Nike was not capable of Army was accomplished at Redstone Arsenal,defending the country. This competition between called the nerve center of the Army’s missilethe two branches caused Secretary of Defense program. During the eight years after it firstCharles E. Wilson to intervene, allotting to the became the Army’s center for missileArmy responsibility for all point defense development in 1948, scientists and engineers atweapons, including SAMs with ranges of up to Redstone had worked on the programs to develop100 miles (160 km). Both Nike and Talos fell the Honest John, Little John, Redstone, Nikeinto this category, giving the Army a monopoly Ajax, Nike Hercules, Hawk, LaCrosse, Corporal,over the SAMs (Bacevich 1986:78-80). In a and Sergeant missiles (Baker 1993:12). Thesimilar confrontation over responsibility for Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) wasIRBMs (the Air Force’s Thor verses the Army’s established at Redstone Arsenal in 1956 toJupiter) occurring at the same time, Wilson ruled oversee the Army’s ballistic missile program, thein favor of the Air Force—the Army could first agency in the United States devotedcontinue to develop Jupiter, but it would belong exclusively to the development of ballisticto the Air Force when deployed. missiles (Brown 1966:2; HOUSAMC 1964:53).

The Jupiter was the first IRBM to be developed in In May 1958, a Hawk missile successfullythe United States. The initial design was intercepted a QF-80 Jet Fighter Drone at tree-topproposed by Dr. Wernher von Braun at Redstone level, destroying it. In June, the 40th FieldArsenal in 1954 (Historical Office, U.S. Army Artillery Missile Group successfullyMateriel Command [HOUSAMC] 1964:53). The accomplished the first overland firing of a5 December 1955 launch of the experimental ballistic missile, a Redstone, at White SandsJupiter Missile RS-12 was the first to operate Missile Range. The same month the Nikesuccessfully under the control of an inertial Hercules was first deployed, and acceleratedguidance system (Hughes 1994:63). Prototype8

Pershing (Bacevich 1986:92).

Inertial guidance is “one of the most important8

technological innovations of the post-war period” independent of the outside environment, and is thus(Luttwak 1971:115). It is composed of a gyroscope- unaffected by hostile electronic warfare environmentsstabilized platform linked via sensors to a computer or inclement weather (Luttwak 1971:115).

monitoring system. The most important aspect ofinertial guidance is that it operates completely


25

production of the missile began (Baker et al. Schlesinger 1993:543), but it was nearly two1994:36). The 54th Anti-Aircraft Artillery, thefirst unit to be equipped with Nike Ajax missilesand one of the first to convert to Nike Hercules,was assigned to Edgewood Arsenal in 1958 toprovide air defense for the Washington, D.C.,area (Aberdeen Proving Ground 1976:10). AndMartin Marietta Aerospace, in Orlando, Florida,was in the same year selected as the primecontractor on what would become one of the mostimportant missiles in the Army’s arsenal, thePershing (Public Affairs Office, U.S. ArmyMissile Command [PAOMICOM] 1991:n.p.).

Development of the first generation Pershing,later known as Pershing I, began in 1958. Themobile missile had a 400-mile (650-km) rangeand a nuclear warhead. It was designed toreplace the nuclear-tipped Redstone, providing ashorter reaction time, greater mobility, and longerrange. The missile was tested at Cape CanaveralAir Force Station and White Sands Missile Rangebeginning in February 1960, and was firstdeployed in 1963. The second and thirdgenerations of the missile would enterdevelopment in the mid-1960s (HOHQAMC1969:159; Public Affairs Office, U.S. ArmyMissile Command 1991:n.p.).

Space Developments

The Army was interested in space mainly becauseof public relations issues.

By demonstrating its leadership in spaceresearch to a fascinated public the Armycould both garner support for a role inmilitary missile development, and go fartoward shedding its image as technically themost backward of the Services. During theEisenhower years the Army luxuriated in itsability to throw missiles farther and moreaccurately than anyone else—as with the3,000-mile Redstone shot of September1956. The Service basked in the publicitythat it gained from solving technicalproblems such as ‘nosecone reentry,’however remote they might be from tacticalrequirements [Bacevich 1986:75].

Eisenhower first declared that the United Stateswould work toward the development of spacesatellites in July 1955 (Hughes 1994:61;

years before he saw the first truly sensationalsuccesses. The Soviet Union’s test of its firstICBM and placement of the world’s first satelliteinto orbit in 1957 increased fears in the U.S.about the level of Soviet technology and first-strike capability. The launch of Sputnik I inOctober

. . . left most Americans dumbfounded.Overnight, their smug self-confidence in thesuperiority of United States technical know-how had been all but destroyed. A flurry ofactivity followed as Washington scrambledto regain its lost pre-eminence [Schlesinger1993:550].

Eisenhower created a panel to study the UnitedStates space program in November 1957 (whichin turn prompted the founding of the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration [NASA]the following year). Initial efforts by the Army toupgrade its space program proved disappointing,especially after a Vanguard rocket exploded on itsCape Canaveral launch pad. Prior to this, theArmy had been restricted from developing itsJupiter missile into a satellite launch vehicle; thelaunch of Sputnik II in November prompted theSecretary of Defense to lift this restriction(Hughes 1992:3-4; Schlesinger 1993:550).However, it was a Redstone rocket that lifted thefirst United States satellite, the Explorer I, intoorbit in January 1958 (Borklund 1991:161).

During the next 30 months, the Army made agreat contribution to the U.S. space program. InMay 1959, the Army completed Project Horizon,a four-volume study that proposed a nationalprogram to have a manned lunar outpost by 1966(Baker et al. 1994:49). The Corps of Engineersestablished a Missiles and Space Office tocoordinate and help direct research among thetechnical services and other government agencies;the Missiles and Space Office soon developed apreliminary design of a simulator to reproduceexpected extraterrestrial environments(Anonymous 1959a:40). Other Army programsclaimed more of the public’s attention. Theservice placed four satellites into earth orbit,launched the western hemisphere’s first lunarprobe and solar satellite, sent three primates intospace, initiated the design of a lunar explorationvehicle, and began working on the launch vehicle


26

that would carry the first humans into space. The Plant) in Indiana were converted to produce andlatter was a modified Redstone missile, which load VX (Harris and Paxman 1982:184; HyltonNASA would use in its Project Mercury. All the 1972:90). An advance in VX delivery was madeArmy’s space-related missions were transferred in 1960 with the development of the M55 115-to NASA on 1 July 1960. Less than a year later, mm rocket, which had a range of 11,000 meters.Navy astronaut Alan B. Shepard, Jr., became the The rocket was noted to have been the firstfirst man in space, sent aloft by the Mercury- significant advance regarding delivery ofRedstone MR-3 on 5 May 1961 (Hughes 1992:1, chemical nerve agents since the 4.2-inch mortar,11-12). into which chemical agents had been loaded

It was not only the Army’s missiles that were weapons development, mosquitoes were bred atinvolved in the space program. The Signal Fort Detrick. These could be infected withResearch Development Laboratory at Fort yellow fever, loaded into cluster bombs, andMonmouth developed solar power cells and solar- either dropped from aircraft or loaded intopowered devices for satellites, radio transmitters, Sergeant missile warheads to be fired at theinfrared scanning equipment for cloud-cover enemy. Newly discovered diseases called Q-mapping, telemetry transmitters, and satellite fever and tularemia were developed for use intelevision cameras (HOCECOM 1985:41; weapons against humans, and new anticropUSASRDL 1959a:23-24, 26). The Signal agents were also developed. Plans were made toResearch Development Laboratory also worked expand production at Pine Bluff Arsenal, and thewith NASA to provide tracking for satellites and Deseret Test Center was established to test thespace probes (USASRDL 1959a:24). These new creations (Harris and Paxman 1982:166, 169-efforts provided initial data for the later 170; Smart 1994:14).development of surveillance and communicationssatellites. Research was indicating future trendsin other ways as well. A report titled U.S. ArmyCapabilities in the Space Age, A Review of theU.S. Army Technical Services’ Performance andPotential notes studies were already underwayregarding the feasibility of a satellite intercept,anti-satellite defense, and other space-baseddefensive systems (Anonymous 1959a:13),foreshadowing the Strategic Defense Initiative ofthe 1980s.

Chemical and Biological WeaponsDevelopments

Programs to develop chemical and biologicalweapons during the mid- to late 1950s and early1960s incorporated advances in the understandingof how agents affected their victims and how theagents could be dispersed, thus resulting in thecreation of new, more powerful chemical warfare(CW) and biological warfare (BW) agents. By1956 the British had developed a manufacturingprocess for VX, discovered in 1952, and thedetails of the process were passed to the UnitedStates. Facilities at the Newport Chemical Plant(later renamed the Newport Army Ammunition

during World War II (Smart 1991a:20). In BW

As the United States became more involved in theVietnam conflict, the budget for chemical andbiological weapons increased significantly. Thiswas in part because of the possibility that“humane” chemicals could remove or greatlydecrease the necessity to kill one’s enemies toachieve victory. The hopes were illusory.Research conducted primarily at EdgewoodArsenal resulted in the development of agents likeEA 1298 and BZ, incapacitants that could disablethe enemy without killing. Lack of control,though, made such weapons as likely to affectfriendly forces as the enemy. Another drawbackwas that field commanders under the influence ofsuch agents, some of which greatly alteredperception, might be more likely to escalate aconventional battle to a nuclear confrontation.Although thousands of kilograms of BZ wereproduced between 1962 and 1964, it was probablynever used on a battlefield (Harris and Paxman1982:189-190). Chemicals which were usedextensively by U.S. forces were anticrop weaponsand defoliants developed at Fort Detrick (Harrisand Paxman 1982:191), the most infamous ofwhich, Agent Orange, is still discussed todaybecause of the impact it had on the troops thatadministered the chemical. By 1959, extensiveoutdoor chemical and biological agent test ranges


27

Vietnam Era—Important Installations

Dugway Proving Ground for chemical andbiological agent testing

Edgewood Arsenal (Aberdeen Proving Ground)for chemical and biological agents research

Fort Detrick, location of the DirectCommunications Link terminal

Pine Bluff Arsenal for biological weaponsdemilitarization

and indoor laboratories had been set up atDugway Proving Ground, which continued tooperate these facilities during the 1960s(Anonymous 1959a:194, 198; Harris and Paxman1982:190). Although one author from the erawrote in 1963 that “‘[t]he best way for the U.S. toachieve its military aims in Southeast Asia wouldbe to rely on chemical warfare’ . . . [to] ‘sanitize’a particular area with gases and sprays that killedeverything from vegetation to humans” (Smart1991a:21), public awareness of the existence ofchemical and biological weapons was beginningto grow, as was the willingness to speak outagainst the use of such weapons (HistoricalOffice, Headquarters, U.S. Army MaterielDevelopment and Readiness Command[HOHQDARCOM] 1978:24).

In a program that may not have been atypical inchemical and biological weapons development,an agreement was worked out with the New YorkState Psychiatric Institute for the testing ofpsychochemicals during the 1950s. “Between1953 and 1957 the United States Army gave140,000 dollars to . . . the New York StatePsychiatric Institute, to discover what effectselected drugs would have on patients” (Harrisand Paxman 1982:189). One of these subjectswas tennis professional Harold Blauer, who diedafter being injected with a large dose of one ofthe agents the agents mentioned above as humanealternatives to traditional chemical weapons—themescaline derivative EA 1298 (Harris andPaxman 1982:188). Other tests were conductedwith the cooperation of almost 1,500 military andcivilian volunteers (Harris and Paxman1982:189).

VIETNAM PERIOD, 1964-1972

Global Setting

The turmoil, and advancement, wrought bytechnology and technological developments of theprevious period shifted to turmoil and progress insocial issues during this period, with landmarkdecisions being made during President Lyndon B.Johnson’s “war on poverty” and in civil rightsissues. For the military, the period was one ofplateaus, of moving away from a stage of rapiddevelopment and into a phase of procurement andmaintenance, and of a greater effort—in spite ofhuge roadblocks like the Vietnam conflict—toachieve a more stable coexistence with Cold Waropponents.

As this period began, the tension between theSoviet Union and United States remained at ahigh level, despite efforts to reduce the intensityof the Cold War conflict in the early 1960s. InJanuary 1964, Soviet planes downed an Air Forcetraining jet over East Germany, killing three crewmembers (Schlesinger 1993:566). But theprimary area of surrogate East-West conflict wasin Southeast Asia, where the U.S.’s commitmentto involvement was based not on the situation inVietnam itself, but on fear of Chineseexpansionism (HOHQAMC 1969:207).

In August 1964, two United States destroyerspatrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin, were attacked byNorth Vietnamese patrol boats. Almostimmediately, Congress passed the Gulf of TonkinResolution, altering the United States role in theregion from one primarily encompassing trainingto one incorporating search and destroymissions—essentially a declaration of limited war(Borklund 1991:165; Schlesinger 1993:569, 572).Vietcong attacks on U.S. forces in February 1965prompted an escalation of the U.S. role in thearea, and Johnson used his authority under theGulf of Tonkin Resolution to order the bombingof North Vietnamese positions. U.S. Marineslanded in Vietnam in March, the first combatforces to be sent to the area. In July, Johnsonincreased the number of troops serving inVietnam to 125,000 and asked Congress for $1.7billion to support the war effort. The bombing ofpositions in North Vietnam was halted at the endof 1965 in an effort to open peace talks, but thesorties were begun again in January 1966. At theend of June the bombing effort was extended to


28

include Hanoi and Haiphong, and troop numbers At the end of March 1972, North Vietnamesehad increased to 285,000 (Schlesinger 1993:571, troops crossed into South Vietnam in a massive573, 575-576). Congressional authorizations for attack. The U.S. subsequently renewed bombingmilitary spending were also increased by 21 raids that had been halted three years previous,percent because of increased demands to support but troops continued to be withdrawn, the lastthe southeast Asia (SEA) conflict (Borklund ground forces leaving in August. Finally, a peace1991:47), and the AMC spent almost $7 billion treaty was agreed upon, signed in Paris in Januaryon new equipment. General Frank S. Besson, Jr. 1973. The signing of the treaty was viewed(the first Commanding General of the AMC) basically as the end of U.S. involvement innoted, however, that the U.S. “full-scale entry Vietnam, although bombing continued until 14into the conflict in Vietnam was a far cry from August of that year. Thus ended a war that hadthe situation in World War II, when we took three “severely challenged Americans’ image ofyears to build and stock a logistical base in themselves as moral guardians of the world”Britain before we risked an invasion of the (Schlesinger 1993:572, 590, 592-594).continent” (HOHQAMC 1969:101).

On the last day of January 1968, the day before revolved around its involvement in Vietnam.the lunar New Year Tet, communist forces in AMC commanding general Frank S. BessonVietnam launched a major attack on South initiated a change in Army procurement in theVietnamese and United States forces. During the five years beginning in 1963, with mobility itemsyear, United States forces in Vietnam would claiming a larger share and missiles a smallerreach their peak level of 541,000 troops. United share of the procurement budget than they had inStates bombing north of the 21st parallel was the past. He cited one reason as the Army goal ofhalted at the end of March, and in May peace a more flexible response, which the Armytalks began in Paris, France. All United States adapted to as it left the Pentomic organizationbombing of North Vietnam was halted in October behind (HOHQAMC 1969:100). 1968 in an effort to end a stalemate of the peacetalks (Schlesinger 1993:572, 579, 581). Although Vietnam served as a primary focus of

In June 1969, after discussing the situation with elsewhere were also shaping the Cold War.the president of South Vietnam, President Nixon Soviets displayed antiballistic missiles in(elected to office at the end of 1968) announced Moscow’s Red Square in May 1964 (NPSthat 25,000 troops would be withdrawn from 1995:40). Military analysts began to turn moreVietnam, the first troop reduction since U.S. often to events in the Third World to help themforces were introduced there in 1965. By the end develop strategy (Arkin and Fieldhouseof the year, troop strength had fallen by 110,000. 1985:131). And China tested its first atomicThe conflict appeared to be on the verge of bomb in October 1964, the entire sequence ofescalating again in April 1970, when Nixon events during the test recorded by United Statesannounced that United States troops had been surveillance (Borklund 1991:166). During thesent into Cambodia following the overthrow of early portion of this period, a conflict involvingPrince Sihanouk and the establishment of a new the United States also erupted in the Dominicanregime under Lon Nol in that country. The Republic. In April 1965, during a civil warformer was supported by Hanoi and Beijing, between the forces of U.S.-supported Donaldwhile the United States supported the Reid Cabral and ex-president Juan Bosch,anticommunist Lon Nol. The number of troops Marines were sent to the country. In May, 20,000continued to be reduced in Vietnam itself, more troops followed. The conflict ended in thehowever, and in January 1972 Nixon announced last days of May as the Organization of Americanthat troop strength in Vietnam would soon fall States sent troops to enforce a peace treaty andbelow 100,000. The same month he made public United States forces withdrew (Schlesingeran eight-point peace proposal (Schlesinger 1993:572).1993:584-586, 589).

Much of the Army’s activity during this period

East-West tension during this period, events


29

During 1966, the Soviets deployed the world’s weapons. The U.S., which had paid littlefirst antiballistic missile system around Moscow,and the U.S. began developing multipleindependently-targetable reentry vehicles(MIRVs) as a means of overwhelming theantiballistic missile system in the Soviet Union(Hubbs and Zielinski 1995:37-38). And the Six-Day War involving Egypt, Syria, Jordan, andIsrael in 1967 prompted the activation of thehotline between the United States and the SovietUnion in an effort to avoid escalation andpossible nuclear exchange. The quick Israelivictory prevented any such exchange (Borklund1991:168). Another event in the Middle East alsodrew the attention of the U.S. military and theworld. That was the Egyptian-supported attack ofthe village of Kitaf, Yemen, in January 1967.Civil war had broken out in that country in 1963,with republican forces supported by Egypt androyalist forces supported by Saudi Arabia andJordan. Various reports between 1963 and 1967,all unsubstantiated, accused Egypt of usingchemical weapons (which could have come fromonly one source, the Soviet Union [Harris andPaxman 1982:234]), but the attack of Kitaf leftlittle doubt.

During this air raid, bombs were droppedupwind of the town that produced a grey-green cloud which drifted over the village.According to International Red Crossreports, 95% of the population up to twokilometers downwind of the impact site,died within 10 to 50 minutes of the attack.All the animals in the area also died. Theestimated total human casualties were over200 [Smart 1991a:23].

Similar attacks were reported in Gahar, Gabas,Hofal, Gadr, and Gadafa in May, the cumulativedeath toll from these surpassing 240.International Red Cross investigations led theagency to declare that mustard agent and possiblynerve agents had been used. Prior to this allegeduse, no country had ever released nerve agents incombat. Egypt, a signatory of the 1925 Geneva9

convention, denied they had used chemical

attention to previous accusations of the use ofchemical agents in part because of the uproar itsown use of defoliants in Vietnam was causing(Smart 1991a:22), now took notice. The attacksin Yemen, combined with reports that theEgyptians had stockpiled chemical munitions forused against Israel prior to the Six-Day War,were used to support requests for thedevelopment of field alarms that could detectchemical agents (Smart 1991a:22-23) and wereprobably used to support chemical and biologicalweapons programs as well.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara hadtestified before the House Armed ServicesCommittee in February 1965, calling for anincreased civil defense program in the UnitedStates and suggesting that the nation develop anantiballistic missile system (Schlesinger1993:571). Near the end of 1967 McNamaraannounced that the United States would developa “thin” antiballistic missile defense. Bydesigning a system specifically for protectionfrom attack by less sophisticated Chineseweaponry, this “thin” system, McNamara felt,would not encourage the Soviet Union to increaseits missile production, and would cost the U.S.only about $5 billion, far less than the $40 billionprice tag for a “heavier” system. The ABMsystem was to use Nike X and Spartan missilesand was called Sentinel. This plan was changedin the spring of 1969, when President Nixonshifted to the development of a “heavier” systemthat could protect against both Soviet and Chineseattack. Fears that this new system, calledSafeguard, would escalate the arms race provokeddebate in Congress, but the plan was approved(Schlesinger 1993:578, 581-582). The firstSafeguard site was established in 1969 to protectMinuteman II emplacements in North Dakota(Hubbs and Zielinski 1995:41-43).

In November 1969, the United States and theSoviet Union met in Helsinki to discuss placinglimitations on ICBMs and antiballistic missilesystems. These meetings became the first ofthree strategic arms limitation talks (SALT, laterSALT I, II, and III). In mid-November theUnited Nations-sponsored NuclearNonproliferation Treaty was signed by the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union, England, and about 60other countries; the treaty pledged signatory

The gases used extensively during World War I9

are not considered nerve gases because contaminationby these agents does not affect the transmission ofimpulses by the nervous system, the definingcharacteristic of nerve agents.


30

nations not to spread the technology or material terminals in the vicinity of Washington andneeded to produce nuclear weapons. France,India, and China, which also possessed nuclearweapons by this time, did not sign the agreement(Schlesinger 1993:585; Weitze 1996a:30).

A week later, President Nixon ordered allstockpiles of biological weapons to be destroyedand brought the 1925 Geneva Protocol,prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, beforethe Senate for ratification with the provision thatthe United States would use chemical weapons inretaliation, and retained the right to use riotcontrol agents and herbicides (Schlesinger1993:586; Smart 1991a:25; USADARCOM1984a:5). The subject of banning both chemicaland biological weapons had come up at a 1968meeting of the standing Eighteen NationDisarmament Committee in Geneva. In previousdiscussions, biological and chemical weapons hadalways been discussed together, but at thismeeting the British proposed they be separatedand introduced the Biological WeaponsConvention. Although there was great oppositionfrom the Eastern bloc, Nixon’s Novemberannouncement appears to have helped changeattitudes. In April 1972, the United States andSoviet Union became signatories to theBiological Weapons Convention, pledging to

. . . “never in any circumstances develop,produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire orretain” any biological weapons. Overeighty other countries followed suit. TheBiological Weapons Convention was atriumph, because unlike many other armscontrol agreements which merely restrictedthe development and deployment of newweapons, it removed one category ofarmaments from the world arsenalsaltogether [Harris and Paxman 1982:172].

Soon thereafter, the facilities at Pine BluffArsenal began turning the biological agents into“harmless sludge” (Harris and Paxman1982:172).

The radio and cable system providing the“hotline” between Washington, D.C., andMoscow (called MOLINK) was upgraded in 1971to a satellite connection called the DirectCommunication Link (DCL), which provideddirect teletype communications between

Moscow. Two independent satellite systemswere used—the Soviet Union’s Molniya II andthe United States’s COMSAT Intelsat IV. TheWashington area terminals were constructed atFort Detrick (HOHQDARCOM 1978:310, 317-318).

A study concerning the construction of a newammunition plant to manufacture projectiles wasinitiated in 1971. As a result of the study,completed in 1974, the Army decided to build theMississippi Army Ammunition Plant at NASA’sNational Space Technology Laboratories facility,near Picayune, Mississippi. Construction beganin 1978 (Bouilly et al. 1984:14; MasonTechnologies, Inc., 1993:1). The installation wasthe first Army ammunition plant constructedsince World War II, and the first in the nation tointegrate metal parts manufacturing, loading, andassembling operations (Bouilly et al. 1984:14;MacDonald and Mack Partnership/BuildingTechnology Incorporated [MMP/BTI] 1984a:14).

In June 1971, the Nixon administrationannounced an important step forward ininternational relations with the lifting of a 21-yeartrade embargo banning commerce with thePeople’s Republic of China. The followingmonth, Nixon “accepted ‘with pleasure’ aninvitation by Premier Chou En Lai to visit thatcountry” (Schlesinger 1993:588) and promised tocall for the seating of China in the United Nations(Schlesinger 1993:589). U.S.-Soviet tensionseased in September 1971 when the Sovietsguaranteed in writing Western access to WestBerlin in exchange for a promise that “WestGermany would not try to incorporate the westernsection of that city” (Schlesinger 1993:589).Other signs that tensions were easing included thesale of feed grains to the Soviets in November1971; an agreement on the further sale of corn,wheat, and other grains, reached in July 1972; andNixon’s announcement that he would travel to theSoviet Union, the first president to do so sinceWWII (Schlesinger 1993:589, 592).

In January 1972 Nixon approved a NASA projectthat entailed the construction and launch of aspace shuttle (Schlesinger 1993:589). Thatapproval was an important step in makingPresident Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense


31

Initiative of the 1980s feasible. In the spring of chemical and biological agents—as well as the1972, the first guided missiles developed inAmerica were fired in combat while the U.S. wasstill involved in Vietnam. Two Huey helicoptersmounted with tube-launched, optically tracked,wire-guided (TOW) missiles went into action inVietnam, and within two months they haddestroyed 26 tanks and 39 other targets (AMC ca.1972:24).

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical WeaponsDevelopments

Developments in the area of nuclear warfare seemto have been less energetic while America wasinvolved in Vietnam than they had been in yearsprevious. Only about 10 new nuclear warheadsentered the U.S. stockpile in the years between1964 and 1972 and between seven and 10 beganbeing developed during the same period. Incomparison, during the period from 1955 to 1963more than 45 new warheads entered the stockpileand research was initiated on 30 to 35 newwarheads (Cochran 1984:7-9). This downwardtrend is reflected in the figures for the Army’snuclear weapons for these periods (Table 2).

The effort at this time among all the armed forcesshifted toward survivability and studies of theeffects of nuclear explosions on electronicequipment and other equipment. NumerousArmy facilities were then extant at the DugwayProving Ground for these types of studies(Dugway Proving Ground 1964:61-78, 130); theNuclear Defense Laboratory was built atEdgewood Arsenal in the early 1960s, and a $4million Tandem Van de Graaf accelerator, theonly one of its kind owned by the Department ofDefense, was installed there in 1968 (AMC ca.1972:13; HOHQAMC 1969:82); the PulseRadiation Facility, with its $5 million nuclearreactor—the most powerful of its type in theUnited States—was completed at AberdeenProving Ground in 1968 (AMC ca. 1972:12); andother facilities were built or updated.

In contrast, quite a lot of work was being doneduring the Vietnam period in the development of

use of some of these weapons. Although theUnited States had adopted a no-first-use policywith regard to chemical and biological weapons,the government did not feel that defoliantstechnically fell under this restriction. OperationRanch Hand was underway by 1964 in Vietnam.Ranch Hand spread defoliants over much of thenorthern half of the country, and later over Laosand Cambodia as well, spraying food crops alongwith ground cover (Harris and Paxman 1982:191-192).

During 1964 tests of BZ, an incapacitant“psychochemical” developed at EdgewoodArsenal based on studies of LSD- and mescaline-type chemicals that had also been experimentedwith there, were conducted at Dugway ProvingGround (Harris and Paxman 1982:187-189).Other tests included a mock assault on New YorkCity, using “harmless bacteria” in 1966 (Harrisand Paxman 1982:158-159); and open air VXtests at Dugway Proving Ground in 1968, whichapparently killed about 3,000 sheep in nearbySkull Valley, Utah, prompting Congress torestrict open air testing (Harris and Paxman1982:216; Smart 1991a:24). By 1967, 4,000 to5,000 tons of VX, possibly the most powerfulnerve agent in existence, had been produced bythe Newport Chemical Plant (Harris and Paxman1982:185).

In an effort to make chemical munitions safer tohandle and store, the Army began in 1967requesting money to produce binary agents,chemical weapons that technically did notbecome lethal until after the weapon deliveringthe agent had been fired and two separatecomponents were mixed in flight to produce thelethal agent (Harris and Paxman 1982:232). TheNavy was the first to sponsor development ofbinary agents, a cure, they hoped, for problemsthey experienced carrying unitary weapons on-board ships (Smart 1991b:2). The Army studythat would eventually lead to the development ofthe M687 Binary GB projectile was first fundedin 1968 (Smart 1991b:2).

32

Table 2Army Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1984

Warhead Delivery Method Development Development First RetirementDesignation Laboratory** Initiated*** Production from Service

Trinity Test LANL 1943 1945 1945

Little Boy* Bomb LANL 1943 1945 1945

Fat Man Bomb LANL 1943 1945 1945

Mk-7 Corporal (Mod 1) LANL appx. 1949 1953 1967

Mk-7 Honest John (Mod 2) LANL appx. 1949 1954 1967

Mk-7 ADM -B (Mod 3) LANL appx. 1949 1954 1967†

Mk-9 280-mm howitzer LANL appx. 1950 1952 1957

W19 280-mm howitzer LANL appx. 1953 1956 1963

T4 ADM LANL post-1955 1957 1963

W29 Redstone LANL post-1955 canceled1956

W30 TADM LANL 1955 1959 1966

W31 Honest John LANL 1954 1958 active 1984

W31 ADM LANL 1954 1958 1965

W32 240-mm howitzer LANL N/A canceled1955

W33 8-inch howitzer LANL 1954 1956 active 1984

W35 Jupiter LANL 1955 canceled1957/1958

W37 Nike Hercules LANL N/A canceled1959

W39 Redstone LANL 1956 1958 1965

W40 LaCrosse LANL 1956 1959 1964

W42 Hawk N/A N/A canceled

W45 Medium ADM LLNL 1956 1965 active 1984

W45 Little John LLNL 1956 1962 retired, yearuncertain

W48 155mm howitzer LLNL 1957 1963 active 1984

33

Table 2 (cont’d)

Warhead Delivery Method Development Development First RetirementDesignation Laboratory** Initiated*** Production from Service

W49 Jupiter LANL 1957 1959 1963

W50 Pershing I LANL 1958 1963 1989

W52 Sergeant LANL 1960 1962 1977

W54 Davy Crockett LANL 1959 1960 1971

W54 Special ADM LANL 1960 1964 1989

W64 Lance N/A N/A canceled1964

W66 Sprint LANL 1968 1974 retired

W70 Lance (Mod-1/2) LLNL 1969 1973 active 1984

W70 Lance (Mod-3) LLNL 1976 1981 active 1984

W71 Spartan LLNL 1968 1974 retired

W74 155mm howitzer N/A N/A canceled1973

W75 8-inch howitzer N/A N/A canceled1973

W79 8-inch howitzer LLNL 1975 1981 active 1984

W82 155mm howitzer LLNL 1978 ca. 1986

W85 Pershing II LANL 1979 ca. 1983 1991(surface/air

burst)

W86 (earth Pershing II LANL 1979 canceledpenetrator) 1981

* Army Air Force weapon** LANL—LosAlamos National Laboratory; LLNL—LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory; N/A—not available*** dates are for warhead, rather than delivery system, development;N/A—not available† Atomic Demolition MunitionSources: Bouilly et al. 1990; Cochran 1984

Communications Infrastructure Developments they are or can be used by the military (Arkin and

In April 1965 NASA launched and placed in orbit for surveillance grew in importance during thisthe world’s first commercial satellite—EarlyBird. It transmitted television and telephonesignals (Schlesinger 1993:572). Although notdirectly related to military endeavors, all satellitesand relay stations may serve as part of themilitary communications infrastructure in that

Fieldhouse 1985:6, 12-13, 160). Satellites used

period of reduced tension and increased effort towork out and ensure adherence to treaties. TwoVela nuclear detection satellites were launched in1970, and continued to operate into the late 1980s(Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:20).


34

The Final Years—Important Installations

Picatinny Arsenal, Armament Research,Development, and Engineering Centerheadquarters

Frankford Arsenal, laser research site

Pine Bluff Arsenal, site of binary chemicalweapons production and BZ demilitarization

The Army was interested in satellites not only forglobal communications and logistical operationsbut also for tactical use. Project EASTT(Experimental Army Satellite Tactical Terminal),conducted during 1967 and 1968, provided basicexperience, and the first satellite of the TacticalSatellite Communications (TACSATCOM)program was launched in 1969. The terminal atthe Field Station 1 of the Army SatelliteCommunication Agency (SATCOMA), inLakehurst, New Jersey, served as “the primary establishment of rules for negotiating a strategiccommunications circuit during the Apollo 11 arms limitation treaty. In October the Middlerecovery operation” (Bingham ca. 1979:321). East provided the setting for the next surrogate

The Joint Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) Kippur War, during which the United StatesProgram, integrating efforts by all three branches supplied Israel with military equipment and theof the military, was set up by the Department of Soviet Union did the same for the Arab forces.Defense in 1971 to study the growing array of U.S. armed forces research and intelligencecommunications needs the services had in communities benefited from the war through thecommon, including the need for means to acquisition of captured Soviet equipment.securely handle the growing volume of battlefield However, the United States as a whole suffereddata being used. The huge scope of the program because of the Arab oil embargo that began withincluded the development of all hardware for use the war (Marken 1976:119; Schlesinger 1993:596,by U.S. tactical forces in a theater of war, with 599).the added criterion that this hardware becompatible with NATO equipment (Bingham ca. In an area not directly related to usual military1980:417). Other joint organizations and operations but certainly representative of theprograms included the UNICOM/STARCOM impact broad military research and development(Universal Integrated Communications System/ programs can have on the lives of citizens inStrategic Army Communications System) general, Electronics Command (ECOM)program in Southeast Asia and the Pacific; the engineers at Fort Monmouth’s Patterson ArmyDefense Communications Agency (DCA); the Hospital developed a new type of pacemaker insynchronized satellite communications system 1973. The “prototype Defibrillator Pacemaker . .(SYNCOM) program; the Defense Satellite . was a lifesaving combination defibrillator andCommunications System (DSCS); and heart pacemaker that not only regulated aAUTODIN, the Automatic Digital Network patient’s heartbeat, but also sensed the start of(CECOM Historical Office 1994:15; heart fibrillation . . . and briefly stopped andHOHQAMC 1969:59, 179; Marken 1976:41). restarted the heart allowing a normal heartbeat toThese were all working to set up what has now resume” (CECOM Historical Office 1994:23).become an immense, intricate globalcommunications network so pervasive and The U.S. vacillated in its attitude towardencompassing that it is difficult to comprehend chemical and biological weapons during thisthe now-extant system in its entirety (Arkin and period. After the Paris peace pact was signed inFieldhouse 1985:6). 1973 officially ending the Vietnam War, the

THE FINAL YEARS, 1973-1989

In mid-June 1973, Soviet and U.S. presidents Kippur War in 1973 provided evidence that theLeonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon began a Soviets had made fairly extensive preparations toseries of talks, which led to an agreement to wage a chemical war (Smart 1991a:25-26),“avoid confrontations that might precipitate a enhancing their ability to survive and fight in anuclear war” (Schlesinger 1993:595) and the chemically or biologically contaminated

U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation with the Yom

Army recommended the eventual abolishment ofits chemical division as a separate entity (Smart1991a:25). Congress objected, apparently in partbecause equipment captured during the Yom


35

environment. This knowledge shifted the focus The Pine Bluff installation also received a $29.1of research in the United States more towardsurvivability as well (Dugway Proving Ground1974:93; Marken 1976:120).

Then in 1975 the U.S. learned that the SovietUnion was possibly developing a new type ofchemical or biological weapon. There had beensome evidence that the Soviets had developed anew agent prior to the Yemen civil war that tookplace in the 1960s. As discussed previously, theU.S. did little to investigate these claims becauseof widespread objections to the use of defoliantsby U.S. forces in Vietnam. However, after theU.S. withdrew the last of its forces fromVietnam, detailed descriptions of NorthVietnamese attacks with a gas that caused violentreactions similar to those reported during theYemenite war began surfacing among the Hmongof Vietnam, a group that had worked closely withthe CIA in Laos. These descriptions promptedthe United States to look more seriously into thepossibility that the Soviets had indeed created anew type of chemical or biological weapon, andsupplied it to not only its allies in Yemen but inVietnam as well. Army scientists believed theHmongs’ stories to be proof that the Soviets haddeveloped a new type of weapon, but a 1981United Nations investigation was inconclusive(Harris and Paxman 1982:235, 237).

The U.S. had the capability to produce binarychemical weapons in 1976, but Congressremained opposed to their production until 1980(Smart 1991b:2). Also influential were the“Wintex” war games of 1979, during which theappropriate response to a “Soviet” attack withchemical weapons was overwhelmingly felt to bethe use of nuclear weapons. This reportedly cameas a surprise to the NATO participants, andcaused many to view chemical weapons in a newlight—a light in which it became apparent that anabsence of chemical weapons could lead to anescalation from conventional to nuclear warfare(Harris and Paxman 1982:230-231). In September1980, Congress appropriated $3.15 million for theconstruction of a plant to produce and load binarymunitions and $20 million for procurement ofequipment for that facility (USADARCOM1984a:7). The site of that plant was Pine BluffArsenal (Bouilly et al. 1984:80).

million contract to design and install a BZDemilitarization Facility in 1983(USADARCOM 1984a:7). A 1984Congressional study by the Chemical WarfareReview Commission found the retaliatorycapabilities of the U.S. military insufficient in theevent of a chemical attack (Smart 1991a:30-31).Congress felt unitary agents were too dangerousto fulfill that need and passed Public Law 99-145in 1986, which directed the Army to dispose ofall its unitary agents, which were both stored inbulk containers and loaded in weapons (Bouilly etal. 1990:239). This set the stage for the ChemicalStockpile Modernization Program (Binary)initiated in fiscal year 1986, under which allunitary chemical weapons would be replaced withbinary weapons (HOHQAMC 1987a:128,1989:22). Production of the M687 155-mmbinary projectile was underway at Pine BluffArsenal by the end of 1987 (HOHQAMC1989:180; Kamerick 1988:IV:24; Smart1991a:31), and the binary shell for use with theArmy’s Multiple Launch Rocket System wasundergoing tests at White Sands Missile Rangeand Dugway Proving Ground in 1987 and 1988(HOHQAMC 1989:180-181).

In spite of the new preparations to wage war on achemical battlefield, tensions between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union eased further duringthis period, evidenced in 1975 by theApollo/Soyuz space mission. On 17 July the twoships docked, and they remained together for twodays. The easing of tensions on one front,however, caused discomfort on another front asChina expressed alarm at the U.S. detente withMoscow, saying that appeasing the Russianswould only increase the danger of war. In May1976, the United States and Soviet Union signeda five-year agreement limiting undergroundnuclear detonations. Partial appeasement ofBeijing came in 1980, when President Carter,near the end of his term in office, announced thatthe United States would sell weapons to China, aresponse to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan(Schlesinger 1993:603-604, 609).

In 1978, NATO asked the United States to deployintermediate range missiles in Europe to offsetthe intermediate range SS-20s the Soviet Unionwas then deploying (PAOMICOM 1991:n.p.), a


36

reversal of prior operations. The U.S. had 612-613). Moral outrage at the downing ofreduced the size of its forces in the late 1960s, Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983 helpedhoping for a Soviet response in kind. It was not encourage Congressional approval of a $187.5forthcoming. As the U.S. military budget and billion defense bill that included all of theseforce strength in Europe had increased during programs and chemical weapons productionearlier Cold War years, the Soviets had responded (Schlesinger 1993:615-616). The same yearwith similar increases. But Western reductions of President Reagan introduced the Strategicthe 1960s had been met with further increases in Defense Initiative (SDI), ostensibly a defensivethe Eastern Bloc. Stabilization of the quantity shield that would prevent missiles from reachingand quality of the U.S. nuclear weapons in targets in the United States (Borklund 1991:173).Europe had also been met with reinforcements by The plan sparked controversy due to its highthe Soviets (HOHQDARCOM 1980a:2). In research and development costs and accusations1978, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. of offensive-use capabilities. On top of theseDuncan noted that “[t]here has been no evidence events, the idea of a nuclear winter wasindicating restraint on the part of the United “introduced into the public debate in 1983”States would be reciprocated by the Soviets (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:154).unless negotiated agreements in specific andverifiable arms control were reached” In 1986, the Reagan administration proposed a(HOHQDARCOM 1980a:3). 90-month delay in the development of space- and

In the fall of 1981, President Reagan (elected in the SDI system but stated that research and1980) announced a five-point program to testing would continue; the Soviet Unionstrengthen the U.S. military, reversing several of proposed a 15-year ban on the deployment of newPresident Carter’s actions. He asked for 100 B-1 missile defense systems. Later on, the Unitedbombers (which the Carter administration had States considered compromising on a 10-yearopposed) and the same number of MX missiles. delay, but the Soviet’s proposal that all SDICarter had approved the MX program in 1979, research be restricted to the laboratory was notwhich called for 200 missiles that would be acceptable to the U.S. (Waldman 1988:4).moved between shelters as a means of reducing Development continued, enthusiasticallytheir vulnerability to Soviet attack; this multiple supported by the large defense contractors in thelaunch point system proved to be infeasible and U.S., who were expected to receive “[m]ore thantoo expensive and was thus abandoned by Reagan one-half of all SDI appropriations” (Waldmanin favor of basing in superhardened Minuteman 1988:41). By the middle of 1986, over $6 billionsilos, “a decision which effectively undermined had been awarded to the more than 1,300the original rationale for the new missile” contractors at work on the project (Waldman(Crockatt 1995:265). Reagan also called for 1988:41).production of a neutron bomb. The neutron bombwas opposed by the Carter administration on During this last period of the Cold War there washumanitarian reasons (Schlesinger 1993:608, “a major resurgence of interest in tactical nuclear10

ground-based weapons that would contribute to

warfare [both in the area of weaponry and in

The validity of “humanitarian” considerations has10

been questioned since at least the Eisenhoweradministration, which viewed its disagreements withthe Army over the strategy of massive retaliation as oneof theoretical excess versus reality. What was the lesshumanitarian option to persons standing on one side ofthe term was often a key deterrent—that is, the morehumanitarian option—to those taking a stance on the are important in evaluating the significance and roles ofother side of the issue. “In brooding over the realities weapons development and production during the Coldof conducting all-out nuclear war, the Army was War period. The relationship between actual andconcerning itself with a contingency that Eisenhower perceived capabilities, and the surveillance andviewed as too remote to merit serious consideration” intelligence infrastructure that grew up around and(Bacevich 1986:31). Authors Arkin and Fieldhouse fomented these perceptions, are elements that make the(1985:84) updated and further defined this opinion in Cold War a unique historical period.

1985: “The military believes that the ‘credibility’behind its policy is what ultimately deters. [However,t]he planners have grown so used to destroying theenemy in their computers that the actual war hasbecome secondary to the game.” Both points of view


37

survivability] by the Department of Defense” Efforts world-wide to reduce nuclear capabilities(Marken 1976:120), the rationale being that as the became much more widespread during the 1980s.likelihood of full-scale war between the United By 1985, “nuclear-free zones” in regions aroundStates and Soviet Union lessened, the chances for the world had been proposed, Canada hada tactical exchange of nuclear weapons with the removed the last American nuclear weapons fromSoviet Union or a third nuclear-capable power within its borders, and half of the NATOgrew. members had prohibited deployment of U.S.

One important nuclear-weapons advance of the Eastern Bloc, Rumania stated that it would not1970s, affecting both production and the number allow Soviet missiles to be deployed on its soil,of warheads in the U.S. stockpile, was the and Bulgaria refused the peacetime deploymentdevelopment of the variable yield warhead. With of Soviet nuclear weapons there (Arkin andthis technology, a single warhead could provide Fieldhouse 1985:143-144). In November 1985,large or small yields as suitable to the situation, U.S. President Reagan and Soviet Presidentlessening the need for stocking a variety of Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva. They foundwarheads providing different destructive little on which to agree, except that they wouldcapabilities (Cochran 1984:13). In fiscal year meet again the following year. That meeting took1975, Army research and development of the place in Reykjavic, Iceland; although noXM753, an 8-inch artillery fired atomic substantive agreement was signed by the twoprojectile, was begun again and research and superpowers (Schlesinger 1993:621, 623), the11

development of atomic demolition munitions meetings inspired hope that arms controlwere dropped in favor of “increased emphasis and measures would be forthcoming in the not-too-exploitation of Earth Penetrator Warheads” distant future. Then, on 8 December 1987,(Marken 1976:120), also called Tactical Earth Reagan and Gorbachev signed the “TreatyPenetrating Weapons (TEPW) and specifically Between the United States of America and thebuilt to destroy subsurface targets (U.S. Army Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on theArmament Command [USAARMCOM] ca. Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and1975:2:44) such as weapons silos and control Shorter-Range Missiles,” more commonly knowncenters. The only nuclear artillery shell being as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces)used at this time was the M422 Nuclear Treaty (On-Site Inspection Agency, Office ofProjectile, which was undergoing modification Public Affairs [OIAOPA] 1991:1). The INFfor use with an 8-inch howitzer (USAARMCOM Treaty limited the Pershing and ground-launchedca. 1975:2:45). Noted to be a major element of cruise missiles on the U.S. side; the SS-5, SS-12,the Army’s nuclear program at this time was the SS-20, SS-23, and SS-C-X4 on the Soviet side;development of “Radiac” equipment that could and provided for inspection of U.S. and U.S.S.R.detect a nuclear environment (Marken 1976:123- production and storage sites for compliance124). Nuclear artillery were fired at Yuma (OIAOPA 1989:1).Proving Ground in fiscal year 1979(HOHQDARCOM 1981:340). And the first tri- One weapon that influenced the Soviet Union toservice nuclear weapons accident exercise (called agree to the INF Treaty was the Army’s PershingNUWAX) was conducted in April 1979 at the system—in the words of President Gorbachev,Nevada Test Site. The test was designed to allow the Pershing II was the “single most important“evaluation of the command, control, factor that caused the Soviet Union to change itscommunications, and other functions involved in policies toward the West” (Historical Division,interdepartmental coordination and related U.S. Army Missile Command [HDMICOM]activities at the scene of a major nuclear weapon 1991:n.p.). Feasibility studies concerned withaccident” (HOHQDARCOM 1981:183). improving the Pershing Ia and Ib with the

nuclear warheads within their borders; in the

addition of a new terminal guidance system beganduring fiscal year 1974, and development of theenhanced version of the missile began in early1979 (HOHQDARCOM 1978:223-224;PAOMICOM 1991:n.p.). The first Pershing IIs

This was probably the 8-inch howitzer munition11

Cochran (1984:9) listed as canceled in 1973.


38

replaced Pershing Ia systems in Germany in The Army’s sites identified as having1983, and the retired missiles were brought back manufacturing capabilities were Pine Bluffto the U.S. to possibly be used as test targets for Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, theSDI research (HOHQAMC 1987a:96; Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, thePAOMICOM 1991:n.p.). In compliance with the Northrup Carolina Corporation Facility (alsoterms of the INF Treaty signed at the end of 1987, known as Phosphate Development Works), andthe destruction of all Pershings was begun in Rocky Mountain Arsenal (USACMDA1989 (Bouilly et al. 1990:95; HDMICOM 1993a:6:1).1991:n.p.).

Although there are arguments about the end of the neighbor Kuwait. During the massive responseCold War, for the purpose of this context the end called Desert Shield-Desert Storm, sanctioned byhas been established as 1989. The fall of the the United Nations and led by the U.S., chemicalBerlin Wall on 9 through 12 November 1989 is or biological agents may have been used by Iraqiwidely seen as a symbolic, if not the actual close forces. The United Nations counterattack againstof the Cold War, and in December Gorbachev and Iraq lasted 38 days in early 1991 (SchlesingerPresident Bush met in Malta, where they “seem 1993:635; Smart 1994:16).to be in agreement that the Cold War is endingand that a new era can develop in U.S.-Soviet At the end of 1991 Gorbachev stepped down fromrelations” (Schlesinger 1993:630). During the his position as leader of the Soviet Union afteryear, all testing of Pershing improvements was initiating some of the most sweeping reforms incanceled, all deployed Pershings were recalled the nation’s history. The Soviet Union ceased toand began undergoing demilitarization, the last of exist as a single entity, thereafter divided into 15the Nike Hercules missiles deployed in Europe republics. The red flag of the union was removedwas retired, and the use of the special atomic from the Kremlin and replaced with the tri-colordemolition munition (SADM) was canceled standard of Russia. One of the primary reasons(Bouilly et al. 1990:137, 200). for the collapse of the country was the economy.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The few years that have passed since 1989 have national product on military investment duringbrought further reductions in the military tensions the last decade of the Cold War, an investmentbetween the superpowers. In mid-1990 the two that provided less general economic benefit thansuperpowers agreed to limit long-range nuclear did U.S. military expenditures (Gansler 1980;weapons and to reduce chemical weapons Schlesinger 1993:639). The Cold War ended instockpiles (Anonymous ca. 1991:6; Schlesinger 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall; it was laid1993:632; Smart 1991a:32). The Chemical to rest in July 1991 when Bush and GorbachevWeapons Convention (CWC) called for the signed the START treaty, pledging todismantling of all facilities that were capable of significantly reduce the number of strategicproducing chemical weapons, and for that nuclear weapons under the control of theirpurpose the U.S. Army Chemical Materiel respective nations.Destruction Agency (USACMDA) was formed.

In August 1990 Iraq invaded its much smaller

Although SDI and the huge investment expense itentailed may have added to the problems of theSoviet Union, this was not the sole cause. Thecountry was spending 12 to 25 percent of its gross

39

CHAPTER 4ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE

ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND DURING THE COLD WAR

THE TECHNICAL SERVICES, 1946-1962

Until 1962, the technical services were the five percent to each of the Chemical andbranches of the Army that provided arms and Transportation corps, four percent to themunitions for the service. These were called the Engineers, and one percent to the Quartermastersupply branches in the 1920s, the supply arms during the years just prior to the creation of theand services between 1931 and 1942, and the AMC in 1962. The Chief of Ordnance, at thatsupply services in 1942 and 1943 (Kane 1995:19). time and throughout its existence, operated mostThen in 1943, this group of seven supply agencies of the installations that provided the munitionswas renamed the technical services; they included and weapons of the Army (HOUSAMC 1964:20-the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, the Office of 21; Weston 1985:S1). Three technical servicesthe Chief Chemical Officer, the Office of the generated the bulk of the items of interest to aChief Signal Officer, the Office of the Chief of study of the material culture during the Cold WarTransportation, the Office of the Quartermaster period—these being the Ordnance Department,General, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and the Signal Corps, and the Chemical Corps.the Office of the Surgeon General. Army supplyfunctions were performed by these agencies fromthe end of World War II until 1962. A detailed The Office of the Chief of Ordnancehistory of these services prior to and duringWorld War II can be found in the multivolume At the end of World War I, many of the Ordnanceseries The United States Army in World War II:The Technical Services. A history of thetechnical services and their relation to themunitions production facilities in the UnitedStates prior to and during World War II can befound in the document in this Army MaterielCommand Historic Context Series written byhistorian Kimberly Kane (1995).

Each technical service was concerned primarilywith research, development, and procurement ofits own items rather than for the Army as awhole. Approximately 67 percent of research and

development funds for the Army went to theOrdnance Corps, 15 percent to the Signal Corps,

Department’s installations were sold, destroyed,or otherwise removed from the departmentinventory, leaving only six “old-line” arsenalswith the responsibility of preserving the know-how and technology for weapons production thatwould be necessary in the event of another war.These arsenals—Springfield (Massachusetts),Watervliet (New York), Watertown(Massachusetts), Rock Island (Illinois), Frankford(Pennsylvania), and Picatinny (NewJersey)—were all government-ownedgovernment-operated (GOGO) installations. Justprior to and during World War II, the United


40

States set up an extensive complex of weapons Command (OMC), and the Ordnance Specialand materiel production and storage installationsto supplement the capacity of the six arsenals.Most of these new facilities were government-owned contractor-operated installations.Seventy-seven in number, the GOCO installationsprovided facilities to load, assemble, and pack(LAP) artillery; manufacture propellants andexplosives; produce small arms ammunition andchemical weapons; and to provide other specialservices and production facilities (Kane 1995:13,19, 46-47).

At the end of World War II, a majority of theseinstallations were closed or placed on stand-by,many to be reactivated during the early years ofthe Cold War, while the Ordnance Departmentretained the responsibility for the developmentand procurement of the Army’s weapons (Bouillyet al. 1984:3). Most of the properties in the AMCinventory belonged to the Ordnance Departmentduring that early period, including the old-linearsenals; however, many of the locations ofsignificant work and achievements took place atSignal Corps and Chemical Corps installations.Signal Corps activities were important becausethey were related to state-of-the-art technologydevelopment, and Chemical Corps undertakingswere important because of the unique rolechemical and biological weapons assumed duringthe Cold War. Work at the old-line arsenals wassignificant for its association with nuclearweapons development and missile research.

Major accomplishments of the OrdnanceDepartment included the initial research anddevelopment of rockets and guided missiles and12

its research into military applications of infraredtechnology, electronic digital computers, and “theadaptation of atomic energy to propulsion”(Anonymous 1959a:15, 31). The most importantsubcommands of the Ordnance Departmentconducting this work were the OrdnanceWeapons Command (OWC), Ordnance Missile

Weapons Ammunition Command (OSWAC).

The precursor of the OSWAC was the St. LouisField Director of Ammunition Plants (FDAP),established during World War II. In 1950 the St.Louis FDAP became the Ordnance AmmunitionCenter, its headquarters established at JolietArsenal, Illinois. The Center was upgraded to theOrdnance Ammunition Command in 1954, and in1959 it was united with Picatinny Arsenal (whereammunition research and development wasconducted) to form the OSWAC (Bouilly et al.1984:3). OSWAC activities were apparently alsoconducted at Frankford Arsenal (Bouilly et al.1984:4). This command was the predecessor tothe AMC Munitions Command (HOHQAMC1969:151).

The OWC was established in January 1955, itsheadquarters at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois. Ithad jurisdiction over the Springfield Armory,Springfield, Massachusetts; and WatertownArsenal, Watertown, Massachusetts (Bouilly etal. 1984:3; Zobrist and Johnson ca. 1957:162).Watervliet Arsenal was added to its activityvenues in approximately 1960 (Bouilly et al.1984:4).

The OMC was established in March 1958 and“took over the responsibility for the entire familyof Army rockets and missiles” (Brown 1966:2).One important element under the OMC was theArmy Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA),headquartered at Redstone Arsenal. The ABMAlaunched the Army’s Explorer satellites (Hughes1992:6) and had several other space-relatedmissions. The ABMA was absorbed into theOMC in December 1961. Another importantOMC office was the Army Rocket and GuidedMissile Agency (ARGMA), also headquartered atRedstone Arsenal. A third important elementunder OMC jurisdiction was White Sands MissileRange (Anonymous 1959a:13, 33; Brown 1966:2;HDMICOM 1991:1).

The Ordnance Department also helped establishthe foundation for the post-1962 depot system. InApril 1954, the Ordnance Department establishedthe Major Item Supply Management Agency(MISMA) in an effort to overcome supplyproblems experienced during the Korean War.

Although the terms “rocket” and “missile” are12

often used interchangeably, they have specificmeanings in this document. A rocket is a propulsionunit that operates by the expulsion of gases, while amissile is the weapon or projectile being launched by arocket or rocket engine.

Chapter 4: Organizational Overview of the Army Materiel Command During the Cold War

41

Under MISMA, ordnance and equipment control research, testing, shell loading, and defense wereof major items was assigned to Letterkenny consolidated at Edgewood (Smart 1994:5-6).Ordnance Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.The installation was later renamed the World War II brought an expansion of CWSLetterkenny Army Depot (LEAD). MISMA’s activities, and new production facilities weremission was expanded to include maintenance of established at Huntsville, Alabama—Huntsvillemajor items in 1959. MISMA’s first test in a Arsenal, later renamed Redstone Arsenal,mobilization situation came in 1961 during the manufactured and loaded chemical shellsBerlin Crisis, when the Berlin wall was built. (Buchanan and Johnson 1983a:n.p.)—and at PineMobilization proved MISMA to be unable to Bluff, Arkansas—production at the Pine Bluffcompletely fulfill its mission of inventory Arsenal began in July 1942 (Pine Bluff Arsenal andmanagement since it could not locate and redirect Mid-West Chemical Depot 1951:22). Plantsitems in low-priority assignments to areas of manufacturing protective clothing were set up atgreater need. This resulted in the phasing out of Columbus, Ohio; Kansas City, Missouri; and NewMISMA and creation of the Major Item Data Cumberland, Pennsylvania (later called the NewAgency (MIDA) in 1963 (Coppola et al. 1993:17; Cumberland Chemical Plant). Charcoal filters forWalker 1985a:5, 20-21, 24). The post-1962 masks were built at Zanesville and Fostoria, Ohio;history of these organizations is discussed below and impregnate factories were established at Niagrain the Depot Systems Command section. Falls, New York (later called the Niagra Falls

The Office of the Chief Chemical Officer Mountain Arsenal, near Denver, Colorado, was built

The Office of the Chief Chemical Officer could facility in 1942, and the proving ground attrace its beginnings to World War I, when the Edgewood Arsenal was supplemented by a muchDepartment of the Interior Bureau of Mines larger one established at Dugway Proving Ground,offered its facilities to the National Research in Utah, the same year (Dugway Proving GroundCouncil in 1917 to help conduct investigations 1967:viii; Smart 1994:9). A storage facility wasinto chemical gases and gas attack defenses. also established near St. John, Utah, its constructionGuided by the Bureau’s director, the Army completed in 1943 (USACMDA 1993b:A:336).Ordnance Department was charged with Originally called the St. John Chemical Warfaredeveloping chemical munitions, and the Army Ammunition Storage Depot, the name was soonMedical Department was assigned responsibility changed to the Deseret Chemical Warfare Depotfor chemical defense. The Office of the Chief of (USACMDA 1993b:A:336; Wilmore 1952:22).Engineers was responsible for training troops to Chemical weapons were also stored at the Bluedispense the new weapons. In June 1918 the Grass Ordnance Depot (Kentucky) beginning inChemical Warfare Service (CWS) was 1942. Most were moved to Rocky Mountainestablished and assigned all the above duties. Arsenal between 1949 and 1951 (USACMDAChemical weapons research and production were 1993c:A:203).to be concentrated at Edgewood Arsenal,Maryland, but Armistice came before many of the The CWS extended its scope of research tofacilities under construction there were biological weapons in 1943 when it set up Campoperational (Smart 1994:4). Detrick at Frederick, Maryland. The Vigo

The CWS was established as a wartime measure Indiana, in 1943 to support biological agentonly, to be abolished shortly after Armistice, but production (Smart 1994:10), but it was placed insince the war technically had not ended, the CWS standby the same year (Kane 1995:62). It wasremained an active organization into 1920, when later transferred to the Atomic Energyit was made a permanent entity by the National Commission for the production of heavy water,Defense Act of 1920. Edgewood Arsenal which it produced between 1944 and 1946. Theremained the center of CWS field activities, and facility was in standby status between 1946 andmost or all activities concerning chemical 1952, when it was rehabilitated and heavy water

Chemical Plant); East St. Louis, Illinois; andMidland, Michigan (Smart 1994:8). Rocky

as an additional chemical munitions production

Ordnance Plant was built near Terra Haute,


42

was again produced there until 1957 (Newport In 1952, the Chemical Corps School was movedArmy Ammunition Plant ca. 1987:5-6). After theTerra Haute plant was transferred to the ChemicalCorps in 1959, it was renamed the NewportChemical Plant and the heavy water facility wasconverted to the manufacture of the nerve agentVX. Production began in 1961 and wasterminated in 1967 (Hylton 1972:76, 90; NewportArmy Ammunition Plant ca. 1987:5-6).

After the end of World War II, the CWS wasdesignated a Corps and thus became one of theArmy technical services, effective August 1946.The primary Chemical Corps research facilitywas established the same month at EdgewoodArsenal, called the Army Chemical Center. Thescope of its mission was expanded to includeresearch into various aspects of nuclear war andradiation contamination (Smart 1994:11, 22).13

The Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot wascombined with Dugway Proving Ground inJanuary 1947 and renamed the Western ChemicalCenter. The Center was inactive until thebeginning of the Korean war in July 1950, whenthe two were separated again and the DeseretChemical Depot was formed (Wilmore 1952:22,24).

Three important Chemical Corps productionfacilities were established during the early 1950s.Biological weapons and bacteria fermentationfacilities were built at Pine Bluff in 1950 and1951 (Harris and Paxman 1982:160). And aninstallation intended for the production of thenerve gas component dichlor was underconstruction at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, in 1952.The installation was initially known as Site A,later as Phosphate Development Works; thedichlor produced there was to be shipped toRocky Mountain Arsenal, also known as Site B,to be further refined into the nerve agent GB.These were in operation by 1953 (Harris andPaxman 1982:257; Midwest Research Instituten.d.:60).

from the Army Chemical Center at EdgewoodArsenal to Fort McClellan, Alabama, andEdgewood became “a center for pilot plantproduction, production engineering, andproduction of special orders, odd lots, and non-standard items” (Smart 1994:13). The DeseretDepot was placed under the command of theTooele Army Depot in May 1955 (USACMDA1993b:A:336), and by the end of that year achemical and biological agent bombing range andlaboratory were in operation at the Yuma TestStation in Arizona (Dugway Proving Ground1955:10). Camp Detrick was renamed FortDetrick in 1954, indicating it was then viewed asa more permanent facility in the Army’sbiological weapons research and developmentprogram (Harris and Paxman 1982:163).

By the end of the 1950s, Chemical Corpsfacilities included the above and two more plants,both inactive at that time. These were theMarshall Chemical Plant, New Martinsville,West Virginia; and the Seattle Chemical Plant,Seattle, Washington (Anonymous 1959a:201;Coppola et al. 1993:15). In addition, research anddevelopment were being conducted by manyprivate enterprises and educational institutions,with over 100 contracts then in place(Anonymous 1959a:198). Just prior to thereorganization that abolished the Chemical Corpsin 1962, the Deseret Test Center, Fort Douglas,Utah, was set up “to carry out specialized testprograms for all military services” (Smart1994:14). And beginning in 1962, some chemicalweapons were being placed in storage at theUmatilla Depot, in northeastern Oregon(USACMDA 1993d:A:293).

The Office of the Chief Signal Officer

The Signal Corps, in existence long before WorldWar I, was responsible primarily for Armycommunications. By the time the United Statesentered World War II, most Signal Corpsactivities were located at Fort Monmouth, NewJersey, and its four nearby subinstallations andlaboratories: Camp Coles, Camp Charles Wood,Sandy Hook, and Camp Evans (Reed et al.1996:11-12). In 1949, the Signal Corps Center

The Radiological Division, in charge of this13

research, eventually became the Nuclear DefenseLaboratories and was moved to Aberdeen ProvingGround in the 1970s (Smart 1994:22).


43

was established at Fort Monmouth, consolidating Custis, Virginia; White Sands Missile Range,the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories New Mexico; Yuma, Arizona; General Mitchell(SCEL, the most important of the Signal Corps Airport, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Fort Georgesuboffices for this context), the Signal Corps G. Meade, Maryland (SCEL ca. 1952:70-71).Board, the Signal School, the Signal Corps Fort Huachuca, Arizona, was placed under thePublications Agency, the Signal Corps jurisdiction of the Signal Corps in 1954, and theIntelligence Unit, the Pigeon Breeding and Signal Corps Electronic Warfare Center wasTraining Center, and the Army’s activities with moved there from Fort Monmouth (HOCECOMthe Armed Services Electro Standards Agency. 1985:39).Signal Corps Field Station Number 1 wasestablished at Fort Bliss the same year. In 1950, By 1956, SCEL had established its West Coastthe Signal Corps Electronic Warfare Center was Office, in Pasadena, California, providing liaisonestablished at Fort Monmouth, and Signal Corps services between the Signal Corps and researchtraining activities were established at Aberdeen and development institutions performing contractProving Ground, Maryland, and Redstone work for the Corps (SCEL 1956:n.p.; USASRDLArsenal, Alabama, in 1951 (HOCECOM 1962:176). In March 1958, SCEL was renamed1985:34-35, 39; White Sands Proving Ground ca. the United States Army Signal Research and1956:26). Development Laboratory, and a long-range

SCEL personnel were on staff not only at Fort established at Deal, New Jersey, the same yearMonmouth but also at many other governmental (HOCECOM 1985:40; USASRDL 1958:27, 149).and nongovernmental agencies outside the Signal In meteorological research, associated groundCorps, including the Massachusetts Institute of stations were established near Thule and Tuto,Technology, Naval Research Laboratory, Navy Greenland, in 1960 (USASRDL 1960:66); and inElectronics Laboratory, Navy Radiological 1961 a high-power, high-frequency transmitterDefense Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force was overhauled for use in research of the solarBase, Detroit Arsenal, California Institute of system. Just prior to the abolishment of theTechnology, Stanford University, NationalAdvisory Committee for Aeronautics, GeneralElectric Company, Applied Physics Laboratory-Johns Hopkins University, Bell TelephoneLaboratories, and the Ballistics ResearchLaboratory (SCEL ca. 1951:82). The SCEL thushad established by the early 1950s quite a widefoundation for building onto the Army’scommunications know-how, as well as thetechnology base in general.

In 1952, the Fort Bliss field station became theWhite Sands Signal Corps Agency, responsible inpart for upper atmosphere electroniccountermeasures research (White Sands ProvingGround ca. 1956:27). Laboratories were alsonoted to have been located at three additionalsites—Avon Siding (location not known), and theOakhurst and Wayside areas in New Jersey—andremote test sites were located at: Fort Sill,Oklahoma; Pyote Air Force Base, Texas; MountWashington, New Hampshire; Fort Churchill,Canada; Camp Edwards, Massachusetts; SenecaOrdnance Depot, Romulus, New York; Fort John

communications satellite tracking center was

Signal Corps, ground stations for the Adventcommunications satellite program wereconstructed at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and CampRoberts, California (USASRDL 1961:4, 20).

The Office of the Chief of Transportation

As mentioned in the introduction, theTransportation Corps did not receive much in theway of military funding; neither were its missionsexceptionally significant when compared to someof the other Army endeavors during the earlyyears of the Cold War. In fiscal year 1957 only4.5 percent of the Army’s research anddevelopment budget was directed at newvehicles; 10 times that amount went into missileand nuclear weapons development. However, asmobility became a new area of focus for theArmy during the latter 1950s, a greater emphasiswas shifted toward transportation, especially byair (Bacevich 1986:100). The workload of theChief of Transportation’s Aviation MaterielAgency increased greatly with assignments to


44

procure aircraft in 1961 and thereafter, but these acquisition tasks for the items they wished towere mainly procurement, not research, have in their own inventory (Kane 1995:64-65).development, or production assignments The best example of functionalism as it came to(HOHQAMC 1969:126). be implemented after the 1962 reorganization was

The Office of the Chief of Engineers tested by this command rather than each of the

One of the most important ways the Office of the they either acquired or were in the process ofChief of Engineers was associated with the Cold developing. Previous attempts to reorganize theWar was through the Manhattan Engineering Army along functional lines had been madeDistrict, established in August 1942 to develop an before, most notably in 1942, but these effortsatomic weapon (HOHQAMC 1969:51). In were neither deep nor thorough enough. By 1946,addition to its other duties, such as construction, the Army had returned to its pre-World War IIthe Corps of Engineers was also responsible for commodity organization (Kane 1995:65-66).testing some of the Army’s equipment. TheYuma Test Branch was set up in Arizona, on the What was needed was not an either/or solutionColorado River, by the Corps of Engineers but a combination of both commodity andResearch and Development Laboratories in 1943. functional organization. Huge increases inHowever, the Corps of Engineers operated the expenditures for research and development infacility only a short while. Inactivated in 1949, industry had prompted a turn away from purethe Yuma Test Branch was transferred to the functionalism and toward the product managerSignal Corps in 1952 (Dugway Proving Ground concept and systems management during the1955:8). early 1950s, and this was the direction to which

The Corps of Engineers increased its involvement the project manager concept, responsibility forin the Army’s space program in 1959 when it the development, production, and fielding of anestablished a Missiles and Space Office as a item or system was assigned to a single office;special division of its Engineer Research and once fielded, the management of the item orDevelopment Laboratories. By this time the system was passed on to a functional orCorps of Engineers had developed preliminary commodity manager as appropriate (HOHQAMCdesigns for an extraterrestrial environments 1969:16).simulator (Anonymous 1959a:40). However, thebulk of the research and development work A 1954 effort to integrate the Army supplyrequired for Corps of Engineers missions was system and reorganize acquisition procedures wascarried out by the Ordnance and Signal corps. noted to have been “rather halfhearted andFor example, radar for use with Corps of inconclusive” (HOHQAMC 1969:4) because theEngineering mapping tasks was developed by the technical services continued to operate as sevenSignal Corps (USASRDL 1961:36). very separate supply systems, even after a Deputy

NEW ORDER—THE ARMYMATERIEL COMMAND

The drive to reorganize the Army grew out of a initiate a thorough reorganization effort. Thetrend in industry and the military to move away Gaither Report examined the spectacular militaryfrom what was called commodity organization and technology advances that the Soviet Unionand move toward functional organization. Under had accomplished in recent years andthe technical services, organization had been recommended adjustments in the United Statescommodity oriented—each service conducted the defense system. The Rockefeller Reportresearch, development, and procurement or presented an argument that the United States

the Test and Evaluation Command. All newmateriel brought into the Army inventory was

developing or purchasing units testing the items

the Army looked (HOHQAMC 1969:35). Under

Chief of Logistics was appointed in 1955 toaddress the problem (HOHQAMC 1969:4; Kane1995:66). Two documents, the National SecurityCouncil Gaither Report of 1957 and theRockefeller Report of 1958, did much to finally


45

military was “out of accord with weapon knowledge among Army staff; by the time itstechnology and the principal military threats tonational safety” (HOUSAMC 1964:14), andfound the military to be losing its technology leadin the world. Congress responded by passing theDefense Reorganization Act of 1958, whichcalled for unification of the armed forces underthe Secretary of Defense and greater integrationof land, sea, and air forces, steps recommendedby the Gaither and Rockefeller reports(HOUSAMC 1964:15).

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamarainitiated a study in 1961 that, finally, hadenormous impact on Army organization. Thestudy was called Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD) Project 80, and was usuallyreferred to as simply Project 80, no lessambiguous than the complete title. The Army’scontribution to Project 80 was undertaken by acommittee led by Leonard W. Hoelscher, DeputyComptroller of the Army. The report of thecommittee’s findings, the Study of the Function,Organization, and Procedures of theDepartment of the Army, OSD Project 80(Army), was published in October 1961. Morecommonly known as the Hoelscher Report, thestudy “became the basis for one of the mostsweeping reorganizations in the history of theDepartment of the Army” (HOHQAMC 1969:8).The Hoelscher committee found among otherthings that the technical services, unified only atthe Army General Staff level, made coordinateddevelopment of the new complex weapons andweapons systems difficult. To remedy theproblem, the committee recommended that the installations and 71 activities in 1962; by 1968Army establish a single field command thatwould be responsible for all materiel functions.That command, called in the Hoelscher Reportthe U.S. Army Systems and Materiel Command,was soon redesignated the Army MaterielDevelopment and Logistics Command (MDLC).The name was changed to the Army MaterielCommand when it was established. Under theHoelscher committee plan, three separateelements were to perform research, development,acquisition, and production; test and evaluation;and supply and distribution (HOHQAMC 1969:9-10, 14).

Project 80 was undertaken outside normalprocedures so the effort was not general

findings were presented to the chiefs of the seventechnical services, Project 80 had already beenapproved by the Secretary of the Army and theArmy Chief of Staff. Only approval by thePresident and Congress remained. SecretaryMcNamara sent the proposal for thereorganization to the President in January 1962.President Kennedy signed it on 16 January and itwas placed before Congress, which had 30 daysto object to its passage. There were no objections(HOHQAMC 1969:3, 11).

The AMC was officially established on 8 May1962, and it became operational on the first ofAugust. The new organization was composed oftwo functional subcommands—the Supply andMaintenance Command (SMC), and the Test andEvaluation Command (TECOM)—and fivecommodity commands—Electronics Command(ECOM), Missile Command (MICOM), MobilityCommand (MOCOM), Munitions Command(MUCOM), and Weapons Command (WECOM).Most of the operations of the seven technicalservices, with the exception of the Corps ofEngineers and the Surgeon General, weredistributed to these subcommands of the AMCand to the Defense Logistics Agency, which wasresponsible for procurement functions andsupplies (AMC ca. 1972:4; Bouilly et al. 1984:3).The reorganization abolished the positions of theChief Signal Officer, the Quartermaster General,the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief ChemicalOfficer, and the Chief of Transportation(HOHQAMC 1969:11). The AMC inherited 170

14

further reorganization and the implementation ofefficiency measures had reduced these numbersby probably about 40 percent (Coppola et al.1993:13).

There have been several changes in thesubcommands of the AMC since its organizationin 1962, and the following sections give anoverview of those changes and the

A different source (HOHQAMC 1969:27) gives14

the figures as 122 installations and 158 activities. Theformer document (cited in the text) provides a list of theindividual installations and activities, whereas the latterprovides only the total figures.


46

ECOM

ERADCOM CORADCOMCERCOM

CECOM

LABCOM

ARL

ELECTRONICS COMMANDEVOLUTION

responsibilities of the subcommands. The AMC and operations were made more responsive towas also renamed the Army Materiel urgent requirements. Six separate laboratoriesDevelopment and Readiness Command were established in June 1965: Electronic(DARCOM) between January 1976 and August Components, Communications and Automatic1984 (Coppola et al. 1993:11). This section is Data Processing, Atmospheric Sciences,organized according to the structure of the Electronic Warfare, Avionics, and Combatoriginal AMC division into five commodity Surveillance and Target Acquisition. Newlysubcommands and two functional subcommands. organized were the Institute for ExploratoryMUCOM and WECOM are combined in one Research and Directorate of Research andsection since they were closely related and have Development. Night vision research wassince been combined into a single subcommand. transferred from the Mobility Command toSimplified illustrations for the five commodity ECOM in November 1965, and the Night Visioncommands show graphically the evolution of Laboratory was incorporated into what thenthese AMC elements through time. became the Combat Surveillance, Night Vision,

Electronics Command laboratories were located at Fort Monmouth; the

AMC commodity subcommand ECOM was entities—one conducting research andformed in 1962, its headquarters at Fort development, the other readiness functions. ForMonmouth. ECOM assumed the activities that most of those subcommands affected, the resulthad been under the Signal Corps—the Army was a two-for-one separation. “For ECOM,Signal Research and Development Laboratories, however, the Committee recommendedthe Army Signal Materiel Support Agency (these transferring avionics, combat surveillance, andapparently renamed Electronics Research and electronic warfare R&D missions to developmentDevelopment Laboratories, and Electronics centers that were not located at Fort Monmouth,Materiel Support Agency [Aberdeen Proving as well as splitting the remaining readiness andGround ca. 1963:1:8]), and the Army Signal R&D functions into two separate Commands”Supply Agency. ECOM assumed the Signal (CECOM Historical Office 1994:9). TheseCorps’ logistics, research, and development changes were implemented, effective the first daymissions and activities associated with tactical of 1978. On that date, the Communicationscommunications systems and other electronic Electronics Materiel Readiness Commandequipment (CECOM Historical Office 1994:1; (CERCOM), the Communications Research andHOHQAMC 1969:172, 178). Development Command (CORADCOM), and the

A restructuring of ECOM began in July 1964 and Command (ERADCOM) were established.continued into 1965, during which time research CORADCOM and CERCOM, both of whichand development supervision was streamlined remained at Fort Monmouth, were short-lived

and Target Acquisition Laboratories(HOHQAMC 1969:173). Most of ECOM’s

Night Vision Laboratory was at Fort Belvoir,Virginia; elements of the Atmospheric SciencesLaboratory (as well as the Electronics Researchand Development Activity and MeteorologicalSupport Activity) were located at White SandsMissile Range, New Mexico, and Fort Huachuca,Arizona; an Aviation Electronics Agency was atSt. Louis, Missouri; and various other activitieswere located at about 20 sites around the world(AMC 1970:9).

In 1974, the Army Materiel Acquisition ReviewCommittee (AMARC) recommended that most ofthe AMC subcommands be separated into two

Electronics Research and Development


47

MICOM

MIRCOM MIRADCOM

MICOM

MISSILE COMMAND EVOLUTION

organizations. Although they achieved the Laboratory (ARL) in late 1992 (CoppolaAMARC objective of increasing emphasis on 1993:25).research and development, the new organizationcreated a great deal of extra, duplicatedadministrative work. The two were combined to Missile Commandcreate the Communications and ElectronicsCommand (CECOM) in mid-1981 (CECOMHistorical Office 1994:9).

ERADCOM was moved to a location separatefrom Fort Monmouth (CECOM Historical Office1994:9), its headquarters at Adelphi, Maryland,which is where it was located in 1985(HOCECOM 1985:58). ERADCOM wasreorganized and redesignated the United StatesArmy Laboratory Command (LABCOM) in July The organization of what was originally, and is1985 (HOHQAMC 1987b:55), which was now again, called the Missile Commandassigned most of ERADCOM’s functions, those (MICOM) has remained fairly consistent over thenot assigned to LABCOM being transferred to last 30 years. MICOM took over the missions ofCECOM. LABCOM’s headquarters and its the Ordnance Missile Command when it wasHarry Diamond Laboratories were located in created in 1962, and there have been no name15

Adelphi, Maryland. Other LABCOM facilities changes or reorganizations other than the divisionincluded the Ballistic Research Laboratory and of duties recommended by the AMARC study,the Human Engineering Laboratory at Aberdeen, which resulted in MICOM being divided into theMaryland; the Vulnerability Assessment Missile Materiel Readiness Command and theLaboratory and the Atmospheric Sciences Missile Research and Development Command inLaboratory at White Sands Missile Range, New 1977, then recombined in 1979 to form onceMexico; the Electronics Technology and Devices again MICOM (Coppola et al. 1993:25).Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; theMaterials Technology Laboratory at Watertown, MICOM’s mission upon its formation includedMassachusetts; and the Army Research Office at the research and development of “some of theResearch Triangle Park, North Carolina (Barnett largest, most expensive, and most advanced ofet al. 1992:13; HOHQAMC 1987b:55). AMC’s weapons systems” (HOHQAMCLaboratories and activities transferred to CECOM 1969:143). In August 1962, the subcommandincluded the Night Vision and Electro-Optics took over responsibility for the Pershing,Laboratory at Fort Belvoir, the Combat Sergeant, Missile B (later called Lance), Hawk,Surveillance and Target Acquisition Laboratory Hercules, and Mauler programs; and MICOMat Fort Monmouth, the Atmospheric Sciences helped in the administration of the Zeus and FieldLaboratory at White Sands Missile Range, and Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systemthe Test Flight Activity at Lakehurst Naval (FABMDS) programs, which were directedStation, in Hew Jersey (CECOM Historical from AMC headquarters (HOHQAMCOffice 1994:11; HOCECOM 1985:58). 1969:1590). MICOM did not manufactureLABCOM was redesignated the Army Research weapons, but maintained “the scientific capability

16

to monitor research, development, and productionefforts of American industry” (AMC 1970:10).MICOM headquarters were at Redstone Arsenal,and that is where the bulk of its operations tookplace. Watertown Arsenal was also under its Harry Diamond Laboratories were composed of15

the main laboratory—the Adelphi LaboratoryCenter—as well as the Blossom Point Field TestFacility, Blossom Point, Maryland, and WoodbridgeResearch Facility, Woodbridge, Virginia (KFS HistoricPreservation Group 1991:III:1). Mauler in 1965 (HOHQAMC 1969:159).

FABMDS was terminated in November 1962,16


48

MOCOM

TAC MECAVCOM

MECOMTACOM AVSCOM

TROSCOM

TARCOM TARADCOM

TSARCOMAVRADCOM

TACOM MERADCOM

NARADCOM

NLABSTROSCOMAVSCOM

ATCOM

MOBILITY COMMAND EVOLUTION

jurisdiction, and the subcommand had small Mobility Commandliaison offices and industrial locations in both theUnited States and overseas (Aberdeen ProvingGround ca. 1963:1:8; AMC 1970:10; HDMICOM1991:1).

There were by 1967 eight major laboratoriesengaged in missile and missile componentresearch and development for MICOM atRedstone Arsenal (Information Office, U.S.Army Missile Command [IOMICOM] 1967:1).One of the most important facilities at the arsenalwas the Francis J. McMorrow Laboratory(Building 5400), which housed laboratoryfacilities for the Advanced Systems, Structuresand Mechanics, Ground Support Equipment,Electromagnetics, and Army Inertial Guidanceand Control activities (IOMICOM 1967:1-2).Other Redstone facilities included the PropulsionLaboratory, the Physical Sciences Laboratory, theTest and Reliability Evaluation Laboratory, theRedstone Scientific Information Center, theRedstone Research Laboratories, and the GorgasLaboratory (IOMICOM 1967:5-8). By 1970,MICOM was also noted to have had jurisdiction The AMC Mobility Command (MOCOM) wasover Lawndale Army Missile Plant, Lawndale,California; Michigan Army Missile Plant,Warren, Michigan; and the Tarheel Army MissilePlant, Burlington, North Carolina (HQUSAMC1970:n.p.).

The AMARC-recommended separation ofresearch and development functions fromreadiness functions was accomplished by creatingthe Missile Materiel Readiness Command(MIRCOM) and Missile Research andDevelopment Command (MIRADCOM),effective at the end of January 1977 (Coppola etal. 1993:25; U.S. Army Materiel Developmentand Readiness Command [USAMDRC] 1977:10).MIRCOM and MIRADCOM both had theirheadquarters at Redstone Arsenal (USAMDRC1977:10-11). When these two elements wererecombined into the new MICOM in July 1979,the headquarters remained at Redstone Arsenal(HOHQDARCOM 1981:101). A “new separateorganization titled, ‘US Army MissileLaboratory’” (HOHQDARCOM 1981:101) wasnoted to have been organized in 1979, also atRedstone Arsenal.

established during the Army reorganization of1962 and assigned the responsibility for the ArmyTank-Automotive Center, Detroit, Michigan; theDetroit Arsenal, Warren, Michigan; theTransportation Materiel Command, St. Louis,Missouri; the Transportation Research Command,Fort Eustis, Virginia; and the Engineer Researchand Development Laboratory, Fort Belvoir,Virginia (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.1963:1:8).

In the first few years of its existence, MOCOM’sresponsibilities grew both in overall scope andwith regard to the complexity of the commoditiesit handled. As a result, the subcommand wasdivided into three separate entities between 1964and 1966—the Tank-Automotive Command(TAC, soon changed to TACOM), the AviationCommand (AVCOM), and the MobilityEquipment Command (MEC, soon changed toMECOM). MOCOM was eliminated in January1967 (HOHQAMC 1969:18).

AVCOM was initially assigned the operation ofthe Aviation Materiel Laboratories at Fort Eustis,Virginia, in 1964, and when AVCOM became amajor subcommand in 1966, it was assigned


49

responsibility for the Army Aviation Depot Command) at Natick, Massachusetts; the GeneralMaintenance Center at Corpus Christi, Texas, and Materiel and Parts Center, New Cumberland,the aircraft maintenance duties at the New Pennsylvania; and the Army Support Center inCumberland, Sharpe, Atlanta, and Red River Philadelphia. By 1975, TROSCOM hadarmy depots (HOHQAMC 1969:126). transferred its responsibilities for materielAVCOM’s mission was to procure and manage handling, construction equipment, and industrialequipment used by the aviation branch of the engines to TACOM (AMC 1973a:25; Coppola etArmy (including aircraft), and to develop and test al. 1993:24; HOHQDARCOM 1978:3).new aviation-related equipment (Headquarters,U.S. Army Materiel Command [HQUSAMC] There were several reorganizations among these1970:n.p.; AMC 1970:8). In October 1968 subcommands in the mid-1970s. The MobilityAVCOM was redesignated the Aviation Systems Equipment Research and Development CenterCommand (AVSCOM) to “better reflect the was established as a separate subcommand insystems approach to management” (AMC ca. 1976, called the Mobility Equipment Research1972:12). By 1970, AVSCOM had added the and Development Command (MERADCOM). ItSaginaw Army Aircraft Plant, Fort Worth, Texas, was responsible for research, development, andto the list of installations under its jurisdiction initial acquisition of many troop battlefield(HQUSAMC 1970:n.p.); it also had “various support items (Coppola et al. 1993:24-25;production plant activities” (AMC 1970:8) under USAMDRC 1977:12). Natick Laboratories wasits jurisdiction, but the specific locations were not also established as a separate subcommand at thedetermined during the current project. same time and renamed the Natick Research and

TACOM’s mission was to develop and supply “a NARADCOM, as Natick before it, was primarilywide range of vehicles which would provide a responsible for development of food items,versatile fighting force with the means to traverse shelter, and clothing (USAMDRC 1977:13, 17).virtually any terrain in varied climates . . . from And, in line with the 1974 AMARCthe swamps and jungles of Southeast Asia to the recommendations, TACOM was split into themuskeg and tundra in the North” (HOHQAMC Tank-Automotive Readiness Command1969:130), although WECOM retained (TARCOM) and Tank-Automotive Research andresponsibility for any vehicle that served Development Command (TARADCOM) in Julyprimarily as a firing platform (HOHQAMC 1976, only to be recombined into TACOM, its1969:148). Its headquarters was at Detroit headquarters still at Warren, Michigan, in 1980;Arsenal (MMP/BTI 1984b:38; HOHQDARCOM the missions of all these subcommands were1980a:11). virtually the same as they had been before except

MECOM was responsible for a wide range of functions (HOHQDARCOM 1980a:11).equipment used by the Army, including barriers, AVSCOM was divided differently, with itsbridging, water purification equipment, readiness functions combined with TROSCOMconstruction equipment, and other battlefield and renamed the Troop Support and Aviationtroop support items (AMC 1970:10). MECOM Materiel Readiness Command (TSARCOM),was redesignated the Troop Support Command while the remaining AVSCOM elements were(TROSCOM) in 1973. It assumed MECOM’s renamed the Aviation Research and Developmentmission, as well as the added responsibility of the Command (AVRADCOM) in the summer ofprovision of food and clothing for troops. In 1977 (Coppola et al. 1993:25).addition to the Mobility Equipment Research andDevelopment Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia There were several reorganizations in the 1980s(formerly the Engineer Research and as well. AVRADCOM was renamed AVSCOMDevelopment Laboratory), TROSCOM had in 1984 and took on some of MERADCOM’sjurisdiction over Natick Laboratories (formerly functions. TROSCOM was also recreated inthe Quartermaster Engineering Command and the 1984, taking over some of the functions ofQuartermaster Research and Development MERADCOM and NLABS. AVSCOM and

Development Command (NARADCOM).

for the split in the readiness and development


50

MUCOM WECOM

ARMCOM

ARRADCOMARRCOM

AMCCOM

MUNITIONS COMMAND ANDWEAPONS COMMAND EVOLUTION

TROSCOM were combined to form the Aviation to avoid] the ‘merchants of death’ appendageand Troop Command (ATCOM) in 1992(Coppola et al. 1993:25).

Munitions Command and Weapons Command

The Munitions Command (MUCOM) andWeapons Command (WECOM) have beenclosely related throughout their existence, andtheir missions have been combined under a singlesubcommand for much of the Cold War era. Forthese reasons the two subcommands are dealtwith together in this section.

MUCOM, its headquarters at Picatinny Arsenal,was responsible for providing ammunition for theArmy. More specifically, it was in charge offorecasting future requirements; designing,developing, producing, and fielding munitions;inventory logistics; maintenance of munitionsstocks; and the retirement and demilitarization ofobsolete or damaged munitions (HOHQAMC1969:151-152). The installations under itsjurisdiction were very numerous due to the lack17

of private enterprises willing to be involved inthis type of manufacturing; there was, therefore,a great need for in-house capabilities. The lack ofinterest in the private sector may have been due tofears of a low profit-to-investment ratio, but thereare other reasons as well. One AMC historiannoted that “[t]here is no ammunition industry inthe United States in the sense that there is anautomobile industry . . . [because Americans wish

applied to the Krupp [ammunition] industries inGermany. American industry hesitates to exposeitself to warmongering connotations”(HOHQAMC 1969:152).

MUCOM operated three primary commoditycenters—Picatinny Arsenal (for conventional andnuclear munitions), Edgewood Arsenal (forchemical and biological munitions), andFrankford Arsenal (concerned with fire control,small arms munitions, cartridges, and variouspropellant-fired devices), as well as theAmmunition Procurement and Supply Agency(APSA) at Joliet Arsenal (Bouilly et al. 1984:3;HOHQAMC 1969:151-152). In 1968, APSA wasresponsible for overseeing 27 GOCO propellantand explosives facilities and LAP facilities(HOHQAMC 1969:152). Most were built duringWorld War II and were by this time outdated ifnot obsolete (HOHQAMC 1969:116).

For the aspect of its mission involving chemicaland biological weapons, MUCOM set up theChemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR)Agency, headquartered at Edgewood Arsenal’sArmy Chemical Center. Both the ChemicalCorps arsenals (Pine Bluff and Rocky Mountain)were assigned to MUCOM, along with FortDetrick (Smart 1994:14). The “luxury” of aseparate organization was short-lived, however.In 1963, the CBR Agency was incorporated intoMUCOM’s other activities at Edgewood Arsenal(Smart 1994:15). Responsibilities were separatedagain in January 1966, when Edgewood Arsenalwas made the Army’s chemical commoditycenter—with jurisdiction over activities atEdgewood, Pine Bluff, and Rocky Mountainarsenals—and Fort Detrick became a separatebiological commodity center, responsible foractivities there and at Pine Bluff (Smart1994:156).

The WECOM mission was concerned with theproduction of weapons and weapon systems(other than missiles) for the Army, and with thepreservation of manufacturing know-how(HOHQAMC 1969:143). This included researchand development, production, procurement, andinventory management (USAWECOM ca.1963:15). The weapons and weapons systemsincluded some vehicles if those vehicles served

The AMC Historical Office (HOHQAMC17

1969:143) noted that in 1969 MUCOM was the largestof the five commodity commands in number ofinstallations and number of employees.


51

primarily as firing platforms. If not, they were The responsibility for five arsenals (Rock Island,the responsibility of MOCOM or TACOM Watervliet, Pine Bluff, Frankford, and Rocky(HOHQAMC 1969:148). Mountain) was transferred to ARRCOM, as was

WECOM was in charge of Rock Island, installations (USAMDRC 1977:n.p.).Watervliet, and Watertown arsenals; and the ARRADCOM had jurisdiction over the variousSpringfield Armory, the latter inactivated at the laboratories that had been under ARMCOM.end of April 1968 (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.1963:1:8; HOHQAMC 1969:80). WECOM’s In 1983, ARRCOM and ARRADCOM becameheadquarters was at Rock Island Arsenal (AMC the last of the AMARC-separated subcommands1970:14). By 1968, Watertown Arsenal was no to be reunited, the action delayed “probablylonger listed among the WECOM installations, because of the high costs involved in the initialbut the AMC Firing Range at Underhill, separation” (Bouilly et al. 1984:6). The resultingVermont, and Cleveland Army Tank-Automotive subcommand was the Armament, Munitions, andPlant, Cleveland, Ohio, had been added Chemical Command (AMCCOM), which retained(HQUSAMC 1970:n.p.; USAWECOM ca. some of the division of the former dual1968:280). subcommand organization—the Armament

In mid-1973, MUCOM transferred its Picatinny, a Chemical Research and Developmentheadquarters from Picatinny Arsenal and the Center was created at Aberdeen Proving Ground,APSA organization from Joliet Arsenal to Rock and readiness functions continued to be carriedIsland Arsenal, where these offices were united out at Rock Island Arsenal. At that time,with WECOM to form the new Armament AMCCOM had in its inventory over 24,000Command (ARMCOM), headquartered at Rock buildings set on 586,946 acres. This includedIsland (Bouilley et al. 1984:3). Jurisdiction over Rock Island Arsenal (where AMCCOMall the MUCOM arsenals and ammunition plants headquarters was located), the Armamentpassed to the new organization. The purpose of Research and Development Center (formerlythe reorganization, according to Lieutenant Picatinny Arsenal), the Chemical Research andGeneral W.W. Vaughn, then AMC Deputy Development Center (CRDC) in the EdgewoodCommanding General, was to “effectively merge Area at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Pine Bluffthe ‘guns and bullets’ responsibility within AMC Arsenal, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Watervlietand thereby increase the effectiveness of limited Arsenal, and many GOCO and GOGO industrialresources” (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:1:4). facilities (Figure 5) (Bouilly et al. 1984:7, 14,ARMCOM had under its control seven arsenals 195; External Affairs Office, U.S. Army(Edgewood, Frankford, Picatinny, Pine Bluff, AMCCOM 1994:5).Rocky Mountain, Rock Island, and Watervliet),25 GOCO Army ammunition plants (seven wereinactive), and other facilities (Figure 4) (AMC Supply and Maintenance Command1973a:13, 1973b:13-16; HOHQDARCOM1978:3). The Supply and Maintenance Command (SMC),

The ARMCOM organization did not last long, up as a functional command during thefalling victim to the AMARC study of 1974. It reorganization of 1962, with its mission towas split into research and development, and oversee a single supply system for the Army.readiness subcommands at the beginning of The SMC was responsible for stock control,1977—the Armament Materiel Readiness maintenance of supplies and equipment, and forCommand (ARRCOM) and the Armament the operation of the Army’s depots. This was theResearch and Development Command largest of all the AMC subcommands created in(ARRADCOM). Rock Island Arsenal served as 1962 (HOHQAMC 1969:22, 32). By the end ofthe headquarters for the former, and 1964 the SMC was operating 25 depots, includingARRADCOM established a new headquarters the Aeronautical Depot Maintenance Centeroffice at Picatinny Arsenal (Bouilly et al. 1984:6). (ARADMAC) at Corpus Christi (AMC ca.

the responsibility for 30 GOCO industrial

Research and Development Center remained at

with headquarters in Washington, D.C., was set

52

Figure 4. ARMCOM installations and activities, 1974 (from USAARMCOM ca. 1975).

53

Figure 5. AMCCOM installations and activities, 1974 (from Bouilly et al. 1984).


54

1972:6). In 1965, the SMC moved from its mid-1970s (Coppola 1993:27; HOHQAMCheadquarters to the AMC office building six 1969:86). It did, however, conduct an internalmiles (9.6 km) away; and in July the following reorganization in 1984 that split it into theyear, the functions of the SMC were merged with Combat Systems Test Activity (CSTA) and thethose of the AMC, ending the history of this Aberdeen Proving Ground Installation Supportsubcommand (AMC ca. 1972:7, 9; Coppola et al. Activity. The scope of the latter was limited to1993:27; HOHQAMC 1969:33). Further the Aberdeen installation; the CSTA hadinformation on the depot system is included in the jurisdiction over the other TECOM installationsDepot Systems Command section below. and activities (Yaquiant 1985:S2). After the 1984

Test and Evaluation Command installation and activity names. One new

The Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) Facility, at Redstone Arsenal—was added inwas set up in 1962 as an AMC functional 1989. This facility was noted to have been “thesubcommand. TECOM was directed to work only facility in the free world capable of testingclosely with weapons developers during early live air defense missile systems in a lightningstages of product development, and to work environment” (Anonymous 1992:n.p;independently during final tests to assure quality HQUSAMC 1970:n.p.).and objectivity in its evaluations. TECOMheadquarters was at Aberdeen Proving Ground,and its mission was to determine the suitability of Depot Systems Commandweapons, equipment, troop use and support items,and other materiel for the Army. Prior to the 1962 creation of the AMC, the

TECOM has remained much the same since its distributed among the various technical services.original organization. One major change The Chemical Corps had two, the Corps ofoccurred in 1963, when a consolidation effort Engineers one, the Signal Corps three, the“reduced the number of subordinate elements Quartermaster eight, the Surgeon General one,from 43 to 15” (Weston 1985:S1). This probably and the Ordnance department had 19 (Coppola etdid not entail as much of a reduction in physical al. 1993:13). In 1962, all of the depot systemproperties as a consolidation—in one example, physical plants were transferred to the SMC; thesix desert test activities at Yuma Test Station responsibility for inventory control was assignedwere combined in August 1963 to form the Yuma to the Major Item Data Agency (MIDA) in 1963Proving Ground (Weston 1985:S4). The 15 (Walker 1985a:24).TECOM installations are shown in Figure 6.

TECOM’s mission changed in 1965, when interrelated system” (Walker 1985a:29) in 1972TECOM was assigned “the responsibility to and several projects, most involving automaticsignoff [sic] on a ‘suitability for release’document” (Weston 1985:S4). From then on,TECOM was considered accountable for theperformance of all items it tested, which greatlyincreased the authority of the subcommand andits commanding general, especially in relation tothe development process (HOHQAMC 1969:21).

Since TECOM was not a commoditysubcommand, it did not have research anddevelopment functions to separate from readinessfunctions, so TECOM remained unified in the

reorganization, there were few changes inTECOM’s organization save some alterations to

TECOM facility—the Hazardous Lightning Test

jurisdiction over the Army’s depots were

The AMC “began to look at depots as an

data processing systems, were implemented to tryto standardize depot operations, maintenance, andstock control (Walker 1985a:29). At that time thedepot system in the continental United Statesincluded six general supply depots (Atlanta, NewCumberland, Sacramento, Sharpe, Tobyhanna,and Charleston), four ammunition depots(Savanna, Seneca, Sierra, and Umatilla), eightcombined general supply and ammunition depots(Anniston, Letterkenny, Lexington-Blue Grass,Pueblo, Fort Wingate, Navajo, Red River, andTooele), two ammunition depot storage activities,

55

Figure 6. TECOM installations and activities, 1968 (from Information Office, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command 1968).


56

and the Aeronautical Depot Maintenance Center Safeguard Logistics Commandat Corpus Christi (AMC 1973b:n.p.). The mostimportant of these in terms of overall stock The small Safeguard Logistics Commandcontrol was Letterkenny, the location of the (SAFLOG) was established 15 April 1968 atDepot Maintenance Control Center (Walker Huntsville, Alabama, to provide logistical support1985a:24); however, the Sierra and Seneca for the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.installations are the most important to this context The subcommand was responsible for allsince they were the storage sites for the Army’s inventory management and maintenance relatednuclear warheads, a mission each was assigned in to the Safeguard System, save functionsthe mid-1950s (Cochran 1984:87). concerning nuclear munitions and their associated

The changes implemented in the depot system 1970:n.p.). SAFLOG was eliminated in Januaryduring the early 1970s, however, were “only a 1973, no longer needed after the Safeguardband-aid approach to the real problem” (Walker System was discontinued (HOHQDARCOM1985a:30). In 1976, a DARCOM effort called 1978:4).Project STAAF (Study to Align AMC’sFunctions) was undertaken to examine variousmethods of reorganizing the depot system that United States Army Internationalhad been proposed. As a result, MIDA was Logistics Commandrestructured and became a subcommand ofDARCOM. All MIDA missions were then The United States Army International Logisticstransferred to the newly created Depot System Command (USAILCOM) was established inCommand (DESCOM) at the end of August 1976 November 1975, combining what were previously(Walker 1985a:37, 39-40). DESCOM was two international logistics activities (notresponsible for the receipt, storage, assignment, subcommands) into one functional element at themaintenance, and disposal of Army inventory New Cumberland Army Depot, Newitems in the United States and abroad (Walker Cumberland, Pennsylvania (USAMDRC 1977:9).1985a:43-44). For the remainder of the Cold USAILCOM was redesignated the United StatesWar, the structure and composition of DESCOM Army Security Assistance Center in 1977, then(Figure 7) remained essentially the same, the United States Army Security Affairsalthough Sharpe Army Depot was removed from Command in 1986. The Security Affairsthe DESCOM inventory in the latter 1980s Command became the Security Assistance(Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Depot System Command in 1990 (Coppola et al. 1993:27).Command [PAODESCOM] ca. 1990:1). Since this subcommand was responsible for

equipment (AMC 1970:16; HQUSAMC

international rather than continental logistics, itsactivities are not further discussed in this document.

57

Figure 7. DESCOM depots and depot activities, 1985 (from Walker 1985b).

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59

CHAPTER 5THEMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

DURING THE COLD WAR

INTRODUCTION

The United States and Soviet Union were the two production lasted from 1955 through 1967; themost influential forces in the world during the third period, from 1967 through 1980, was one ofCold War period. In the United States, it was the stability, during which the concentration of effortAir Force that carried the majority of the overt was on the improvement of performance andresponsibilities for the weaponry and capabilities operations of equipment; and the final period ofthat were most significant during this era, since it 1980 to the date of this publication was a periodwas this service that had jurisdiction over most of of second growth.the long-range nuclear capabilities and weaponsdelivery platforms. The Army’s role in United Similarly, eras can be assigned ArmyStates defensive and offensive capabilities development during the approximately 45 yearslessened as Eisenhower focused on the ability to of the Cold War. From the end of World War IIprovide a massive nuclear air strike as the means until the mid-1960s, the Army focused itsof deterring war. The impracticality of this type resources on the development of newof warfare, a need for more and better equipped technology—materiel ranging from radios toground forces to fight in local limited conflicts, missiles all entered a period of intensive researchand the expansion of the Army’s missions into and development that resulted not only in greatspace and high-technology areas have helped to advances for the military, but also heavilyrestore some of the significance of the Army. augmented consumer industries with items likeHowever, the same new technology and the ever- the integrated circuit and the transistor.increasing range of weapons and operationscapabilities have also served to lessen thedependance on traditional ground forces fordefense. This chapter traces the Cold War historyof the Army from a thematic perspective,examining the weapon systems and operationsthat have had a significant impact on the Army,the U.S. military, and the world.

In discussing just nuclear weapons, HistorianThomas Cochran (1984:6) has divided U.S.development into four periods. The first early

research period lasted from the end of World WarII to 1955; the second period of growth and peak

As manifested by the development ofguided missiles, supersonic aircraft, atomicweapons, and complex electronicsequipment, the 1945-1965 period was an eraof technological revolution in weaponry.This revolution had a profound effect on thecharacter of the military program. Thetechnical complexity of modern weapons,their lengthy period of development, andenormous costs posed tremendousmanagement problems [HOHQAMC1969:48].


60

Installations with ImportantTechnology Base Research

Associations

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Fort Belvoir

Fort Monmouth

Harry Diamond Laboratories

White Sands Missile Range

During this period, perhaps the most interestingof the Cold War, the military experienced whathas been called a “technological revolution of themost profound nature” (Bacevich 1986:53).

From the mid-1960s until about 1980 there seemsto have been less focus on new developments, butrather on the refinement of what had beenaccomplished during the two decades preceding1965. As can be noted in this chapter, there werefewer new developments during this period andthe focus shifted to the improvement of team, has had a well-defined objective; on thetechnologies already in existence. For example, other extreme, some endeavors have beenatomic artillery was first developed in the 1950s, conducted in the name of technologicalthe warheads delivered by, among others, 8-inch advancement or have concerned “areas of broadand 155-mm howitzer shells; earth-penetrating military interest [generated] in response to thenuclear howitzer shells in 8-inch and 155-mm growing technology appetite of modern war”sizes were under development in the mid-1970s. (Barnett et al. 1992:13), even though no specificProduction methods for VX, perhaps the most application may have been immediately foreseen.powerful nerve agent ever developed, were Research of the latter kind, conducted in part byworked out by 1956 and the chemical agent BZ organizations like the Institute for Exploratorywas developed in the early 1960s; thereafter, the Research at Fort Monmouth, established amain development concerning chemical weapons technology base from which the Army and thewas the creation of binary warheads, which other services could draw information needed forperformed the final mix of the chemical agents the development of new items. The speed with(GB, in existence since the 1940s, and VX) while which new technologies came into being duringin flight. the Cold War made such research necessary so

During the final years of the Cold War there was one’s opponent developed a new offensive ora return to the development of new technology, defensive capability, and countermeasures couldthis time related to the Strategic Defense be quickly taken. “[W]here total destruction of aInitiative and its component systems like high- foe is possible in a very short period of time, . . .energy laser and particle beams, sensing systems it is imperative that this nation retain its lead incapable of distinguishing offensive missile scientific research” (War Department Equipmentlaunches and decoy reentry vehicles, and Board 1946:n.p.). As noted recently by Armyhardware and software complex and reliable Research Laboratory historians (Barnett et al.enough to control the new equipment. This 1992:13), technology demands have prompted therenewed accent on high technology development construction of new facilities and the expansionwas extremely expensive, and as such played a of other installations and facilities, so the reachrole in bringing about the end of the Cold War. for new technological heights has been directly

ARMY DEPENDENCE ON TECHNOLOGYDURING THE COLD WAR

Development of a Technology Base technological superiority (especially when, as

Development of weapons and systems in the superiority) and to avoid technological surprisesArmy, as well as the other services, has followed that, if developed by potential adversaries, couldboth a direct and an indirect path. Some research, affect significantly the balance of power”such as that conducted by the Manhattan Project (Gansler 1980:10-11). But Congress and the

that basic knowledge was already in place when

related to the expansion of the Cold War materialculture.

Defense industry analyst and economist JacquesGansler (1980:12) also notes a well-developedtechnological base was needed “to maintain

today, the United States lacks numerical

Chapter 5: Thematic History of the United States Army During the Cold War

61

public usually see contributions to the United Diana, in which the first radar signal wasStates economy and civilian industries as the bounced off the moon at the Evans Signalforemost reason, or justification, for maintaining Laboratory (HOCECOM 1985:32), and the 1946a strong research program. This has been establishment of the Nuclear Physics Section ofespecially true since World War II, during which the Terminal Ballistics Laboratory at the Ballistictime “history shows that the U.S. defense Research Laboratory (BRL) to study “theindustry has been driven by technology (rather processes and techniques used in nuclearthan by costs). This has resulted in an extremely research” (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.heavy emphasis on R&D funding, often at the 1957:91). The personnel worked closely withexpense of production funding. Greater emphasis scientists in other laboratories public and privatehas often been placed on systems under and collected information about the latestdevelopment than on those deployed” (Gansler developments in nuclear weapons developments1980:10-11). In the post-World War II period (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1957:91). SignalDepartment of Defense money has propped up Corps Engineering Laboratories personnel alsocomputer, jet aircraft, nuclear power, and space worked with other nonmilitary organizationscommunications industries until sufficient conducting basic research, such as thecivilian markets evolved to sustain private Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), theenterprises in these areas. These industries would California Institute of Technology, Stanfordlikely have evolved without the aid of military University, the General Electric Company, theinvestment, but they would have done so less Applied Physics Laboratory-Johns Hopkinsquickly and pervasively. This impact of military University, and Bell Telephone Laboratoriesresearch and development, and the concerted (SCEL ca. 1951:82). Such research by the Signaleffort to build a broad technology base, “must be Corps covered topics in electricity,considered a major legacy of the post-World War electrochemistry, magnetism, electron ballistics,II period” (Gansler 1980:21). and atmospheric physics, and the goal was to

This discussion of the technology base focuses on and techniques” (SCEL ca. 1952:8). One earlythe basic research and development conducted by Cold War instrument that had wide applicationsthe Army during the Cold War period, but also outside the military was the theodolite, developedincludes references to other developments that by technicians at the BRL annex at White Sandshave wide application outside the military, such Missile Range (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.as the invention of the theodolite and 1957:67).development of meteorological data bases. In theliterature reviewed, the scope of the phrase The Thermionics Laboratory was established at“technology base” and related terms seems to Fort Monmouth in 1951, and the equipment setuphave varied somewhat, used at times in reference there enabled technicians to make nearly any kindto research with broad application to both military of vacuum tube known and to fabricateand civilian developments, but also used to refer “experimental models of all types of electronto projects with specific military objectives. In tubes” (SCEL ca. 1951:59). Early research ingeneral, this portion of the chapter deals only solid state circuitry was also conducted at thiswith research that had few direct or immediate laboratory (SCEL ca. 1952:73). The electronicsmilitary goals since those research projects, if package for the Vanguard II weather researchrelated to significant military programs, are satellite and other meteorological anddiscussed in other sections of this report. communications equipment were built as well at

The overwhelming majority of broad technology facility during the early 1950s (CECOMbase research programs were conducted by the Historical Office 1994:5). Other Signal CorpsSignal Corps, ECOM, CORADCOM, CECOM, weather-related research included studies ofthe Ballistics Research Laboratory, and the winds in the upper atmosphere and resulted in thelaboratories under these subcommands—that is, development of the Loki Passive Target Windthe electronics departments of the Army. Early Sensing System to gather data contributing to theexamples are the experiment called Project understanding of weather patterns (USASRDL

“provide a base for the evolution of new weapons

laboratory facilities in Fort Monmouth’s Hexagon


62

1959a:90); and research into the effects of rain on Columbia Radiation Laboratory at Columbiaatmospheric radiation remaining after a nuclear University, the Microwave Research Institute atblast (USASRDL 1959a:85, 1961:64). In the late the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, the1950s, Chemical Corps scientists conducting Stanford Electronics Laboratory at Stanfordgeneral research, probably at Edgewood Arsenal, University, and the Electronics Researchformulated a mathematical model describing the Laboratory at the University of California, andspread of plant disease through an agricultural possibly others (USAERDL 1962:3). Findingsarea and were developing a similar model for the generated by these studies found application inspread of disease in human populations the areas of communications, target detection,(Anonymous 1959a:191). control, guidance, radar, electronic warfare

The Institute for Exploratory Research was development (USAERDL 1962:3).established as a separate Signal Corps departmentat Fort Monmouth in 1959. Its mission was “to By 1960, “many of the possibilities being openedconduct investigations into new areas of science up by science and technology simply could not befor useful applications, to include both basic pursued” (HOHQAMC 1969:4) because doing soresearch on little and poorly understood was far too expensive. Technology base researchphenomena and properties of matter, and those then began receiving greater guidance throughaspects of applied research to show the need for DoD and Army planning, “which described futuremilitary exploitation through additional research needs, [and] provided AMC with the guidanceand development” (USASRDL 1959a:3). It was necessary to focus resources on barrier problems.made up of a Computational Analysis Division From the continuous process of planning,and three exploratory research divisions reviewing, and evaluating, a purposeful generalconcerning communications, electronics, and orientation of Army research and exploratorysurveillance. The separate Surveillance development effort emerged, and promptDepartment also included a Meteorological utilization of pertinent new information wasDivision (USASRDL 1959b:n.p.). Exploratory fostered” (HOHQAMC 1969:82). By the mid- toresearch was noted to include astro- and geo- late 1960s, the DoD was noted as supportingphysics, plasma physics, nuclear physics, astro- “nearly half of all academic research in theelectronics, various radio-related work, radar physical sciences and engineering being done intechnology, acoustics, meteorology, and solid American universities and colleges. Thestate devices (USASRDL 1959a:i-ii, 3). The Department’s goal was the advancement ofInstitute also oversaw several research contracts knowledge in a balanced manner across the entirewith other firms, including Project Lincoln, under spectrum of science and technology pertinent towhich MIT was conducting research into a wide defense effort” (HOHQAMC 1969:77).range of electronic equipment and technologiesrelated to air defense (USASRDL 1960:3). In 1970, five AMC laboratories were noted to18

Other organizations conducting work under have been conducting basic and applied researchcontract with the institute included the Laboratory for the Army. These were the Aberdeen Researchfor Insulation Research at MIT, the Coordinated and Development Center (basic research includedScience Laboratory at the University of Illinois, health physics and human factors, capabilities,the Cuft Laboratory at Harvard University, the limitations, and engineering applications), the

countermeasures, and especially in laser

Materials and Mechanics Research Center(Watertown, Massachusetts, conducting basicresearch into metals, ceramics, and othermaterials), Harry Diamond Laboratories(Washington, D.C.), Natick Laboratories(Massachusetts), and the Aeronautical ResearchLaboratory, Moffett Field, California. However,since the Night Vision Laboratory at Fort Belvoir,established in 1965 to conduct technology baseresearch and optical equipment development, was

Project Lincoln included research of direction18

center and combat center components that went into theAir Force’s important SAGE (semiautomatic groundenvironment) complexes. These components includedportions of the data transmission system and thecomputers that processed locational data obtained byradar, used to analyze an enemy attack and help directfriendly aircraft to interception points on a nearly real-time basis (U.S. Air Force, Air Defense Command ca.1959:1-8).


63

Installations with ImportantElectronic Warfare Research

Associations

Fort Huachuca

Fort Monmouth


not included, this list may not be complete. technology research. Much of the research wasInvestigations at the Night Vision Laboratory in conducted by the national laboratories and1973 included research into “optically pumped numerous private contractors (Waldmaninfrared dye lasers and semiconductor injection 1988:138). This research is discussed in thelasers” (U.S. Army Electronics Command section of this report dealing with space-related[USAECOM] ca. 1973:36) and infrared thermal activities of the Army.imaging systems (HOHQAMC 1969:173;USAECOM ca. 1973:37).

In 1977 ECOM was noted as maintaining atechnology base in areas that included radar,electro-optics, remote sensing, and acoustics.Laser research was also conducted at HarryDiamond Laboratories and Frankford Arsenal(USAECOM ca. 1977:31). The same yearECOM noted that a broader technology base inmeteorology was needed. The AtmosphericSciences Laboratory at White Sands, NewMexico, was focusing on automating weatherdata, developing new types of sensors, and the Electronic Warfare (EW) involves usingdevelopment of models of the upper atmosphere electromagnetic energy as a means of denying(USAECOM ca. 1977:89). airspace to the enemy while leaving that airspace

By 1980 more than half the $40 billion spent in The significance of EW in the Cold War has beenthe United States each year on research and attested by authors Arkin and Fieldhousedevelopment came from the federal government, (1985:65), who have commented that theand over half that amount was coming from the “superior ability to detect and target the enemy’sDoD (Gansler 1980:97). “This $10 billion or forces, to hide and communicate with one’s own,more spent yearly by the Department of Defense and to control military operations has becomeis not by itself what makes defense research and more important than the weapons themselves”development so critically important. Rather, it is (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:65).the fact that the United States bases its overalldefense posture almost entirely on ‘technological The Army viewed the primary subdivisions of itssuperiority’ that makes R&D a central focus for EW programs in general as consisting ofthe DOD [sic] and therefore for the defenseindustrial base” (Gansler 1980:97). However,less than one-fifth of the DoD total was goingtoward “‘research and advanced development’(the so-called technology base), which is thecritical area of really new ideas and feasibilitydemonstrations” (Gansler 1980:97).

The focus of technology base research in the1980s was directed by efforts to develop theStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ballistic missiledefense system, including the development ofnew technologies and processes to achieve a goalthat was specific in objective but vague in themeans of reaching that objective. One of thethree concentrations of the SDI program, asdirected by the Strategic Defense InitiativeOrganization (SDIO), was basic and applied

Electronic Warfare

available to friendly forces (USAECOM 1972:7).

“electronic countermeasures, . . . electronicwarfare support measures, and . . . electroniccounter-countermeasures” (USAECOM 1972:7).The countermeasures and counter-countermeasures are the most important to thiscontext, the support measures mainly includingplatforms, power sources, and equipment withsimilar support purposes. Electroniccountermeasure (ECM in this report; in otherdocuments this is sometimes also called CM)devices protected aircraft, tanks, troops, and othermateriel from attack by enemy weapons, andreduced enemy capabilities to communicate witheach other and to detect friendly forces with radarand electro-optical systems. The latter objectiveincluded tactical signal intelligence (SIGINT),whereby signals of hostile weapons and otheremitters were located and identified. Counter-


64

countermeasures (ECCM in this report; at Fort Monmouth’s Evans Signal Laboratoryabbreviated alternately as CCM in some (SCEL 1956:n.p.).documentation) reduced vulnerability to enemyEW (USAECOM 1972:30). The Signal Corpsand the ECOM, CORADCOM, and CECOMorganizations at Fort Monmouth were theimportant avenues of research, development, andproduction. Also of major importance to ArmyEW programs were the Electronic ProvingGround at Fort Huachuca and the White SandsMissile Range.

The Signal Corps conducted most if not allresearch and development into signaltransmission and reception devices for the Army,and either produced or contracted to haveproduced related equipment for the Army at thebeginning of the Cold War. The Signal Corpswas headquartered at Fort Monmouth, where theSignal Corps Engineering Laboratories (SCEL)were located (CECOM Historical Office 1994:3;HOCECOM 1985:31, 34).

SCEL was requested in 1946 to set up an annex atWhite Sands Missile Range to assist in theestablishment of communications and electronicsfacilities there (White Sands Proving Ground ca.1956:26). Although much of the SCEL annexmission involved missile tracking, the WhiteSands area was noted at that time to be “ideallysituated for all types of electronic and opticalinstrumentation” (White Sands Proving Groundca. 1956:34), and since the War DepartmentEquipment Board (1946:n.p.) stated that VT-typefuzes used in bombs and missiles weresusceptible to “hostile electronic devices,” it maybe that EW research was being conducted atWhite Sands even in the years immediatelyfollowing the end of World War II. By the early1950s, the mission of the activity at White Sandsspecifically included the development of“techniques for electronic countermeasuresagainst guided missiles” (White Sands ProvingGround ca. 1956:28).

The early 1950s brought change to FortMonmouth as well. At the beginning of thedecade, the Signal Corps Electronic WarfareCenter was established there (HOCECOM1985:39), and construction began on the Hexagonin 1952 (Reed et al. 1996:34). By 1956, theCountermeasures Division had been established

The Electronic Warfare Center was relocatedfrom Fort Monmouth to Fort Huachuca in early1954, where it became the foundation for theElectronic Proving Ground (HOCECOM1985:39; Yaquiant 1985:S3). The first buildingsconstructed for the Electronic Proving Groundincluded the underground MeasurementsLaboratory, where research involving microwaveradiation was conducted; and a Close-in TestQuadrant “with a calibrated control track or hard-surface runway for the positioning of equipmentswhose radiations are to be intercepted at theplatform and measured in the lab” (Department ofthe Army, Office of the Chief Signal Officer[DAOCSO] 1957:n.p.). Missile guidance systemvulnerability in hostile EW environments was asignificant research theme at the ElectronicProving Ground. Supported by the Signal Corps’research and development laboratories at FortMonmouth, research in this area made significantadvances in the late 1950s with the developmentof

extensions of the frequency ranges coveredby electronic countermeasures equipment,reductions in size and weight, greateraccuracy, easier maintenance, more rapidfunctioning, higher efficiency and theadoption of several entirely new techniquesfor countermeasures purposes. Systemsstudies were continued and equipmentrequirements were established for feasibleelectronic warfare systems [USASRDL1958:52, 73-74].

In 1958, a unique radar-invisible test tower madeentirely of wood and nonmetallic nuts and boltswas built at the Electronic Proving Ground (ArmyResearch and Development Newsmagazinen.d.:n.p.).

The Signal Research and DevelopmentLaboratory at Fort Monmouth proposed newsatellites be used in electronic warfare, probablyfor observation and signal interception, in 1957(USASRDL 1958:27). EW equipment underdevelopment during the late 1950s includeddevices for countering the abilities of guidancesystems to home in on ground radar signals like


65

those produced by the AN/MSQ-1 and The Signal Corps had set up the Electronic19

SHORAN (short-range radio aid to navigation). Defense Laboratory at Fort Monmouth by 1958 toA contract to develop an ECM system for this conduct research in EW vulnerability and devicespurpose was awarded to Melpar, Incorporated, in and for what was termed Quick Reactionfiscal year 1958, the design one of several Fabrication (Bingham, interview 1995;developed by Motorola, Incorporated. Other USASRDL 1958:61-62). In 1961 the laboratory’sequipment under development were devices for operations were expanded to include research andjamming tactical communications and for development and Quick Reaction Fabricationlocating enemy radars being used to detect mortar efforts for not only the Army but for the Nationalfire. Proposed platforms for distributing tactical Security Agency, U.S. Army Security Agency,communications jamming devices included the Air Force, Navy, and other governmentmortar shells, into which the jammers could be agencies (USASRDL 1961:126).packed and fired into enemy territory (USASRDL1958:53). Decoy navigation beacons that could The Army depended heavily on EW devices inbe dropped by parachute into enemy territory to Vietnam to protect personnel and aircraft, to jamdisorient enemy pilots were also being enemy equipment, and to find and identifyinvestigated. What was actually developed, by targets. The AN/A1Q-80 Airborne Radar1959, was the transmitter T-729(XE-1)GLT, Jammer, designed by ECOM and ready forwhich consisted of two inflatable spheres limited procurement in 1967, increasedcontaining the electronic components of the survivability rates in antiaircraft environments.beacon transmitter and an antenna (USASRDL Another important device was “an airborne fuze1959a:70). ECM equipment to protect the jammer, a self-contained wing-pod set, whichMohawk and other Army aircraft from electronic would search the frequency range of interest,detection and acquisition by antiaircraft fire identify VT fuze associated signals, and generate20

while operating inside enemy territory was also a jamming signal which predetonated VT fuzebeing researched (USASRDL 1958:56-57). projectiles at safe distances from the aircraft”

By 1959 there was a Countermeasures Division in ECOM developed or helped develop was theoperation at Fort Monmouth, which consisted of AN/MLO-29 communications jammer anddepartments conducting studies in vulnerability to countermeasure set, in production by 1965; andEW, countermeasure systems, detection and the AN/GLQ-3 tactical-use transmitting andlocation, and jamming and deception. All the receiving countermeasure set, in production inprimary research facilities were located in the 1966, the first high-power communicationsEvans Area (USASRDL 1959b:n.p.). Activities jamming device (HOHQAMC 1969:176). Basicthat year focused on “countering research related to EW appears to have often beencommunications, fuzes, radars, jammers and contracted out, while feasibility studies andnavigational aids and to improving our prototype development were accomplished bycapabilities in the search, intercept, direction ECOM personnel (USAERDL 1962:25). Afinding, recording and analysis functions” reorganization effort within ECOM in 1964 and(USASRDL 1959a:67). 1965 resulted in the creation of six separate

(HOHQAMC 1969:176). Other equipment that

laboratories, one of which was the ElectronicWarfare Laboratory, at Fort Monmouth(HOHQAMC 1969:173).

One of the most extensive facilities under thejurisdiction of the Electronic Proving Ground inthe late 1960s and early 1970s was theElectromagnetic Environmental Test Facility,contractor-operated and located in Tucson,Arizona. The facility was designed to test theoperation of equipment in electromagneticenvironments that were either naturally occurring

In military nomenclature, the prefix AN designates19

equipment for the Army and Navy. Most of theequipment specifically referred to in this report, exceptfor missile systems and mobility equipment, carries theAN prefix.

Acquisition, or more commonly target acquisition,20

is the “detection of targets by the sensors or a weaponssystem [or t]he process of searching for and detectingthreatening objects in space. Sensors are designed tosearch large areas of space and to distinguish potentialtargets from other objects” (Waldman 1988:5).


66

or created through EW measures. Thus the counter-mortar/counter-battery and combatfacility tested both electromagnetic compatibility surveillance radars”; and “[r]adar and infraredwith friendly systems and vulnerability to hostile warning devices . . . are being developed to alertsystems (AMC 1973c:26; U.S. Army Electronic pilots and individual combat troops that they areProving Ground [USAEPG] ca. 1970:35). By the being illuminated by hostile threats, so thatearly 1970s, extensive testing facilities were in evasive action can be taken” (USAECOMplace at Fort Huachuca, and the Electronic 1972:30).Warfare, Intelligence and CommunicationsBranch of the proving ground was noted to have By 1972, the Electronic Warfare Laboratory hadbeen playing a leading role in the acquisition of an annex at Mountain View, California, andEW-related equipment (USAEPG ca. 1970:16). Intelligence Materiel Development offices at FortThe former Radar Engineering Laboratory, in the Holabird, Maryland (USAECOM 1972:n.p.). ABlacktail Canyon portion of the West Range, was new 41,000-square-foot (3,772-square-meter)redesignated the Electromagnetic Interference Electronic Warfare Laboratory was built at FortTest Facility in 1969 or 1970. The facility had a Monmouth adjacent to the Hexagon during fiscal36-by-18-foot (11-by-5.5-meter) anechoic year 1972 (USAECOM ca. 1973:13). The uniquechamber with a 24-foot (7.25-meter) ceiling, large facility offered “complete input/output control byenough to accommodate a 2.5-ton truck or a tank; means of shielded rooms and special vaults whichthree shielded enclosures; and other buildings and are ideal for the conduct of classified programs”structures that included the main laboratory, a 50- (USAECOM 1972:n.p.). The Electronic Warfareby-100-by-25-foot (15-by-30-by-7.5-meter) Laboratory had also established a “Missile EWbuilding of cinder block and reinforced concrete technical area” (USAECOM 1972:n.p.) at Whiteconstruction equipped with low level radiation Sands Missile Range. The activity initially seemscounters, thermal luminescence detectors, to have occupiedspectrum analyzers, and other advanced sensorsand analysis tools (USAEPG 1962:n.p., ca.1970:13, 36). Testing at the facility determinedthe type and strength of electromagneticemissions from electronic equipment as well asthe susceptibility of equipment to external signals(USAEPG ca. 1970:36).

During the early 1970s, EW research increased itsfocus on infrared and optical wavelength systemsand began relying more heavily on computer-aided systems design. Mathematical modelingwas used in the design of high-power jammers,the analysis of expendable EW devices, and to“optimize decision making in the presence ofuncertainty” (USAECOM 1972:30). TheElectromagnetic Environmental Test Facilityused a number of computer models to analyzeequipment operations in hostile EW environments(USAEPG ca. 1970:35). New moretechnologically advanced weapons systems usingimproved optical and radar aiming and guidancesystems protected by sophisticated ECMequipment intended to defeat infrared homingweapons required corresponding advances inelectronic target acquisition. “New developmentswere initiated to counter antitank guided missilesand for microwave expendable jammers against

two main buildings . . . and 30 otherbuildings with an approximate total of200,000 square feet [18,400 square meters].The unique location at the foot of a longmissile range provides many specialinvestigation facilities. Cross rangefacilities are also provided on the tops oftwo opposing mountains [USAECOM1972:n.p.].

However, in 1974, the space at White Sands inuse by the laboratory was noted to have beenabout 10,000 square feet (920 square meters) in11 buildings and 9,600 square feet (883 squaremeters) in trailers and portable shelters(USAECOM ca. 1974:76).

Also at White Sands Missile Range was thelargest “rectangular-taper, RF, anechoic chamber. . . in the US” (USAECOM ca. 1977:190),completed in the mid-1970s. The floor of thechamber could be removed to accommodateheavy items such as helicopters and tanks. Thechamber was built to investigate the vulnerabilityof equipment in hostile EW environments, as wellas conduct radar-related evaluations (USAECOMca. 1977:190). An unusual mobile laboratory wasat the missile range as well. The Army Airborne


67

EW Laboratory, more informally called Big intelligence equipment along with surveillance,Crow, was a modified Air Force KC-135 that weapon location, detection and identificationprovided a platform for the airborne EW equipments. The Center’s programs encompassvulnerability evaluation of missiles. Big Crow the entire electromagnetic spectrum from thecould transmit and receive signals for radar communications frequency range through lightresearch; provided “the capability for dispensing and ultraviolet” (U.S. Army Communications-chaff and for generating barrage noise, spot noise, Electronics Command [USACECOM] 1985:6,cross-polarized pulse and CW [continuous wave], 25).and deception signals” (USAECOM ca.1977:189); and could carry missile systems and One of the laboratories under the EW/RSTAsubsystems aloft on the interior and exterior for Center was the Signals Warfare Laboratory,airborne testing (USAECOM ca. 1977:189). which developed technology and prototype

By 1977 an anechoic facility in Building 2525 at (IEW) items relevant to tactical and strategicFort Monmouth was available for use by the needs. During fiscal year 1985, the laboratoryElectronic Warfare Laboratory, and test facilities fielded 49 new items. “This new equipment, withat the Earle-Wayside Test Area near Fort significant automated capability, greatly improvesMonmouth were also being used by the laboratory the ability of the combat commanders at division(USAECOM ca. 1977:186). The Earle-Wayside level to ‘see’ the threat throughout the divisionfacilities occupied 100 acres of open land and 25 area of interest, and to perform critical Electronicacres of facilities that included Countermeasures (ECM) against important threat

test ranges, antenna farms, specialhelicopter evaluation facilities, antenna testranges, and a laser testing range. Completecommunications and special purposeinstrumentation, including a groundcomplex for test and calibration of airbornesystems, are part of the site.

A large antenna range of 60 acres . . . wascleared and leveled to a maximum grade of2% to facilitate the testing of EW systems.The area has low electromagnetic noise,which makes it an ideal area for deploymentof direction-finding systems to testcapabilities and measure performances withminimal environmental effects [U.S. ArmyElectronics Command ca. 1977:186].

An Electronic Warfare Laboratory test facilitywas also located at Sandy Hook, New Jersey,where a tower provided a platform for electronicintelligence testing (USAECOM ca. 1977:187).

In 1985, the Electronic Warfare Laboratory andthe Combat Surveillance and Target AcquisitionLaboratory were consolidated to form theElectronic Warfare/Reconnaissance Surveillanceand Target Acquisition (EW/RSTA) Center(under CECOM), which was assigned the design,development, initial acquisition, and fielding of“noncommunications and selectedcommunications EW countermeasures and

equipment for intelligence and electronic warfare21

communications” (USACECOM 1985:33).Examples of the fielded equipment are theAN/ALQ-136(V)1 Radar Jammer, the AN/ALQ-156(V)2 Missile Detector, and the AN/APR-39(V)2 Radar Warning Receiver, the AN/ALQ-144 lightweight infrared jammer for use inhelicopters as protection from guided missiles, aswell as the Guardrail V, a communicationsinterceptor and direction-finding system carried ina pressurized RC-13D airplane (USACECOM1985:25, 28).

Although the increased use of electronics andelectronic components in weapons and weaponssystems acted as a significant force multiplier,giving the Army more for money spent onpersonnel and equipment, it should also bepointed out that increased speed could also meanless control of the military apparatus as evergreater demands are made on the human operatorsto comprehend, evaluate, and establish prioritiesfor the vast amounts of information garnered bythe smaller, faster electronic equipment.

Although intelligence and electronic warfare were21

linked throughout the Cold War era, in part because onefunction of EW equipment was the location of variousenemy emplacements, the two appear to have becomemore closely aligned in the 1970s, when the acronymIEW and associated terms began appearing morefrequently.


68

Installations with ImportantSimulation Research Associations


Detroit Arsenal

Dugway Proving Ground

Fort Belvoir

Fort Huachuca

Fort Monmouth

Frankford Arsenal


Picatinny Arsenal

Redstone Arsenal

Rock Island Arsenal


Historians Arkin and Fieldhouse (1985:82) have environmental chambers. Altitude chambers andnoted that by this time the destruction of launch simulators were important to missileelectronic systems could have had a greater development and to the development of theimpact in a war then even the destruction of electronic and other components that wereweapons stockpiles (Arkin and Fieldhouse incorporated in missile systems. With the growing1985:82). emphasis on nuclear weaponry and a vast array of

Simulation electromagnetic pulse simulators were vital to

Methods and facilities for simulating the effectsof weapons use and the effects of environmentson materiel and vehicles were extant at the end ofWorld War II, but the increasing complexity ofweapons systems, higher cost of munitions andfuel, restrictions and bans limiting some types oftesting, and other factors made simulation anincreasingly important aspect of weapons andmateriel research, development, testing, andevaluation as the Cold War progressed.Simulation equipment included devices that couldduplicate weapons use over time; provide anenvironment like that in which weapons,munitions, and vehicles would be used; and serveto train troops without the use of live munitionand fuel.

Expanding readiness capabilities to include thecapacity to fight in any location on the globeincreased the need for testing the operation ofArmy equipment in environmental extremes, sooperations were examined in a variety of

electronic equipment important to almost everyaspect of battle, nuclear blast simulators and

development and testing of electronic components,especially after the testing of nuclear explosivedevices was banned. Bans on the open air testing ofchemical and biological agents created a need forsimulating distribution characteristics. And, towardthe end of the Cold War, complex analyticalmethods were developed to digitally simulate battlescenarios, used to help determine which proposedweapons systems would be pursued.

Environmental Simulation

Providing artificial environments was part of themission of several installations andsubcommands. Environmental chambers wereused to test electronic components and equipmentat Fort Monmouth, in the Climatic TestLaboratory, as early as 1942, and by 1951 therewas a chamber capable of providing temperaturesfrom -85° to +190°F (-65° to +87°C) in a spacelarge enough to accommodate heavy weapons andvehicles. Rain and humidity could also besimulated there (SCEL ca. 1951:34, 62).Environmental chambers were available in WhiteSands Missile Range’s Environmental andInstrumentation Laboratory by the 1950s (WhiteSands Proving Ground ca. 1956:36, 38-39). TheHexagon, completed at Fort Monmouth in 1954,included simulation facilities by at least 1972(USAECOM 1972:n.p.). And the unique high-temperature test facility (Figure 8) for tanks wasconstructed at Detroit Arsenal in 1954 (Weitze1996b:G-47).

By 1964 there were several environmentalchambers at Dugway Proving Ground, including“an Arctic Chamber, Desert Chamber, a TropicChamber, an Altitude Chamber, a Dust TestChamber and a Rain Chamber which contains SaltSpray and Immersion units” (Dugway ProvingGround 1964:172). The altitude chamber couldsimulate conditions a missile would encounter


69

Figure 8. Building 212, Detroit Arsenal. The sculptural circular structure, to the left, housed the high temperature testcell (Test Cell 9). Building 212 was designed by master architect Minoru Yamasaki (photo courtesy ofJoseph Murphey).

during a low-level flight; the arctic chamber By this time, Fort Huachuca also had anmeasured 14 by 32 by 18 feet (4.25 by 9.75 by 5.5 Environmental Test Facility, which includedmeters) and could maintain a temperature of - several chambers and a variety of devices that80°F (-62°C); the desert chamber measured 21 could provide temperature from -100° to +250°Ffeet square by 13 feet high (6.4 meters square by (-73° to +121°C) and could simulate altitudes up4 meters high) and was typically used to hold to 250,000 feet (76 km), humidity up to 96experimental items at a temperature of +160°F percent, light intensity up to 360 British Thermal(+71°C) for nine weeks; and the tropical chamber Units per hour, rainfall up to 12 inches (30.5 cm)was slightly larger and could maintain a per hour, wind up to 60 miles (97 km) per hour,temperature of +120°F (+49°C) and 95 percent and dust densities up to 1 gram per cubic foot ofhumidity (Dugway Proving Ground 1964:172, air (USAEPG ca. 1970:31). The communications174-176). links between the buildings composing the

The Electro-Optical Test Facility (Figure 9) was was itself a simulation of a communicationsbuilt at Fort Huachuca by 1970. This facility, the system between a headquarters and nineonly one of its kind in the world, provided subordinate units (USAEPG ca. 1970:17).simulated environments under which thermalinfrared viewers and light intensification At Rock Island Arsenal, the Keith L. Wareequipment could be tested. A simulated Simulation and Experimental Firing Center wasbackground provided temperature-controlled opened at the end of 1970. The simulationtargets visible under conditions that included laboratory housed equipment capable ofshell bursts and flare illumination. The space mimicking all types of motion that couldbetween the targets could be obscured by smoke, potentially impact weapons mountsfog, and particulate matter along its 50-meter (USAWECOM ca. 1971:273-274). The facilityoptical path (USAEPG ca. 1970:38, n.d.:n.p.). held four firing ranges, a large climatic chamber

Communications Test Facility at Fort Huachuca

70

Figure 9. The Electro-Optical Test Facility at Fort Huachuca (from USAEPG n.d.:n.p.).


71

that could be used as a firing range and includedcomputer graphic setups and a holographicsystem, vehicle gun mount simulators, and “acomputerized data acquisition and reductionsystem” (USAARMCOM ca. 1976:1:8;USAWECOM 1973:6:4) that could provide real-time analysis of weapon dynamics with variousmounts, and delayed manipulation of test data forfurther analysis. The Keith L. Ware laboratorywas the principle simulation and testing facilityfor automatic weapons at Rock Island Arsenal(USAARMCOM ca. 1976:1:11).

Facilities in for the Night Vision Laboratory, firstestablished at Fort Belvoir by 1962, wereexpanded through the addition of a simulationbuilding by 1972 (HOHQAMC 1969:175;USAECOM 1972:n.p.). By 1975 there was alsosimulation equipment at Frankford Arsenal,including an anechoic chamber, holographicequipment, an 18-inch high-gravity shockmachine, an atmospheric simulator, a tropicalclimate room, and a space simulator(USAARMCOM ca. 1976:1:8). Otherinstallations with environmental simulators wereRedstone Arsenal, which had two anechoicchambers in its Francis J. McMorrow Laboratory(Building 5400) (IOMICOM 1967:1-2); andPicatinny Arsenal, which operated anenvironmental test chamber (USAARMCOM ca.1976:1:8).

New environmental simulators were set up in thebasement of Fort Monmouth’s Hexagon in 1986.Simulation equipment in the Environmental TestLaboratory could reproduce most natural andman-made environments as well as the vibrationsof vehicles and aircraft, and could accelerate theimpact of these to determine lifetime effects in ashort period of time (USACECOM 1986:47). Atabout the same time, an Armored Vehicle NoiseEnvironment Simulator was set up in thebasement of the Hexagon as part of the AcousticsResearch Laboratory. This facility included an80Hz anechoic chamber and reverberantchambers, as well as other equipment forsimulating the noise inside tracked vehicles. Theequipment was used in the development of audiodevices (USACECOM 1985:50, 1986:46).

Missile Flight Simulation

Some of the earliest flight simulation equipmentwere the wind tunnels, the first of which were setup at Redstone Arsenal and Aberdeen ProvingGround. During the latter half of 1951 twosupersonic wind tunnels (discussed in the MissileDevelopment section of this report) were installedat Redstone Arsenal and a third was being movedfrom the Ballistic Research Laboratory atAberdeen Proving Ground (Redstone Arsenal ca.1952a:30). A Fight Simulation Laboratory waslocated at White Sands Missile Range by 1956,but work there was concentrated on mathematicalsimulation rather than physical simulation (WhiteSands Proving Ground ca. 1956:36-39). By 1968,digital simulation was being used for pre-flight,flight, and post-flight simulation at that facility(White Sands Missile Range 1968:71-72).

The Structural Dynamics Test Facility was builtat Redstone Arsenal in 1964 for simulating theloads that missiles experience during launch; itwas a “major test facility . . . unique in thiscountry” (Buchanan and Johnson 1983b:n.p.). Itwas later used to test Apollo space vehicles,Skylab, and the space shuttle (Buchanan andJohnson 1983b:n.p.). Redstone Arsenal alsoconducted simulation tasks in the Francis J.McMorrow Laboratory (Building 5400), whichcontained two anechoic chambers and flightsimulators (IOMICOM 1967:1-2).

In 1975 a Track Accelerator was installed atPicatinny Arsenal to simulate missile accelerationto evaluate effects on missile components. Itcould generate either one or two pulses tosimulate accelerations up to 100 times thegravitational constant (G), and telemetryequipment was used to monitor componentperformance during tests (USAARMCOM ca.1976:1:10). Simulation work related to thefluidics in missile systems was conducted atHarry Diamond Laboratories (USAMDRC1977:18); and the Dynamic IRCM (infraredcounter measures) Simulator, in operation atWhite Sands Missile Range by 1977, included amissile flight simulator and simulated infraredtargets (USAECOM ca. 1977:188).


72

Nuclear Effects Simulation nitrogen tank” (Army Research and Development

The study of nuclear explosions involved some ofthe most technologically advanced simulationequipment and facilities in the inventory of theArmy in particular and the military in general,many of these facilities designed specifically forparticular research goals or foci. These variedfacilities played important roles during the ColdWar and should be carefully considered whendetermining properties of exceptional significanceat Cold War installations. In 1957, the SignalResearch and Development Laboratory increasedits emphasis on studies of the effects of radiationon electronic parts and components through thesimulation of nuclear explosions. Much of thiswork was performed at the Godiva transient fastreactor at the national laboratory in Los Alamos,New Mexico (USASRDL 1958:121-122), and atother national laboratories and nuclear facilities.The nation’s first nuclear reactor had been set upat Fort Belvoir in April the same year(Schlesinger 1993:548).

By 1960 there was also a nuclear detonationsimulator at Fort Huachuca. It was used forexperiments in nuclear surveillance andelectromagnetic energy propagation. “Thegenerator produces a 1.5-megavolt broadbandimpulse peaked at about 20kc [kilocycles] andcan radiate 10 megawatts of power from avertical antenna 8000 feet [2.5 km] long held aloftby a helicopter” (USASRDL 1960:74). Anothersimulator at the facility emulated the propagationof low frequency radio waves over vegetatedterrain (USASRDL 1961:79). The DefenseAtomic Support Agency (DASA) sponsored aNuclear Effects Program that in 1963 wasdeveloping new methods of mathematicallyanalyzing simulated and actual nucleardetonations to provide more accurateinterpretation of simulated effects (USAERDL1963:84).

The Weapons Spectrum Generator (WSG) wasinstalled at the Ballistics Research Laboratory atAberdeen Proving Ground in 1968, along with the$5 million Army Pulse Radiation Facility. Thegenerator provided “a convenient means ofyielding a wide spectrum of neutron energies forresearch studies. The Basic WSG includes anaccelerator, neutron converter and a liquid

1968:1). The simulator was needed as areplacement for actual detonations, banned in1962, but it had the added benefit of being a moreeconomic means of conducting nuclear weaponstests. The facility housing the WSG consisted of1,600 square feet (150 square meters) of floorspace and was surrounded by high-densityconcrete walls two feet (0.6 meters) thick. Sevenfour-by-eight-foot (1.2-by-2.4-meter) aluminumcontainers filled with water provided additionalprotection from neutron and gamma raycontamination. The WSG was operated byremote control from an adjoining control room(Army Research and Development 1968:1-3).

In 1969, construction began at the new locationfor Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), locateduntil that time in the National Bureau ofStandards facilities at Washington, D.C. HDLhad conducted nuclear effects research at itsDiamond Ordnance Reactor Facility (DORF)since at least 1963 (USAERDL 1963:65).Construction at the new site included thesignificant Aurora Simulator (Building 500),22

used to simulate and study the effects of transientradiation on communications equipment(MMP/BTI 1984c:16). The Army noted that“[n]othing remotely resembling its simulatednuclear explosion capability exists anywhere elsein the world” (AMC ca. 1972:20). At this timethe Army designated HDL the AMC leadlaboratory for the study of nuclear effects. HDLacquired the Woodbridge Research Facility(Woodbridge, Virginia) in 1971, previously usedas a transmitting station but modified to conductelectromagnetic pulse (EMP) simulationexperiments thereafter. Building 202, originallyconstructed in 1952, was modified for thispurpose and Building 211 was constructed tohouse a second EMP simulations laboratory in1979 (MMP/BTI 1984c:19-20).

By the late 1970s, ECOM reported that therewere also “sources and generators for Alpha,Beta, Gamma, and Neutron radiation and a 250-kilovolt constant potential X-ray machine forenergy dependence tests” (USAECOM ca.1977:47) located in the Evans Area of Fort

Documentation of the Aurora Simulator meeting22

Historic American Engineering Survey Level IIstandards is currently underway.


73

Monmouth and at Sandy Hook, New Jersey. Atleast two, and possibly all, of these equipmentsets were small. The AN/UDM-1A CalibrationSource set on a workbench, and the KamanNeutron Generator was a portable unit on awheeled cart (USAECOM ca. 1977:47-48).

Digital Battlefield Simulation

Another type of simulation, coming into use inthe early 1970s, was called Operations Analysis.Defined as “the development and application ofmathematical models to evaluate the performanceand effectiveness of conceptual, developmental,and/or modified weapon systems” (USAWECOMca. 1972:235), Operations Analysis supplied ameans of simulating weapons effectiveness inrealistic battlefield environments, and wasprimarily used to evaluate the cost effectivenessof proposed weapons systems and modificationsprior to full scale development. The DynamicTactical Simulator (DYNTACS), installed at theWeapons Laboratory at Rock Island Arsenalduring fiscal year 1970, used Operations Analysisto provide “a highly complex stochasticsimulation of armored combat in a mid-intensitywarfare situation. By analyzing simulated battleresults, certain quantitative and qualitativeconclusions can be reached which provide a basisfor decisions on force structure and weaponssystem design” (USAWECOM ca. 1972:236-237).

Similarly, the Gun Air Defense EffectivenessStudy (GADES) program begun during fiscalyear 1971 provided analysis of present and futureair defense systems through simulation andperformance evaluation based on that simulation.The GADES program required the coordinatedefforts of several military organizations, includingAberdeen Proving Ground, Frankford Arsenal,White Sands Missile Range, Holloman Air ForceBase, the New Mexico Air National Guard, andthe Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility(USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2:63). These types ofstudies continued throughout the remainder of theCold War, examples from the 1980s being theThreat Deployment Simulation (USACECOM engagement simulator called the Multiple1986:47) and the DGTS [the meaning of thisacronym was not located] software system for“developing and generating battlefield scenarios”(USACECOM 1986:48).

Other Simulation

The simulation facilities in this subsectionprimarily include aviation simulators andequipment that mimicked weapons use withoutthe expenditure of ammunition. In the area ofaviation simulators, a helicopter simulator wasbuilt at Rock Island Arsenal in 1972(USAWECOM ca. 1972:447), and the TacticalAvionics System Simulator (TASS) provided“real time capability for computer simulation ofthe airframe [of an Army airplane], avionics,weapons, and external environment in a mannerthat allows the aircraft crew to be included in thesystem” (USAECOM ca. 1974:79). Thesimulator integrated a mock-up of an Armyaircraft cockpit, environment simulationequipment, motion systems, and visual display.The system was used for evaluating avionicssystems prior to full development (USAECOMca. 1974:79).

By 1974, simulation was being used extensivelyin the evaluation of weapons performance(USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2:1-70). This includedthe development of chemical agent simulants thatcould be used to determine disseminationcharacteristics of actual agents. Since most of thechemicals in production in the 1970s were binaryagents, suitable simulation of in-flight mixingwas also needed (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:3:27).In 1974, operational evaluation of the XM687155-mm Binary GB Projectile and XM736 BinaryVX 8-inch Projectile were dependent on thedevelopment of new simulation techniquesrelated to mixing and dissemination of the agents,in part using computer models (USAARMCOMca. 1975:2:66-67). In 1975 an Artillery WeaponsTest Simulator was installed at the Rock IslandArsenal Test and Evaluation Range for use infiring tests of the XM198 155-mm (Towed) andM110E2 (Self-Propelled) howitzers(USAARMCOM ca. 1976:1:10).

There were also several types of trainingsimulators developed for the Army. In late 1978,development testing was completed for a laser

Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES).Laser transmitters—for use with the M16 rifle,Army machine guns, and other weapons—andcorresponding detector arrays that could detectincoming signals as hits and near misses were


74

Installations with ImportantChemical and Biological Weapons

Associations

Aberdeen Proving Ground,Edgewood Area


Fort Detrick

Newport Army AmmunitionPlant

Pine Bluff Arsenal

Rocky Mountain Arsenal

developed by Xerox Electro-Optical Systems(HOHQDARCOM 1980b:113). In the early1980s, the conduct of fire trainer (COFT), whichprovided simulated exercises for training in theuse of tank and fighting vehicle guns, wasdeveloped to combat the toll that increasingammunition and fuel costs were having ontraining. The prototype, built by GeneralElectric’s Simulation and Control SystemsDepartment (Daytona Beach, Florida), wassuccessfully tested at Fort Hood in 1981,resulting in a development contract beingawarded to General Electric. The first versiondeveloped was called the Unit COFT (UCOFT)and was intended for use in classroom instruction; dichloroethylsulfide, better known as mustardit was fielded in 1985 (Bouilly et al. 1984:61, 63; agent, was first recognized in 1854 (SmartKamerick 1988:II:40, IV:11). The UCOFT was 1991a:2). White phosphorus was used in both“transportable but not mobile” (Bouilly et al. world wars to produce smoke screens. It also had1984:63), installed on concrete pads, and antipersonnel capabilities since it could causeconsisted of three shelters eight feet (2.5 meters) serious burns. During the early part of thiswide by 20 feet (6 meters) long, one each for the century, the term “chemical weapon” includedinstructor and crew stations, the computer system, tactical weapons using incendiary mixtures,and for debriefing (Bouilly et al. 1984:63). A smoking compounds, and irritating, poisonous, ormobile COFT, basically a UCOFT mounted on a asphyxiating gases, but the phrase—as usedtrailer, was in use by 1987 (Kamerick within the U.S. military—was narrowed during1988:II:40). Another simulated gun training the early Cold War period to “a chemicaldevice was the Videodisc Gunnery Simulator compound which, through its chemical properties,(VIGS), produced by the Educational Computer produces lethal or damaging effects on man”Corporation of Orlando, Florida, and fielded in (Smart 1991a:1), thus excluding “riot controlthe late 1980s (Kamerick 1988:II:39). agents, chemical herbicides, smoke materials, and

And finally, what was described as the “most were used in Vietnam. Redefining the phrasemodern, most capable HF [high frequency] was an attempt to avoid trespass on internationalchannel simulator available in the world” agreements not to use chemical weapons.(USACECOM 1985:50) was delivered toCECOM at Fort Monmouth in August 1984. The United States formally established the

ARMY WEAPONRY DURINGTHE COLD WAR

Biological and Chemical Weapons agents, and three shell-loading plants were set up

Background

The chemical weapons used during this centuryhave an association with warfare reaching backalmost 200 years. Phosgene, also known as CG,was identified in 1811; chloropicrin wasdiscovered in 1848; and the toxic nature of

flame weapons” (Smart 1991a:1), many of which

Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in 1918, itsheadquarters and only activity at that time locatedat Aberdeen Proving Ground on a peninsula calledGunpowder Neck, about 20 miles (32 km) north ofBaltimore, Maryland. Facilities for producingchlorine, phosgene, chloropicrin, and mustard

during 1917 and 1918 on a portion of the newlyacquired proving ground, the facilities initiallycalled the Gunpowder Neck Reservation. When thefacility was activated in 1918, the name waschanged to Edgewood Arsenal (Smart 1994:4;Historic American Building Survey/HistoricAmerican Engineering Record [HABS/HAER]1982:34, 36). The heavy use of chemical weaponsduring the First World War spawned a chemical


75

arms race, with Great Britain putting forth a very Camp Detrick, nicknamed the Health Farm, wasconcerted effort to develop new weapons from both activated in the spring of 1943 to conductorganic and inorganic compounds. England’s most research into biological weapons. A bacteriaimportant development laboratory was located on a production unit near Terra Haute, Indiana—the7,000-acre site on the Salisbury Plain. The facility, Vigo Ordnance Plant—was also set up during thewhich still exists, is called Porton Down, and its war (Harris and Paxman 1982:97, 103; Smartscientists greatly aided the development of chemical 1994:10). Anthrax was produced and bombsweapons both in England and in the United States filled at an experimental production line at Fortduring this period and during the Cold War (Harris Detrick in 1944; the Vigo Ordnance Plant had aand Paxman 1982:21). capacity to produce 500,000 anthrax bombs or

The chemical production facilities at Edgewoodwere shut down after World War I and eventuallyall equipment was removed, although some of theoriginal buildings remained in 1982(HABS/HAER 1982:39). As World War IIneared, the CWS was granted permission to firstbegin producing mustard, then to rehabilitateother facilities and construct new buildings atEdgewood Arsenal. In 1941 the mission of thefacility was expanded when the SpecialAssignments Branch was formed there to conductpreliminary research into biological weapons, andin 1942 “a biological warfare researchorganization” was established at EdgewoodArsenal (Harris and Paxman 1982:95-96). Thearsenal was redesignated the Chemical WarfareCenter in 1942 (HABS/HAER 1982:41), thecenter’s headquarters then located in BuildingE1675 (Smart 1994:23).

As hostilities increased prior to World War II,Congress authorized the construction of threeadditional chemical production plants. The firstto be built was Pine Bluff Arsenal (original calledthe Chemical Warfare Arsenal), near Little Rock,Arkansas, constructed during 1942 and 1943 tofill incendiary weapons, and to manufacturecompounds for and to fill chlorine, mustard, andlewisite weapons (MMP/BTI 1984d:15; PineBluff Arsenal and Mid-West Chemical Depot1951:23; USADARCOM 1984a:4). HuntsvilleArsenal (now part of Redstone Arsenal) wasconstructed during this same time to produceincendiaries, mustard, chlorine, lewisite, andphosgene. The Redstone Ordnance Plant wasbuilt nearby to load, assemble, and pack chemicalmunitions, but did not produce chemical agentsthemselves (Buchanan and Johnson 1983a:n.p.;MMP/BTI 1984e:15, 19, 22). Rocky MountainArsenal was the third chemical agent productionfacility (Wiley 1951:14).

250,000 botulus toxin bombs per month, but theplant never went into operation (Harris andPaxman 1982:78, 103). New herbicides had alsobeen developed by the end of World War II.These included 2, 4 dichlorophenoxyacetic acid(code-named LN8); 2, 4, 5 trichlorophenoxy-acetic acid (known as LN14 and 245T); andisopropyl N-phenolcarbonate (LN33) (Harris andPaxman 1982:259-260). At least two test sitesfor chemical and biological weapons wereestablished during World War II. One was theField Testing Station, near Pascagoula,Mississippi; the other was the Field TestingStation near Dugway, Utah (Harris and Paxman1982:97). Although all major countries involvedin World War I were using chemical weapons by1917, it is generally accepted that there was nouse of chemical weapons during World War II(Smart 1994:4). Most chemical and biologicalwarfare (CBW) activities other than research atFort Detrick and Edgewood Arsenal were haltedat the end of World War II (USADARCOM1984a:4).

Cold War Chemical and Biological WarfareAgent Production

Operations in the months immediately followingthe end of World War II indicated research intochemical and biological warfare by Germany andJapan had in some ways surpassed what theAllies had been accomplishing. A Germanscientist had in 1936 discovered the first nerveagent, tabun, which inhibits the body’s ability toproduce cholinesterase, a chemical that controlsmuscle contraction and thus all bodily functions(Harris and Paxman 1982:54). Data capturedafter the end of the war from German plants andfrom the interrogation of German scientists fed ananticholinesterase agent research program in the


76

United States during the early years of the Cold Initial work to determine feasible productionWar (Midwest Research Institute n.d.:59). methods for GB was done at Edgewood Arsenal,

The Japanese had conducted extensive research plant to produce the nerve agent. Universal Oilinto biological agents, and eventually Products was selected to design and build the“[p]athological material and specimens from five facility, and the Tennessee Valley Authority washundred human [germ warfare experiment] selected to operate it. Construction of the plant,victims were turned over to the Americans. The actually producing only dichloro, an intermediarynumber of people actually experimented upon in the GB process, began in 1950 at a site nearwas far higher, and almost certainly ran into four Muscle Shoals, Alabama. By 1953, only “a tokenfigures” (Harris and Paxman 1982:79). Some quantity of dichloro . . . a partial tank car loadingJapanese bacteriologists may have worked with of thirty tons” (USADARCOM 1986:1) had beenthe United States in the development of germ produced. The latter stages of GB productionwarfare agents in exchange for protection against were to take place in a new facility at Rockywar crimes prosecution (Harris and Paxman Mountain Arsenal (Harris and Paxman 1982:184;1982:141). The employment, and residence, of Midwest Research Institute n.d.:59-60). ThatJapanese bacteriologists at Fort Detrick or other facility was designed by the Vitro Corporation ofsites would certainly add to the significance of America in 1950, and construction was 80 percentthose sites. complete by the spring of 1952 (Midwest

Further impetus for the research came from fears Muscle Shoals facility, plagued by productionof Soviet capabilities since the Soviets likely and management problems (Midwest Researchrecovered not only research data and two Institute n.d.:60), was still not operable, a pilotproduction plants for the manufacture of GB plant for dichloro production was built at Rocky(isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate), but also Mountain Arsenal. The operator at the Coloradoextensive research documentation for the more facility had developed better a production processpowerful nerve agent soman (pinacolyl by 1955, when much of the complex equipmentmethylphosphonofluoridate), or GD (Harris and installed there to be used in the development of aPaxman 1982:138-140). better process was removed, leaving only the

In 1946, the newly created Chemical Corps took final assembly of the dichloro production facilityas its mission the study of radiological effects and at Rocky Mountain was complete at the end ofestablished a Radiological Division at the the summer of 1957. By then, the originalEdgewood Arsenal Army Chemical Center. The capacity for GB production at Rocky Mountainmission, at first the study of effects and defensive had tripled the original estimates (Midwestmeasures that could protect troops from those Research Institute n.d.:61-62, 72-75).effects, was expanded to include the use ofnonexplosive radioactive weapons in 1949. The Congress also appropriated $90 million in 1950division grew to become the Nuclear Defense for the rehabilitation of Pine Bluff Arsenal andLaboratories, and moved to Aberdeen Proving the construction of a new biological agentGround in the 1970s (Smart 1994:11, 22). Most production facility there. The new facility, theof the literature that mentions the work of this first biological weapons production line to belaboratory discusses the defensive applications, constructed during peacetime, was ambiguouslyso it will be discussed further in the survivability called the Production Development Laboratoriessection below. However, the data and technology (MMP/BTI 1984d:36; Figure 10). “The newbase acquired would have offensive usecapabilities as well, and was probably drawn onin the development of the neutron bomb of the1980s. At some point in the 1960s, the NuclearDefense Laboratory became the Nuclear EffectsLaboratory (Smart n.d.:15), possibly indicatingincreasing attention to offensive uses of radiation.

and by 1950 the CWS had decided to build a

Research Institute n.d.:61). Since by 1952 the

equipment needed for that simpler process. The

biological warfare plant had ten storeys [sic],three of them built underground. It was equippedwith ten fermentors for the mass production ofbacteria at short notice, although the plant wasnever used to capacity” (Harris and Paxman1982:160). Completed in 1953 and called the X201 Plant, that facility cost approximately $79

77

Figure 10. The 10-story Production Development Laboratories facility originally part of Pine Bluff Arsenal. The building now belongs to the Department of Health,Education, and Welfare, and houses the National Center for Toxicological Research (photo courtesy of Joseph Murphey).


78

million to build. Diseases produced there Rocky Mountain Arsenal’s mission was expandedincluded anthrax (code-named N), brucellosis in 1953 to incorporate research and engineering(US), tularemia (UL), and psittacosis (SI), the activities aimed at working out chemical agentlatter three termed more humane since they were production methods that could utilize existing orless often fatal than was anthrax. However, the easily modified facilities in private industry. Itfirst biological agents produced there, developed also established a means of providing testingat Fort Detrick in 1950 and 1951, targeted plants services and technical assistance for theserather than humans (Harris and Paxman industries. The standard design of the M55 GB1982:160-161). Increased research efforts into Rocket, a 115-mm rocket that could be adapted tobiological agents during the Korean War resulted carry nerve agent VX as well, was worked out atin research contracts being let to Ohio State Rocky Mountain Arsenal in 1960. The rocketUniversity concerning the development of was “the first significant ground capability for thevaccines for the diseases developed at Fort delivery of chemical agents since the 4.2-inchDetrick (Harris and Paxman 1982:163; mortar” (Rocky Mountain Arsenal 1980:4; SmartUSADARCOM 1984a:5). 1991a:20).

During the 1950s, development began to focus on The years following the Korean War were “thethe use of missiles for the delivery of chemical heyday years of the Chemical Corps” (Smartand biological agents (Smart 1991a:19), but 1991a:18). Development at the Army Chemicalduring the Korean War it was the 4.2-inch Center (at Edgewood Arsenal) ranged fromchemical mortar that saw actual use (Smart bombs for jet aircraft to missile warheads and1994:11), although warheads carrying either new protective masks (Smart 1994:23). Thechemical or biological agents were developed for center also outgrew Building E1675 and moved touse with the surface-to-surface Sergeant missile E5101 in 1956 (Smart 1994:23). A newand other delivery platforms. As during World laboratory was established at Dugway ProvingWar II, no chemical agents usually considered Ground for biological weapons research intoxic to humans were used. The chemical mortar October 1953, redesignated the Biologicalused during that war was a smoke generator. Weapons Assessment Laboratories in March(HOHQAMC 1969:160). During the Korean 1954. That activity, but not Dugway’sWar, Pine Bluff seems to have only produced association with CBW agents, was discontinuedincendiaries and smoke obscurants at the beginning of 1956 (Dugway Proving(USADARCOM 1984a:5). Rocky Mountain Ground 1967:ix). At Fort Detrick, a program toArsenal was noted to have been producingincendiary and chemical munition for the Army,Navy, and Air Force (Rocky Mountain Arsenal1980:3). Less production was necessary becausethe Chemical Corps could for the most partsurvive with what it had on hand in its stockpiles(Smart 1994:13). But if production was on hold,research was not. Reportedly, a million dollarswere appropriated for new laboratories at CampDetrick (Harris and Paxman 1982:162). A yetmore powerful nerve agent was discovered in1952 in England, the discovery passed fromPorton Down to the Edgewood Arsenal scientists,who refined a variant they called VX. The newagent became very important during the nextseveral decades. It could potentially contaminatea battle area for weeks and was three times morepowerful than sarin (Harris and Paxman1982:184).

breed colonies of Aedes aegypti, also known asthe yellow fever mosquito, was also conductedduring the 1950s. “[B]y the late fifties a plan hadbeen drawn up for a plant to produce one hundredand thirty million mosquitoes a month. Once themosquitoes had been infected with yellow fever,the Chemical Corps planned to fire them at anenemy from ‘cluster bombs’ dropped fromaircraft and from the warhead of the ‘Sergeant’missile” (Harris and Paxman 1982:166). GB wasalso loaded into Honest John warheads duringthis period (HOHQDARCOM 1980a:458).During the five years from June 1951 to July1956, over 38.7 million complete chemicalartillery rounds were produced at RedstoneArsenal. By the end of 1955, Redstone wasproducing “a major portion of all chemicalartillery ammunition used by U.S. armed forces”(Hughes 1994:14).


79

Plans to build a VX production facility were research], flame and smoke, and CBR defenseinitiated in 1956, and by September 1957 the (HOUSAMC 1964:86). At that time, there were23

Chemical Corps and the Corps of Engineers had five active installations under the jurisdiction ofdetermined they would let a production contract the Chemical Corps—the Army Chemical Centerto private industry. In 1958 a contract was signed (formerly Edgewood Arsenal), Pine Bluffwith the M.W. Kellogg Company, who was to Arsenal, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Fort Detrick,develop a production process and pilot plant study and Dugway Proving Ground; in addition it had(conducted in close collaboration with the Army four inactive plants—the Marshall ChemicalChemical Center at Edgewood Arsenal), and the Plant, Niagra Falls Chemical Plant, PhosphateAtomic Energy Commission’s Heavy Water Plant Development Works, and Seattle Chemical Plantat the Newport Army Ammunition Plant (then (Anonymous 1959a:200-201). There were alsocalled the Newport Army Chemical Plant) was about 115 research and development contracts letchosen as the production site. The design concept to industrial enterprises and institutionsof the facility was initiated by the Food (Anonymous 1959a:198).Machinery and Chemical Corporation of SanJose, California, which was to serve as the A 1959 discussion of the facilities at Fort Detrickconstruction contractor and operator. The highlighted the biological research done there,architectural and engineering plans were where scientists had made pioneeringdeveloped by the Lummus Company of Newark, developments during this heyday periodNew Jersey (Hylton 1972:76, 83, 89). The newfacility was described as “unexceptional, its maincharacteristic being a ten storey [sic] tower wherethe forty miles (64 km) of pipes involved in theprocess culminated in the final production of VX.In a lower building the oily liquid was loaded intorockets, shells, and bombs” (Harris and Paxman1982:185). The facility was completed in 1961 ata cost of almost $16.5 million, and it operatedfrom then to 1968, when the facility was placedin standby (Newport Army Ammunition Plant ca.1987:6). By 1967, the facility had producedbetween 4,000 and 5,000 tons of VX (Harris andPaxman 1982:185), which was used to fill M55rockets, M23 mines, TMU-28 B spray tanks, andperhaps other munitions, all filled and assembledat Newport. Bulk agent was stored in one-toncontainers for future use (USADARCOM1984b:2). VX was also placed in M426projectiles at some time prior to 1974(USAARMCOM ca. 1975:3:32).

By 1959 the Chemical Corps had 28 basicweapon types in its inventory, divided intocategories of chemical warfare, biologicalwarfare, radiological warfare [no examples ofradiation weapons were located during this

in the bio-engineering field of large scaleculture of pathogenic or other hazardousmaterials. Complex techniques for theirproduction were developed, culminating indesign criteria, technical assistance to theCorps of Engineers during construction, andthe operation of biological agent productionfacilities. These facilities provide completesafety to the workers within the building aswell as to the surrounding community[Anonymous 1959a:191].

The work there also included the application ofmodern production engineering technology to thebreeding of insects; the development ofmathematical models to describe biologicalphenomena such as the spread of plant diseasethrough an agricultural area and the spread ofinfection through the human body (Anonymous1959a:191, 194). Important studies in theproduction, measurement, and effects ofbiological aerosols were conducted elsewhere, insuch facilities as the Reynier Chamber at DugwayProving Ground, where the effects of the newaerosols could be studied in a controlledenvironments on animals and with mechanicalsamplers (Anonymous 1959a:193).

Fort Detrick and Dugway Proving Ground werenoted to be the only Army locations conductingresearch into biological weapons during fiscalyear 1959, and $18.9 million was spent on thisresearch at these two locations. At that time there

The plans possibly included or were developed23

around the manufacturing process worked out that yearby British scientists, details of which were shared withthe United States under the terms of the TripartiteAgreement (Harris and Paxman 1982:184).


80

were over 1.6 million square feet (150,000 square (chloroacetophenone), with a new irritant calledmeters) of laboratory space at Fort Detrick and CS (o-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile). Possible37,000 at Dugway. Over 90 percent of the uses for CS were studied in a program calledlaboratories at these installations were designated Black Magic, with the result that the agent“hot” (where work with live diseases and became fill for dispersion canisters, gas handcontaminants was conducted) and “the personnel grenades, and tanks that could be slung belowwho work in these environments are protected helicopters and aircraft. CS, a white crystal,from infectious micro-organisms by an extensive causes “immediate and incapacitating irritation ofsystem of safe-guards” (Anonymous 1959a:197). the eyes and respiratory system” (HOHQAMCAn average of $5 million was spent each year 1969:157) in concentrations as low as one to twoimproving the facilities subsequent to the end of parts per million but is far less toxic than itsthe Korean War, with new facilities added for the predecessor, CN (HOHQAMC 1969:157).“large scale production of micro-organisms, [a] Facilities for producing CS were constructed atgreenhouse for investigation of crop pathogens Pine Bluff Arsenal in 1961 at a cost of aboutand chemicals affecting crop growth, a 1,000,000 $600,000 (USADARCOM 1984a:5). The agentvolt X-ray instrument, huge animal holding and was used in Vietnam, sprayed from E158 andbreeding rooms which can hold thousands of E159 airborne canister clusters and delivered byguinea pigs at one time, also test chambers, 105-mm, 155-mm, and 4.2-inch artillery andHorton Test Sphere, and pilot plants including mortar shells loaded with CS canisters. The “riotone remote controlled BW pilot plant” control” agent was also delivered in a 55-pound(Anonymous 1959a:198). One of the more bomb, the SM920E2, and CS clouds could beunusual facilities was the Horton Test Sphere, a produced with hand grenades or, more quickly,globe 40 feet (12 meters) in diameter set atop an with the E8 16-tube launcher firing 35-mm CSexposure chamber with viewing ports, “used to cartridges or with the 40-mm CS cartridge (E24)expose animals to highly toxic aerosol clouds fired from a grenade launcher or other hand-heldfrom BW weapons” (Anonymous 1959a:199). launcher (HOHQAMC 1969:158). At

Research into chemical weapons at Edgewood M79 bombs were filled with cyanogen chlorideArsenal and Dugway Proving Ground ran to (CK) and phosgene (Rocky Mountain Arsenal$17.4 million in fiscal year 1959. By this time 1980:5), although these were most likely not usedthe Chemical Warfare Laboratories incorporated in Vietnam.860,000 square feet (79,000 square meters) oflaboratory space (additional areas were used for In the late 1950s and early 1960s a new series oftesting), built for a total investment of $74 chemical agents was developed, agents that weremission. “Some of the special facilities and viewed as “humane” alternatives to the agonizing,equipment are [a] chemical process laboratory, debilitating, and lethal alternatives. Reportedly,wound ballistics facility, dynamic aerosol the Army hoped that this new family of chemicalsexposure chamber, vapor-phase chromatograph would “prove that war without death was indeedanalyzer, infrared spectrometer, nuclear magnetic possible” (Harris and Paxman 1982:187). Calledresonance spectrometer, ultraviolet spectrometer, psychochemicals, these agents owed their originsultra-high speed photographic equipment, gassing to the work of Dr. Albert Hoffman and hischambers, and high-vacuum evaporating unit” discovery of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in(Anonymous 1959a:197). The Chemical Corps 1943. After about a decade of experiments withEngineering Command at Edgewood Arsenal LSD and related substances, the Army decided toprovided design and engineering services, use one it called BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) toincluding specifications and drawings, for the fill its “humane” weapons. BZ, which couldconstruction of additional manufacturing plants easily be sprayed over an area or distributed byand processing facilities (Anonymous bombs, took about a half hour to affect its victim,1959a:197). causing a dry mouth and throat, nausea, and

In 1959 the Army began replacing its standard effects, including loss of memory andirritant “tear gas,” called CN hallucinations, could last for two weeks or more

approximately this time, perhaps earlier, M78 and

altered vision for a few hours thereafter. After


81

(Harris and Paxman 1982:189-190). The Armycontracted with a private company, theMillmaster Chemical Corporation, to produce BZand spent about two million dollars on a BZ load,assemble, and pack facility at Pine Bluff Arsenalin 1962 (Figure 11). One hundred thousandpounds of BZ were produced in the next twoyears (Harris and Paxman 1982:190;HOHQDARCOM 1980a:467), which appears torepresent the entire production of the agent for theArmy. Millmaster Chemical packed the agent in16-gallon drums and shipped these to Pine BluffArsenal, where it was repacked in M43 bombclusters and M44 generator clusters(HOHQDARCOM 1980a:467). The BZproduction and filling program was terminated in1964 (HOHQAMC 1969:59).

Growing United States involvement in the jungleconditions of Vietnam encouraged an increase inresearch concerning defoliants, and between 1961and 1969 more than 26,000 compounds wereinvestigated at Fort Detrick. Six were selectedfor use, coded by the color of the drums used fordelivery. They were known as agents Green,Pink, Purple, White, Blue, and Orange (Harrisand Paxman 1982:191).

In the late 1960s production of two newbiological agents called Q-fever and tularemiahad begun (the latter, and probably the former aswell, was produced at Pine Bluff Arsenal) andwere being loaded into munitions (Harris andPaxman 1982:163, 170). Little is known aboutthese, but the $25 million spent on unspecifiedconstruction “completed in 1964 in the BiologicalOperations area” at Pine Bluff (USADARCOM1984a:5) may have been related to the productionof these.

The Amos A. Fries Building (Building NumberE3300) was completed in 1965 at EdgewoodArsenal, giving the installation a new modernchemical weapons research facility. It wasdesigned by the architect-engineer firm Howell,Lewis, Shay, and Associates, of Philadelphia,Pennsylvania, and constructed by the PiracciConstruction Company, Inc., of Baltimore,Maryland. The building contained 53 laboratoriesand included overnight facilities so ongoingexperiments need not be left unattended overnight(Army Research and Development

Newsmagazine 1963:20). Each laboratory had anindependent air exhaust system, and the airpressure in the entire building was regulated sothat the pressure in the change rooms was slightlybelow that of the corridors, and that of thelaboratories was less than that of the changerooms. This ensured that airborne contaminantswould be eliminated through the exhaust system.Walkways on the building exterior connected thelaboratories as well. In one laboratory, theceiling panels could be removed, joining it withthe laboratory above to accommodate tallprocessing equipment (Anonymous n.d.:1).

By 1968 an aerosol version of CS had beendeveloped by the addition of agglomerates. CS-2,as the new form was called, was distributed as acloud from helicopter-borne dispensers inVietnam. The effectiveness of the agent wasincreased by its “remarkable capacity to formeffective secondary aerosols when disturbed onthe ground, making it virtually a persistent terraincontaminant” (HOHQAMC 1969:158). Whenblown into tunnels in southeast Asia, it renderedthem unusable for some months. Testimony toeither the effectiveness or perceived effectivenessof the agent is the fact that Army procurement ofCS increased ten-fold between 1960 and 1968(HOHQAMC 1969:158).

As offensive chemical weapons were destroyed inthe 1970s (as per the instructions of PresidentNixon), research shifted to survivability.However, the argument that without thedevelopment of offensive weapons a gooddefense could not be constructed probably stillheld much weight. In 1974, ARMCOM statedthat

[i]n developing and maintaining a defensiveposture for this country, it is imperative toknow the properties of agents that pose apotential chemical threat. Much of theknowledge of chemical agents and theirformulation is made available throughintelligence sources. This information israrely complete and often contradictory;however, the evidence is sufficient toindicate that potential enemies of this nationare dealing with agents which must be (andare currently being) evaluated in EdgewoodArsenal’s Laboratories [USAARMCOM ca.1975:2-2].

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Figure 11. The BZ load, assemble, and pack facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal. The building now belongs to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, andhouses the National Center for Toxicological Research (photo courtesy of Joseph Murphey).


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Research is known to have been underway on XM687 155-mm Binary GB Projectile was alsosnake venom neurotoxins in 1974 under development at this time and was noted to(USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2:4), and in 1975 be the “most advanced Binary Munition Systemoptimal production and deployment in the development cycle” (USAARMCOM ca.characteristics of a new liquid irritant called EA 1975:2:66).4923 was under study (USAARMCOM ca.1976:II:66). Although international agreement One of the main buildings at Edgewood in whichbanned the production of chemical weapons, research on binary chemicals was undertaken wasresearch into new binary agents continued. E5625, a “four-story plant [and] . . . the Army’s

The Binary Era

What initiated a revolutionary change in chemicalmunitions began in 1954, the year that Armyscientists first came up with the binary concept,a method of not actually creating the chemicalagent until the means of its delivery was on itsway to its target. Only then were twoindividually less dangerous components mixed toform the lethal weapon. The Navy was the first24

to apply this concept to weapons design, initiallysponsoring development efforts in the early1960s, but it was not until 1968 that funding forexploratory development was appropriated. Thefirst binary weapons were developed in 1976.That weapon was the M687 Binary GB2 155-mmProjectile; production of the weapon, however,was by then banned under the 1969 chemicalweapons moratorium (Smart 1991b:2).

Research at Edgewood Arsenal continued,though, and by 1974 developers wereconcentrating on a lethal binary agent called EA5365 and related compounds. “Other mixtures ofagents aimed at superior skin penetrationeffectiveness are being devised for utilization ina binary system” (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2:2).Experimental delivery systems included theXM736, which entered its “Full ScaleDevelopment Phase” during fiscal year 1974(USAARMCOM ca. 1975:3:32). The XM736was an 8-inch VX projectile which dispersedagent from the rear, a new design in deliverysystems (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2:67). The

25

main site for chemical warfare research”(Benjamin 1986:n.p.). Agents and relatedcompounds manufactured in this buildingincluded GB, GD, GF, EA 1356, EA 3534, DetoxSolution A, Detox Solution B, NN, BZ, LSD, andBBC; other agents handled there included H, HD,HN, L, CG, PS, CK, AC, CS, CS-1, and CS-2.The G agents were produced there from about1948 through 1975 (Yon 1988:20-33). EdgewoodArsenal’s pilot plant for the production ofchemical agents underwent a million dollarmodernization in the mid-1970s, the improvedsetup operational by the end of 1975. Theupdated facility could more economically producetoxic, riot, and incapacitating agents, as well asbinary components and other special compoundsused in the chemical agent production program.The new plant could demonstrate manufacturingprocesses on a production scale, and it included“the most modern design feature for safety andchemical surety” (USAARMCOM ca. 1976:1:9).

In 1981, $3.15 million was provided to beginconstruction of a binary weapons load, assemble,and pack facility. The installation at which thiswould be constructed was Pine Bluff Arsenal,which had been designated the Army’s IntegratedBinary Munitions Production Facility duringfiscal year 1978. A World War II building inwhich mustard agent had been produced wasselected for the methylphosphonic difluoride (DF)manufacturing plant, and modifications and newconstruction began in October. The constructionamount was upped to $20 million for theinstallation of a 155-mm binary projectileproduction line the following year (Bouilly et al.1984:80; USADARCOM 1984a:7). The C.E.

It should be noted however that DF, one of the24

components of binary nerve agent GB, was “aspoisonous as strychninie [sic]” (Harris and Paxman1982:232). dimethylpolysulfide (Bouilly et al. 1984:81).

The two components of binary GB were ethyl 2-25

(diisopropylamino), or ethylmethylphosphonite, morecommonly known as EDMP or QL, and


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Lummus Company (later renamed Lummus (Dugway Proving Ground 1955:10). AlthoughCrest, Inc.) of Bloomfield, New Jersey, was some testing was conducted at Fort Detrick,awarded the equipment installation contract Edgewood Arsenal, and possibly at the(USADARCOM 1984a:8; Figure 12). manufacturing sites on a very limited basis, the

Only in 1985 did Congress authorize the Army to biological agents and weapons was here at Dugwaybegin producing binary chemical weapons. Proving Ground.Production of the M687 155-mm Projectile beganin 1987 at Pine Bluff Arsenal. Once the new By 1959, the Dugway Proving Ground chemical andagents were in production, the Army decided to biological munitions test area included grids up todispose of its VX and QL production facilities at 11.5 miles (18.5 km) long to measure the speed andthe Newport Army Ammunition Plant, and an extent of gas and aerosol agent diffusion. Effectsexpansion of the binary program got underway. were measured with mechanical samplers, animals,A feasibility study concerning the production of and even human volunteers (Anonymousthe XM135 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket 1959a:194). The largest test grid covered about 90System) Binary Chemical Warhead had begun in square miles (23,000 hectares), had 175 miles (282May 1986 to compliment research on an km) of hard-surfaced roads, and 3,000 samplingimproved binary nerve agent for an MLRS that stations (Anonymous 1959a:188). By 1964,had begun in the early 1980s. The bilateral Dugway Proving Ground had grid fields extendingchemical weapons agreement between the United to 150 square miles (38,700 hectares) that wereStates and Soviet Union in June 1990 eventually “elaborately instrumented for chemical, biological,halted the production of these weapons (Bouilly and meteorological sampling” (Dugway Provinget al. 1984:80, 129, 139; Smart 1991b:1-2). Ground 1964:81). The Aerial Spray Grid (Figure

Chemical and Biological Warfare Agent TestingFacilities

In 1942 a new proving ground much larger than theone at Edgewood Arsenal was opened in Utah:Dugway Proving Ground (Smart 1994:9). The sitewas chosen for its remoteness in February, and inMarch construction began at what was then calledDog Area, now known as the Ditto TechnicalCenter. The first tests were conducted that samesummer. The proving ground was placed onstandby after the end of World War II, thenincorporated into the new Western Chemical Centerin 1947. The Western Chemical Center wascomposed of Dugway Proving Ground and theDeseret Chemical Warfare Depot, both of whichremained inactive until 1950. Dugway ProvingGround was reactivated in mid-1950, and newadministrative and housing areas were constructedto accommodate scientists and troops involved inGB and other chemical agent tests (DugwayProving Ground 1967:viii; Harris and Paxman1982:184). In 1955, test facilities at Dugwayincluded a bombing range five miles (8 km) wideand 12 miles (19 km) long “available for all toxictests of any chemical or bacteriological agents”

Army’s primary venue for testing its chemical and

13) included a 300-foot (91-meter) tower for samplecollections and four 100-foot (30-meter) towers.The grid was used primarily for the testing ofbiological munitions and dissemination equipment(Dugway Proving Ground 1964:83). The WestGrid, used to test chemical munitions anddissemination devices, included a 325-foot (99-meter) tall steel framework rocket tower used to firerockets into an impact pit, and a 50-foot (15.2-meter) tall A-frame used to drop or fire smallmunitions into a pit (Dugway Proving Ground1964:88-91). The West Vertical Grid (see Figure13), used primarily in the testing of biological agentsand munitions, consisted of an array of concentriccircles of sampling stations, the closest at 25 yards(23 meters) from the center being supplemented bya railroad track on which a vacuum car and foursampling cars could be positioned as desired(Dugway Proving Ground 1964:101, 104). TheV-Grid (see Figure 13) facility was used to testVX and “chemical agents in the ‘V’ series”(Dugway Proving Ground 1964:117). It wascomposed of a central A-frame 60 feet (18.25meters) high from which munitions could besuspended or dropped to simulate air or surfacedetonation, surrounded by a dense array ofsamplers in the central portion, arcs with verticalsamplers and 100-foot (30.5-meter) towers

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Figure 12. One portion of the Integrated Binary Munitions Production Facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal. The facility will be destroyed under the terms of the 1990bilateral chemical weapons agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (photo courtesy of Joseph Murphey).

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Figure 13. Dugway Proving Ground, 1964 (from Dugway Proving Ground 1964).


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farther away from the grid center, and foxholes a steam autoclave in a room adjacent to thewith samplers (Dugway Proving Ground change room, and a gas processing chamber was1964:117, 119). Decontamination and change used to decontaminate protective gear in a week-house facilities were also located in this area, and long process using an ethylene oxide and Freonvehicles were not removed from the grid region mixture (Dugway Proving Ground 1964:191). A(Dugway Proving Ground 1964:118). change house with “hot” and “cold” showers was

Little is known about the early study and testing involved in nonpersistent chemical agentor the use of radiation for offensive purposes. A experiments (Dugway Proving Ground 1964:189).radiological laboratory and high radiation facility There was also a radiological laboratory in thewas located in the Able Area of Dugway Proving Able Area where some biological research wasGround “which can be made available to support conducted (Dugway Proving Ground 1964:32).a radiological program if required” (Dugway By 1974 Dugway Proving Ground had a 26-mile-Proving Ground 1964:76). The facilities included long (42-km-long) Chemical Missile Warheada chemistry laboratory, two radiological counting Test Range (Dugway Proving Ground 1974:31).rooms, a photographic laboratory and darkroom,and a hot cell “capable of containing up to300,000 curies of activity, and provided withappropriate mechanical and hydraulicmanipulators” (Dugway Proving Ground1964:76). The many different test grids atDugway were noted to have been “upgraded incapability and modernized on a ‘continuing basis,commensurate with requirements, state-of-the-artdevelopment and availability of funds” (DugwayProving Ground 1974:84). However, as noted inChapter 6 of this report, modifications due totechnological improvements would notnecessarily mean loss of integrity for suchimportant facilities as those at Dugway ProvingGround.

The Biological Division at Dugway ProvingGround had its principal laboratory, a munitionsfilling building, animal rearing and holdingfacilities, a decontamination building, andmunitions storage facilities in the Baker Area in1964. In the Baker Area laboratory were about60 rooms where tests were conducted, fieldsamples were analyzed, and the effects onanimate subjects were studied (Dugway ProvingGround 1964:32). The decontamination buildingwas a permanent concrete block structure used todecontaminate personnel and equipment engagedin the study of pathogenic bacterial agents. Itincorporated “three ultraviolet locks; one as a pre-entrance to the contaminated changing areas, onebetween the ‘hot’ change room and the showeringfacilities, and one between the showers and the‘cold’ change room. Personnel returning frombiological trials must pass through all of theseultraviolet locks” (Dugway Proving Ground1964:191). Clothing was also decontaminated by

also located in the Dog Area for use by personnel

Chemical and Biological Warfare Agent andWeapons Storage

Chemical agents were stored at several sitesduring the Cold War era. Both chemical andbiological agents were stored at Tooele ArmyDepot beginning in World War II. Agents thatare known to have been stored there include thevarious G agents, VX (in bombs and shells), andmustard. By 1977 the Chemical Agent MunitionsDisposal System (CAMDS) was established atTooele Army Depot. A leak of GB in 1987caused that facility to be shut down (Harris andPaxman 1982:196; HOHQAMC 1989:179;HOHQDARCOM 1980a:456; USACMDA1993b:A:336).

The Deseret Chemical Warfare Depot wasestablished in 1942, then combined with DugwayProving Ground in 1947 to create the WesternChemical Center (Wilmore 1952:22, 24). Bothstandard and experimental munitions were storedin magazines in the Toxic Gas Area of DugwayProving Ground (Dugway Proving Ground1964:160).

Chemical agents were stored at Blue Grass ArmyDepot beginning in 1942, but most were movedbetween 1949 and 1951 to Rocky MountainArsenal. During the post-World War II period,the depot acted as a transfer point for chemicalmunitions being shipped between Tooele, PineBluff, Anniston, Umatilla, and Sunny PointMilitary Ocean Terminal. Mustard was destroyedby incineration at Blue Grass between 1949 and1955. Mustard and agents GB and VX are known


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Installations with Important MissileDevelopment Associations



Longhorn Army AmmunitionPlant

Picatinny Arsenal

Pueblo Army Depot

Redstone Arsenal

Red River Army AmmunitionPlant

Rock Island Arsenal

Watervliet Arsenal


to have been stored at this site (USACE, St. The World War II-constructed Umatilla Depot, inLouis District 1994:6-3; USACMDA northeastern Oregon, began storing chemical1993c:A:203). munitions in 1962 and continued to serve as a

In the late 1940s approximately seven square miles Cold War. Weapons filled with mustard, GB, and(1,800 hectares) of space were set aside and VX were stored and maintained at the facilityfacilities built for the storage of chemical weapons (USACMDA 1993d:A:293). VX was also storedat Rocky Mountain Arsenal (Wiley 1951:13). The at the Newport Army Ammunition Plant, the onlyAMC decided in 1968 to dispose of excess and chemical stored there, from the date of firstobsolete chemical stocks in storage at Rocky production in 1961 throughout the remainder ofMountain, but environmental concerns delayed any the Cold War era (USACMDA 1993e:6:3).disposal action until 1971. All biological agentswere added to the disposal list by presidential order Anniston Army Depot received its first chemicalin November 1969 (USADARCOM 1984a:5). The agents and munitions in February 1963. Agentsfirst of these to be destroyed was known as TX GB, VX, thickened mustard (HT), and distilledAnti-Crop Agent, stored at Rocky Mountain Arsenal mustard (HD) were stored in areas F and Iand in small amounts at Beale Air Force Base in (USACMDA 1993f:A:11). Other sites whereCalifornia. Disposal began in 1971 and was limited amounts of chemical weapons were storedcompleted in 1973 (Rocky Mountain Arsenal for limited periods included the Pueblo,1980:8). All of the biological stockpiles were Louisiana, Letterkenny, Sharpe, and Red Riverdestroyed by May 1973 (HOHQDARCOM army depots (Kamerick 1988:IV:11; Smart1978:24). Mustard was destroyed from 1972 into 1991a:31; USACMDA 1993g:A:109).1974; GB in M34 bomb clusters from 1973 through1976 (Rocky Mountain Arsenal 1980:8). More GBin underground storage tanks, Weteye bombs, and Missile DevelopmentHonest John warheads were demilitarized from1974 into 1976 (Rocky Mountain Arsenal 1980:9).

Chemical and biological munitions and agentswere stored at Pine Bluff Arsenal in bothwarehouse buildings and igloos (Pine BluffArsenal and Mid-West Chemical Depot 1951:23;Figure 14). In 1972, approximately one-fourth ofthe igloos at Pine Bluff contained GB, VX, or BZ(Pine Bluff Arsenal 1972:6). BZ, apparently allpacked in weapons, was stored at Pine BluffArsenal from 1963 until at least 1983(HOHQDARCOM 1980a:467; USADARCOM1984a:7). In May 1972, the facilities wherebiological agents had been produced were turnedover to the Department of Health, Education, andWelfare, and the National Center forToxicological Research was established there(USADARCOM 1984a:5). Functions continuedto be turned over to the National Center forToxicological Research until 1979(USADARCOM 1984a:6). A $29.1 millioncontract to design and install equipment for thedemilitarization of BZ stored at Pine BluffArsenal was awarded to Burns and Roe IndustrialServices Corporation of Paramus, New Jersey, in1983 (USADARCOM 1984a:7).

chemical weapons depot for the remainder of the

Background

One AMC historian has noted that “[o]f allweapon systems, the guided missile was the mostcomplex and difficult to design and build”(HOUSAMC 1964:6). Even as early as thishistorian was writing, missile development

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Figure 14. Example of the biological and chemical storage facilities at Pine Bluff Arsenal. On the right is a converted World War II-era igloo; on the left is arefrigerated building for storage of biological agents (photo courtesy of Joseph Murphey).


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included advanced electronic mechanisms, that used a V-2 as the first stage and a WACproximity and other complex fuzes, and highly Corporal as the second stage. With thisvolatile and powerful fuels; and mating them to combination the Army made its first realnuclear, chemical, and biological warheads advances in missile flight, setting distance,increased their complexity. “Missile technology altitude, and velocity records (Hughes 1992:2).involved such physical sciences as aerodynamics,gyrostatics, heat transfer, metallurgy, propulsion, In 1948, another important link in the Armyservomechanisms, telemetry, thermodynamics, missile program was established when theand chemistry. Much of the work represented Ordnance Department designated Redstonenew advances in the field rather than existing Arsenal, a World War II GOCO chemicalachievements” (HOUSAMC 1964:6). The manufacturing facility, as its center for rocket andrelatively few Army installations and facilities missile research and development. Theworking in the field of guided missile research department continued to use missile-associatedand testing were not only at the forefront of facilities such as the solventless propellant line atmilitary weapons development, but were helping Picatinny Arsenal and the Thiokol Corporationplace the first instruments and humans in the perchlorate propellant development plant at“new world” of outer space, an activity Elkton, Maryland (Rocket Branch, Research andAmericans used to help define their place and Development Division, Ordnance Departmentvalue in the world during the Cold War period. 1948:5). Availability of land and expediency

Rocket and missile development was only just location—the Ordnance Department felt Redstonegetting underway during World War II, and the Arsenal could be converted to this purpose morefacility that would prove to be one of the most quickly and cheaply than any other facilityimportant research centers in the nation’s missile (Quinton 1948:1). The “excellent chemicalprogram was built at the beginning of World War laboratory building” was singled out as beingII. The Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) particularly suitable to the needs of missilewas completed at Aberdeen Proving Ground by research (Rocket Branch, Research and1941 (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1957:25). It Development Division, Ordnance Departmentwas then and for the majority of the Cold War 1948:4). A complete set of drawings for Fortone of the most important research facilities in Bliss was sent to Redstone Arsenal for thethe nation. preparation of “final drawings and specifications

Missile Research and Development

One of the most important functions of theOrdnance Department during the early Cold Waryears was the research and development ofrockets and missiles. The Research andDevelopment Division of the OrdnanceDepartment established Sub-office Rocket at FortBliss, Texas, in December 1946, its missionconcerning the development of the Hermes IImissile, the precursor of the Redstone missile(Redstone Arsenal ca. 1952a:21-22). Workingthere with the Americans were several Germanscientists who had come over during OperationPaperclip (Redstone Arsenal ca. 1951:25),discussed in Chapter 3. In 1947, the Armycombined what it called its Bumper Program withthe Hermes project, the result being theexperimental development of a two-stage missile

26

were the main reasons for choosing the Redstone

pertinent to facility requirements for MissileResearch and Development” (Redstone Arsenalca. 1951:25).

In January 1950, the Redstone Arsenal PostEngineer initiated the drawings needed for theconversion of existing facilities there to the newmission (Redstone Arsenal ca. 1951:25). Sub-office Rocket was moved to Redstone Arsenal in1950, where it was renamed first the OrdnanceGuided Missile Center, then the Guided MissileDevelopment Branch, and later the GuidedMissile Development Group (Redstone Arsenalca. 1952a:22). The Missile Development Grouphad four branches—Projects, PropulsionResearch, Design, and Test and Evaluation;

Thiokol Corporation became the contractor-26

operator of the Redstone Arsenal in 1949 (MMP/BTI1984e:12).


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Rohm and Haas Company conducted basic Redstone Arsenal engineers “depended heavily”research; and the Redstone Division of Thiokol on data obtained by tests conducted at BRL for itsCorporation was engaged in applied, development of the Redstone (Aberdeen Provingdevelopmental, and some basic research in Ground ca. 1957:86). “Models of new designs ofpropellants (Redstone Arsenal ca. 1952a:11). shell, rockets, guided missiles, and bombs were

The Research Division of Rohm and Haas provide data needed by designers. In addition, aCompany was already operating in 58 buildings large amount of troubleshooting was done toat Redstone Arsenal in late 1949, conducting determine, for example, what caused a new shellresearch into solid propellants for use in to be unstable in flight or a new rocket to beOrdnance Department rockets for its missile inaccurate” (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.programs (Rohm and Haas, Research Division 1957:86). The first production Redstone missilen.d.:234). A temperature-controlled laboratory was to the Army delivered on 27 July 1953and a new addition to the Propulsion Research (Hughes 1994:42).Laboratory were completed for the researchcompany in 1951 (Redstone Arsenal ca.1952a:11). [The Propulsion Research Laboratorymay be the same facility referred to in theliterature as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, whichis mentioned on the following page.] Rohm andHaas had worked with the government for manyyears prior to that time, and that relationship wascontinued throughout much of the Cold War. In1985, Rohm and Haas was noted to have“assisted in the chemical research in almost everymajor missile project this country has everdeveloped” (Still 1985:n.p.), including “much ofthe basic research behind the development ofsolid and liquid propellant rockets in the periodimmediately following World War II” (Still1985:n.p.).

During the summer of 1950, the Office of theChief of Ordnance directed the missiledevelopment group at Redstone Arsenal toestablish “the requirements for a guided missilewith a range of 500 miles [800 km]” (RedstoneArsenal ca. 1952a:21). In the fall of 1950 ProjectHermes C-1 was formally transferred to RedstoneArsenal and redesignated Project Major; themissile was renamed again in April 1952, when itbecame known as the Redstone (RedstoneArsenal ca. 1952a:21-22). Scientists at RedstoneArsenal designed the missile body, the guidanceand control system, and the propulsion system;they were also responsible for the design andconstruction of test facilities for guided missiles,their rocket motors, and other components(Redstone Arsenal ca. 1952a:22, 30) that wereinstalled at White Sands Missile Range, theprimary test range for the Army’s missiles.

tested in the wind tunnels and free flight ranges to

The wind tunnels mentioned above weresignificant pieces of equipment in missileresearch. Prior to the beginning of the Cold War,the first continuous-flow supersonic wind tunnel“in the free world” (Silirie n.d.:n.p.) large enoughfor testing of missiles was set up at BRL.Completed in 1944, it was the first of five high-speed wind tunnels set up there. Another windtunnel used by BRL was brought to the UnitedStates during Operation Paperclip and set up atWright Field, Ohio. That tunnel had been builtduring the early World War II years atPeenemuende, Germany, and was not supersonic(Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1957:34). Greaterair speeds were achieved in a tunnel that was firstdesigned in 1945 by BRL scientists (Figure 15).It had a flexible throat, and was hoped to moveair at speeds up to Mach 4.4. This tunnel wascompleted in September 1947, but could notachieve Mach 4 speeds until improvements hadbeen made the following year. Continuedimprovements to the nozzle in the flexible throatincreased these speeds to nearly Mach 5 by 1955(Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1957:35, 71). Inthe latter half of 1951, two supersonic windtunnels were installed in the test area of RedstoneArsenal. The test chamber of the first measuredtwo inches by three inches (five by 7.6 cm) andcould develop air speeds of up to Mach 3.6; thesecond slightly larger 18-cm-square tunnel couldmove air at speeds up to Mach 4.6. A thirdtunnel was moved from Aberdeen ProvingGround during this period and installed shortlythereafter at Redstone. It had a 15-by-20-inch(38-by-51-cm) test chamber and could also

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Figure 15. Supersonic wind tunnel built at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 1947 (from Aberdeen Proving Ground 1957:35)).


93

develop speeds of up to Mach 4.6 (Redstone of the Nike program in 1951. The Nike program,Arsenal ca. 1952a:31). All three of these were of too, already had a history reaching back severalthe blow-down type, and at least the third tunnel years, beginning with the Ordnance contract with27

included a “complex arrangement of prisms, Bell Telephone Laboratories for the feasibilitymirrors and a still camera . . . to record the shock study of an antiaircraft defense system usingwaves produced during each test. Complex guided missiles, dated 1945 (Hughes 1994:19).electronics equipment gather[ed] other On 15 November 1951 the first successful firinginformation too—all by remote control” (TheHuntsville Times 1953:n.p.).

Redstone Arsenal was given responsibility forcoordinating research and development of theCorporal surface-to-surface missile program inthe summer of 1951, and supervision of the entireprogram passed from the Jet PropulsionLaboratory to Redstone in 1955 (Hughes1994:19). Research for the Corporal had begun in1936 and had progressed through severaldevelopmental stages when the OrdnanceDepartment decided in 1949 to modify theCorporal E for use as an “interim guided missilesystem” (Hughes 1994:19) called Corporal TypeI. At the end of the year, a contract to produce200 Corporal Type I missiles was awarded toFirestone Tire and Rubber Company, the firstmissile contract of its kind executed in the UnitedStates (Hughes 1994:21).

Other private companies involved in the missileprogram—conducting research into rockets,guided missiles, and associated upper-airresearch—included Douglas Aircraft Company,Western Electric Corporation, General ElectricCompany, Glenn L. Martin Company, BellTelephone Laboratories, Gilfillan Brothers,Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories, RadioCorporation of America, and the Applied Physics Building (The Huntsville Times 1954:n.p.).Laboratory of the California Institute ofTechnology (White Sands Proving Ground ca. In early 1958 a solid-propellant replacement for1956:34).

Redstone was also assigned the responsibility forcoordinating the research and development phase

of a Nike guided missile against a ground targetwas accomplished (Hughes 1994:21).

The Test Branch of the Guided MissileDevelopment Group at Redstone Arsenal wasalso responsible for “planning, engineering,design, construction, operation, and maintenanceof major and secondary test facilities for guidedmissiles, power-plants, and their components”(Redstone Arsenal ca. 1952a:30). In 1952 a new28

building for missile assembly and functionaltesting was completed and equipped (RedstoneArsenal ca. 1953:2). In 1954 fabrication andassembly operations were moved to this newMissile Assembly Building, Number 405(Redstone Arsenal ca. 1954:116). The buildinghad a high bay more than 100 feet (30 meters) talland an overhead crane with a 20-ton capacity(The Huntsville Times 1954:n.p.). Another majorconstruction project was the $1 million JosiahGorgas Laboratory, completed in 1952 for Rohmand Haas. The building contained 18 individuallaboratories and was connected to 12 high-pressure test cells constructed of double-reinforced concrete for the study of propellant(Hill 1952:n.p.). In 1952 and 1953, additionalconstruction programs totaling about $3.5 millionwere also underway at Redstone Arsenal,including a $1.5 million Guidance and Control

the Redstone was approved and named Redstone-S, that name changed to Pershing two weekslater. Although development of the Pershing wasassigned to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency(ABMA, headquartered at Redstone Arsenal),much of the actual research and development of

The blowdown type wind tunnel incorporated large27

tanks and pressure differences to move air. In thesystems at Redstone Arsenal, outside air was filteredand dried then stored in a tank at one end of the tunnel.A vacuum was then created in larger tanks at the otherend; when the valve was opened, the air would rush intothe vacuum for approximately 90 seconds (TheHuntsville Times 1953:n.p.). in a separate section below.

This testing was involved in the research and28

development phase of the missile program when theaerodynamics and fin configurations of scale modelsand other missile components were tested. Testlaunching of the actual full-scale missiles is discussed


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the missile was contracted out to the Martin storage, maintenance, and repair of all theCompany of Orlando, Florida. The ABMA Ordnance missile systems, including theaccepted the first Pershing from the company development of the Honest John, Little John,[now known as Martin Marietta Aerospace Redstone, Nike Ajax, Nike Hercules, Hawk,Company] in April 1959, less than 13 months LaCrosse, Corporal, and Sergeant (Bakerafter the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with Martin 1993:12).Marietta had been awarded (HDMICOM 1991:4-6; HOUSAMC 1964:53). Several other private Although the bulk of the Army’s missile researchcompanies were also involved in the development was conducted at Redstone Arsenal, other Armyof Pershing components: computer components installations also made contributions. Atwere built by Allied Corporation, Bendix Picatinny Arsenal, scientists helped developGuidance Systems Division, of Teterboro, New warhead sections (including the explosiveJersey; rocket motors were built by Hercules payload, fuzing devices, and the arming andIncorporated Bacchus Works at Magna, Utah; safety mechanisms) for the Hawk, Corporal,radars were built by the Loral System Group, Honest John, Little John, LaCrosse, Redstone,Defense Systems Division, of Akron, Ohio; and Pershing, Sergeant, SAM-D, Lance, andthe Singer Company’s Kearfott Guidance and Safeguard systems (USAAMCCOM 1987:2).Navigation Division, Wayne, New Jersey, built Technicians at Watervliet Arsenal helped designthe inertial platforms (PAOMICOM 1991:n.p.). Hawk components and redesigned the warheadIn 1959, a $15.5 million construction program for the Honest John in 1959. The following yearrelated to Pershing development began at they built the sustainer motors—the engines thatRedstone Arsenal, which included the propelled the missile after initial liftoff—for theconstruction of a test stand for the Pershing Nike Hercules missile. The south end of the Bigmissile (Anonymous 1959b:n.p.). Gun Shop (Building 110) at Watervliet Arsenal

The Lance, known as Missile B until January 1963, (Watervliet Arsenal ca. 1982:194). Research andwas a highly mobile surface-to-surface missile built development of fuzes and their components wasto replace the Honest John and Sergeant missiles, conducted at Harry Diamond Laboratories inand was the first to use prepackaged storable liquid Washington, D.C. The laboratory was originallypropellant. It also had a simplified guidance and established to research proximity fuzes, but itscontrol system called direction control-automet. Its research scope expanded to micro-basic and extended range models were combined miniaturization, ultra-high frequency components,into a single development program for an extended and the use of pneumatics and hydraulics forrange missile in 1968 (HOHQAMC 1969:160). control and response purposes. “Their researchThe first fluidic controlled missile was launched in into pure fluid systems culminated in the1964. Fluidic control used small streams of gas to successful application in a programed flight of aoperate missile guidance and control functions. missile employing a pure fluid yaw controlFluidic guidance and control systems were an device” (HOHQAMC 1969:82). And betweenimportant development since they contained no 1957 and 1962, the Engineering Division at Rockmoving parts and were highly resistant to radiation Island Arsenal worked on a launching system forand heat (AMC ca. 1972:6). By this time, missile the Nike Hercules (USAWECOM ca. 1963:83).systems had become extremelycomplex—incorporating as many as 300,000 One missile subsystem that involved significantseparate parts and components—and research, research and development efforts outside thedevelopment, and production efforts had grown ABMA and MICOM organizations was guidancewith the complexity of the systems. The Nike control instrumentation. Involving radar, radio,Zeus program in 1964 involved the “prime and computer technology, this subsystem wascontractor, 139 subcontractors, hundreds of more suitable to development by the Signalsmaller contractors, and numerous Government Corps, ECOM, and CECOM than the Missileagencies” (HOHQAMC 1969:48). All the work Command, which was more concerned with theat least on some level was associated with aerodynamics, propulsion, and overall systemsRedstone Arsenal, which was involved not only design. The Signal Research and Developmentin the research and development but also in the Laboratory designed radar beacons, radios,

was converted to Nike Hercules production


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transponders, and missile controls, as well as sensitive guidance components of the Army’sother missile-related electronic items during early missiles and navigation systems” (IOMICOMCold War missile development (USASRDL 1966:2). By 1967, all the Army’s major missile1959a:64-66). The low weight and small size of research and development laboratories werethe first miniature radar beacon used for missile located at Redstone Arsenal in eight mainguidance (Transponder Set AN/DPN-42) made buildings, all of “special construction and . . .smaller missiles possible (USASRDL 1958:75). unique in the Army” (IOMICOM 1967:2). AtThe Lance of the 1960s incorporated a “new that time the Francis J. McMorrow Laboratoriessimplified guidance and control concept called had two anechoic chambers used in developingdirection control-automet designed to assure a missile antennas and investigating radar andhigh degree of accuracy at a low unit cost” antenna characteristics, flight simulators for(HOHQAMC 1969:160). Fluidic controls, which testing guidance and control, and a complex ofused gas rather than mechanical manipulation and clean rooms used for inspecting and testingwere more resistant to radiation and heat, were mechanical and electro-mechanical components,first applied to missile control in 1964 (AMC ca. subsystems, and systems (IOMICOM 1967:2).1972:6). McMorrow Laboratories also had a very diverse

The $3.5 million research center consisting of a development related for all aspects of missilefast pulse reactor plant and two laboratories was development, ranging from launch systems to “allconstructed at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 1966 major areas of electromagnetics technologyand 1967. The facility was noted to have been applicable to weapons system[s]” (IOMICOM“of great importance in missile work” (Pickett 1967:5). It should be reiterated, however, that the1966:n.p.). Designed by Dr. Hubert P. Yockey, facilities at Redstone Arsenal were not used forthe unit could simulate a radioactive environment production on any but a very limited scale—“Thesuch as would exist at the detonation of nuclear Command [MICOM] does not manufacturedevices, and thus could test the operation of weapons systems but maintains the scientificmissile components within the radioactive area capability to monitor research, development, and(Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1968:n.p.). production efforts of American industry” (AMC

At Redstone Arsenal, a new addition to the the large Missile Assembly buildings at WhiteFrancis J. McMorrow Laboratories (the MICOM Sands Missile Range, Redstone Arsenal, andresearch and development laboratory complex) possibly other locations (HOHQDARCOMwas constructed at a cost of $2.5 million in 1966, 1978:222; Jones 1986:45; White Sands Provingthe new facility to house the Army Inertial Ground ca. 1956:21).Guidance and Control Laboratory. Thelaboratory provided the Army with A feasibility study for development of an

the most up-to-date facilities to supportresearch and development in the field ofinertial guidance and control for newer,more advanced rocket and missile systems.. . . [T]he laboratory also acts as the Army’sInertial Guidance Management andTechnology Center with the responsibilityof coordinating and providing technical andprogram support to all Army research anddevelopment on inertial systems andcomponents used for guidance, navigation,stabilization and control [IOMICOM1966:1].

Its most important features were the isolationplatforms, clean rooms, and “other specializedfacilities used in developing and testing ultra-

collection of facilities for research and

1970:10). Missile components were assembled in

improved Pershing, the Perishing II, was begun in1973, the most important improvement being theaddition of new terminal homing guidancesystem. Martin Marietta was chosen as the primecontractor undertaking the work(HOHQDARCOM 1978:223-224). Actualdevelopment of the Pershing II began in 1979(PAOMICOM 1991:n.p.). Research anddevelopment for the Army Tactical MissileSystem (TACMS), one of the last missile systemsin development during the Cold War, wasinitiated in 1985. The goal of the TACMSprogram was “to develop ballistic missiles withinterchangeable warheads carrying differentsubmunitions that would be fired from thestandard Multiple Launch Rocket System”


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(HOHQAMC 1987a:88). LTV Aerospace and of both ground-based and missile-borne guidanceDefense Company was selected to be the primary systems, including computers and radar devices.contractor for the development of this missile Environmental testing facilities included large(HOHQAMC 1987a:88). chambers simulating heat, cold, rain, humidity,

Missile Testing

The most significant Army missile test site wasWhite Sands Missile Range. It was opened on 9July 1945 as the nation’s first missile test facility.The first tests there began in September 1945with Tiny Tim firings (Yaquiant 1985:S2).Among the first buildings associated with thismission was a “huge missile assembly building”constructed in 1945 (White Sands ProvingGround ca. 1956:21). The first launch site, about6.5 miles (10.5 km) east of the originalheadquarters area, included a blockhouse made ofconcrete 10 feet (3 meters) thick with a pyramidalconcrete roof that had a maximum thickness of 27feet (8.2 meters) and blast-proof doors. It was“built to withstand the impact of a rocket fallingfreely, from an altitude of 100 miles [161 km], orat a speed of 2,000 miles [3,200 km] an hour”(White Sands Proving Ground ca. 1956:21). Thebuilding housed controls for firing missiles aswell as communications and instrumentationequipment; construction of the facility buildingbegan in July 1945 (White Sands Proving Groundca. 1956:22). These were the first blockhouses ofthis type ever built by the Army. A similar butsmaller blockhouse was completed in 1947 at theNaval Ordnance Missile Test Facility, about twomiles from the Army blockhouse. Three similarblockhouses were also built at the nearbyHolloman Air Force Base in 1947 and 1948(MMP/BTI 1984s:59, 62, 64, 70; Weitze,personal communication 1996; White SandsProving Ground ca. 1956:23).

Extensive laboratory facilities were also builtthere in 1945 in a complex called the Electro-Mechanical Laboratories, where missilecomponents were tested. The four facilities inthis complex were, in 1956, the Environmentaland Instrumentation Laboratory, the FlightSimulation Laboratory, the Guidance and ControlLaboratory, and the Rocket Vehicle andWarheads Laboratory (White Sands ProvingGround ca. 1956:36). The Guidance and ControlLaboratory was capable of testing all components

wind, salt fog, and dust, and could even exposecomponents to fungus (White Sands ProvingGround ca. 1956:38).

There were also several early static test standsbuilt at White Sands Missile Range, the firstcompleted in 1946 “under the guidance of theGerman scientists brought to WSPG [WhiteSands Proving Ground] under the V-2 program[Operation Paperclip]” (White Sands ProvingGround ca. 1956:36). One of those scientists wasGuenther Hintz, who claimed in the mid-1950sthat “‘the scientists built much of their ownequipment, including the still existing and muchused 100,000-pound static test stand’” (WhiteSands Proving Ground ca. 1956:37). By 1954there were three other static test stands at WhiteSands capable of handling thrusts of up to a halfmillion pounds (White Sands Proving Ground ca.1956:37).

Other equipment and instrumentation wasdeveloped and built by scientists with the WhiteSands Annex-Ballistic Research Laboratories,established in March 1946 to help provideinstrumentation to derive trajectory and flightperformance data; “telemetered recordings ofperformance of missile components from withinthe missile itself”; and timing equipmentestablishing an accurate reference formeasurement data (White Sands Proving Groundca. 1956:32). BRL scientists at the White SandsAnnex developed the first theodolite (AberdeenProving Ground ca. 1957:67). Additional testfacilities were located at the BRL main facility atAberdeen Proving Ground. The blast sphere builtthere in 1946, 30 feet (9 meters) in diameter and40 feet (12 meters) long, was used to simulatehigh-altitude atmospheric pressure for researchinto the ways missile warheads damaged targetsof different types (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.1957:89). A free-flight aerodynamic range builtin the basement of the main BRL building duringWorld War II served as the model for thetransonic free-flight range designed in 1944 andconstructed in 1947. The range, fullyinstrumented by the summer of 1950, wasenclosed by a building about 1,000 feet [300


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meters] long, 24 feet [7.3 meters] across, and 24 rocket or missile was held in place by a static testfeet high. An associated instrumentation buildingwas located “several hundred yards away”(Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. 1957:71). Amicrowave interferometer was installed atAberdeen Proving Ground in 1953, used to obtaindetails about projectiles as they traveled througha gun tube (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.1957:72); and a shock tube eight feet (2.4 meters)in diameter and 500 feet (152 meters) long wasinstalled at BRL facilities by 1968 to study theeffects of a nuclear blast on Nike X engines(Information Office, Aberdeen Proving Ground1968:n.p.).

White Sands Missile Range also had thecapability to track missiles both optically andelectronically to obtain flight data for analysis.The installation’s equipment included“cinetheodolites, tracking telescopes, terminaltelescopes, fixed cameras, Doppler Velocity andPosition System (DOVAP), Missile Rangingsystem (MIRAN), velocimeters, telemetry,Frequency Modulation/Frequency Modulation(FM/FM), Pulse Duration Modulation/FrequencyModulation (PDM/FM), Pulse PhaseModulation/Amplitude Modulation (PPM/AM),[and] radar” (White Sands Proving Ground ca.1956:41). The cinetheodolite system, acombination of a theodolite and a movie camera,was called the “work horse” of the Range becauseit was such a basic instrument at the installation(White Sands Proving Ground ca. 1956:41-42).An experimental model of a long range opticaltracking instrument designed by the SignalResearch and Development Laboratory was alsoinstalled at White Sands Missile Range in 1958,a twin of a unit installed at Cape Canaveral,Florida. These instruments used powerfultelescopes to collect data that were thentransmitted to computers for analysis; they wereconsidered “one of the best sources of data on theinitial flight stage of missiles and rockets”(USASRDL 1958:151).

Although most of the Army’s firings where themissiles left the ground were conducted at WhiteSands Missile Range, static firings—where the29

stand—were conducted elsewhere. A significanttest facility was built at Redstone Arsenal in1953, designed by the Parsons-Aerojet Company;it included a static firing stand that couldaccommodate a complete missile, a coldcalibration stand for propulsion system tests, alaboratory, and a blockhouse (Redstone Arsenalca. 1952b:35). The static firing stand was notedto have been “of the highest importance as a testof the functioning of the propulsion unit and allother components as an integrated system”(Redstone Arsenal ca. 1953:7). This was “thefirst test stand in the United States toaccommodate the entire launch vehicle for statictests” (MMP/BTI 1984e:33; Redstone Arsenal ca.1953:7). The facility was used for Army guidedmissile research until 1960, when it wastransferred to NASA, which continued to use ituntil 1973. The stand was used in tests of theJupiter C and the Mercury-Redstone rocketengine systems (Buchanan and Johnson1983c:n.p.), and in 1976 was placed on theNational Register of Historic Places (MMP/BTI1984e:33). Another test stand facility was built atRedstone Arsenal in 1957, for use with solidrocket motors. Booster stage rockets of theSaturn S-1B and the F-1 engine of the Saturn 1-Cwere tested at this facility, which was alsotransferred to NASA in 1960 (Buchanan andJohnson 1983c:n.p.). Another setup at RedstoneArsenal used to test missiles was thepreacceleration launcher built in the 1950s. Alsoknown as the Fred Tube, it had an inside diameterof six inches (15.25 cm), was 112 feet (34meters) long, and was used to launch warheads,projectiles, and scale models. Solid rocketpropellant loaded in one end of the tube was usedto propel the unit being tested. The method ofpropulsion used in the Fred Tube was unique inthe country as all other preacceleration launchersused either compressed air or an explosive chargeto propel the experimental missile or model(Jones 1957:11).

By 1968 the most important launch facilities atWhite Sands were located at the south end of therange (White Sands Missile Range 1968:62).

There were three national missile-testing ranges in29

1966; White Sands Missile Range was the only one to Navy and Air Force installations, respectively (Browntest missiles over land. The other two ranges were the 1966:4).

Pacific Missile Range and the Atlantic Missile Range,


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Launch Complex 32 (Figure 16) included four shop was constructed at Letterkenny Army Depotlaunch pads, a blockhouse, and support buildings in 1957 (MMP/BTI 1984h:36). Other depotsfor missile assembly, maintenance, inspection, where missiles have been stored include Annistonand communications. It was being used mainly in and Tooele army depots (AMC 1970:17).1968 to test Army weapons systems like theHawk and Sergeant (White Sands Missile Range Pueblo Army Depot’s mission was expanded to1968:62). Launch Complex 36 had been the inspection of rocket motors in 1971, when itsconstructed to support Redstone firings. It had radiographic inspection facility becameone launch pad, a large track-mounted gantry, and operational. The facility included the largest X-one blockhouse (White Sands Missile Range ray machine in Colorado—the 25-megavolt1968:64). Launch Complex 38 had been betatron—and a smaller 320-kilovolt X-rayconstructed for testing the Nike Zeus system, and machine. The larger machine was housed in athe Small Missile Range was “heavily 6,000-square-foot (552-square-meter) two-storyinstrumented for obtaining detailed launch and building with eight-foot-thick (2.5-meter-thick)trajectory data in firings of small, limited-range reinforced concrete walls and an 11-foot-widemissiles such as the Shillelagh” (White Sands (3.35-meter-wide) steel door weighing 96 tons.Missile Range 1968:64). Test equipment in use The equipment was used to x-ray the interior ofin 1968 included centrifuge machines for large rocket motors (AMC ca. 1972:21). All ofsimulating acceleration; a noise chamber to test the installation’s maintenance mission except forthe effects of missile operation noise on its the maintenance of Pershing missiles wascomponents; and a fast burst reactor, pulsed transferred to Letterkenny Army Depot in 1974neutron generator, and Gamma Linear Electron (Pueblo Depot Activity n.d.:n.p.). Then in 1987,Accelerator (Gamma Linac) for testing the effects Pueblo Army Depot was assigned the duty ofof nuclear detonations on weapons systems demilitarizing Pershing missiles, a mission it(White Sands Missile Range 1968:74). By 1985, completed in May 1991 (Pueblo Depot ActivityWhite Sands Missile Range was TECOM’s n.d.:n.p.). And in what may have been their most“largest and most highly instrumented significant roles associated with Army missiles,installation” (Yaquaint 1985:S2). Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant and Pueblo

Missile Maintenance and Disassembly

Several facilities were associated with themaintenance and disassembly of the Army’sfamily of missiles. One of the earliestmaintenance facilities was located at PuebloArmy Depot, selected as a maintenance center forguided missiles in the late 1950s (MMP/BTI1984f:41). Likewise, Red River Army Depot hasbeen associated with missile repair, maintenance,and assembly since about 1957 (MMP/BTI1984g:34), and a guided missile maintenance

Army Depot were responsible for destroyingPershing rocket motors under the terms of theINF Treaty (Figure 17). The first Pershingmotors were fired at Longhorn ArmyAmmunition Plant in September 1988, while themission at Pueblo Army Depot began thefollowing month. The last Pershing Ia rocketmotor was destroyed in July 1989, and thedestruction of Pershing II motors began inOctober. Destruction of these motors wasaccomplished after the end of the Cold War(Bouilly et al. 1990:95; HDMICOM 1991:10;OIAOPA 1991:2).

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Figure 16. Configuration of the launch complexes at White Sands Missile Range, 1968 (from White Sands Missile Range 1968).


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Installations with ImportantNuclear Weapons Associations


Picatinny Arsenal

Watervliet Arsenal

Figure 17. Pershing II Test Stand at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in which Pershing rocket motors weredestroyed, as required under the terms of the INF Treaty (photo courtesy of Joseph Murphey).

Nuclear Weapons powerful symbol of the Cold War. As such, the

Background

Nuclear weapons are perhaps generally thought ofas the single most important, and the mostdefining, element of the Cold War. Thatperception and the amount of attention directed atnuclear munitions and weapons during the yearssince the end of World War II have made them a

important place nuclear weapons already occupyin the Cold War material culture—as the mostdestructive means of war ever created—isenhanced still further, making these weapons andthe places associated with their developmentextremely significant.

A few definitions bear repeating. There are twobasic types of nuclear explosive devices—fissionand fusion. The former were the first to bedeveloped. The latter, more powerful devices arealso known as thermonuclear or hydrogendevices, both of which involve fusion in theexplosive reaction (Cochran 1984:26). Anotherpoint to remember is that with the development ofmore powerful nuclear weapons and faster, moreresponsive delivery vehicles, an integralcommunications and intelligence support system


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evolved (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:6), without barometric pressure, or timer); and other controlwhich neither the Cold War nor nuclear weapons or safety devices in addition to fissile and fusionwould have assumed the shape and proportions material (Cochran 1984:30).they have.

The four phases of nuclear weapons developmentdefined by Thomas Cochran (see the introductionto this chapter) are: a research and developmentperiod lasting from the end of World War II toabout 1955; a period of peak production andgrowth, lasting to about 1967; a period ofstabilization and growth lasting untilapproximately 1980; and one of secondarygrowth. Although the following discussion doesnot follow these phases exclusively, thesedevelopmental periods should be kept in mind.Also pertinent to this section is Cochran’sdiscussion (1984:14) of the life of a nuclearwarhead, which

extends through seven “phases,” coveringsome 30 years. . . . The research andengineering phases (phases 1-4 ) typically30

take as much as nine years. The formalresearch phases draw upon a continuingadvanced concepts and basic scientificresearch program within the laboratories.Production and stockpiling can take placeover as much as an 8-25 year period.Underground testing initially occurs duringthe first three phases. The initial outlay oflarge amounts of research, production, andconstruction money occurs during phase 3.Once a warhead has been approved forproduction, it enters phase 4 and thenadvances to phase 5 when full scale31

production actually begins [Cochran1984:14].

The sixth phase is production, deployment, andstorage; and the final phase is retirement of thewarhead (Cochran 1984:17). Warheads arecomplex components of a weapon, and maycontain a sequencing microprocessor; highexplosives; neutron actuators; a safing and armingsystem; a fuzing mechanism (actuated by radar,

Research and Development

A significant difference between the Little Boybomb with its Mk-1 warhead and Fat Man withits Mk-2 warhead was that the former was a gunassembly type weapon, while the latter was animplosion weapon. A nuclear detonation usingimplosion required less fissile material than didthe gun assembly type. Since fissile material wasscarce in the 1940s, research focused onimproving the implosion device used in Fat Man,making it more efficient and reliable (Cochran1984:6). Improvements reduced the size andweight of the warheads in the Mk-7 used in theCorporal and Honest John missiles and AtomicDemolition Munitions (ADM), the Army’s firstatomic weapons (see Table 1), as well as in otherwarheads used by the Navy and Air Force(Cochran 1984:11).

Much of the research and development work fornuclear warheads was conducted at nationallaboratories like the Los Alamos NationalLaboratory, but nuclear weapons-related32

research was conducted at several Armyfacilities. By 1946 a Nuclear Physics Sectionwas conducting research in the TerminalBallistics Laboratory of BRL, located atAberdeen Proving Ground. The section workedclosely with other governmental and privatelaboratories, and through those contacts “BRLgained access to information about the latestdevelopments in the nuclear field, much of whichwas put to use in the development of new nuclearweapons” (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca.1957:91). BRL participated via the NuclearPhysics Section in most of the nuclear tests in

Conception, feasibility study, development30

engineering, and production engineering (Cochran1984:17).

First production, which also entails evaluation and31

acceptance of the warhead by the military (Cochran assembly” (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:Appendix1984:17). A:182).

The national laboratories are all under Department32

of Energy administration (Arkin and Fieldhouse1985:Appendix A:177, 188, 20, 202). The Departmentof Energy in 1984 was described as having “control ofall aspects of the development and production ofnuclear warheads, research, nuclear materialsproduction, components production, testing and


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both Nevada and the Pacific during the latter half Research for DACRO began in April 1958, withof the 1940s and the 1950s (Aberdeen Proving the warhead section research assigned to LosGround ca. 1957:91). Picatinny Arsenal, known Alamos National Laboratory in 1959. Thealso as the Armament Research, Development, concept of a small battlefield weapon was madeand Engineering Center, was also involved in possible by the U.S. Atomic Energyearly atomic weapons development—engineers Commission’s development of a new miniaturethere developed the first atomic artillery shell, for atomic warhead. The first allotments for thethe 280-mm Atomic Cannon, and the Davy system ran to approximately $10 million.Crockett was “developed under the technical Another $15 million was added the followingdirection of Picatinny” (USAAMCCOM 1987:2). year, $9 million of that amount going to PicatinnyPicatinny engineers also contributed to the and Watervliet arsenals. By September 1961 thedevelopment of the explosive, fuzing, safing, and research and development program had beenarming devices for warheads for the Nike family completed and production initiated. Productionof missiles, and developed warheads for most was completed by the middle of 1963 (Cochranother Army atomic weapons, including Hawk, 1984:8; Johnson and Zobrist ca. 1960:11;Corporal, Honest John, Little John, LaCrosse, USAWECOM ca. 1964:72-73).Redstone, Pershing, Sergeant, SAM-D, Lance,and Safeguard (USAAMCCOM 1987:2). Picatinny Arsenal was the commodity center for

Most of the nuclear warheads in the United States much of the Cold War era. In the 1960sstockpile in 1955 were bombs assigned to the Air Picatinny was responsible for the management ofForce (Cochran 1984:7, 11). Between 1955 and “research and engineering and such procurement,1967, 54 new types of warheads entered the U.S. production, and quality assurance as directlymilitary stockpile, 16 of which saw uses in Army applied to commodity management up to theweapons (see Table 2). Eight new warheads fielding of any managed item” (HOHQAMCentered the Army inventory for delivery with 1969:151). By 1974, Picatinny Arsenal wasshort-range missiles and four new warheads were home to the Large Caliber and Nuclear Munitionsdeveloped for use as atomic demolition munitions Center, and as such was responsible for research,(Cochran 1984:12). Development of a 155-mm development, and engineering of nuclearnuclear artillery projectile (the M454) began in munitions. It was then also the lead laboratory1957 and production ran from 1962 into the latter for studies in energetic materiels and was1960s. Its yield was less than one kiloton (Kt), “charged with the formulation, coordinationprobably close to 0.1 Kt; its range was from 1.6 management and conduct of comprehensive basicto 14.0 km, and the projectile was not considered research, exploratory development and advancedaccurate. The Army planned to replace this development programs executed by eleven (11)warhead with the W82 enhanced radiation (ER) separate government agencies having a total155-mm round in 1986 (Cochran 1984:54-55). program value of approximately six millionAnother important weapon of this period was the dollars” (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:1-6).Davy Crockett (DACRO) system, which Picatinny Arsenal was renamed the Army

consisted of a jeep- or tripod-mountedrecoilless launcher which could fire anatomic warhead of considerable force butwith an effective area small enough to avoiddamage to the user, friendly forces orcivilians. With its very high degree ofmobility, it gave the front line infantrytroops a low-yield nuclear punch of astrength that had previously been availableonly from heavy artillery. Adaptability toconventional warheads also increased theeffectiveness of the weapon [WatervlietArsenal ca. 1982:187].

33

both conventional and nuclear munitions during

Armament Research and Development Commandin 1977, but its mission continued to includeresearch and development of “new and improvedversions of existing munitions and weapons”(Bouilly et al. 1990:6; USAAMCCOM 1987:3).By the mid-1980s the arsenal had been assignedits original name again, and activities there

The Atomic Energy Commission was preceded by33

the Energy Research and Development Administrationand succeeded by the Department of Energy (Cochran1984:14).


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included the Army Armament Research and conditions similar to those that would exist in aDevelopment Center (responsible for research, nuclear detonation. Dr. Hubert P. Yockey, whodevelopment, procurement, and production had previously served as the manager of researchsupport for the Army’s nuclear arsenal, and for and development for Aerojet General Nucleonics,the development of future nuclear gunnery), and directed the reactor design project (Aberdeenthe Army Large Caliber Weapon SystemsLaboratory, where research and development wasconducted for nuclear warhead components. Thelatter facility was also the lead laboratory for 155-mm nuclear artillery development and for designof “insertable nuclear components” (Arkin andFieldhouse 1985:Appendix A:199).

The Pershing program was initiated in the late1950s as a replacement for the nuclear-capableRedstone, and the aim of the program was toprovide a missile with greater range and mobility,and shorter reaction time. The first version of thePershing was fielded in 1963. A program toimprove the Pershing was initiated in 1966 andthe second generation Pershing Ia—more reliable,flexible, cost effective, and easier tomaintain—began replacing the original Pershingin 1969. The Pershing Ia carried a W50 three-warhead section that offered three yield options,these possibly being 60, 200, and 400 Kt(Cochran 1984:56). The Pershing II, whichincluded a terminally guided reentry vehicle, newpropulsion sections, and enhanced rangecapability (Figure 18), was first deployed inDecember 1983 (HDMICOM 1991:2;HOHQAMC 1969:159).

A variety of nuclear pulse generators had beenbuilt by the Army by the mid-1960s, most ofwhich appear to have been meant for the study ofradiation effects on biological systems and onelectronic and other missile and vehiclecomponents rather than for the study of warheaddevelopment, although it is likely that the nuclearfacilities served a dual purpose when needed.One exception is the $5 million nuclear reactorcenter built at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 1966and 1967. The fast pulse reactor was “similar toone at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory [andwas] . . . considered of great importance inmissile work” (Pickett 1966:n.p.). The smallreactor (the unit itself was less than one cubicmeter square) and its plant were accompanied bytwo laboratories. The reactor could create

Proving Ground ca. 1968:n.p.; Army Researchand Development 1968:1; Pickett 1966:n.p.).Other studies related to the development ofnuclear weapons were conducted at HarryDiamond Laboratories, which in 1970 was notedto have been doing research related to fuzes fornuclear weapons (AMC 1970:18). HDL was also“the Army’s lead laboratory for nuclear weaponseffects studies” and operated the AuroraSimulator (AMC ca. 1972:20).

In 1973 a feasibility study for an improved 8-inchatomic projectile was completed. Research onthe new warhead for this weapon lasted from1975 through 1980. The new M753 provided aselectable yield of up to 10 Kt and, since it wasballistically similar to the conventional 8-inchround, eliminated the need for a spotter to be firedto set the firing gun’s sights, a drawback ofearlier nuclear artillery. The M753 also requiredno field assembly and its rocket assist extendedits range to 29 km (Cochran 1984:77-78).

By 1974 research had begun on a new type ofnuclear warhead, the earth penetrator, designed todestroy subsurface targets. That year“[t]heoretical and computer aided weapon designinvestigations [were] being vigorously pursued inconjunction with OGA and AEC [Atomic EnergyCommission] facilities to provide the urgentlyrequired capability” (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2-44). An important Army weapon to eventuallyutilize the new design was the Pershing II system.The design of the Pershing II was approved byDARCOM Engineering Development in 1979,but the earth penetrator option was to remain in34

development pending further study of its utility.

The earth penetrator under development for use by34

Pershing II was the W86, designed to penetrate up toabout “nine stories” (Cochran 1984:311) beforedetonating. It was for use with targets that requiredearth shock or cratering to destroy or damage. Theearth penetrator was also developed to produce minimalfallout (Cochran 1984:311).

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Figure 18. (a) Comparison of Pershing Ia and Pershing II missiles and (b) flight sequence of Pershing II missileshowing radar scanning to increase accuracy (from Cochran 1984).


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“Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory was the DOE (or no) actual hardware design and development[Department of Energy] developing laboratory responsibility for the nuclear warhead section ofand designated the warheads as the W85 . . . and the missile system. . . . AMCCOM personnelthe W86” (HOHQDARCOM 1981:180). Martin feared the command would be squeezed out of itsMarietta was responsible for the design of the traditional mission for nuclear missiles if earlysystem (HOHQDARCOM 1981:180). planning did not include command

The Pershing II was a highly mobile theaternuclear weapon that could provide strategic The XM785 being developed during the latesupport, and so was called a gray area (neither 1980s was to be compatible with all U.S. andsolely tactical nor strategic) weapon. “The some NATO 155-mm howitzers. Harry DiamondPershing II [was] the first long-range terminally Laboratories was working with the DoE toguided missile deployed anywhere. . . . [It was] develop the fuze for the projectile (Kamerickhighly accurate and [could] destroy hardened 1988:IV:16). In 1989 the Department ofmilitary targets” (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:54). Defense-Department of Energy Nuclear WeaponsIt had a range of 1,800 km, carried a single Standing Committee reviewed test results of thewarhead, measured about 35 feet (10.6 meters) in XM785 and delayed the program “at least 24length by about 40 inches (102 cm) in diameter, months so that the Department of Energy couldused a two-stage solid fuel motor and employed make the changes. [Since most] . . . of thea Radar/Correlation terminal inertial guidance changes did not affect Army-designedsystem. Pershing Ia had a range of only 400 components” (Bouilly et al. 1990:33), and themiles (640 km) and did not employ the DoE was making the changes, it was likely theRadar/Correlation Terminal guidance system DoE that designed the nuclear portion of the(PAOMICOM 1991:n.p.). weapon.

Research in the early 1980s continued to focus ongreater miniaturization and accuracy. Oneinnovation that was being applied to designs inthis period was ER capability using tritium as thefissile material, being incorporated in the W70Modification 3 for the Lance, the W79 8-inchmortar round, and the W82 155-mm artilleryround (Cochran 1984:14-15, 72). In 1985, threeUnited States laboratories were “responsible forwarhead research, design and testing: theLawrence Livermore National Laboratory atLivermore, California; the Los Alamos NationalLaboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico; and theSandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, NewMexico” (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:67).

Research on a replacement for the Lance wasauthorized in 1987; the new unit to be a multiplelaunch system (Kamerick 1988:II:33).Designated the follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL)program, its objective was a vehicle-mountedrocket launcher similar to the M270 MLRS butwith one nuclear-capable missile in each of thelaunchers canisters. “It is likely that AMCCOMand ARDEC [Armament Research, Developmentand Engineering Center] would have very little

representation” (Bouilly et al. 1990:36).

Production

Three types of production facilities were uniqueto the production of nuclear munitions for theArmy. The first produced the fissile or fusionmaterial used in the warhead, the secondproduced the various non-nuclear components ofthe warhead and did some assembly, and the thirdconducted the final assembly. Associated withthe early production of fissile material was theheavy water plant at the Newport ArmyAmmunition Plant, constructed by DuPont during1943 and 1944. Heavy water is used in nuclearreactors. The Newport plant operated until 1946,then was reactivated in 1952 and operated until1957 (Newport Army Ammunition Plant ca.1987:5-6). This was the only Army plant to fillthis requirement.

Although a categorical statement cannot be maderegarding the topic, it is very unlikely thatweapons grade fissile and fusion material wasproduced at Army Cold War facilities, althougha limited amount may have been produced as aby-product at facilities with nuclear generators,


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reactors, and other atomic energy equipment used York (Gaither 1995:33). All assembly activitiesprimarily for testing. The uranium, plutonium, were consolidated at Pantex Plant in 1975and tritium specifically produced for nuclear (MMP/BTI 1984i:47).warheads were manufactured or processed at the“Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky;the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant inPiketon, Ohio; the Feed Materials ProductionCenter in Fernald, Ohio; the Ashtabula ExtrusionPlant in Ashtabula, Ohio; the HanfordReservation in Richland, Washington; theSavannah River Plant in Aiken, South Carolina;and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory inIdaho Falls, Idaho” (Arkin and Fieldhouse1985:162).

The second type of facility built “one-of-a-kindcomponents” (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:68) andpartially assembled warheads. Although Arkinand Fieldhouse (1985:68) stated there were“seven U.S. production facilities that produce thethousands of subcomponents needed for thetwenty-eight different warheads in the U.S.arsenal [in 1985],” they only listed five—theRocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado; KansasCity Plant, Kansas City, Missouri; MoundLaboratory, Miamisburg, Ohio; Pinellas Plant,Clearwater, Florida; and Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge,Tennessee (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:162). Allof these were operated under the Department ofEnergy and its predecessor organizations.

Nuclear warheads other than test units (LosAlamos National Laboratory had facilities for theassembly of complete nuclear devices) have beenassembled into their final state at only twofacilities—Iowa Army Ammunition Plant andPantex Plant. Conversion of the facilities at theIowa Army Ammunition Plant to accommodatenuclear warhead assembly began in 1947, theproject undertaken by the Silas Mason Company,Shreveport, Louisiana, which also operated thefacility. The first weapons components came offthe line in mid-1949 (Lemert 1979:161, 164).Reconstruction at Pantex Plant began in 1951 andwas completed the following year, with SilasMason Company again serving as theconstructing contractor. Procter and GambleDefense Corporation operated the plant until1956, when operations were transferred to whatwas then known as the Mason and Hanger-SilasMason Company, Incorporated, located in New

Testing

Like nuclear warhead production, nuclear testswere conducted at properties under the DoE andits predecessor organizations. The mostimportant test site in the United States is theNevada Test Site, a DoE facility headquartered atCamp Mercury (Arkin and Fieldhouse1985:Appendix A:197). Continental UnitedStates sites at which testing was conducted in thepast but is not being conducted currently arelocated at Alamogordo, Carlsbad, andFarmington, New Mexico; at Hattiesburg,Mississippi; and at Grand Valley and Rifle, inColorado (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:162).

Storage, Maintenance, and Demilitarization

The primary Army installations where nuclearweapons were stored were Sierra Army Depot,Herlong, California, and Seneca Army Depot,Romulus, New York. They received all thefinished warheads from the DoE assembly plants(Pantex Plant and Iowa Army Ammunition Plant)and held them during peacetime. Theseinstallations were also responsible for transferringnuclear warheads to field depots where nuclearweapons were deployed and to other storage sitesin emergency situations (Cochran 1984:87).

Seneca and Sierra army depots also conducted thedemilitarization of nuclear warheads. After theUnited States and Soviet Union signed the INFTreaty in 1989, the warheads for the Pershingmissile systems were disassembled at those twoinstallations while other portions of the missileswere destroyed elsewhere—for example, ballisticcases were destroyed at the Pueblo Army Depot,and rocket motors were destroyed at LonghornArmy Ammunition Plant (Bouilly et al. 1990:35,95). Soviet observers were present in the U.S.during these activities at the sites involved, andAmerican observers attended similardemilitarization procedures in the Soviet Union.


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Installations with ImportantSurvivability Associations

Aberdeen Proving Ground,Edgewood Area

Army Research Laboratory


Fort Detrick

Fort Huachuca

Fort Monmouth

Natick Laboratories

Picatinny Arsenal

Watervliet Arsenal


Survivability in Nuclear, Biological, entailed better clothing and breathing apparatus,and Chemical Environments

The nature of chemical weapons, as opposed toexplosive weapons, made it possible to defeat orat least mitigate their utility by defensive means,allowing troops to continue to operate in acontaminated environment. Defenses againstbiological agents and radiation were created asattack by these types of weapons became moreprobable. Numerous nuclear detonationscontributed to the technology data base for thedevelopment of protective and detection devicesrelated to nuclear warfare, from the hardening ofcommunications terminals to the development ofdog-tag radiation sensors. Although most of theliterature discussing chemical, biological, andradiological issues deals with the development ofoffensive weapons rather than with defenses, thefacilities discussed in the chemical and biologicalweapons section of this report are likely to havealso conducted research in defensive measures,and cultural resources investigations at thesefacilities should take this into consideration.Likewise, most facilities involved in electronicwarfare research would have also beenconducting research into nuclear effects defenses.Even if research was not conducted for immediateapplication in defensive systems, much of thedata generated from research into the effects ofoffensive weapons could have had defenseapplications as well. The most technologicallyadvanced research dealt with nucleareffects—chemical and biological defense usually

and warning systems, some as simple as paperthat changed color when exposed to airborneagents. Facilities related to nuclear effectsresearch, on the other hand, were at the forefrontof technology and related facilities containedsome of the most significant research equipmentin the world.

The first efforts to enhance survivability inchemical warfare environments were simple ragsplaced over the face, which evolved into the moreefficient masks and charcoal respirators of WorldWar I. In the United States, research wasconcentrated at Edgewood Arsenal, and a gasmask industry consisting of private businessesand one government factory had come into beingby the end of World War I. After armistice, alldefensive research efforts were moved toEdgewood Arsenal (Smart 1994:5-6).

During World War II survivability studies wereexpanded to cover biological and radiologicalprotection, with initial efforts focusing onimpregnated clothing and improved masks. TheProtective Division of the Chemical WarfareLaboratory at Edgewood Arsenal beganradiological studies in 1943 (Smart n.d.:15), andthe Radiological Division was formed in 1946(Smart 1994:22). The Division probably got mostof the data it needed for development of newprotective items from the DASA, the Departmentof Defense office in charge of all work related tonuclear weapons effects (Anonymous 1992:n.p.).Although details were not located, research intoprotection against biological agents known tohave been underway at Fort Detrick in theimmediate post-war period (Harris and Paxman1982:162) probably entailed the development ofsimilar protective gear. Research in this area wasexpanded in 1951 with the setup of additionallaboratory facilities at Fort Detrick (Harris andPaxman 1982:162).

During the Korean War, more effort was made todevelop the means to detect toxic conditions andwarn troops of those conditions early enough toallow preventative measures to be taken againstcontamination (Smart 1994:13). This researchwas important not only on the battlefield but inthe laboratories as well. At Fort Monmouth, theHealth Physics Laboratory developed a film


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badge for use by its own personnel that revealed Facility in the Able Area of Dugway Provingthe level of radiation exposure (SCEL ca.1951:59). A similar device was later developedfor troop usage. In protection against attack bybiological agents, research during this period alsoincluded the development of new vaccines. Atleast some of that research was contracted out tononmilitary institutions like Ohio StateUniversity (Harris and Paxman 1982:163).

After the Korean War, Chemical Corps work inthese areas seems to have leveled off, although anew gas mask that used no canister was inventedin the latter years of the decade (Smart 1994:13).Quite a lot of research into the detection ofradiation was conducted by the Signal Corps atFort Monmouth. In fiscal year 1958 a radiationdetector called SEMIRAD (Secondary-ElectronMixed-Radiation Dosimeter) was developed bythe Signal Corps (USASRDL 1958:99;USAERDL 1963:44). And during the same year“several additional installations were made ofRadiological Defense Warning System, AN/FJW-1(V), . . . [which monitored] gamma radiationlevels in addition to its original purpose—todetect a nuclear detonation and to activatedefensive devices prior to the arrival of the shockwave and/or residual radiation from thedetonation” (USASRDL 1958:99). The locationsof these installations were not listed, but thesystem appears to have been for domestic use.The Nuclear Surveillance System AN/GSQ-36(V) was under development for use on thenuclear battlefield. It could cover a tactical area200 miles (320 km) deep by 150 miles (240 km)wide (USASRDL 1958:100).

The Army made a well-publicized effort todemonstrate its ability to survive in a nuclearenvironment with the Desert Rock VI nucleartest, in which troops operated near ground zerominutes after the detonation of a 30-Kt atomicdevice (Bacevich 1986:110-112). The test wasconducted to demonstrate (and observe) not onlythe survivability of personnel, but of equipmentas well. Especially susceptible to the high EMPwas communications equipment. Many of thenuclear reactors and simulators set up during thisperiod and thereafter were used to study EMPeffects on electronic equipment and the use andefficacy of shielding (USASRDL 1958:122,1959a:146). Although some of this type ofresearch was conducted at the Radiation Test

Ground (Dugway Proving Ground 1964:31), thismission was reportedly “transferred to the USArmy Chemical Corps, Nuclear DefenseLaboratories” (Grochowski 1961:1) by the end of1962, and the Chemical Corps Radiological Unitwas reassigned from Dugway Proving Ground tothe U.S. Army Nuclear Defense Laboratory atEdgewood Arsenal in March 1963 (DugwayProving Ground 1967:xi). Defense anddecontamination studies related to chemical andbiological warfare, however, continued to beconducted at Dugway, particularly at the AerialSpray Grid (Dugway Proving Ground 1964:82),for Dugway was the primary location for thetesting of chemical and biological defensivedevices during the Cold War.

Chemical decontaminants for use on weapons andmateriel were developed as early as 1940, butthey corroded the application equipment. A newdecontaminant called Decontamination Solution2 (DS2) was developed in 1960. DS2 was lesscorrosive to brass and less destructive of plastics,rubber, and fabric, but it was less than ideal sinceit was a skin irritant and could soften new paint.Application was by the M2 DecontaminatingApparatus or the M11 Portable DecontaminatingApparatus (Smart 1991a:20).

After the Army reorganized in 1962, one of themain facilities researching detection,identification, and defenses against chemicalagents was the Chemical Research andDevelopment Laboratories at Aberdeen ProvingGround, where decontamination equipment,personnel protection devices, and mobile agentidentification laboratories were developed, aswell as warning systems for all the services andfor civil defense organizations (HOHQAMC1969:84).

Research concerning the impact of EMP oncommunications equipment increasedsignificantly during fiscal year 1962, when a35

The ban on the atmospheric testing that had gone35

into effect in 1962 encouraged the military both in theUnited States and in other nations to put more effortinto simulating the effects produced by the detonationof nuclear weapons (Army Research and Development1968:1).


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“systematic characterization of all electronic Weapons were also tested for susceptibility andmaterials and parts under nuclear radiation pulses resistance to attack by micro-organisms andwas undertaken to provide quantitative and nuclear detonations, especially missiles. Atcomplete design data on the deviation of their White Sands Missile Range, five stationaryelectrical characteristics from rated performance chambers were used to study micro-organismstandards” (USAERDL 1962:124). New types of effects on missiles, and additional portablecommunications cables were researched at Sandia polyethylene chambers could be used for fieldPulse Reactor Facility (USAERDL 1962:123), studies (White Sands Missile Range 1968:76). Aresulting in findings that significantly reduced fast burst reactor, pulse neutron generator, and aEMP impact the following year (USAERDL Gamma Linac provided the simulation of the1963:65). Other nuclear effects experiments were environment near a nuclear detonation (Whiteconducted at the Diamond Ordnance Reactor Sands Missile Range 1968:77). By the end of theFacility (a facility operated by Harry Diamond Cold War, White Sands Missile Range wouldLaboratories) during this period as part of its evolve into the primary research facility fornuclear vulnerability program (HOHQAMC nuclear effects testing (Anonymous 1992:n.p.).1969:82; USAERDL 1963:65).

Aberdeen Proving Ground also had a nuclear facility in the Edgewood Area of Aberdeeneffects laboratory by 1963 (Aberdeen Proving Proving Ground, with its Tandem Van de GraaffGround ca. 1963:10:5), and construction of a accelerator, was used to simulate nuclearNuclear Pulse Reactor Facility began there in environments to obtain “a better understanding of1964 (Anonymous ca. 1991:4). In 1966 a fast nuclear phenomenology that will enhance ourpulse reactor similar to one at the Oak Ridge ability to predict nuclear weapons effects as wellNational Laboratory was under construction as our ability to devise and develop counter(Pickett 1966:n.p.). The new facility was measures to be utilized by both the military andreportedly the “most powerful nuclear reactor of civilian populace in a nuclear confrontation”its type in the United States . . . [and was used to] (U.S. Army Nuclear Defense Laboratorytest nuclear irradiation effects on small and large [USANDL] 1968:n.p.). The Tandem Van deweapons systems and components” (AMC ca. Graaff accelerator was the eighth accelerator of1972:12). Scientists at Oak Ridge designed and this type that had been manufactured by the Highbuilt the reactor core and controls while Burns Voltage Engineering Corporation, Burlington,and Roe, New York, designed the other structures Massachusetts, and in 1968 was unique in theat the facility (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. United States military establishment (USANDL1965:n.p.). 1968:n.p.). This facility also contributed to the

Construction began in 1964 on a new facility at survivability measures.Dugway Proving Ground for the study of residualradiation from nuclear detonations. The facility By 1970, the Radiological Test Facility located at(Radiological Test Facility Number I) was acircular pad surrounded by a two-foot-high (0.6-meter-high) concrete wall and two small controland observation buildings. During experiments,approximately 20 million radioactive “seeds”containing cobalt 60 could be spread over thesurface of the pad by a remote-controlledspreader, and later collected by remote-controlledmagnetic drum sweeper. Lead glass windows inthe control building permitted viewing into theexperiment area. A 10-foot-high (3-meter-high)earthen embankment formed an outer barrier ofthe testing area, with a guard house set at theentrance (Dugway Proving Ground 1964:61-72).

Beginning in 1968, the Ralph J. Truex accelerator

technology base for use in developing

Fort Huachuca was equipped with “a wide rangeof modern instrumentation that include[d] thermalluminescence detectors, low level radiationcounters, and spectrum analyzers . . . [used] tomeasure parameters for detection meter surveyrate meters, dosimeters, and monitoring systems”(USAEPG ca. 1970:13), which made that facilityalso an important element in the researchinfrastructure concerning nuclear environmentsurvivability. Another important facility was theAurora Pulsed Radiation Simulator, completed atAdelphi, Maryland, by 1972. This unique facilitywas operated by the Harry Diamond Laboratoriesand was designated as the Army’s lead laboratory


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for the study of nuclear weapons effects. purification systems were developed, skin“Nothing remotely resembling its simulated decontamination kits were put together, and smallnuclear explosion capability exists anywhere else easy-to-handle equipment decontaminatingin the world” (AMC ca. 1972:20). systems were designed, giving the sense that the

The Army’s first chemical detector was fielded in environments could be as pervasive as the gas1968. The M8 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm attacks of World War I. Protection strategies alsocontinuously monitored the air and could detect addressed the possibility of operating for longeven very low concentrations of nerve agents periods of time in NBC environments. In 1974,(Smart 1991a:24). Research efforts of the 1970s research began on a reverse osmosis waterbrought about the development of improved purifying unit (ROWPU) that could provide up totechniques for detecting chemical and biological 600 gallons of potable water per hour. The unitsagents. Research on an Ion Cluster Mass were ready for testing in 1976 and were approvedSpectrometer System revealed sensitivities to for deployment in 1978. The Army planned toconcentrations of less than 0.1 parts per billion of use the ROWPUs to replace all its watersome nerve agents through high-volume sampling purification equipment, which included(USAARMCOM ca. 1976:11-64). “Erdlators, distillation units, pretreatment kits,

Most research in NBC-environment protection 1980b:116). The ROWPUs could remove mostprior to the 1970s concentrated on providing bacteria, viruses, and chemical, biological, andprotection for the individual soldier. Research radiological contaminants (HOHQDARCOMinto collective protection systems for personnel 1980b:116).and equipment began by 1970, and one result wasthe M51 Shelter System, a collapsible structure The XM272 water testing kit went intofor up to 10 persons (Smart 1991a:26-27). production at the end of 1983. The kit gave NBCCollective systems continued to receive attention defense units a simple means of detecting a fairlyin the 1980s and to the end of the Cold War. wide range of chemical agents in water in aboutDevelopment of collective protection equipment 30 minutes (Bouilly et al. 1984:291). The XM16for the M1E1 Abrams tank began in 1982, with was under development at the same time. Thispriority given to the “Garrett system,” which used equipment consisted of a jet engine mounted on“turbine bleed air, a cooling system, and an NBC a truck and was used to quickly decontaminatefilter developed by the Chemical Systems large weapons and tactical vehicles—theLaboratory” (Bouilly et al. 1984:290) located at decontaminant was injected into the jet exhaust.Aberdeen Proving Ground. Equipment for the The development contract was held by Brunswickindividual soldier called the POTMC (protective Corporation (Bouilly et al. 1984:291-292). Aoutfit, toxicological, microclimate controlled) had Portable Decontamination Apparatus (XM13)been under development at Natick Laboratories; was also under development in 1983, and thein 1982 that mission was transferred to M258A1 Skin Decontaminating Kit (SDK) wasARRCOM (Bouilly et al. 1984:85), so it most placed into production the same year (Bouilly etlikely went to the laboratories at Aberdeen al. 1984:90-91). At the end of the Cold War, anProving Ground. The Chemical Research and improved SDK, the XM291, was beingDevelopment Center at Aberdeen was responsible developed. It could be used not only on skin, butfor chemical and biological defense, detection, on some equipment (like the M16 rifle) as welland identification systems; protective systems; (Bouilly et al. 1990:27).and decontamination systems for both theindividual and groups (Bouilly et al. 1990:8). Full scale development of the NBC

In the 1970s the Army’s view of, or ability to system to detect and warn troops aboutaddress, what was entailed by survivability was contaminated areas, and to collect soil, water, andalso adapted to a better understanding of what plant samples for later analysis—began in 1986battle with chemical, biological, and radiological (HOHQAMC 1987a:128). Also a hand-heldweapons would probably be like. Water Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) that could check

Army expected conditions in which NBC

and ion exchange units” (HOHQDARCOM

Reconnaissance System (NBCRS)—an integrated


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personnel and equipment for contamination went in environments, advanced predictioninto production, the contract issued to a Britishfirm. Other developments included an improvedmask, a polyethylene liner and air filtrationsystem for keeping rooms free of contamination(the M20 Simplified Collective ProtectionEquipment), and the Non-aqueous EquipmentDecontamination System (NAEDS) for treatingsmall electronic components and optical devices(HOHQAMC 1987a:129; Smart 1991a:30). Yetmore simple was the M9 Detector Paper, whichcould be attached to the outside of a vehicle or toa soldier’s body. The M9 contained “B-1 dyewhich turned red when contaminated with anyknown liquid agent” (Smart 1991a:30). At leastsome of this paper was produced at EdgewoodArsenal (Carpenter et al. 1990:132).

When the Cold War ended, improvements inmobility and detection systems were still beingmade. In 1987 the production contract for theM17 Lightweight Decontamination System(called the Sanator), which generated pressurizedhot water, was awarded (HOHQAMC 1989:181).And the development of the XM21 RemoteSensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) wasnearing completion at the end of the year. Thelatter unit was to be able to detect chemicalagents from as far away as five kilometers, but itwas not completed before the end of the ColdWar (Bouilly et al. 1990:35; Kamerick1988:IV:26).

Studies concerning a slightly different type ofsurvivability—the hardening of equipment andcommunications lines—had begun at least by the1970s, probably earlier, at the ElectronicTechnology and Devices Laboratory at FortMonmouth (USAECOM 1972:7). The HardenedBallistic Missile Defense Materials Program wasinitiated by the AMC by 1975 and involved majorefforts by the Army Materiel and MechanicsResearch Center (the lead laboratory, atWatertown Arsenal) and the Ballistic ResearchLaboratory, as well as lessor efforts by HarryDiamond Laboratories. The program, asdescribed by one document from the period,involved hardening ballistic missile defensesystems against

pulsed nuclear radiation, and ablation anderosion and environments. It involves effort

techniques, hardened electronics, hardenednose tips and control surfaces, opticalsensors and substructures. An improvedliquid pitch impregnated carbon/carbon fineweave nose tip material has been fabricated,tested in the 50 megawatt arc and flight testsdesigned for final material characterization.The optical sensor tasks concentrated onintrinsic photodetector improvements andmethods to improve multi-detector arraydata output under operational conditions.Fabrication and testing of high modulusgraphite epoxy subscale substructures hasbegun. The beryllium substructuresprogram has entered the subscale designphase. Advanced subscale motor casematerials will be tested in the Dining Carunderground test [Marken 1976:145].

A main objective among the atomic programs offiscal year 1985 was the improvement of nuclearweapons survivability, security, and safety(NWS ), which may have involved enhancing the3

hardness of nuclear warfare-related sites by thebroader application of improvements worked outduring the course of nuclear survivability research(England et al. 1986:14).

At the end of the Cold War, TECOM was “theArmy’s center for nuclear survivabilityassessment [and nearly all] environmentsproduced by a nuclear detonation; thermal, blast,electromagnetic pulse, x-rays, and neutronradiation can be simulated in carefully controlledlaboratory conditions at White Sands MissileRange. Facilities are also available at the U.S.Army Electronic Proving Ground” (Anonymous1992:n.p.) at Fort Huachuca. The only majorfacility for conducting chemical defense anddecontamination testing at the end of the ColdWar was the Defensive Test Chamber at DugwayProving Ground (Anonymous 1992:n.p.).

The concept of survivability was usuallyassociated with the physical health of troops andtheir ability to maneuver in environmentscontaminated with chemicals, infectants, andradiation. The ability to function in electronicwarfare environments was not usually consideredas an aspect of “survivability” but as exercisesrequiring electronic warfare measures,countermeasures, and counter countermeasures.However, by the 1980s, CECOM’s Center forTactical Computer Systems (CENTACS) was


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Installations with ImportantInfrastructure Development

Associations


Fort Monmouth

applying the phrase “battlefield survivability” toArmy C I (Command, Control, Communications,3

and Intelligence) systems that could becompromised by electronic warfare(USACECOM 1985:17). The center wasdeveloping better means of keeping C I-related3

activity secure (USACECOM 1985:17). Theseaspects of “survivability” are further discussed inthe Electronic Warfare section of this report. but perhaps one of the most pervasive of these

COLD WAR INFRASTRUCTURE

Toward the Ubiquitous Battleground— components inhibited speed. Once techniques forMilitary Infrastructure Expansion controlling electricity were learned, manipulation

The Cold War infrastructure that has evolved faster mode of calculation. One of the mostduring the 45 years since the end of World War II obvious reasons the military was interested inexists on at least two different levels. One is the faster calculating machines was for the“production facilities, training, mutual production of firing tables for use by artillerydevelopment of weapons, civic action programs, troops (Lessels 1986:n.p.). New weaponsand military preparation under the North Atlantic developments were changing firing characteristicsTreaty Organization (NATO) known as faster than personnel could recalculate the tables.infrastructure. . . . In NATO parlance,infrastructure meant the fixed installations which What is generally considered the first digitalwere necessary for military deployment andoperations, such as pipelines, airfields,navigational aids, and port installations”(HOHQAMC 1969:185). The other is a lessvisible infrastructure, one of communications viaa global network. “It includes the mobilization ofscience and technology, and the use of civilianresources for military purposes . . . ” (Arkin andFieldhouse 1985:12) that blur the distinctionbetween military and civilian. “The globe is sofully wired that it is difficult to comprehend theentire infrastructure” (Arkin and Fieldhouse1985:6). Throughout the Cold War there was amovement toward expansion of this latter type ofinfrastructure that involved the creation of a widerange of high-technology electronic equipmentand increased cooperation between governmentand private enterprises. This globalcommunications environment was made possibleby the development of the computer andassociated means of digital manipulation of data.

Computers

Cold War military research and development hasspawned many new industries (Gansler 1980:12)

industries was the computer. Machines aidingmathematical computation had been around forcenturies by the time World War II arrived; mostwere analog, or mechanical, machines. But thenecessity of physically manipulating mechanical

of numbers electronically made possible a much

computer was under development during WorldWar II by the Ballistics Research Laboratories atAberdeen Proving Ground and the University ofPennsylvania’s Moore School of Engineering butwas not operable until after the end of the war.ENIAC, the Electronic Numerator, Integrator,Analyzer, and Computer, became officiallyoperable in February 1946, although it had beenworking for at least a few months prior to thattime. The computer was a base ten machine thatoperated by sending synchronized pulses toperform its calculations and could be operated forabout five and one-half hours between repairs. InNovember of the preceding year, ENIACperformed calculations concerning the feasibilityof a proposed hydrogen bomb design thatrevealed design flaws that “would have beenimpossible to detect without the aid of ENIAC”(Lessels 1986:n.p.). The unit was installed atBRL in 1947 and was modified to increase itsusefulness over the next five years (AberdeenProving Ground ca. 1957:73). ENIAC continuedto be used until 1955, when it was replaced by amore advanced computer (Lessels 1986:n.p.;Muuss 1996:n.p.).


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As was characteristic of much Cold War missile guidance system component by 1956,technological development, the process of when it was noted that “there was not one portionresearch and development of ENIAC indicated of the guidance systems, from computers throughthe direction of future research efforts. ENIAC radars, which could not be subjected to closewas not able to store information, but as early as scrutiny” (White Sands Proving Ground ca.1944 the scientists who had designed the machine 1956:38) by the personnel at White Sands Missilehad developed a new memory device, Range. By that year, a general purpose computerincorporated in the design of EDVAC (the was also installed at the White Sands range forElectronic Discrete Variable Automatic used in flight simulation (White Sands ProvingComputer), being developed in 1944; this work Ground ca. 1956:39). At Redstone Arsenal,was also being conducted at the Moore School of computer systems in Building 4619 served theEngineering (Muuss 1996:n.p.). When it went East Area Blockhouse, the control center for theinto “practical operation” (Aberdeen Proving Solid Motor Structural Test Facility (BuchananGround ca. 1957:73) at BRL in 1952, its and Johnson 1983d:n.p.). At Fort Monmouth,usefulness was less than had been expected, but computers were also being applied to theEDVAC represented a major developmental step development of countermeasures for use insince it operated using Binary Coded Decimal electronic warfare environments via the(the first computer to do so) and had both fixed simulation of those environments (USASRDLand floating point capabilities (Muuss 1996:n.p.). 1958:62).The next generation of computer was ORDVAC(Ordnance Variable Automatic Computer), Computers also influenced the directions anddeveloped by the University of Illinois and goals of research and development within theinstalled at BRL in 1952. This was the fastest Army. The introduction of systems analysis tomachine at the laboratory facility for the next defense procedure has been attributed toseveral years (Aberdeen Proving Ground ca. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and it1957:73), and it was “a prototype, a forerunner of was systems analysis that gave the Armyall the machines that [were] to follow for decadesafter” (Muuss 1996:n.p.). BRL employees alsogave ORDVAC the first compiler and wrote theFORAST language so that programs would nothave to be input in machine code. FORASTwould also be used on the next BRL computer,making it probably the first portable software(Muuss 1996:n.p.).

ORDVAC lost its status of being the fastest BRLmachine to the BRLESC (Ballistic ResearchLaboratory’s Electric Scientific Computer) in1962; the BRLESC was at that time the fastestcomputer in the world. It was built entirely byBRL scientists from stock parts developed by theNational Bureau of Standards (Muuss 1996:n.p.).By the time BRLESC was developed, the size ofcomputer components had been greatly reduced(Figure 19), a trend that continues today (Muuss1996:n.p.).

The use of computers was quickly expanded. Asearly as December 1951 a prototypecomputerized guidance system was used to directa missile, the Corporal E Flight 11 (Hughes1994:21). Computers were probably a common

the means for finding all the ways aparticular thing could be done and . . . [ofmaking an informed choice] on the basis ofcost and effectiveness. Since thesecomparisons were based to a large extent onmathematical quantification, computers andmathematics became primary tools fordetermining which option would buy themost effectiveness for the same money[HOHQAMC 1969:7].

Dependence on computers increased quickly,prompting defense establishment critics to warn thatcomputers were replacing human judgement inmilitary decision-making (HOHQAMC 1969:7).Some of the criticism may have been generated byefforts like the Army’s attempts to partiallyautomate command and control systems in the late1950s. Examples of the efforts were the ArmyTactical Operations Center and MOBIDIC,discussed below (Bingham ca. 1980:159).

By 1960 computers were being used in theengineering departments of several Armyfacilities, including Redstone Arsenal, AberdeenProving Ground, White Sands Missile Range, and

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Figure 19. Comparable components of the first four computers at BRL, showing the progress made in miniaturization (from Muuss 1996).


115

Watertown Arsenal (Kempf 1961:Appendix 5), systems were incompatible (Bingham ca.and by 1963 their use was being applied to a 1980:261). An effort to integrate all field dataDASA-sponsored Nuclear Effects Program at operations began in 1980 by congressionalFort Monmouth, wherein computers were used to mandate (Bingham ca. 1980:171). Known asanalyze the effects of shock pulse generators on SIGMA, the project sought to create a Militaryelectronic components (USAERDL 1963:83-84). Computer Family using interchangeable hardwareOf a more fundamental nature, computers were at and software (Bingham ca. 1980:173, 261).this time beginning to be used for inventory Much of the work related to this effort wasmanagement. The National Automatic Data conducted at the Center for Tactical ComputerProcessing Program for AMC Logistics Systems (CENTACS) at Fort MonmouthManagement (NAPALM), initiated in 1964 and (Bingham ca. 1980:259, 261, ca. 1981:102-103;later renamed the AMC Five-Year ADP Program, HOCECOM 1985:52).“was to establish standard systems operating onstandard equipment within each operating level of Flight simulation capabilities at White Sandsthe AMC complex using standard computer Missile Range were augmented in 1968 by theprograms” (AMC ca. 1972:6). The effort was addition of eight analog computers; and facilitiessupported by the Automated Logistics there used digital machines to simulate flight,Management Systems Agency (ALMSA) in St. preflight, and post-flight activities and conditionsLouis, Missouri (AMC ca. 1972:6). The (White Sands Missile Range 1968:71-72). Byprototype computer for use in establishing 1974, ECOM (at Fort Monmouth) had developedautomatic data processing throughout the Army’s the Tactical Avionics System Simulator (TASS).depot system was installed at Letterkenny Army The simulation facility could provide “a uniqueDepot in July 1970 (AMC ca. 1972:16). Called at capability for analysis of total aircraft/avionicsfirst Project SPEED (system-wide project for systems . . . [and] computer simulation of theelectronic equipment at depots), soon expanded to airframe, avionics, weapons, and externalProject SPEEDEX (system-wide project for environment in a manner that allow[ed] theelectronic equipment at depots, extended), the aircraft crew to be included in the system”system was installed at Sacramento, Sharpe, (USAECOM ca. 1974:79).Safeguard, Pueblo, and Red River army depots bymid-1972 (AMC ca. 1972:24). By 1974, computers were used very extensively

In the late 1950s Fort Monmouth scientists heat transfer rates and erosion in hypervelocityworking in the newly completed Hexagon gun barrels were being tested at Rock Islanddeveloped the first large-scale computer for Arsenal without the expenditure of ammunitionbattlefield use, the Mobil Digital Computer (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2-28), resulting in less(MOBIDIC). Other Army computer systems waste of increasingly expensive munitions.developed for the same purpose during the late Computer simulation was also used to examine1950s and early 1960s were the Basic Processor the effectiveness of chemical agent dispersal,and Computer, the INFORMER, and the Army avoiding the release of dangerous compounds intoTactical Operations Center, AN/MSQ-19, and, the environment (USAARMCOM ca. 1975:2-67).for use in Europe, the Field Artillery DigitalAutomatic Computer (CECOM Historical Office In 1977, the Electronics Technology and Devices1994:5; HOHQAMC 1969:172). Several Laboratory, at Fort Monmouth, developed “theattempts were made to establish an automated technology to produce a high speed, high density,Tactical Operations System (TOS), but the low power, computer chip operating at 50 MHz atcomplexity and scale of the task had created a 10 volts” (CECOM Historical Office 1994:25),maze of problems by the late 1970s (Bingham ca. important to the Army and other defense arms,1980:159-160). TOS is discussed further in the but also very important to commercial computerCommand and Control section below. Problems development since it pointed the way to theintegrating the various information systems CMOS micro-processor, an early eight-bitcomponents in the Army became apparent in processor used in personal computers (CECOM1979 after a survey revealed that the hardware Historical Office 1994:25).and software for various tactical information

to evaluate weapons. By this time, for example,


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Installations with ImportantC I Associations3


Fort Belvoir

Fort Huachuca

Fort Monmouth

By at least the early 1980s, the computer was maneuvering combat troops. “Without them, theplaying one of its most important Cold War Army would be as helpless as a person without aroles—helping determine the intent of enemy nervous system” (Department of the Armyactions and develop responses by the United 1991:130). The current C I (Command, Control,States, a role it would continue to play throughout Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)the remainder of the Cold War. Digitized maps concept did not spring fully developed from somehelped computers on board guided missiles find planning office but came about as developmentstheir targets. The actual profiles of the terrain in communications and Army organizationover which they were passing were compared developed through time. Command and controlwith digitized maps, and flight path corrections were functions in the realm of the commandingwere made accordingly (Arkin and Fieldhouse officer prior to the Cold War, but developments in1985:21). Computers also helped develop communications and information systems madeelectronic warfare measures and determine those responsibilities much more complex,countermeasures (USACECOM 1985:33). requiring: greater support from intelligence

The Army’s first supercomputer was installed at and develop appropriate responses to enemyBRL in December 1986, its value indicated by the actions; automatic data processing systems tofact that it was immediately running nonstop help organize and analyze intelligenceseven days a week at 90 percent utilization. A information and coordinate it with supplysecond supercomputer was installed there in July logistics and materiel capabilities; andof the following year (HOHQAMC 1989:79). sophisticated communications systems to linkIntelligence data were beginning to be analyzed intelligence, command, troops, and supportaccording to probability representations elements into a cohesive force. In this section,(USACECOM 1985:33), and efforts were being communications developments are addressedtaken to enhance artificial intelligence first, then the more specific C I, and later C I,capabilities and computer input to the decision- systems are discussed.making processes of defense and war(USACECOM 1985:19, 1986:46-47), while“[c]omputer simulations, training maneuvers, andwargames [were] act[ing] out every war thatplanners [could] imagine” (Arkin and Fieldhouse1985:155). Computers were by this time used notonly for research but also for communications,intelligence gathering and interpretation, andcontrol of operations, and had become one of the“keys to victory in warfare” (Arkin andFieldhouse 1985:84).

Command, Control, and Communications

Command, control, and communications providethe basic structure for organizing and

4

gathering activities to coordinate troop movement

3 4

Communications

The Radio Laboratories at Camp Alfred Vail,now part of Fort Monmouth, were some of theArmy’s earliest communications researchfacilities. They were built during World War I,primarily to conduct research into thestandardization of vacuum tubes and testcommercially developed equipment purchased bythe Army (CECOM Historical Office 1994:1).Communications research was consolidated at thefacility during the interwar period, and it wasduring the years from the 1920s to 1939 that“most of the radio and communication equipmentused during World War II was developed”(CECOM Historical Office 1994:3), includingsome of the first RADAR (Radio Detection andRanging) units, the SCR-268 and SCR-270(CECOM Historical Office 1994:3).

Early communications studies included at leastone that a Signal Corps historian calledvisionary—thought transference. During WorldWar II, thought transference and electro-encephalography were studied at Fort Monmouth


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laboratories, and scientists there thought it likely By 1957, emphasis was being placed on long-that the Soviet Union was doing similar work. range communications and the use of the moonGuidelines for future work included and meteors as relays, and a lunar relay fieldinvestigations into whether thought was station was in place in Urbana, Illinois, by fiscalelectromagnetic, and if so, what frequency bands year 1957 (U.S. Army Signal Engineeringwere used by the body and how these could be Laboratories [USASEL] 1958:48). The firstamplified and put to practical use (SCEL communications satellite was launched during1945:n.p.). This did not apparently result in Project SCORE (Signal Communications viasignificant communications breakthroughs, but it Orbiting Relay Experiment), the satellite placedpoints toward the spirit of exploration and state- in orbit in December 1958 (CECOM Historicalsupported research that helped build the Office 1994:5; USASRDL 1959a:23).technology base of the Cold War. The Establishment of a comprehensive space-basedpropagation of electromagnetic waves through communications system began in the late 1950srock formations was also “under investigation” with the Defense Communications Satellite(SCEL ca. 1952:58). (COMSAT) Program. Its goal was the setup of a

In 1946, one of the most important events of Cold which eventually became the Defense SatelliteWar communications, and space research, took Communications System. To support theplace at Fort Monmouth. Lieutenant Colonel program, the Army set up the Army AdventJohn J. DeWitt, then commander of the Management Agency (AAMA), the agencylaboratories at the installation, assigned scientists renamed the Satellite Communications Agencya project that later came to be know as Project (SATCOMA) in 1962. Organized at FortDiana. On 10 January, an SCR-271 Radar Monmouth in 1960, AAMA managed the AdventAntenna that had been modified to greatly satellite communications research andincrease its power was pointed at the rising moon. development program and the development andThe signal it sent was received 2.5 seconds later, fabrication of the ground communicationsmarking the first human contact with a celestial complex. The project involved the developmentbody and the beginning of space communications of satellite microwave communications(CECOM Historical Office 1994:5). Although equipment and associated ground stationstouted as an almost perfunctory assignment (the (USASRDL 1960:20). Although the Fortproject was reportedly assigned as “busy-work” Monmouth agency initially was responsible for atto scientists awaiting discharge), long-range least some level of development of Adventcommunications had been seen as a logical satellites, that part of its mission was terminatedextension of research developments as early as in 1962, with only one model completed1940. They simply were not researched until (USAERDL 1962:23-24).after the end of the war (SCEL ca. 1952:58).

Communications developments during the 1950s REAL-TIME Satellite Communications Systemincluded a new line of radio sets “designed to was inaugurated in 1959, involving the placementwork as part of an integrated wire-radio of up to three satellites in geo-synchronous orbitcommunication system, rather than as a single above the equator to serve as communicationsfacility to fill one specific need. This represents relays between ground stations. Development ofthe successful culmination of one of the Signal the Courier Satellite Delayed RepeaterCorps’ most important post-war research and Communications System was also initiated indevelopment objectives” (SCEL ca. 1951:9), and 1959. This system provided the capability toit was an early effort to coordinate systems into store information transmitted from one groundwhat would become the integrated C I type of station, then relay that information to another3

command infrastructure. Other developments ground station when that station came into range.included new high-speed facsimile equipment, The Signal Research and Developmentadvances in the synthesis of quartz (for use as Laboratory conducted research related to bothradio crystals), and perhaps most importantly the these projects (USASRDL 1959a:25, 1960:20).use of transistors to replace vacuum tubes (SCELca. 1951:9).

worldwide satellite communications system,

A joint service project called the Army-Air Force


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The synchronized satellite communications Fort Monmouth also underwent some updating ofsystem (SYNCOM) program began in 1962, with its facilities during the 1960s, when newthe laboratories at Fort Monmouth again equipment to “process and utilize the new spaceresponsible for ground terminal development. age materials in metals and ceramics”The SYNCOM ground terminals were to be (USAERDL 1963:83) was installed. High-mobile, and each terminal was “comprised of temperature furnaces, cutting and shaping tools,eleven vans, including a 30-foot [9-meter] and ultra-low-pressure vacuum generatingparabolic tracking antenna capable of being equipment were set up, as well as massassembled or dismantled in the field” spectrometry equipment for gas analysis(USAERDL 1962:24). The ground stations at (USAERDL 1963:83).Fort Dix and Camp Roberts were modified toallow communications with the SYNCOM Radio improvements of the 1960s followed thesatellite, and Fort Monmouth’s Signal Research trend in electronics development elsewhere,and Development Laboratory also provided becoming smaller and more reliable. A newshipboard SYNCOM equipment for the Navy family of FM radio sets developed at Fort(USAERDL 1962:24). A stationary SYNCOM Monmouth included the AN/PRT-4, AN/PRR-9,station was installed at Lakehurst, New Jersey; AN/VRC-12, AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-77, all ofand a second stationary station was tested at Fork, which used transistors in replacement of mostMaryland, then disassembled for reconstruction at vacuum tubes. “One vehicular set replaced threean undisclosed location overseas (USAERDL versions of the standardized series, covered the1963:7).

During the 1960s, SATCOMA developed 10classes of satellite communications terminals,reduced the size and complexity of equipment,and established ground terminals around theworld to carry Department of Defense messagesvia the Initial Defense Satellite CommunicationsSystem. The initial program was composed ofonly two satellites; 25 more were added betweenmid-1966 and mid-1968, by which time therewere 16 ground stations in operation around theworld. The system was renamed the DefenseSatellite Communications System in 1967(Bingham ca. 1979:306-307; HOHQAMC1969:179; USAERDL 1962:24; USASRDL1961:20). Ground stations in the continental U.S.were located at Fort Dix, New Jersey; CampRoberts, California; Brandywine, Maryland;Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; and PetersonField, Colorado (HOHQAMC 1969:1800); andtraining terminals were located at the SignalSchool at Fort Monmouth. Each was owned bythe Army but operated by the service withjurisdiction of the installation on which thefacility was located (HOHQAMC 1969:179).Construction at the Fort Dix and Camp Robertsfacilities began in March 1961 and wascompleted near the end of 1962 (USAERDL1962:23; USASRDL 1961:20). A satellitetracking center for long-range communicationshad also been established at Deal, New Jersey(USASRDL 1958:27).

entire 30-76 MHZ [sic] band and provided morethan twice the number of radio frequencychannels” (HOHQAMC 1969:176). Larger, morecomplex equipment for the Army AreaCommunication System (AACOMS) then underdevelopment included multiplexing equipmentusing a new pulse code modulation technique thatreduced the size of the transceivers and otherradio units, increased reliability, and loweredcosts. Similar improvements were made inAACOMS radio relays that were being greatlyimproved through the use of solid state circuitry(HOHQAMC 1969:177). Again, much of thisdevelopment occurred in the laboratories at FortMonmouth or at outside laboratories undercontract with them. Related electroniccomponent developments occurred at AberdeenProving Ground and the university laboratorieswith which Aberdeen scientists were working.

The Army established the U.S. ArmyCommunications Systems Agency in 1967 tomanage a very wide range of communicationsprojects, from commercial item acquisition toglobal systems like the Automatic DigitalNetwork (AUTODIN) and the DirectCommunications Link. The headquarters for theagency was at Fort Monmouth (Marken1976:243). AUTODIN was a communicationsnetwork dedicated to the transmission ofinventory-related data (Marken 1976:41), and theDirect Communications Link provided the “hot


119

line” between the United States and Soviet Union of the Cold War appears to have been related to(HOHQDARCOM 1978:310). expanding the systems in place and developing

The Army began development of yet another C I uses. By 1985, three communicationsimportant family of radios in 1975, called the systems were noted to form the backbone ofVHF-FM Single Channel Ground and Airborne Army communications—Mobile SubscriberRadio System (SINCGARS V). This radio Equipment (MSE), SINCGARS, and a systemsystem was to better integrate tactical command known as the PLRS [Position Location Reportingand control functions by providing transmission System]/JTIDS [Joint Tactical Informationof battlefield data, as well as voice and records Distribution System] Hybrid, discussed belowtransmissions. The system used a sophisticated (USACECOM 1985:11).technique of frequency hopping to ensuretransmission security in hostile electronicenvironments. By 1978, SINCGARS V hadreached the advanced development stage(Bingham ca. 1980:291).

Improvements in the use of fiber optics for datatransmission in extremely harsh battlefieldconditions were also developed in the late 1970s.“The techniques developed for interfacing thefiber optic cables with existing multiplexerswitches was the beginning of the Army’s moveto fiber optic transmission for most of itsbattlefield tactical communications, and providedcivilian companies with the technology toproduce fiber optic data transmission lines forbusiness communications” (CECOM HistoricalOffice 1994:25).

During the 1970s, the global communicationssystem also expanded via a program called theMinimum Essential Emergency CommunicationsNetwork (MEECN), established in 1970. “It ismade up of airborne command posts, satellitesystems, ground transmitters, and more exoticrelays, all able to operate during and after anuclear war” (Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:77).Most of the components were operated by the AirForce and the Navy (Arkin and Fieldhouse1985:77-80), but it is likely that at least some ofthe research was conducted at Fort Monmouth, asindicated by the assignment of the WorldwideMilitary Command and Control Systems(WWMCCS) development project to the ArmyCommunications System Agency at thatinstallation in 1979 (HOHQDARCOM1981:214).

With these developments, the basic hardware forcommunications was in place, and much of theresearch and development effort for the remainder

communications equipment suitable to tactical3

Extension to Command and Control

The C I concept was hinted at as early as 1952,3

when a Signal Corps document noted thatelectronics were the “heart” of not only globalcommunications for the Army but also of theatersystems that would “interlace communicationszones, . . . [and] Combat Systems which tieforward commanders into a single team and addup to the payoff in battle” (SCEL ca. 1952:7;italics in the original). An example of one earlysystem was the Army Area CommunicationsSystem, mentioned above.

By the late 1950s, attempts were being made toautomate command and control in approximately30 functional areas covering terrain and targetintelligence; enemy situation; weather data;friendly forces situation in terms of airfield andheliport locations, barrier and gap crossingcapabilities, NBC contamination, constructionstatus, and other aspects of tactical readiness; andfire support in terms of target analysis andplanning for the use of NBC weapons. The firsteffort was called the Army Tactical OperationsCenter project, and it lasted from 1958 through1964. The MOBIDIC computer developed atFort Monmouth was the central component of thissystem (Bingham ca. 1980:159).

Another similar project, described as anintegrated system for a field army calledCommand Control Information System (CCIS),was being researched at MIT’s LincolnLaboratory in 1962 (USAERDL 1962:4). By thenext year CCIS had apparently been redesignatedCCIS-70 (the “70” for 1970, the year in which thesystem was to be fielded), and the projectmanagers office was moved from Fort Huachucato Fort Belvoir (HOHQAMC 1969:57).


120

The first of several generations of TOS was dedicated to the creation of a coordinatedcalled European TOS and was under development battlefield communications net. In 1969,from 1964 through 1970. Instead of specialized SATCOMA was in charge of tactical satelliteautomatic data processing hardware like the communications, which at that time involved onlyMOBIDIC, TOS was developed with commercial one experimental Army satellite tactical terminalhardware and software developed by Bunker (EASTT) and experimental communicationsRamo Info Systems. The number of functional satellites developed by the MIT’s Lincolnareas being automated was reduced from 32 to 18 Laboratory for the Air Force (HOHQAMCduring this period (Bingham ca. 1980:159-160). 1969:179). In the early 1970s work was being36

An effort called Development TOS was conducted on the Tactical Fire Direction System,undertaken from 1969 through 1973, using called TACFIRE, described as an “integrated, on-hardware developed by the Control Data line, tactical computer system . . . [that applied]Corporation and software developed by Bunker automatic data processing techniques to the sevenRamo. The number of functional areas was again field artillery functions of technical fire control,reduced for this system, this time to seven tactical fire control, fire planning, artillery target(Bingham ca. 1980:160). The TOS Operable intelligence, artillery survey, meteorological data,Segment (TOS ) was developed from 1971 and ammunition and fire unit status”2

through 1977. This system used military- (HOHQDARCOM 1978:147). The TACFIREproduced hardware and reduced the number of Software Support Group was located at Fort Sill,functional areas to first three, then two—enemy Oklahoma (Bingham ca. 1979:46).situation and friendly situation. The nextgeneration was Division TOS, wherein functional Also of importance in the 1970s was theareas of TOS were expanded to 15. By 1980, development of the Very High Speed Integrated2

after more than 20 years of work, “TOS was still Circuit (VHSIC) technology at the Electronicsin its advanced development phase” (Bingham ca. Technology and Devices Laboratory at Fort1980:160). Congress deleted TOS from the Monmouth in 1977 (CECOM Historical Officedefense budget for fiscal year 1980 after their 1994:25). One of the first applications was theinvestigations concluded that there were too many Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) andproblems with both the hardware and software Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systemunder development at that time, and that the (JTIDS), as well as the PLRS/JTIDS Hybridresearchers had failed to “‘identify and (PJH) organized in 1979. The new technologysubstantiate the information needs of . . . thebattlefield commander’” (Bingham ca. 1980:167).

TOS systems included not only communicationsradios but also a variety of specialized equipment

37

These were divided into three areas. Intelligence36

included: enemy situation, order of battle, terrain Most of the research and development was conductedintelligence, strategic intelligence, counter intelligence, by Hughes Aircraft Corporation and General Dynamicstarget intelligence, hostile air defense, intelligence (Bingham ca. 1979:103). JTIDS was a “family ofcollection management, and weather data. Operations secure, jam-resistant terminals designed to satisfyincluded: friendly unit situation, tactical troop tactical data communication, relative navigation, andmovement, airfield/heliport location, barrier and identification needs of all US services” (Bingham ca.tactical gap crossing, chemical contamination, 1979:111). The Air Force was the principal developer,engineering construction status, electronic warfare, and Hughes Aircraft Corporation again did much of thebiological contamination, tactical air support, research and development (Bingham ca. 1979:112).communications planning, air and space coordination, Plans in fiscal year 1977 incorporated the PLRS systemnuclear fire support, nuclear strike effects, air defense with TACFIRE via the JTIDS Class II terminal underinformation, psychological operations, and Army air the PJH program “to meet short-term needs foroperations. Fire Support included: preliminary target improved battlefield communications” (Bingham ca.analysis, nuclear target analysis, nuclear fire planning, 1979:113, 115). CECOM historian Richard Binghamchemical target analysis, and fallout protection (ca. 1980:236) noted that the hybrid system “combined(Bingham ca. 1980:159). desirable features of the Army Position Location

PLRS was a joint project between the Army and37

the Marine Corps (Marken 1976:148), and JTIDS wasa joint effort among the Army, Navy, and Air Force(Bingham ca. 1980:41, 236). PLRS was initiated by theMarine Corps in 1963; hardware similarities with theArmy Digital Data Link programs prompted the MarineCorps to invite Army participation in the PLRSprogram, which it did in 1973 (Bingham ca. 1979:102).


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reduced the boards and power requirements of the and evaluation efforts (USACECOM 1985:17,system significantly, and its further impact was 1986:46). The Center for Tactical Computer“expected to provide a dramatic improvement in Systems (CENTACS), headquartered at FortArmy C3 [sic] system capabilities and asignificant reduction of system cost, size, weightand power” (Bingham ca. 1979:45; Bingham ca.1981:85).

Congress denied TOS funding in fiscal year 1980yet acknowledged a need for an automatedcommand and control system. In response, theArmy initiated a program codenamed SIGMA,also known as the Force Level and ManeuverControl System, which would incorporateprevious PLRS, JTIDS, and PJH developments(Bingham ca. 1981:137, 165). SIGMA wouldconcentrate on the development of software anduse hardware that had been developed under otherprograms (Bingham ca. 1980:173). UnderSIGMA, the C system (still usually referred to3

simply as command and control) would resemblethe diagram in Figure 20.

C advancements in the 1980s included the3

dispersal of computers and terminals to improvesurvivability (this part of a program calledDistributed Command, Control, andCommunications, or DC ) and the development of3

better tactical data base management indistributed processing. The maneuver controlfunctions of this system were to incorporate thelatest artificial intelligence (AI) technology. TheCenter for Communications Systems at FortMonmouth conducted research related to DC3

technology under its Battlefield InformationDistributed Technology Program and through test

Monmouth’s Hexagon, supported the programthrough its research in the field of artificialintelligence. “The technology thrusts are aimedat applying AI techniques to improve theeffectiveness of command and control decisionmaking by helping the commander to assimilatethe large amount of data available. Areas ofresearch include planning, plan recognition,terrain reasoning, and natural languageunderstanding/generation” (USACECOM1985:19).

As the end of the Cold War approached, severalsystems that traced their beginnings to initialTOS efforts were fielded or in the advancedstages of development. Integrated software tocollect, store, analyze, and distribute C I3

information was called the Combat ServiceSupport Control System; development began inearly 1988. TRW, Inc., of Redondo Beach,California, was the developer (Department of theArmy 1991:133). PJH, renamed the Army DataDistribution System, entered final development in1985 but was not fielded until after the end of theCold War. Development was conducted by theGround Systems Group of Hughes AircraftCompany, Fullerton, California, and GEC-Marconi, of Totowa, New Jersey (Department ofthe Army 1991:137). The first SINCGARS Vradio sets were experimentally fielded inDecember 1987, and initial production was begunthe following January. International Telephoneand Telegraph’s Aerospace/Optical Division, FortWayne, Indiana, was the primary contractor forboth ground and airborne models (Department ofthe Army 1991:139). Mobile SubscriberEquipment was selected for production fromamong available items in the mid- to latter 1980s,and GTE supplied the equipment from 1986through the end of the Cold War (Department ofthe Army 1991:141). The Forward Area AirDefense System (FAADS) was integrated intooverall tactical command and control via theForward Area Air Defense Command, Controland Intelligence (FAAD C I) communications2

network. The software development and systemsintegration effort was conducted by TRW, and theproject began in fiscal year 1986 (Department ofthe Army 1991:143; HOHQAMC 1987a:89).

Reporting System and the tri-service Joint TacticalInformation Distribution System. The Army undertookits development in 1977 when studies of Armycommunications disclosed the woeful inadequacy ofexisting methods to satisfy the data exchangerequirements of the automated air defense, fieldartillery, intelligence and C systems the Army would2field in the ‘80’s [sic]. The JTIDS portion of thePJH—specifically, the JTIDS Class 2terminal—provided a capability for data distribution inreal time (i.e., nearly instantaneously) and, presumably,in the volumes the Army would require for efficienttactical activity. The PLRS component would providethe positioning and navigation information commanderswould need to assure the effectiveness of combat,combat support and combat service support elements onthe battlefield” (Bingham ca. 1980:236).

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Figure 20. The command, control, and subordinate system concept of the 1980s (from Bingham ca. 1981).


123

Intelligence and Surveillance the knowledge of others’ capabilities a necessity

Intelligence and surveillance research was provide an adequate defense or aassociated with several other areas of military counterbalancing offense.development, including aviation, space andatmospheric studies, electronic warfare, Surveillance research was conducted by thecommunications and electronics, and computers. Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth during the earlyAny of the installations and facilities conducting Cold War period in the same division asactivities related to these themes may have been, meteorological research, which was conducted indirectly or indirectly, involved in the development the Evans Signal Laboratory (SCEL 1956:n.p.),and production of surveillance and intelligence and in 1949 the Signal Corps Intelligence Unitgathering equipment and systems. There were, was established there (HOCECOM 1985:34). Byhowever, two levels at which surveillance and 1956, intelligence-related research at Fortintelligence gathering took place. The first level Monmouth was being conducted in thewas the long-range observation and detection of Surveillance Department of the Physical Sciencesthe activities of other nations, such as the Division; the Radar Development and Radarmonitoring of nuclear detonations in the Soviet Systems departments of the Radar Division; andUnion and China, and the second was related to the Detection and Location Department of thetactical, or battlefield, surveillance, such as the Countermeasures Division. All were located inlocation and capabilities of enemy forces. This the Evans Signal Laboratory (SCEL 1956:n.p.).second area was by far of greater concern to the Related work may have been conducted atresearch and development functions of the Army. laboratories in the Hexagon. The Infrared

Although surveillance and intelligence gathering along with several other scanners and mappers,may seem at first to have played a passive or was under development in 1958 for use aboarddefensive role during the Cold War, historians both piloted and drone craft. The AN/UAS-3William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse (1985:65) could produce maps and plot the locations ofhave noted that these activities were very much a infrared radiation emitted by ground forcespart of Cold War confrontation. “Scientific (USASRDL 1959a:94; 1960:69).research, information gathering, and earlywarning surveillance are part of a qualitative arms It was not until 1958 that a Signal Corpsrace. The superior ability to detect and target the department was given responsibility “for certainenemy’s forces, to hide and communicate with new programs in the Combat Surveillance Area”one’s own, and to control military operations has (USASRDL 1959a:53). The new Signal Corpsbecome more important than the weapons Surveillance Department was composed of Radar,themselves.” They have also noted (1985:6, 77) Meteorological, Applied Physics, Avionics,that the significance of facilities conducting Countermeasures, and Systems divisions, withintelligence and surveillance activities “can be most laboratories located in the Evans Area of thefully appreciated only in the context of the entire installation (USASRDL 1959b:n.p.). The samenetwork” of global communications and data year, laboratories at Fort Monmouth were notedacquisition infrastructure. The role that facilities to have been conducting research into theinvolved in the programs discussed below played development of electronic intelligence (ELINT)in the establishment of a global information equipment and the use of drones to carrynetwork should be considered in assessing their surveillance equipment (USASRDL 1958:52).significance. Also in 1958, a surveillance system capable of

The Cold War—with weapons more powerful represent “significant progress . . . in research andthan any known before—made it possible for development leading to instrumentation foreven “a small nation [not to mention a large measurement of radiation and surveillance ofnation], properly directed and equipped . . . to nuclear detonation” (USASRDL 1958:98). Fortdevastate a larger foe” (War Department Monmouth’s Signal Research and DevelopmentEquipment Board 1946:n.p.). The possible Laboratory was able to locate nuclear detonationspossession of such power made surveillance and up to 500 miles (800 km) away in experiments

so that appropriate measures could be taken to

Battlefield Surveillance System AN/UAS-3,

monitoring nuclear detonations was said to


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conducted in 1958, particularly Operation Plumb first fielded in 1961. The Mohawk systemBob. The Nuclear Surveillance System included an aircraft, photographic and electronicAN/GSQ-36(V) under development at that time sensors (either visual, side-looking airborne radarcould operate in all weather and could provide the [SLAR], or infrared), data links, and associatedlocation, height of burst, yield, and a prediction of ground support equipment for day and nightfallout levels (USASRDL 1958:98-100). surveillance. Development of an improved

Surveillance systems also looked outward to Acquisition Aircraft System (STAAS) that wouldmonitor activities in space. In 1959, plans to put incorporate both SLAR and infrared capabilitiesin place what was called a world net ground- began in fiscal year 1966 (HOHQAMCbased surveillance system, a joint DoD and 1969:169). Mapping was also a surveillance task,NASA project, were developed. Work toward the and in 1960 Signal Corps laboratories begandevelopment of primary, secondary, and mobile directing research into three-dimensionalstations was conducted at Fort Monmouth mapping equipment designated Radarlaboratories (USASRDL 1959a:24). The world Surveillance Set AN/APS-106. The equipmentnet program was redesignated and reoriented as would provide the Corps of Engineers with datathe Project Bankhead satellite tracking system in for “the rapid and accurate fabrication of maps of1961 (USASRDL 1961:20). On the ground, plans uncharted territory” (USASRDL 1961:36),for an Indirect Nuclear Bomb Assessment valuable in battle situations as well as for theSurveillance System (INBASS) had been programing of missile guidance systems.developed by 1960, and a study was underway atthe Signal Research and Development Laboratory Intelligence activities were enhanced with effortsto determine the best methods of obtaining to further develop night vision equipment.nuclear burst data and to assess the value of that Research was conducted by the Armydata “under terrain and meteorological conditions Engineering Research and Developmentto be encountered in the field” (USASRDL Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, and some of the first1960:76), but which would probably have long- systems for troop use entered development inrange surveillance applications as well. 1962. These were the Starlight Scope, the CrewDetonation Locator Central AN/GSS-5 was tested Served Weapons Night Vision Sight (AN/TVS-in the nuclear pulse simulator at Fort Huachuca in 2), and the larger Night Observation Device1960, where the unit was determined to be too (AN/TVS04). Another early significant piece oflarge and complex for field use (USASRDL battlefield equipment was the lightweight ground-1960:74, 79). to-ground surveillance radar set (AN/PPS-5) that

Similarly, the Signal and Ordnance corps were meters distant (HOHQAMC 1969:175). It wasjointly sponsoring a contract with Radio also in the early 1960s that some of the firstCorporation of America (RCA) to investigate the lasers (called then optical masers) werefeasibility of placing a television camera in a recognized for their possible applications inmissile for use in battlefield surveillance “radar, communications, detection, [and](Anonymous 1959a:75), as well as being guidance” (USAERDL 1962:3).applicable to long-range observation. The SignalCorps was also looking at whether fluctuations in The Electronics Research and Developmentthe earth’s magnetic field could be used to detect Laboratories at Fort Monmouth began a studynuclear explosions (USASRDL 1960:75). In concerning the acquisition of nuclear burst1959, the Fort Monmouth Surveillance Depart- location and yield information in 1962, with ament consisted of Radar, Meteorological, Applied major portion of the effort directed towardPhysics, Avionics, Countermeasures, and studying the ratio of the signal from the burst toSystems divisions, with activities in both the interference as distance increased (USAERDLHexagon and Evans Area (USASRDL 1962:44). A prototype instrument intended for1959b:n.p.). recording the movement of weather clouds and

Battlefield surveillance was enhanced with the delivered to the laboratory in 1962 (USAERDLdeployment of the Mohawk Surveillance System, 1962:73).

Mohawk and a new Surveillance and Target

could track personnel and vehicles up to 10,000

the cloud created by a nuclear burst was also


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Installations Important to theArmy Mission in Space

Fort Monmouth

Redstone Arsenal

The Army Electronic Proving Ground, at Fort evaluation at Yuma Proving Ground by 1977,Huachuca, was the primary test site for electronic “greatly enhanced [troop] capability to locateequipment and played a “leading role in the mortar and artillery fire” (CECOM Historicalacquisition of . . . non-communications Office 1994:25; HOHQAMC 1987a:203).equipments that are essential to the effectiveness Another notable accomplishment, involving theof [the] automated battlefield” (USAEPG ca. Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition1970:16). Facilities in place in the early 1960s Laboratory, was the development of Guardrail V,included the Drone Engineering Laboratory, the an “airborne comm[unications] intelligenceRadar Engineering Laboratory—located in intercept and direction-finding system”Blacktail Canyon, where it would be sheltered (USACECOM 1985:25).from radio signals generated at other USAEPGfacilities, and where those facilities would be In the 1980s research into systems that couldsheltered from transmitter radiation from within locate and identify enemy control centers wasthis laboratory—and Yuma Test Station, with its being conducted at the CECOM Signals Warfareradar complexes, microwave and drone control Laboratory at Fort Monmouth’s Vint Hill Farmssystems, and other test facilities (USAEPG Station (Bingham ca. 1981:383; USACECOM1962:n.p.). 1985:6), and, in 1985, elements of the Electronic

The Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Acquisition laboratories were combined to formLaboratory, established in the Evans Area at Fort the Electronic Warfare/ReconnaissanceMonmouth in June 1965 (HOHQAMC 1969:173), Surveillance and Target Acquisition Centerwas charged with several surveillance-related (USACECOM 1985:6). Research emphasis atmissions, including tactical surveillance; target these facilities was turning increasingly towardacquisition and designation; and identification automation of the intelligence analysis process,friend, foe, or neutral (IFFN) (USAECOM ca. and a 1985 breakthrough was to “provide a more1977:31). Facilities there included at least one exact representation of the tactical situation basedanechoic chamber by the early 1970s, used for on the automated processing of sensor inputs than38

radar work and measurement of antenna patterns: is possible with today’s probability

It provides an indoor measuring site having prototype of a new computer for processing thea 65-foot [19.75-meter] usable transmission information, “[e]quivalent in processing power todistance. The walls, ceiling and floor are a VAX 11/780 computer with four large arraylined with microwave absorption materials processors” (USACECOM 1985:33) was alsohaving 20 db and 40 db absorption developed in 1985.characteristics. The reflectivity level of thechamber for antenna pattern measurementsis approximately 45 db from 1.1 Ghz to 34.5Ghz but drops to -16.8 db at 500 MHz[USAECOM ca. 1974:76].

During the 1970s, the trend was to refine andimprove surveillance equipment developed duringthe previous decade. The AN/PVS-5 nightgoggles were improvements of the secondgeneration Starlight scopes (CECOM HistoricalOffice 1994:17). Mortar- and artillery-locatingradar sets like the AN/TPQ-36 and -37 (called theFirefinder), which were developed at FortMonmouth laboratories and had entered

Warfare and the Combat Surveillance and Target

representations” (USACECOM 1985:33). A

TURNING TOWARD SPACE

One facet of US patriotism is faith intechnology, especially military and spacetechnology. Space is seen as America’sdestiny and the “pre-eminent militaryenvironment of our time”

—E. Reiss, in The StrategicDefense Initiative

A second chamber was located in the Electronic38

Warfare Laboratory (USAECOM ca. 1977:186).


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Initial Efforts to Place the Army in Space outstanding success for the U.S. space program”

The initial step into space by the Army at Fort intense activity, the Army placed four satellites inMonmouth via Project Diana started the Army on orbit, launched a lunar probe and solar satellite,an effort that served a dual purpose—one, the launched three primates into space, beganArmy’s mission in space advanced the working on a booster rocket capable of 1.5capabilities of the service militarily, taking the million pounds of thrust and designed for useworld initiative of expanding its range of with a lunar exploration vehicle, and beganoperations beyond the limits of the lower working on the Saturn booster, the vehicle thatatmosphere; two, the step toward the upper would launch the first men into space (Hughesatmosphere and beyond was a public relations 1992:1). The launch vehicles were developed atprogram that Army leaders hoped would ensure Redstone Arsenal, and many of the satellitethe service a significant role in military components were designed and built at Fortoperations of the future. Although the Army’s Monmouth (CECOM Historical Office 1994:5;subsequent involvement in the general space HOHQAMC 1969:178; USASRDL 1958:26).program was interrupted by restrictions and wasshort-lived overall, its contributions to the In January 1958 the Army placed the Explorer Iprogram were very significant. satellite in orbit, using a Redstone rocket as a

As mentioned in previous sections, the Army Explorer satellites were placed in orbit in Marchbegan taking its first physical steps into space in and July of 1958 and October 1959. The last ofthe late 1940s at Redstone Arsenal, with its team these, which was also the final United Statesof scientists working under the leadership of Dr. effort in the International Geophysical YearWernher von Braun. The world altitude records program, was used to conduct seven experimentsthey established in 1947 using a two-stage rocket related to space and cosmic radiation, andbased on the German V-2 were crowned by “opened a new era in global meteorology” (BakerBumper Round 5, fired from White Sands Missile et al. 1994:53). The first lunar probe, Pioneer III,Range on 24 February 1949, the first United was launched in December 1958 and traveledStates missile to penetrate space (Hughes over 66,500 miles (107,000 km) before falling1992:2). In 1954, Dr. von Braun proposed using back toward earth. “Although a failure as a lunara Redstone missile, then under development, as probe, PIONEER III was considered a scientificthe main booster of a four-stage rocket capable of success because of the data it provided on cosmiclaunching satellites. The upper three stages radiation. It also was a successful test of thewould be Loki rockets. Enthusiastically four-stage JUNO II launch vehicle” (Hughessupported by the Army, plans were expanded into 1992:6). Pioneer IV, launched three months later,a joint Army-Navy program called Project passed within 36,000 miles (58,000 km) of theOrbiter, only to be set aside in favor of a Navy moon and became the first United States satelliteprogram based on the Viking missile (Hughes to achieve a permanent orbit around the sun1992:3). The Army was then specifically (Hughes 1992:7). restricted from developing plans to use a Jupiterrocket to launch a satellite, a restriction that was Not only were the Signal Corps and Ordnancelifted in 1957 after the launch of Sputnik I and II Department involved in space research, the(Hughes 1992:3-4). Chemical Corps indicated it could contribute as

The Army Ballistic Missile Agency, established determination of radiation dosages and of thein 1956 at Redstone Arsenal, “boosted the first effects of thermal radiation on space probes, theAmerican satellite into orbit around the earth, and analysis of planet surfaces, radiation shieldingdeveloped and tested the first nose cone capable and the “determination of requirements andof withstanding the tremendous heat created upon means of attenuation and decontamination at [a]its re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere from outer manned station,” studies of injuries in low airspace” (HOUSAMC 1964:52, 55). The lifting of pressure environments, “[n]on-electronicthe restrictions against the Army’s involvement in signaling devices,” studies of extraterrestrialthe space effort was followed by “a time of biological and chemical hazards, and “[s]pecial

(Hughes 1992:1). During the next 30 months of

booster (Borklund 1991:161). The other three

well. Suggested areas of research included


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weapons” (Anonymous 1959a:187, 189-190, The Army’s fairly extensive meteorological202). And by 1960, the Signal Corps had begunan ongoing study of the effects of long-termgamma radiation on electrical components inspace environments (USASRDL 1960:108,1961:115).

However, these activities, mainly by the SignalCorps and Ordnance Department, were the lastgreat efforts of the Army in the general spaceexploration area. Although the Army seems tohave already developed plans for operations inspace—the Corps of Engineers had prepared “apreliminary design of an extraterrestrial logisticsand operations simulator . . . [to] providesimulated extraterrestrial environments in whichhardware and operations could be tested in ‘dryruns’” (Anonymous 1959a:40), and studies for anantisatellite defense system and space-baseddefense vehicles (foreshadowing the StrategicDefense Initiative) were underway as early as1959 (Anonymous 1959a:13)—its efforts werecut short. The National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration was created in 1958, andgradually the Army’s efforts to explore spacetravel were transferred to the new agency. TheArmy transferred all its space-related missions toNASA on 1 July 1960 (Hughes 1992:12).

Eyes and Ears of the Upper Atmosphere

Although the Army lost its missions directlyinvolving space exploration, it still carried outspace-related endeavors, especially in the areas ofcommunications, and in meteorological and upperatmospheric studies as they related to signalpropagation and missile flight and guidance.These missions also traced their beginnings toProject Diana. Within a decade of Project39

Diana, the United States had “a viable satellitesystem with a network of fixed and transportableterminals worldwide, capable of instantaneouslinking between distant and (occasionally) remotelocations” (Bingham ca. 1979:305; SCEL ca.1951:33).

studies, which were related to communicationsand missile delivery, were centered at the SignalCorps laboratories under Fort Monmouth(including those located in arctic regions). Atthese laboratories, research was conducted intothe propagation of radio signals through space,investigating problems “from all possibledirections” (SCEL ca. 1951:34). A low-temperature stratosphere chamber at FortMonmouth in operation by 1951 was used to test“meteorological equipments, components andmaterials for use in guided missiles, rockets andother high altitude devices” (SCEL ca. 1951:62).At least some climatic test chambers at FortMonmouth were in operation as early as 1942,and an ozone generator was installed in the late1940s or early 1950s to increase the installation’sresearch capabilities (SCEL ca. 1951:62). Theweather, and knowledge of its interactions withmateriel, was important to the Pentomic Army,with its emphasis on nuclear capabilities. Forexample, low cloud cover “shields against highaltitude explosions, but reflects and intensifiesheat from low blasts” (USASRDL 1958:83). Andin 1960 the Army noted that there was an urgentneed for data on conditions in the upperatmosphere—“[i]nformation of this type has beenespecially important for the design of theRedstone, Jupiter, and Pershing missiles”(USASRDL 1960:65). Leaving no area thatcould provide useful information unexplored, theSignal Corps noted in 1958 that technicalrequirements were being determined for “thedevelopment of instrumentation and techniquesfor Army weather applications so that maximumutilization and exploitation of weather factorsmay be achieved” (USASRDL 1958:83). Theorigins of the DoD’s Defense SatelliteCommunication System can be traced to thisperiod and Army research into the establishmentof a worldwide communications network basedon the use of satellites (Bingham ca. 1979:306).

The first solar-powered devices were developedat the Hexagon and installed in the Vanguard Isatellite, launched in 1958. Laboratories in thisresearch center developed the infrared equipmentused to map the earth’s cloud cover that wasinstalled in Vanguard II. The second Vanguardsatellite was launched in February 1959 andperformed its weather-related data acquisition

The Diana antenna was “a participant in all U.S.39

space probe launchings and was the only station in thecountry to track Russia’s Lunik-II rocket” (LongBranch Daily Record 1960:n.p.).


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tasks beyond the expectations of its developers. first of three Courier satellites was launched inThese laboratories also developed the first June 1960. The ground stations were located atcommunications satellite for Project SCORE and Fort Monmouth and in Puerto Rico (USASRDLhelped develop the first televised weather satellite 1960:19). The second Courier launch wasby 1960 (Anonymous 1959a:75; CECOM unsuccessful, and equipment aboard the thirdHistorical Office 1994:5; USASRDL 1959a:24). satellite, placed in orbit in October 1960, failedThe satellite used in Project SCORE was of the after less than three weeks of operationrepeater type—it recorded signals transmitted (USASRDL 1961:19).from stations, then replayed the information whenin range of other terminals in Texas, Arizona, and During the 1960s, SATCOMA became a “leadingGeorgia (Bingham 1979:305). The Television participant in the Nation’s space communicationsInfrared Observational Satellite (TIROS) system program, and the agency had a record ofconsisted of five “satellite packages including continuing accomplishments in satellitecoarse and fine resolution TV camera chains, communications research and development”telemetering equipment, IR [infrared] systems, (HOHQAMC 1969:179). The research andspin and precession damping controls” development phase of Project SYNCOM was(USASRDL 1959a:26), as well as mobile ground completed in 1966, and the two satellites werestations in Hawaii and a fixed station at Fort placed in orbit in June of that year. By 1968, allMonmouth; backup ground stations at Cape the terminals required for the initial phase of theCanaveral and at the RCA facility in Hightstown, DSCS network had been established, includingNew Jersey; control and computation facilities in the five continental United States terminals.the Washington, D.C., area; and Minitrack SATCOMA was also involved in command andStations around the world (USASRDL 1959a:26). control efforts, providing satellites for tacticalThe Signal Corps also provided ground support communications. Because of this aspect of itsfor the TIROS II satellite, launched near the end mission, SATCOMA was the “focal point forof 1960 (USASRDL 1961:19). Army activity in the tactical satellite program and

The Army’s Advent Management Agency was under tri-service representation” (Bingham ca.established at Fort Monmouth in the fall of 1960, 1979:320; HOHQAMC 1969:179).then redesignated the United States ArmySatellite Communications Agency (SATCOMA) In 1971 the DoD began DSCS Phase II with thein 1962 (Bingham ca. 1979:307). SATCOMA launch of two equatorial satellites, and the Armynot only developed satellite communications continued to provide ground support.terminals for fixed locations and for use aboard Replacement of the analog system with digitalships and aircraft, it also worked with NASA to equipment began in 1974, and the Armyprovide ground support for Project SYNCOM, a introduced its AN/FSC-78 heavy dutydemonstration project to show capability of communications terminal. Eighteen of thesesetting up round-the-clock “telephone, teletype, terminals were deployed by the Army, Air Force,and facsimile linking across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Navy worldwide; the United States locationsand Indian Oceans, . . . [an effort that] pioneered were in Northwest, Virginia; New Boston, Newa new era in long-distance communications” Hampshire; Fort Detrick, Maryland; Sunnyvale,(Bingham ca. 1979:307). When the Initial California; Fort George G. Meade, Maryland;Defense Communications Satellite Project, Camp Roberts, California; Offutt Air Force Base,forerunner of the DSCS, was initiated in 1964, Nebraska; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, AlaskaSATCOMA was in charge of developing, (HOHQDARCOM 1980b:295; Markenprocuring, and installing the ground terminal 1976:259). The Direct Communications Linknetwork. The initial DSCS was operational by between Washington and Moscow (MOLINK)1967 (Bingham ca. 1979:308). was changed from radio and cable to satellite in

Development of the Courier communications the U.S. were constructed at Fort Detricksatellite and associated ground facilities was also (HOHQDARCOM 1978:310, 317-318). By theundertaken by Fort Monmouth personnel, and the end of the 1970s SATCOMA was in charge of

the test control center for the whole program

1971 as well. Two MOLINK ground terminals in


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what was called the earth environment (probably first heard of “strategic defense” in the televisedmeaning all ground stations) of DoD broadcast of Reagan’s speech (Reiss 1992:38).communications systems (HOHQDARCOM1980b:293), and by 1980 its responsibilities Between 1983 and 1985, SDI became theincluded ground support responsibilities of the Pentagon’s largest single research andNAVSTAR Global Positioning System, which development program, its goal to undo thewould use 24 satellites to provide navigational balance of the superpowers that Presidentreference points for United States forces Kennedy had termed MAD (Mutually Assuredanywhere in the world (Bingham ca. 1980:306, Destruction) by shifting national defense away473). from offensive and toward defensive capabilities.

The Army has continued to conduct research into oversee the program, which at the next levelthe upper atmosphere and meteorology. The included the Army Strategic Defense Commandincreased reliance on electronic systems that may (which specialized in research and developmentbe affected by atmospheric conditions and use of of ground-based and theater defense systems), thesensors employing lasers, infrared devices, and Air Force Electronic Systems Division, the Navalelecto-optics have made necessary a better Research Laboratory, DARPA, and the Defenseunderstanding of earth’s weather systems. Solar Nuclear Agency (DNA). The Army Strategiceffects studies are necessary for similar reasons. Defense Command was created in July 1985 byResearch and operations have continued to take renaming the Ballistic Missile Defenseplace in one more area, the most secretive aspect Organization (BMDO) that had been located atof the military’s involvement in Redstone Arsenal (Reiss 1992:8, 32, 51, 53, 186;space—information collection, from photographic Waldman 1988:138). The Army agencies thatreconnaissance to communications monitoring most benefited from SDI funds were the BMDO,(Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985:26, 28, 72). the AMC Armament Research and DevelopmentAlthough no statement verifying the use of Center (formerly Picatinny Arsenal), and thefacilities at Fort Monmouth or Fort Huachuca for Army Materials and Mechanics Research Centerresearch into space-related surveillance at Watertown Arsenal (Reiss 1992:62). equipment was located, it is likely that thosefacilities were involved in this research area During fiscal year 1983, prior to Presidentduring the Cold War, and that involvement should Reagan’s SDI announcement, Redstone Arsenalbe researched when assessing the significance of had a boost in business that foreshadowed theproperties at those installations. Special attention SDI role it would play. Funding for theshould be paid to information about the Key Hole endoatmospheric non-nuclear kill program,(KH) series of surveillance satellites. KH-1 was administered by the Ballistic Missile Defenselaunched in 1961, and some in the series are still Advanced Technology Center at Redstonein use (Dunnigan 1988:375-377). Arsenal, was doubled. This eventually became

Strategic Defense Initiative

In 1983, President Reagan introduced the idea ofa ballistic missile defense system he called theStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI), ostensibly adefensive shield that would prevent missiles fromreaching military targets in the United States(Borklund 1991:173). The proposal was not,strictly speaking, impromptu but neither was itsannouncement discussed with members of themilitary establishment. The head of the DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

The SDI Office (SDIO) was chartered in 1984 to

the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor(HEDI) of the SDI program (Reiss 1992:66).During the remainder of the Cold War, the Armyreceived the bulk of SDI funds. By April 1988,the amount of SDI-related funding going to theArmy had surpassed $2.5 billion, nearly half thetotal SDI outlay, and the Army had overseen orwas continuing to oversee 2,618 researchcontracts (Reiss 1992:95). The bulk of theresearch work was conducted by privateenterprises or institutions, but the three Armyorganizations mentioned above most likely didconduct research in this field. It is important tonote, however, that private interests providedgreat support for the program because they stood


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to gain extremely large monetary awards for seen its funding cut and “both its design andrelated research work (Reiss 1992:92-99). On the rationale transformed” (Reiss 1992:179). Withother hand, the utopian language that the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent eventsaccompanied talk about SDI during the early confirming that a significant shift in internationalyears may have made the Army and the other relations was underway, SDI lost its usefulness asservices nervous. Although the program provided a bargaining chip and slipped even further downan avenue for funding, accomplishment of the the list of national priorities. The SDIO had inmost ambitious goal—reversing the status quo of 1987 planned to ask for funds of about $8 billionCold War offensive capabilities and reforming the for fiscal year 1991; when the time came toMAD equation—could take some of the submit their request they asked for $4.66 million;traditional deterrent roles from the services and they were granted $2.89 billion. The SDIreduce their importance over the long run (Reiss program was redirected in 1991, when President1992:119). George Bush established GPALS, the Global

The research demands for SDI were immense. 1992:179).The program involved a huge number ofcomponents and required the development of “an The significance of SDI in its association withextraordinary amount of technology that doesn’t AMC material culture, however, does not dependyet exist” (Dunnigan 1988:387). These included on successful development and deployment, buta sensor system capable of tracking rather on its place in the history of Cold Warapproximately 10,000 warheads, lasers and high-technology research and developmentparticle beams (probably space-based high-energy programs and its role in bringing about the end ofbeam weapons like the X-ray laser or lower the Cold War. Concerning the former, SDI didpowered particle beams), and extremely complex play a very significant role in the history of Coldsoftware to coordinate and control operations War technological development since it served to(Dunnigan 1988:388). Since 1973 some laser reinvigorate the search for and development ofweapon research had been underway at FrankfordArsenal’s Optical Laboratory, the Army’s only“in-house capability in the special field of opticallens and system design. . . . [I]ts activities areprimarily directed toward Army weapon systemapplications” (USAWECOM 1973:6-11). By1977, the Army Electronics Command hadseveral laser test facilities at its installations(USAECOM ca. 1977:46-47). And by 1986, thePulse Power Laboratory had been established atFort Monmouth to conduct research related toSDI (Bingham, interview 1995).

In 1986, some “important SDI factions” beganpushing for deployment of an early version of astrategic defense, what was then termed an InitialOperating Capability (IOC). Ground baseddefenses would be central to the IOC, so theArmy stood to benefit from a push for earlydeployment. This was especially true of theRedstone installation, which “had long beenresearching these concepts” (Reiss 1992:118).The SDIO did not win congressional endorsementfor the construction of an early IOC system(Reiss 1992:119). Other disappointmentsfollowed, and since 1988 the SDI program has

Protection Against Limited Strikes (Reiss

new technologies that flourished at—anddefined—the beginning of the Cold War. AMCproperties that reflect this revitalized researchprogram should be closely considered in futurework assessing individual properties.

SDI also had important internationalconsequences—“nothing weighed more heavily inSoviet geopolitical calculations after 1983 thanReagan’s proposal [for SDI, which] . . . providedthe incentive for the Soviets to resume armstalks” (Glynn 1992:340-341). When Gorbachevcame to power in 1985, he placed great emphasison the elimination of SDI, and until 1988 his hopethat he could convince President Reagan to giveup SDI formed a large portion of the motivationbehind Soviet diplomacy. Limitation orelimination of the program would have vindicatedGorbachev’s leadership to Soviet hard liners andthe populace in general, would have removedwhat many presumed a major threat to the unionin the twenty-first century, and would haveprovided Gorbachev with an important symbolicpeace achievement (Glynn 1992:341, 346, 348).The significant role of SDI internationally, then,was not only to rouse Soviet interest in an arms


131

agreement—SDI was the carrot to achieve stopper than a useful hypothesis” (Reissthis—but also to block an agreement that would 1992:193)—there were many other problems;have only repeated agreements of the past and to SDI exacerbated problems that were already well“encourage the channeling of political energies in developed (Reiss 1992:192-193). a different, more productive direction” (Glynn1992:352), that is, toward the elimination ofstrategic nuclear arms rather than quantitativelimitations.

There are two other possible ways of interpreting fought on military stockpile, capability, andthe significance of the SDI program. One is theeconomic impact of SDI that discussed in the lastsection of this chapter. And finally, SDI can beviewed for its originality as a Cold War tactic.However, new as the technological conceptswere, the basic premise of SDI did not mark asignificant departure in the strategy of the U.S.government, the military, or the Army.Antiballistic missiles and ballistic missile defensesystems (SDI was one example, Sentinel andSafeguard are two others) have been part of theresearch program since the early 1960s. SDIresearch and testing violated the spirit, andarguably the letter, of the ABM Treaty limitingthe development and deployment of such systemssince 1972 (Reiss 1992:32).

Determining SDI’s role in bringing about the endof the Cold War is problematic, and an objectiveand fully knowledgeable analysis may beimpossible this soon after the event. SDIenthusiasts like British Prime Minister MargaretThatcher have said that SDI was instrumental inthat aspect, but author Edward Reiss (1992:192)believes such an interpretation of its role

supplies a satisfyingly simple explanationfor the swirling currents of Soviet policy;and suggests an equally simple explanationfor SDI. It sails over any deeperconsideration of the origins of “newthinking” prior to 1983; the arms controlrecord of Brezhnev in the 1970s; and therise of liberal think tanks which promotedglobalistika (global studies) and “mutualist”approaches to the arms race, no longer seenas external imposition or symptom of classstruggle, but as a ‘pan-human’ issuerequiring interactive solutions [Reiss1992:192].

The idea that SDI was the reason for the fall ofthe Soviet Union is more of a “slogan or thought-

THE COLD WAR ECONOMIC FRONT

The Cold War can be viewed not only as it was

technology fronts, but also, within limits, as a warof economics. The high investment in continualdevelopment of newer, faster, better weapon anddefense systems had not only a dollar cost butalso a cost related to the economic vitality of thenations involved in the Cold War. In the UnitedStates, the impact was mitigated by thecontributions the technology base anddevelopment of new industries made to thegeneral economy (Gansler 1980:21). The impactwas felt more heavily in the Soviet Union.

Throughout much of the Cold War, defensespending in the Soviet Union ran at about 25percent of the nation’s disposable income, “anextraordinary burden on the economy” (Lebowand Stein 1993:372). During the 1960s and thefirst half of the 1970s, defense procurement in theUnited States was falling off, but the SovietUnion continued to spend enormous amounts onits military systems. In the late 1960s, Sovietexpenditures were increasing by about eightpercent a year, and by about four percent per yearin the early 1970s. By 1980, the Soviet Unionwas spending a dollar-equivalent slightly morethan that spent by the United States (Gansler1980:250).

Soviet officials began to recognize in the 1970sthat the country’s economy would stagnate if themilitary continued to consume such a large shareof the nation’s economic resources (Lebow andStein 1993:372). However, this was “primarily aresponse to internal imperatives, . . . notcorrelated with American defense spending. Nor[was] there any observable relationship betweendefense spending and changes in the politicalrelationship between the superpowers, until thecuts in the American defense budget in 1991”(Lebow and Stein 1993:372).


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Since the end of the Cold War was brought about pertinent to the leaders of the Soviet Union,at least in part by economic problems in the whose economic performance is flagging” (CEPSoviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries, there is 1987:195).an economic aspect to the significance of AMCCold War-era properties. As can be seen by the Although Soviet documentation of its defensepreceding, however, investment in the Soviet expenditures has not been released, defenseUnion appears to have operated independently of spending in the Soviet Union appears to havethat in the U.S. during the Cold War, so this remained steady throughout the 1980s. The onlytheme offers little contribution to the significance apparent impact of SDI was “to shift in marginalof Cold War properties. One exception could be ways the allocation of defense rubles. After SDI,the Army AMC Cold War properties associated more funds were earmarked to developingwith Strategic Defense Initiative research, the countermeasures to ballistic defense” (Lebow andmost capital-intensive program of the Cold War, Stein 1993:371). If there was no rise in spendingbut the relationship is tenuous. to meet the American initiative, neither was there

“Conventional wisdom assumes that the Soviet indicated the bankruptcy of the Soviet economy.Union was forced to match American defensespending and to end the Cold War when it couldno longer compete” (Lebow and Stein 1993:371).However, a mid-1980s study by the Council onEconomic Priorities (CEP) indicates thatconventional wisdom may have been linked moreto the utopian rhetoric of SDI and too-enthusiasticinterpretations of American influence in theSoviet Union. CEP (1987:171-172) proposedthree Soviet responses to SDI—expansion ofmissile and warhead forces; development of itsbomber- and sea-based cruise missile fleet; and,least likely of all, direct competition with theU.S. to develop similar capabilities. Accordingto its analyses of these possibilities, the firstresponse would cost between $5.9 and 9.5 billionto complete (CEP 1987:180-183), and the secondapproximately $40 billion over 15 years (CEP1987:184-186). Since the total defense budget ofthe Soviet Union in 1981 was approximately $220billion, either option was feasible (CEP1987:186). And, since estimates at the time thisstudy was conducted predicted the total cost ofSDI at $400 billion to over $5 trillion, theeconomic weight of SDI appeared not to rest onthe Soviets. “Faced with expenditures of $10-40billion to counter American strategic defensescosting from 10 to 200 times as much, it isdifficult to imagine that the U.S.S.R. would bethe side most concerned about being bankruptedby the arms race” (CEP 1987:187). However,CEP did concede that “[c]ountermeasures, thoughperhaps only one-tenth as costly as a full-blownSDI defense, would tax the discretionary budgetof any nation. This problem is especially

a fall in Soviet defense spending that would have

CIA statistics show that Soviet defensespending remained relatively constant as aproportion of Soviet gross national productduring the first four years of Gorbachev’stenure. The Soviet gross national productdeclined precipitously in the late 1980s andearly 1990s as Gorbachev’s domesticreforms had a profoundly negative impacton the Soviet economy. Soviet defensespending was reduced only in 1989 and didnot shrink as rapidly as the overalleconomy. . . . The proposition thatAmerican defense spending bankrupted theSoviet economy and forced an end to theCold War is not sustained by the availableevidence [Lebow and Stein 1993:372].

As described above, the economic impact of thevarious Cold War defense programs in the UnitedStates appears to have had little direct relation tothe evolution of the Cold War or to its conclusion.This assessment includes the SDI program,sometimes cited as instrumental in ending theCold War by requiring Soviet defenseexpenditures that the nation was not able to meet.Although “conventional wisdom” views theeconomic impact of SDI and other programs (andtherefore the facilities related to these programs)as vital to bringing about the end of the Cold Warby requiring economic support that drained theresources of the Soviet Union, the actual impactis far from clear at this time. For this reason,caution should be used when using the economicimpact of a facility in support of an assessment ofexceptional significance.

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CHAPTER 6ASSESSING THE COLD WAR MATERIAL CULTURE

INTRODUCTION ANDSTATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this section of the context is to technology and equipment. The most significant“present a clear and concise methodology for AMC Cold War contributions entail advances andpractical field application of the context to developments in defense technology related toevaluate specific installation material culture” major weapons systems, some of which have(USACE, Fort Worth 1994:10). The evaluation played pivotal roles in defense strategy during theinvolves assessing the eligibility of AMC Cold Cold War era. This includes primarily theWar-era resources for inclusion in the National production, research and development, and testRegister of Historic Places. AMC cultural and evaluation facilities where “raw materials” inresources that fall under this Cold War context the form of concepts were transformed into theand that have achieved their significance during intermediate items that equipped, and helpedthe last 50 years must meet not only one of the define, the roles of U.S. Army troops on both astandard four criteria to be considered eligible for national and global scale. Therefore, in theinclusion in the NRHP (these four criteria are discussion and table that follow, property typesdiscussed below), but also must meet Criteria are assessed as having a greater or lesserConsideration G (NPS 1994:42). Resources that likelihood of including resources of exceptionalcan meet at least one of the four standard criteria significance according to their association withand Criteria Consideration G may be included in the development and production of majorthe NRHP as resources of exceptional weapons systems. Following the discussion ofsignificance. property types, a methodology suitable to the

Application of Criteria Consideration G to AMC resources is presented, with special emphasis onCold War resources should focus on the roles of the level of integrity need for inclusion in thethese resources within Army production and NRHP under Criteria Consideration G.combat subsystems and on their unmistakable andextraordinary importance due to a direct andinfluential relationship with Cold War events,strategy, and tactics. The production subsystemis composed of two major elements, the Training A list of property types and subtypes that shouldand Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the include all material cultural resources in theAMC, the latter of which is the topic of the AMC inventory is provided in this chapter (Tablecontext presented herein. The primary task of the 3). These may not include all subtypes at anproduction subsystem is the conversion of raw installation, but a comprehensive list of subtypes

materials into the intermediate items required bythe combat subsystem. TRADOC accomplishesthis goal by training troops; AMC by producing

inventory and assessment of AMC Cold War

COLD WAR PROPERTY TYPES

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Table 3Army Cold War Property Types, Thematic Associations, and Significance*

Property Primary Thematic Associations Probability of Exceptional Significance Type Subtype Thematic Architecture/

Engineering/Technology

Storage Facilities

Igloos •nuclear warfare moderate low•chemical and biological warfare moderate low•other themes low low

Warehouses •nuclear warfare moderate low•other themes low low

Maintenance •missile development moderate lowfacilities •other themes low low

Shipping •will need installation-specific low lowfacilities determination

Production Facilities

Pilot plants •chemical and biological warfare high low•other themes moderate low

Manufacturing •chemical and biological warfare high lowand chemical •other themes moderate lowprocessingfacilities

General assembly •will need installation-specific moderate lowbuildings determination

Missile assembly •missile development moderate, high for early examples highbuildings •nuclear warfare moderate, high for early examples high

•chemical and biological warfare moderate, high for early examples high

Nuclear warhead •nuclear warfare high highassemblybuildings

Re-entry vehicle •missile development moderate unknownassembly •nuclear warfare moderate unknownbuildings •chemical and biological warfare moderate unknown

•other thematic associations (i.e., moderate unknownmeteorology or technology base)

Other assembly •will need installation-specific low lowbuildings determination

Production •will need installation-specific low lowsupport determination

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Table 3 (cont’d)

Property Primary Thematic Associations Probability of Exceptional Significance

Type Subtype Thematic Architecture/Engineering/Technology

Research and Development Facilities

Laboratory •technology base low to moderate, depending on moderatecomplexes equipment remaining

Chemical and •chemical and biological warfare moderate to high, depending on moderatebiological equipment remaininglaboratories

Radiation •nuclear warfare moderate to high, depending on moderatelaboratories equipment remaining

Electronics •communications low to moderate, depending on moderatelaboratories equipment remaining

•technology base moderate to high for important moderate

•other thematic associations (i.e. low to moderate, depending on moderateelectronic warfare) equipment remaining

technology base associations,depending on equipment remaining

Specialized •space and technology base high highresearch facilities •other thematic associations unknown unknown

Clean rooms •nuclear warfare moderate low•chemical and biological warfare moderate low•other thematic associations unknown unknown

Hot rooms •nuclear warfare moderate low•chemical and biological warfare moderate low

Nuclear power •technology base high moderateplants •other thematic associations high unknown

Other research •will need to be determined unknown unknownand developmentfacilities

Communications Facilities

Single antennas •ground-based communications low low, moderate for

•communications via outer space moderate moderate•intelligence gathering and moderate moderate

surveillance•other thematic associations unknown unknown

early examples

Antenna ranges •ground-based communications low low, high for early

•communications via outer space moderate moderate•intelligence gathering and surveillance moderate moderate•other thematic associations unknown unknown

examples of newtechnologies

Communications •international relations (i.e., MOLINK) moderate unknownterminals •ground-based communications low low

•communications via outer space moderate moderate•other thematic associations unknown unknown

Table 3 (cont’d)



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Intelligence and Surveillance Facilities

— •intelligence gathering, surveillance moderate low, moderate forearly examples ofnew technologies

Test and Evaluation Facilities

Exposure •nuclear warfare moderate unknownchambers •chemical and biological warfare moderate unknown

•other thematic associations low unknown

Environmental •nuclear warfare high unknownchambers •chemical and biological warfare high unknown


Nuclear effects •nuclear warfare high highfacilities

Anechoic •communications moderate, high for early examples moderate, high forchambers prototypes

•other thematic associations moderate, high for early examples moderate, high forprototypes

Test ranges and •nuclear warfare high lowgrids •chemical and biological warfare high moderate

•other thematic associations low low

Missile launch •missile development low, moderate to high for early low, moderate tosites and specialized examples high for early

•other thematic associations unknown lowexamples

Missile tracking •missile development low lowand telemetry •other thematic associations low lowfacilities

Launch vehicle •missile development moderate, high for early examples hightest stands •other thematic associations moderate high

Blockhouses •missile development moderate, high for early examples high•nuclear warfare high high•other thematic associations unknown unknown

Other control and •will need installation-specific moderate highinstrumentation determinationfacilities

Specialized test •will need installation-specific moderate moderatefacilities determination

Test tracks •missile development low, high for early examples high•other thematic associations low, moderate for early examples unknown

Table 3 (cont’d)



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Training Facilities

— •nuclear warfare moderate unknown•chemical and biological warfare moderate unknown•other thematic associations low low

Troop and Employee Support

— •will need installation-specific low lowdetermination

Utility and Basic Infrastructure

— •will need installation-specific low lowdetermination

Weapons Systems and Platforms

Aircraft •will need to be determined for moderate unknowneach cultural resource

Missiles •nuclear warfare moderate unknown•biological and chemical warfare moderate unknown•other thematic associations low unknown

Tanks and •nuclear warfare moderate unknownfighting vehicles •biological and chemical warfare moderate unknown


Mobility •nuclear warfare low unknownequipment •biological and chemical warfare low unknown


* The “Primary Thematic Associations”column lists individually the thematic associations that are most likely to be associated withproperty types and subtypes and that are most likely to have bearing on the significance of cultural resources that belong to theseproperty types and subtypes.

The “Probabilityof ExceptionalSignificance,Thematic”columnshows the likelihood that property types associated with various ColdWar-era themesmay be determinedto be significant. A “low” assessment does not mean that cultural resources associated with thesepropertytypes and themes should be assumed to be less significant by those doing installation-specificinventories and assessments,but rather that few of these cultural resources extant throughout the nation are expected to be found to warrant inclusion in the NRHPunder Criteria ConsiderationG. Individual resources may be found to have been extremely significant during the Cold War.

The “Probabilityof ExceptionalSignificance,Architecture/Engineering/Technology”column shows the likelihood that property typesmay include individualresources that are significant because of architectural, engineering,or technologicaldesign. Like the columnimmediately to its left, a “low” assessment does not mean that cultural resources associated with these property types and themesshouldbe assumedby those doing installation-specificinventories and assessments to be less significant, but rather that few of thesecultural resourcesextant throughoutthe nationare expected to be found to warrant inclusion in the NRHP under Criteria ConsiderationG becauseof architecturalor engineering design or style, or their incorporationof new technology. Some individual resources maybe found to have been extremely significant during the Cold War.


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would require an inventory of all resources and is production, electricity generating plants, waterthus more suitable to detailed inventories pumping stations, and other such industrialcompiled for specific installations under support facilities. This property type is veryinvestigation. In the following paragraphs, each likely to include exceptionally significantproperty type listed in Table 3 is discussed. It examples of architectural, engineering, orshould be noted that these property types have technological designs or developments.been developed to aid assessment under CriteriaConsideration G; additions may be needed to The property type including research andadapt this for use in considering facilities that development facilities is perhaps the mosthave reached 50 years of age and need not meet important property type for Cold War resources.Criteria Consideration G. The group is more diverse than production

Storage facilities include ammunition and probably have to be expanded for installation-explosives storage igloos, warehouses, and other specific investigations. Some of the buildingsbuildings where materiel was stored or prepared may have housed operations related to severalfor shipment. Many of these are at Army depots, areas of research interest, and thus can be termedsome of which also had the mission of laboratory complexes. Other laboratory buildingsmaintaining the items they stored or items that may have housed, for example, only chemical andwere stored elsewhere. Since maintenance and biological research efforts, or only radiationupkeep was one element of storage, maintenance experiments. Many were involved in electronicsfacilities are included as a subtype of this research. Specialized research facilities couldproperty type. This property type is expected to include laboratories and special equipment setupscontain few resources of exceptional significance. involved in projects that were of limited durationExceptions may include storage facilities or exploratory in nature. Clean rooms were builtspecifically adapted to store nuclear, chemical, or to prevent the external environment frombiological weapons or weapons components. To contaminating the experiment, while hot roomsbe considered eligible under Criteria were constructed to keep what was beingConsideration G, that thematic association must experimented with from contaminating thebe expressed by physical features, probably outside air. Nuclear power plants were uniquearchitectural features associated with such and significant enough to deserve a subtype ofspecialized missions. their own. Research and development facilities

Production facilities include a wide range of were the resources through which the drive forbuildings and structures. Pilot plants were new weapons and new technology was channeled.constructed for experimental or limited However, a caution should be mentionedproduction, or as a means of refining production regarding the assessment of resources within thisprocesses. Some of the chemical agent pilot property type. The significance of many will beplants produced enough agent that larger facilities intrinsically related to equipment setups; thewere never needed, or at least were never built. integrity of such resources can be seriouslyManufacturing and chemical process plants were impacted by the removal or alteration of thatinvolved in the production of all types of materiel equipment. Further discussion of integrity as itcomponents, from explosives and propellants to relates to this and other property types isgas masks. General assembly buildings include presented in the “Basic Guidelines and Criteria”the load, assemble, and pack buildings where section, later in this chapter.components of shells, bombs, and other materielwere combined. Missile assembly buildings The communications facilities property type isstand apart architecturally and thus compose a intended to include antennas, antenna ranges,separate subtype, as do the few buildings at associated buildings containing radio equipment,Pantex Plant and Iowa Army Ammunition Plant and other types of transmission orwhere nuclear warheads were assembled. communications terminal resources. AlthoughProduction support facilities include maintenance communications resources in general wereand machine shops related to industrial important to Cold War defense strategy and

facilities, and the number of subtypes will

are extremely important as a class because they

Chapter 6: Assessing the Cold War Material Culture

139

tactics, most are basic infrastructure and should The static test stands were used to test launchnot be considered exceptionally significant. vehicles and rocket motors secured in a fixedExceptions would be early examples that position during their burn period. Block housesrepresent significant advances in technology. were the reinforced-construction control and

The property type for intelligence and personnel while testing explosive devices (fromsurveillance facilities (collecting information for atomic weapons to rocket motors). Other controluse by the United States) is related not to research and instrumentation facilities were used to protectand development concerning the means of personnel during the testing of less dangerousinformation collection but to the actual conduct of items and would include buildings like the controlsurveillance and intelligence gathering. Since structures at the Radiological Test Facility atmost intelligence and surveillance was conducted Dugway Proving Ground. Test tracks were usedoverseas, this property type will probably be of to evaluate the function of missile equipmentlittle importance to cultural resources in the under the strain of acceleration. Resources of thiscontinental United States. Exceptions may property type should be carefully considered forinclude facilities used, for instance, to record exceptional significance since many werenuclear detonations; however, it is unlikely that associated with important developments in Coldsuch would have been the primary mission of the War technology. Testing facilities worked infacility, so most will be more appropriately conjunction with the research and developmentassociated with a different property type. facilities to transform concepts for weapons andIntelligence and surveillance facilities could systems into usable weapons, defense technology,include equipment like surveillance satellites. and materiel.

The test and evaluation facilities property type The training facilities property type will likelyalso includes many different subtypes. Exposure include few AMC cultural resources ofchambers were used to subject inanimate and exceptional significance since TRADOC ratheranimate objects to contaminants within an than AMC carried most of the responsibility forenclosed space and thus were most often training troops. Some AMC installations mayassociated with the chemical and biological have included specialized facilities for trainingwarfare theme. However, some such chambers troops in nuclear, biological, or chemicalmay exist that were constructed to study radiation weapons handling and warfare tactics. They areeffects. Environmental chambers were similar to unlikely to be considered exceptionallyexposure chambers but had the added capacity to significant for architectural or engineeringsimulate natural conditions such as a salt fog or a associations; a few may be considereddust storm. Others could simulate the noise and exceptionally significant for their relation tovibration of the interior of an airplane or tank. nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare themes.The above subtypes should not include thenuclear effects setups, which were very Troop and employee support facilities includespecialized environmental facilities. Anechoic housing and other facilities used by the personnelchambers were specialized quiet rooms in which for recreation, health care, religious worship, andcarrier waves and their associated equipment most other activities related to their comfort andcould be studied. Test ranges typically contain well-being. In general, this property type is notmore landscape features than architectural directly associated with the accomplishment offeatures. They were used to test and evaluate military missions at the installation. This broadweapons and weapon systems in the open property type includes subtypes such as healthenvironment and would include both the chemical clinics, dental clinics, fitness centers, recreationand biological test areas of Dugway Proving halls, commissaries, and other facilities. None ofGround as well as the missile test ranges of these facilities should be exceptionally significantWhite Sands Missile Range. Some buildings, within the Cold War context.structures, and objects at missile ranges wouldalso be associated with the missile launch site and Likewise, the utility and basic infrastructuremissile tracking and telemetry facility subtypes.

instrumentation centers used to protect the control

resources are not expected to be found


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exceptionally significant because they will not to the theme with which it is associated. Theexhibit a strong association with major Cold War most important themes of the Cold War werethemes. Examples of this property type would nuclear warfare, chemical and biological warfare,include administration buildings, offices, sewage missile and space-related development,systems, and utility distribution systems. technology base development, and activities

Weapons systems and platforms may be found communications (see Table 3).eligible for inclusion in the NRHP as objects. Anexample of a weapon system would be a Pershing In addition to thematic relations, Cold WarIa missile, while an example of a platform would cultural resources need to be considered for theirbe the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System. Only architectural, engineering, and technologicalearly, prototype, or specially modified versions significance. Many of the basic facilities thatthat had a significant impact on strategy or tactics now make up the AMC inventory were builtare likely to warrant inclusion in the NRHP under during World War II as part of a massiveCriteria Consideration G. industrial mobilization program (see Kane 1995

This chapter presents an assessment of the buildings and structures built during that timelikelihood that each property type and subtype were constructed from standardized governmentwill include resources of exceptional significance drawings, while the designs for other facilitiesas related to Cold War themes and in association were developed by large, well-known architectswith Cold War architecture, engineering, and and architect-engineer firms like Albert Kahntechnology developments (see Table 3). Associates, Day & Zimmermann, Fraser BraceAlthough at the national scale it is impossible to Engineering Company, Mason and Hangertie property types to Cold War significance in any Company, and Smith, Hinchman & Grylls (Kanemore than a general way, the generalization is 1995:73-78, 90). This trend continued into thehelpful in that it points out the areas where Cold War era, with some buildings andparticular attention should be paid. However, structures—igloos and warehouses, forspecific resources that belong to a property type instance—being constructed from standardizedshown to have a high likelihood of containing Army plans, while other were designed byexceptionally significant resources should not outside architects and architect-engineer firmsautomatically be considered exceptionally (Table 4).significant, and vice versa for those propertytypes shown to be unlikely to include properties The likelihood that such buildings and structuresof exceptional significance. Responsibility for a constructed from standardized plans arefinal determination of the significance of specific architecturally significant enough to becultural resources must rest with those considered eligible for inclusion in the NRHPinventorying and assessing resources, and the under Criteria Consideration G is low. However,presentation of the relative importance of a wide range of specialized facilities were builtproperty types and subtypes on a national level during the Cold War period, many of which were(see Table 3). designed according to specific criteria determined

The broad Cold War themes with which the missions to be carried out at the facilities.property types may be associated are the primary Although this report provides general contextualconsideration for determination of exceptional material for assessing these potential architecturalsignificance under this context. These themes are and engineering resources, more detaileddiscussed in detail in Chapter 5 of this document, installation- and facility-specific contexts willto which reference should be made during the likely be needed for adequate NRHP assessmentassessment of specific AMC Cold War of such unique resources. The likelihood that theproperties. As with property types, some themes various property types will include resources thatare in general more important than others, but, are exceptionally significant for theiragain, the level of significance of a resource will architectural, engineering, or technologicalnot be based solely on its association with a associations has been herein rated as low,certain theme—more precisely, the resource must moderate, or high (see Table 3).be of unmistakable and extraordinary importance

related to intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and

for details of this program). At least some of the

by the unique research, testing, or manufacturing

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Table 4Firms Involved in the Architectural and Engineering Design of Cold War-Era Army Facilities

Name of Firm Facility CommentsBallinger Company, Natick Laboratories, original designed and constructed betweenPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania facilities 1952 and 1953

Black and Veatch, Iowa Army Ammunition Plant; Black and Veatch was veryKansas City, Missouri atomic warhead production facility important during the Cold War,

designing many military facilitiesand playing a prominent role in thedesign of facilities with nuclear-related missions

Burns and Roe Industrial Services Pine Bluff Arsenal; BZ designed equipment and oversawCorporation, Demilitarization Facility installation in 1983 and 1984Paramus, New Jersey

Catalytic, Incorporated Newport Chemical Plant; QL engineering design; facilityproduction facility probably not completed

C.E. Lummus Company, Newport Chemical Plant; VX structure designNewark, New Jersey production facility

Chemical Corps Engineering Newport Chemical Plant; VX the Chemical Corps had developedCommand production facility the pilot plant design by 1956

Chemical Corps Engineering Fort Detrick; chemical agent Chemical Corps EngineeringCommand and Corps of Engineers production and biological agent Command developed specifications

fermentation facilities and drawings and acted as designconsultant

Corps of Engineers, Indiana Army Ammunition Plant; designed in 1978Omaha District automated black powder production

facility

Day and Zimmermann, Inc., Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant; designed and constructed betweenPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania Maintenance Shop, Central Stores 1950 and 1953

Warehouse, and AdministrationArea

E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Kansas Army Ammunition Plant; designed between 1967 and 1968Company, Inc., Lead Azide FacilityWilmington, Delaware

Ellerby Associates, Harry Diamond Laboratories; houses main offices andMinneapolis, Minnesota Administration and Laboratory laboratories, designed between

Complex 1974 and 1976; Ellerby may havealso designed other facilities

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Table 4 (cont’d)

Name of Firm Facility CommentsFood Machinery and Chemical Newport Chemical Plant; VX designed at least some of theCorporation, production facility process equipment; much of theSan Jose, California existing equipment was in good

condition and was used in the newfacility

Buckminster Fuller Dymaxion Deployment Units these are examples of Fuller’s(Figure 21), at Fort Monmouth and futuristic, visionary architecturalDugway Proving Ground, perhaps style; although designed and builtat other Army sites during WWII, their use during the

Cold War in communicationstesting allows consideration underthis context

Gilboy, O’Malley, and Stopper, Tobyhanna Army Depot, carried out from 1951 through 1955Philadelphia, Pennsylvania rehabilitation and new construction

throughout the entire depot

H.K. Ferguson Company, Badger Army Ammunition Plant; H.K. Ferguson Company may haveCleveland, Ohio powder production facilities only been the construction

contractor

Hayes, Seay, Mattern and Mattern, Radford Army Ammunition Plant; designed ca. 1951Roankoe, Virginia rocket propellant casting facilities,

triple-base powder andnitroglycerin manufacturingfacilities

Hayes, Seay, Mattern and Mattern, Mississippi Army Ammunition designed and constructed betweenRoankoe, Virginia Plant; load, assemble, and pack area 1980 and 1983

Howell Lewis Shay and Associates, Edgewood Arsenal; Amos A. FriesPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania Building

Albert Kahn, Mississippi Army Ammunition designed and constructed betweenDetroit, Michigan Plant; Cargo Metal Parts Building 1980 and 1983

M.W. Kellogg Company Newport Chemical Plant; VX Kellogg Company conductedproduction facility process, research, and development

studies and additional pilot plantstudies in conjunction with theChemical Warfare Laboratories in1958 and 1959

Massman-Patti-Tanner and Sunflower Army Ammunition designed and constructed betweenMitchell Construction Company Plant; powder production facilities 1951 and 1955

Parsons-Aerojet Company Redstone Arsenal; first static test designed the facility ca. 1952, nowstand and associated laboratory and located in the Marshall Spaceblockhouse Flight Center and listed on NRHP

Table 4 (cont’d)

Name of Firm Facility Comments

143

Raymond and Rado Watervliet Arsenal; ProductAssurance/Gage Laboratory withtemperature and humiditycontrolled laboratories

Redstone Arsenal Post Engineer’s Redstone Arsenal; first Missile design of the facilities, dating fromOffice Research and Development 1950, based on drawings sent from

facilities Fort Bliss

Remington Rand Corporation Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant;155-mm shell manufacturing lineand other facilities

United Engineers and Constructors, Mississippi Army Ammunition designed and constructed betweenInc., Plant; Projectile Metal Parts 1980 and 1983Boston, Massachusetts Building

Universal Match Corporation, Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant; designed ca. 1952St. Louis, Missouri pyrotechnics load, assemble, and

pack facility

Vitro Corporation of America Rocky Mountain Arsenal; GB may have only been involved in themanufacturing facility process design; some of Vitro’s

work supervised by North AtlanticDivision Engineers

Minoru Yamasaki Detroit Arsenal, Propulsion System constructed in 1954; the PropulsionLaboratory (formerly the High System Laboratory has beenTemperature Building and the assessed as exceptionallyAutomotive Components significant (Criteria ConsiderationLaboratory) G)

Z Division of Sandia Laboratory Sandia Laboratory noted to have been responsible forthe engineering details, productionsites, and military-assistedassembly, testing and maintenanceof nuclear weapons; worked closelywith the architect/engineer firm ofBlack and Veatch

Sources: Anonymous 1959a:191, 197, 202; Army Research and Development Newsmagazine 1963:20; Bouilly et al. 1984:81-82;Buchanan1982:n.p.;Buchananand Johnson 1983a:n.p.; Hylton 1972:76, 82; Kacharian 1986a:Number44, 1986b:90; Lemert 1979:165;MMP/BTI 1984a:17, 1984j:29, 1984k:43, 1984l:32, 1984m:26, 1984n:31, 1984o:13, 1984p:31, 1984q:37-38, 1984r:17, 20; Marks1960:116;MidwestResearchInstituten.d.:61-62;Redstone Arsenal ca. 1951:25, ca. 1952b:35; Shapton 1993:1; USADARCOM1984a:7-8, 1984c:1, 1984f:ii; Ward 1987:n.p.; Weitze 1996a:20-21;1996b:G-50;Weitze, personal communication1996.


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Figure 21. Dymaxion Deployment Units at Fort Monmouth (photo courtesy of Joseph Murphey).

ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY

FOR FIELD APPLICATION

Basic Guidelines and Criteria

The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)of 1966, as amended through 1992, sets forthguidelines for the management and preservationof cultural resources that a federal agency owns,over which a federal agency has jurisdiction, orthat may be impacted by undertakings licensed orfunded by a federal agency or agencies.Specifically, installation commanders arerequired to identify and evaluate resources thatcould be affected by undertakings, as defined bythe NHPA. As authorized by the NHPA, theSecretary of the Interior has set forth criteria forevaluating cultural resources to determine theeligibility of those resources for inclusion in theNational Register of Historic Places (36 CFR 800§ 60.4). The qualification of a property as

significant is judged in relation to four criteria forevaluation, defined by the following:

The quality of significance in Americanhistory, architecture, archeology, and cultureis present in districts, sites, buildings,structures, and objects that possess integrityof location, design, setting, materials,workmanship, feeling, and association, and:

(a) that are associated with events thathave made a significant contribution tothe broad patterns of our history; or

(b) that are associated with the lives ofpersons significant in our past; or

(c) that embody the distinctivecharacteristics of a type, period, ormethod of construction, or thatrepresent the work of a master, or thatpossess high artistic values, or thatrepresent a significant anddistinguishable entity whosecomponents may lack individualdistinction; or


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(d) that have yielded, or may be likely to eligible, that eligibility determined by the role ityield, information important inprehistory or history [36 CFR § 60.4].

However, 36 CFR § 60.4 also states that culturalresources that “have achieved significance withinthe past 50 years shall not be considered eligiblefor the National Register” unless they meetspecial considerations. As described in NationalRegister Bulletin 15 (NPS 1994:25), suchresources “can be eligible for listing . . . if theymeet special requirements, called CriteriaConsiderations, in addition to meeting the regularrequirements (that is, being eligible under one ormore of the four Criteria and possessingintegrity).” The consideration for culturalresources that have achieved significance withinthe last 50 years is Criteria Consideration G,under which a property may be eligible if “it is ofexceptional importance” (36 CFR §60.4). Fivemajor classes of cultural resources may be listedon the NRHP, based on definitions provided in 36CFR § 60.3 (Table 5).

The National Park Service has set forth five stepsfor use in determining qualification for inclusionin the NRHP, the order of those steps being thatwhich is generally considered most efficient forsuch determinations. Due to the large number ofCold War resources and the likelihood that manyhave lost their integrity through structuralmodification, by the removal of equipmentintegral to the function and character of theresource, or by other means, the orderrecommended for the five steps has been slightlyaltered. Therefore, the first step in evaluatingAMC Cold War cultural resources is to determinewhether or not the resources retain sufficientintegrity to be considered eligible for inclusion inthe NRHP.

What loss of integrity means is somewhatproblematic. A cultural resource does not have tohave been built within the time frame of thecontext to be considered exceptionally significant.It must have achieved significance during thattime. Otherwise, an unimportant World War IIresource that housed extremely important ColdWar operations would automatically be ineligiblefor listing in the NRHP. Any building, whetherit was built before or at any time during theperiod covered by this context, is potentially

played and—what is most important—by howmodifications to that building reflected that role.It would be difficult to justify an unmodifiedWorld War II building as exceptionallysignificant under a Cold War context, even if thebuilding housed important Cold War operations.An unmodified building would not reflect its ColdWar role, but would rather reflect its World WarII origin and purpose. If a World War II-erabuilding were modified in a way that reflected thepurpose of the operations or activities carried outthere during the Cold War, and those operationsor activities were important enough to qualify thebuilding as exceptionally significant, then it couldjustifiably be assessed under a Cold War context.Loss of integrity would be determined by theextent subsequent alterations impacted themodifications originally undertaken to fulfill theCold War mission under which it achievedexceptional significance. But, if a building orstructure continued to be involved in activities orevents of exceptional significance over a periodof years or decades, alterations to the propertyduring that time would not necessarily mean aloss of integrity since the activities and eventsconducted there continued to be of exceptionalsignificance. To the contrary, changes andalterations could reflect the importance of abuilding or structure since such changes mayeven enhance the representation or feeling of animportant aspect of the Cold War era—thecontinual advancement of technology. In fact,this continual push for the bigger, better, morepowerful, more toxic, more precise, and the moreadvanced in equipment and weapons is crucial tothe understanding of the AMC role in the ColdWar. As such, there may be resources for whichalterations could enhance significance rather thanmean a loss of integrity. The assessment ofindividual resources should considermodifications with this possibility in mind;however, this interpretation of integrity should beapplied only after very careful consideration.

The removal of equipment from within resourcesmust also be considered in determining loss ofintegrity. Buildings, structures, or objects thatonce housed exceptionally significanttechnological or scientific equipment that has beensubsequently removed have suffered a loss of


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Table 5Classes of Cultural Resources

• Building“A building is a structure created to shelter any form of human activity, such as a house, barn,church, hotel, or similar structure. Building may refer to a historically related complex such as acourthouse and jail or a house and barn.

Examples: Molly Brown House (Denver, CO)Meek Mansion and Carriage House (Hayward, CA)Huron County Courthouse and Jail (Norwalk, OH)Fairntosh Plantation (Durham vicinity, NC)”

• Structure“A structure is a work made up of interdependent and interrelated parts in a definite pattern oforganization. Constructed by man, it is often an engineering project large in scale.

Examples: Swanton Covered Bridge (Swanton vicinity, VT)Old Point Loma Lighthouse (San Diego, CA)North Point Water Tower (Milwaukee, WI)Reber Radio Telescope (Green Bay vicinity, WI)”

• Object“An object is a material thing of functional, aesthetic, cultural, historical or scientific value thatmay be, by nature or design, movable yet related to a specific setting or environment.

Examples: Delta Queen Steamboat (Cincinnati, OH)Adams Memorial (Rock Creek Cemetery, Washington, DC)Sumpter Valley Gold Dredge (Sumpter, OR)”

• Site“A site is the location of a significant event, a prehistoric or historic occupation or activity, or abuilding or structure, whether standing, ruined, or vanished, where the location itself maintainshistorical or archeological value regardless of the value of any existing structure.

Examples: Cabin Creek Battlefield (Pensacola vicinity, OK)Mound Cemetery Mound (Chester vicinity, OH)Mud Springs Pony Express SAT Site (Dalton vicinity, NE)”

• District“A district is a geographically definable area, urban or rural, possessing a significant concentration,linkage, or continuity of sites, buildings, structures, or objects united by past events or aestheticallyby plan or physical development. A district may also comprise individual elements separatedgeographically but linked by association or history.

Examples: Georgetown Historic District (Washington, DC)Martin Luther King Historic District (Atlanta, GA)Durango-Silverton Narrow-Gauge Railroad (right-of-way-between Durango andSilverton, CO)”

Source: 36 CFR 800 § 60.3

integrity because of the removal of that Consideration G. In the event the building orequipment. If the remaining shell can not be structural shell is of a singular or highly unusualconsidered exceptionally significant in and of design developed specifically for housingitself, independent of the equipment it once extraordinarily significant equipment, then thecontained, it would not meet Criteria shell itself may express the role of the shell with


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its previously installed equipment sufficiently to regional, or national level, and the mostbe considered under Criteria Consideration G. appropriate level for assessing AMC Cold WarLikewise, independent equipment setups and resources for exceptional significance is theother technological and scientific properties national level. A specific definition ofshould be evaluated as whole systems. The “exceptional” is not defined under Criteriaintegrity of setups from which components have Consideration G—“[e]xceptional, by its ownbeen removed, and of remaining components definition, cannot be fully catalogued oronce part of a larger technological system, has anticipated. It may reflect the extraordinarybeen seriously impacted by the removal of their impact of a political or social event . . . [or it]associated components. Equipment that only may apply to an entire category of resources sopartially represents a larger integrated setup fragile that survivors of any age are unusual”would not usually retain enough integrity to be (NPS n.d.:3). Therefore, “exceptional” is open toeligible for inclusion in the NRHP under Criteria interpretation, and that determination must beConsideration G. made on a case-by-case basis by individuals and

Resources that do retain their integrity should be resources. AMC Cold War cultural resources thatcategorized as a building, structure, district, are determined to be exceptionally significantobject, or site (NPS 1994:3). Most of the Army will most likely be associated with the firstCold War material culture resources will be one definition given above since resources that “canof the first four. Buildings could include, for last more than fifty years cannot be consideredexample, laboratory complexes and blockhouses;structures may include wind tunnels andenvironmental chambers; and objects couldinclude cinetheodolites and Big Crow, theArmy’s Airborne EW Laboratory. A resourceshould then be associated with a historic contextsuch as this document. A more specific contextmay be needed to fully evaluate the significanceof some resources. For example, wind tunnelswere important to the development not only ofmissiles, but of aircraft as well. Historians andother researchers will need to determine if NRHPeligibility can be adequately assessed by theapplication of this general AMC Cold Warcontext alone, or if additional research—specificand directly related to the resource or resourcesbeing assessed—need be done for properevaluation.

Next, the resource should be evaluated accordingto the four NRHP criteria and, if the resource isof a type generally excluded from inclusion in theNational Register, evaluated according to theCriteria Considerations. Since Cold Warresources have all achieved significance withinthe last 50 years, they are excluded from NRHPinclusion unless they can meet CriteriaConsideration G (NPS 1994:3).

For a cultural resource to qualify under CriteriaConsideration G, its significance must beestablished as exceptional on a community, state,

organizations conducting the assessments of the

exceptionally important because of the fragilityof the class of resources” (NPS 1994:42; italicsadded). However, recommendations ofexceptional significance may be warranted forresources that are singular and fragile survivors ofa class of properties.

Methodology for Field Application

An installation-by-installation inventory of allcultural resources under AMC ownership shouldbe completed as the first step in determiningwhich AMC Cold War resources are eligible forinclusion in the NRHP under CriteriaConsideration G. The five steps outlined in thepreceding section should then be followed todetermine if the resource should be recommendedeligible for inclusion in the NRHP. In addition toclassifying the resource as a building, structure,object, district, or site, resources should also beassociated with the appropriate property type (andsubtype if necessary), using Table 3 as a generalreference for determining property types. Usingthe relevant chapters of this document as a guide,the resource should then be evaluated accordingto its national context as a Cold War-era AMCresource. In order to be considered under thiscontext, the resource must be less than 50 yearsold or must have achieved or continued to achievesignificance into a period that precedes


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nomination by no more than 50 years, that is, into resources than to architectural, engineering, andthe Cold War period (NPS 1994:41). technological resources.

Several areas of research will need to be Information sources for the preceding shouldaddressed to first establish significance under the include but not be limited to the following areas.four NRHP criteria, then establish exceptional First and foremost are the collections andsignificance under Criteria Consideration G. The historical documentation at the installation orresources themselves will most likely meet facility (in the history office, public relationsCriterion A if they were associated with activities office, museum, archives, and possibly at otherof the Army during the Cold War. To determine locations) and at any other installations or officessignificance under Criterion B, important persons that had jurisdiction over or managementinvolved in operations or otherwise associated responsibilities concerning that installation orwith the facility will be noted. The importance of facility during the Cold War. Facilitiesresearch and development to AMC endeavors engineering offices should be consulted forduring the Cold War era means particular installation maps and relevant architectural andattention should be paid to persons both military engineering drawings. History offices of theand civilian who made outstanding achievements command or commands that the installation orin their fields of study—examples would be Dr. facility has operated under should also beWernher von Braun, associated with missile contacted. These offices may contain informationresearch at Redstone Arsenal; and Dr. Hubert P. about not only the installation or facility itself butYockey, who designed the nuclear reactor built at also about cooperative efforts with otherAberdeen Proving Ground. An architectural and organizations that may have relevance to itsengineering evaluation of the resources would significance. Another important source ofalso need to be made to determine significance information about the installation is the Nationalunder Criterion C. It should be noted that Archives (Military History, Cartographic, Stillresources could only be considered significant Pictures, and Motion Pictures departments, asunder Criterion C if they were constructed during well as others). National Records Centers maythe Cold War or if they were modified in such a also need to be contacted. These archives holdway that their association with Cold War-era records that remain under the authority of thearchitectural styles or elements can be clearly issuing or authoring agency (which must giveseen. Replacement of wood windows and doors permission for access by researchers) prior toin World War II-era buildings with modern metal disposal or being turned over to the Nationalunits would not be such a modification, and Archives. National libraries that may need to beneither would the adaptation of a building interior consulted include the Library of Congress and theto Cold War production processes if that building Pentagon Reference Library. A source of

additional guidance regarding other sources ofstill primarily conveys the feel of its originalperiod of construction. However, a World War IIbuilding to which a new facade has been addedmay have a visual impact that conveys its ColdWar association and thus would warrantinvestigation into its significance under CriterionC. Significant additions to buildings andstructures to house or otherwise incorporate ColdWar equipment, activities, or operations mayallow the resources to be considered under a ColdWar context. Resources exhibiting suchextensive modifications that would qualify themunder Criterion C are expected to be few. It is,likewise, unlikely that any resources will befound significant under Criterion D. Thiscriterion is more applicable to archeological

military information is the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History in Washington, D.C. Regionalrepositories of relevance to this research would bethe National Archives and RecordsAdministration field branches, as well as thepresidential libraries. State repositories andarchives may have some pertinent information;and local libraries, archives, historicalorganizations, and museums that may havecollections related to the facility and itsoperations should be contacted.

If a cultural resource meets at least one of thefour NRHP criteria, then it must also meetCriteria Consideration G to be recommendedeligible for inclusion in the NRHP as an


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exceptionally significant resource. As mentioned employee support facilities, as well as utility andabove, the term “exceptional” is open to basic infrastructure facilities. These propertyinterpretation. For a resource to meet Criteria types include family housing and other quarters,Consideration G, the manner in which a resource administrative buildings, general maintenanceis considered exceptional should be made shops, sewage treatment plants, hospitals andexplicit. The significance of the resource should clinics, and other such support facilities (see alsobe justified as exceptional by clearly Table 3). These latter property types will bedemonstrating how the resource was inventoried and evaluated as they reach 50 yearsextraordinarily important to one or more of the of age, conducted through standard NHPACold War themes discussed in this report; how its compliance procedures.existence is clearly related to a person or personsof extraordinary importance to one or more of the The determination of eligibility for Cold WarCold War themes; how it is an extraordinary material culture resources to be included in theexample of an architectural style or work of a National Register should be made based on themaster; or how it clearly portrays an guidelines and requirements discussed in thisextraordinary advance in engineering design or chapter. Once a resource is considered eligibletechnology. Property types that are most likely to for inclusion in the NRHP, concurrence betweeninclude resources that meet Criteria Consideration the agency that owns or controls the resource andG are production facilities, research and the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO)development facilities, and test and evaluation must be obtained. With this concurrence, thefacilities. These property types include the resource may then be recommended for inclusionlaboratories, arsenal, production, and test in the NRHP and formally nominated using theorganizations that converted technology and appropriate NPS forms and procedures. Onceresearch efforts into the weaponry and these are submitted, the Secretary of the Interior,intelligence equipment for use by combat forces. represented for this purpose by the Keeper of theProperty types unlikely to include resources that National Register, may accept or decline themeet Criteria Consideration G are troop and nomination.

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CHAPTER 7CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

The foregoing report presents a national context supply of materiel, carried out just prior to andfor the Army Materiel Command and its during World War II, was one of the greatestpredecessor organizations (the technical services) undertakings of these seven Army branches. Theduring the Cold War. The purpose of the resulting facilities, added to the six “old line”document is to provide a basic guide to the arsenals built prior to World War I, establishedoverall operations of the AMC and the technical the basic industrial infrastructure for theservices so that the significance of cultural production of materiel and other Army needsresources in the AMC inventory may be assessed throughout the Cold War.according to the role they played in the Cold Warand so that suitable resources may be included on The technical services were instrumental not onlythe National Register of Historic Places. This in providing the Army’s supply functions but alsodocument accomplishes these goals by first in helping to establish the character and setting ofpresenting a global and national perspective of the Cold War nationally and globally. The Corpsthe Cold War; second, by outlining the of Engineers Manhattan Engineering Districtorganization and evolution of the AMC and its developed the first nuclear weapon. The Signalpredecessor organizations throughout the Cold Corps helped develop the first satellites andWar; and third, by presenting the various themes space-based communications systems,associated with the AMC’s operations during the establishing a foundation for today’sCold War. In addition, a field methodology telecommunications industry. The Signal Corpspresenting criteria for the assessment of worked with the Ordnance Department to developproperties for inclusion in the National Register the first digital computers and made greatof Historic Places and guidelines for the advances in the miniaturization of componentsinventory and assessment of individual that have made these and other advancedinstallations and facilities has been proposed. electronics components common household

Prior to the formation of the AMC in 1962, the Department developed the missiles that initiatedacquisition of the Army's supplies was the task of space exploration, making available a new sensethe seven technical services: the Ordnance of pride and national identity to Americans andDepartment, the Chemical Corps, the Signal expanding the front of possible Cold War battlesCorps, the Transportation Corps, the to encompass the entire globe. And the ChemicalQuartermaster General, the Corps of Engineers, Corps provided an excellent example of theand the Surgeon General. The Army’s massive lengths to which humans will go to prepare forprogram to construct an industrial base for the waging war.

goods. The Corps of Engineers and the Ordnance


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In 1962, the AMC was established as the munitions and weapons systems. The work ofculmination of a long-running effort to reorganize this family of subcommands included a widethe Army and organize its supply activities in a range of nuclear weapons and nuclear effectsway more suitable to a heavily industrialized research, chemical weapons research, and fasternation, and more in line with modern methods of and more accurate means of delivering warheads.factory and business operations. An attempt toreorient the Army technical services away from Throughout the Cold War, the impact of Armycommodity organization and toward functional supply programs have reached, and continue toorganization in 1942 failed; the Army had reach, far beyond the realm of military endeavors.completely returned to its pre-World War II Although developments like the transistor,organization by 1946. But the shortcomings of computers, and communications satellites almostthis arrangement, unsuited to the basic research certainly would have occurred in the absence ofand development needs of the modern Army, had Army research and development efforts, thebecome readily apparent by the late 1950s. The AMC probably pushed advances into existenceresult was the Army’s adoption of the project years or even decades before they would havemanager organization then in use in private otherwise occurred. Our present understanding ofindustry and the dissolution of most of the the earth’s natural systems owes a debt also to thetechnical services. In their stead five commodity AMC and its efforts to compile basiccommands and two functional commands were meteorological and environmental data. Broadcreated, all administered by the new Army issues related to health and the spread of diseaseMateriel Command, formally established in 1962. have also benefited from Army AMC activities.

The five AMC commodity commands were the AMC funding for research and developmentElectronics Command (ECOM), Missile programs conducted for the Army.Command (MICOM), Mobility Command(MOCOM), Munitions Command (MUCOM), Many AMC cultural resources in the continentaland Weapons Command (WECOM). The two United States played important roles in these andfunctional commands were the Supply and other Army activities during the Cold War period,Maintenance Command (SMC) and the Test and roles that were important not only in militaryEvaluation Command (TECOM). These seven circles but also shaped the lives and culturalsubcommands, and the new subcommands that inheritance of all Americans—and in many wayswere formed as the AMC evolved throughout the have altered the lives of people around the world.Cold War, expanded the developments begun by The AMC’s relationship to our history of the lastthe technical services. ECOM and its relatives 50 years is one of vast proportions, encompassingfurthered computer, communications, and other the 40-year shadow that forebode nuclear war inelectronic components development. This family the minds of the general public and theof subcommands was also involved in a wide development of chemical and biological weaponsvariety of technology base development, with of immense power that few knew about, to theapplications ranging from meteorology to development of the tools of communication thattelecommunications to long-life batteries. prompted cultural theorist Marshall McLuhan toMICOM was involved in many of the Army’s describe a coming new world order that wouldlargest, most complex, and most expensive take the form of a global village. The legacy ofweapons systems. MOCOM, and later AVCOM the AMC should be held as an important reminderand AVSCOM (Aviation Command and Aviation of these examples of human possibility, theSystems Command), provided the Army with its provider of the instruments for the possibleimportant air capabilities. MUCOM and annihilation of the human race, and of the toolsWECOM, as their names imply, were responsible that offer the possibility of greater unification infor most research and development for the Army's our future.

And educational institutions have benefited from

153

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175

INDEX

AACOMS, 118 Armament, Munitions, and Chemical CommandAberdeen Proving Ground, 4, 5, 10, 15, 27, 31, (AMCCOM), 50, 51, 53, 105

38, 42, 43, 47, 51, 54, 60, 62, 68, 71-74, 76, Army ADVENT Management Agency88, 90-92, 95-97, 100-101, 103, 107-110, (AAMA), 117112, 113, 116, 118 Army Airborne EW Laboratory (Big Crow), 67,

AC, 83 147Advent satellite, 43, 117, 128 Army Ammunition Procurement and SupplyAeronautical Depot Maintenance Center Agency (APSA), 50, 51

(ARADMAC), 51, 56 Army Area Communication SystemAjax missile, 24, 25, 94 (AACOMS), 118Albert J. Myer Research and Development Army Aviation Systems Command

Center (the Hexagon), 10, 16, 61, 64, 66, 68, (AVSCOM), 48, 49, 15271, 115, 121, 123, 124, 127 Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 24,

AMC Logistics Program Hardcore, Automated 40, 93, 94, 126(ALPHA), 72 Army Chemical Center (ACC), 42, 50, 76, 78,

Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency, 7950 Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee

anechoic chambers, 16, 66, 67, 71, 95, 125, (AMARC), 46-49, 51136, 138 Army Materiel and Mechanics Research Center

anthrax, 75, 78 (AMMRC), 111antiballistic missile (ABM), 13, 19, 28, 29, 56, Army Materiel Development and Readiness

131 Command (DARCOM), 46, 48, 56, 103anticrop agents, 26, 88 Army Pulse Radiation Facility (APRF), 72Apollo space mission, 34, 35, 71 Army Research Laboratory (ARL), 4, 47, 60,Armament Command (ARMCOM), 50, 51, 52, 107

81 Army Research Office (ARO), 47Armament Materiel Readiness Command Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency

(ARRCOM), 50, 51, 110 (ARGMA), 40Armament Research and Development Center Army Safeguard Logistics Command

(ARDC), 16, 51, 62, 103, 129 (SAFLOG), 56Armament Research and Development Army Tactical Missile System (TACMS), 95

Command (ARRADCOM), 50, 51, 102 Artificial Intelligence (AI), 116, 121Armament Research, Development and Atlas missiles, 12, 19

Engineering Center (ARDEC), 105 Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory (ASL), 46,47, 63


176

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 6, 10, 41, Chemical Corps, 17, 39, 40, 42, 50, 54, 62, 76,102, 103 78-80, 108, 126, 141, 151

Aurora Pulsed Radiation Simulator, 72, 103, Chemical Corps Engineering Command, 80,109 141

Automated Logistics Management Systems Chemical Research and Development Center,Agency (ALMSA), 115 51, 110

automatic data processing (ADP), 46, 54, 115, Chemical Research and Development Center116, 120 (CRDC), 51, 110

automatic digital network (AUTODIN), 34, 118 chemical warfare (CW), 10, 17, 25-27, 29, 31,Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM), 48, 34, 35, 42, 60, 73-75, 78, 80-84, 87, 88, 108,

50 110, 111, 115, 133, 141Aviation Command (AVCOM), 48, 49, 152 AC, 83Aviation Research and Development Command Agent Orange, 26

(AVRADCOM), 48, 49, 102 anticholinesterase, 75Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM), 48, anticrop agents, 26, 88

49, 152 BBC, 83Badger Army Ammunition Plant, 142 BZ, 26, 31, 34, 35, 60, 80-83, 88, 141Ballistic Research Laboratory’s Electronic chloride, 80

Scientific Computer, 113 chlorine, 74, 75BBC, 83 chloroacetophenone (CN), 80BESM, 17 chloropicrin, 74binary weapons, 31, 34, 35, 60, 73, 83-85, 113 cholinesterase, 75biological warfare (BW), 10, 17, 26, 27, 29-31, CS, a tear gas, 80, 81, 83

40-42, 68, 75-81, 84, 87-89, 107, 108, 110, cyanogen chloride (CK), 80141 defoliants, 26, 29, 31, 35, 81

anthrax, 75, 78 dichlorophenoxyacetic (LN8), 75anthrax (N), 75, 78 distilled mustard gas (HD), 83, 88botulus, 75 EA 1298 (a derivative of mescaline), 26, 27mosquitoes, 78 EA 4923 (a volatile liquid irritant), 83psittacosis (SI), 78 GB2, 83Q-fever, 26, 81 GD, 76, 83tularemia, 26, 78, 81 GF, 83

Blue Grass Army Ammunition Plant, 41, 54, 87 isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (GB),Brezhnev, Leonid, 34, 131 17, 31, 42, 60, 73, 76, 78, 83, 84, 87, 88, 143brucellosis (US), 78 isopropyl N-phenol carbonate (LN33), 75Bumper Program, 9, 90, 126 lewisite (L), 75bystrodeistvuiushchaia elektronnaia schetnaia

mashina (BESM), 17BZ, 26, 31, 34, 35, 60, 80-83, 88, 141C I, 112, 116, 117, 119, 1213

Cape Canaveral, 19, 25, 97, 128Center for Communications Systems

(CENCOMS), 121Center for Tactical Computer Systems

(CENTACS), 111, 115, 121Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 13, 20, 35,

132Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal

System (CAMDS), 87Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), 110Chemical and Biological Defense Command

(CBDCOM), 4

lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), 31, 80, 83mustard (H), 29, 74, 75, 83, 87, 88phosgene (CG), 74, 75, 80, 83sarin (GB), 17, 31, 42, 60, 73, 76, 78, 83, 84,87, 88, 143

soman (GD), 25, 26, 43, 76, 83, 126, 127,129

tabun, 75VX, 17, 26, 31, 42, 60, 73, 78, 79, 83, 84, 87,88, 141-142

Chemical Warfare Laboratories (CWL), 80, 142chloride, 80chlorine, 74, 75chloroacetophenone (CN), 80chloropicrin, 74cinetheodolite, 97

Index

177

Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Distributed Command, Control andLaboratory (CSTAL), 47, 67, 125 Communications (DC ), 121

Command and Control (C ), 113, 115, 116, 119, domino theory, 122

121, 128 Doppler Velocity and Position SystemCommand Control Information System-1970 (DOVAP), 97

(CCIS-70), 119 Dugway Proving Ground, 10, 17, 27, 31, 35, 41,Command, Control, and Communications (C ), 42, 44, 68, 69, 74, 75, 78-80, 84, 86, 87,3

3, 116, 121 107-109, 111, 139, 142Command, Control, Communications, and Dymaxion Deployment Unit, 142, 144

Intelligence (C I), 112 Dynamic Tactical Simulator (DYNTACS), 733

Communications and Electronics Command earth penetrator (EP) warhead, 33, 37, 103(CECOM), 4, 46, 47, 61, 64, 67, 74, 94, 111, Edgewood Arsenal, 4, 10, 17, 25-27, 31, 38, 41,120, 125 42, 50, 51, 62, 74-76, 78-81, 83, 84,

Communications Electronics Materiel 107-109, 111, 142Readiness Command (CERCOM), 46 electro-magnetic pulse (EMP), 72, 108, 109

Communications Research and Development Electromagnetic Environmental Test Facility,Command (CORADCOM), 46, 61, 64 65, 66

computers, 36, 40, 62, 96, 97, 112-116, 121, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM),123, 151, 152 64

conduct of fire trainer (COFT), 74 electronic countermeasures, 43, 64, 67Corona satellites, 19 electronic countermeasures (ECM), 63, 65-67,Corps of Engineers, 1, 3, 6, 25, 44, 45, 54, 79, 69, 91, 97, 105

124, 127, 151 Electronic Defense Laboratory (EDL), 65counter-countermeasures (CCM), 64 Electronic Discrete Variable AutomaticCourier satellites, 117, 128 Computer (EDVAC), 113CS, a tear gas, 80, 81, 83 electronic intelligence (ELINT), 67, 123cyanogen chloride (CK), 80 Electronic Numerical Integrator, Analyzer, andDavy Crockett Weapon System (DACRO), 23, Computer (ENIAC), 9, 10, 112, 113

102 Electronic Warfare Laboratory (EWL), 65-67,Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 125

(DARPA), 129 Electronics Command (ECOM), 34, 45, 46, 61,Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), 72, 63-65, 72, 94, 115, 130, 152

107, 115 Electronics Research and DevelopmentDefense Communications Agency (DCA), 34 Command (ERADCOM), 46, 47Defense Communications Satellite (COMSAT), Electronics Technology and Devices

30, 117, 128 Laboratory, 47, 115, 120Defense Logistics Agency, 22, 45 electro-optics, 47, 63defibrillator pacemaker, 34 Engineer Research and Developmentdefoliants, 26, 29, 31, 35, 81 Laboratory (ERDL), 48, 49Department of Defense (DoD), 3, 31, 34, 61-63, Eniwetok Atoll, 12, 19

105, 107, 118, 124, 128, 129 environment chambers, 68, 138Department of Energy (DoE), 101, 102, 105, Experimental Army Satellite Tactical Terminal

106 (EASTT), 34, 120Depot Maintenance Control Center (DMCC), Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System

56 (FABMDS), 47Depot System Command (DESCOM), 56, 57 Field Artillery Digital Automatic ComputerDeseret Chemical Depot, 41, 42, 84, 87 (FADAC), 115Detroit Arsenal, 4, 43, 48, 49, 68, 69, 143 fluidic control, 94Direct Communication Link (DCL), 30 fluidic controls, 95

dichlorophenoxyacetic (LN8), 30, 128, 136 follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL), 105Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line), 16 FORAST, 113

3


178

Fort Belvoir, 19, 46-49, 60, 62, 68, 71, 72, 116, Honest John missile, 12, 22, 24, 32, 78, 88, 94,119, 124 101, 102

Fort Bliss, 43, 90, 143 identification friend, foe or neutral (IFFN), 125Fort Bragg, 12 Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, 140Fort Detrick, 10, 17, 26, 27, 30, 41, 42, 50, Industrial Operations Command (IOC), 4, 130

74-76, 78-81, 84, 107, 128, 141 INFORMER computer, 115Fort Dix, 43, 118 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 13,Fort Eustis, 48 19, 25Fort George G. Meade, 43, 128 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), 13,Fort Huachuca, 43, 46, 63, 64, 66, 68-70, 72, 24

107, 109, 111, 116, 119, 124, 129 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INFFort Monmouth, 4, 5, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 26, 42, Treaty), 37, 38, 98, 100, 106

43, 46, 47, 60-68, 72, 74, 107, 108, 111-113, International Geophysical Year (IGY), 18, 126115-121, 123-130, 142 Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, 18, 106, 138,

Fort Sill, 43, 120 141Fort Wingate, 54 jamming devices, 65, 67Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS), Joint Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC), 34

121 Joint Tactical Information Distribution SystemFrankford Arsenal, 34, 39, 40, 50, 51, 63, 68, (JTIDS), 119-121

71, 73, 130 Joliet Army Ammunition Plant, 40, 50, 51Fries, Amos A., Building, 81, 141 Jupiter missiles, 21, 24, 25, 32, 97, 126, 127Fuller, Buckminster, 142 Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, 140Gadget (first atomic device), 5 Laboratory Command (LABCOM), 47, 52Gamma Linear Electron Accelerator, 98 Laboratory for Insulation Research, 62GB2, 83 Lance missile, 33, 47, 94, 95, 102, 105GD, 76, 83 lasers, 19, 34, 60, 62, 63, 67, 73, 124, 129, 130GF, 83 Letterkenny Army Depot, 41, 98, 115Global Positioning System (GPS), 129 lewisite (L), 75Global Protection Against Limited Strikes Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, 54

(GPALS), 130 Lightweight Decontamination SystemGorbachev, Mikhail, 37, 38, 130 (SANATOR), 111Gorgas, Josiah, Laboratory, 15, 48, 93 Little John missiles, 24, 32, 94, 102Government-owned, Contractor-operated Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, 141

(GOCO), 9, 40, 50, 51, 90 Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, 88, 98,Government-owned, Government-operated 100, 106, 143

(GOGO), 39, 51 Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, 143Gun Air Defense Effectiveness Study lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), 31, 80, 83

(GADES), 73 Major Item Data Agency (MIDA), 41, 54, 56Harry Diamond Laboratories, 47, 60, 62, 63, 68, Major Item Supply Management Agency

71, 72, 88, 94, 103, 105, 109, 111, 142 (MISMA), 40, 41Diamond Ordnance Reactor Facility Manhattan Project, 5, 6, 13, 44, 60, 151(DORF), 72, 109 establishment of, 6

Hawk missile, 24, 32, 47, 94, 98, 102 masers, 124Hercules missile, 24, 25, 32, 38, 47, 94 Materials Technology Laboratory, 47Hermes missile, 9, 90, 91 Materiel Development and Logistics Command,Hexagon, 10, 16, 61, 64, 66, 68, 71, 115, 121, 22, 45

123, 124, 127 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), 21High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor Mercury-Redstone missiles, 26, 97

(HEDI), 129 Missile Command (MICOM), 4, 45, 47, 48, 94,High-Speed Electronic Calculating Machine, 17 95, 152Hoelscher Report, 22, 45 Missile Readiness Command (MIRCOM), 47,

48

Index

179

Missile Research and Development Command National Center for Toxicological Research, 77,(MIRADCOM), 47, 48 82, 88

Missiles National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), 2,Ajax, 24, 25, 94 3, 97, 133, 137, 139, 140, 144-149Atlas, 12, 19 National Security Council (NSC), 8, 9, 12, 14,Hawk, 24, 32, 47, 94, 98, 102 15, 18, 44Hercules, 24, 25, 32, 38, 47, 94 National Space Technology LaboratoriesHonest John, 12, 22, 24, 32, 78, 88, 94, 101, (NSTL), 30102 Navajo Army Depot, 54

Jupiter, 21, 24, 25, 32, 97, 126, 127 NAVSTAR, 129Lance, 33, 47, 94, 95, 102, 105 New Cumberland Army Depot, 41, 49, 54, 56Little John, 24, 32, 94, 102 Newport Army Ammunition Plant, 26, 38, 42,Mercury-Redstone, 26, 97 74, 79, 84, 88, 105MX, 12, 36 Newport Chemical Plant, 26, 31, 42, 141, 142Nike, 16, 24, 25, 29, 32, 38, 93, 94, 97, 98, Night Vision and Electro-Optics Laboratory102 (NVEOL), 47

ORDCIT, 9 Nike missiles , 16, 24, 25, 29, 32, 38, 93, 94,Pershing, 24, 25, 33, 37, 38, 47, 93-95, 98, 97, 98, 102102-106, 127, 140 North American Air Defense Command

Sergeant, 24, 26, 33, 47, 78, 94, 98, 102 (NORAD), 19Zeus, 47, 94, 98 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 8,

Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, 30, 142, 34, 35, 37, 105, 112143 NSC 162/2, 14, 15

mobile digital computer (MOBIDIC), 113, 115, NSC-7, 8119, 120 nuclear weapon accident exercise (NUWAX),

Mobility Command (MOCOM), 45, 48, 51, 152 37Mobility Equipment Command (MECOM), 48, Operation Paperclip, 9, 90, 91

49 ORDCIT missiles, 9Mobility Equipment Research and Development Ordnance Ammunition Center, 40

Command (MERADCOM), 48, 49 Ordnance Ammunition Command, 40Molniya satellite, 30 Ordnance Department, 9, 39-41, 54, 90, 91, 93,multiple independently-targetable reentry 126, 127, 151

vehicle (MIRV), 29 Ordnance Special Weapons AmmunitionMultiple Integrated Laser Engagement System Command (OSWAC), 40

(MILES), 12, 13, 19, 24, 54, 69, 73, 74, 79, Ordnance Variable Automatic Computer84, 88, 91, 96, 105, 108, 123, 126 (ORDVAC), 17, 113

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 35, Ordnance Weapons Command (OWC), 22, 4084, 105 Pantex Plant, 18, 23, 106, 138

Munitions Command (MUCOM), 45, 46, 50, Pentomic Army, 4, 18, 22, 28, 12751, 152 Pershing missiles, 24, 25, 33, 37, 38, 47, 93-95,

Muscle Shoals Development Works, 17 98, 102-106, 127, 140mustard (H), 29, 74, 75, 83, 87, 88 phosgene (CG), 74, 75, 80, 83Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 20, 129, Phosphate Development Works, 17, 38, 42, 79

130 Picatinny Arsenal, 9, 10, 34, 40, 50, 51, 68, 71,MX missile, 12, 36 88, 90, 94, 100, 102, 107, 129Natick Laboratories (NLABS), 49, 53, 62, 107, Pine Bluff Arsenal, 10, 17, 26, 27, 30, 34, 35,

110, 141 38, 41, 51, 74-77, 79-85, 88, 89, 141Natick Research and Development Command PLRS/JTIDS Hybrid (PJH), 119-121

(NARADCOM), 48, 49 Position Location Reporting System (PLRS),National Aeronautics and Space Administration 119-121

(NASA), 25, 26, 30, 33, 97, 124, 127, 128 Project Diana, 9, 61, 117, 125, 127psittacosis (SI), 78


180

Pueblo Army Depot, 54, 88, 98, 106, 115 Sunflower Army Ammunition Plant, 141Quartermaster Corps, 22, 39, 45, 49, 54, 151 Supply and Maintenance Command (SMC), 45,Q-fever, 26, 81 51, 54, 152radar (Radio Detection and Ranging), 1, 6, 9, synchronized satellite communications system

12, 17, 19, 24, 44, 61-67, 94-96, 101, 104, (SYNCOM), 34, 118, 128105, 116, 117, 123-125 tabun, 75

Radford Army Ammunition Plant, 142 Tactical Operations System (TOS), 115, 120,Red River Army Depot, 49, 54, 88, 98, 115 121Redstone Arsenal, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 24, 40, Tactical Satellite Communications

41, 43, 47, 48, 68, 71, 75, 78, 88, 90, 91, (TACSATCOM), 34, 12093-95, 97, 113, 126, 129, 143, 148 Tandem Van de Graaf accelerator, 31

remote sensing chemical agent alarm Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM), 1, 4,(RSCAAL), 111 48, 49, 51

Rock Island Arsenal, 4, 40, 51, 68, 69, 71, 73, Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness88, 94, 115 Command (TARCOM), 48, 49, 54

Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 38 Tank-Automotive Research and DevelopmentRohm and Haas, 91, 93 Command (TARADCOM), 48, 49, 102Safeguard ABM system, 29, 56, 94, 102, 115, terminal guidance, 37, 105

131 Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), 4,Saginaw Army Aircraft Plant, 49 44, 45, 54, 55, 98, 111, 152sarin (GB), 17, 31, 42, 60, 73, 76, 78, 83, 84, Tobyhanna Army Depot, 142

87, 88, 143 Tooele Army Depot, 42, 87Satellite Communications Agency Transportation Corps, 39, 43, 151

(SATCOMA), 34, 117, 118, 120, 128 Trinity Site, 5, 32Seattle Chemical Plant, 42, 79 Tripartite Agreement, 7, 79Seneca Army Depot, 106 Troop Support And Aviation MaterielSentinel ABM System, 29, 131 Readiness Command (TSARCOM), 48, 49Sergeant missiles, 24, 26, 33, 47, 78, 94, 98, Troop Support Command (TROSCOM), 48, 49,

102 50Sharpe Army Depot, 56 tularemia, 26, 78, 81side looking airborne radar (SLAR), 124 unit COFT (UCOFT), 74Sierra Army Depot, 106 Vint Hill Farms Station, 125Signal Corps, 9, 13, 16-18, 39, 40, 42-44, 54, von Braun, Werhner, 16, 24, 126, 148

61, 62, 64, 65, 94, 108, 116, 119, 123, 124, Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory, 47126-128, 151 VX, 17, 26, 31, 42, 60, 73, 78, 79, 83, 84, 87,

Signal Corps Electronic Warfare Center, 43, 64 88, 141, 142Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, 16-18, Watertown Arsenal, 39, 40, 47, 48, 51, 62, 111,

43, 61, 64 115, 129Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL), 67, 125 Watervliet Arsenal, 23, 39, 40, 51, 88, 94, 100,soman (GD), 25, 26, 43, 76, 83, 126, 127, 129 102, 107, 143special atomic demolition munition (SADM), Weapons Command (WECOM), 22, 23, 40, 45,

38 46, 49-51, 152Springfield Armory, 40, 51 White Sands Missile Range, 5, 6, 9, 15, 24, 25,Sputnik, 19, 25, 126 35, 40, 43, 46, 47, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 68, 71,Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 29, 73, 88, 91, 93, 95-99, 107, 109, 111, 113,

68, 96 115, 126, 139Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 3, 26, 31, 36, wind tunnels, 15, 71, 91-93, 147

38, 60, 63, 127, 129-132 Woodbridge Research Facility, 47, 72Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Yuma Proving Ground, 37, 54, 125

(SDIO), 63, 129, 130 Zeus missiles, 47, 94, 98

APPENDIX AABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A-2

Many of these abbreviations and acronyms are used in this report, where they are also defined. They areincluded as an appendix not only for reference in the use of this report, but also for the use of historiansand others conducting future research at individual installations and facilities.

1 DOF—one-degree-of-freedom245T (also known as LN14)—an herbicide; 2, 4, 5 trichlorophenoxyacetic acidAACOMS—Army Area Communication SystemAAMA—Army ADVENT Management AgencyABLY—Atomic Burst Location and YieldABM—anti-ballistic missileABMA—Army Ballistic Missile AgencyAC—chemical warfare agent, compound name not knownAC&W—Aircraft Control and WarningACADA—Automatic Chemical Agent Detector AlarmACC—Army Chemical CenterACCS/CCS —Army Command Control System/Command Control Subordinate System2

ADEP—Asset Data Evaluation ProgramADP—automatic data processingADTA—Aviation Development Test ActivityAEF—American Expeditionary ForcesAEFA—Aviation Engineer Flight ActivityAFCRS—Armor Full Crew Research SimulatorAFDP—Army Force Development PlantAFSATCOM—Air Force Satellite Communications SystemAFSWP—Armed Forces Special Weapons ProjectAI—artificial intelligenceAID—Agency for International DevelopmentAIF—Army Industrial FundALMSA—Automated Logistics Management Systems AgencyALPHA—AMC Logistics Program Hardcore, AutomatedAMARC—Army Materiel Acquisition Review CommitteeAMBA—Army Ballistic Missile AgencyAMCCOM—Armament, Munitions, and Chemicals CommandAMCL—Advanced Materiel Concepts LaboratoryAMMRC—Army Materiel and Mechanics Research CenterAMP—Army Materiel PlanANAD—Anniston Army DepotAOMC—Army Ordnance Missile CommandAPC—Armored Personnel CarrierAPG—Aberdeen Proving GroundAPRF—Army Pulse Radiation FacilityAPSA—U.S. Army Ammunition Procurement ans Supply AgencyARADMAC—Aeronautical Depot Maintenance CenterARAP—Artillery Fired Atomic ProjectileARDC—Air Research and Development CommandARDC—Armament Research and Development CenterARDEC—Armament Research, Development and Engineering CenterARGMA—Army Rocket and Guided Missile AgencyARIA—EC-135N Advanced Range Instrumentation AircraftARL—Army Research LaboratoryARMCOM—Armament CommandARO—Army Research Office

A-3

ARPA—Advanced Research Project AgencyARRADCOM—U.S. Army Armament Research and Development CommandARRCOM—U.S. Army Armament Materiel Readiness CommandASARC—Army Systems Acquisition Review CouncilASCP—Army Strategic Capabilities PlanASE—Aircraft Survivability EquipmentsASL—Atmospheric Sciences LaboratoryASOD—approved Secretary of DefenseASP—Army Strategic PlanATAC—U.S. Army Tank-Automotive CommandATCOM—Aviation and Troop CommandATDA—Army Training Device AgencyATS—Abrams tank systemATSTB—Automated Tactical System Test BedAUTODIN—automatic digital networkAUTOSEVOCOM—Automatic Secure Voice CommunicationsAVCOM—Army Aviation CommandAVCOM—Aviation Materiel CommandAVRADCOM—Aviation Research and Development CommandAVSCOM—Army Aviation Systems CommandBAS—Battlefield Automated SystemsBASE—Basic Army Strategic EstimateBBC (or B.B.C.)— -bromobenzyl cyanide, a chemical warfare agentBCW—binary chemical warheadBE—Basic EncyclopediaBENET—Benet Weapons LaboratoryBESM—bystrodeistvuiushchaia elektronnaia schetnaia mashina (High- Speed Electronic Calculating

Machine)BFCF—Bigeye fill and close facilityBMD—Ballistic Missile DefenseBMEWS—Ballistic Missile Early Warning SystemBRC II—Battlefield Communications Review IIBRL—Ballistics Research LaboratoryBRLESC—Ballistic Research Laboratory’s Electronic Scientific ComputerBrown Board—Department of the Army Board of Inquiry on the Army Logistics SystemBWL—Benet Weapons LaboratoryBZ—3-quinuclidinyl benzilate, an incapacitating chemical warfare agentC-E—Communications-ElectronicsC —Command, Control, and Communications3

C I—Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence3

CAM—Chemical Agent MonitorCAMDS—Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal SystemCAMO-PAC—Central Ammunition Management Office-PacificCBDA—Chemical and Biological Defense AgencyCBDCOM—Chemical and Biological Defense CommandCBR—chemical, biological, and radiologicalCBU—cluster bomb unitCBW—chemical and biological warfareCCAD—Corpus Christi Army DepotCCIS—Command Control Information SystemCCIS-70—Command Control Information System-1970CCS —Command, Control and Subordinate System2

CCSS—Commodity Command Standard System

A-4

CDC—Command Developments CommandCDED—Combat Development Experimentation CommandCECOM—Communications and Electronics CommandCEM—combined effects munitionsCENCOMS—Center for Communications Systems CENSEI—Center for Systems Engineering and IntegrationCENTACS—Center for Tactical Computer SystemsCERCOM—Communications Electronics Materiel Readiness CommandCG—phosgeneCH POCl methyldichloro phosphine oxide3 2—

CIA—Central Intelligence AgencyCIES—Commander’s Information Executive SystemCK—cyanogen chlorideCml C MATCOM—Chemical Corps Materiel CommandCN—chloroacetophenone, a tear gasCOMSAT—Defense Communications SatelliteCOMSEC—communications securityCONAC—Continental Air CommandCONFOR—Concept and Force Design GroupCONUS—Continental United StatesCORADCOM—Communications Research and Development CommandCR—dibenz (b,f)-1,4-oxazepine, a tear gasCRDC—Chemical Research and Development CenterCRDEC—Chemical Research, Development and Engineering CenterCS—o-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, a tear gasCS-1—probably a variation of the chemical warfare agent code named CSCS-2—variation of the chemical warfare agent code named CSCS&TAL—Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition LaboratoryCSDA—Central System Design AgencyCSTA—Combat Surveillance Target Acquisition or Combat Systems Test ActivityCSTAL—Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition LaboratoryCTF—Communications Test FacilityCW—chemical weaponCW—continuous wave (electronics, electronic warfare)CW/BDR—chemical warfare/biological defense researchCWC—Chemical Weapons ConventionCWL—Chemical Warfare LaboratoriesDA—Department of the ArmyDACRO—Davy Crockett Weapon SystemDARCOM—U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness CommandDASA—Defense Atomic Support AgencyDC—methylphosphonic dichloride, also called di-chloroDC —Distributed Command, Control and Communications3

DCA—Defense Communications AgencyDCGMR—Deputy Command General for Materiel ReadinessDCL—Direct Communication LinkDCP—data collection platformDCP—Decision Coordinating PaperDCPA—Defense Civil Preparedness AgencyDCSLOG—Deputy Chief of Staff for LogisticsDDU—Dymaxion Deployment UnitDESCOM—Depot System CommandDEW Line—Distant Early Warning Line

A-5

DF—methylphosphoryldifluoride, one of the components of GB2, the binary form of nerve agent sarin(GB)

DFS—Digital Facsimile SystemDIA—Defense Intelligence AgencyDIL—Directorate for International LogisticsDIPEC—Defense Industrial Plant Equipment CenterDIPR—Department Industrial Plant ReserveDLA—Defense Logistics AgencyDMCC—Depot Maintenance Control CenterDMHP—di-methyl hydrogen phosphiteDMR—Digital Microwave RadioDoD—Department of DefenseDORF—Diamond Ordnance Reactor FacilityDOVAP—Doppler Velocity and Position SystemDPM—Defense Program MemorandumDRGS—Direct Readout Ground StationDSA—Defense Supply AgencyDSCP—Defense Satellite Communications ProgramDSS—Direct Support SystemDT/OT—development test/operational testDTC—Ditto Technical CenterDU—depleted uraniumDYNTACS—Dynamic Tactical SimulatorE-O—electro-opticalEA 1298—a derivative of mescaline developed at Edgewood ArsenalEA1356—a chemical warfare agent developed at Edgewood ArsenalEA3534—a chemical warfare agent developed at Edgewood ArsenalEA 4923—a volatile liquid irritant developed at Edgewood ArsenalEA-APG—Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving GroundEASTT—Experimental Army Satellite Tactical TerminalECCM—electronic counter-countermeasuresECM—electronic countermeasuresECOM—U.S. Army Electronics CommandEDL—Electronic Defense LaboratoryEDMP—ethyl 2-(diisopropylamino)—ethylmethylphosphoniteEDVAC—Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic ComputerELINT—electronic intelligenceEM-pulse—electromagnetic pulseEMC—electromagnetic compatibilityEMETF—Electromagnetic Environmental Test FacilityEMI—Electromagnetic InterferenceEML—Electro-Mechanical LaboratoriesEMP—electromagnetic pulseEMRH—electromagnetic radiation hazardEMRO—electromagnetic radiation operationalEMV—electromagnetic vulnerabilityENIAC—Electronic Numerical Integrator, Analyzer, and ComputerENSURE—Expediting Nonstandard Urgent Requirements for EquipmentEOD—Explosive Ordnance DisposalEP—earth penetratorERADCOM—Electronics Research and Development CommandERCS—Emergency Rocket Communications SystemERDL—Engineer Research and Development Laboratory

A-6

ESD—electrostatic dischargeETDL—Electronics Technology and Devices LaboratoryEW/RSTA—Electronic Warfare/Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target AcquisitionEWI&C—Electronic Warfare, Intelligence and CommunicationsEWIS—Electronic Warfare Information SystemEWL—Electronic Warfare LaboratoryFAAD—Forward Area Air DefenseFABMDS—Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense SystemFADAC—Field Artillery Digital Automatic ComputerFAS—Fire Support Aerial SystemFCDED—Fire Control Development and Engineering DirectorateFDL—Flight Determination LaboratoryFEMA—Federal Emergency Management AgencyFM—a screening smokeFMC Corporation—Food Machinery and Chemical CorporationFORSCOM—Forces CommandFOTL—follow-on-to-LanceFS—a screening smokeFSA—Field Support ActivityG agent—American nomenclature for a series of nerve agents that includes tabun (GA), sarin (GB), and

soman (GD)GA—a nerve agent called tabun, or O-ethyl dimethylamidophosphorylcyanideGADES—Gun Air Defense Effectiveness StudyGamma Linac—Gamma Linear Electron AcceleratorGAO—Government Accounting OfficeGB—a nerve agent called sarin, or isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridateGB—isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate, or sarinGB-2—binary form of GB (sarin), composed of methylphosphoryldifluoride (DF) and isopropanolGD—a nerve agent called soman, or pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridateGD—pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate, or somanGD-2—binary form of GD (soman), composed of methylphosphoryldifluorid (DF) and pinacolylalcoholGF—a nerve agent, cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridateGF—cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate, GLAD—grenade launcher attachable deviceGLCM—Ground-Launched Cruise MissileGMFS—Ground Mobile Forces Satellite CommunicationsGMFSC—Ground Mobile Forces Satellite CommunicationsGOCO—Government-owned, Contractor-operatedGOGO—Government-owned, Government-operatedGPS—Global Positioning SystemGSA—General Services AdministrationGSE—ground support equipmentGWEN—Ground Wave Emergency NetworkH—normal mustard agent, bis-(2-chloroethyl)sulphideHN—nitrogen mustard chemical warfare agentHADC—Holloman Air Development CenterHC—a screening smokeHCPE—hybrid collective protection equipmentHD—distilled mustard gasHDL—Harry Diamond LaboratoriesHEL—High Energy LaserHEL—U.S. Human Engineering LaboratoryHELSTF—Tri-Service High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility

A-7

HF—high-frequencyHMMWV—High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled VehicleHMX—high melt explosiveHowze Board—Army Tactical Mobility Requirements BoardHPRR—Health Physics Research ReactorHT—thickened mustardIBPF—Integrated Binary Production FacilityICAMR—Interdepartmental Committee of Applied Meteorological ResearchICBM—intercontinental ballistic missileIDSCS—initial defense satellite communications systemIEW—intelligence and electronic warfareIFF—identification friend or foeIFFN—identification friend, foe, or neutralIGOR—Intercept Ground Optical RecorderIGY—International Geophysical YearILLIAC—Illinois Automatic ComputerIMDSO—Intelligence Materiel Development and Support OfficeIMP—Instrumentation Master Plan ProgramINBASS—Indirect Nuclear Bomb Assessment Surveillance SystemINF Treaty—Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces TreatyINSBD—Intelligence and Security BoardIOC—Industrial Operations CommandIOC—Initial Operating Capability (proposed early SDI deployment)IPE—industrial plant equipmentIPT—initial production testIR—infraredIRBM—intermediate-range ballistic missileIVA—Integrated Vulnerability AssessmentJATO—jet-assisted take-off engineJCS—Joint Chiefs of StaffJMPTC—Joint Military Packaging Training CenterJPL—Jet Propulsion LaboratoryJSOP—Joint Strategic Objectives PlanJSPC—Joint Strategic Plans CommitteeJSTPS—Joint Strategic Target Planning StaffJTIDS—Joint Tactical Information Distribution SystemL—lewisite, or dichloro 2-chlorovinylarsine, a chemical warfare agentLABCOM—U.S. Army Laboratory Commandlaser—optical maser, light amplification by stimulated emission of radiationLCC—launch control centerLDB—Logistics Data BaseLEAD—Letterkenny Army DepotLES-5—Lincoln Experimental SatelliteLIR—Laboratory for Insulation ResearchLLNO—Low-Level Night OperationsLN14 (see also known as 245T)—an herbicide; 2, 4, 5 trichlorophenoxyacetic acidLN33—an herbicide; isopropyl N-phenolcarbonateLN8—an herbicide; 2, 4 dichlorophenoxyacetic acidLOH—Light Observation Helicopter (name changed to Cayuse in 1967)LPA—launch pod assemblyLSCESP—Life Support Chemical Equipment Surveillance ProgramLSD—lysergic acid diethylamideM-DOF—multiple-degree-of-freedom

A-8

MAIDS—Multipurpose Automatic Inspection and Diagnostic Systemmaser—microwave amplification by stimulated emission of radiationMASSTER—Modern Army Selected Systems Test Evaluation and ReviewMATCOM—Chemical Corps Material CommandMBC—meteor burst communicationsmc—megacycleMCA—Military Construction, ArmyMCC—Military Co-operation CommitteeMCF—Military Computer FamilyMDLC—U.S. Army Materiel Development and Logistics CommandMEC—Mobility Equipment CenterMECOM—Mobility Equipment CommandMEECN—Minimum Essential Emergency Communications NetworkMegatron—Mega-gauss betatronMERADCOM—Mobility Equipment Research and Development CommandMERDC—Mobility Equipment Research and Development CenterMERDL—Mobility Equipment Research and Development LaboratoryMet Team—Meteorological TeamMEV—million electron voltsMHE—Materiels Handling EquipmentMICOM—Missile CommandMIDA—Major Item Data AgencyMIDP—major item distribution planMILES—Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement SystemMIRADCOM—Missile Research and Development CommandMIRAN—Missile Ranging SystemMIRCOM—Missile Materiel Readiness CommandMIRV—multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicleMISMA—Major Item Supply Management AgencyMIT—Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyMLR—Multiple Launch RocketMLRS—Multiple Launch Rocket SystemMOBIDIC—mobile digital computerMOCOM—Mobility CommandMOLINK—Direct Communications Link between Washington and MoscowMOMS III—Meteorological-Optical Measuring SystemMPBME—Munitions Production Base Modernization and ExpansionMRBM—medium-range ballistic missileMRN—Meteorological Rocket NetworkMTL—Materials Technology LaboratoryMUCOM—Munitions CommandN—code name for anthraxNACS—Northern Area Communications SystemNAEDS—Non-aqueous Equipment Decontamination SystemNAPALM—National Automatic Data Processing Program for AMC Logistics ManagementNARADCOM—Natick Research and Development CommandNAS—National Academy of SciencesNASA—National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationNAST—Navy ADVENT Shipboard TerminalNATO—North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNBC—Nuclear, Biological and ChemicalNBCRS—NBC Reconnaissance SystemNCAD—New Cumberland Army Depot

A-9

NCP—Newport Chemical PlantNCTR—National Center for Toxicological ResearchNDSS—Nuclear Detonation Detection SystemNET—New Equipment TrainingNICP—National Inventory Control PointNIPR—National Industrial Plant ReserveNLABS—Natick LaboratoriesNMP—National Maintenance PointsNN—a chemical warfare agentNORAD—North American Air Defense CommandNQ—nitroguanidineNRC—Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNRL—Naval Research LaboratoryNSC—National Security CouncilNSTL—National Space Technology LaboratoriesNTB—National Target BaseNTEC—Naval Training Equipment CenterNTF—Network Test FacilityNUWAX—nuclear weapon accident exerciseNVEO—Night Vision and Electro-OpticNVEOL—Night Vision and Electro-Optics LaboratoryNWER—Nuclear Weapons Effects ResearchOASIS Program—Ownership and Accountability of Selected Secondary Items in Supply ProgramOCCIS—Operations Command and Control Information SystemOGMS—Ordnance Guided Missile SchoolOMA—operation and maintenance, ArmyOMEW—Office of Missile Electronic WarfareOMT—Office of Manufacturing TechnologyOPA—Other Procurement, ArmyOPCW—Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical WeaponsOPO—Office of Personnel OperationsOQMG—Office of the Quartermaster GeneralORDCIT—Army Ordnance Department and California Institute of Technology rocket development programORDVAC—Ordnance Variable Automatic ComputerOSD—Office of the Secretary of DefenseOSWAC—Ordnance Special Weapons-Ammunition CommandOTEA—Operational Test and Evaluation AgencyOWC—Ordnance Weapons CommandPARCS—Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization SystemPAS—Primary Alerting SystemPDM/FM—Pulse Duration Modulation/Frequency ModulationPDW—Phosphate Development WorksPEMA—Procurement of Missiles and Equipment, ArmyPEO—Program Executive OfficePIa—Pershing IaPIb—Pershing IbPII—Pershing IIPJBD—Permanent Joint Board on DefensePJH—PLRS/JTIDS HybridPlato—Programmed Logic for Automatic Teaching OperationsPLRS—Position Location Reporting SystemPM/NUC—Project Manager for Nuclear MunitionsPNL—Prescribed Nuclear Load

A-10

POTMC—protective outfit, toxicological, microclimate controlledPPM/AM—Pulse Phase Modulation/Amplitude ModulationPPMO—PERSHING Program Managers’ OfficePRON—procurement request order numberPS—chemical warfare agentPWP—plasticized white phosphorusQF—ethyl 2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphoniteQL—O-ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite, one of the components of VX-2, the binary

form of nerve agent VXQRA—quick reaction alertQRC—quick reaction capabilityRADAR—Radio Detection and RangingRADINT—Radar IntelligenceRAP—rocket-assisted projectileRCAF—Royal Canadian Air ForceRDTE—Research, Development, Test, and EvaluationRE&E—Research, Development and EngineeringRFP—Request for ProposalRIF—reparable item fileRIK—Radio Installation KitRMA—Rocky Mountain ArsenalROCC—Region Operations Control CenterRPT—reference test pointRPWPU—reverse osmosis water purifying unitRRAD—Red River Army DepotRSCAAL—remote sensing chemical agent alarmSAC—U.S. Army Security Assistance CenterSADARM—Sense and Destroy ArmySADM—special atomic demolition munitionSAF—safing, arming and fuzingSAFLOG—Army Safeguard Logistics CommandSAGE—Semi-Automatic Ground EnvironmentSALT—Strategic Arms Limitation TalksSAM—Surface-to-Air MissileSAM-D—Surface-to-Air Missile DevelopmentSANATOR—Lightweight Decontamination System, M17SATCOM—Satellite Communications AgencySATCOM System—U.S. Army Satellite Communications SystemSATCOMA—Satellite Communications AgencySATE—Study of Army Test and EvaluationSCEL—Signal Corps Engineering LaboratoriesSCGDL—Signal Corps General Development LaboratoriesSCGS—Signal Corps Ground ServiceSCORE—Signal Communications via Orbiting Relay ExperimentSCORE I—Signal Communications Orbit Repeater ExperimentSDDM—Secretary of Defense Decision MemorandumSDI—Strategic Defense InitiativeSDIO—strategic defense initiative organizationSDK—skin decontaminating kitSEA—Southeast Asia SEMIRAD—Secondary-Electron Mixed-Radiation DosimeterSHF—super high frequencySI—code name for the biological warfare agent using psittacosis

A-11

SIDTC—Single Integrated Development Test CycleSIGINT—Signal IntelligenceSIMILE—Simulation of ILLIAC ExactlySINCGARS—Single Channel Ground And Airborne Radio SystemSIOP—Single Integrated Operational PlanSLAR—side looking airborne radarSLEP—Service Life Extension ProgramSLFCS—Survivable Low Frequency Communications SystemSMC—Supply and Maintenance CommandSMES—superconductive magnetic energy storageSMS—Strategic Missile SquadronSMS—Synchronous Meteorological SatelliteSNN—Standard Study NumberingSOSUS—Sound Surveillance SystemSPEED (or Project SPEED)—system-wide project for electronic equipment at depotsSPEEDEX (or Project SPEEDEX)—system-wide project for electronic equipment at depots, extendedSPRF—Sandia Pulsed Reactor FacilitySRTS—Short Range Thermal SightSTAAS—Surveillance and Target Acquisition Aircraft SystemSTANO—Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Night ObservationSTARCOM—Strategic Army Communications SystemSTRAMS—Strategic Missile StudySTRICOM—Simulation Training and Inspection CommandSURVIVALAB—survivability assessment capabilitySW—methyl phosphorus dichlorideSWL—Signals Warfare LaboratorySYNCOM—synchronized satellite communications systemT&E—Test and EvaluationTAC—Tank-Automotive CenterTACMS—Army Tactical Missile SystemTACOM—Tank-Automotive CommandTACSATCOM—Tactical Satellite CommunicationsTARADCOM—Tank-Automotive Research and Development CommandTARC—the Army research CouncilTARCOM—Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness CommandTASAMS—The Army Supply and Maintenance SystemTASMS—The Army Supply and Maintenance StudyTASS—Tactical Avionics System SimulatorTC—Transportation CorpsTCATA—TRADOC Combined Arms Test ActivityTCS—Tactical Computer SystemTCT—Tactical Computer TerminalTDBMS—Tactical Data Base Management systemTDI—Target Data InventoryTDLR—Training Device Letter of RequirementsTDMA—time division multiple accessTEAD—Tooele Army DepotTEAD-S—Tooele Army Depot-South AreaTEAMUP—Test Evaluation Analysis and Management Uniformity PlanTECOM—U.S. Army Test and Evaluation CommandTEPW—Tactical Earth Penetrating WeaponsTERCOM—terrain contour matchingTGW—terminal guidance warhead

A-12

TIIF—Tactical Imagery Interpretation FacilityTILO—Technical Industrial Liaison OfficeTIROS—Television Infra Red Observational SatelliteTMDE—test, measurement and diagnostic equipmentTOFC—Trailer-on-a-flat-carTOS—Tactical Operations SystemTOS —TOS Operable Segment2—

TOW—tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guidedTRADE—Training DevicesTRADER—Training Device Requirement officeTRADOC—Army Training and Doctrine CommandTREE—Transient Radiation Effects on ElectronicsTRI-TAC—Joint Tactical CommunicationsTROSCOM—Troop Support CommandTSARCOM—Troop Support And Aviation Materiel Readiness CommandTSC—Training Support CenterTTS—Tank Thermal SightTVA—Tennessee Valley AuthorityUCOFT—unit COFTUL—code name for the biological warfare agent using tularemiaUMDA—Umatilla Depot ActivityUN—United NationsUNICOM—Universal Integrated Communications SystemUS—code name for the biological warfare agent using brucellosisUSACMDA—U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction AgencyUSACSA—U.S. Army Communications Systems AgencyUSAEL—U.S. Army Electronics LaboratoriesUSAEPG—U.S. Army Electronic Proving GroundUSAILCOM—U.S. Army International Logistics CommandUSALMC—U.S. Army Logistics Management CenterUSAMC—U.S. Army Materiel CommandUSAMCC—U.S. Army Meteorology and Calibration CenterUSAMETA—U.S. Army Management Engineering Training AgencyUSAREUR—U.S. Army, EuropeUSASAC—U.S. Army Security Affairs CommandUSASAC—U.S. Army Security Assistance CommandUSASATCOMA—United States Army Satellite Communications AgencyUSASCRDL—U.S. Army Signal Corps Research Development LaboratoryUSASRDL—U.S. Army Signal Research and Development LaboratoryUSASTRATCOM—U.S. Army Strategic Communications Systems CommandVAL—Vulnerability Assessment LaboratoryVCSA—Vice Chief of Staff, ArmyVHF—very-high-frequencyVHSIC—Very High Speed Integrated CircuitVIGS—Videodisc Gunnery SimulatorVX—a nerve agent, O-ethyl S-diisopropylaminomethyl methylphosphonothiolateVX-2—binary form of nerve agent VX, composed of O-ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl

methylphosphonite (QL) and sulphurWACS—White Alice Communications SystemWECOM—Weapons CommandWHS—warhead sectionWP—white phosphorusWRF—Woodbridge Research Facility

A-13

WSA-BRL—White Sands Annex - Ballistic Research LaboratoriesWSMR—White Sands Missile RangeWSSCA—White Sands Signal Corps AgencyWWMCCS—Worldwide Military Command and Control SystemsWWSSN—Worldwide Standardized Seismograph NetworkXM785—155mm Nuclear Projectile

APPENDIX BAMC COLD WAR INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES

B-2

INTRODUCTION

The first of the two tables in this appendix, Table B-1, includes much of the information gathered during thecurrent research project regarding the locations of AMC and related Technical Service activities that tookplace during the Cold War. Since this table is based on the name of the facilities or offices at which theactivities took place, a cross reference listing all the facilities by state and city has been provided in TableB-2. This table was compiled because some of the installations, facilities, and activities occurred at the samephysical location under different names. Organization by city will help relate such facilities during futureresearch concerning individual installations.

The information in Table B-1 was compiled primarily from AMC directories listing the command’s variousoffices and facilities, supplemented by lists from other sources. The table includes many installations andfacilities that are no longer in the AMC inventory, as well as some locations at installations that do notbelong to the Army. These activities, such as the Airworthiness Qualification Test Directorate at EdwardsAir Force Base, are listed to present the overall scope of AMC operations so that the significance ofoperations at AMC facilities can be assessed more accurately. The table includes a complete list of allinstallations and facilities transferred to the AMC in 1962, when the Technical Services were discontinued,and what should be a complete list of AMC facilities in 1992 (marked with *). However, even though anumber of documents for the intervening years were consulted, the table may not include all activities thatwere initiated and concluded during the years between 1962 and 1992. Although all of the installations,facilities, and activities in this table are directly or indirectly associated with the AMC, not all have carriedout missions that convey the significance of the AMC during the Cold War. As with the AMC activities atnon-Army installations, the facilities and activities of lesser importance have been included here to betterpresent the overall scope of AMC undertakings during the Cold War era, as is proper for this historic context.Titles set in bold type indicate that the facility or activity was of greater importance.

Up to four subheadings for each installation or facility are shown in Table B-1—missions and capabilities,associated Technical Services, associated AMC subcommands, and facilities and activities. The missionsand capabilities section lists only data that were definitely identified with the activity in the various sourcesas a primary activity at that facility. Associated Technical Services lists the technical services that areknown or very likely to have conducted activities at that facility. For example, it can be assumed that theBlack Hills Ordnance Depot was associated with Ordnance Department storage activities. If no associatedTechnical Service is listed, the facility or activity may not have been initiated prior to 1962. AssociatedAMC subcommands lists only subcommands with which a definite association was located. Some alsoreported directly to AMC headquarters. The last section lists major facilities and activities. These includenot only activities that were important to overall AMC operations but also activities that were important atthe installation.

B-3

Table B-1Army Cold War Installations, Facilities, and Activities

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND* Aberdeen, MarylandMajor missions and capabilities—chemical, biological, and nuclear research, development, limited

production, testing; survivabilityAssociated Technical Services—Chemical Corps, Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Corps,

Surgeon GeneralAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, ARMCOM, ARRADCOM, LABCOM, MUCOM,

TECOM, TROSCOM, othersMajor facilities and activities—

Army Chemical Center Chemical Corps Nuclear Defense LaboratoryAmos A. Fries Laboratory Edgewood Arsenal ActivityArmy Pulse Radiation Facility Human EngineeringLaboratories*Army Ballistics Research Laboratory Materiel Systems Analysis Activity*Army Radiation Control Team MUCOMcommoditycenter for chemical and biologicalArmy Research and DevelopmentCenter munitions at Edgewood ArsenalChemical Research, Development and MUCOM’s Chemical-Biological-Radiological AgencyEngineering Center (also called Chemical headquartersSystems Laboratory and Chemical Research and Nuclear Defense LaboratoryDevelopmentCenter) Ordnance Assembly PlantChemicalResearchand DevelopmentLaboratory Small Arms Systems AgencyChemical-Biological-RadiologicalAgency TECOM headquarters*Chemical Corps EngineeringCommand Test and Evaluation Command headquarters

Wound Ballistics Laboratory

ADELPHI LABORATORY CENTER* (HarryDiamond Laboratories main laboratory)

Adelphi, Maryland

Major missions and capabilities—nuclear research, missile guidance and control systems, missile fuzingAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC acquisitionAssociated AMC subcommands—LABCOM, probably othersMajor facilities and activities—

Aurora Simulator LABCOM headquarters

ALABAMA ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Childersburg, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—propellant, explosives, and ammunition productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

ALAMEDA ANNEX Alameda, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster Corps

ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT* Anniston, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—storage (including chemical agents), maintenance, missile storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

B-4

Table B-1 (cont’d)

ARLINGTON HALL STATION Arlington, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—intelligence-related researchAssociated Technical Services—Chemical Corps, Ordnance Department, Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Army Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency Army Ordnance Technology Intelligence AgencyArmy Intelligence and Security Command Army Signal Intelligence Agencyheadquarters Defense Intelligence Agency

ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Washington, D.C.

Major missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activityMajor facilities and activities—probably administrative

ARMY CHEMICAL PROCUREMENTDISTRICT, NEW YORK New York, New YorkAssociated Technical Services—Chemical Corps

ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS PROCUREMENTDISTRICT, SAN FRANCISCO San Francisco, CaliforniaAssociated Technical Services—Chemical Corps

ARMY COLD REGIONS RESEARCH LABORATORY Hanover, New HampshireMajor missions and capabilities—technology base researchAssociated Technical Services—Corps of EngineersAssociated AMC subcommands—probably MOCOM, TACOMMajor facilities and activities—cold temperature effects research

ARMY DESERT TEST CENTER Salt Lake City, UtahMajor missions and capabilities—chemical agents testing and evaluationAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—chemical agents testing and evaluation

ARMY ELECTRONICS RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Adelphi, Maryland

Major missions and capabilities—electronics-related research and developmentAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—ERADCOMMajor facilities and activities—electronics-related research and development

B-5


ARMY ENGINEER PROCUREMENTOFFICE Chicago, IllinoisAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers

ARMY ENGINEER SUPPLY CONTROL OFFICE St. Louis, MissouriAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers

ARMY ENGINEER MAINTENANCECENTER Columbus, OhioAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers

ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND FIRING RANGE Underhill, VermontAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—WECOM

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, BIRMINGHAM Birmingham, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, BOSTON Boston, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, CHICAGO Chicago, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, CINCINNATI Cincinnati, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, CLEVELAND Cleveland, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

B-6


ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, DETROIT Detroit, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, LOS ANGELES Pasadena, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, NEW YORK New York, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, PHILADELPHIA Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, SAN FRANCISCO San Francisco, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY ORDNANCE DISTRICT, ST. LOUIS St. Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—probably administrativeAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

ARMY PICTORIAL CENTER Long Island City, New York

ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE* Research Triangle Park, North CarolinaAssociated AMC subcommands—LABCOM

ARMY SIGNAL AVIONICS FIELD OFFICE St. Louis, MissouriAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

B-7


ARMY SIGNAL CORPS INSPECTOR GENERAL, FIELD Upper Darby, PennsylvaniaOFFICE, NO. 1

Associated Technical Services—Signal Corps

ARMY SIGNAL CORPS INSPECTOR GENERAL, FIELD Chicago, IllinoisOFFICE, NO. 2Associated Technical Services—Signal Corps

ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY AGENCY Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaAssociated Technical Services—Signal Corps

ARMY SUPPORT CENTER Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster Corps

ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS Richmond, VirginiaAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster Corps

ARMY TRAINING DEVICE AGENCY (TRADE) Orlando, FloridaMajor missions and capabilities—basic researchAssociated Technical Services—Corps of EngineersAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

ARMY TRANSPORTATIONAVIATION FIELD OFFICE Washington, D.C.Associated Technical Services—Transport Corps

ARMY TRANSPORTATIONFREIGHT CONSOLIDATINGSTATION Granite City, IllinoisAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

ARMY TRANSPORTATION MATERIEL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS St. Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—coordinate supplies of transportation equipmentAssociated Technical Services—Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

B-8


ARMY TRANSPORTATION AERONAUTICAL DEPOT MAINTENANCE CENTER Corpus Christi, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—aviation-related equipment storage and maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM

ARMY TRANSPORTATIONINTELLIGENCEAGENCY Washington, D.C.Associated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

ARMY TRANSPORTATIONTERMINAL COMMAND Seattle, WashingtonMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

ATCHISON ORDNANCE STORAGE FACILITY Atchison, KansasMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—WECOM

ATLANTA ARMY DEPOT Forest Park, GeorgiaMajor missions and capabilities—storage and maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers, Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army Engineer Depot MaintenanceShop

AUBURN DEPOT ACTIVITY Auburn, WashingtonMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster Corps

AVIATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS St. Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC organizationAssociated AMC subcommands—AVRADCOM

AVIATION SYSTEMS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS* St. Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM

B-9


BADGER ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Baraboo, WisconsinMajor missions and capabilities—explosives productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

in 1989, considered for location of superconductivemagnetic energy storage (SMES) facility

BEAVER ARMY TERMINAL Clatskanie, OregonMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

BELVOIR FUELS AND LUBRICANTS RESEARCH FACILITY* San Antonio, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—petroleum-related researchAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

BENICIA ARSENAL Benicia, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department

BENICIA CEMETERY* Benicia, CaliforniaAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

BIRDSBORO ORDNANCE STEEL FOUNDRY AND BIRDSBORO ARMYTANK-AUTOMOTIVE STEEL FOUNDRY

Birdsboro, Pennsylvania

Major missions and capabilities—steel productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

BLACK HILLS ORDNANCE DEPOT Igloo, South DakotaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known, no longer active

BLOSSOM POINT FIELD TEST FACILITY* (HARRY DIAMOND LABORATORIES) Blossom Point, MarylandMajor missions and capabilities—testing for Harry Diamond LaboratoriesAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—LABCOM

B-10


BOSTON ARMY BASE Boston, MassachusettsAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsMajor facilities and activities—

QuartermsterActivities

BROOKLYN ARMY TERMINAL Brooklyn, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

BURLINGTON ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT Burlington, New JerseyMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—MUCOM

CAMERON STATION Alexandria, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—supply logisticsAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Defense Logistics Agency

CAMP LEROY JOHNSON New Orleans, LouisianaAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

CAMP ROBERTS San Miguel, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—satellite communications-related activitiesAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

CAMP ROBERTS ANNEX Paso Robles, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—communications-related activitiesAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

CAMP STANLEY STORAGE ACTIVITY* San Antonio, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

B-11


CATOOSA RIFLE RANGE Chattanooga, TennesseeMajor missions and capabilities—testing and evaluation

CHARLES MELVIN PRICE SUPPORT CENTER* Granite City, IllinoisAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM

Charleston Army Depot North Charleston, South CarolinaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

CHARLOTTE ORDNANCE MISSILE PLANT Charlotte, North CarolinaMajor missions and capabilities—missile- and rocket-related productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

CHICAGO ORDNANCE PLANT Chicago, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—electronic components productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

CLEVELAND ARMY TANK-AUTOMOTIVE PLANT Cleveland, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—tank and automotive productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—WECOM

CLEVELANDORDNANCE DISTRICT INDUSTRIALSTORAGE ACTIVITY Warren, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

COLD SPRINGS BATTERY PLANT Cold Springs, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—battery productionAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-12


COLUMBUS GENERAL DEPOT Columbus, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

QuartermasterCorps Equipment and Parts Commodity Center

COOSA RIVER STORAGE ANNEX* Talledega, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

CORAOPOLIS ORDNANCE STEEL FOUNDRY AND CORAOPOLISARMY TANK-AUTOMOTIVE STEEL FOUNDRY

Coraopolis, Pennsylvania

Major missions and capabilities—steel productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

CORNHUSKER ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Grand Island, NebraskaMajor missions and capabilities—projectile productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

probable headquarters for Strategic Air Command emergency relocation team (the definite location is not public knowledge)

CORPUS CHRISTI ARMY DEPOT* Corpus Christi, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—storage, distribution, and maintenance of aviation equipmentAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

CRANE ARMY AMMUNITIONACTIVITY* Crane, IndianaAssociated Technical Services—none, Navy facility until 1977Associated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

DEFENSE AMMUNITIONCENTER AND SCHOOL* Savanna, IllinoisAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

DEFENSE CONSTRUCTIONSUPPLY CENTER* Columbus, OhioAssociated AMC subcommands—Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Supply Agency (DSA)

B-13


DEFENSE DEPOT OGDEN* Ogden, UtahAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTIONREGION EAST* New Cumberland, PennsylvaniaAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTIONREGION WEST,* SHARPE SITE Lathrop, CaliforniaAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTIONREGION WEST* Stockton, CaliforniaAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTIONREGION CENTRAL* Memphis, TennesseeAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEFENSE GENERAL SUPPLY CENTER* Richmond, VirginiaAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA, DSA

DEFENSE INDUSTRIALPLANT EQUIPMENT CENTER* Memphis, TennesseeAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaAssociated AMC subcommands—DSA

DEFENSE PLANT REPRESENTATIVE’S OFFICE, BOEING HELICOPTER* Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEFENSE PLANT REPRESENTATIVE’S OFFICE, BELL HELICOPTER* Fort Worth, TexasAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA

DEPOT SYSTEM COMMAND (DESCOM) HEADQUARTERS* Chambersburg, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

B-14


DESERET DEPOT ACTIVITY St. John, UtahMajor missions and capabilities—storage (including chemical munitions)Associated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—TECOM

DETROIT ARSENAL ACRES* Warren, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—provide housingAssociated Technical Services—none, acquired 1961 from NavyAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

DETROIT ARSENAL AND TANK PLANT* Warren, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—tank and tank component research and developmentAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—MOCOM, TACOMMajor facilities and activities—

MOCOM headquarters TACOM headquarters

DETROIT ORDNANCE DISTRICT INDUSTRIALSTORAGE ACTIVITY Fort Custer, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department

DIAMOND ORDNANCE FUZE LABORATORIES (in the NationalBureau of Standards building until 1969—see also HarryDiamond Laboratories)

Washington, D.C.

Major missions and capabilities—fuze research and development, nuclear effects researchAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—LABCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Diamond Ordnance Reactor Facility (DORF)

DICKSON GUN PLANT Houston, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—gun tube productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

DIRECTORATE OF INTERNATIONALLOGISTICS Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—logistics administration

B-15


DUGWAY PROVING GROUND* Dugway, UtahMajor missions and capabilities—chemical and biological weapons testing and evaluation, nuclear

effects research, various proving ground activitiesAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Deseret Test Center part of the Utah Test and Training Rangeextensive chemical and biological test facilities Research and DevelopmentTest Center

EAST CHICAGO ORDNANCE STEEL FOUNDRY East Chicago, IndianaMajor missions and capabilities—tank and automotive productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE Edwards Air Force Base, CaliforniaAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM, TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

AirworthinessQualificationTest Directorate*

ERIE ORDNANCE DEPOT Port Clinton, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department

ERIE PROVING GROUND Port Clinton, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—various proving ground activities, testing and evaluationAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department

ETHAN ALLEN FIRING RANGE* Burlington, VermontMajor missions and capabilities—testing and evaluationAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

FAIRBANKS PERMAFROSTSTATION Fairbanks, AlaskaMajor missions and capabilities—cold environment testing

FIELD SAFETY ACTIVITY* Charlestown, Indiana

B-16


FORT BELVOIR Alexandria, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—nuclear and chemical weapons development, nuclear weapons physical

security equipment development, mapping activities, proving ground activities, night vision equipmentresearch and development

Associated Technical Services—Corps of EngineersAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, ECOM, ERADCOM, TROSCOM, othersMajor facilities and activities—

Army Engineer Center and School EngineeringResearch and DevelopmentLaboratoriesArmy Engineer TopographicLaboratories Engineers Proving GroundArmy Engineer Research and Development Engineers Test UnitLaboratories MobilityEquipment Research and DevelopmentCenterArmy Nuclear and Chemical Agency Mobility Equipment Research and DevelopmentArmy Polar Research and DevelopmentCenter Command headquartersBelvoirResearchand DevelopmentCenter/ Mobility Night Vision and Electro-OpticsDirectorate*Equipment Research and Development Command Night Vision Laboratoryheadquarters Polar Research and DevelopmentCenterElectronics Command Laboratory

FORT BENNING Fort Benning, GeorgiaAssociated AMC subcommands—TRADOCMajor facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office* Training Device RequirementOffice (TRADER)

FORT BLISS El Paso, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—missile research and development, trainingAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department, Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—variousMajor facilities and activities—

Air Defense Center and School (NATO Nike Logistics Assistance Office*Hercules Main School) Ordnance Department Research and DevelopmentArmy antiaircraft ranges Division Sub-office Rocket location

FORT BRAGG Fort Bragg, North CarolinaMajor facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office, 82nd ABN Division* Logistics Assistance Office, (East) XVIIIth AirborneCorps*

FORT CAMPBELL Fort Campbell, KentuckyMajor facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office*

FORT CARSON Fort Carson, ColoradoMajor facilities and activities—


B-17


FORT CHAFFEE Fort Smith, ArkansasMajor missions and capabilities—research and development

FORT DETRICK Fredrick, MarylandMajor missions and capabilities—biological weapons research and development, hub for Washington

satellite communicationsAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army East Coast TelecommunicationsCenter primary biological weapons research centerMoscow-WashingtonDirect CommunicationsLink

FORT DEVENS Fort Devens, MassachusettsMajor facilities and activities—


FORT DRUM Watertown, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—Strategic Air Command bomber training rangeMajor facilities and activities—


FORT EUSTIS Newport News, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—aviation-related researchAssociated Technical Services—Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AVCOM, AVSCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army TransportationResearch Command Aviation Research and Technology Activity*Aviation Materiel Laboratories Logistics Assistance Office*

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE Baltimore, MarylandMajor missions and capabilities—signals receipt for intelligence activities, responsible for nuclear

weapons release and control codesAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, othersMajor facilities and activities—

Army Signal Air Defense EngineeringAgency Logistics Assistance Office*Intelligence Materiel Activity* National Security Agency

FORT GILLEM Forest Park, GeorgiaMajor facilities and activities—

Security Support Activity*

B-18


FORT GORDON Fort Gordon, GeorgiaMajor facilities and activities—


FORT GREELY Fairbanks, AlaskaMajor missions and capabilities—cold environment testing (possibly including chemical weapons)Associated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army Chemical Corps Arctic Test Activity Researchand DevelopmentTest Center/ArcticTrainingArmy Cold Regions Test Center Center

FORT HOLABIRD Fort Holabird, MarylandAssociated AMC subcommands—ECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Electronic Warfare Laboratory

FORT HOOD Fort Hood, TexasMajor facilities and activities—

AMC Liaison Office, Test Experiment Command* Field Support Activity for Modern Army SelectedLogistics Assistance Office, Central* Systems Test Evaluation and review (MASSTER)

FORT HUACHUCA Sierra Vista, ArizonaMajor missions and capabilities—communications and electronic equipment research and development,

engineering, and testing (including surveillance equipment)Associated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, ECOM, TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Communications, Command, and Intelligence Electronic Proving Ground*School Information Systems Command headquartersCommunicationsCommand headquarters Logistics Assistance Office*CommunicationsSecurity Logistics Activity* Signal Corps Electronic Warfare Center

FORT HUNTER LIGGETT Jolon, CaliforniaMajor facilities and activities—

Combat Developmentand ExperimentationCenter

FORT IRWIN Fort Irwin, CaliforniaMajor facilities and activities—


FORT JACKSON Fort Jackson, South CarolinaMajor facilities and activities—


B-19


FORT KNOX Fort Knox, KentuckyMajor facilities and activities—


FORT LEAVENWORTH Fort Leavenworth, KansasAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOMMajor facilities and activities—

CECOM Training and Maneuver Systems*

FORT LEE Petersburg, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—research, engineering, testing, and evaluationAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsMajor facilities and activities—

QuartermasterResearch and EngineeringField Evaluation Agency

FORT LEONARD WOOD Fort Leonard Wood, MissouriMajor facilities and activities—


FORT LEWIS Fort Lewis, WashingtonMajor facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office, West* Logistics Assistance Office, Fort Lewis*

FORT MASON Fort Mason, GeorgiaMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

FORT MCCLELLAN Anniston, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—nuclear security trainingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—various

FORT MCPHERSON Fort McPherson, GeorgiaMajor facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office, Conus*

B-20


FORT MONMOUTH Red Bank, New JerseyMajor missions and capabilities—research, development, testing, and evaluation of command and

communications equipment, electronic warfare-related research and developmentAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, CERCOM, ECOM, ERADCOM, AMC, LABCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Albert J. Myer Research and Development Center Communications and Electronics Command(the Hexagon) headquartersArmy Advent ManagementAgency CommunicationsResearch and DevelopmentCommandArmy CommunicationsSystems Agency headquartersArmy Satellite CommunicationsAgency ECOM headquarters*Army Signal Research and DevelopmentAgency Electronics Technology and Devices Laboratory*AtmosphericSciences Laboratory Electronic Warfare LaboratoryCenter for CommunicationsSystems (CENCOMS) Evans and Oakhurst areas (Asbury Park, New Jersey)Charles Wood Area Signal Corps Electronic Warfare CenterCombat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Signal Corps EngineeringLaboratoriesLaboratory Wayside Area (Earle, New Jersey)Communications and Automatic Data ProcessingLaboratory

FORT MONROE Hampton, VirginiaAssociated AMC subcommands—Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)Major facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office* Training and Doctrine Command headquarters

FORT ORD Fort Ord, CaliforniaMajor facilities and activities—


FORT POLK Fort Polk, LouisianaMajor facilities and activities—


FORT RICHARDSON Fort Richardson, AlaskaMajor facilities and activities—


FORT RILEY Junction City, KansasMajor missions and capabilities—maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office* TransportationAircraft MaintenanceShop

B-21


FORT RITCHIE Cascade, MarylandMajor missions and capabilities—communicationsAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—variousMajor facilities and activities—

Army CommunicationsSupport Activity NationalCommand Authority alternate command post*

FORT RUCKER Daleville, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—research, engineering, testing, and trainingAssociated Technical Services—Signal Corps, Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Aviation Center and School Aviation Technical Test Center*Army Signal Aviation Test and Support Agency Logistics Assistance Office*Army Transportation Aircraft Test and SupportActivity

FORT SAM HOUSTON San Antonio, TexasMajor facilities and activities—

Medical Training Headquarters

FORT SILL Lawton, OklahomaMajor missions and capabilities—nuclear artillery and missile training, military software developmentAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—variousMajor facilities and activities—


FORT STEWART Fort Stewart, GeorgiaMajor facilities and activities—


FORT WAINWRIGHT Fort Wainwright, AlaskaMajor missions and capabilities—cold environment testingAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Department, Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Army Corps of Engineers Arctic Test Activity Logistics Assistance Office*Army TransportationArctic Test Activity Ordnance Arctic Test Activity

FORT WINGATE ARMY DEPOT* Gallup, New MexicoMajor missions and capabilities—storage and logisticsAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepotAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, DESCOM

B-22


FORT WORTH GENERAL DEPOT Fort Worth, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—storage and maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster Corps, Signal Corps, Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

TransportationAircraft MaintenanceShop

FRANKFORD ARSENAL Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—various research and development, simulation activitiesAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—ARMCOM, ARRCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Fire Control Development and Engineering Microwave LaboratoryDirectorate Optical Laboratorylaser research location OrdnanceSpecialWeapons and AmmunitionCommandLow Energy Ion Beam Facility activities

GATEWAY ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT St. Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—projectile productionAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—MUCOM

GENERAL MATERIEL AND PARTS CENTER New Cumberland, PennsylvaniaAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

GERSTLE RIVER ARCTIC TEST SITE Fairbanks, AlaskaMajor missions and capabilities—cold environment testingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

GILA BEND AREA Gila Bend, ArizonaMajor missions and capabilities—research and developmentAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—possibly TECOM or MICOM

GRAND BLANC STORAGE FACILITY Grand Blanc, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department

GRANITE CITY ARMY DEPOT Granite City, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services-Corps of EngineersAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-23


GRANITE CITY ENGINEER DEPOT Granite City, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Corps of EngineersAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

GREEN RIVER ORDNANCE WORKS Dixon, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

GULF ORDNANCE PLANT Prairie, MississippiMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

HARRY DIAMOND LABORATORIES AND TEST AREA (see alsoDiamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories, Washington, D.C.)

Adelphi, Maryland

Major missions and capabilities—research, development, testing (primarily related to fuzes) nuclearweapons effects research, laser research, missile guidance and control component development

Associated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—ERADCOM, LABCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Aurora Facility (electro-magneticpulse simulation) LABCOM headquartersDiamond Ordnance Reactor Facility (DORF) Woodbridge facility (Woodbridge,VA)

HAWTHORNE ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Hawthorne, NevadaMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition storage, nuclear bombing rangeAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOMMajor facilities and activities—

8th Air Force Strategic Air Command nuclear bombing practice site

HAYS ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Pittsburgh, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition productionAssociated Technical Services—none, Navy facility until 1977Associated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

HOLSTON ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Kingsport, TennesseeMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition and propellants productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

B-24


INDIANA ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Charlestown, IndianaMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance and propellant productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

INDUSTRIALENGINEERINGACTIVITY* Rock Island, Illinois

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITY* Alexandria, Virginia

INSTALLATIONSAND SERVICES ACTIVITY* Rock Island, Illinois

INTERNATIONALLOGISTICS COMMAND (ILCOM) HEADQUARTERS New Cumberland, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—ILCOM

IOWA ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Middletown, IowaMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance production, including the final assembly of nuclear warheadsAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Nuclear warhead assembly plant

JEFFERSON PROVING GROUND* Madison, IndianaMajor missions and capabilities—research, testing, and evaluationAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Research and DevelopmentAmmunitionTest Center

JOINT CONEX CONTROL AGENCY Washington, D.C.Major missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-25


JOLIET ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Joliet, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency Ordnance AmmunitionCommand headquartersheadquarters Ordnance Special Weapons Ammunition CommandOrdnance AmmunitionCenter headquarters

KANSAS ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Parsons, KansasMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

KEWEENAW FIELD STATION* Houghton, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

KEYSTONE ORDNANCE WORKS Meadville, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

KINGSBURY ORDNANCE PLANT La Porte, IndianaMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

KING’S BAY ARMY TERMINAL St. Mary’s, GeorgiaMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

LABORATORY COMMAND (LABCOM) HEADQUARTERS* Adelphi, MarylandMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—LABCOM

B-26


LAKE CITY ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Independence, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—small arms ammunition productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

LAKE MEAD BASE Las Vegas, NevadaMajor missions and capabilities—Air Force logistics depot (Army-owned)Associated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER Hampton, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—aviation-related research and developmentAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Aviation Research and Technology Activity*

LAWNDALE ARMY MISSILE PLANT Lawndale, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—MICOM

LENAPE ORDNANCE MODIFICATION CENTER Newark, DelawareMajor missions and capabilities—tank and automotive productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT* Chambersburg, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—storage and logisticsAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army Major Item Supply ManagementAgency Center of Technical Excellence for the Patriot AirDefense Missile System

LEXINGTON-BLUE GRASS ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY* Lexington, KentuckyMajor missions and capabilities—storage (including chemical agents), guided missile maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department, Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—chemical storage facilities, missile maintenance facilities

B-27


LIMA ARMY TANK CENTER Lima, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—tank modification, M-1 tank productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOMMajor facilities and activities—

Lima Army ModificationCenter Lima Ordnance Steel FoundryLima Army Tank Plant*

LIVONIA ORDNANCE STORAGE FACILITY Livonia, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

LONE STAR ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Texarkana, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

LONGHORN ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Marshall, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance and propellant production, Pershing demilitarizationAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

pilot high melt explosive (HMX) facility for process Pershing rocket motor destruction sitedevelopment

LOUISIANA ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Shreveport, LouisianaMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

LOUISVILLE MEDICAL DEPOT Louisville, KentuckyMajor missions and capabilities—medical supplies storageAssociated Technical Services—Surgeon GeneralAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

MALTA TEST STATION Schenectady, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—missile testingAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-28


MANAGEMENTENGINEERINGACTIVITY* Huntsville, Alabama

MANAGEMENTENGINEERINGCOLLEGE* Rock Island, Illinois

MANASSAS FAMILY HOUSING/INDEPENDENTHILL* Manassas, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—provide housingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM

MARSHAL CHEMICAL PLANT New Martinsville, West VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—chemical productionAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—none, pre-AMC activity

MASTER DUPLICATE EMERGENCYFILES DEPOSITORY* Atchison, KansasMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY* Watertown, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—materials researchAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—LABCOM

MATERIEL READINESS SUPPORT ACTIVITY* Lexington, Kentucky

MAYNARD QUARTERMASTERTEST ACTIVITY Maynard, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—research, engineering, and testingAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

MCALESTER ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* McAlester, OklahomaMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition storageAssociated Technical Services—none, Navy facility until 1977Associated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

B-29


MEMPHIS GENERAL DEPOT Memphis, TennesseeMajor missions and capabilities—storage, maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers, Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—DSAMajor facilities and activities—

U.S. Army Engineer Depot MaintenanceShop

MICHIGAN ARMY MISSILE PLANT Warren, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—-missile and rocket productionAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—MICOM

MICHIGAN ORDNANCE MISSILE PLANT Sterling Heights, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—missile and rocket productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

MILAN ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Milan, TennesseeMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition production, storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Milan Depot Activity

MICHIGAN SCREW PRODUCTS* Warren, MichiganAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

MIDWESTERNREGIONAL OFFICE, ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY AGENCY Chicago, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—supply logisticsAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL Bayonne, New JerseyMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminal

MILTON K. CUMMINGS RESEARCH PARK Huntsville, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—missile research and development (including nuclear)Associated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—MICOM, variousMajor facilities and activities—

Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command/AdvancedTechnology Center

B-30


MISSISSIPPI ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Picayune, MississippiMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition production and storageAssociated Technical Services—none, construction began in 1978Associated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, DARCOM

MOBILITY SYSTEMS LABORATORY Warren, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—mobility systems researchAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

MOBILIZATION AVCRAD CONTROL ELEMENT (MACE), National Havre De Grace, MarylandGuard unit under IOC during National Emergency

MOFFETT FIELD Moffett Field, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—various research and developmentAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army Air Mobility Research and Development Ames Research CenterLaboratory Advanced Systems Research and Analysis*

MOUNT LEMON ELECTRONIC PROVING GROUND Mount Lemon, ArizonaMajor missions and capabilities—communications equipment testing, tracking radar testingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, TECOM

MT. RANIER ORDNANCE DEPOT Tacoma, WashingtonMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

MULE MOUNTAIN ELECTRONIC PROVING GROUND Mule Mountain, ArizonaMajor missions and capabilities—communications equipment testingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, TECOM

MUSKEGON ARMY ENGINE PLANT Muskegon, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—engine productionAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

B-31


MUSKEGON ORDNANCE PLANT Muskegon, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—tank and automotive productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

NASA-L EWIS RESEARCH CENTER Cleveland, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—aviation-related researchAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Aviation Systems Command Propulsion Directorate*

NATICK LABORATORIES Natick, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOMMajor facilities and activities—none known

NATICK RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER Natick, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—research, engineering, and developmentAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—none, pre-AMC activity

NATICK RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND(NARADCOM) HEADQUARTERS

Natick, Massachusetts

Major missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—NARADCOM

NATICK RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTER* Natick, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—research, engineering, and developmentAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

NATICK RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING Needham, MassachusettsCENTER, NEEDHAM HOUSING*Major missions and capabilities—personnel housingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

B-32


NATICK RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING Sudbury, MassachusettsCENTER, WAYLAND HOUSING*Major missions and capabilities—personal housingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

NATICK RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING Hudson, MassachusettsCENTER, HUDSON HOUSING*Major missions and capabilities—personnel housingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

NAVAJO ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY Flagstaff, ArizonaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER Lakehurst, New JerseyMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army Airborne Electronic Research Activity*

NEW CUMBERLAND ARMY DEPOT New Cumberland, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—storage and logistics (including chemical agents), maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Chemical Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM, DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army InternationalLogistics Command TransportationAircraft MaintenanceShopCatalog Data Activity*

NEW ORLEANS ARMY TERMINAL New Orleans, LouisianaMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

NEWPORT ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Newport, IndianaMajor missions and capabilities—heavy water production, chemical agents production and munitions

fillingAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

VX production plant

B-33


NIAGARA FALLS CHEMICAL PLANT Niagara Falls, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—chemicals productionAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—MUCOM

OAKLAND ARMY TERMINAL Oakland, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

OATMAN MOUNTAIN ELECTRONIC PROVING GROUND Oatman Mountain, ArizonaMajor missions and capabilities—communications equipment testing, radar testingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, TECOM

ORLANDO BRANCH OFFICE* Orlando, FloridaAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

PACIFIC ORDNANCE STEEL FOUNDRY Pittsburg, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—tank and automotive productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

PACKAGING, STORAGE, AND CONTAINERIZATIONCENTER* Tobyhanna, PennsylvaniaAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

PANTEX PLANT Amarillo, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance production, nuclear weapons final assembly siteAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

one of the most important sites in the U.S. for nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly*

PEDRICKTOWNSUPPORT FACILITY Pedricktown, New Jersey

PENTAGON Washington, D.C.Major facilities and activities—

Logistics Assistance Office, Reserve ComponentsOffice, Army Reserve/NationalGuard*

B-34


PHILADELPHIAQUARTERMASTERCENTER Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—storage and logisticsAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Defense Clothing and Textile Supply Center

PHOSPHATE DEVELOPMENT WORKS* Muscle Shoals, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—chemical productionAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

PICATINNY ARSENAL* Dover, New JerseyMajor missions and capabilities—Army center of nuclear weapons and warhead research and

developmentAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, ARMCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Armament Research and Development Command Army Ordnance Special Weapons-Ammunitionheadquarters Command headquartersArmamentResearch,Development,and Engineering MUCOM commodity center for nuclear munitionsCenter MUCOM headquartersArmy Large Caliber Weapon Systems Laboratory Surety Field Activity*

PINE BLUFF ARSENAL* (and Midwest Chemical Depot) Pine Bluff, ArkansasMajor missions and capabilities—chemical and biological agents production and storage, chemical

munitions filling and storageAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, ARRCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

BZ, CS, DF, and other chemical production plants Midwest Chemical Depot facility

PLUM BROOK ORDNANCE WORKS Sandusky, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

PONTIAC STORAGE FACILITY* Pontiac, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO Presidio of San Francisco, CaliforniaMajor facilities and activities—

Logistic Control Activity*

B-35


PRODUCTION BASE MODERNIZATION ACTIVITY, ARMY Charleston, South CarolinaMAINTENANCEFACILITY

PUEBLO ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY* Pueblo, ColoradoMajor missions and capabilities—storage (including chemical agents), Pershing missile storage and

maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—chemical storage facilities, missile storage and maintenance facilities

QUARTERMASTERAREA SUPPORT OFFICE Chicago, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

QUARTERMASTERFOOD AND CONTAINER INSTITUTE FOR THE ARMED FORCES Chicago, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—research, engineering, and testingAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

QUARTERMASTERPETROLEUM CENTER, ARMY Washington, D.C.Major missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

QUARTERMASTER RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS Natick, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

RADFORD ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Radford, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition and propellants productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

RARITAN ARSENAL Metuchen, New JerseyMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-36


RAVENNA ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Ravenna, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition production and storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT Texarkana, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—storage and logistics (including chemical agent protective devices)Associated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM, DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—

School of Engineeringand Logistics*

REDSTONE ARSENAL* Huntsville, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—rocket and guided missile research and development (including nuclear

missiles)Associated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—MICOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army Ballistic Missile Agency MIRCOM headquartersArmy Rocket and Guided Missile Agency Missile Research, Development and EngineeringBallistic Missile Defense Organization LaboratoryGuidance and Control Laboratory Redstone Arsenal Support Activity*Josiah Gorgas Laboratory Test, Measurement,and Diagnostic Equipment Activity*MICOM headquartersMIRADCOMheadquarters

RICHMOND QUARTERMASTERDEPOT Richmond, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—supply logisticsAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Designated Defense General Supply Center

RIDGEWOODARMY WEAPONS PLANT Cincinnati, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—WECOMAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

RIDGEWOOD ORDNANCE PLANT Cincinnati, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-37


RIO VISTA STORAGE AREA Rio Vista, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

RIVERBANK ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Riverbank, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—projectile productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL* Rock Island, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—tank component research and development, nuclear weapons research

and development, storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, ARMCOM, ARRADCOM, ARRCOM, WECOMMajor facilities and activities—

AMCCOM headquarters IOC headquartersArmament Materiel Readiness Command Ordnance ManagementEngineeringTraining Agencyheadquarters OWC headquartersARMCOM headquarters Rock Island Depot ActivityArmy Ordnance Field Activity Rodman LaboratoryARRCOM headquarters WECOM headquarters

ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL* Commerce City, ColoradoMajor missions and capabilities—chemical agents production and storageAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—ARRCOM, MUCOMMajor facilities and activities—

chemical agent production facilities Rocky Mountain Depot Activity

ROSSFORD ORDNANCE DEPOT Toledo, OhioMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Joint Military Packaging Training Center Ordnance Packaging Agency

ROTTERDAMHOUSING* Schenectady, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—personnel housingAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM

B-38


SACRAMENTO ARMY DEPOT* Sacramento, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—storage, laser testing, maintenance of radar, laser, and electronic

warfare equipment, design and production of electronic warfare communications sheltersAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Laser Test ranges

SAGINAW ARMY AIRCRAFT PLANT Fort Worth, TexasMajor missions and capabilities—helicopter assembly and productionAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM

SAVANNA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY* Savanna, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—storage (may have included nuclear munitions until approximately

1975)Associated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

SCHENECTADYGENERAL DEPOT Schenectady, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—storage and maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers, Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not knownMajor facilities and activities—

Army Engineer Depot MaintenanceShop

SCRANTON ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Scranton, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—ammunition and projectile productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

SEATTLE CHEMICAL PLANT Seattle, WashingtonMajor missions and capabilities—chemicals productionAssociated Technical Services—Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, ALEXANDRIA* Alexandria, Virginia

SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION New Cumberland, PennsylvaniaREGION EAST*

B-39


SENECA ARMY DEPOT* Romulus, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—nuclear warhead storage and maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—ATCOM, DESCOM, MICOM, WECOMMajor facilities and activities—

center for neutron bomb storage once the largestnuclear weapons and warheads depot inthe world

SHARPE ARMY DEPOT Lathrop, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM, DESCOM

SIERRA ARMY DEPOT* Herlong, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—storage (including nuclear weapons)Associated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—

nuclear weapons and warheads storage site

SIOUX ORDNANCE DEPOT Sidney, NebraskaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

SPRINGFIELDARMORY Springfield, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—WECOM

ST. LOUIS ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* St. Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—projectile productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM, MUCOM

ST. LOUIS ORDNANCE STEEL FOUNDRY St. Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—steel productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-40


STRATFORD ARMY ENGINE PLANT* Stratford, ConnecticutMajor missions and capabilities—engine productionAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—AVSCOM

SUNFLOWER ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Desoto, KansasMajor missions and capabilities—propellant productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

SUNNY POINT MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL Southport, North CarolinaMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

SUPPORT ACTIVITY, PHILADELPHIA* Philadelphia, PennsylvaniaAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

SYSTEMS INTEGRATIONAND MANAGEMENTACTIVITY* Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

TACOM SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SELFRIDGE* Selfridge Air National Guard Base, MichiganAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

TANK-AUTOMOTIVE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS* Warren, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—none, post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—TACOM

TANK-AUTOMOTIVE MATERIEL READINESS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS Warren, MichiganMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TARCOM

TANK-AUTOMOTIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTCOMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Warren, Michigan

Major missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TARADCOM

B-41


TARHEEL ARMY MISSILE PLANT Burlington, North CarolinaMajor missions and capabilities—missile and rocket productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—MICOM

TELEVISION-AUDIO SUPPORT AGENCY Sacramento, CaliforniaAssociated AMC subcommands—ECOM

THEODORE ARMY TERMINAL Theodore, AlabamaMajor missions and capabilities—Army terminalAssociated Technical Services—Transportation Corps

TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT* Tobyhanna, PennsylvaniaMajor missions and capabilities—storage, communications and photographic equipment maintenance,

design and produce electronic warfare communications sheltersAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Center of Technical Excellence for Tactical and Strategic Satellite CommunicationsSystems

TOOELE ARMY DEPOT, RAILROAD MAINTENANCE* Ogden, UtahAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

TOOELE ARMY DEPOT* Tooele, UtahMajor missions and capabilities—storage, logistics, and demilitarization (including chemical agents)Associated Technical Services—Ordnance Department, Chemical CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOMMajor facilities and activities—

location of the prototype Chemical Agent and Tooele Army Depot, South Area*Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS)

TRACY DEPOT ACTIVITY Tracy, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—DSA

TROOP SUPPORT AND AVIATION MATERIEL READINESSCOMMAND (TSARCOM) HEADQUARTERS

St. Louis, Missouri

Major missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TSARCOM

B-42


TROOP SUPPORT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS* Saint Louis, MissouriMajor missions and capabilities—command administrationAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—TROSCOM

TWIN CITIES ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* New Brighton, MinnesotaMajor missions and capabilities—small arms ammunition productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

UMATILLA ARMY DEPOT ACTIVITY* Hermiston, OregonMajor missions and capabilities—storage (including chemical weapons)Associated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—DESCOM

UTAH GENERAL DEPOT* Ogden, UtahMajor missions and capabilities—storage and maintenanceAssociated Technical Services—Corps of Engineers Quartermaster Corps, Transportation CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—DLA, DSAMajor facilities and activities—

Army Engineer Depot MaintenanceShop TransportationRail Equipment MaintenanceShop

VINT HILL FARMS STATION* Warrenton, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—communications and intelligence research and developmentAssociated Technical Services—not knownAssociated AMC subcommands—CECOM, ECOM, ERADCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Electronic Warfare Laboratory Signals Warfare Directorate*Intelligence Materiel ManagementCenter*

VOLUNTEER ARMY AMMUNITION PLANT* Chattanooga, TennesseeMajor missions and capabilities—chemicals productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, MUCOM

VOORHEESVILLEDEPOT ACTIVITY Voorheesville, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—storageAssociated Technical Services—Quartermaster CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

B-43


WABASH RIVER ORDNANCE WORKS Newport, IndianaMajor missions and capabilities—ordnance productionAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—not known

WATERTOWN ARSENAL Watertown, MassachusettsMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—LABCOMMajor facilities and activities—

Material and Mechanics Research Center

WATERVLIET ARSENAL* Watervliet, New YorkMajor missions and capabilities—research, development, and production of artillery componentsAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance DepartmentAssociated AMC subcommands—AMCCOM, ARMCOM, ARRCOM, ARRADCOM, WECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Benet Research and DevelopmentLaboratory

WEAPONS LABORATORY Rock Island, IllinoisMajor missions and capabilities—weapons and weapons systems research and testingAssociated Technical Services—post-AMC activityAssociated AMC subcommands—ARMCOM

WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE, ARMY SIGNAL SUPPLY AGENCY Pasadena, CaliforniaMajor missions and capabilities—not knownAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—pre-AMC activity

B-44


WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE* White Sands, New MexicoMajor missions and capabilities—weapons research, development, testing, and evaluation (conventional

and nuclear—involved in the development of every Army nuclear missile); nuclear effects testingAssociated Technical Services—Ordnance Department, Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—ECOM, LABCOM, TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Alamo Peak, New Mexico (missile telemetry site) Idaho Launch Site, Shoofly, Idaho (launch and radarArmy Signal Missile Support Agency tracking site)AtmosphericSciences Laboratory McGregor Range, New Mexico (Pershing I missileBlue Butte, Idaho (missile radar tracking and firing support)telemetry site) Moab, Utah (missile telemetry site)Edgemead, Idaho (missile radar tracking site) Monafee Peak, Colorado (missile telemetry site)El Huerfano, New Mexico (missile telemetry site) Mt. Tailor, New Mexico (missile telemetry site)Electronic Warfare Laboratory Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho (missile radarGrassmere, Idaho (missile radar tracking site) tracking site)Green River Launch Site/Utah Test Complex, Price, Nuclear Effects FacilityUtah (Pershing launch site; radar tracking site) Research and DevelopmentWeapons Test CenterHagerman, Idaho (missile radar tracking site) VulnerabilityAssessment Laboratory*High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility (HELSTF) White Sands Solar Furnace

WOODBRIDGE RESEARCH FACILITY* (HARRY DIAMOND LABORATORIES) Woodbridge, VirginiaMajor missions and capabilities—nuclear vulnerability testingAssociated Technical Services—Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—MERADCOM, LABCOM

YUMA PROVING GROUND* Yuma, ArizonaMajor missions and capabilities—communications and electronic equipment research, engineering, and

testingAssociated Technical Services—Chemical Corps, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Department,

Quartermaster Corps, Signal CorpsAssociated AMC subcommands—TECOMMajor facilities and activities—

Army Chemical Corps Desert Test Activity Army Signal Corps Test Activity (Yuma Test Station,Army Corps of Engineers Desert Test Activity Arizona)Army Ordnance Test Activity (Yuma Test Station, Research and DevelopmentTest CenterArizona) Site Sibyl (Benson, Arizona)Army Quartermaster Research and EngineeringAirborne Test Activity

* active AMC installation or activity in 1992

B-45

Acronyms Used in Table B-1

AMC—Army Materiel Command DESCOM—Depot Systems CommandAMCCOM—Armament, Materiel, and Chemical DLA—Defense Logistics AgencyCommand DSA—Defense Supply AgencyARMCOM—Armament Command ECOM—Electronics CommandARRADCOM—ArmamentResearch and Development ERADCOM—Electronics Research and DevelopmentCommand CommandARRCOM—Armament Materiel Readiness Command LABCOM—Laboratory CommandAVCOM—Aviation Command MICOM—Missile CommandAVRADCOM—Aviation Research and Development MUCOM—Munitions CommandCommand TACOM—Tank-AutomotiveCommandAVSCOM—Aviation Systems Command TECOM—Test and Evaluation CommandCECOM—Communications-ElectronicsCommand TROSCOM—Troop Support CommandCERCOM—Communications and Electronics Materiel WECOM—Weapons CommandCommand

B-46

Table B-2Army Cold War Installations, Facilities, and Activities, by Location

Location Installation, Facility, or Activity Name

Alabama Anniston Anniston Army DepotFort McClellan

Birmingham Army Ordnance District, Birmingham

Childersburg Alabama Army Ammunition Plant

Daleville Fort Rucker

Huntsville Management Engineering ActivityMilton K. Cummings Research ParkRedstone Arsenal

Muscle Shoals Phosphate Development Works

Talledega Coosa River Storage Annex

Theodore Theodore Army Terminal

Alaska Fairbanks Fairbanks Permafrost StationFort GreelyGerstle River Arctic Test Site

Fort Richardson Fort Richardson

Fort Wainwright Fort Wainwright

Arizona Flagstaff Navajo Army Depot Activity

Gila Bend Gila Bend Area

Mount Lemon Mount Lemon Electronic Proving Ground

Mule Mountain Mule Mountain Electronic Proving Ground

Oatman Mountain Oatman Mountain Electronic Proving Ground

Sierra Vista Fort Huachuca

Yuma Yuma Proving Ground

Arkansas Fort Smith Fort Chaffee

Pine Bluff Pine Bluff Arsenal

B-47



California Alameda Alameda Annex

Benicia Benicia ArsenalBenicia Cemetery

Edwards Air Force Base Edwards Air Force Base

Fort Irwin Fort Irwin

Fort Ord Fort Ord

Herlong Sierra Army Depot

Jolon Fort Hunter Liggett

Lathrop Defense Distribution Region West, Sharpe SiteSharpe Army Depot

Lawndale Lawndale Army Missile Plant

Moffett Field Moffett Field

Oakland Army Chemical Corps Procurement District, SanFrancisco

Oakland Army Terminal

Pasadena Army Ordnance District, Los AngelesWestern Regional Office, Army Signal Supply Agency

Paso Robles Camp Roberts Annex

Pittsburg Pacific Ordnance Steel Foundry

Presidio of San Presidio of San FranciscoFrancisco

Rio Vista Rio Vista Storage Area

Riverbank Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant

Sacramento Sacramento Army DepotTelevision-Audio Support Agency

San Francisco Army Ordnance District, San Francisco

San Miguel Camp Roberts

Stockton Defense Distribution Region West

Tracy Tracy Depot Activity



B-48

Colorado Commerce City Rocky Mountain Arsenal

Fort Carson Fort Carson

Pueblo Pueblo Army Depot Activity

Connecticut Stratford Stratford Army Engine Plant

Delaware Newark Lenape Ordnance Modification Center

District ofColumbia

Washington Army Chemical Corps Research and DevelopmentCommand headquarters

Army Transportation Aviation Field OfficeArmy Transportation Intelligence AgencyDiamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories (in the National

Bureau of Standards building until 1969—see alsoHarry Diamond Laboratories)

Joint CONEX Control AgencyPentagon , Logistics Assistance Office, Reserve

Components Office, Army Reserve/National GuardQuartermaster Petroleum Center, U.S. Army

Florida Orlando Army Training Device Agency (TRADE)Orlando Branch Office

Georgia Forest Park Atlanta Army DepotFort Gillem

Fort Benning Fort Benning

Fort Gordon Fort Gordon

Fort Mason Fort Mason

Fort McPherson Fort McPherson

Fort Stewart Fort Stewart

St. Mary’s King’s Bay Army Terminal



B-49

Illinois Chicago Army Engineer Procurement OfficeArmy Ordnance District, ChicagoArmy Signal Corps Inspector General Field Office,

No. 2Chicago Ordnance PlantMidwestern Regional Office, Army Signal Supply

AgencyQuartermaster Area Support OfficeQuartermaster Food and Container Institute for the

Armed Forces

Dixon Green River Ordnance Works

Granite City Army Transportation Freight Consolidating StationCharles Melvin Price Support CenterGranite City Army DepotGranite City Engineer Depot

Joliet Joliet Army Ammunition Plant

Rock Island Industrial Engineering ActivityInstallations and Services ActivityManagement Engineering CollegeRock Island ArsenalWeapons Laboratory

Savanna Defense Ammunition Center and SchoolSavanna Army Depot Activity

Indiana Charlestown Field Safety ActivityIndiana Army Ammunition Plant

Crane Crane Army Ammunition Activity

East Chicago East Chicago Ordnance Steel Foundry

La Porte Kingsbury Ordnance Plant

Madison Jefferson Proving Ground

Newport Newport Army Ammunition PlantWabash River Ordnance Works

Iowa Middletown Iowa Army Ammunition Plant



B-50

Kansas Atchison Atchison Ordnance Storage FacilityMaster Duplicate Emergency Files Depository

Desoto Sunflower Army Ammunition Plant

Fort Leavenworth Fort Leavenworth

Junction City Fort Riley

Parsons Kansas Army Ammunition Plant

Kentucky Fort Campbell Fort Campbell

Fort Knox Fort Knox

Lexington Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot ActivityMateriel Readiness Support Activity

Louisville Louisville Medical Depot

Louisiana Fort Polk Fort Polk

New Orleans Camp Leroy JohnsonNew Orleans Army Terminal

Shreveport Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant

Maryland Aberdeen Aberdeen Proving GroundEdgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground

Adelphi Adelphi Laboratory CenterArmy Electronics Research and Development

CommandHarry Diamond Laboratories and Test Area (see also

Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories, Washington,D.C.)

Laboratory Command headquarters

Baltimore Fort George G. Meade

Blossom Point Blossom Point Test Facility

Cascade Fort Ritchie

Fort Holabird Fort Holabird

Fredrick Fort Detrick



B-51

Maryland (cont’d) Havre De Grace Mobilization AVCRAD Control Element (MACE),National Guard unit under IOC during NationalEmergency

Massachusetts Boston Army Ordnance District, BostonBoston Army Base

Fort Devens Fort Devens

Hudson Natick Research, Development, and EngineeringCenter, Hudson Housing

Maynard Maynard Quartermaster Test Activity

Natick Natick LaboratoriesNatick Research and Development CenterNatick Research and Development Command

headquartersNatick Research, Development, and Engineering

CenterQuartermaster Research and Engineering Command

headquarters

Needham Natick Research, Development, and EngineeringCenter, Needham Housing

Springfield Springfield Armory

Sudbury Natick Research, Development, and EngineeringCenter, Wayland Housing

Watertown Materials Technology LaboratoryWatertown Arsenal

Michigan Detroit Army Ordnance District, Detroit

Fort Custer Detroit Ordnance District Industrial Storage Activity

Grand Blanc Grand Blanc Storage Facility

Houghton Keweenaw Field Station

Livonia Livonia Ordnance Storage Facility

Muskegon Muskegon Army Engine PlantMuskegon Ordnance Plant

Pontiac Pontiac Storage Facility



B-52

Michigan (cont’d) Selfridge Air National TACOM Support Activity, SelfridgeGuard Base

Sterling Heights Michigan Ordnance Missile Plant

Warren Detroit Arsenal AcresDetroit Arsenal and Tank PlantMichigan Army Missile PlantMichigan Screw ProductsMobility Systems LaboratoryTank-Automotive Command headquartersTank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command

headquartersTank-Automotive Research and Development

Command

Minnesota New Brighton Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant

Mississippi Picayune Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant

Prairie Gulf Ordnance Plant

Missouri Fort Leonard Wood Fort Leonard Wood

Independence Lake City Army Ammunition Plant

St. Louis Army Engineer Supply Control OfficeArmy Ordnance District, St. LouisArmy Signal Avionics Field OfficeArmy Transportation Materiel Command headquartersAviation Research and Development Command

headquartersAviation Systems Command headquartersGateway Army Ammunition PlantSt. Louis Army Ammunition PlantSt. Louis Ordnance Steel FoundryTroop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness

Command headquartersTroop Support Command headquarters

Nebraska Grand Island Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant

Sidney Sioux Ordnance Depot



B-53

Nevada Hawthorne Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant

Las Vegas Lake Mead Base

New Hampshire Hanover Army Cold Regions Research Laboratory

New Jersey Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal

Burlington Burlington Army Ammunition Plant

Dover Picatinny Arsenal

Lakehurst Naval Air Warfare Center, Army Airborne ElectronicResearch Activity

Metuchen Raritan Arsenal

Pedricktown Pedricktown Support Facility

Red Bank Fort Monmouth

New Mexico Gallup Fort Wingate Army Depot

White Sands White Sands Missile Range

New York Brooklyn Brooklyn Army Terminal

Cold Springs Cold Springs Battery Plant

Long Island City Army Pictorial Center

New York City Army Chemical Procurement District, New YorkArmy Ordnance District, New York

Niagara Falls Niagara Falls Chemical Plant

Romulus Seneca Army Depot

Schenectady Malta Test StationRotterdam HousingSchenectady General Depot

Voorheesville Voorheesville Depot Activity

Watertown Fort Drum

Watervliet Watervliet Arsenal



B-54

North Carolina Burlington Tarheel Army Missile Plant

Charlotte Charlotte Ordnance Missile Plant

Fort Bragg Fort Bragg

Research Triangle Park Army Research Office

Southport Sunny Point Military Ocean Terminal

Ohio Cincinnati Army Ordnance District, CincinnatiRidgewood Army Weapons PlantRidgewood Ordnance Plant

Cleveland Army Ordnance District, ClevelandCleveland Army Tank-Automotive PlantNASA-Lewis Research Center, Aviation Systems

Command, Propulsion Directorate

Columbus Army Engineer Maintenance CenterColumbus General DepotDefense Construction Supply Center

Lima Lima Army Tank Center

Port Clinton Erie Ordnance DepotErie Proving Ground

Ravenna Ravenna Army Ammunition Plant

Sandusky Plum Brook Ordnance Works

Toledo Rossford Ordnance Depot

Warren Cleveland Ordnance District Industrial StorageActivity

Oklahoma Lawton Fort Sill

McAlester McAlester Army Ammunition Plant

Oregon Clatskanie Beaver Army Terminal

Hermiston Umatilla Army Depot Activity



B-55

Pennsylvania Birdsboro Birdsboro Ordnance Steel Foundry and BirdsboroArmy Tank-Automotive Steel Foundry

Chambersburg Depot System Command headquartersLetterkenny Army DepotSystems Integration and Management Activity

Coraopolis Coraopolis Ordnance Steel Foundry and CoraopolisArmy Tank-Automotive Steel Foundry

Meadville Keystone Ordnance Works

New Cumberland Defense Distribution Region EastGeneral Materiel and Parts CenterInternational Logistics Command (ILCOM)

headquartersNew Cumberland Army DepotSecurity Assistance Command, Defense Distribution

Region East

Philadelphia Army Ordnance District, PhiladelphiaArmy Signal Supply AgencyArmy Support CenterArmy Support Command headquartersDefense Personnel Support CenterDefense Plant Representative’s Office, Boeing

HelicopterDirectorate of International LogisticsFrankford ArsenalPhiladelphia Quartermaster CenterSupport Activity, Philadelphia

Pittsburgh Hays Army Ammunition Plant

Scranton Scranton Army Ammunition Plant

Tobyhanna Packaging, Storage, and Containerization CenterTobyhanna Army Depot

Upper Darby Army Signal Corps Inspector General Field Office,No. 1

South Carolina Charleston Production Base Modernization Activity, ArmyMaintenance Facility

Fort Jackson Fort Jackson

North Charleston Charleston Army Depot

South Dakota Igloo Black Hills Ordnance Depot



B-56

Tennessee Chattanooga Catoosa Rifle RangeVolunteer Army Ammunition Plant

Kingsport Holston Army Ammunition Plant

Memphis Defense Industrial Plant Equipment CenterDefense Distribution Region CentralMemphis General Depot

Milan Milan Army Ammunition Plant

Texas Amarillo Pantex Plant

Corpus Christi Army Transportation Aeronautical Depot MaintenanceCenter

Corpus Christi Army Depot

El Paso Fort Bliss

Fort Hood Fort Hood

Fort Worth Defense Plant Representative’s Office, Bell HelicopterFort Worth General DepotSaginaw Army Aircraft Plant

Houston Dickson Gun Plant

Marshall Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant

San Antonio Belvoir Fuels and Lubricants Research FacilityCamp Stanley Storage ActivityFort Sam Houston

Texarkana Lone Star Army Ammunition PlantRed River Army Depot

Utah Dugway Dugway Proving Ground

Ogden Defense Depot OgdenTooele Army Depot Railroad MaintenanceUtah General Depot

Salt Lake City Army Desert Test Center

St. John Deseret Depot Activity

Tooele Tooele Army Depot



B-57

Vermont Burlington Ethan Allen Firing Range

Underhill Army Materiel Command Firing Range

Virginia Alexandria Cameron StationFort BelvoirInspector General ActivitySecurity Assistance Command, Alexandria

Arlington Arlington Hall Station

Hampton Fort MonroeLangley Research Center

Manassas Manassas Family Housing/Independent Hill

Newport News Fort Eustis

Petersburg Fort Lee

Radford Radford Army Ammunition Plant

Richmond Army Support Command headquartersDefense General Supply CenterRichmond Quartermaster Depot

Warrenton Vint Hill Farms Station

Woodbridge Woodbridge Research Facility

Washington Auburn Auburn Depot Activity

Fort Lewis Fort Lewis

Seattle Army Transportation Terminal CommandSeattle Chemical Plant

Tacoma Mt. Ranier Ordnance Depot

West Virginia New Martinsville Marshal Chemical Plant

Wisconsin Baraboo Badger Army Ammunition Plant

B-58

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B-60

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B-61

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trinity and the wall

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