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Tank defense weapons ( 3 7 ~ 1 ~ buns especial ly for tmk defense)follow Close behind th pene t ra ting infan t ry1 a por t ion of the a n t i a i r c ra f t i s ti me ly brought forward* 364. The rupture of th e hos t i le defense on a broad i h n t i s the indica- t i o n of approaching v ictor y.

Further advances of the inf an try i n i t s pra.vi ous at 'tack di re ct io nsup to Me s e iz u r e of t h e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y c o n s ti t u te s i t s n ex t ta sk . Prema-ture flanking movanents are t o be p r e v ~ t e d n t i l t he enemy i s ,&e f i n i t e l y brokepthrough. The troops in the pen etra t ion must be assured th at th e ir f lanks ar eprotected, Advancing res erv es prevent stoppage of th e at ta ck , re pe l counter-attacks, and ankmnte the forward movement. Th$ a r e t o be employed where asuccess h a s oceur red i n o rde r ' t o explo i t it w it h a l l f or ce . Likewise t he em-ployment e f t roops t o r o l l up the hos t i l e l in es i s a m t t e r for resdrves , whichar e esp eci nll y employed for ' t h i s purpose. New reserve-s a r e faraec? from the r e -maining units, from-pinched out .and dispersed elements.

' b at i s not destroyed by the break through and the fo l l o~ fi ng nvel- opment must be pursued.

365. Should th e ee ihy succeed i n ree sta bli shi ng his defense or of defend-ing fu rt ho r t o the rear, the attack.must bi: renewed. -F or dt hi s purpose th e timeand spao e-unity of the at ta ck must be sccured amw, a s we ll a s t h e nocossaryf i r e support ordered.. 366. Should we be unable to carry the engagenent through t o a d eci sio npr io r to darkness, then, as a rul e, the troops arrange th ei r defense. Consid-er at io n should be given the p o ss ib il it y of ski r t i ng forc es dur ing the night i norder s a t dam to a t t ack dec i s ive ly in Q more favorable area. I t might al so bereckoned t h a t th e enemy om reg ai n h is freedom of mov.w,nt during th e n igh t and

t h a t on th e ne xt morhing we -se lves may. see a di f f eren t s i t uat ion oppos iteUS. This POB s i b i l i t ~ x i s t s es @c ia ll y when an -envelopment cannot Be carried- t o completion d u r k t he day. Reconnaissance: ,r a i d smust obtain inforinktion.Night at tac ks a re able t o r i x t h e enmy a t th e same time., .

367. If no essential changes in t h e h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n a re t o be expected)th e ord ers for the a tt a ck on the following day must be issu ed su ff ic ie nt lyear ly , so tha t a l l arms, e speoia l ly the a r t i l l e ry and 'tanks, can pfoperly d o 'th e i r prepara t ions. Higher e o m d e r s must no t fear, occasional ly , t o i ssueth ei r orders before they have a complete pictur e of the, 'd ayls ba tt l e .The nig ht can be u t i l i z e d t o advsno e th e i i i fm%rynearer the enemy,in order t o obta in by daylight a favorable l i n e of d eparture for t h e continu-ance of the att6.ck. So me ti ~e s ight a t t a c t s a re recommended i n orcler t o securete rr ai n important f or the further execution of the at t ack . Relief, of unit s ,even though v er y exhausted, must be th e excepl;ion.h r i n g tilo ni gh t, by i r r e p l a r haras si ng f i r e s , i n s ofa r a s m u n i -t i o n permits, and by' a i r bombing deep behind tho h o s t i l e l in e s, must th e enemycommunication i n tho t o r r a i n hold by him, a s we ll a s roarward thoreof , be madedi ff ic ul t , espe cial l y for the bringing up of reinforcemtmts and m u n i t i o n .

368. %= the trnops succecdod by daylight i n socurin;: favorable are as ofdo pr t u r e fo r t he b ra & through, a uniform as sa ul t can be begun a t a fix ed how.Hwover, the a r t i l l e r y w i l l be able to su~j porta? ea r ly morning attttac1.r only i ft ho l i ne s of dq a r t u re o f t he i n f a n t ry und the hos t i le s i tu at ia n have been oom-munioatod i n ample tina, and i f it has adequate information for unobservedf i r e , . Observation i n tho ea r ly morn* i s oftrn impossible bccause of v ic ib il -i t y oondit ions . Therefore it may be nehessary to s e t a l a t e r time fo r t h e in -fait r y advance,

By f i r e s upon othor ar ca s the .enemy i s deceived a s to the time and the dec i s ive a rea qf the penetrat ion. Report No. 14,507.
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369. Though i t be unce rtain whether the s rt ua ti on m i l l e s s e n t i a l l ychange, neve rthel ess a l l prep arations a re made so that the a tta ck can belaunched th e next day, The det erm ina tio n of the time of the a tt ac k can bereserved.370. If essen t ia l changes in the ho s t i l e s i t ua t ion ar e ca lcula ted , thea t tack must be built up around new reconnaissance.371. Arter a successPully executed attack should the forces be insuffi-c ien t t o advance further, the t er ra i n already gained i s to be .h eld. The as-sumption of t h e defe nse, whether it be merely a suspension of th e a tt ac k or apurely defensive measure, most be ordered. Trrapi d reo rgan izati on and es-tablishment af the infantry, i t s heavy weapon a s we ll a s im e d i a t e new regu-l a t i o n s fo r t h e a r t i l l e r y a c t i v i t y a r e impo rtan t. The a r t i l l e r y w nc er ns it-s e l f no t only with the defense agains t h o st i l e infa atry but with th e counter-ac t ing of host il e . a r t i l l e r y f i r e which in such a s i t ua t ion usual ly f a l l s heav-i l y on our Waxtry.372. A meetiag engagemnt ensues when two approaching enomios-snter intoba tt le vnthobi long preparation the refor.

Docisions and conduct often are enshrouded in uncertainty.373. Uncerta in ty and in c l ar i t y , which lead t o co l l i s io n, a r c the great -e s t causes of meeting engagancats.

Likewise, a me et ing engagement ensues whea, although th e approach-ing opponents a r e cognizarrt of each othe r, one or both at ta ck immediately o ra f t e r o nly hasty assembly posit ions. Such a dec isioil can have in mind theu ti li za ti o n of grea ter readine ss fo r combat, the occupation of important ter -ra in o r the rea l i za t i on o f othe r t a c t i c a l ih ten t ions . I t a r i s e s o n l y f r om afee l ing of super ior i ty .

Moreover, indi vidu al u n it s i n the courss of an engagement meet s i t -uations which .have th e e a r m rk s of a meeting engagement..374. According t o th e i n i t i a l siixdntions th e meeting engagement ta ka sdi ff er en t forms. Often th e co urse of th e engagement by the forward elementsi s of si ga if ic an ee f or the depleyment and conduct of t he l a t e r engagement.

. With immediate at ta ck s f'rom m r c h form ation by both opponents t he recan devel'op t h e sc rge back and foi-th, i n which the independence o f ac t io n andc ap n bi l i t i e ~ f lower l eade rs m d t roops ar e dec is ive ,In apo$her manner th e meeting 6ngag&mnt develops, .i f bo th opponent:from the fir.st -engage deployed i h combat and 'one, a f t e r th e f i r s t enoounter,holds himself back tnihile waiting, or i f bosh from the f i r s t t r y t o inc rease thcba tt le readiness of t h ei r for'ces by assembly posi t ion s,Finally, should one of th e opponents gi vs up h is advance and mwe

tiwljr in to a defensive po sitio n, th e oth er may, according to cirnunstanoes,be required t o organize his a t t ack as agains t a pos i t ion,

375. Success i n meeting m ga unent s f a l l s t o bim who an ti ci pa te s th eenemy ai~dhnld s him i n d e pe n d m e fwikhout freedom of ontiox.), Quick pe ro ep tl i;f Lavorable siturrtions, rapid conduct i n unclar i f i e d s :.'i.;l:ations, bmediatoor;I ers ar e nec essar y presumptions.

The s ur es t bas is for suecress i s th e advantage 6 ea rl ie r) ef b a tt lepreparation. This advantage forc es the enemy t o fig ht against sup eri or ity andf a c i l i t a t e s tine fur th er combat i n t h e des i red di rec t ion.Report No. 14,5a7.


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376, Only excoptio mlly a t the time of meeting wi l l the i nte nt i on ofth e enemy be cl ea r t o us* Shod&, an important t e r r a i n are a l i e between th eopponents, a ra pi d ad~ fm ccof the ho st i l e advshce guard m ~ s t e reckonedwith. Rest raint on th e p ar t -of the ehm y i s t o be expected if he has not theadvantage of ba tt lo p repar ation or i f hs has no particu1r.r t e r r a i n advantageon his side.As a rule the i n i t i a l engagements w i l l bring a cer tain clar i ty 3 ex-eeptf cna l ly may th is c l a r i f ioa t io Lbe waited f cr r

3774 If the commander has timely information about +Re advance of theenemy, by the kinri and time of t he deploynient w i l l he s ee k 50 f ix the begin-ning and course of the b at tle .378. Has th e conunander no tim el y infor matio n of th e s it u at io n , it maybe necessary for the column c o m d e r s i n a m rc h of several cei?&s t o makeindependent d ec is io ns of co nsid er ab le conseq.uence. These must ..k6ep t b t h e i ror ig in al missions a s long a s the suppositions (oonditiozG) ra i a in unohanged.Should an adja.ccnt march column en te r in to b a t tl e , then must i t be determinedv&ether p a r t i c ip a t ion i n th i s engagemurat, i n tile e v ~ n t uch ac t ion dev ia5es

f r s m the mission and mareh objec tive, does not lead t o t h e renunciation ofgreater suecoss.

I t i s the mission sf the comand6r t o regain quickly contr8l ofth e sit uatien 'wbi ch.th e su bordinate leaders, b y independent action , havebrought absut.379. Th e m is si rn nf tho ad vanceguard, to secure freedom of doc isionfor the conu nder of the march colunm, t i m fo r the b at tl o pr epara tion of th ef o l l e d r g forces , and good observa tion condi t ions fo r tho m s s of tho ar t i l l e r y

and th e heavy in fa nt ry weapoas, can be accomplished off en si ve ly or d efens ively.Decisive a ct io n vri l l often lead t o success. A l imi te d re ti rement i s to be con-sidered against a superior onemy and i n unfavorable te rr a in and thereby shortenthe time of' ow mn dcplopwnt.380, The b at t l e readi ness of t he advame p a r d i s to be secured quickly.Early- employment of heavy in fa nt ry weapons and of th e advmce p a r d a r t i l l e ra s s i s t s i n breaking the f i r s t ho st i le re sistan ce, brings the ho st i le movemet o a s top, and draws out the h ost i le a r t i l le r y f i re . Should tanks be atta che dt o the advance ~ ua rd ,a surp r ise a t taok b y these can be of treat effect.

I f immediate attock by the infantry is indicated, it i s mployed,without further preparation, i n the decisivc: direction, under protection of apo rt io n of the heavy inf an tr y weapons quick ly going in to po si tio n, or it a t -tacks a f te r only a sh or t assembly posi t ion.Should the advance guard c o m n d e r decide to defcnd, it may be suit-able to bring the advance guard a r t i l l e r y into pos i t io ns widely separated inorder t o deceive th e enemy a s t o our s t rcng th q d o fo rce him t o roundaboutmd cautious conduct. Lil


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Earl y employment of the ar t i l l e r y and i t s nieans of.obs8rvktionsecure. be st an a r t i l l e r y .preponderance over t he enemy. Therefore, it can bei -ecomnded tha t the en t i re a r t i l l e ry be orde red in to ac t ion :b i fo re the i n i -.. . .t i a l engagement has enti re1 y c l a r i f i e d t h e s i t u a t i o n ,The forming up. of the a r t i l l e r y i n a M e ti n g enng'agbent i s deter-mined by the s i t u a t i o n * preMous develbpment,, t h e kind of. i l i i t i a l Contact , dis-.

t r ib i l t ion of the a r t i l l e r y t b individual march cblumns and' according to ter-$tiin, each s i t ua tio n being di ff er on ti Frequently unitkry mploymmt i s a t t a i n -ed only gradually, Oftsn the in i t i a l . 6 rdel' of th e comander t o t h e a r ' t i l l e rycan contain pnly the general in ten tio n and S a t t i e misdlons of the a r t i l l e r y i ngeneral terms. In t h e f i r t h e r , c o u r s e of t he engagement t h e 0 0 4 d e r e x e r t sh i s in f luence w e r the artillery by assig ning b a tt le missions *ich deVelopa s t h e s i t u a t i o n c l e ar s .

. .852. On the basi s of th e. pr eL im im ry (covering for ce) esgagement and, i fpos s'ibie, h is pa rso nal ground .reconnais san c e, th e cormnandar. Efccidos how h e

w i l l further aonduct the engngment., Should he decide, in o rd er t o m a W a i n an advantage ivhichha helds,t o a t ta ck (wi thout assembly p ~ s i t i o n s- ) ,he launches. t h e main fo rc e :d i r e c t l y in to


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At.tack of Positions.

386. Thr measures used by the ~ t t ~ ~ k o r tho con-epend on his int ent ion , duct of thq enemy, t he r e l a t i v e strengths, t h ~i ' tu a t io n ond s t r e n g t h of t h o h o s t i l e ' p o s i t i o n ancl tb& 'tcrrain for tlie at tr ic k* , 387. Should we be unable t o avoid or envelop &e h o s t i l e pos it io n, h i s fr on t must be at tac ked and a penetrat ion sou&t for.

The execution of th e fro nta l a t ta ck i s determined according t o themanner the attc.c!cer can br in g h i s f or ce s and means, i n accordanc e wi th timeand space, i nto ef fe ct , Should "hese forces pad moans be insufficielit for abrc& through, a l o s s extensive obje ctive must be i a d i cotod.988,. Tl+e t i m e re qu ir ed pr io r kc ti-ie begi nnin g of t'nc n$tack i s $opendent.on whether the' a t t s d e r has i n h i s .possess ion the to rr a i r i immediz te ly i n f ron tof .the po si ti on or must f i r s t sdc&o it, ard the t ine required fox- prcpara-t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l ar f o r t he o s s ~ mb l y f tho fo rces jn qssembly positions.

The more d i f f i c u l t t h ; at ta ok appears, the moru thorough must be th o preparations. The t ime required for prep arc t i ons on t h ~ ) a r t of tho a t - t acke r i s also favorably ~ t i l i ~ e d y the dofcndir.The amouqt of fo r ce s and means re qu ir ed depends upon t h e st re n g th of the hos t i le defense . An at ta&.under taken w2th ins uf f i c i en t forces md means ccn l e a d to a grievous rever se.

389. To pro pe rly d ispo se our for ce s it i s impo rtan t to know early the dominnting po in ts of tho h o st i l e posi t ion . For tho dec is ion as t o t h e deci - s iue act ion s of th e at-l;aclc t h i s i s an important m t t e r .

390. Systematic reconnaissance or din ar i ly provldes the f i n a l ba s i s f or the a t t ack preparations and di sp o si ti on s. This reconnaissa noe combines infor. mation for the advance and fo r th e a t tack. Gassed ar ea s and th e i r extent i n f ront of th e pos i t ion n re t o be e s p e c i a l l y i d e n t i f i e d . A thorough examination of th e mp w s t be md e.A i r roconnaissmce, conducted early enough, w i l l f in d th e enemy a twork. By memis of phctogrc-phr- and v i s u a l r eoon nais sanc e t h i s reco nnn issan cesecuros an in si gh t into h o s t i l e dei'cnse measures, both i n advance of and int h e p o s i t i o n . F lye rs can a s s i s t and aoce le ra to long rmge f i r e , Attcclc avia-t i o n p ro teo t s our uir reconnaissance and at t .acks hosti le air reconnaissance. .md capt ive ba l loons .Ground battle r ccon nais s~nc c ounds out the a i r reconnaissnnce. Ba tt le rew nnu is sanoe must be pushed through. A r t i l l e r y cbs ervuki on meFuls ar e employed e ar ly .The com md er di re ct s r oconnnis sanc e g d info rmnt ion means.

591. With t k E ad-rmc e tO .the h i s t i l e p o s i t i o n t he q ue st io n mi n e s :*ere does the main b a t t i o f i e l d b e gi n? In t h e t e r r a i n l y i n g ' b e fo re t h e p o s i -tion tho enemy w i l l aonduct delaying action. In f ron t o f tho main ba t t l e pos f -t i o n th e a tt ac k er must reolcon with advanced pos it io ns and o ~!tpost pos ition s.Thc #at tac ko r must s t r i v e to actvunce quickly r.nd energetically,A rt i l le ry f i r e f rom cons iderable d is tances must not hold him up, Ho sti le bnt-t e r i e s must be s i lenced quickly . A s a rulo th s a d v w t ; devel,aps in to numeroussma l l a t t n c k proup8 which a r e composed of in fa n tr y and a r t i l l e r y , and, accord-

Report No, 14,507.-75-


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8

m e d s j f tanks, .Pbqs e must quic kly break through or push back theeneny. 'Cf poss ible, we push pa st h o st il e advanced po sit ion s i n order not tohold up the actvance*Should the po si t i on of the main ba t t l e p os i t i on be uncla ri f ied ,should the enemy accomplish timely and tenaoious resistance or. should we de-s i re to avoid a premature advance in to the h os t i l e posi t io n 's ef f ec t ive f i r e

zone, th e approach must be made by bounds. IIowever, because of * t h i s thetroops cannot be denied the po ss ib i l i t ie s of u t i l i z in g favorable opportuni t ies,The goal of tho approach march i s th e sec uring of t e r r a i n for t hea r t i l le r y deployment and a r t i l le r y observat ion of the bat t lo f ie ld .

392. Meeting a closely bit infantry defense supported by strong arti l-le ry echelaned i n depth usu al ly is proof th at tho ar ea of the ho st i l e mainba t t l e pos i t i cn has been reached. The fo rm rd in fan t ry d igs i n m d tnkos overpro tec tion of the davelopment and of th e a r t i l l e r y observaiticn positio ns.I t must be in pos i t i on t o r epo l hos t i l e t h rus t s .

The m s s o f t h e infant ry and the o ther arms not yet necess ar i lyemployed can be held back beyond th e ef fe ct ive range of ho st il e a r ti l le r y .333. The fu rt he r reconnaissance and .in fo na tio n provide de ta il s of thehos t i l e pos i t i on s-?d for the conduct of the at t ack . Therefore, the hos t i lebutpost must o rd in ar i ly be driven in. .Ry continuous observation. .ef the at ta ck t e r r a i n i s the informationobtain ed whereby we oan prope rly assign obj ective s to .tho a r t i l l e r y and heavyinfantry weapons. . ..

. ,

A rt i l le ry aviators, balloons, end observation ba t ta l io ns are em-ployed for target reconnaissance. They of ten del ive r th e f in a l bases fo r thea r t i l l e r y deployment. However, t h e deployment cannot be ..delayed. &va tt in g th es eagencies. . . . .... .Fho tog ra~ hic econnaissance es ta bl is he s tho probable main ba. t t lef i e l d . Commanders anrl tro ops reo eiv e th e nec ess ary pi ct ur es .P o s s i b i l i t i e s fir ta nk anplnyment ar e t o be recannoitered.Engineers determine t h e pa rt i ou la r k i d and sl; rength of blocksand hinder anoes.The h os ti le cam unica tion system i s imrestigatod by means o f l i s t en -ing devices and methads, Security of our uvm system against s imilar host i ledevices i s necessary.By a r t i l l e r y f i r e f r o ~ ndifferent positions and by reconnaissancera id s the enemy i s made t o div ulg e his strength, Heconnaissanct, at ta ck s(r ai ds ) ar e esp ec ia lly important i f lo ca l retireme nts of dummy positio ns ar ct o be reckoned with.The timc neceesary for reconnaissance and information cannot be mdet0.o short. Only by re li ab le ar.d exa et repo rts can th e cooperation ef tho arms

be of f ect ed r Late r c h g e s cause l e s s o r t ime , a r e difficult of execution andare aecompaniod by losses.394. On the basis of the reconnaissanao and infbrmtion resul ts the com-mander i nd iv id ua ll y deoidcs upon the conduct of the attack.

,.$tiring forcc s a rc t o be mncentrated agai nst those ar eas wh&e thea t ta c k moans e&be br ou@t to %l l e f fec t . Areas of .pcne-tr t ion are . not to bechosen so small tha t t he pcnetf~i ti i lg ' roops a r e e+os&d t o th e uni ted f i r e ofthe defender. Success a t one a re a of pene tration must be ca rr ie d over t o th eothers so that the por t ion? of thc .position lying between are quickly overcome.I t may be expeditious t o i o mound or envelop strong poin ts af t h e ho st il e

, .,

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position. Areas avoided must be he ld d om or by ot he r mean% diminated . Highpoi nts upon which the defender can bring oonoentrated a r t i l l e r y f i r e , ordinar-i l y a r e more qu ickly tnken by an advance on ei th e r side the reo f. Point s whichl a t e r a re important for our onn observation and favorable t a nk t e r r a i n may bedecis ive i n t h e choice o f t h e penetra t ion zone. Likewise, the ter ra in i n therear of th e hos t i le p os i t io n i s t o be g iven consideration .

395. According t o th e s izo of the force the objec t ive i s d lose or d is ta n t ,If the a t t ack cannot be carried through with one impulse, severala t tacks , following one another as qui ckly a s possible , must be.executed, eachwith a l im ited objective. The r ap id u t i l i s a t i o n of a sucoess must not be den-i ed a s a r e s ul t .

396. Opposite t he h as t i l e a r t i l l e r y prepared for ae t io n our ~ r t i l l e r ymust execute deployment circumspectly. In accordance vkth t h e i r missions,t h e i r d e k d s f o r o bs er va ti on and t h e t e r r a i n t h e b a t t e r i e s a r e c a r ef u l ly d is -tr ib ut cd.Tho at ta ck pre para tion and t h c ammunition supply fo r a r t i l l e r y re-

quires t i m e . 397. The ar ea s from mbich the In f& tr y launches i t s attack must be ad-vanced a s near a s po ss ib le t o th e enemy, must provide cover fo r t he deployed infantry aad mke pos si bl o obs erv ati an f or t he heavy i nf an tr y weapons and th e a r t i l l e r y fo r thei r immediate support o f the a t tack .

Often must tho f i n a l arons of departure pr io r t o the In fan t ry a t t aokbe gained by combat.

398. A t th e l a t e s t , the cgmmander, a t t h e time he makes his deci sion t o a tt a ck , i s s u es t h e S rd e r s s t i l l n eaos sa ry fo r t h e a r t i l l e ry , fo r t ho In fan t ry att ack organizntion, fo r tho cemplction of t h e ba t t l e oommmications ne t and i t s connection with tho special n et s and for the o ther a t tack preparat ions . 399. Upon recommcadations of t h e a r t i l l e r y commander, th e commanderC r d ~ r s h e a r t i l l e r y d is tr ib ut io n in accordance with i t s tas ks, Therefore,in ce rta in oases, the spli% ting of individunl unit s , and in pa rt ic ul ar of

heavy artillery, must be made. The morc di f f i c u l t t h e attack appears, the moreimportant i s it t o be able t o concent rate super io r a r t i l l e ry f i r e on the deo i-s ive a t tack zreas .In th e corps, should div is io ns fi gh t bes ide one w*other i n smallzones, it may be su it ab le for the corps commander t 6 give sp ec ia l ins-t ructi onst o the d iv is ions for the organization of th e i r own and e s p ec i a l l y a l l o t t ed a r rt i l l e r y and t o assign ta sks outside th e division zone. Normally the rete nti on'under immediate corps control i s l im ite d t o the heaviest ba tt e ri e s mplsyad fordistant missions.

400, Tho at ta ck plan of t h e commtlnder i s th e b a si s of th e a r t i l l e r y and js.fantry f i r e plan. The commander may charge th e a r t i l l e r y cnmmander with drawing up a f i r i n g plan, mbich aceording to thc sz ve ri ty of the a tt zo k i s gcncral or specific. I t may be, ag ains t str ong pcs iti oni i, a regu lator of the in fa nt ry at tack i n time and i n the securing of objeetivcs.

The Inf ant ry and Ar tiL lor y f i r e p l m s must bc;. i n harmony. Thogre at +es tioA i s t ha t a l l p reviously knmn tp rg et s must'be eggaged and thr- t 'a11 ta rg e ts appmaring a t th e beginning of o r during th e cour se of t he attao k,and pa r ti cu la r ly the se which from neighboring zones a r e el 'fec tive' agai nst ouradvance, must be engaged. The In fa nt ry and A r t i l l e r y f i r e plan8 must 6on sia erthe rearward pos it io n @f the te rr a i n of the a t tack . . For a l l of these tasks ,it i s necessaqy that compatible arrangements be made betvrem. .-the lower Infantryand Artillery cemmariders cooperating i n their individual zones, It i s t h e irtask mutually to help eeoh other and iner ease the f i r e effeotiveness and conse-quently t o be su re tha t by f i r e a t t acks new ta rg e t s a re f i re d upan.

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Should th e A rt i l le ry and t h e Minenwerfers havc th e ' sm e ta rg et s ,i n some in sta nc es it may be sui table t o a t t ac h the Minenvrerfers to t he a r t i l -le ry .401. From t h e advanoe of t h e In fa n try up t o t h e e n t r a n ~ ~ i n t o .he hos-t i l e main b a t t l e f i e l d , we must even s t r iv e for f i r e super ior i ty over the hos-t i l e a r t i l le r y . Such su pe ri or it y i s indispensable for t h e advance of oIir In-fan t ry if th e 6n6my has s tron g a r t i l l e r y which has b een we ll a 'djusted. Like-wise, the h o s t i l e a i r defense b a tt er ie s must be beaten dovm ear ly.

The a r t i l l e r y qf the defender w i l l attempt t r , viithdra$,.f,rom the en-gaganent4 This can o c ' c a s ' i o ~ l l ~e preve rited By good ob se rv ati on means and anact iv e ba t t le a i r reconnaissance. Otherwise i s th e i r enegement f i r s t poss ib lewhen our Infantry at ta ck forces the defender t o show h is ba tt er ie s i n th ei rfin@ f i r ing pos i t ionsbThe known, and th os e with eonsiderab l e ce r t a i n t y determinccj, hos-t i l e b a t t e r i es m u s t be ago.ged pri or t o the advanc? of t he Inf6ntry a tt ac k sot h a t they can n.o longer f i r e c ffec t ive ly . Then i s it poss ib le t o ho ld these

dnwn with m a l l un it s, t o pla ce tk mass on newly appearing ba t te r i e s and tosupport eff ect ive ly, su f fi ci e nt ly and immediately tho Infantry4 Should th e '~?ianyshow, a i thc beginning of tho Infa ntty at ta ck , new and strong ar t i l l e r y ,f i r e s up er io ri ty 'ovcr t h i 8 must be secured, depending on con ditions, As aresult of this, a d'drresponding pause ill the Infantry at t a c k p u s t be made.The more .d i f f i cul t the engagemcnt ( ~ o u n t e r b n t t e r ~ )f the hos t i l ear t i l l e r y , tho mcrc important i s the b l inding of hoot i lo a r t i l l e r y obsvrvationi n doc isive moments of t h c att ack .Cmly rarely w i l l it be possible to begin with surpriso tho ongage-msnt of the a r t i l l e r y (courrterbattPrp) j us t before o r a t the beginning of th e

Infantry at tack. On the ot he r hand, no ot he r choice may be pos si bl e with un-favorable v i s i b i l i ty and observat ion condi tions , if the t ime of the Infantrya t t ack i s not postponed.402. The preparations of th e at tack ing Infa ntry i n the are as of depar-tu re depend upon the p ro tec tio n which these of fe r against ho st i l e f i r e andupon the time of th e :b eg i nnN of th e In fant ry a t t ack , If the a reas of de-part ure a re unfcvorable and the t i m o f a t h & yet undecided these pos i t ionsa r e occupied la te . Cwerzd avenues of approach a r e t o bu reconnoitered.403. The success af tb a r t i l l e r y c ou nt er ba tt er y, t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s ofInfantry prepara t ion in the area a of departure and the r es ul ts of the ass id i -o u ~ l ycontinued ba t t le reconnaissance are bases for the t ime of tho Infantrya t t ack , the o rder fo r i s i ssued a s l a t e a s possible.404. A t t h e tb a ordered the infantry advances from the a re as of depar-tu re . The exeoution of the In fan try att a ck and th e speed with which it i sca r r ie d forward depend upon: ( 1 ) th e proxim ity of th e ar ea .of depaarture t o th emain ho st i l e posit ion, ( 2 ) the t y p e o f te r ra in over which the at t aok must ad-vance, (3) the command tho ho sti le f i r e has over t h i s t er ra in , and ( 4 ) t h estre ngth of tho ho st i l e occupatinn.

If th e af-eks af d e p a r t u r e l i e disk& and s-i;rong a r t i l i o r y f i r e i st o be reckoned with, it m y be vc ry su i t ab le t o malce the i n i t i a l advancesmder.covering darkness. Snioke i s us efu l i n f a c i l i t a t i n g the advanee over,a d the winning'of, t e r r a i n without cover. Vkenevcr tho Infa ntry i s held upby hos t i l e f i re , it digs in . Gradmlly it works fo r-mrd , n w a t t h i s p la ce ,now a t th at , u t i l i z e s tho 'cooper~.t ing f i r c s of heavy infa ntry weapons and ar-t i l l e r y t o aclvmoe %nd a g ai n d ig s i n * Thus th e infunbry advance can extendover days, agai nst a s trong, x e l l organized po sit ion .&a ovcr t e r r a i n 8 i f fi .ecul t fo r tAe a t tackor . In such s i tu at io ns the Infantry, e t the baginning ofthe at tac k, by advancing i n a deeply organieod, t h i p l i n o fermatinn can e nti ceout t he ho s t i lo f i r e and for ce the enemy t o omploy h i s heavy i n f a n t r j weaponsand a r t i l - l e~y.

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405. If th e above intent iof? i s accomplished and th er e i s a not iceables u ~ e r i o r i t y f our own ar t i l l er y, by furth er working forward the Infan try en-g,aies i n a str ong er f i r e .fight nea rer th e enemy. I f necessary th e most ad-vanced e1oirent;s pire reinforcad, The heavy infantry weapons must be employedac ai r~ st hose areas which Yie a r t i l l e r y cannot effectively reach,V h r ea s agains t weak resistcuicc ' the penct rc~tioc ,? imnied,i8tely

f o l l m - th e working forward t o the main ba t t l e - po si t io n , aga inst a tenaciousdefense th e pen etra tio n must b e prepared by th e combined f i r e of a l l arms de-ployed i n depth i n ard,.-r t o wear 'do.em'i;hs encmy cud croa ic n softening.. In accordance mith th e str eng th of th e he st il o main l i n e th e pene-t ra .Gon shapes i t se l f d i f fe rent ly . Against a weak_ defense it k i l l often comeabout throu gh th e indspendsnt a ct io n of lower commanders and on t e r r a i n notprepared th erefor . Against a tenacious defense it m y be necesskry t o preparea coordinated penetr ation attack. The infantry during .the ni&t preceding,concen trates tho forward elements and attem pts to ad+anos a s near a s pos si bl et o the enemy so t h a t it can u t i l i z e fu l l y i t s f i r e support ; The penet rat ioni s or di m ri ly a ooordimtad asoault , launched a t a par t icu lar hour. The hour

of a t t ac k i s t o be kept secret. The at tac k i s t o be launched a t dmm, i f t h eattaoking infantry is. t* avoid -'exposure t o ho st il e observed f i r e during bright-ness. Thc infa ntr y, without tur nin g as id e and followin@, ho a r t i l l e r y sxd . 'heavy inf an tr y weapons f i r e , pushes through t e i t s objective. I t may be neces-sary t o us e e~i gi ne er sto des tro y hinderances ere cted by th e ehomy. P ar ts oft h e ~ r t i l l o r y re to be made available ea rl y to scaompnny the ir fu nt ry -&ichbreaks through nnd should be at ta ch ed th er et o; ba tt er ie s which recognize th cpo ss ib il i- ti es of advancing do 30 of their own vol i t ion .406, In the coope ration between f i r e anti the advancing as sa ul t and vsithth e cooperation of a l l arms the enemy, a f t e r t h e pen etra tio n, i s beaten down

(see pa ra~raphs363 and 364 ) i n tho depth of th e po si t io n i n nmarous individ-ual engagements up to the complete break through or until the atthidment oft h e f i r s t o bj ,o cti ve . Should ei th er of the se f a i l of accomplishment, th e t e r -r a i n alr ead y won i s defonded and h?ld u n t i l t h e a t t a c k om bk renbvred.: No re-connaissance and information measures a re t o be taken.407. During t h e ccur ss of t h e at ta ck the enemy may attempt to reestab-l i s h the defense i n a rearward posi t ion i n order t o f ig ht bherc in under morefavorable conditions ; als o he ra y wish to withdrav! from f i r t h e r combat. Inboth instances ha w i l l o rdLmr ily a t t m p t to break off contact during thenigM .

Or din aril y tho most forvmrd troops re wg ni zo it f i r s t i f the enemyw i l l not continuo tho cngagunent i n h i s present p ositio n. The ahnrpcst vigi-lance must bo m i n t h in o d o ve r a l l h o s t i l o movements and actions.Likewise often w i l l th e impulse t o fol low ernaneke from th e mostadvanced tro ops. Every e f f o r t must be made, by sharp and deoisive'followingup, t o maintain c lose con tac t ~ 5 t hhe enemy. Reconnaissance i s made f o r gas-sed areas. Should th e enemy delay upon a po si ti on lyin g not t oo f a r t o -therea r , it i s the task of the f i r s t l in e t raops (forward) t o force th e reconnais-sance of and information &out the nw! position and the conditions of approaoh

the reto ,' In a night withdrawal by th e enemy, strong troop s can only fe llo w a tdaylight. Tnese, i n th e faoe of: t h e expected counterniocisures of t h e enemy,arid es pe ci al ly of hi s artillery, mu s t ad-.,ante b y bounds and on ly th en can do 'so>&en th e mass of our a r t i l l e r y h as be en advanced t o new post t ipns ~ n d s pro-parod t o fire... :.In the ins tsn ce where t h e enemy r c t i r e s f a r -f;o th e re ar and the pur-s u i t csnnot, be immcdi-toly undertaken, the com and er sp coi fios th o conduct ofth e ar t i l l e r y , regula too thi: follm-r up by the j .nfrzLtryFin? 1leci6os the locat io nof the reserve. OPtm %illhe niass of t h e in fa nt ry not be bble t o 'cdvanoobvcr the previous fr ont l ine p ri o r to dayl ight . If po ss ib lc , thc encmy mustbe overtdcon.

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Coun toratt acks by tho r e t i r i n g enomy must Bc expected.408, Abbrevktod at ta ck propdrations a r e i n ordet i f th e onemy, throughprevious e'ngagm&nts, hVsbeen sh&q or .if ho i s ne t preparod for. defense, ori f t he p os si bi l i ty i s offered t o su$prise him and use our ovm superiori ty.Upon thb 8i tm t io n , the s t re ng th of the h os ti le posit ion, sad. the depth of th eobjective, is determinod the ex te nt to wh ic h the r eco nna issq ce ana. :bnfarmationmeasures and a t t a c k pr ep arat io ns can be abbrev iated. Rapid deployment of t h e

a r t i l l e r y and quick~developmentof' the in fa nt ry clo se t o t he enemy po si ti onmake possib le th e u ti l i za t i on quickly of a fa wr ab le s i t uat ion . Under condi-tfons favoring th ei r employment, the ea rl y pr ep ra ti on s md use of tank un it sw i l l fu ci li ta %: e he c,t.tnck. . Smoke, i n favorable weather and torrain, must beconsidered.

409. Against im cnemy Pi&t Lng delay ix action,. . the attacker w i l l a r r ive .more quickly a t h i s objec t ive i f he a tt ac ks a t one. pl ac e v&th stro:ig forces.An ntt6clr pushed through qu ickl y and deeply fo rce s tho cnomy t o evacuate e a r lythe whole front. Should he succeed in w'itfldrawing then me should, by a rapidfollow up and the n ssignw nt of dis ' t& objec tives, not l e t contact be brokenand- thus shou3.d we prevent him reforming hi% front,. .Should t h s enemy occupy 4rearward po sit i on we should, a s circainistmeos permit, launch a new at ta ck a tnnothbr area on his fro nt i n order to sur pri se him olld provide tho p os si bi l i tyfo r an e a r l y bronlc through. For t h i s purpose tho new at ta ck groups must bcformed early. The m s s of th e a r t i l l e r y i s to be ,h p t 'w e l l advanced; tank em-.p l o p e a t mzy be quit;a. su it ab le , engin eers should be we ll forward cnd an ly th emcst necessary camunioctions ar e c j l l c d for.

V I I . Pursuit.

410. Tiredness of th e troop s m y never be the ba sis fo r no t pursuing, The leader is cutho rizcd t o dr-nond the z p p r e n t l y impossihle. Boldness md dcring must guide him. Everyone nus t do h i s utmost, 411. Measures f i r the p ur su it nro t o be taken seasonably. AD over-est imation of m approaching success may lead t o t he donger of a ser iou s s e tback. Forces which a r e launched t o o ea rl y in pursu it may endanger the suocessof th e victory.412, The victor pursues on a broad front and always strives to outflankthe enemy, to outdis tance him, t o s t r i ke h is re tr ea t i n flank, or t o force himaway from his line of commmications.

Obsteclos pl.aced i n th e r ea r of th e enemy a s s i s t the pursuingtroops.. t413. When tho co m qd er , through a i r and other troop s' rep ort s, through

tb advance of h i s ' troops, .through the r el ax at io n of t he h o st i l c coun.termea-sures, and a t t i m s th rough rep or t s of neighboring t roops , recogn izes th a t th e 'enemy cannot maintain h is po sit io n, -he spurs o n t o the utmost t he " w i l l of vic-tory" of the 1m er commzders, he put s. into motion i n tho dec isiv e pursuit, di r-ectio n a l l ava ilabl e troops, and a s s o n bs possible arlvmces. roformed or newlyformed pur su it groups. VJoaporls of h ig h. spec?d and mob il ity. a r e t o . b e pushedforward with the foremost troops. Lucrative missions ar e of,fered e sp ec ia ll yto army sava lry md stron g motorized forces. Motorized engineers, bank defenseweapons and autiaircraft elements should accompany the motorised elements.WhQl th o p ur su it cannot bc ox ecutn d'by outdistnno ing tho cnemy rtr the routethere to i s too f ar , the pursuing troops ar e t o b e pushed through o.t t he breakthrough area. A t such ar ea s coo rdi mt ed~ oon u~~ and secured..ust' bc

414. Attac k and bombardment av ia t io n i s to be cnploycd against the re-t re a t in g main ho s t i lc forco. This avia t ion increases thc d issolut ion of thehos t i l e force cmd dis rup ts the t ra ff ic on the roarward main roads, a t cr i t i c a lpo in t s and a t ra i l rpad s ta t ions .

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Observation av ia ti on reco nn oit ers t he r oads along which th e enemyr e t r e a t s and observes pa r t i cu la r ly for re inforcem nts l a s t ing formrd;416. As soon a s th e enemy y ie ld s , t h e lower commanders immediately an d'vrithout a k i t i n g ,orders , tak e up t!m p u r m i t . - They must a c t bo ld ly nnd inde-pendently. 'Every advantage i s taken. of h o s t i l e weaknesses. It is agains t theenemy tha.t .contact and &op eratio n wit h adjacent unit^ aresought..

' n the pressure of (he S r s u i t repo rts ooncerning obje ctivc s gainedmust not be forgotten.416. Ammunition-supply for a l l arms i s a pr ere qu isi t e for th e eff ect ive carrying on of the f i r e pu rs u it . . 417. Because of' i t s long range and mobil i ty the ar t i l l e r y i s espec ial ly sui table. fo r pursuit . Where ~ dm iss i ble , he f i r e i s of grea t violcnco.

A port ion of the a r t i l l e r y remains i n posi t ion so long a s the vrith-drawing enemy con be engaged with observed and ple nne d f i r e . Espeoial ly ared i st a n t t a r ge t s t o be taken w d e r fi r o r th e advnnce of thc pursuing inf ant rycannot be hinderod. Long range f l c t tr aj ec to ry bat to ri os osver th e roads ofre t r ca t and ra i l r oad s ta t ions wi th s trong f i r e s of in te rd ic tion .

Strong ar t i l l e r y e1mcntt.c pr ess on i n conjunction with the pursuinginfantry,. prevent the enany con solid ating a posit ion, eagage co. mt em tta cksand $ r a d u ~ l l ~ bo-ake over t h e f i r0 missions of t h e el an en ts s t i l l r o m ~ . ~ i n ghind ..418, By f ir c ' a r d the in fa nt ry ass ur es tho complete de-t r ~ ~ ' ~ r e s s i x afe a t o f t he e nmy* necc;ssnry, it f i @ t s wit h hand grenades md bayonets.The heavy i n f ' n n t ~weapons must,not he si ta te t o go into po si ti on c lose behind

or among th e foremost elements. It -p us hc s pas t strong ho st il c resis tan ce, t h eremoval of t h i s r es is tm ce being l e f t t o -tho rearward elements, &ich advancewhere t h e pursuing $roops must quic kly g ai n ground. Too ea r l y change of f ro n ti s t o be awidcd.

419. Terrain poisoned by the cnemy i s t o be aw id ed ,ad the t roops fo l -lowing must be informed th er eo f, Troops on motor v e h ic lc s can push throught h i s t o r r a i n, A t areas ea s i ly dogassod (s t r ee ts and te r r a i n without g,rowth)passages aro made a t the e a r l ie s t t ime possible.420. Engineers which have not been sen t t o outdistw.ce tNe enemy and t o

plaoe obstacles along the routes o f re t rea t , repa i r the s t r ee t s and roads i nre ar of th e pursuing troops.421. The s igna l tr oo ps do tbfr utmost to maintain comunicai;ion betweenthe commander and the pursuing troops. Comun ication must of te n be maintainedby means of radio.

The divis ion al s igna l bntta l in n pnskas forward the trunk l i n e i n themain pu rs ui t d ire cti on ,. Should t h e enemy renew ba tt le , an advanced message cen-t e r i s established for oonm~unicationby ?&re o each flank and rea nmr d,.

During t h e pur sui t every e f f o r t i s made t o in te rc ep t enemy messagesand comunications. .

422, A l l commanders accompany or cl os ol y fo llow the pursu ing troops.423' Positions m d renr guards must not be al1,wed t o drav th e pursuerfrom the dboisive dir uct ian .no r t o corrtairi larg e forces, W i y a ttem pt mustbe made to $t r ik e the m i n hos t i le force . Correspondingly the reserves arepushed forward and when nece ssa ry new st ri k in g tro op s a r e fo'med from th e se t ocarry un the purst1,ujt with renermd energy.

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Should th e enemy re es ta bl is h himself i n te r r a i n from vhich he cannotbe d is l o d ~ e d t onoe, the attack must be again coordinated and be supported ~ d t bstro ng a r t i l l e r y f i r e .424. ~ r g d z a t i o nof t h e u n i t s ; supply of ammunition, b a tt l e needs andra t ions t akc ,~ l ' ac i i " du in g he m w w n t forward. These m s t nq t in t e r fe re wi ththe r@ id advance o f - t h e purmit.. : The- wnmsr.der must r e l i e v e th e' piigsuingtroops of supply m d cvacuntion w o r ~ i e.425. Ouring a night pu rsu it the i nf an try pushes forward fron tal ly , alongthe s t ree t s , whi le the a r t i l l e r y executes t o i t s fu l l e s t capaci ty and up to i t sgreate st ..range : f i re s of int erd ict ion . I n div 2d u ~l a t t a li o n s t ~ y follorv andogo into pos itio n according t o th e map. .Theso extend the depth of tho interdic.:t io n f i r e s and occasional ly c m take par t i n the c loso cambat of the infant ry . .. ,

Reports concerning ob je ct iv es rea ched by: t h e advanc od elementsshould be sent reanvard so t h a t t hes e e l~ rments r e na t f i r e d in to by o;lr owna r t l l ery ..Night air a t tack s can inorease the a r t i l le r y e f fe c t i n the rearward

h o s t i l e t e r m i n .I f possible, enc irc lin g elements ar e pushed forward during th e night

426. Only s n ord ers of t h e high cormnand i s the purs ui t swpended'or stop-ped.

The pu rsu i t cmn@ t be stopped i n one area.

VI I I . , Defense.

427. The defenqe i s pri ma rily eff ect cd by fi re . Therefore th e defendermust seek to secure ilbe maximum f i r e e ff ec t. To t h i s end a thorough knowledgeof t h e b a t t l e t e r r a i n a s s i s t s i n b e t t er u t i l iz s . t i o n of t he t e r r a i n and i n bet-t e r f i e l d f o r ti f ic a ti o n s, which at the same t i m prov ide be tte r. cover and asupe rior f i r e e f f ec t aga ins t t he a t t acke r., .

428, The fa ct that, the: cle,f;nse has. n i t the i n i t i a t i v e a s does the attao k-er , demands th at co nt ac t with th e enemy he made a s ea r ly a s po ss ib le 9 that ever?reconnhissance agency bs employed to determine 'th e:d ire cti on of. tKe ho st il e sp-proach, t he composition and st re ng th of h is fo rc es . Likpwise, it.:s:.importantto secure the posi t ion car ly i n all di rec t ioas from which,n suddsn a tt ac k mightbe launched. Curing the defense orgnnieation a d arrangements wo must be abl'et o occupy the terrain - against n surp t i se a tt ack . For t h i s purpose t h o t roopsar e so di str ibu ted during the establ ishment of the defeme.

429. The t e r r a i n on v,hich tho defenso i s made detcrmincs the lo cn tio n ofthe forvrard elem~nts. Good observa tion for t he a r t i l l e r y and h c a q in f i n t ry%-enp& is . or d i m r i l y the most hp or ts nt co ns id cr ~t io nf oi- ef fe kt iv e, stron gf i r e . Yet, accord iy: t o the t e r ra in t h e nesess i ty of p lacing nur in fal l try outof h o s t i le eb se rv at i on may be of gr en t importzuco. The necessity of defensoagainst tank a t tack may ca l l f e r t he u t i l i z a t io n of na tu ra l obs t~ .e l e s such a srivars, swmps arid stoep slopos.Terra in very strong f ro nt al ly but mhich i s very VUlndrahle i n f lan k

nm~be ' ~ ~ r t h l e s s Somtimos opm terrain;or defense. which can be cornandadby f i r e dur ing th e dey and with f a v ~ r a b l e bscrvr.tion, provides :far-reachingf l ank defense. T , k dcfenso i s m d e strong er by gassing areas, 'Seldom can one fin d favor able t e r r a i n ki a l l parts Of the defensivearea , espec ia l ly i n l srge areas ,

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I f t h e o f fens ive i s l a t e r to be assumed, th e choice of t e r r a i nmust be governed thereby.

If cond itions permit, +-he t e r r a i n must be reconnoit;?rsd al so fromthe ho st i l e point of vie%430. Capable u t i l i za t io n o f. t he n a tu ra l t e r r a i n and good camouflagingof t he defensive are a preserves th c ' r i i t ur al t er ra in pictur e and makes morbdi ff ic u l t t he t as k of the h os t i l e reconnaissance end information agencies.Occasiollally l e s s favorab'le .t er ra in oan be more favor able f p r tile defcnderthan a stronger te r r a in are a whrlch l e t s the in te at i on and orgoll ization ofth e defender be re ad il y rcoognized.. . .

Where thc te r r a i n i s not na t ura l ly s t rong, it mu s t b e a r t i f i c i a l l ystrengthencd. I n i t i a l l y this is ordinarily aacomplishcd by obstticles and hin-derances, I f t he re a re su f f i c i en t fo rces a d . time, l e ss fovorab lo . t e r ra in canbe mde exceptional ly stror??by u t i l i z i ng na tu ra l f ea tu ras (streams, ete. ).431. Every pos sib i l i t y i s t o be u ki l izc d to surp r isc the-enany; thc a t -

tacker must be doooived a s to the f i e ld fo rt if ic at io ns , the occupation by andstr eng th of our tro op s a s woll os about th e kind of: defense and i t s tunacity.432. Inso far a s the am un it io n supply peiztzts and i f our intent ions arenot t o wait and @pen close range su rp ri sc f i r o, our f i r o ef f ec t must be u t i -l i ze d a t the greutesi; ranges. As the cncmy advmces ho should come understr ong er and st ro rg or Yir e.

The comm dcr i s responsible for the f i r e f ight * I t s uniform con-duct presupposes conp lctcd communication net s .-433. A s a ru le it i s f i r s t i n the at tack , but sometimes during the ap-

proach, t h a t we le ar n of the ho st i l e d is t r ibu t io n of forces and the a rea chosenby him for the ]rain a h a & and consequently v~here he foc al po int of our de-fense must be. The employment of our fo rc e nust be based on t h i s con side ra tio n,For the protootion of a n open flan k strong reser ves a r e necessary.Ctherwisc, the f i r e paver of a defensivc frorit o mn ot be weakened through t heret ent ion of st rong reserves.

434. If h o s t i l e c on ta ct h as not been made th en th e commander can, i ngeneral, choose his terrain and t roop dis t r ibut ion . Further freedom of ao-ti o n can be secured by the e ar ly delay of th e h os ti le approach.

If it rem ans uncl ear as t o where th e enemy w i l l come then it canbe recoliunerded t h a t t h e dofense pla ce hi mself in d c f e ~ s eassembly po si t ion(Abwehr Be re it st ell un ge n ). The rap i d assumption of the intended dofcnse mustbe preparcd and secured.435. Should t h e def ensiv e be assumed innnediately bef ore or a f t e r th ef i r s t contact, the choice of the defense tcrrr. in c w no longer ire %ladedepend-en t upon tim-consuming rrucomaissance. I n ttnf&vorable t e r r a i n t l l ~ r b oinesth e question whothcr we should not r e t i r e t o more favorable ts rr a in , 0r;ifth e def ense must be assumed, whethcr it i a not aclvisable, by a quick blow, t ose i z e t h i s t e r r a ir i from the emmy. . .

The assumptlcn of the dcfomsu i s moot +JQy oxeouted from a marcni n s ev er al columns or from th e dovclop&,436.. Should th e abt ack be given up and t h e tr oop s pa ss t o th e defense,the defense i s .iwledia te ly es ts bl i shed* For th i s th e , f i r s t . necess ity i s t o

make the forward l i n e @la organize i n de2th, --.ACCOWE~T?t h and t o ...~ c i r oum-s'qanoes o G may b e compelled to advmce or r e t i r e i n many p la ce s f r o m t h e l i n ereached in .the .a t t&& i n order to secure be t te r defense possibilities.

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The tra n si ti o n t o delaying acti on ensues from th e defense.437. In a l l s i tua t ion s th er e must be no doubt a s t o th e intended ac-t i on t Defense i n posi t ion or delaying act ion.

Defense-38. The te r r a i n i n vhich t roops defend i s ca l led t h e i r "posit ion".

The most important p ar t of every pos itio n i s th e main ba tt le posi- t i on ( ~ a u ~ t k a m ~ f f e l d ) . t is h el d t o t he l a s t .

In every "posi tion" (st el lu ng) th er e ar e &anced posi t ions andcovering fora es i n fre nt of th e main ba t t le posi t ion. For t h e i r conduct, see- 456. and 457.

439. A p o si ti on can m l y f u l f i l l i t s aim i f it for ces t h e enemy t o a t t ack ar causes. him t o give up his a t tac k inkentions. I t must be based upen th e t roops ava i lable .

A f lan k pa si t i on should farce t he enemy t o at t ack i p a d i r e c t i o nwhich ta ke s him from h i s o ri gi na l di re ct io n of advance. The neoessi ty forsuch an att ack i s forced i f th e enemy can* avoid t h e fla nk pos itio n by turn?ing aside and i f he cannot atta ck it i n f la nk .440. The defen der's prosp ects a r e most fa vorab le i f th e enemy i s forcedt o att ac k the posi tio n frq nta lly. I n order t o be abl e t o meet an envelopmentof h is p os iti on th e defender must be so disposed a s t o be able t o bend back ort o echelon hi s threatened flank. Against ho st il e attempts t o go around th e.p o si ti on we must ac t offen sively .441. Should th e defender advance i n fro nt of hi s pos itio n ag ain st th e a t tacker , he must not thereby endanger th e secur i ty of th e posi t i on end i t s completion and ho must not s p l i t hi s fo rces . 442. The defense of the main ba t t le posi t ion d e m d s the organiza t ion i n d q t h , of a l l fo rces . This s p l i t s t h e hos t i l e f i r e , makes poss ib le the thioke ning. of our oum fir. e from th e re ar , permi ts l m n l withdrawals in t h e face of super ior f i r p a n d permits t h o defense 'to continue even i n the face a f ho st i le penetr at ions - nt o the main Lmtt le po si t ion . The o rg an iz at io n demands t h a t t f u , mass of th c heavy and t h c gr e a t es t number pos sib le of th e l ig ht in-

frntry woapons mst be able to f i r e i n f m n t of t h e m a i n .b a tt l e p o si ti on . Tho au th6riza t ion f o r . ocal . ~vi thd ray als n the .face of super ior f i r e can be given ba tt a li o n wmmmders by th e n ex t higher oonnnandor and t o su bsrd inate commmders by th e ba tt n .l io n wmmander provid ed such withdrawal does not endanger t l ie defense and does n ut pm m it th e enm y to e s t a b l i s h him- s e l f in t h e main b a t t l e pas i t ion .

443. The width and dapth of th e defense stand i n clo se re la tio n.c la< oo.sily obscrved to rr a i n p o k i t s grea te r breadth thah h i l l yand not easi ly obsorvcd terrain, Strong nat ura l obs tac les makc it possib le

t o employ Only sec uri. ty -forces. Doplated or. so re ly exhausted troo ps req uir emore narro7kr sec tors , darkn6s.s : . . or l i gh t v is ib i l i ty more dense occu*pa tio n of t h e POrvmrd li ne . By occupying th e te r r a i n i n groups groa ter bread thcan be assigned, yot whon t b d o f e n s , e i s of considerable du rntion a more o rle ss .continuous lin e of occupatipn i s to be established.. .Faact fi gu re s cnnnot be given fo r s ec to r widths. A s a guido it maybe sa id t k n t i n not unfavorable t e r r n l n the sec tor br eadths may r.pproximatelydbuble t h e breadth of zom s i n the nttaok.

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444. According t o th e time, working fo rc es and means ava i$ab le th e posi-t i o n i s completed i n s t rength or only temporar i ly (has t i ly) .A well -f inished ba tt le posi t ion, as a rule , embraces a s er ie s ofmutually supporting defensive are as with obsta cles, tren ches and n e st s of in-dividual arms. The pos i tions are d i s t r i b d e d i r r e p l a r l y and s t rongly i ndepth and a r e ere cte d i n the sequence of th e ir importance. A t p a r t i c u l a r l yinlportant a r e as strong po in ts of di ff er en t arms shouM be l a i d out. The plan

of defense shou ld be di ff ic ul t of recogni tion both on the ground and from theair. Adjacent se c% or s must be ab le t o support each pth er. Too great striving'for fla nk ing support must not inv ali da te the fr on ta l defense. Especia l ly indarkness and invisible weather i s the po ss i b i l i ty of suf f i c ien t f r on ta l de-fense of great importance.radially a sure connection betwem aL1 se ct or s must be b u i l t up.

Obstac les, dmy.v iorks , measured poin ts i n the t e r r a i n i n f ro nt o f ,the' hos ition , thc, removal of fiistj,pctive ob je ct s 'n t h e pesition, oamouflage,obsird&i.on po,gts and communication trenches complete the def cnsive. layout.-445. Ordinar i ly the commander determines from the X$ip, t he ' k i n b a tt le -f i e l d and a s s i g s a general l i ne a s a guide fo r t he l oc a t i on o f t he main l i ne7f resis tance. With t h i s l i ne he se&es the w nt i nu i ty of the defens ive posi -t ion .

Thm l w e r commfmders must fix t h e main ba t t l e l in e on the t e r r a in ,s ince only on th e t er ra in can the d et a i l s of th e defense , the lo cat io n of thel i ne and i t s occupation, be decided.The main li ne of re si st an ce i s placed s uf f ic ien t ly f8.r i n f ron t ofthe a r t i l l e r y and heavy infa ntry weapons observation3 it i s s o l oc at e d t h a t

the h os t i l e obsorvat ion and f i r e a r e depr ived of e f fe c t the reon as long asposs ib le ; moreover t ha t ' by i t s loca t ion (a)t gains surprise ov,.r theenemy. Therefore we must search the te r r a i n 'car eful ly for h o st i l e obsorvationp o ss ib i l i t ie s and adapt ourselves accordingly. I n h i l l y t e r r a i n th e r a i n l i n eo f res is tanc e may be located on reverse s lopes i f th e r e i s danger tha t itvvould be e a d y ko ove re d on a forward slope and could n o t be long maintainedagains t hos t i le f ' i re .

446. The dofenqe of the main b a t t l e po si ti on must bc so prgpared throught h e f i r e o f a l l arms twt a t the la t es t the encmy breaks in f ront of th e M.L.R. His progress must be h d w n to a l l arms.

447. he OPs of the a r t i l l e r y and heavy inf an try neaporrs nu st , fo r th eengagement which ta k e s plnoe i n advance or" the main b a tt le po sit ion , provided i s t a n t obs erva ti on in t o hos t i l e t e r r a h of a t t a c k . On the other hand, i t mayocca sion ally be necessary t o be co nt wt with lim ite d observation fo r th e imme-di at e defense of the main b a t t l e po si t ioo r Should thc fo ran ost .ps rt i on of th emain ba t t l e pos i t i on (BIILR) l ine on t h e reverse s lope , the a r t i l l e r y and heavyi n f a n b y weapons m u s t have ,advanced obse rver s, th es e being o n the. fonnfardslopes and under Proteetion of the b'hpos't. Keight s i n roar an6 flan k observa-t ion are used where possible.

For th e lo ca ti on of th e OPs of the a r t i l l e r y nnd heavy in fa nt ryweapons, see par. A ~ ~ ? ~ l i a r y34. OPs m us t be prep wed,

448, For roconrmissnnco, security and b a t t l e , t h e p o s it i o n i$dividodinto sectors . The sector boundaries ar c to .b e so drawn t h a t they, i f possible,dono't dividb defensive works, I t may be necessary t o takc eSpeoialm easures ',for pro tec t ia n of the sec tor boundariest i n case of neces sity, sec uri ty detach;ments a r e to be express ly enp lopd fo r t h i s purpose, o r a @ e s pec i a ll y a t n igh tduring 'weather of l o w ' v i s i b i l i t y .

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449. Reserves in ' the sect.or..cf the employed in f a n t r y h u e the followingfunctions r t o ' re in fo rc e 'ehe fo1;ward ek ii en ts ; .by oourrternttack t o hukl backth e enemy who has a foothold: to pro,vide lo ca l re li e fs .~b &qloyment ' 6 f " t h re sk rv e depends on the sit ua ti on , The most

impoktant po ss ib ii i t ie s are to be prepared for.450. In the cvurse of a long defe nse r e l i e f s of u n i t s may become neoes-

sary r Ordinari ly r e l i e f s ar e effe cted during darkness. Each r e l i e f must beprepared and securcd, m d t h e time of the taking over and re l i e f expressedi n orders. Simultaneous re l i ef of a r t i l l e r y and infnntry can lend t o a ser-ious disturba~ice f the b a t t l e ac t i v i t y .

'Nhen a r e l i e f i s mado tho re i s a t ra ns i to r y ln ss by the t roops offanli l iari ty with tho te rr ai n, the enemy and the loch1 ba tt le condit ions.a rearward posi ti on i s t o be recommended. I ni s made nnly under severe aonditionsi It s h a l lbe locathd sc b r to t he r ea r t h a t it forces t h o onemyto a new b M l l c r y do-

plsyment. I ts co ns tr uc tio n depends upon the si tu at io n, the time and th eforce available. The fo rc es nscessary, fo r the ba tt le mwt not be depletedin m d er t o co n st ru ct t h i s po si ti on .c '

The r o t k m e n t to a rearward position can be ordered i f it i s rocog-nieed th a t th e former pos it i on can bc held on ly wi th d i sp ro por t i ~na tc lygroatsacr i f ice and i f other mn dit ions do not forbid t h i s action.

452. The defense of R posi t ibn , ha s t i l y prepared m d not re inforced, andth at of 0x11. completed wit h a ll means, i s conducted on the same princ i-p les .. , :,The deth i led conduct of +.he defender depends upon. kiis h i ss t rength m d mearis, the nafhral. and a r t i f i c i a l st reng th of the pos i t ion and thetime for+ pre par ati on. ...453. Tho a r r a r y m n t s for t ho dofens9 must provide for the cooperation ofa l l anns, which bss ent ia l ly ar e su i te d to ce r t a i n te rr a i n are as and whose effgc-t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e l i n i t e d by th e t er r ai n. . he clo se cooperation of a l larms with reference to time' and. space and th ei r f u l l ut i l iz a ti on occasionallymakes it necessary t o order detl i i ls which are otherwise matters l e f t t o lowercommanders.

., .

454. The defender must seek t o learn e a r l y th e a ttaclc in ten t ions of theenemy, He observes the? reconnaissance md information measures of th e a t t a c k e r ;he i n t e rp re t s h i s r ad i e n s t and seeks to ide nti fy the extent and d is t r ibut ionof the apprcaching forces. The bandi t ions beh ind t h e hos t i l e f ron t ; t ra f f i c ,ai rp or ts , f om a rd landing f i e l d s , etc., must ba ob,served.We cen.mnke important deduotions f cr the measureswe should take byreco nnoite ring th e t e r r a i n i n which th e anelriy may cancefitrat,e or dovolop, es-pec ia l ly as to a r t i l l e r y f i r i n g p o s i t i ~ n s nd O.P, p e s a i b i l i t i e s ; i i k e ~ i s e

through rreonnaissar ibe of t&k a n p l o p n t ter ra i n-a nd. ivbrable te rr a i n for hos-t i l e i n fan t ry at tack .. . . . , . . , , .By means of a t t a c k (p & su it ) .aviat'i'oi, A&, troops;- non-use of ra di oiand o t + r measures we sc re en our q n d e f e p e prapcra1;ions.an. .

.,

. Reconnaissance, info m at io n, and , scree ning measures s.nd ' t h e evalua-t i a n of all r e , a l l t s mus t l i e i n one hand. . . . . .Report No. 14,507.

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455. Trocps forward of the ba tt le po si ti on execute delaying ac tio n, a sa rul e under th e immediate conymnd of th e a rea commander. Increased speedand mobi lity ar e of advantage t o thes e troops, In . the f i re ' l i ne they shouldbe made strong i n a r t i l l e r y and heavy i nfan try weapons.. The cooperution ofneighboring units i s arranged tnrough higher cornand. The delaying actioni n f ron t of the po si ti on can be more ,e as il y executed if obstacles and naturalh inderances can be u t i l i ze d and i'f a r t i l l e r y wi th in the pos i t ion can f i r eupon t h e enemy a s he apprcaches nearer.. The coqtander of th e a re a arr ang esfor the ret ire me nt of the advanced forces int o the pos it i on and the ir ba tt leac t i v i t y w i thin t he seetor.

456. Advanced po si ti al is must th e at ta ck er secu ring ea rly, com-manding ground i n advanoe of our outpost; the u t i l i z a t i o n of advanced a r t i l -lery OPs tmkes it possible t o deceive the a.tta.cl;er a s t o t he remainder o f - t h eposit i or, and causes him t o develop his ar t i l l e r y prematurely. In general,advanced positi ons a r e chosen so f a r forward i n the di re ct io n of t h e enemy soth at they can be supported by a pa r t of the a r t i l l e r x i n the main bat t l e posi -. .t ion .The ar ea commander ( ~ r u p p o n d h r e r ) rd er s i f and where advancedpos.itions s h a l l be taken and under wh$m the troops operate. Should thesetroops be subordinate t o a scotor commander wi th in whose boundnri.es,'they l i e ,th e area coiunander can a s a i m t c the troops of t he seoter th e tasks, s teengthand conduct ef the advanced positions.Advanced pos iti ons a r e t o be es pe oi al ly provided with heavymachine guns, tan k dofenso weapons and l i ~ h tat te ri e' s. The advanced posi-ti on s must not be exposed t o p a r t i a l defeat. They a r c t o be withdrawn time ly*Their re tu rn t o the main ba tt le po sit ion i s t o be secured. Their ret irement 1must not, if possible, hinder the ac ti vi ty ?f the outpost troops.

457. Outposts provido time f o r t h e t roops of the main bat t l e pos i t ion t oprepare themselves, mpplcment the obse rvati on of th e main po si ti on i nt o t h eatta ck. te rr ai n, and deceive the enemy as t o th e lbcation of the .main position,They ar e dir ect ed t o &at extent thsy sh al l pa rt ic ip at e i n the engagements. ofthe advancea po si ti on and how long. t o continue th i s action. The st re ng th afthe outpost , i t s dis tan ce from th e main ba tt le po si ti on and i t s conduct dependupon the mission and the terrain, The outpost must not be beyond the effectiverange of the l i gh t a r t i l le ry i n the main pos i t ion .The out po st s may be weak so long a s advanced po si ti on s a r e forward

cP them; likovrise by day i n ea si ly observed te r ra in . Ordinari ly the outpostsar e est ab li sh ed by the Inf ant ry u n i t s of th e main po si ti on , to whom the y be-long or are a t t a c k d .

As a h e cornxander ( ~ r u ~ ~ e n f k r e r )ul e, order s the approximates t r e r i ~ t h f the o u tp os t, i t s most udvanced li ne of re si st an ce . and the. len gthof time i t s im ll hold. On a broad fr on t differe nt conduct i n differ ent sec-t o r s may be suitn.ble. The conduct of t h e ou tp os ts of ad ja ce nt ~ e c t o r smustbe harmonized.The retir em ent of t h e o utp ost s must be so arranged t h a t it dees nothinder the f i r e af the main pos i t ion ind so th at th e outpost t roops are notthereby endangered. Prearranged si gn al s between t h e outpost and the main bat-

t l e p os it io n w i l l f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r cooporation.Snall , prepared at tacks with l im ited objec tives and under t he pr o-t ea t i o n cf the autp ost can di st ur b the h o s t i l e preparations and secure worth-while information.

4584 The d e f a s e af the m i n b a t tl e i s based upon th e systemati-ca l l y p repared f i r e ac t i v i t y of all e m . This i s expressed i n a f i r e p lanwhich i s arranged ss i rd ic a ted i n par. 400 .

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he arr ahg em nts for tke se f ir e s , t o incl'dude tho se a* diStantrmges, t h e i r udi ty, the cooperat ion &tween Infantry and Art i l le ry, thestrong f i r e ~once nt~ati ' ons:the 'rapi d' concenkrtt t ions on ser idusly threa'ienedpo int s a r e ta sk s 6f .t he h k h e r commander ,md o'f the comiander& of sec t o r s i nwhich the various ai(ms' mu s t &operate.If possib le , t he en t i r e t e r ra in in f ron t bf the main bat t le posi-t io n t o include long r q e s must Ve thorou&hly commarded by f i r e. The indi-vi du al arms must, according t o t h e i r pe cu lia rit ie : and based on considorationsof t e r ra in s t ruc tu re anti cover, supplement eaeh other.The near&$ the enemy'app~achkstfi&main b a t t l e posit'i'on, th e moremust o w f i r e . b e oonc&ratod a&ii ist.him. .Likevuise, ag ains t an enemy who has made a lo ca l pe ne tr at io n i n th emain position, must the E ire and cooperation of a l l am s be directed.

. . . , . , ., .. . . . , .459, he a r t i l l e r y engagec th e approaching enemy from advanced po si tio ns ,and if wcessafy from posi tions i n f ront of the main ba t t l e posi t ion . In ter-

dic tio n and harassing f i r e s tire exec uted with the a i d of observers pushedwell forward ivho omploy wir el e+ 6dmu nicatio n. A r t i l l e r y a i r p l h e obse rve rsand a por tion of the obs erv ati on ba tt a li on a r e to be employed. Under certaincandi tions ex ist i ng talephone l in e s or .prearranged l ight signal s can be ut i l -ized, I t may be su ita bl e t o l i m it .t h e number of b a tt er ie s &ich execute t h i sac t ion i n order not t o giv e-t o the enemy an ea rl y insight into our st rength.. , .. . - , . . . . , . ~ , . . . . .. .. . . . . . , -As 'the.'defom e of. *he ..rplain..ba.%tle.p osi ti on .i s gr ad ual ly undertaken,the organizat ion of the a r t i l l e r y therefor .must be i n depth. This organiza-ti o n in 'd ep th and cooperation with the In fa ntr y must be prepared e a r ly andtimely. - Every e f fo r t - i s t o 6+&cle t o assuro that the majori ty-o i ' the bat ter -ie s, even with the de nial o f dvanced and main observatio n, can f i r e upon +&eat t acker and a ls o can engage wi th success an enemy who has pen et ra ted t he mainposi t ion. Final ly, i t my of te n be ;ecessary' fo r ba tt er ie s to chanze ' theirposi t io ns durine the nibht preceding th e expected at ta ck ag ainst the b at t l eposi t ion if it i s expected th a t the 'enemy knovrs thei r locat ion .

s

In o rder t o ach ieve i t s fu l l es t o f fec t, t he a r t i l l e ry must be em-ployed with great mobility. I.t.s versatile employment roquir6s careful pre-parat ions with re sp ec t-t o OPs, fi ri ng pos itio ns, f&ille da te , change of posi-ti on s and ca rr ~u fla gin gof a l l movements a@ paths to and from the positions.460. The mass of the a r t i l l e r y must be abl e t o lay concentkated fy re bothfar and near i n fr on t of the main b a tt le posi-ki'on. As long as po ss ib le t hea r t i l l e r y regimental commander controls th e f ir e . According to t h i s pr inc ipl eare th e or ga ni z~ t i onof the a r t i l l e r y and the assignment of f i r e miss ions t o be. .made.

An army corps comarvler hciving assig ned' corps a r t i l l e r y l;o divisio ns,can give ins t ruct ions fo r the organizat ion of the a i . t i l l er y i n the d iv is ions(at tached and assigned) and can assign a r t i l l e r y ba t t le t a s k s t o thom cutsid oth e i r innnediate se ct or s. In gen era l, the corps commander re ta in s under h i sc o n t r o l only. heavy b a tt e r ie s for emplqment es+c ial ly on di st an t missions...

The div isio n coinmender decides upon t he a r t i l l e r y d is tr ib uk on , withwhich Infantry u n i t s t h e a r t i l l e r y e lements w i l l uvrk together, which w i l l bed i rec t ly suppor t ed by a r t i l l e ry and &ich w i l l have a r t i l l e r y a tt ached. Inorder : t ha t h e may d h y s have a de c i s i ve e lement i n h i s 'cwp hand,^ the d iv is ionc o ~ ~ e rust retain a p r o P o r t i ~ r ~ a t e l ~ " s t r or t i l l e r y ' ~ i tunder the imnm-d ia t e con t ro l of t k e divisioxt, . that i s , uncler tho ar t i l l e r y ccmander.

' .Ar t i l l e ry un i t s which d i re ot ly supnor$ infant ry G i t k i n t he defenseof the main bat t le posi t ion rjlus $rovid e ;.&m~micatign.witht h e 1h an tt- y com-manders. The commanders of b B t h ' ~ ~ % smust maintaSn'this comunication. A s f o rthe other wnside rnt ions, th e cooperation beteeen Ar t i l l er y and In fantry corres-ponds t o t he pr inc iple s enwlciated i n par. 329 ff .,, ..

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461. Whcn the si tu at io n, es pe ci al ly th e ammunition si tu at io n, pe rmits, t hea r f i l le r y f i r e s t o t b imi t of i t s rmgc ,I t rakes more d i f f ic u l t th e hos t i le approach: it f f r e s upon th e hos- t i l e a r t i l l e r y going in to pos it ion, , it$OPs and t h e i r i ns ta ll at io ns 'and inter - rup t s t h e h o s t i l e cormnunicution and ammunit i on supply...hereupon it begins the engagkment of the hos t i l e ba t te r l e s an3 m t i a i rc r a f t ar t i l l e r y . See paragraph

3 5 8 i The f i r e of the ho st i l e a r t i l l e r y must be dram out earlj r so th at we canloc ate h is b a tt e r ie s and engage them, Should t h i s no t be done, then we mustgradually engage these ba t t er ie s a s they are located ;. 'Agains t a ho s t i le a r t i l -lery super ior i ty or i f we.wish to surpr is e the enemy,: vre must sometimes r e f r a i nfrom an ea rl y engagement of the h os ti le a r t i l l e r y , .

TIE ad.rancel of th e ho.s-tile i n h t y in to assembly area s, t he command, post s, t h e mmmunications and supply of the enemy a r e t o ba combatted wit hf i r e s of in t er di ct io n and sur pris e :?i res i n conjunotion vdth t ,hose of thh heavyI n f ~ n t r y eapons. .-Assembly ar ea s a r e t o be taken under fire,

Then the h cs t i l e in fan t ry p lace s i t s e l f i n assembiy posi ti .on for a t -t ac k , t h e m s s of: t he - & r t i l l e r y should be. employed ag a in s t th es e elements. Ofspe6 iol importarice i s the engagement of t h e h o s ti le heavy Inf nnt ry weaponsAtt ent ion is. di re ct ed t o th e approach and assembly of tanks. Only the most

' necessary por t ion of the a r t i l le ry i s con tinued in 'oounterbat teryr A t decisivemomcnts t h e h o s t i l c OPs a r e to be blin de d by amoke or ne ut ra li ze d by ob se rv edf i r e .462, The in fan try. opens i t s f i r e as soon a d a s s t rongly a s poss ib le . I t sf ir e ac t iv i ty r e s t s upon.the f i r e p l ans Whsna r t he heavy and l i g h t ~ ~ e a p o n s ~v;e a r e weak i n a r t i l l e r y , ' the heavy machine guns and o ft en th e minenv?crfors must.engage th c approcching enemy. a t long di st am e. For t h is purpose a hor ti sn ofthe heavy Infant ry weepom ar e looated i n ih e forwerd pa rt of the main ba t t lepo si ti on or even i n advanoe thereof. As th e enemy, approaohes tLe defense lo ca te d

deeper i n the po s i t ion a lso takes par t . For t h i s purpose heavy weapons of re -serve un i t s a re , i n case o f need, employed. The heavy machine guns must belocated i n ooncea ledpos itions, and must have covered al te rn at e pos itio ns fromwhich they ban del iver f lank ing f i re .The n eare r th e att,ackF.P approaches, the more the l i gh t in fan try wea-prns engage .in t h e f i r e f i gh t . . .Should th e ho s ti le f i r e cause @ips i n td i k f &t r y f i r e de fe ns e, t h eloc al commander must re c t i f y t h i s con diti on vd.thout +delay,Rermnnais sance must determine t h e v a ~ i o u s os s i b i l i t i e s fo r t ho em-

ploymont o f - support and reserve uni ts . c ,lhcse dig i n and prepare t he ir lo ca ldefense. These may be permitted, i n str ong h o s t il e fi r e , ta locate themselvesi n a re as not so e a s i l y f i ~ c d pon.463. Should a po rt io n ef tha main b a t tl e po sit io n pi? lo st , vre must f i r s ts t r i ve through f i r e to an ni hi la te t he enemy who has pe ne tr at ed . Our infantryel e re nt s and supporting weapons uh ic h a r e i n p r & i m i t y ' of t h o penetration endea-vor by immediate 1.ooal w un ts ra tt ao k t o hu rl back, th e enemy before he has oppor-tun i ty t o es t ab l i sh himse lf. These e l m n t s can be eff ect ive ly supported bya r t i l le r y f i r e l a i d i n rear cf the enemy rho has penetrated the position. How-ever , th ey must not be dependent upon 43-10 ar t i l i e ry coopera t ion .

. ., Shoula t h e nbove'me asu res fai>, or. should t h e enemy make z'!fargepenctratLon,- th e higher aommander dec ides whether a genera l oounter at taak d l 1 be made.to res tore the . pos i t ion or whether the ma in ba t t l e pos i t ion i s t o be taken up. fu rt he r t o the re ar , The oounterattaok, wllere po ssible , i s t o be launched aga ins t th e h o s ti le flank. Tho couneerattaqk requir e$, espec ial.ly when undertaken by st ro ng fo rc es , thorough prepa ration , Assembly po si tio ns , time, objeotive, 'zones, a r t i l l e r y support, onployment of tanks and ai r force

un it s must be cont rolled by on e oommander. Too great h s t e le ads -to fa i lu r e

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Reserves in'ocnded for tho co un te ra tt ac k must be so assembled orduring th e Course of th e att ac k- so sh if te d that' they a r e quLclcly ava ilab le.484) - A t al l . t i m es a l l weapbns must be prepa red t o re s i s t a su rpr i se a t -t ack by ni gh t, during weathbr of l e w vi s i b i l i ty and i n t e r r a i n of poor v i s i -b i l i t y A

No?rdalllyj defensive f i r e s a r e la i d G e d i a t e l y i n f ro nt of "the ba t -t l e p ds it io n. These must be prepared- and a r e executed upon sig na l, es pe ci aldemands, or by .order, T h s e are l imi ted a s to t ime and space.. The l ig ht a r it i l l e r y and heavy infantry weaponsplace thes e f i r c s on lo ca l i t i es which theli g h t in fa nt ry rieapam c.annot reach. T h e execution of tha' defensive fire,t h e weapons engaged th er ei n, th e du rat ion , the ammunition allatment, the rein-forcement o r extension therea f by r 'einforced ba tt er id s must be p re ~r ra ng ed .~cgula t ' ionoconcerning the authorization af the defensive f i r e must b- pre-pared, A batterjr can execute defensive f i r e only on so ari a re a a s itcan expent ta..coVer effectively.

The h o s t i l e approach must be id en ti fi ed ear ly. The increa sed re-ccr+aissance a c t i v i t y , l i s t e n i n g p o st s , t h e t e r r a i n f a c i l ". and i l l m i n a t i o n ofi t a t e t h is inf crm tin a . Enemy wWch has penetra tad the maia ba t t le pos i t ionar e oxpclled by lo cal cou nter atta ck (Gngenstodd), i f necessary, by th e [email protected] individual must be in stru cted a s to his oondunt i n a 's ur pr is ea t t ack .

465. Sure order and information transmission imply a deeply organized,c16ssly kn i t comunica t ion net. Such a n e t i s S u i l t up t o the grea tes t . axtentpo.fisible. L a t er a l .c o mmi c a t i o n i s of g r e a t important e . I f poss ible , th erad io remains s i l en t un t i l t h e b a t t l e i s j o i n i d .In add i t ion ta th e wire &m m io at io n t o the sec tor commandera~ihoarn immediately uuder t h ~ormnand of .the di vi si on .c om ~? de r' , he rliv isio n sig -ria1 ta t t a l i o n has t h e primary duty of es ta bl is hi ng communication between thoartillery commander and his units aria t o make po ssi ble cooperation with the a rct i l l e r y avia tor , observat ion ba t t a l io n and ba l loon uni ts , As t ime per pi ts , ,gradually must special net s for infantr y, a r t i l le r y , balloon, antiair .ora@ anda i r force uni ts , e tc ., be es tabl ished.The npss of the signal mans i s employed i n the main bat t l e posi-tion. Advanced p ~ s i t i o n s forward of out pcs ts) &d outp osts must he ccm ect -ed; wi re le ss means of copmunication ar e es pe ci al ly suit able . Al ter na te ar-

rangments a rc to -be p repa red , S igna l co ~ u n io a t io n rom the ;nain ba t t l epcg i t ion t , the rear m u s t be mainta ined and improved. The wir e ne t, acco rdin gt o and f r rc es ava i lab le , i s l a id by cab le.S i p a l reconnaissance is important .. O u r o w s igna l t ra f f i c must bere st r ic t ed and screened.The commander co nt ro ls t h e assignment of and- changes i n l i g h t si c-nals . . .

466'. Engineers ar e wployed i n the te r ra in i n advance of the pq s i t ion tocreate obstacles . end execute hindering mrics. Within tho ba t t l e p os i t i on theyar e emplop d to er ec t obst acle s, communications, camouflages, et c. h g i n e e r smay be att ach ed ;to i nf an tr y un i t s confrontbd with. heavy defensive tanks. I ng & 8 ~ a l , he commandor p laces the Z ~ ~ i n e e r s ' a t the beginning of t h en reserved e f d s e , i n o rd er 'a employ them *ere t h ei r te ch ni ca l as si st an ce beeones mostnecessary.. .: 467. T&kr,-a re enployed o f f&ivd lyr They a r e da c i s iw re s e rv e ' i n thehan6s af the c o d o r , c ~ p s o i a l . $ ~u it ab ie fo r general co:unterat.iaclc (Gegenan-g r i f f y a r fo r the engagement of h os ti le tanks. . '

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O rd in ari ly t h ei r a s ~ a n b l ~ p o s i t i o n of e f f ec -s f a r t o t he r ed r o& t i v e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y range, Direct observation of the bw tt le fi el d i s de- sired. The various emplo~perrtposs ib i l i t i e s a re reconnoi te red , I n gen eral , tan ks a r e employed on or de rs of th e highe'r commander,

' v h b con t ro l s the t i m e and obJectivu.of the at ta ck and the cocperati.on of otherarms.468. A r t i f i c i a l fog (smok*) can serve t o conceal the s hi ft in g qf reserve@and displacement of a rt il le r y . Agninst.air observation such movements can beconcealed only i f the y s t a r t from one ntitu ral cmo-uflage (~mod s,v i l l age ) andlead t o another, and the gaps between w e silffioiently long, covered by smoke.

Likewise b at te r ie s which must f i r e during act iv e *ir reconnaissance can be qamouflaged i f smoh screens a r e plac ed not o nly over th e bat to r ies but a ls o a re employed where b a tt er ie s ar e not f i r i ng . (F ein t camouflage) Gas i s mployed according t o Section XVIII ( ~ e c r e t ) .

469. A i r fo rc es may suppart t h e defense6 P ur rn it uhititn dis rup t hos t i l e-a i r reconnaissancer With sufficient strength avhilab'le our a i r u n i t s a r e a l s o able t o a tta ok the approaching h o st il e grouDd forces: Abwe all; bombers are t o be launcked against ho st i l e a i r por ts and detrainmeli t$, 8 . .

The main a ct i v it y of the pur sui t (a tt ac k) and bombardment a vi at io n t akes p lace i n the t i m immediately preceding t h e at t a c k on the main ba tt l e pos i t ion , A t t h i s t ime, if poss ible , stron g pu rs ui t Tomnations a re t o be em-ployed i n order t o beat dovm ho st il e fly ers . For t h i s purpose sec tor s not att ack ed must be denuded of a i r fq rc e plan es, Like~visd, during t h i s time, as-sembly posit ions, reserves, f i r in g b at t er ie s and ca ptive balloons ean ba a t - tacked. 470. During th e approach of th e enemy aur a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y must above a l l prevent h ost i le air reconnaissance. For t h i s DU rDOSR same i s pushed we li forward, i f necessary, i n fr on t of the main posi tion .

With the beginning of th e ho st il e a r t i l l e r y deployment th e an ti - a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y i s t o be employed t o g r o t e c t our a r t i l l e r y and m u n i t i o n dm-%. I m e d i a t ~ l yb efore a d d uring t h e a t t a ck , b e si d es t h e p ro t e c t i o n of the ar t i l l e ry , i s the prot ec t io n of reserves important. I f it i s lcnom

where the e n b y d i r ec t s h i s deci sive a t t ack , it i s i n t h i s l o c al i t y t h a t our a n t i a i r c r a f t p ro t e o t i o n is concentrated. A t areas *ere a t tacks i n depth are expected indiv idual a n t i a i r o r an b a t t e r i e s or AA machine gun companie's are pushed forward. ' 471. If t he defense i s t o be renewed i n a rearward po sit ian , the breaking off of the engagement, t he r e t i r e m n t and the resumption of thc defense must be p re pa re d be forehand , The nnintenance of the coherence of the r et i ri n g t roops i s espe cia l l y importmt .

The commander must make h is de ci si on s and th e prepa re .t ions be so handled t h a t th e enemy.cmnot le ar n t he intention. A l l measures must be able t o be c arri.ed through tvithout pr ec ip it at io n, The re ti re me nt must be seoured and i n cozljunction vrith ne ighborin g secto rs , . I f weather ef low v i s i > i l i t y , a r t i f i c i a l smoke or favorable t e r r a i n cannot be employed, tnen nigh t should be chosen for 'the > d i r m e n t , . .

The enemy' gu st b e deceived into believing; sr) long as. po ssi ble ,that; our occupation of the o ri g in al po sit ion continues. . For th i s purposei s th e niaintenanck of the f i r e acki vity of a l l ' arms i n - h e o r i c i n a l p o s i t io nmost suitable. 'fhe fo ll rw in g. enemy must be delayed t o t h e maxim& which i s:Beport No. 14,507..

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~.most sat isfactor i I y accomplished by e a rl y . a g t i l l e ry f i r e r ea d in e ss i n t h e newpos it ion . Should the new pos i t i on l i e fa r to the rea r , a r t i l l e r y i n in te rme-d i a t e p o s i t i o n s i s most advantageous. Gassing a re as i n and behind t h e formerpo si ti on s ar e mos'l; ef fn ct iv e delaying measures.

472, Should the ho s t i l e a t tac k break d m , with adequate forces the do- fender should pa ss t o the offensive. In an at ta ck ou t of our po si ti on we must %reckon hat %ha enemy i s deeply organized and th a t he has a r t i l l e r y super ior i ty ,Should no pos s ib i l i t y a r i s e t o bea t dom the h os t i l e a r t i l l e r y o r t o b reakthrou $ th e enemy, -the a t t a c k '3ut o f the pos i t ion w i l l l ead to a s eve re f ron ta ls tr u gg l e with. u q e r t a i ~ e s u l t s . An enveloping a t t ack .o ff er s the gre a te s tprospects of success. Under som oondit ions the inst i tut ions of an entirelynemf cperation must be cansidered..

473. I f tho defender intends Do pass t o delaying ac tion he must rBckrn with a f u l l y developed enemy. There fore th e f i r s t rea rward l i n e of re s i s t a nce must be s e t well t o the rear. 474. Should the b a t t le end in dec is iv ely or should a l u l l come i n thegeneral operations, the s i tu a ti o n can a r i s e i n which th e opponents s tand oppo-s i t e i n s l ig ht combat and the oondit ions approach those of p osi t io n warfare.Then it must be decided whether th e former posit ion w i l l be held or a new positt i o n f u r t h e r t o t he r e a r w j l l bc chosen. In the l a t t e r case , the farmer pos i-t i on can be u t i l i ze d a s an advnnced po s i t ia n or a s the outpos t pos i t ion of t henew M.L.R. I f t he p o s i t io n i s h eld , it i s fu r th er s t rengthened, weak areasa re re in forced o r given up. So f a r a s possib le out pos ts %r e pushed forward.

In order to conserve the for ce a rearrangement of the b a t t l e t roops ,thc reserves, and th os e i n support i s made, Obstacles ar e reinforced, dugoutsfo r men and ammunition a r e construot ed. The gas defense i s increased.Through po sit io ns prepared a r t h e r t o the rea r a s trong support can be renderedthe fur ther defense .

In addit ion to th ese measures, provis ions fo r the ca re of t h e troopsare made i n and behind th e po si t i on -- provisions fo r water , th o wounded andthe s ick .

Delaying Action,

475, Delaying action.may be fo rced by the hos t i l e supe r io r i ty o r it maybe executed vo lu nt ar il y by our for ces, 111 t h e . l a t t e r i n s t a n e a it f u l f i l l s itsmission only i f ~ u p c r i o rhos t i le forcos fo l low. I t can of te n be advantageouslyemployed a s an in t roduc t ion to an engagement o r a s as si st an ce during an engage-ment.

_ . . i . ' .' 476. ,&laying action i s executed fr om a Line o$ re si st an ce and aceordiag. . ,t o condit, ions continued from other rearward l i n e s of resista nce. The ac ti on may of fe r strong re si st an ce or m y be conduceed without clo se engagement.

The defens e in th e li n e of re si st an ce must fo rc e th e enemy ea rl y andwit h con sid era ble force s, t o time consuming and co st 1y ba t t l e p repa ra t ions ,. ., ,

The defense between the line of re ais ta ns e must delay the enemy and w$q . t i&

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