trusts digests

7/27/2019 Trusts Digests

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Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximo briones

G.R. No. 150175

Facts:

Donata and Maximino are married. When Maximino died, Donata through her petition shewas able to transfer in her as a sole owner the properties acquired by Maximino prior to their

marriage. When Donata died her niece and nephew took over the properties as administrator, by

this time one of the descendants also file a petition to be appointed as administrator but it was not

successful because the properties are already under the name of Donata and her descendants was

already assigned as administrators. The heirs of Maximino claimed that they were defrauded by

Donate when she successfully transferred the properties under her name and allege that Donata was

just a trustee under Art 1451 of NCC.

Issue: Is Donata just a trustee?

Ruling:

No. The court finds that Donata did not use fraud when she transferred the properties in her

name. Donata and some of Maximinos siblings just live in the same street and from the wake

Maximo it was only now that they made an action.

The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed,

through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered

in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs

of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real

properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October

1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and

regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence,

making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties,

and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis forthe Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been

dismissed.

LABANON vs LABANON Trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property and another

person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the

performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.

Trusts are classified under the Civil Code as either express or implied. Such classification determines theprescriptive period for enforcing such trust.

No particular form of words or conduct is necessary for the manifestation of intention to create a trust. Itis possible to create a trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee". Conversely, the mere fact that

these words are used does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each

case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is

known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to create

is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is

called a trust.


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An express trust is created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or bywords evidencing an intention to create a trust; the use of the word trust is not required or essential to its

constitution, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.

Under Section 40 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, all actions for recovery of real property prescribed in10 years, excepting only actions based on continuing or subsisting trusts that were considered by section

38 as imprescriptible. As held in the case of Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958, however, thecontinuing or subsisting trusts contemplated in section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure referred only to

express unrepudiated trusts, and did not include constructive trusts (that are imposed by law) where no

fiduciary relation exists and the trustee does not recognize the trust at all.

that the prescriptive period for the enforcement of an express trust of ten (10) years starts upon therepudiation of the trust by the trustee

Gomez v. Duyan

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorariassailing the Decision[1]of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. CV No. 49163 ordering the reconveyance by the petitioners to the respondents of the propertycovered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 and declaring said title cancelled, therebyreversing the Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80 which dismissed thecomplaint. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 80 in Civil Case No. Q-91-8821 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACCORDINGLY,defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to RECONVEY in favor of plaintiffs-appellants the propertycovered by TCT No. 281115, which title is hereby declared CANCELLED. With costs.[3]

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

The parties in this case are relatives residing at 96 General Avenue, Project 8, Quezon City whichconsists of four houses situated in an eight hundred-square meter (800 sq.m.) lot, covered by TCT No.

41717 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Eulogio Duyan (now deceased)married to Purisima Duyan, one of the respondents in this case. The property in dispute whichconstitutes one-half of the property previously covered by TCT No. 41717 is now covered by TCT No.281115 issued in the name of petitioner spouses.[4]

Eulogio Duyan and Feliza Duyan are siblings. In his desire to help his sister, Eulogio allowed her toconstruct a house on the disputed lot sometime in 1968.[5]Petitioners acknowledged the fact that thedisputed property was owned by Eulogio and that they were staying in the disputed property solely dueto his benevolence. Accordingly, an instrument entitled Pagpapahayag was executed by the siblings on 5May 1974. The instrument provides that in the event that the property will be registered in Felizas name,she will continue to acknowledge Eulogio as the owner and will never assert ownership over the same,except in accordance with her brothers wishes.

[6]The pertinent portions of the instrument read:

Na napagkasunduan naming magcapatid na bouin ang documentong ito bilang katibayan anglahat;

. . . .

4. Na kaming magkapatid ay magtutulongan at magdadamayan maging sa hirap atginhawa alang-alang sa ikabubuti ng aming mga mahal sa buhay;
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5. Na ito ay mailagay sa pangalan man ng aming Ama o pangalan ko ay itoy hindi ko pag-aari kundi ari ito ng aking kuya, Eulogio V. Duyan, at-

6. Na ito ay aming igagalang maging saan man makarating ngayon at kailan man.[7]

On 11 May 1974, a deed of sale covering a residential house situated on the disputed lot was

executed by Eulogio and Regina Velasquez, a common-law wife of the former, in favor of petitioners forthe sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). Thereafter, petitioners allegedly asserted ownership notonly over the said house but over the whole lot covered by TCT No. 41717 .[8]This prompted Eulogioslegal wife, Purisima, to file a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners withthe then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-B, Quezon City.[9]

Deciding the case in favor of Purisima, the trial court ordered petitioners to surrender possession ofthe property to her. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case after the parties entered into anamicable settlement.[10]

On 25 January 1978, Eulogio and Purisima this time, as vendors, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale infavor of petitioners with respect to the disputed lot for the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos(P20,000.00).[11]

Purisima claims that the deed of sale was executed merely to give color of legality to petitioners

stay in the disputed property so that she and her children will not drive them away after they (Purisimaand her children) manifested their opposition to Eulogios decision to let them stay therein.

[12]Petitionersclaim otherwise, contending that the sale was freely agreed upon by the parties thereto; hence, it wasauthentic and validly executed.[13]

Subsequent to the execution of the deed of sale or on 10 February1978,[14]another Pagpapahayag was executed between Eulogio and Feliza, where the latteracknowledged that the lot subject of the deed of sale[15]will eventually be transferred to respondentsherein who are her nephews and nieces and the children of Eulogio.[16]The pertinent portions of thesecond Pagpapahayag read:

Na pagkatapos ng lahat ng hidwaan sa Husgado ay aming isasagawa agad and conwaring pagbibilimuli ng nasabing xxx aming binili sa aking capatid na si Gg. Eulogio V. Duyan. At pag mangyari angnasabing hatian ng lote, ay aming ilalagay agad sa pangalan ng aming mga pamangkin na sinaSalome V. Duyan, Divina V. Duyan, Cresencia V. Duyan, Reulgina V. Duyan, Domincia, Rodrigo atAvencio C. Duyan.[17]

Notwithstanding the second Pagpapahayag, petitioners caused the registration of the deed of saledated 25 January 1978 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. As a consequence, TCT No. 281115covering the disputed lot was issued on 22 September 1981 in the name of petitioners.[18]

On 20 May 1991, respondents filed a suit for reconveyance of real property and cancellation of TCTNo. 281115 with damages against petitioners before Branch 80 of the Quezon City RTC.

On 5 September 1994, the trial court rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint and orderingrespondents to pay jointly and severally defendants therein, now petitioners, the amount of TenThousand Pesos (P10,000,00) as reasonable attorneys fees and to pay the costs of the suit.[19]

In dismissing the case, the trial court held that:

[the] TCT No. 281115 (Exh. 4) was validly issued pursuant to the Absolute Deed of Sale dated January

25, 1978 (Exh. 3) duly registered at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. The same becameindefeasible and conclusive upon the expiration of one year period from its entry as it was not attackeddirectly by anyone due to fraud.[20]
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that an implied trust arose in favorof respondents over the disputed property by virtue of the Pagpapahayagdated 10 February 1978. It heldthat the action for reconveyance of property was properly filed by respondents against petitioners.[21]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[22]having been denied by the appellate court in

a Resolution[23]promulgated on 28 June 2000, the case was elevated to this Court by way of a petition forreview.

Petitioners in their petition for review[24]contend that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuseof discretion

[25]when it reversed the RTC decision and that the error, if not corrected, will cause themgreat injustice.[26]They claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ordered the reconveyance bypetitioners to respondents of the property covered by TCT No. 281115 and declared the cancellation ofsaid title[27].

The contention is without merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in ordering the reconveyance ofthe property in dispute.

As found by the appellate court, the trial court failed to consider the law on trusts despite theexistence of uncontroverted evidence establishing the creation of a trust as it anchored its decision solelyon the indefeasibility of title aspect. Although it recognized the instruments creating the trust, the trial

court nevertheless held that:

In the document entitled Pagpapahayag (Exh. B), although the defendant Felisa Gomez stipulated

therein that she will not claim ownership over the lot covered by TCT No. 41717, even in the event thatthe same will be transferred in her name, the same does not bar her totally from becoming as ownerbecause of the exception provided therein that she can still own the lot or part thereof in accordance withthe wishes of the deceased which was clearly manifested when the Absolute Deed of Sale of the half ofthe lot covered by TCT No. 41717 was executed between the deceased and his spouse Purisima Duyan(plaintiff) and the defendants.[28]

While citing the provisions of the Pagpapahayag dated 5 May 1974 and concluding therefrom thatFeliza was not actually prohibited from claiming ownership over the property, the trial court completelydisregarded and missed the import of the other Pagpapahayag dated 10 February 1978.

In express terms, Feliza undertook in the subsequent Pagpapahayag to convey the property subjectof the fictitious deed of sale to her own nephews and nieces who are the children of her brotherEulogio. To reiterate, Feliza stated At pag mangyari ang nasabing hatian ng lote, ay aming ilalagayagad sa pangalan ng aming mga pamangkin na sina Salome V. Duyan, Divina V. Duyan, Cresencia V.

Duyan, Reulgina V. Duyan, Domincia, Rodrigo at Avencio C. Duyan.[29]It must be noted that thisPagpapahayag was entered into by Eulogio and Feliza after the supposed sale of the property on 25January 1978. Based on the clear provisions of this document, the intent of the siblings to create a trustwas manifest with Eulogio as the trustor, Feliza as the trustee and Eulogios children as the beneficiaries

or the cestui qui trust[30]of the res[31]which was the disputed property. This is based on the provision ofthe law on trusts which states that:

Art. 1440. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed asregards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whosebenefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary.[32]

However, the trust created was not merely implied as held by the Court of Appeals but belongs tothe express kind. Based on the provisions of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, Express trusts are thosewhich the direct and positive acts of the parties create, by some writing, deed or will, or words evincingan intention to create a trust.

[33]
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In this case, the provisions of the Pagpapahayag dated 10 February 1978 left no room for doubt. Itwas clearly intended therein by Eulogio and Feliza that the property subject of the sale will subsequentlybe placed by the latter in the name of respondents, thus creating a trust relationship over the property indispute.

Even if the word trust was not expressly used by the signatories to the 10 February1978 Pagpapahayag and the document did not expressly state that a trust was being established byreason thereof, the establishment of an express trust cannot be discounted. Under the Civil Code, Noparticular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearlyintended.

[34]In a decision penned by Justice Paras, this Court held that under the law on Trusts, it isnot necessary that the document expressly state and provide for the express trust, for it may even becreated orally, no particular words are required for its creation (Art. 1444, CivilCode).

[35]ThePagpapahayag dated 10 February 1978 having been freely entered into by Eulogio andFeliza, it had the force of law between them. It was therefore incumbent upon Feliza as trustee tocomply with the provisions of the instrument and have the subject property registered in the names ofher nephews and nieces.

Petitioners subsequent act of registering the disputed property in their own names and resisting

the action for reconveyance later filed by respondents was clearly a betrayal of the provisions of the

express trust created by the 10 February 1978 Pagpapahayag. By these actions, petitioners not onlyfailed to comply with the provisions of thePagpapahayag, but actually circumvented them.

It is worthy of note that petitioners never denied the existence, authenticity and due execution ofthe 10 February 1978 Pagpapahayag as they merely objected to the purpose of its presentation .[36]Asheld by the appellate court:

Neither refutation nor denial of the existence of such document exist in the records of the case atbar. Particularly, Feliza did not even raise any objection as to the due execution and authenticity of thePagpapahayag dated 10 February 1978. In relation thereto, it is worthy to note that an objection as tothe purpose of its presentation is not tantamount to an objection as to the authenticity and dueexecution of the document. In view of the absence of such objection, the GOMEZES as signatoriesthereto, are deemed bound by the stipulations therein.[37]

A trust is sacred and inviolable. The courts have therefore shielded fiduciary relations againstevery manner of chicanery or detestable design cloaked by legal technicalities.

[38]Considering thispronouncement of the Supreme Court and the betrayal by petitioners of the provisions ofthe Pagpapahayag creating the trust in this case, the Court of Appeals rightly ordered the reconveyanceof the disputed property to respondents and the cancellation of TCT No. 21885.

Moreover, petitioners admitted in the Pagpapahayag itself that the 25 January 1978 sale wasfictitious. This is evident by the use of the phrase conwaring pagbibili[39]which means simulated orfictitious sale. Thus, petitioners are estopped from claiming or asserting ownership over the subject

property based on the 25 January 1978 deed of sale. Felizas admission in the said Pagpapahayag of thefalsity of the sale is deemed conclusive upon her and her co-petitioner Eugenio Gomez. Under the CivilCode, Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making

it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.[40]

That admission cannotnow be denied by Feliza as against Eulogio and his successors-in-interest, the latter having relied uponher representation.

Petitioners argue that the action for reconveyance filed by respondents against them is not proper,the latter not being the owners of the property in question.[41]Invoking the 25 January 1978 deed of saledespite Felizas admission adverted to above that such sale was fictitious, petitioners assert that they are

the owners of the subject property. They claim that the best proof of ownership of a piece of land is thecertificate of title, and the TCT being in their name, they are the rightful owners thereof.[42]They further
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argue that based on the case ofDela Pea vs. Court of Appeals[43]among others, reconveyance is aremedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be wrongfully titled in anothers name.[44]

The argument begs the question. Reconveyance is precisely the proper action for respondents totake against petitioners since the former are claiming that they are the rightful owners of the property inquestion, not petitioners. By filing an action for reconveyance, a party seeks to show that the person whosecured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.[45]

Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the disputed property and the corresponding issuanceof a certificate of title in their name as vesting ownership on them simply because an express trust overthe property was created in favor of respondents. It has been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrenstitle over the property held in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on theregistration.[46]

The law safeguards the rightful partys interest in titled land from fraud and im proper technicalitiesby allowing such party to bring an action for reconveyance of whatever he has been deprived of as longas the property has not been transferred or conveyed to an innocent purchaser for value .[47]The actionwhile respecting the registration decree as incontrovertible, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land fromthe registered owner to the rightful owner.[48]As this Court held in the case ofEscobar vs. Locsin, TheTorrens system was never calculated to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust.

[49]

In a further effort to bolster the claim that they own the property in dispute, petitioners attempt tointroduce new evidence annexed to their petition in the form of a purported declaration made by Eulogiodated 19 February 1979.[50]The declaration purports to state that the previous instruments entered intoby him and the petitioners are void because he had already sold the lot to them .[51]This declaration,although annexed to the Petition for Review appears nowhere in the records of the trial court and theappellate court. This is a piece of factual evidence which should have been presented before the trialcourt to be considered and to allow respondents the opportunity to rebut it or to present evidence to thecontrary. The Rules of Court specifically provides that The court shall consider no evidence which hasnot been formally offered

[52]The alleged declaration not having been formally offered in evidence isdeemed to be a mere scrap of paper which has no evidentiary value.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the conflict between the decision of the appellate court and that of

the trial court provides this Court with a ground to review the decisions of both courts.[53]

That may betrue but the circumstance does not suffice to warrant the reversal of the Court of Appeals

Decision. Quite the contrary, the undisputed facts and the applicable law ineluctably support theconclusion that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and the Decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Ringor v. Ringor

Petitioners seek the review of the Decision[1]dated November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 48581 and its Resolution,[2]dated April 24, 2001, denying the subsequent motion forreconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (formerly theCourt of First Instance) of Dagupan City, Branch 43, in favor of herein respondents, for partition andreconveyance of land with damages.

The controversy involves lands in San Fabian, Pangasinan, owned by the late Jacobo Ringor. By hisfirst wife, Gavina Laranang, he had two children, Juan and Catalina. He did not have offsprings by hissecond and third wives. Catalina predeceased her father Jacobo who died sometime in 1935, leaving Juanhis lone heir.
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Juan married Gavina Marcella. They had seven (7) children, namely: Jose (the father andpredecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners), Genoveva, Felipa, Concordia, Agapito, Emeteria andEspirita. Genoveva and Agapito are represented in this case by Teofilo Abalos and Marcelina Ringor,their respective children. Espirita is represented by her children, Avelina, Cresencia and FelimonAlmasen.

Jacobo applied for the registration of his lands under the Torrens system. He filed three landregistration cases alone, with his son Juan, or his grandson Jose, applying jointly with him.

The first application, docketed as Expediente 241, G.L.R.O. Record No. 13152 was applied for aloneby Jacobo. While Jacobo was the only applicant in Expediente241, on November 22, 1921, in Decree No.119561, Parcels 1 and 2 of the lands in Expediente241 were adjudicated to Jacobo and his son, Juan, inequal shares aspro-indiviso co-owners.[3]On March 6, 1922, OCT No. 23689 was issued in the names ofJacobo and Juan.[4]With Jacobos thumbmark, in aCompraventa dated November 6, 1928, the one-half() undivided interest of Jacobo in the said Parcels 1 and 2 was sold and transferred toJose. The OCTwas eventually cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 15918, dated November 6, 1928. Thesale to Jose was registered only on February 15, 1940.[5]

Decree No. 119562awarded full ownership ofParcel 3 to Jacobo.[6]Thus, OCT No. 23690 pertainingto Parcel 3, was issued in Jacobos name.[7]By another Compraventaalso dated November 6, 1928, and

with the same circumstances as the Compraventa in Parcels 1 and 2, the entire interest of Jacobo in Parcel3 was likewise sold and transferred to Jose. Thereafter, TCT No. 5090 was issued in the name ofJose.[8] All the lands declared to Jacobo in Expediente 241 were allegedly sold to Jose for P6,000.[9]

In the second application, Expediente244, G.L.R.O. Record No. 13168, Jacobo named Jose as theapplicant. In Decree No. 65500,the five (5) parcels of land inExpediente 244 were adjudicated to Jose as adonacion de su abuelo (donation of his grandfather).

[10]On April 18, 1918, OCT No. 18797was issuedexclusively to Jose.[11]

The third application docketed as Expediente 4449, G.L.R.O. Record No. 23643, was filed in thenames of Jacobo and his only son Juan.[12]It covered three parcels of land. Juan died on July 16, 1922, ayear before the decision of the land registration court was issued. On October 10, 1923, in Decree No.147191, half of Parcel 1 was adjudicated to Jacobo and the other half to Jose and later, three-fourths ()

of parcels 2 and 3 to Jacobo and one-fourth () to Jose.[13]

Although Juan was one of the namedapplicants, it later appeared that Joses name was substituted for Juans name because of an erroneous

information that Jose was the only successor-in-interest of Juan.[14]Thus, on February 29, 1924, OCT Nos.25885 and 25886 were issued in the names of Jacobo and Jose respectively.[15]

Subsequently, in a Compraventa dated November 3, 1928, Jacobo allegedly sold and transferred toJose his one-half () undivided interest in Parcel 1 covered by OCT No. 25885. Jacobos thumbmarkappeared on the Compraventa.[16]These lands are now covered by TCT No. 15916, in the name ofpetitioner corporation, Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., organized after the initiation of the instantcase.[17] By another Compraventa also dated November 3, 1928, the three-fourths () undividedinterests of Jacobo in Parcels 2 and 3 covered by OCT No. 25886 were likewise sold and transferred toJose. The Compraventas were duly registered sometime in 1940. The OCTs were cancelled and new TCTswere issued in the name of Jose. Jacobo allegedly sold to Jose for P800 all the lands declared to him

in Expediente4449.[18]

During trial, witnesses attested that even after the decisions in the three land registration cases andthe Compraventas, Jacobo remained in possession of the lands and continued administering them as hedid prior to their registration. He unfailingly gave a share of the produce to all the 7 children of his sonJuan. According to witness Julio Monsis,[19]Jacobo did not partition the lands since the latter said that hestill needed them.[20]When Jacobo died on June 7, 1935, the lands under the three land registrationapplications, including those which petitioners sought to partition in their counterclaim before the trialcourt, remained undivided. Jose, as the eldest grandchild, assumed and continued the administration of
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the lands.[21]He also conscientiously gave his 5 younger sisters and only brother Agapito, their share inthe produce and income from the lands.[22]Herein respondents claim they repeatedly asked Jose forpartitioning of the land; however, every time they did, Jose always answered that it was not going to beeasy because there would be big and small shares.

[23]Respondents explained that they did notzealously press for the immediate partition of the lands because Jose constantly assured them that hewould never cheat them and because they respected him highly.[24]

Jose died on April 30, 1971. Respondents demanded from Joses children, herein petitioners, thepartition and delivery of their share in the estate left by Jacobo and under Joses administration. The

petitioners refused and attempts at amicable settlement failed.[25]On March 27, 1973, respondents fileda Complaint for partition and reconveyance with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. D-3037.An Amended Complaint was admitted by the lower court in its Order of August 6, 1973.[26]

In their Complaint, herein respondents claimed that (1) they are all grandchildren and/or greatgrandchildren of Jacobo, who left intestate the disputed lands with a total area of 322,775 sq. m., alllocated in San Fabian, Pangasinan, and declared for tax purposes in the name of Jose Ringor; (2) that thelate Jose Ringor had always been the administrator and trustee of Jacobo ;[27](3) that after Jacobosdeath, they asked for their shares of the intestate properties but was refused; and (4) that Jose as trusteeand overseer of all these properties was answerable to the respondents for their just shares in the

intestate properties of Jacobo.

[28]

They asked for (a) the partition of their corresponding shares, thecancellation of OCT No. 18797 issued in the name of Jose Ringor under Expediente 244 and that these besubdivided among the seven children of Jose Ringor, and the six children and grandchildren of JuanRingor; (b) the payment to plaintiffs of whatever maybe found as chargeable to the late Jose Ringor astrustee, as well as liability for administering these properties from the time of Joses death up to the timethe case is terminated; and (c) the payment of attorneys fees, surveyors expenses and cost of the suit.[29]

In their Answer, herein petitioners insisted that they rightfully own and possess the disputedlands. They alleged that their father acquired legitimate title to and remained in continuous,uninterrupted and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the said parcels of land in the concept of anowner at varying times since 1917, 1923, and 1928, as evidenced by the certificates of title issued morethan thirty (30) years ago and in some cases more than fifty (50) years ago, before the present suit wasinstituted by respondents. They claimed that Jacobo sold the parcels of land under ExpedienteNos.

4449 and 241 to Jose for valuable consideration on November 3 and 6, 1928, respectively, evidenced bynotarial deeds of sale duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. The other disputed landssought to be divided, petitioners assured, were held by Jose as exclusive owner.

In their Amended Answer, petitioners averred that the parcels of land in the exclusive name of Joseare his exclusive properties acquired by him either by inheritance, homestead patent, or purchase. Theyclaimed that Jose had long acquired indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the said properties inaccordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. These are evidenced by OCT No.18797issued March 6, 1919 for Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Plan Psu-6099; OCT No. 23797on May 6, 1922for Plan Psu-15467; TCT No. 5090 issued December 12, 1929 for Lot No. 3, Plan Psu-6095; TCT No.15918 issued February 15, 1940 for Lots Nos. 1 & 2, Plan Psu-6095 Amd; TCT No. 15917on February 15,1940 for Lots Nos. 1 & 2, Plan Psu-35491; and TCT No. 15916 issued February 15, 1940 for Plan Psu-31271,now TCT No. 93019 issued November 22, 1971. Further, according to petitioners, whatever cause or right

of action, if any, the respondents had with respect to the properties owned and possessed by them andtheir late father, including those based on constructive trust, it had long been barred by prescription andlaches and/or prior judgments since it is an incontrovertible fact that Jose had been, for more than thirty(30) years and in some cases for more than fifty (50) years, the exclusive registered owner of theregistered properties.[30]Lastly, petitioners asserted that respondents claim of express trust concerningthe properties in question could not be proved by parol evidence.

While trial of the case was in progress, Julio Monsis, alleging he was the only child of MacariaDiscipulo and Jacobo, filed a Complaint in Intervention. So did Leocadia Ringor, alleging she was theonly child of Jacobo with Marcelina Gimeno. When Julio died on February 3, 1977, he was survived by his
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wife Felipa and their legitimate children Maria, Federico, Eusebio, Paciencia, Panfilo and Fermin, allsurnamed Monsis. On July 8, 1982, herein respondents filed an Amendment to their AmendedComplaintimpleading as additional party-defendants, the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc.[31]

On February 10, 1995, the RTC decided in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of theDecision set forth its judgment:

(a) Declaring the 7 children of Juan L. Ringor who are the grandchildren of Jacobo Ringor, namely: Jose,Genoveva, Felipa, Concordia, Agapito, Emeteria and Espirita, all surnamed Ringor, as pro-indiviso co-owners of all the lands covered by Expediente Nos. 241, 244 and 4449 described in pages 2, 3, 4 and 5 ofthis decision brought under the Land Registration Act and now covered by TCT No. 15918 (Lots 1 and 2)and TCT 5090 (Lot No. 3) in the name of Jose Ringor (Expediente 241); TCT No. 15916 in the name ofdefendant Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc. (Lot 1, Expediente 2449); TCT No. 15917 (Lots 2 and 3, Expediente4449); and TCT No. 18797 (Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Expediente 244), in the name of Jose Ringor;

(b) Ordering the partition of the said parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 15918, 5090, 15916, 15917 and18797, all of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, among Jose, Genoveva, Felipa, Concordia, Agapito,Emeteria and Espirita, all surnamed Ringor into 7 equal parts;

(c) Ordering defendants to render an accounting to the plaintiffs of all the income, produce and rents onthese parcels of land from 1973 until the respective shares of the plaintiffs are physically and peacefullydelivered to each of them;

(d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 for attorneysfees;

(e) Dismissing the Complaints-in-Intervention of Julio Mon[sis] and Leocadia Ringor;

(f) On the Counterclaim, ordering the partition in seven (7) equal shares the parcels of land described inparagraph 34 (a and b), pages 14 and 15 of this decision, among Jose, Genoveva, Felipa, Concordia,Agapito, Emeteria and Espirita, all surnamed Ringor.

(g) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[32]

The trial court concluded that Jacobo created an express trust over his entire property in favor of hisgrandchildren. It found that Jose held the subject lands as co-owner and trustee of the express trust. Thetrial court held that the notarial deeds of sale executed between Jacobo and Jose in Expediente 241 werefalse and simulated. It noted that Jose registered the deed of sale twelve years after their execution andfive years after Jacobos death. More important, the trial court declared that Jacobo continued to occupy

and exercise acts of ownership over the same parcels of land until his death despite the supposed sale toJose.

On Expediente244, the trial court observed that the document evidencing that Jacobo donated thelands therein to Jose was never presented to the registration court, nor was any explanation given for thefailure to register the alleged donation. Hence, the donation was declared invalid.

On Expediente 4449, the trial court observed that although the applicants were Jacobo and Juan, theland was erroneously adjudicated to Jacobo and Jose because it was made to appear that Jose was theonly child who succeeded Juan, who died a year before the application was adjudicated, when in factJuan had seven children. Jacobo knew of this error, yet he did nothing to correct it.
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The trial court concluded that all these incidents and circumstances served as indicia that Jacobocared little if the lands were in his name or someone elses. As far as he was concerned, all these landsbelonged to him such that notwithstanding the subsequent compraventas, he continued to possess andadminister the lands and all the profits from them were at his disposal. Thus, the trial court continued,from the acts of Jacobo and his full exercise of dominion over the lands until his death, it could bededuced that the compraventas were without consideration and this was why the compraventas were not

registered during Jacobos lifetime. The trial court noted that even after the registration ofthe compraventas, until his own death, Jose continued Jacobos practice of sharing the produce of theland with his siblings, a recognition that even Jose considered that his siblings were beneficial co-ownersof the lands under his care.[33]

The trial court reasoned that despite the absence of a document proving the express trust, the samewas proven by parol evidence. The trial court explained that the prohibition in Article 1443[34]of the NewCivil Code that no express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved byparol evidence is a prohibition for purposes of presenting proof on the matter, but it could be waived bya party.[35] It went on to say that the failure to object to parol evidence during trial and the cross-examination of the witnesses is a waiver of the prohibition. Furthermore, it said that Jose, as trustee, didnot repudiate the trust, such that the trust remained, and since the trust continued to exist, an action tocompel the trustee to convey the properties has not prescribed nor is it barred by laches.[36]

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioners contended that the lower court erred when (1) it ruled thatJacobo Ringor constituted an express trust over the disputed properties abovecited in favor ofrespondents as the beneficiaries and with Jose Ringor as trustee; and (2) it gave weight to the oralevidence of herein respondents to prove the existence of an express trust in their favor.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision. The Motion for Reconsideration ofpetitioners was also denied.

Now before us the petitioners, in their Memorandum, raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A DOCUMENT, INSTRUMENT, DEED OR ANY WRITINGCREATING AN EXPRESS TRUST AND FORMING PART OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORDWHICH SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AS THE SAME WAS AFFIRMED

BY THE COURT A QUO, THAT AN EXPRESS TRUST WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE LATEJACOBO RINGOR OVER THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION IN FAVOR OF THERESPONDENTS AS THE BENEFICIARIES, WITH JOSE RINGOR AS THE TRUSTEETHEREOF (AND CO-BENEFICIARY AT THE SAME TIME).

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURTS RULINGS AS THE SAME WERE AFFIRMED ONAPPEAL BY THE COURT A QUO, WERE ANCHORED ONLY ON PAROL EVIDENCE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ADMISSION OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO PROVE EXPRESS TRUSTAS PROSCRIBED BY ART. 1443 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE CAN BE WAIVED.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS VALIDLY WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TOTHE ADMISSION BY THE TRIAL COURT OF PAROL EVIDENCE AS PROOF OF THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXPRESS TRUST.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTSRULING ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO THE PAROLEVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXPRESS TRUST.

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH WEREAFFIRMED IN TOTO BY THE COURT A QUO ARE SUPPORTED BY, OR CONTRARY TO,THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
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7. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS AND GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION IN VIRTUALLY ORDERING THE NULLIFICATION AND/ORDECLARING THE NULLITY OF --- ALL THE TITLES (TCT NO. 5090, TCT NO. 15918, OCTNO. 18797, TCT NO. 1597, AND TCT NO. 93019 ) OF JOSE RINGOR AND HIS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST (THE PETITIONERS HEREIN) AND DIVESTING THEM OF THEIR EXCLUSIVEOWNERSHIP OVER THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION; THE DECISIONS OF THE

LAND REGISTRATION COURTS IN EXPEDIENTE244 AND 4449; THE DONATIONREFERRED TO IN THE DECISION INEXPEDIENTE244; AND THE FOUR (4) DULYNOTARIZED COMPRAVENTAS EXECUTED BY JACOBO RINGOR IN FAVOR OF JOSERINGOR COVERING THE PARCELS OF LAND DESCRIBED THEREIN, AND --- WHETHEROR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONIN DECLARING THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND AS BELONGING TO THE INTESTATEESTATE OF JACOBO RINGOR AND UNDER THE CO-OWNERSHIP OF JOSE RINGOR ANDTHE RESPONDENTS, AND IN ORDERING THEIR PARTITION AMONG THE SEVENCHILDREN OF JUAN RINGOR, IN VIOLATION OF THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THECIVIL CODE, AND THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE INDEFEASIBILITY OFA TORRENS TITLE.

8. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ACTION WAS ALREADY BARRED BY

PRESCRIPTION, BOTH ACQUISITIVE AND EXTINCTIVE, AND LACHES.[37]

Briefly stated, the issues to be resolved in this petition are: (1) Were the factual findings of the lowerand appellate courts supported by evidence on record? (2) Was there a valid express trust established byJacobo Ringor? (3) May parol evidence be used as proof of the establishment of the express trust? (4) Didthe court in effect nullify the Torrens titles over the disputed parcels of land? (5) Were respondentsaction barred by prescription and laches?

We shall now address these issues together.

At the outset, petitioners urge this Court to review the factual findings of the case. It is a well-established principle, however, that in an appeal via certiorarionly questions of law may be raised.[38] Thefindings of fact of the Court of Appeals especially when not at variance with those of the trial court may not, generally be reviewed by this Court. The findings of fact of the lower court are conclusive on us,

absent any palpable error or patent arbitrariness. In this case, we find no tenable route but to leave thefindings of fact of the lower courts untouched, and move on to the resolution of the other issues.

Petitioners main contention is that the trial and appellate co urts had no basis to conclude thatJacobo constituted an express trust because respondents did not present any deed, instrument ordocument expressly declaring that a trust was constituted. Petitioners anchor their assertion on the CivilCode, particularly their interpretation of Articles 1440,[39]1441,[40] 1443,[41]1444,[42]1445,[43]and1446,[44]as they point out that in these provisions, for an express trust over an immovable to exist, fourelements must be present, namely: (1) a trustor or settlor who executes the instrument creating the trust;(2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to carry out the trust; (3) the trust res, consisting ofduly identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui que trust, or beneficiaries whose identitymust be clear. Petitioners aver that these elements are indispensable for an express trust to exist.Petitioners then lament that respondents did not present during trial or even attach to the records of the

case, any deed, instrument or document that Jacobo intended to create a trust. Petitioners, in theirpetition, insist that the intent to create a trust must be in writing; and they claimed that they objected,from the beginning, to the introduction of any oral testimony to prove the establishment of an expresstrust.

Respondents, for their part, argue that Jacobo created an express trust. Respondents cite the threeapplications for registration of the lands referred to the Expedientes241, 244 and 4449 and thethree Compraventas as documentary proofs that an express trust was created by Jacobo. According tothem, this conclusion can be gleaned clearly when Jacobo exercised acts of ownership over all the
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disputed lands even after the alleged donation and deeds of sale in favor of Jose, and when Jacoboreligiously gave shares of the income and produce of the disputed lands to the respondents, a practiceJose continued until three years before his death.

Express trusts, sometimes referred to as direct trusts, are intentionally created by the direct andpositive acts of the settlor or the trustor by some writing, deed, or will, ororal declaration.[45]It iscreated not necessarily by some written words, but by the direct and positive acts of the parties. Noparticular words are required, it being sufficient that a trust was clearly intended.[46]Unless required by astatutory provision, such as the Statute of Frauds, a writing is not a requisite for the creation of atrust.[47]Such a statute providing that no instruments concerning lands shall be created or declaredunless by written instruments signed by the party creating the trust, or by his attorney, is not to beconstrued as precluding a creation of a trust by oral agreement, but merely as rendering such a trustunenforceable.[48]Contrary to the claim of petitioners, oral testimony is allowed to prove that a trustexists. It is not error for the court to rely on parol evidence, - - i.e., the oral testimonies of witnessesEmeteria Ringor, Julio Monsis and Teofilo Abalos - - which the appellate court also relied on to arrive atthe conclusion that an express trust exists. What is crucial is the intention to create a trust. Whileoftentimes the intention is manifested by the trustor in express or explicit language, such intention maybe manifested by inference from what the trustor has said or done, from the nature of the transaction, orfrom the circumstances surrounding the creation of the purported trust.[49]

However, an inference of the intention to create a trust, made from language, conduct orcircumstances, must be made with reasonable certainty.[50]It cannot rest on vague, uncertain orindefinite declarations. An inference of intention to create a trust, predicated only on circumstances, canbe made only where they admit of no other interpretation.[51]In the present case, crediblewitnesses testified that (1) the lands subject ofExpedientes241 and 4449 were made and transferred inthe name of Jose merely for convenience since Juan predeceased Jacobo; (2) despite the Compraventas,transferring all the lands in Joses name, Jacobo continued t o perform all the acts of ownership includingpossession, use and administration of the lands; (3) Jacobo did not want to partition the lands because hewas still using them; (4) when Jacobo died, Jose took over the administration of the lands andconscientiously and unfailingly gave his siblings their share in the produce of the lands, in recognition oftheir share as co-owners; and (5) Jose did not repudiate the claim of his siblings and only explained upontheir expression of the desire for partitioning, that it was not going to be an easy task.

From all these premises and the fact that Jose did not repudiate the claim of his co-heirs, it can beconcluded that as far as the lands covered by ExpedienteNos.241 and4449 are concerned, when Jacobotransferred these lands to Jose, in what the lower court said were simulated or falsified sales, Jacobosintention impressed upon the titles of Jose a trust in favor of the true party-beneficiaries, including hereinrespondents.

Under the doctrine of partial performance recognized in this jurisdiction, the objection to the oralcharacter of a trust may be overcome or removed where there has been partial performance of the termsof the trust as to raise an equity in the promisee.[52]A trustee may perform the provisions of the trust, andif he does, the beneficiary is protected in benefits that he has received from such performance.[53]Thus,when a verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated, its enforceability willnot be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement.[54]Noteworthy,

despite the compraventas transferring the lands in his name, Jose unfailingly gave his siblings their shareof the produce of the lands. Furthermore, not only did he fail to repudiate the trust, he also assured hisco-heirs that it was the inconvenience of partitioning that kept him from transferring the shares of hissiblings to them. Accordingly, with respect to the lands covered by ExpedienteNos.241 and 4449, anexpress trust exists with Jose Ringor as trustee in favor of all the heirs of Jacobo Ringor. As far asprescription or laches are concerned, they pose no hindrance or limitation to the enforcement of anexpress trust.[55]

Finally, on the lands covered in Expediente244, we note that as a donacion de su abuelo, thedonation impaired the hereditary rights of succession of Joses co-heirs. Nevertheless, these were
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transferred to Jose by final judgment of the land registration court. Despite the registration in Joses

name, Jose did not take possession over them from the date of registration to the time of Jacobos

death. Instead, while alive, Jacobo retained possession, and continued the administration of the lands.Considering then these circumstances, Article 1449 of the New Civil Code on implied trusts is thepertinent law. It provides that, [t]here is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but itappears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no

beneficial interest or only a part thereof. Article 1449 creates a resulting trust where the donee becomesthe trustee of the real beneficiary.[56]Generally, resulting trusts do not prescribe except when the trusteerepudiates the trust.[57]Further, the action to reconvey does not prescribe so long as the property standsin the name of the trustee.[58]To allow prescription would be tantamount to allowing a trustee to acquiretitle against his principal and true owner.[59]Here, Jose did not repudiate the trust, and the titles of thedisputed lands are still registered in Joses name or in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc.

Petitioners contend, however, that the court a quo virtually nullified all the land titles in Joses namewhen it declared that the disputed lands belong to the intestate estate of Jacobo and Jose and his siblingswere co-owners thereof. This, petitioners aver, violates the principle ofres judicata and the indefeasibilityof the Torrens title.

Nothing is farther from the truth than this contention. A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a

property held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration .

[60]

ATorrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrenssystem does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested. It doesnot protect a usurper from the true owner.[61]The Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal inthe performance of a trust.[62]It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Whereone does not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrenssystem of registration can confirm orrecord nothing.[63]Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands in Joses name nor in the nameof the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust byrelying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs.[64]The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce thetrust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended trust must be sustained.

To recapitulate, we find no reversible error in the assailed decision of the appellate court. We are inagreement in sustaining the findings and conclusions of the court a quo. The trial court found in favor of

herein respondents claim that the deeds of sale that caused the registration of the TCTsin Expedientes241 and 4449 in Joses name were invalid. The deeds were false, simulated and clearlywithout consideration. The trial court also found that Jose owned only about three hectares of landwhich he farmed, and he had no other means for his alleged purchases. He was never in business, norgainfully employed in the government or in the private sector. Neither were the children of Josepropertied nor employed.[65]In fine, we sustain its findings on the invalidity of the deeds of sale for beingsimulated and false.

As for the donations of the lands in Expediente244, the basis of which was an alleged donacion desu abuelothe trial court concluded they were invalid donations because no deed of donation was evershown. The trial court noted that the documents evidencing the donations were never presented forregistration simply because there was never a donation to Jose and because at the time the applicationwas filed, Jacobos only son, Juan, was still alive. The donation was allegedly made merely to facilitate

the registration of the lands in Joses name.

[66]

As found by the trial court and sustained by the appellatecourt, it was merely for convenience that Jacobo registered the lands in the name of Jose. He did notintend to relinquish his rights to the lands. His intention was clearly to keep the lands for himself until hisdeath, and it was to be understood that Jose was merely a trustee. We are not inclined to disturb thesefindings and conclusions of the trial court, sustained by the Court of Appeals, which persuasively convinceus that the transfers of the lands in Expedientes 241 and 4449 were simulated sales, and in Expediente244 the transfers were invalid donations.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 27, 2000 ofthe Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, formerly the Court of FirstInstance of Dagupan City, Branch 43, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SECUYA v. Vda. De Selma

In action for quieting of title, the plaintiff must show not only that there is a cloud or contrary interestover the subject real property, but that the have a valid title to it. In the present case, the action must fail,because petitioners failed to show the requisite title.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the July 30, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 38580,1 which affirmed the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu

City. The CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, [there being] no error in the appealed decision, the same is herebyAFFIRMED intoto.3

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing [evidence] and considerations, this court hereby findsthe preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendant Gerarda Selma as judgment isrendered:

1. Dismissing this Complaint for Quieting of title, Cancellation of Certificate of Title of Gerarda

vda. de Selma and damages,

2. Ordering the plaintiffs to vacate the premises in question and turn over the possession of thesame to the defendant Gerarda Selma;

3. Requiring the plaintiffs to pay defendant the sum of P20,000 as moral damages, according toArt. 2217, attorney's fees of P15,000.00, litigation expenses of P5,000.00 pursuant to Art. 2208No. 11 and to pay the costs of this suit.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.4

Likewise challenged is the October 14, 1998 CA Resolution which denied petitioners' Motion for

Reconsideration.

5

The Facts

The present Petition is rooted in an action for quieting of title filed before the RTC by Benigna, Miguel,Marcelino, Coraz

trusts digests

Documents