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Truth, KoΣmoΣ, and Apeth in the Homeric Poems

A.W.H. Adkins

The Classical Quarterly / Volume 22 / Issue 01 / May 1972, pp 5 - 18DOI: 10.1017/S0009838800033966, Published online: 11 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009838800033966

How to cite this article:A.W.H. Adkins (1972). Truth, KoΣmoΣ, and Apeth in the Homeric Poems. TheClassical Quarterly, 22, pp 5-18 doi:10.1017/S0009838800033966

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TRUTH, KOZMOZ, AND APETH IN THEHOMERIC POEMS

A NUMBER of scholars have discussed the difficulty of preserving accurately—or at all—information about the past1 in the Greek Dark Ages when theliteracy of Minoan/Mycenean Greece had been lost. Such preservationnecessarily depended on the memories of the members of the society, especiallythose of the professional 'rememberers', the bards of the oral tradition: in sucha society, if knowledge of an event is to be available to future generations,it must not be forgotten. The bards are of course aware of the importance ofmemory: the Muses are the daughters of Memory,2 and a prayer to them isa prayer that they will supply to the bard's mind—and to the tip of his tongue—what he needs for his verse;3 and in so far as he believes that the eventsportrayed in his poem really happened, he is aware that it is upon his memory,and the goddesses believed to work through it, that he must rely for know-ledge about the past. Truth about the past, then, depends on accurate memory,and some scholars have discussed the extent to which this situation producesor encourages an epistemology, and view of truth, different from those familiarto those who live in literate societies.4

Where a necessary condition of making a true statement in a society isalways that it has not been forgotten, is truth identified with 'not forgetting'or 'unforgottenness' ? After all, one of Homeric and later Greek's words fortruth is aX-qdeia, a plausible derivation of which is a privative +A176-, interpret-able as 'unforgottenness' or 'unconcealedness'. In a non-literate society, onecondition of the 'unconcealedness' of a piece of information would be that ithad not been forgotten; and we might be tempted to suppose that Homericusage adverted to this fact.

Now there is a striking passage in Iliad 23 which, considered in isolation,might well suggest (a) that the etymology of aXrjBeiTj is a-\-\7]6-; (b) that theHomeric bards were aware of this; and (c) that their usage was closely con-trolled by their awareness. In 359 ff. Achilles

•napa Se OKOTTOV efcrevavrldeov &olviKa, oirdova naTpos eoto,

to? fiefivecoTO Spofiovs Kai a\rj9elr]v w

Phoenix was set there explicitly to remember—not perhaps the most obviousword to choose for the functions of an umpire, rather than 'watch', 'notice','observe'—and declare atofid-q. The juxtaposition suggests a conscious parallelbetween remembering and not having forgotten; but this passage, and one or

1 I am not suggesting that the Linear B a list of names and numbers.script was used for this purpose; but its 4 See most recently M. Detienne, Lesexistence created possibilities not available Maitres de verite dans la Grece archaique,to a non-literate society. (Maspero, Paris, 1967). I find some of this

2 Hesiod, Theogony 53 ff. author's conclusions unacceptable; but3 So that the most heartfelt prayer to the pp. 11 ff. and 22 ff. furnish an illuminating

Muses occurs not at the beginning of a evocation of the experience of living in adeeply felt passage of poetry, but at the non-literate society.beginning of the 'Catalogue', Iliad 2. 484 ff.,

6 A. W. H. ADKINS

two similar ones,1 do not in themselves justify our equation of dXrjdeirj with nothaving forgotten, or with what one has not forgotten. Only a consideration ofthe total behaviour of dXrjdrjs and dX-qOelrj in Homer, together with that of wordswhich appear similar in usage, will reveal the full implications of the word.

Those who have discussed dXrjdetrj in the light of its apparent etymologyhave on the whole considered the difficulty of making true statements aboutthe (remote or fairly remote) past, which is indeed a problem in a non-literateculture. True statements about the past, however, are not the only kind of truestatements that one can make, and dXrjdrjs in Homer may have reference to thefuture. In Odyssey 17 Telemachus, pretending ignorance of Odysseus' identity,tells Eumaeus to take the 'beggar' to solicit alms through the city, since hecannot afford to accept the 'beggar' as his own guest, 14 f.:

6 tjeivos S' ei TT€p jxaXa prjvtei, dXyiov avra>

eacrerai" 77 yap ifiol <j>lX' dXrjQea

Similarly, in Odyssey 21, Odysseus makes a promise to his faithful servants,212 ff .:

a<j>wCv S', cos eaerai nep, dXrjdeirjv KaTaXe£wet x* VTT' e/xot ye 6eos Sap-dcrrj fj.vrjaTrjpas dyavovs,

dfj.<f>oTepois dAo^ous /cat /CT̂ /Ltar' oVaercra).

In both cases, 'what I have not forgotten' is manifest nonsense. This, however,does not in itself entail that the idea of 'forgetting', or of the root Xrjd whoserange is not the same as that of 'forget'—, is not consciously present to themind of the poet or his characters. It would be possible to hold that dX^Bilt)acquires a notion of tense from its context, and that the one word can conveywhat has not been forgotten (by the speaker or another, or by any group upto and including the society as a whole), what is not now being forgotten, or—as in the two passages quoted—what will not be forgotten. This last is mostlikely to occur when a speaker is expressing a resolve, promise, or threat,saying that he will not forget it; and since resolves and threats are kinds ofutterance which we might hesitate to pronounce 'true' or 'false', whereas theymay evidently be dXr/dea,2 we might be tempted to treat this as further evidencefor Homeric man's consciousness of the X-qO- root in the word. (As will appear,however, so to treat this linguistic behaviour would be over-sophisticated:ordinary language, whether Homeric or modern English, readily speaks of truethreats and promises.)

The wider question, however, needs further discussion, though Telemachus'form of expression should perhaps at once cause us to doubt. When he utters

i the generalization 17 yap ifiol (f>lX' dXrjdia ^vd-qaaaOai, how are we to interpret;| it ? Which tense are we to supply ? We cannot really supply all three, to producej the fully open generalization which seems needed; and if we confine the

1 Cf. also Odyssey 11. 505 ff., where forgotten'.Odysseus says oi mirvaiiaj, anything of 2 Compare also Odysseus' aXi/Bea threatsPeleus, but will tell iraaav dAijflfwjv about in Odyssey 18. 342. A reluctance to speak ofNeoptolemus. The contrast, and the fact 'true threats' might lead us to interpret thethat 'the whole truth' seems a slightly odd line in isolation as 'threats he would notphrase in the context, might lead us to forget (to perform)',render by 'all I remember', 'all I have not

TRUTH, KOZMOZ, AND APETH IN HOMER 7

expression to the future, as seems necessary if only one tense is in mind, thereis the additional difficulty that there is no word for 'threats' expressed, so thatTelemachus appears to be saying 'I am wont to say things that I do not forget';and Telemachus' powers of total recall are not really relevant in the context.In fact, as will appear, there are good reasons for doubting whether Homericman is conscious in this manner of the Xrjd- root in dXrjdelr].

Examples in which dXr)6elrj refers to the past themselves do not alwaysencourage the interpretation 'not forgotten'. In Odyssey 17. 104 ff. Penelopecomplains to Telemachus that, though she has been sunk in grief since thedeparture of Odysseus,

ovSe /xot erXrjs,TTplv eXdeiv iAvrj<jTrjpas ayqvopas es roSe Sa>fj.a,voarov aov narpos crdcfxx elndfiev, ei irov a/coucray.

Telemachus replies, 108:

roiyap eyw TOI, [ifJTep, dXrjOelrjv

It is hardly likely that Telemachus has forgotten anything he has recentlyheard about Odysseus' return, for to discover any information that he couldwas the purpose of the voyage from which he has just returned; and 'whatI have not forgotten' is hardly an appropriate or soothing response to Pene-lope's outburst. Similarly, Iliad 24. 406 ff., Priam's

el [lev 8rj Bepdncov IlrjXrj'CdSeoi }i%iXfjosels, dye S17 /u.01 Trdaav dXrjOeirjv KardXetjov,T) e n Trap vrjecrariv e/xoj ird'Cs, tfe /JUV TJ8T)fjai KVCXLV [teXeifTTl rafjucbv npovOrjKev M.

asks for information which the supposed retainer of Achilles could hardly haveforgotten or failed to notice, and the anguish of Priam's own situation renders'all you have not forgotten' very inadequate.

If the society were neurotically aware of the inadequacy of its historical in-formation in comparison with literate societies of whose existence it knew, andallowed this awareness to overflow into daily life, we might interpret the lasttwo passages as expressive of such a neurotic anxiety about memory: neurotic,certainly, for Penelope and Priam are asking for information which would notusually be committed to permanent record even in a modern literate society.But Homer's characters—as opposed to the occasionally expressed and fullyjustified anxieties of the epic poet in face of his material—betray no suchneurotic anxiety.1 (Even literate cultures of their day and earlier did not keepdetailed historical records.) Penelope and Priam, in fact, seem to be askingfor the truth.

aXrjdel-q has received more discussion than other Homeric words whichappear to convey the idea of 'truth'. The remainder should, however, be

1 The anxiety which is felt is not that the he is dead. See my 'Eixo/xai., ei5x")Arj, andcharacter himself may forget a fact about cu^os in Homer', CQ, NS xix (1969), 32 f.,the past, but that the other members of the 'Threatening, Abusing, and Feeling Angry insociety may not notice him adequately the Homeric Poems', JZfSlxxxix(ig69), i8ff.while he is alive, and may forget him when

8 A. W. H. ADKINS

discussed, since their behaviour and relationships with each other and withdXrjdeLrj throw light on the concept of truth possessed by Homeric society.

Iliad 23. 359 ff. appeared to parallel aXrjdeiT) with remembering, and there-fore to oppose it to forgetting or failing to notice. Were the concept of truthto be absent altogether from Homeric society, its place being taken by thatof not forgetting, or that of what has not been forgotten, we should expect tofind dXyjOfiT] always opposed to 'forgetting' or 'forgotten'. However, the fevS-root undeniably appears in the Homeric poems, and its function, and relation-ship to dX-qOdrj and other Homeric words frequently rendered 'truth', must beconsidered.

In Iliad 6. 163 ff. it is said of Anteia

rj Se tfievaa^evq Upoirov fiacnXfja TrpoorjvSa-

"Tedvalrjs, d> UpoW', fj KaKTave BeXXepo(f>6vTrjV,

os fi' edeXev (juXoTtyri fuyrjiievai OVK

Here it seems undeniable that the poet is ascribing deliberate falsehood to her.Certainly Anteia did not act as she did because she had forgotten or failed tonotice something. May we not then say at once that Homeric man had theconcept of 'lie' in precisely the form which is familiar to us ? Further investiga-tion is necessary, to discover the range of tpevSos and ipevSeo-Oai in Homer;for were ifievBos and tjievbeoOai to span both deliberate falsehood and mistakeof fact, it would be impossible to say that Homeric man had either the conceptof 'lie' or the concept of 'mistake of fact' in the forms familiar to us. Further-more, we might prima facie expect to discover that Homeric man did notdistinguish between lies and mistakes of fact, inasmuch as he was living in ashame-culture or results-culture. In such a society results, not intentions, count;and since a statement which is factually incorrect may be the result either ofa mistake or of a deliberate lie, we might well expect such a society as this totreat both as tfitvSos, and indeed inquire whether the society had the conceptof 'lie' as we know it.

The question is difficult to answer on the basis of the evidence supplied bythe Homeric poems. Most usages of <fiev8os and ipevSecrdai certainly occur inpassages where there has been deliberate deception; and there are none inwhich I am able to demonstrate conclusively that such an overtone is notpresent. The doubtful cases are the following.

In Iliad 9. 115 f. Agamemnon, now convinced that he should appeaseAchilles, says to Nestor, who has just advised such a course,

to yipov, ov TI i/ievSos e/xay dras KareXetjas'v, ov8' avros

In saying 'you are right', ov ipevSos, he implicitly contrasts Nestor's utterancewith the ifievSos that he might have uttered; and the contrast with 'error' atleast makes good sense, in our eyes at all events. However, certainty is impos-sible here: ipevSos is negatived to convey the idea of truth; 'truth' may beopposed either to 'lie' or to 'mistake', and the range of ov ipevSos conveying'truth' might be wider than that of un-negatived t/ievSos; while on the otherhand Agamemnon is under considerable emotional stress and, had he taken theopposite view of Nestor's words, might well have treated them as a deliberatefalsehood rather than as a mistake of fact.

TRUTH, K02M0Z, AND APETH IN HOMER

Again, in Iliad 5. 635 ff. Tlepolemus says to Sarpedon

Se ere </>a<n Aios yovov aly16x010U, enel TTOXXOV Keivcov ivi&eveai dvSpcov

01 A 16s i^cyivovro hrl -nporipwv dvdpumaiv.

'They are in error' makes sense in the context; but Tlepolemus is tauntingan enemy, and possibly ascribing the flattering view of Sarpedon to Sarpedon'sfriends, Tlepolemus' enemies. To them he might well ascribe deliberatefalsehood rather than mistake. We may compare a passage in Iliad 4. 404 f.Agamemnon has been belittling Diomedes in comparison with his father.Diomedes, abashed, says nothing; but Sthenelus replies

Arpeth-q, pvrj tfi€v8e' emoTa/iievos- aa<j>a eirreLV

•fj[ieis TOL Trarepcov /xe'y' dfieivoves ev^ofied' elvai.

Agamemnon's opinion might have been sincerely held; but Sthenelus explicitlysays that in his view Agamemnon could speak the truth and deliberatelychooses ijievSeadai. Sthenelus' anger does not permit him to entertain thepossibility of Agamemnon's sincerity; and it is arguable that Iliad 5. 635 ff.and 9. 115 f. betoken a similar state of mind. Accordingly, apparent pressuresof a results-culture notwithstanding, it is necessary on the basis of the evidenceso far presented1 to incline rather to the view that Homeric society had theconcept 'lie' in a form familiar to us; and I shall indeed offer further evidencefor this view in the course of this article, and endeavour to account for thesituation.

But whedier or no Homeric Greeks distinguished between mistakes of factand deliberate falsehoods, it is evident that they had a concept of a falsestatement; so that it would be difficult to deny them the concept of a truestatement (as distinct from one merely containing something that one had notforgotten). It remains to be determined, however, whether ifievSos includesonly false statements. A possible objection to the view that dA f̂lij? 'meant' 'true',and possible argument for its 'meaning' 'not forgotten', or something similar,with appropriate tense-modifications, was the use of dXrjd'qs of threats andsimilar utterances. tpevBos, however, has no possible etymological connectionwith forgetting and is undeniably used in contexts where the speaker is notunaware of the truth: it conveys, when used with statements, at least that theproposition is not in accordance with the facts. Accordingly if t/ievSos, too, isused of threats and similar utterances, it is not possible to argue on the basisof its range of usage that dAijflij? when used of statements does not imply thatthese are in accordance with the facts.

In Iliad 4. 234 ff., when the Trojans have broken the oaths for the singlecombat between Paris and Menelaus in Book 3, Eurymedon indeed shouts

Hpyetoi, [irq rrco TI [ie8ieT€ OovpiSos

ov yap em i/reuSeWi 7rax^p Zevs eWer' apcoyos,aAA' or irep vporepoi imep opKia SijAijaavro,TCOV 17x01 avraiv repeva XP°a yvres ISovrat.

1 One might of course contend that this is speculation, and I shall offer moreSthenelus would have regarded Agamem- evidence below in support of the view given

. non's speech as 0<rOSos even had he supposed in the text.that he did not fmoTaoBai odefia eliniv; but

io A. W. H. ADKINSThis, whether one reads tfievSeacri. (from xpevSrjs, a hapax in the sense of 'liar'in Homer) or tpevSeaoi (from i/ievSos), refers to making certain promises in anoath and failing to keep them. We might prefer to speak of promises being'fulfilled' or 'unfulfilled' rather than 'true' or 'false', and should certainly usesuch language of threats. But Homeric man clearly uses the xpeuS- root ofpromises. There is no example of such language in connection with a threat;but the range of ahjdrjs and the i/ievS- root appears to be very similar, and thereis no question of remembering or forgetting in the latter case. Homer's speak-ing of true or false promises or threats is simply 'ordinary-language' usage.1

It would appear, then, that words derived from a-\-Xrj9- and the ifrevS- rootexpress for Homeric man the connection between a verbal utterance and whatwas, is, or will turn out to be the case; and no matter what philosophicaldifficulties can be generated from such a view of truth, this seems to correspondclosely with the common-sense, unsophisticated view of the concept in literatesocieties.

Other questions raised by Homer's use of t/ievSos will be discussed below.However, a few words must be said about other words rendered by 'true'.First, vrjfieprqs. The word, it seems to be agreed, is derived from the negativingprefix vrj- and the root d/xapr-. Now the d^apr- root spans both mistake andmoral error, so that if the Greeks of the Homeric period were conscious of theetymology, and influenced by it, we might expect to find here a word whichcould be opposed both to making a factually incorrect statement and totelling a deliberate lie. The picture would be very different from 'not havingforgotten'. Forgetting is ceasing to be aware of or to have access to a piece ofinformation: if all one's fellows, in a non-literate culture, forget something,that piece of information is gone for good; but one may miss a mark whilebeing aware of the mark's existence.

However, it is use, not etymology, that counts. Despite differing etymologies,aXrjdrjs and lrqftepnjs might nevertheless have exactly the same range of usage.The ranges certainly overlap. In Iliad 6. 376 Hector bade Andromache'sservants to tell him vrjixepria; and the housekeeper replies, 382:

"EKTOP, 67ret £iaA' avcoyas dXrjOda yLvd-qaaadai.

simply replacing v-qfiepria by aXt]6ia. Again (to widen the discussion to includeother words rendered 'true') >pefi8os may be opposed either to a\r]6rjs (e.g.Odyssey 14. 124 f.) or to vrjfieprrjs (Odyssey 3. 19 ff.) or to ervpov (Iliad 10.534 ff.); while Odyssey 4. 642 ff., where Antinous says to Noemon

V7]fJ,epT£S fJLOl €V10TT£, TTOT tt»^£TO K0.1 TlV

KOVpOl. €TTOVT* ; 'I9o.K7jS eijdlpeTOl, TJ eol aVTOV

drjres TE S/xcDej T€ ; SvvaiTo Ke Kal TO reXeaaai.Kal fioi TOVT' ayopevoov tTr/rvfiov, o<j>p' ev eiSw,r\ ae /St'jj deKovros amr)vpa vrja fieXaivav,77c €KCLV ol SoJKas . . . ,

shows a similar overlapping range for vq^epris and eT-qrvfj,ov: there seem to beno grounds other than metrical ones for the choice of one word rather thananother in the passages quoted or cited here.

1 The Homeric Greek, like Annie Laurie, sophical discourse do problems arise fromcan 'give a promise true'. Only in philo- this.

TRUTH, KOSMOE, AND APETH IN HOMER n

At this point I must carefully define the limited purpose of this article. Ifwords have different ranges of use, the fact that one of them can be substitutedfor another in a sentence to convey 'roughly the same meaning' does notrender the words synonymous; for the difference in range will endow thewords with different overtones, and in so far as the etymology of the words ispresent to the mind of their user, this too may have a similar effect. It isalways of great importance to remember this fact in reading literature, par-ticularly poetry, in a foreign, and particularly a remote and 'dead' language,and to make every effort to recover the overtones so far as is possible,1 and thequestion is relevant to the poetic effect of the different Homeric words whichwe are tempted to render by 'true' and 'truth'; but I am here, in the limitedspace at my disposal, discussing a different matter: whether or no the non-literate nature of Homeric society has an important epistemological effect onthat society's concept of truth; and for this limited purpose, when I am notengaged in literary criticism, it suffices to demonstrate whether or no thesewords are used in a manner which appears not unfamiliar to us, whose conceptof truth is part of our literate culture.

The evidence so far cited points to a familiar concept of truth; and we mustconsider the reasons for this. Most important would appear to be the fact that,though in a non-literate society in particular—I shall discuss this furtherbelow—a necessary condition of being able to make a true statement is thatone should not have forgotten or failed to notice the relevant facts, it is notin most cases the condition at the forefront of the mind of the person makingthe true statement. In Odyssey 16. 243 ff. Telemachus, while acknowledgingOdysseus' prowess as a warrior, says

aAAd Xltjv ju.e'ya cures ' ayq p.' e^ei' °v8e KSV e'irjdv8pe 8vco iroXXoioi /cat l<f>8ip,oicrt. p,dxecr6<u.

pyqar-qpoiv 8' OVT' ap 8e/ca? drpeKes oxne 8V' olai,

aAAa TTOXV nXeoves' ra^a S' etcreai ev9d8' api.6p.6v.

e/c p.ev Aov\ix^ol° &va> /cat nevrrjKOVTaxovpoi KeKpifievoi, ei; Se 8p7](n~f]pes eirovrafetc Se £dp,r]s iriuvpes Kal eiKoai <j>u>Tes eaaiv . . .

Here a necessary condition of Telemachus' making these statements isthat his memory has preserved the relevant facts; but Telemachus is notthinking of this, but of demonstrating the truth of his assertion about thesuitors' numbers in a manner entirely familiar to us. Homeric society under-stands the function of evidence in establishing the truth.

More light is shown by a passage in Odyssey 1. Athena says to Telemachus,206 ff.:

ctAA' aye fxoi. r68e elne Kal arpeKecos KaTaXe^ov,

el 8rj i£ aiiToto TOCTO? mi l? ei? 'O8vofjos.alva>s p.ev Ke^aXr/v re Kal op,p.a.Ta KaAa. eoiKas

Keivw, eirel 6ap.a roTov ep.iay6p.e9' dAAijAoiax,•npiv ye TOV is Tpotrjv dva/Jry/xevcu, evQa -nep aAAot.

Athena (disguised as Mentor) is asking to be told drpeKews; and she gives1 See my 'Meaning, Using, Editing and Translating' in Approaches to Classical Litera-

ture edited by C. Stray, Duckworth (which will be published in the near future).

ia A. W. H. ADKINSreasons, evidence, for making the surmise which she is asking Telemachusto confirm. Telemachus replies, 214 ff.:

Toiyap eyco TOI, £etve, ju,aA' drpeKecus dyopevoio.li.r)T-qp fiev r' ep,e (f>7](n TOV eppevai, avrap eyco yeOVK 018'• ov yap TTW TIS iov yovov avros dveyvco.d>S 8rj eyco y' otj>eXov fiaKapos vv rev ep.fj.evai vlosdvepos, ov KTtaTecrcnv eots em yfjpas ererfie.vvv 8' os diroTjioraTOS yevero Qvryrcov dvdpcb-ncov,TOV p.' eK cfiaoi yeveaBai, enel o~v p,e TOUT ipeelveis.

Telemachus' speaking aTpeKecos here consists basically in his saying OVK 018';and so does not consist in giving a true answer to the question, but in beingtruthful about his inability to answer it. Much more important, however, isthe indication that in the kind of situation portrayed here—which we have yetto define—'what people say' is not equivalent to the truth, though, as I havetried to show elsewhere,1 there are situations in the Homeric poems in which'what people say' takes precedence over all considerations.

In this society, then, truth is not equated with what has not been forgotten;it may be distinguished from 'what people say', though Homeric society is a'shame-culture'; and evidence is deemed relevant to establishing it. In fact,as far as I can ascertain, the society's non-literacy may render certain kindsof truths more difficult to establish, but does not affect the society's concept oftruth. Nor, I believe, is this surprising: we are comparing the—'ordinary-language', for there is no other—concept of truth in Homeric society with ourown 'ordinary-language' concept; and I see no reason to suppose that thelatter has been developed primarily from situations in which documentaryevidence is available, a minority even in our society. True statements aboutpresent events which fall within the experience of the person making themhave the same relation to 'the facts' in any society, literate or non-literate,and are confirmable in the same manner; and if an individual wishes to knowthe truth about an important (recently) past event in a non-literate society,the fact that he is a member of a society makes it possible for him to ask othermembers about the event; and if different people give him the same account,their agreement will be more in the forefront of his mind than the fact that,had they forgotten what happened, they would be unable to tell him anything.These situations are surely the majority, and certainly suffice to produce aconcept of truth quite familiar to ourselves. (The Homeric concept does notequate the truth with 'what people/most people say': as the case of Tele-machus shows, it is 'the facts of the case' that determine it; and true statementsabout present events falling within one's experience will serve to establishthe concept in this form.)

In fact, the most powerful influences upon the Homeric concept of truth,and those that lend interest to discussing it, have little relationship with the non-literacy of the society, but a close relationship with the society's values.

In Odyssey 8. 178 ff. Odysseus says to Euryalus, who has taunted him withbeing a merchant, and no athlete,

1 See my Merit and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, i960), chapter iii, pp. 48 f.

TRUTH, K0ZM02, AND APETH IN HOMER 13

wpivds fJ.01 9vfj.6v evl onqdeaoi <f>LXoiaiV

elnciiv ov Kara KOOfj,ov eyw 8 ' oil vfj'ts dedXcov,

coj av ye [xvOelai, dXX ev TTOWTOUJLV OLOJ

efj.IJ.evat,, 6(f>p' T)fir) re nevoWea XfPCTt T efifjoi.

Now Odysseus certainly holds that what Euryalus says is untrue; but byterming it ov Kara K6O-)JU>V he is not castigating the speech as untrue. Earlier,Odysseus had characterized Euryalus' speech as oi5 K<X\6V, and said of Euryalus

dvBpl !oi/ca? (166); and he then reflected, 167 ff:

ourto? oi> TTa.vre.aai deol ^aptcvra 8t8ovaivdvSpdaiv, ovre <f>vr]v OVT' alp <f>pevas OUT' ayopujrvv.aX\os fJ.ev yap eiSoj atciSvorepos neXei dvr/p,dAAa Oeos fiop<f>r)V eneai aTe<f>ei, ol Se T' es ainovTepn6fj,evoi \evo~aovaiv 0 8 ' d.o<j>a\eojs dyopeveialSoT fx,eiXi)(Lrj, [xera. Se TTpeTrei dypofxevoiaiv,ipXOfievov S' dva. darv deov u>s elaopooiaw.dXXog 8 ' av e'So? fiev dXlyKios ddavdroiaiv,dXX' ov ol \dpis dfjxfuTTepioTe^erai ineeaacv,a>? Kal aol etSos fJ.ev dpinpeTres, ov8e Kev dXXcos0118k 6eos rev^eie, voov S' dno(f><i>\i.6s iooi.

i, x<J-Pls'- Odysseus is evaluating speakers in termsof grace, charm, appropriateness, pleasantness; and in his mind there seemsto be a parallel between a man being pleasant to the eye and a speech beingpleasing to the ear. Euryalus' speech is untrue; but by being ov Kara Koafiovit offends against a requirement which, at least in this type of situation, ismore important than truth in the eyes of Odysseus, whose response is pre-sumably characteristic of other Homeric dyaQot here.

Another speaker whose utterances are ou Kara. K6O[XOV is Thersites, Iliad 2.212 ff.:

OepaiTTjs 8' €Tt ij.ovvos dfJ.eTpO€Trrjs ixoXuia,os etrea <f>pe.al f)ow aKoap.d r e iroXXd r e 37877,paip, drdp ov Kara. Koopov, ipi^efievai fiaaiXevow,aAA' o TI oi etaano yeXouov Hpyeloiaivefj.fj.evat.

There is no suggestion that what Thersites says is, in general, false, and hisone recorded speech, Iliad 2. 225 ff, is not demonstrably untrue. Nevertheless,it is ov Kara Koapov: a characteristic which it shares with Euryalus' untruewords discussed above; and in these passages no words which we render 'true'or 'false' are employed.

In Odyssey 14. 361 ff, however, when the disguised Odysseus has told hima long tale of his wanderings, including hopeful news of Odysseus, Eumaeusreplies

a SeiAe tjelvwv, ij fioc juaAa Ovfiov opivas

ravra eKaara Xeycov, oaa 8rj Trades 1}8' oa' dXrjQrjs.

dAAa rd y ' ov Kara. KOOfiov 6tofj,ai, ov8e fie ireiaeis

dfj.<$>* 'OSvafj'C- TI ae XPV TOIOV eoWaifiev8ea8ai;

14 A. W. H. ADKINS

Here we have tftevSeo-dai, but accompanied by paiftiSicos', and it isthat parallels ov KOTO, KOCT/XOV. Again, the status of the 'beggar' (rotov iovseems relevant to the situation.

Other passages furnish Homeric reasons for speaking the truth. In Odyssey3. 17 ff. Athena, disguised as Mentor, counsels Telemachus:

dAA' aye vvv Wvs Kie Nearopos lTnro8dfj.oiO'

et8op.ev rjv Tiva firJTiv evl arqOeaai KexevOe.

Xlcroeadai 8e fj.iv avros, OTTOS vrjfieprea eiTrr)4

iftevSos S' OVK ipeer fiaAa yap nevvvfievos tori.

It is TTenvvfj-evos not to utter tjievSos—at least in some circumstances1—-just asit is ov Kara Koo-pov to utter *fie€8os, at least in some circumstances. (The linesmay also be taken as confirmation of the hypothesis that tjtevSos is not usedto decry mistakes of fact as mistakes of fact: to be Treirvv jxivos is not to be omni-scient.) There may, however, be circumstances in which these evaluationswould not apply. On two occasions characters debate whether or no they shallutter tfrevSos- In Iliad 10. 533 ff., when the Greek leaders are awaiting thereturn of Odysseus and Diomedes from their scouting expedition, Nestor hearsthe sound of hoof-beats, and says

d> <j>LXoi, ApyeLtov r/yr/ropes rj8e fieSovres,

ifievcrofiai, r) ZTVJAOV epia>; KeXerat 8e fie Bvfios.

ITTTTCOV fi' (LKVTTOSWV afj^jA. KTVTTOS ovaTa /JaAAei.

a t yap 8rj '08vaevs re Kal 6 Kparepos Aiofj,rj8rjs

c5S' a<j>ap eK Tpwcov eXaaalaro fj.u>vv)(as tirnovs'

dAA' alvws 8el8oiKa /cara <f>p4va /LMJ TI TrdOaxnv

Apyelcov ol apicrroi vno Tpdxov 6pvfiay8ov,

while in Odyssey 4. 138 fF. Helen, suspecting the identity of Telemachus, says

"I8[j,€v 8rj, MeveXae 8iOTpe<j>es, ot rives o!8e

avSpwv evxeroann-ai iKavefiev rj^irepov 8S>;

j ervfwv epeco; KeXerai 8e fie Ovfxos.

What would be Nestor's and Helen's motives for t/ievSeaOai ? Nestor can hearhoof-beats, and infers hopefully that Odysseus and Diomedes are returningsafely; but he fears they may have come to some harm, and presumablywishes to avoid giving the pain of dashing false hopes which he might raisein the other Greeks. While if Helen likens Telemachus to Odysseus, she willinevitably revive memories of the Trojan War, 145 f., OT' epeio KwcomSoy€LV€K' il^aioi I TjXBed' VTTO Tpoirjv, TroXefxov dpaovv opfxaivovres, and these memories

are painful for Menelaus and presumably embarrassing for Helen herself.Here, on both occasions, the dvpos enjoins speech; but presumably in each

case the speaker was reluctant to speak 'out of turn' from fear of causingunnecessary pain to no good end; and though Kara. K6OIJ.OV does not appear,such behaviour would presumably be ov Kara Koa^ov, just as it is the mark ofthe Trerrvu/xeVos to speak the truth where the information is longed for. Analogousjudgements could be passed in other societies; but the use of ov Kara Koapov andTreTTvvfx.ivos links the judgements, as it must, to the Homeric Greek value-system,with all its implications; and we should not assume that the implications

1 See below, pp. 16 f.

TRUTH, KOZMOZ, AND APETH IN HOMER i5

are those familiar to us. The situation of Thersites should already give uspause, as should Pisistratus' words to Menelaus in Odyssey 4. He says thatTelemachus is Odysseus' son, 157 ff.:

Keivov jueV TOI 08' vlos ir-qrvfiov, <I>s dyopeveis'dAAa oa6</>pci)v earl, veju.eacraT<u 8 ' ivl Bvficoa>8' e\d(l)v TO TTpcoTov eTreCT/SoAia? dva<f>aLveivdvra aidev, TOV v&'i deov ws repTrofied' avSfj.

Telemachus' reason for being unwilling to speak is that he is o-a6<f>pa>v, anddoes not wish to display iireofioXlcu. LSJ rather oddly render 'hasty speech,scurrility', which Telemachus, on the basis of his general character, seemsunlikely to have displayed if he had spoken. Butcher and Lang render 157 ff.:'He is of a sober wit, and thinketh it shame in his heart as on this his firstcoming to make show of presumptuous words in the presence of thee, in whosevoice we twain delight as in the voice of a god.' 'Presumptuous'; but Tele-machus has been deterred from saying anything: the implications of i-rreafioXLaineed further exploration. The word is a hapax in Homer, as is the adjectivee-nwjSoAo?, used of Thersites at Iliad 2. 275. LSJ render 'scurrilous'. It is un-likely that had Telemachus opened his mouth the tone of his utterance wouldhave resembled in any way Thersites' one recorded speech: his speeches laterin Book 4 exhibit his customary politeness, 291 ff., 316 ff., 594 ff. Yet hefeared—or Pisistratus says that he feared—that his words might be interpretedas eTreo-jSoAtai: what characteristic do they share, or is it feared they may bethought to share, with Thersites' railing words in Iliad 2 ?

It is first necessary to characterize the type of situations with which we areconcerned. All are of the kind in which peaceful co-operation is hoped for andin a sense 'expected' in Homeric society: relationships between hosts andguests, and fellow participants in assemblies. 'Expected'; but Homeric societyis stratified; its dyadol—among whom themselves there is an order of prece-dence, even if it is possible to discern it clearly only when we are concerned withdyaOol of different ages—are drawn by the claims of their dperrj, and theirneed to demonstrate that they possess it, to compete with each other; and itis much more expected of them that they demonstrate their apery when chal-lenged than that they behave in other ways. Accordingly, where each dyadosis, and must be, so touchy about his dper-q, the utmost care is needed if anyco-operation is to be possible at all. Words which hurt, which give offence, willbe regarded in the same way by the recipient, whatever the intentions of thespeaker, and where dper-q is, or may be, affected, dyadol are likely to evaluatewhat is said in terms of its grace, charm, and pleasantness—or at least theabsence of offensiveness—rather than its truth; and KOOJAOS, whose range spanswhat is orderly and what is ornamental, is a word well suited to evaluate speechin this manner. What speech is or is not Kara. Koofiov will, of course, be deter-mined by the dyadot, whose values are accepted by all the characters in theHomeric poems: speech or behaviour which the dyadol as a group regard asunbeautiful, unpleasing, disorderly, will be stigmatized as oi> KCLTO. K6O\JX>V ; andwhere dperr\ is affected, its being ov Kara, Koafxov will override the question ofits truth. An dyados will not of course be deterred from a speech or course ofaction demanded by his dperr) by the reflection that it is ov Kara.

1 See my 'Homeric Values and Homeric Society', JHS xci (1971), 12 ff.

16 A. W. H. A D K I N S

but he will expect his inferiors to behave Kara Koapov in their relations withhim, and when those inferiors do not wish to make trouble for themselves, asThersites makes trouble for himself in Iliad 2, they will behave and speak /cardKocrfiov. If the dperq of the dya86s addressed is held by him to have beenimpugned by the speech, the intention of the speaker is irrelevant (thoughpresumably an apology would sometimes be possible); hence Telemachus'reluctance at first to say anything to Menelaus, and the fact that Telemachus'words might have turned out to be hrecrfioXlcu, like those of Thersites, despitethe very different intent of the two.1 (The young dyados was supposed to showal8d>s towards his elders and betters, as the cases of Telemachus, Odyssey 3. 24,and Diomedes, Iliad 10. 237, demonstrate; and indeed might, as these twopassages show, be deterred from actions approved, or not disapproved, by thesociety.)

A demand by the dyados that speech shall, if it cannot be both unhurtfuland true, be unhurtful, may create a reluctance to speak a truth that wouldcause pain even when the dperij of the recipient of the speech is not affected.Telemachus is afraid that Nestor will not tell him any news he may have ofOdysseus, Odyssey 3. 92 ff., though to discover the truth, whatever it may be,is the reason why he has come to Pylos:

TovveKa vvv TO. ad yovvad' iKavop.ai., a t K' edeXr/o-Oa

K€tvov Xvypov oXedpov ivianelv, et TTOV oTrwrras6tf>9aXfiolai Teoiaw, 77 aAAou fj,vdov aKovaas

TrXa^ofievov iripi yap fuv 6'C^vpov T4K£ p.rjT7)p.

fir)$4 TL /A' aloofievos fieiXlaaeo /LCTJS' eXealpcuv,

dXX' ev fj,oi KardXeijov OTTCOS rjvTrjcras OTTCDTTTJS-Xiaoofiat., €i nore TOL Tt Trarr/p epos, eodXos ' 08vaoevs,

7} enos rj€ TL epyov imoards i^eriXeaaeSrj/xa) evt TpwcDV, 061. ndaxere irrj/xar' ^ ^ a i o t 'Ttov vvv fioi fxvfjaai, Kal fxoi vrjpepTes ivlanes.

To overcome the aiSaj? he fears Nestor may feel for him, Telemachus notmerely asks him to set it on one side, but makes it a question of repayinga debt he may owe Odysseus for a good turn done by Odysseus to Nestor:Telemachus is emphasizing as strongly as he can that to tell him the truth aboutOdysseus' fate, whatever it may be, will be a good and kindly act.

When dpeTTj is unaffected by speaking the truth, not only is it KaTa KOOIAOV

to speak the truth, but the phrase may characterize the statement as true.In Odyssey 8. 487 ff. Odysseus thus responds to Demodocus' song of Troy:

', e^o)(a Sij ae fipoTwv alvit,ofi.' dnavTcov77 ere ye Mover' eSi'Safe, Aios Trdl's, r) ad y' /inoXXoDV.XiyjV ydp KaTa KOOJXOV Axaiwv olrov deloeis,ooa' ep£av T ' ercaOov TC Kal oaa' ifj,6yr]oav }^.^aioi,a>S T£ TTOV rj a u r o j irapecjv 77 dXXov aKovaas.

Demodocus is praised for singing Kara. Koapov; and the whole passage isconcerned with the factual accuracy which suggests an eyewitness, not with

1 Professor John Gould has suggested to emofioXlai. These renderings seem to me tome 'forwardness' and 'forward' as 'rough express admirably the 'feel' and overtonesEnglish equivalents' for eTrecr/JdAo? and of the words.

TRUTH, K0ZM02, AND APETH IN HOMER 17

poetic quality: one does not become a better poet simply by being presentat the event one is describing. Kara KOCT/XOV, it would appear, can characterizea passage as being true. Odysseus goes on to ask Demodocus to sing of the WoodenHorse, saying, 496 ff.:

a" Kev Srj fioi ravra Kara fiolpav KavTtV iyd) namv pwd-qaojxai dvOpwnoMTivd)S apa TOI TTp6<j>pwv Beds amaae Oiamv doiSrjv.

He asks Demodocus to sing Kara polpav, as before he sang KOTO. Koofujv. Heis asking Demodocus to sing with accuracy and truth: Kara, potpav and KaraK6(T[M}V are sometimes1 available for this purpose.

Now 'in accordance with KOCT/AO?' and 'in accordance with fxolpa certainlyhelp to maintain the co-operative structure of Homeric society as the dyaOolwish it to be; but both KOCT(WS and fu>Tpa range beyond the social structure.When the Cyclops, Odyssey 9. 342, milked his ewes and she-goats -navra Karajxolpav, there was no reference to social status, any more than when thePhaeacians, Odyssey 13. 77, sat down Koafuo at the rowing-benches: in bothcases the criterion is appropriateness to the task in hand; and a wide rangeof activities can be praised in this manner when they are well performed.When, even though the situation is a co-operative one, the dpe-rq and/or statusof the participants are involved, to behave or speak /caret Koafiov is to behavewith due regard to their relative status and aperr), and truth is comparativelyunimportant. But where such status and dperr) are not important, to narratesomething Kara KOO/IOV or Kara fxolpav may be precisely to narrate it truthfullyand accurately.

Truth-telling—the telling of desired, useful truths, at all events—is to beexpected only from <f>lAoi., those who are for one reason or another within thesame co-operative group;2 and even there it is only to be told when dperi)and status-considerations do not forbid it. But when they do not, and the truthis die most important consideration, the situation is co-operative and relaxed;and accordingly intentions can be taken into account, and a lie distinguishedfrom a mistake of fact. Furthermore, the truth can be effectively distinguishedfrom 'what people say', as it cannot when the aperr) of the speaker is at issue.When Zeus, Iliad 8. 146 ff., terrifies Diomedes' horses with a flash of lightning,Nestor, who is acting as his charioteer, realizes that Zeus is angry and advisesretreat. Diomedes acknowledges the appropriateness of the advice:

val Srj ravrd ye Trdvra, yepov, Kara. fj.oipav eeiires.

It would be appropriate to yield to the superior dpenj of Zeus, and no shame isinvolved in yielding to the gods.

aAAa TOS' alvov axos KpaSirjv Kal Ovfxov iKavei-"EKTOJP yap rrore <f>rjaei, ivl Tpweacr' dyopevww"TvSetSrjS vn' ejxeio (j>o^evfievos iKero vfjas."u>s TTOT' ciTreiAijcrei.' Tore p,oi yavoi, evpeta -)(0d>v.

1 Cf. also Eumaeus' words, Odyssey 14. linked in guest—friend relationships. See my361 ff., discussed above, pp. 13 f. ' "Friendship" and "Self-sufficiency" in

2 Members of the same OIKOS or army HomerandAristotle',CQ.Nsxiii(i963),3off.contingent, and those with whom one is

C

18 A. W. H. ADKINS

If Diomedes retreats before the superior power of Zeus, it will look as if he isretreating before Hector; and this would be aloxpov for Diomedes. Nestorreplies, 152 ff.:

co fioi, TvSeos vU 8at<f>povos, olov eenre?.

e" Trep yap a' "EitTaip ye KOLKOV /ecu dvaA/aSct (frqoei,

dXX' ov TTeiaovrai Tpwes Kal AapSavlwves

Kal TpuKov aAcv^ot neyadv/Mcov d&mOTawv,

rdcjv iv Kovlrjai fidXes BaXepovs irapaKoLras.

Nestor does not say, 'Don't worry. It isn't true', but, 'Don't worry. If Hectordoes say that, the Trojans will never believe it.' Were they to believe it, ofcourse, in a shame-culture—and here at least the absence of written documents,with the impossibility of the truth being thus preserved in defiance of what'they say', does encourage the existence of a shame-culture—the situationwould be alaxpov for Diomedes, who would experience terrible eXeyxecr]. Evenhere, of course, it is not that the truth cannot be intellectually distinguishedfrom 'what they say', but that it is so much less important, in Diomedes' eyesand everyone else's, than 'what they say'. Telemachus, however, in Odyssey 1.214 ff., discussed above, is despondent, thinking not of his dptrrj, but of hisgenerally wretched condition. People say he is the son of Odysseus, thednoTnoTaTos of mankind, but he for his part does not know whedier it is true.In either case, in his present state of dejection, he does not feel that it wouldaffect his dperr) much; for he is not at the moment conscious of himself asdyados.

I conclude, therefore, that the non-literacy of Homeric society has nodiscernible effect on the nature of its concept of truth—though it inevitablygreatly affects the society's ability to preserve and transmit facts—but the valuesof Homeric society have a considerable effect on the status of truth in thesociety, and sometimes deter truth-telling, sometimes render trutfi, thoughdistinguishable and distinguished from 'what people say', much less importantthan the latter.1

University of Reading A. W. H . ADKINS

1 This article is a product of my researches the Director of the Society, Professor Maxwhile at the Society for the Humanities of Black, and all at the Society for the out-Cornell University during the academic standing facilities and manifold kindnessesyear 1969/70. I should like to thank Cornell, which I enjoyed during my sojourn there.