TU Bergakademie Freiberg

The university is located in the small town of Freiberg in the Free State of Saxony.

In 2015 the TU Bergakademie Freiberg celebrated its 250th

anniversary: It is the world’s oldest mining and metallurgy

oriented university.

UNESCO‘s World Heritage

German-Czech region of Erzgebirge/Krušnohoří was added to UNESCO's World Heritage List in

July 2019. Among the key elements is the “Mining Landscape of Freiberg”.

Among the key elements in Freiberg:

The City Wall

Kornhaus (Granary)

Upper Market

Werner Building of the University

Academy Building The Cathedral

of the University2

The University

4,060 students, 6 faculties, 89 professors.

The university has its own research and instruction mine.

In the form of a donation, the university received one of the largest and most outstanding

private collections of minerals to add to its mineralogical collection.

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Some former students and researchers in Freiberg …

Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg) (1772-1801), important

poet of German Romanticism. He started his studies in Freiberg in 1797.

August Wilhelm Lampadius (1772-1842) made an important illuminating

discovery in Freiberg. The professor assembled a gas lamp in his house on

Fischergasse, which became the first on the European continent.

Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859). One of the most renowned German

natural scientists and geologists.

Hans Carl von Carlowitz (1645-1714). Coined the term "sustainability".

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Michael W. Lomonossow (1711-1765). Russian polymath, scientist

and writer, who made important contributions to literature,

education, and science. Among his discoveries were the

atmosphere of Venus and the law of conservation of mass in

chemical reactions.

James Watt junior (1769-1848). Son of James Watt, the inventor

of the steam engine.

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Major discoveries at Freiberg University

Ferdinand Reich and Theodor Richter discovered the element Indium.

Clemens Winkler found the element Germanium in Freiberg’s ore deposits.

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© Fraunhofer-Institut für Mikrostruktur von Werkstoffen und Systemen IMWS

Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft in a Nutshell

26,000 staff

72 institutes and

research units

Application-orientated

research for the direct

benefit of industry and to the

advantage of society.

2,2 billion euros

research budget

© Fraunhofer-Institut für Mikrostruktur von Werkstoffen und Systemen IMWS

The Fraunhofer Institute for Microstructure of Materials and Systems IMWS

Fraunhofer IMWS Halle

Fraunhofer IMWS Schkopau

Fraunhofer IMWS Soest

Key figures (2018):

327 staff

23,8 Mio. euro budget

26 % industry revenue

Quality management

ISO 9001-2017

Directors:

Prof. Matthias Petzold

PD Dr. Christian Growitsch (Deputy)

Prof. Dr. Thomas Höche (Deputy)

Dr.-Ing. Sylvia Schattauer (Deputy)

Sites:

Halle (Saale)

Schkopau

Freiberg

Soest

Leuna (from 2019)

© Fraunhofer-Institut für Mikrostruktur von Werkstoffen und Systemen IMWS

Areas of Research

Mikroelektronik Photovoltaik Biomaterialien Kunststoffe

Prof. Petzold Prof. Gottschalg Prof. Heilmann Prof. Michel

Chemie Optik Leuchtstoffe CEM

Prof. Meyer Prof. Höche Prof. Schweizer PD Dr. Growitsch

Fehleranalyse an

integrierten Schaltkreisen

Fehleranalyse an

Solarzellen

Analyse von

Pflegeprodukten

Eigenschaftsoptimierung von

Reifenelastomeren

Optimierung von Katalysatoren

und Membranen

Analyse von

Effektpigmenten

Thermografie von

LED-Modulen

Materialökonomie

Microelectronics Photovoltaics Bio Materials Plastics

Prof. Petzold Prof. Gottschalg Prof. Heilmann Prof. Michel

Chemical Processes Optical Materials Phosphors Economics

Prof. Meyer Prof. Höche Prof. Schweizer PD Dr. Growitsch

Failure analyses in

microelectronics

Failure analyses in

solar cells

Analyses of cosmetic

care products

Polymer processing and

optimization

Carbon catalysis

Water electrolysis

Analyses of effect pigments

and optical coatings

Thermography of

LED modules

Economics of materials

© Fraunhofer-Institut für Mikrostruktur von Werkstoffen und Systemen IMWS

Center for Economics of Materials CEM

Topics

Seite 10

Total Design Management

Efficient materials

Design for Deconstruction

Materials Data Space

Eco DesignMaterials and goods markets

Global Value Chains

Raw material / energy markets

Technology impact assessments

Trade barriers and regulation

Economic Structural Dynamics

Structural and sustainable industrial

policy

Policy impact assessments

New markets / business models

Structural change and industrial

transformation

Innovative Energy Systems Geschäftsstelle

»Leistungs- und Transfer-

zentrum CBS«

Geschäftsstelle »Strukturwandel«

Techno-

economics

Economics of

Materials

Social Norms and Preferences in Public Good Provision: An Introduction

I. Definitions

II. Social Norms and Cognitive Dissonance

III. Norm Establishment and Enforcement

IV. Kantian Optimization

Agenda

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I. Definitions

Social norms are

“the informal rules that govern behavior in groups and societies”.

(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

“Social norms are […] different from personal attitudes: they communicate ideas about social

approval, or perceptions about what is normal or desirable in a given community”.

(Paluck et al. 2010)

“Social norms are customary rules of behavior that coordinate our interactions with others. Once a

particular way of doing things becomes established as a rule, it continues in force because we

prefer to conform to the rule given the expectation that others are going to conform (Lewis, 1969).”

(New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics)

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“A social norm is held in place by the reciprocal expectations of the people within a reference

group. Because of the interdependence of expectation and action, social norms can be stiffly

resistant to change.”

(Mackie et al. 2015)

Bicchieri’s (2010) concept of norms is based on

• expectations: - empirical expectations

- normative expectations

• conditional preferences

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Empirical expectation: belief that enough other people in a similar situation obey the

norm (e.g. a reciprocity norm).

I expect: “In most families, women do the cooking.”

Normative expectation: belief that enough other people think we ought to obey the

norm in that situation.

I expect: “Men to believe/think that men should make decisions

about what food is consumed in the household.”

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Conditional preference: my preference depends on what I expect others do or what I

expect others think I should do. → Interdependent choice

[Unconditional preference: I have the preference regardless of

what I expect others do or what I expect others think I should

do.]

→ Since expectations matter to choice, influencing expectations will result in very

different behavioral outcomes, e.g. in the context of environmental/climate

protection.

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Empirical Research on the Influence of Norms on Environmental Protection: Examples

Energy Saving (Allcott & Mullainathan 2010, Science)

‚Green‘ Electricity Programs (Cost & Kahn 2013, Journal of the European Economic Association)

Water Saving (Brent et al. 2015, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists)

Participation in Programs Protecting Ecosystems (Chen et al. 2009, PNAS)

Recycling (Czajkowski et al. 2017, EARE)

Environmental-friendly Behavior in Hotels (Reese et al. 2014, Journal of Social Psychology)

Car Use (Eriksson et al. 2008, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice)

Waste Prevention (Cecere et al. 2014, Ecological Economics)

Collective Management of Natural Resources (Water for Irrigation, Forests) (Pretty 2003, Science)

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There are still many open questions in the context of social norms and below I will highlight some

aspects which are – not exclusively – relevant in the environmental context.

II. Social Norms and Cognitive Dissonance

The Case of the Poor Husband(based on Montgomery 1994)

Three cognitions of the husband:

1. I am a good husband.

2. Good husbands support their families at a socially acceptable level. (SOCIAL NORM!)

3. I do not support my family at a socially acceptable level.

→ Cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957)

→ Feeling of mental discomfort

→ Psychological costs

Reduction of this dissonance lowers psycholgical costs and thus creates benefits.

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Ways for the husband to escape/reduce dissonance

• Give up the first cognition e.g. by reducing self-esteem, i.e. the husband does not

consider himself to be “good” or

• Redefining his role (disassociating from his family).

• Increasing efforts (in order to earn more money) or self-sacrifice (reducing own

consumption).

All these options tend to involve costs for the husband and he will weight them up

against

• each other and

• the benefits of cognitive-dissonance mitigation.

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Aid to Families with Dependent Children

An alternative way to combat dissonance, which may be cheaper for the husband:

A federal assistance program may support families, but now we have to better

specify the social norm:

Do “good” husbands support their families in a socially acceptable way

with their own money?

Or is public assistance a perfect substitute for own money?

What do these reasonings imply for environmental-friendly behaviour?

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Dissonance: A Tentative Transfer to the Case of Polluters

Three cognitions of a polluting person:

1. I am a responsible person.

2. Responsible persons behave in an environmental-friendly way.

3. The level of greenhouse emissions I cause are beyond environmentally sustainable levels.

→ Cognitive dissonance

→ Feeling of mental discomfort

→ Psychological costs

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Ways for the polluter to escape/reduce dissonance

• Give up first cognition (which will adversely affect his self-esteem).

• Redefine one‘s role, e.g. by ignoring scietific findings and thus disputing one‘s role as

someone whose behaviour is relevant for environmental quality (climate change denier).

• Improve performance either by using cleaner technologies or reducing consumption

levels.

These options tend to involve costs.

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An Alternative Way to Mitigate Dissonance May Be Offsetting

Enjoy others‘ abatement, e.g. foreign abatement induced by one‘s purchase of carbon offsets.

Again, the norm has to be better specified:

• Is offsetting a perfect substitute for own abatement?

This depends on the “exact” nature of climate-related norms, i.e. is it irrelevant

in the context of the norms who pollutes and who abates?

Related discussion points:

• Local ancillary benefits (local air pollution rise) lost (Buchholz et al. 2020)

• Private benefits (prestige, warm-glow) gained (Kotchen 2009b).

• Related ethical issues may again cause dissonance (Hyams and Fawcett 2013).

• “Although people are investing large and growing amounts of time and money in the

voluntary carbon off set market, the scale of their efforts is entirely incommensurate

with the problem of climate change” (Kotchen 2009a).

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Different Institutional Frameworks for Norm Setting

GovernmentalRegulator

EstablishingNorms

VoluntaryContribution toEnvironmental Protection

Regulated Private Entity (e.g. utilities; Alcott 2011, JPubE)

Non-governmentalOrganization

EstablishingNorms

VoluntaryContribution toEnvironmental Protection

III. Norm Establishment and Enforcement

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Non-Governmental Establishment of Social Norms and Norm-Enforcement

Twofold Public Good Problem:1) Donation ei to the mechanism ‘NGO‘.

2) Contribution xi to the ‘intrinsic’ public good.

Framework

Agents can cooperate on an instrumental level by establishing a norm-enforcing mechanism that

influences the provision of an environmental public good

(Buchholz, Falkinger & Rübbelke 2014, JPET).

The mechanism defines norms and generates sanctions (→ social esteem).

Structure of a Two-Stage Game

Stage 1: Stage 2:

Donation to a norm-establishing Choice of a contribution to a

voluntary mechanism ‘NGO‘ public environmental good

(choice of ei) (choice of xi)

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Even if there is a large number of agents, such a voluntarily created system to establish

and enforce norms can bring about a Pareto improved outcome.

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IV. Kantian Optimization

In the analysis above, the Nash conjecture was applied.

An alternative conception was recently (re-)invented by Roemer.

The Kantian approach requires:

An agent magnifies the effect of his action by assuming that everyone takes a

similar action, and so the externality will not be ignored by the individual

(Roemer 2010, Scand. J. Econ.).

An agent asks:

“If I were to deviate from my stipulated action, and all others were to deviate in

like manner from their stipulated actions, would I prefer the

consequences of the new action profile?” (Roemer 2015, JPubE)

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Kantian optimization and social norms:

The optimization is motivated by a moral attitude or social norm: each must think

that he should take an action if and only if he would advocate that all others

take a similar action. (Roemer 2015, JPubE)

Kantian optimization and Pareto efficiency:

If agents optimize in the Kantian way, then certain allocation rules will produce

Pareto efficient allocations, while Nash optimization will not.

Tax competition in a two-country economy:

Eichner and Pethig (2019) show that Kantians choose a higher tax rate than

Nashians for any given tax rate of the other country → Kantians seek to mitigate

the (Nashian) race to the bottom.

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References

Allcott, H. & Mullainathan, S. (2010). Behavior and energy policy. Science, 327(5970), 1204-1205.

Bicchieri, C. (2010). Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 9(3), 297-313.

Brent, D.A. et al. (2015). Social comparisons, household water use, and participation in utility conservation programs: Evidence from three randomizedtrials. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 2(4), 597-627.

Buchholz, W. et al. (2014). Non‐governmental public norm enforcement in large societies as a two‐stage game of voluntary public good provision. JPET,16(6), 899-916.

Buchholz, W. et al. (2020). Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy: New Theoretical Developments and Empirical Findings, Springer.

Cecere, G. et al. (2014). Waste prevention and social preferences: the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Ecological Economics, 107, 163-176.

Chen, X. et al. (2009). Linking social norms to efficient conservation investment in payments for ecosystem services. PNAS, 106(28), 11812-11817.

Costa, D.L. & Kahn, M.E. (2013). Energy conservation “nudges” and environmentalist ideology: Evidence from a randomized residential electricity fieldexperiment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 680-702.

Czajkowski, M. et al. (2017). Social norms, morals and self-interest as determinants of pro-environment behaviours: the case of household recycling.Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(4), 647-670.

Eichner, T. & Pethig, R. (2019). Kant-Nash tax competition. CESifo Working Paper, No. 7571, Munich.

Eriksson, L. et al. (2008). Acceptability of single and combined transport policy measures: The importance of environmental and policy specific beliefs.Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 42(8), 1117-1128.

Hyams, K. & Fawcett, T. (2013). The ethics of carbon offsetting. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 4(2), 91-98.

Kotchen, M.J. (2009a). Offsetting green guilt. Stanford Social Innovation Review, 7(2), 26-31.

Kotchen, M.J. (2009b). Voluntary provision of public goods for bads: A theory of environmental offsets. The Economic Journal, 119(537), 883-899.

Mackie, G. et al. (2015). What are social norms? How are they measured. University of California at San Diego-UNICEF Working Paper.

Montgomery, J.D. (1994). Revisiting Tally's Corner: Mainstream Norms, Cognitive Dissonance, and Underclass Behavior. Rationality and Society, 6(4),462-488.

Paluck, E.L. et al. (2010). Social norms marketing aimed at gender based violence: A literature review and critical assessment. International RescueCommittee.

Pretty, J. (2003). Social capital and the collective management of resources. Science, 302(5652), 1912-1914.

Reese, G. et al. (2014). A towel less: Social norms enhance pro-environmental behavior in hotels. Journal of Social Psychology, 154(2), 97-100.

Roemer, J.E. (2010). Kantian equilibrium. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 112(1), 1-24.

Roemer, J.E. (2015). Kantian optimization: A microfoundation for cooperation. Journal of Public Economics, 127, 45-57. 28

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