BEYOND COVID-19: CAN THE WORLD BOUNCE BACK?More than a vaccine is needed for a big rebound | PAGE 4

WORLD: HOW CHINA LOST CONTROLPolitics stymied science, letting virus run amok | PAGE 6

SPORTS: OLYMPICS’ BATTLE WITH WEATHER HEATS UP AGAIN PAGE 10

NATIONAL 2, 3BEYOND COVID-19 4WORLD 5-7CUBA NATIONAL DAY 5SUDAN NATIONAL DAY 7NEW YEAR SPECIAL 8,9

SPORTS 10OPINION 11TELEVISION 12,13WEATHER 13SPOTLIGHT 14, 15

INSIDE TODAY

Tech titans face scrutinyBusiness success amid pandemic energizes calls for stronger regulation WORLD, PAGE 7

COVID-19 updatesFor news and reference information about the COVID-19 pandemic, see our special dedicated web page: jtimes.jp/covid19

NOTICE: The New York Times International Edition is not published on New Year’s Day. Due to a newspaper holiday on Jan. 1, there will be no issue of The Japan Times / The New York Times International Edition on Jan. 2. The press holiday is to provide time off for delivery personnel. The Japan Times, Ltd.

CCommentaryBRAD GLOSSERMANCONTRIBUTING WRITER

While the future is always unknowable, in Japan a darker uncertainty than usual hangs over the year to come. Much of the anxiety emanates from COVID-19, a dis-ease that poses profound challenges to a society that privileges person-to-person connections and uses those networks to make critical distinctions between insiders and outsiders. COVID-19 has also magni-fied developments and accelerated trends both internal and external that work against Japan, exposing weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

The future need not be bleak, however. Japan could use this year to prepare for inevi-table changes in domestic and foreign affairs and better position itself for that world. It is unlikely to do so.

End-of-year reports of a mutated version of COVID-19 that has forced governments to again close borders are a poignant reminder that a vaccine is not the end of the pandemic. Fears of a vaccine-resistant strain will per-sist, as will the prospect of an entirely new disease. Biological threats are now a perma-nent feature of the security environment and governments and societies must incor-porate them into policymaking with all the resulting side effects — such as permanent real-time surveillance and monitoring of populations, with equally troubling impli-cations for social and political order.

The COVID-19 crisis has prodded the shift-ing balance of power in ways that disadvan-tage Japan. Despite initial missteps, China has contained the virus and its economy has been the first to snap back. Beijing has bur-nished its image with offers of aid — money, vaccines and personal protective equipment — to afflicted countries. The United States, by contrast, has fumbled its response as its death toll skyrocketed and political divi-sions complicated a national vaccination campaign.

Mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis has compounded doubts about U.S. capabil-ity and competence. Combined with the departure of a president with whom Japan

enjoyed unusual influence, the typical hand-wringing in Tokyo that greets a Democratic administration in Washington, and concern that the U.S. is becoming more inward look-ing and focused on getting its own house in order, Japanese unease is expanding as geo-political competition intensifies.

Uncertainty quickly shades into insecu-rity. Chinese incursions into waters sur-rounding the Senkaku Islands occur daily. Beijing’s assertions of sovereignty over the South China Sea — abetted by a relent-

less island-building program — continue unabated. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait have been rising. North Korea has a proclivity to test new U.S. presidents. All mean that secu-rity concerns — especially questions about the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense — are real.

The regional and global order that has allowed Japan to prosper is under assault. Revisionist powers are working to rewrite rules and restructure institutions in their favor — and to Tokyo’s disadvantage. There

are doubts about allies in the effort to sup-port the status quo. Relations with South Korea remain strained. Australia is under mounting pressure from Beijing. India remains committed to an independent for-eign policy that renders it an unreliable part-ner. Southeast Asia seeks to remain above the geopolitical fray. And Europe is likely to prioritize trans-Atlantic ties over relations with distant Asia-Pacific nations.

If developments beyond its shores are worrisome, domestic affairs are alarming.

The economy continues to stumble. After a horrific 27.8% drop in GDP — the steepest decline in the postwar era — in the second quarter of 2020 and something of a recov-ery, most economists anticipate the econ-omy will shrink more than 5% in total in 2020, although a sustained third wave could prove those projections too optimistic. Most experts don’t expect a recovery to pre-pan-demic levels before 2022.

Politics clouds the economic outlook. After taking office with the highest approval

ratings in Japanese history, the Suga admin-istration has suffered a double-digit decline in support and popularity. The most chari-table thing to say is that it is uninspiring. The response to the COVID-19 crisis has been marked by confusion; efforts to deal with the third wave have been especially inco-herent. Suga seems tone deaf and oblivious to appearances. The Abe administration’s scandals appear to have assumed a second wind. The opposition remains stunted and weak, however.

The government is divided on key issues, most significantly its China policy. In one breath, China is a threat to Japan’s territo-rial integrity and a revisionist country that seeks hegemonic status in Asia; in the next, it is the key to Japan’s economic recovery. Those competing views have blocked the emergence of the consensus needed to artic-ulate a new National Security Strategy, one originally planned to have been released at the end of 2020. Confidence in the nation’s leadership is waning when that confidence is needed most.

Amidst all this turbulence, Japan will muddle along. The swirl of events has strengthened the allure of the familiar, rein-forcing demands for a steady, experienced hand on the tiller, even if that leader lacks vision or the personality needed to rally the nation. Consistency has assumed near tal-ismanic status, despite the ineffectiveness of those policies. Japan’s small ‘c’ conser-vatism, with a near refusal to risk substan-tive changes, continues to dominate policy making.

Of course, changes are taking place — no society is trapped in amber. The assault on the sanctity of the hanko, the personal seal that is a prerequisite for most personal and business transactions, is long overdue. It is the first of a larger suite of potential changes that COVID-19 offers Japan, innovations that could facilitate new work and lifestyle arrangements that would better position the country to deal with headwinds that it faces. Sustained telecommuting could accelerate the digitalization that is key to a successful 21st century economy. It could promote decentralization and reverse the depopu-lation of the countryside. More flexible work practices would allow Japan to better incorporate women and elder workers in the economy. All these adjustments would enhance productivity. (And of course they

In a chaotic world, Japan needs bold actionKey issues remain at home and abroad, but appetite for proactive approach is lacking

Continued on page 11 ->

Japan to play key role in Asia as Biden settles inAAnalysis

JESSE JOHNSON AND SATOSHI SUGIYAMASTAFF WRITERS

When U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Amer-ica First” policy gets the boot on Jan. 20, it will be replaced by Joe Biden’s more out-ward-looking and cooperative approach in Asia — one in which Japan is widely expected to play an integral part.

As Washington looks warily at China’s rise, it will aim for Japan to play a placeholder role as the Biden White House focuses immedi-ately on reining in the coronavirus pandemic that has left about 340,000 dead in the U.S.

“They’ll have no choice but to take care of that damage first,” a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official said on condition of ano-nymity. “This will be less about (the Asia-Pacific region) being lowered in priority than about repairing that damage.”

In the meantime, Tokyo “will continue to act as a ‘placeholder’ for the incoming administration,” standing in for the U.S. and buying Biden valuable time as he focuses on his domestic agenda, said Stephen Nagy, an

expert on Asian geopolitics at International Christian University in Tokyo.

Beyond China, Japan will be particularly interested to see how the next U.S. president tackles trade, regional security as well as its relationships with Southeast Asia and the two Koreas, all while he also keeps one eye on the pandemic.

But divining how Japan figures into

Biden’s foreign policy requires a look at who he chooses for key posts.

Biden’s teamBiden has revealed little about his Asia play-book and has not tapped any “Asia hands” among his Cabinet and advisory picks, though he is reportedly considering appoint-ing a White House “Asia czar” to the National Security Council, signaling the rising impor-tance of the region.

But some in Tokyo are concerned that the new administration might represent “Obama 2.0,” since a large number of the president-elect’s Cabinet picks served under President Barack Obama. Such a scenario would unnerve those in Japan who have viewed Trump’s tough position on China with relief after they were left to speculate if Obama took seriously the challenge Beijing represented.

This view, however, ignores the seismic shift since Obama’s last two years in office — a change that Tokyo has yet to fully grasp, said Yuki Tatsumi, director of the Washing-ton-based Stimson Center’s Japan program.

Antony Blinken, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s nominee for secretary of state, speaks in Wilming-ton, Delaware, on Nov. 24. as Biden looks on. REUTERS

A boy sits on decorations for the year-end and New Year’s Shinto rituals at a shrine in Tokyo on Dec. 22. REUTERS

Continued on page 3 ->

PAGE: 1PAGE: 1

| www.japantimes.co.jpISSN 0289-1956 © THE JAPAN TIMES, LTD., 2021

土金木水火月

125th year | no. 43,277

金

ALL THE NEWS WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR

FRIDAY, JANUARY 1, 2021 Consumption tax included (本体価格¥209) ¥230