School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University,

University of London

Title: What were the driving factors that affected the potential accession of Turkey to

the EU since the negotiations began in 2004?

Student Number: 110204280

Word Count: 11502

A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree: B.A (Honours) in Politics with Business Management

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In submitting this work, I declare that I have read and understood the College

regulations on plagiarism contained in the Student Handbook. The work

contained in this project is solely my own and all the sources used are cited in the

text and contained in my bibliography.

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Abstract:

This thesis will implement the neoliberal-neorealist debate to hypothesise; ‘what were

the factors that affected the potential accession of Turkey to the EU since the

negotiations began in 2004?’ The involvement of intra-state actors that communicate

a differentiating characteristic for both sides will be suggested through, both the

historic and pragmatic discourses that have created the current situation for Turkey’s

accession. I will be discussing Turkey’s domestic and international circumstances

regarding their contemporary political agenda and responsibilities, versus the potential

prosperities and stagnations for Turkey’s social and economic resources that are on

offer for the EU to appraise. I will achieve this through a precise measurement of the

ideological protocols of the AKP regime; of merging democracy with religion as a

model for modernity, which also juxtaposes the foundations of the debate between

neoliberalism and neorealism. My aim will be to contrast the political and economic

variations within Turkey’s domestic and international position by evaluating their

significance within its geopolitical diplomacy and adverse ideological methodologies

for installing democracy and modernity. Ultimately, my objective will be to exploit

the interdependence that is eminent for full membership, and how the EU must

quantify the potential prosperities when involving Turkey into their political and

socio-economic jurisdiction, despite the alternative alliance probabilities that Turkey

are acknowledging as a contingency for her modernization.

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Table of Contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction & Literature Review…………………………………5

Chapter 2: Radicalisation of Turkish Politics: Turkey’s Democratic

Transformation into ‘The New Turkey’……………………...........................12

Appendices…………………………………………………………………...19

Chapter 3: Hegemony in Turkish Nationalism: Identity & Dual Identity …...26

Chapter 4: Role Of Cultural Politics Of Accession In Turkey……………….33

Chapter 5: Concept Of Democracy In A Non-Democratic Environment……39

Chapter 6: The ‘Insulator’ State: Economics & Geopolitics in Future Prospects

of EU Accession……………………………………………………………...46

Chapter 7: Conclusion………………………………………………………..52

Bibliography………………………………………………………………….55

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Chapter 1: Introduction & Literature Review

My analysis on distinguishing between the driving factors which affected Turkey’s

accession negotiations with the EU, are categorized into three ontological and

theoretical sub-categories in our contemporary conceptions of international relation

theories. The ‘three traditions of international theory’ as Wight proposes are; “Realists

who focus on the systematic forces generated by international anarchy; the

Rationalists who concentrate on the societal forces associated with institutionalized

intercourse; and the Revolutionists who emphasize the moral, psychological and even

legal pressures brought about by the fact that the states are underpinned by a world

society held together by a common culture” (Wight.1991). The proximities between

the AKP’s neo-Ottoman agenda can be classified as a neorealist example prior to their

political autonomy, since their political autonomy over the past decade derives certain

similarities with recognizing the “EU as an anarchic representation of a liberal

democratic entity” (Parslow.2006). In addition to Wight’s distinctions, a certain

segment of an Islamic oriented and politically active parish represented by the Gülen

admirers, can be linked with the ‘revolutionist’ jurisdiction. The Gülen alternative,

despite originating from the same process of disintegrating the Turkish secular

government; manifested a problematic scenario for social popularity towards the

AKP. The misconception towards a collective virtue on modernity and Turkish

nationalism between the AKP and Gülen extremes, sought different aspirations on

Turkey’s political sovereignty. Historically, the secularist regime of Mustafa Kemal

Atatürk had overcome this paradox through incorporating a Westphalia model

towards establishing a democratic republic that was free from preeminent Ottoman

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rule. The EU as a form of neoliberal democracy admires the ‘Kemalist’ reforms that

took place through the process of ‘Turkification’, which ultimately established the

‘Republic of Turkey’ in 1923. Atatürk’s supervision and romance with pro-Western

liberal models, which were emerging through classical liberal traditions in Europe and

the United States in the early half of the 19th century; later applied as a template for

the AKP to demonstrate a new model of post-modern virtues, which were exercised

under the renewed international political rejuvenation in Turkey. The EU can

therefore distinguish between the nationalistic divisions in Turkey, together with their

enlargement policy to push Turkey to adopt a hybrid ideological formula consisting of

rationalist and realist ontological segmentations toward the AKP’s foreign policy. It is

perhaps the gradual transforming identity of the AKP, regarding their proximity

within the ‘three traditions of international theory’; that correlates them between a

‘realist’ identity when addressing their international doctrine, and a ‘rationalist’

approach when justifying their foreign policy agenda to Turkish society.

The slogan of ‘ a self-helped system of anarchy’ by Prime Minister Erdogan

(Tursan.2004); creates the security dilemma on enhancing political power as a means

of promoting the EU’s security agenda. Appointing the actors that implement the

most rational forms of utilitarianism is seen in Turkey through rationalising economic

policies. Turkey’s remarkable economic growth since the domestic financial crisis in

2001 can be illustrated as an indicator of the realist potencies towards implementing a

democratic agenda within their ordered preferences; “Turkey has undergone a

profound economic transformation since 2001. It has recorded a remarkable GDP

growth rate of almost 6% in average during the period of 2002-2011. Thus, per capita

income increased up to 10,500 USD in 2011, from the modest figure of 3,500 USD

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recorded in 2002” (MFA.2012). The AKP’s neorealist protocol however differs from

their secularist predecessors, which at the time emphasized for a nation state to govern

itself in the international arena, through liberalised realist manifestos. Turkey’s

NATO membership is a prime example of how Turkish diplomacy under the AKP

had set out a revised and structured socio-economic plan of re-distributing power into

a unipolar international system. The credibility for Turkey’s economic success is

awarded by the AKP’s monetary policy on implementing a “free market economy to

operate under neoliberal conditions” (Harvey.2005). The collective unification of

subordinated anti-secular social segments; is due to a class struggle between secular

elitism and deteriorated Ottoman social class. This allowed a utopian oppression to

mature, when applying ‘hard politics’ to overpower the secularist dominance.

Kropotkin’s studies on utopian socialism, “functions now belonging to government

would be substituted by free agreements growing out of the direct relations between,

free groups of producers and consumers” (Day.2005. p. 118); supplemented a new

theory for the AKP’s doctrine to replace traditionalist secular values. Two of the most

persistent theoretical debates in international relations; neorealism versus

neoliberalism, can therefore be implemented into the Turkey/EU accession case study.

Neorealism and neoliberalism; “failed to contribute as much as they might have to

international relations theory – suffering from serious internal weaknesses and

limitations that the neorealist-neoliberal debate has often obscured, rather than

clarified” (Baldwin.1993). The internal complexities seen in Turkey through the

formation of class struggle and polarization in Turkish nationalism can be used to

rectify the historical political discourses between, the neorealist AKP and the

neoliberal EU. The monophonic autonomy under the AKP government undermines

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the significance of the international institutions and more importantly; “fails to

explain the distribution of power from a bipolar to a unipolar system” (Nas.2010).

The constitution of the European Union represents, “a series of intergovernmental

bargains, which each imply an agenda for the intervening period of consolidation”

(Moravcsik. 1993). It is crucial to exploit the potential motivations behind the

‘bargains’ that were proposed to Turkey throughout their accession negotiations with

the EU. Furthermore, it is important to outline the paradigms of neoliberalism as an

act of enhancing global political and economic cooperation between the EU and

Turkey, which are seen as entities beyond the control of a bipolar sovereign state-

system. The rudimental aim of the EU’s neoliberal project, “is to dis-embed capital

from states” and more pragmatically through; “running deficits to absorb any excess

product within its boarders and expanding its export markets” (Harvey. 2005. p.11).

The question therefore of redistributive politics being incorporated as an attempt to

export ‘development’ both politically and economically into Turkey, supplements;

“controls over the free mobility of capital” (Harvey.2005). The neorealist-neoliberal

debate therefore is down to the advanced capitalist state-system that is implementing

certain degrees of political integration towards states that are seen as ‘developing’,

with respect to their advancement and regulation of power and support. A lack of

seeking rational behaviour within the principles of liberalism, contradicts what is

exercised in Turkey under the AKP regime. Naturally, The AKP therefore neglects

the pursuit for compromise between the communication and cooperation of accession

bargaining. In defence to the EU propositions, the strengths of liberal theory indicate

how the economics of international relations are constructed to satisfy a collective

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level of security and cooperation across multinational politics. Globalisation therefore

is the epicentre of modernity and the modern phenomenon of neoliberal

craftsmanship. The EU aims to satisfy its asymmetric political and economic

objectives through its enlargement programme, which Turkey can potentially play an

important role in. The austerity of the Copenhagen Criteria and the Maastricht Treaty

represent a cumulative engagement with international law, which dismisses any

violations to the conduct of the European Commissions rule of law. Turkey must obey

the legislated conduct of the European Commission in order to increase its

probabilities of accession. However, the limitations on the EU’s enlargement project

for Turkey, involves the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power politics, which occurs during intra-

state conventionalism. Prioritizing collective security as a means of distinguishing

between ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’, articulated by Nye; endorses the

constructivist approach which I will incorporate into the neorealist-neoliberal debate;

“as our understanding of leadership changes, so too should our conceptualization of

power” (Nye.2008).

The argument suggested by constructivists relates back to the structure of the

international system, which is consisting of both bipolar and multipolar cooperation

methodologies. It is important to highlight that neoliberal principality is not an all-

determining factor for understanding, why states behave in the way that they do.

Despite the realist approach, anarchy is overruled since anarchic subjectivities are the

reasons behind defining state sovereignty. Turkey’s consolidation of the EU on

anarchy, therefore should implement a more pragmatic re-evaluation towards a

collectively represented enlargement protocol from the EU member states. The liberal

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doctrine established in many core European states, recognise Turkey’s ambivalence

with anarchy towards them, nevertheless they suggest that Turkey should engage with

a series of political sacrifices made in the name of achieving a cooperative diplomatic

environment (Gelncross.2012). The constructivists disagree, as Wendt points out in

Anarchy Is What States Make Of It; “state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy

and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and

institutions” (Wendt.1992). Wendt further describes the anarchic self-helped system

to a rationalist dimension; “while anarchy permits the realist world with self helped

power politics to emerge, it does not always necessitate such a response to itself”

(Wendt.1992). The role of a human actor seen as an active political agent; suffices

that ideas and identities are heavily emphasised on constructivist conceptualisations of

implementing a self-fulfilling prophecy. The concept of how certain ideas and

identities construct the behaviour of states, links closely to the negative externalities

that exist in the neorealist-neoliberal debate; such that; “if states believe that anarchy

is going to lead to war, then that is the likelihood of it to actually happen”

(Wendt.1992) In the Euro-Turkish case, ‘war’ can be juxtaposed to a series of

political discourses that have accumulated throughout Turkey’s ‘democratic

transformation’, positioned by the AKP’s political autonomy. It is therefore vital to

incorporate the changing ideas in Turkey and Europe when examining the reasons

behind the bargaining conditions. Constructivism argues that the individual and non-

state actor; is vital to the promotion of certain ideas to exist. Nye’s methodology on

distinguishing between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, is rather seen as a form of involving

‘hard’ and ‘soft’ politics, which is taking place in Turkey’s geopolitical judiciary;

“while hard power relies on controlling followers through rewards and intimidation,

soft power involves a leader’s ability to inspire others” (Nye.2008).

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The criticisms made by the secularist oppositions to the AKP have on many occasions

cross-referenced the two ideological worlds that exist in Turkey, albeit; transforming

the AKP regime as an alternative international outlook for Turkish sovereignty. An

overwhelming majority in the AKP still recognise the EU as the primary anchor for

Turkish democracy and modernization, despite the perceived limitations of

cooperation in issues relating to the reform of Turkish secularism (Aydin&Resem.

2007. p. 113). Nevertheless the increasing discrimination that is articulated by the

AKP towards the EU double standards, along with decreasing levels of support for

EU membership by the AKP supporters within Turkish society; incurs the fact that an

explicitly domesticated Euro-scepticism, originates from the depths of both the ‘left’

and ‘right’ wings in Turkey’s political environment. This suggests that the

sustainability for the pro-European discourse, within the AKP; could be difficult to

maintain in the long-term accession process. In 2014, AKP became the second longest

serving political entity, since Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). The

difference between the traditional liberal examples that Atatürk implemented

originally, versus the AKP’s ‘anti-secular’ theological ideology, created a

rudimentary counter for society to evaluate. The AKP’s popularity therefore

motivated their supporters to prepare for a new prospect of how ‘The New Turkey’

should operate and dignify Turkish nationalism, both domestically and

internationally.

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Chapter 2: Radicalisation of Turkish Politics: Turkey’s Democratic

Transformation into; ‘The New Turkey’

In order to manifest a portfolio towards a turbulent accession process, the domestic

factors that have shaped the diplomatic position of modern day Turkey must be

exploited through an empirical agenda and a historical discourse, which breaches the

boundaries of theoretical conceptions in international relations. The Justice and

Development Party (AKP), is constituted ordinarily of Islamic-oriented ideological

policies that support the pro-Islamist constituencies within Turkish politics. Atatürk’s

revolutionary transformation from the Ottoman Empire into a modern and secular

nation-state, extended through the assimilation of individual cultures and entities to be

represented by the estate ‘Kemalist’ reforms; which universally applied throughout

Turkish politics and social solidarity. Atatürk’s excessive secularist modernization

promoted a rationalist ontological ‘democratic transformation’ in Turkey, by

converting the Ottoman-state into a modern secular nation-state. Atatürk’s

‘Westernised’ reforms achieved a new political hegemony in Turkey, most notably

fuelled by Atatürk’s military success in Turkey’s ‘Liberation War’ against the

‘Western Allies’ in 1922. The newly appropriated hegemonic formation for Turkish

nationalism; later would create the incentive for the establishment of the ‘Republic of

Turkey’ in 1923. In certain aspects, it is Atatürk’s legacy that profoundly stimulates

the sense of national pride when associating ones self to a widely recognised patriotic

romance with their nationality. Turkey is an extreme example of such patriotism,

since national pride and asserting traditional moral values; has characterised the

conduct for maintaining secular ideologies for decades. Unfortunately the

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disturbances in objectivist patriotic origins; had created perspective-based

subjectivities within the totality of Turkish nationalism. The subordination of certain

social and cultural societies in Turkey, have been historically oppressed by the

traditional ‘Kemalist’ morals, which inevitably provoked the pro-Islamist movement

to mature.

The representation of neorealist and revolutionist agendas that emerged from the

social and political divisions in Turkey has deeper subsidiary roots. The AKP model

had initially began when the Islamist Welfare Party (RP), consisting of realist and

revolutionist extremists; won the general election in 1995. This benchmarked a

significant turning point for Turkish politics as for the first time since the Ottoman

Empire; a predominantly pro-Islamist regime had gained political power in Turkey.

The RP’s dogma for political Islam however restrained EU candidacy aspirations due

to the RP’s anti-Western political infrastructure. The norms of Westphalia argue that

referencing certain repercussions of the Arab Spring; were used as a model to achieve

modernity aspirations in Turkey, through a pro-Islamist route. The RP considered

Turkey’s geopolitical neighbourhood in the Middle East as a historic example of

Westernised liberal diplomatic intercourse in the Arab world, indicating that there

were a means to an end when EU accession was consolidated. Perhaps the RP had

overlooked the prosperities for Turkey’s role in the EU’s enlargement project, since a

security discourse from the past in the region, matured into the consideration that

Turkey’s engagement with stronger diplomatic bonds in the Arab world, would

prevent a reoccurrence of post-Cold War secularised liberal models to manifest in

Turkey. The RP aimed to establish an anti-Western diplomatic threshold, which

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correlated the Ottoman epistemology, by strategically strengthening Turkey’s

significance in the region through the development of postmodern faith-based

populism.

The ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’ politics essentially begins at this point, since tighter

relations with Iran, Syria and Libya had subsequently increased popularity for Turkey

through fuelling pro-Islamist techniques. The alienation of the secular political elite

that was influencing Turkey’s diplomacy in the past would gradually disintegrate

through the coercion of the Turkish military. Inevitably the radicalization of the

‘Kemalist’ independent judiciary would be challenged by the neo-Ottoman RP

doctrine. The UN Security Council dislodged the RP out of office through initiating

Turkey’s ‘post-modern coup’ in 1997, in order to prevent the growing threat of faith-

based extremism to continue marginalizing the Arab world (Aydin&Resem. 2007).

The RP’s parliamentary members therefore joined a short-lived Virtue Party (FP) in

an attempt to revive their previously unsuccessful political esteem. Nonetheless, the

FP was summoned to shut down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for yet again

conducting anti-secular manifestos. The ‘conservative democrats’ that found refuge

within the FP; teamed among the likes of ex-RP member; Recep Tayyip Erdogan,

provided opportunity to establish a new political party. The network that was

generated through the RP and FP trials; directly asserted into the AKP and its renewed

epistemology; “disassociating itself from the RP’s history of ideology and leadership”

(Aydin&Resem. 2007. P.114). Nye’s representation of power politics can be applied

when evaluating the conceptions on Turkish leadership under the RP/FP regimes,

which directly contributed to a re-conceptualized meaning of power for the pro-

Islamist entities. Symbolically, the masked visage of what the AKP represented, is

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seen in certain paradigms of the figurative ‘mask’, in this case the headscarf; which

had made an appearance for the first time in the Turkish Grand National Assembly

(TBMM). Ex-RP member Merve Kavakçi had been one of many anti-secular MP’s

that were banned from swearing their oath in the TBMM. Curiously, Kavakçi was one

of the central figures that participated in centralizing the AKP’s network and played

an iconic part in the AKP’s campaigning towards woman in Turkey through

promoting faith-based feminist campaigning strategies. Kavakçi experienced

despotism towards her human rights from the secularist Democratic Left Party’s

(DSP) chairman; Bülent Ecevit, who dismissed her representational rights in the

TBMM. Kavakçi’s appearance with the headscarf; idealised the anti-secularist effigy

of the RP/FP models, which indeed constituted the first direct implementation of

rationalist legislations into Turkish politics. The communications were regarding the

pro-Islamist RP/FP members to advise the European Council of Human Rights

(ECHR) on reviewing the DSP’s human rights violations to Kavakçi; which were

legislated according to ‘Articles 10’ (freedom of expression) and ‘11’ (freedom of

association) of the ECHR (Demir.2007). Subsequently the TBMM issued a special

commission for the religious headscarf, despite the fact that all the members of the

establishment were men rather than woman, therefore implicating the issue of men

making decisions for what is a subject that concerns the ultimatum from woman.

Kavakçi’s example is one of many legal battles that took place during the uprising of

anti-secular political organizations, although it is a significant incident to consider

when realizing how the pro-Islamist mentality utilised the liberal legislative model to

overcome their domestic representational disability in the TBMM. Idealizing the

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virtues of postmodernism and feminism; as a recipe for excelling political solidarity,

fundamentally proclaimed an eschewed ‘anti-Kemalist’ nature for the AKP’s political

jurisdiction. I would like to outline the significance of the AKP’s argument for

supporting their inquisitions toward the secularist and international criticisms that also

participated in counter-inquisitions against the transparency and ethics of the AKP’s

ideological ancestry. Incorporating the empirical data relating to the AKP’s evolution

process will provide a strong case for identifying the potential reasons behind

potentially jeopardizing domestic political stability, and regulating social democracy

in the name of re-appropriating ‘The New Turkey’. The weighing of achievability and

accountability towards accession into Europe is the primary objective for the AKP’s

modernization plan, not to mention the EU’s bilateral political and economic interest

in the region. The gradual liberalisation of political orientations; were first initiated by

a political junta (Milli Birlik Komitesi), which disciplined the counter-guerrilla; ‘stay-

behind-anti-communist’ armies in Turkey, initiated by covert CIA operations

(Dikici.2009). The ‘stay-behind’ agents had collaborated an anti-guerrilla military

establishment, which most notably targeted the Greek population in Turkey under the

‘false flag operation’; “Turkish fanatical groups fired up by the counter-guerrilla,

wrecked hundreds of Greek homes and businesses in Istanbul and Izmir, killing 16

Greeks, wounding 32, and raping 200 woman in the process” (Ganser.2005. p.227).

The indulgence of the CIA in Turkish politics begins at the point of corrupting certain

parts of the pro-Islamist political diameter in Turkey’s 1971 military coup, which the

‘stay-behind’ counter-guerrilla army engaged in domestic violence and managed to

implement the militaries secular predominance in Turkey. The ‘stay-behind’ agents

had coerced with Fethullah Gülen, who authenticated the RP, FP, and eventually the

AKP’s religious DNA. His involvement in building Mosques around the region and

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subsidising private sector elites in opening religious schools and academies

throughout Turkey, and further into the Middle East and Central Asia; made him one

of the most influential and powerful figures in Turkey’s pro-Islamist cast. Gülen’s

estimated net worth of 20 billion USD, is owed to his tight relationship with the US

government, as a means of easing US protocols to configure into the Islamic world.

Furthermore, the fallout between Erdogan and Gülen, once the AKP had gained

political power, ignited a self-actualised psychological power battle between the

popular Erdogan, and the influential Imam Gülen. The involvement of the US in

Turkey began earlier, as a reflex on the growing eminent threat of communism in the

region, which implicated the 1960 military coup.

The coup was orchestrated by Alparsaln Türkes, who in 1945; was court martialed

due to ‘fascist and racist activities’. Nonetheless the coup managed to overthrow the

secularist Democratic Party through axiomatic support from the Turkish military

general Cemal Gürsel, and the undetected external covert operations that collaborated

the first major coup d’état in Turkey. The resulting opportunities for anti-secular

political organizations, established an alternative pro-Islamic political party under the

National Outlook Movement (MHP) (Aydin&Resem. 2007. P.115). The MHP’s

political existence provided leeway for minimising anti-secularist political influences,

as pro-Islamist reputations and popularity outgrew the traditional secular conduct, or

so it was claimed. The likes of Tayyip Erdogan (Mayor of Istanbul), Bülent Arinç

(President of the National Assembly), and Abdullah Gül (Foreign Minister), were

among those who were trained under the MHP, along with a vast diversity of political

agents that participated within the pro-Islamic jurisdiction (Aydin&Resem. 2007.

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P.115). I would like to demonstrate some of the empirical data that suggests a more

valid source towards the assumptions concerning the ‘democratic transition’ between

secular and pro-Islamic political institutionalism.

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Appendices:

*Key 1: Secular vs. non-secular party categorization;

Secular Non-secular

Republican People's Party (CHP) Justice Party (AP) - Post-1960 coup

Democrat Party (DP) Motherland Party (ANAP)

Justice Party (AP) pre-1960 coup Democratic Party (DYP)

Welfare Party (RP)

Democratic Left Party (DSP)

Justice and Development Party (AK

Parti)

Source: (Mark Fikri – March 2015).

*Key 1 categorizes each political party into their respected political identities (Note:

‘AP’’s anti-secular transition took place between the 1965 and 1969 electoral

campaign).

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*Appendix 1: The list of MP’s and deputies in respect to their political orientation

who have obtained the highest percentage of election votes between 1946-2011;

Source: (TÜIK. Grafik 1. 2012)

20

*Appendix 2: Public participation in voting (%) between 1950-2011;

Source: (TÜIK. Grafik 2. 2015)

21

*Appendix 3: Percentage of Vote’s that were not represented within the electoral

campaigns between 1950-2011

Source: (TÜIK. Grafik 4. 2012).

22

*Appendix 1 represents a significant decrease in the ratio of electoral success among

the secularist political campaigns, which occurred after the first military coup in 1960

and the post-military coup in 1997. In *Appendix 1 the predominant CHP and DP

percentages, fluctuating between 70%-80% up until 1961; suggests a significant

political autonomy under the secular nation-state system under ‘Kemalist’ reforms.

The backlash for secularism is seen when introducing the 1960 coup, as the AP’s

buffered transition into the neo-Islamic doctrine; between 1961-1969, interestingly

sees a faint rise of 3.6% before losing again to the CHP, which saw an increase of

8.9% from their previous success. The significant shift in rank amongst pro-Islamist

MP’s is clearly noticed between 1980-1990, as the political elites gradually liberated

themselves towards the growing pro-Islamist rejuvenation. This can further be seen

when reviewing the secularist growth in electoral success ratios, which increased

between 1973-1977; thus causing the foundations of pro-Islamist doctrines to be built

beneath the democratic surface. The surreptitious occurrence of sub-politics taking

place, can further endorse the correspondence between the surfaced political election

data in *Appendix 1 to the voting participation percentages in *Appendix 2.

The prospect of pro-Islamist populism deteriorating secularist parties can be deduced

from the decreased public participation ratios after 1961. The sharp rise of public

participation in voting after 1977; depicts the optimum public interest in elections

since 1950. This suggests that the transformation process of Turkish politics had been

23

acknowledged by society, regardless of their political opinions. The record-high

participation ratio in 1977 demonstrated the restoration and renewal of social welfare

schemes under the emerging pro-Islamist AP government in 1965. Despite a lack of

ample segmentations for presenting the demographic ratio between; those segments of

society that voted to reinstate a secular nation-sate, versus those who voted to partake

in a new pro-Islamist reform; under the ANAP and DYP governments, remains to

undermine the transparency of democratic transformations in Turkey.

*Appendix 3 illustrates the votes that have not been accounted for within the national

council, therefore aiding the questioning on content validity and acumen for Turkey’s

democratic transformation between 1983-2011. Focussing between 1983-1987, and

1995-2002 we can see in 1983-1987 an increase in voting participation reaching a

record-high capacity (*Appendix 2). The evidence of political re-shuffling within the

non-secular parties during the ANAP’s political power (*Appendix 1), reinforces the

CHP’s 47.3% being overtaken by the ANAP’s 52.9 % in 1983 and collecting 64.9%

of votes in 1987. *Appendix 3 indicates that the votes in 1983; weren’t representing

54.9% of the total voting capacity, suggesting that although the secular government

was in a statistical political and popular decline, the votes that had not been accounted

for, directly corresponded with the heightened pro-Islamist popularity. Furthermore,

the similarities between the ANAP’s campaign and the AKP’s campaign, later in

2002 (*Appendix 1); statistically indicates that a share of 66% of votes obtained by

the AKP, with roughly a turn out of 90% (*Appendix 2); fails to amass with the

criteria depicted in *Appendix 3. The accountability statistics in *Appendix 3 therefore

indicate a growing concern from the public, regarding the mechanism of democratic

24

activities in Turkey as seen with 45.3% of votes not being represented within the

general elections.

The ‘1997 military memorandum’ staged a post-modern coup against the Islamist

Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan of the RP as the secularized military junta

overthrew Erbakan’s government. The coup however had initiated a ‘learning

process’ among political Islamists, since the realization of the missing piece in the

political jigsaw was the lack of attempts made towards respecting secular traditions

and values; “without secular acknowledgement, they would not have a chance for

sustained and effective participation in the Turkish political system, given its

constitutional boundaries” (Önis.2006). The missing piece of the political puzzle

would therefore be the AKP movement in the minds of the pro-Islamist RP/FP

judiciaries. To add to this, the AKP also realized the necessity of a ‘Western

influence’ in Turkey’s ‘democratic transformation’, in order to build a stronger

alternative against the foundations of a secular independent judiciary; not to mention

the “high levels of the state bureaucracy, and in the mainstream media, through

depowering the traditional secular military influence in Turkish politics”

(Aydin&Resem. 2007. P.114). The Appendices are ultimately depicting a correlation

between the two democratic uprisings in 1983 and 2002, the political success of pro-

Islamist parties embedded a political framework on disengaging their secular

oppositions; which implies a degree for double standards to take place through a

democratic contingency plan in Turkey. The correspondence with the misleading

political transparency, whereby the domestic secular officials, and the EU

commissions spectatorship on the AKP’s regimes; subsequently must recognise the

25

AKP’s gradual political autonomy and hegemonic monopolisation to be derived from

various strategies of out-manoeuvring the ‘Kemalist’ legacies. The significance of

establishing the MHP after staging the 1960 military coup, further implies the reasons

behind the disintegration of members of parliament. Mechanising political diversity

therefore managed to oppress the secular system, and uplift the traditional secular

autonomy in Turkish politics.

26

Chapter 3: Hegemony in Turkish Nationalism: Identity & Dual Identity

The difficulty for describing the AKP’s evolution process, as being democratic and

egalitarian; is somewhat overruled since the statistics in the Appendices paint a

different picture. “The AKP elites reject any formal reference to Islam or to the notion

of themselves being ‘Muslim democrats’, as often suggested by the EU”

(Akdogan.2004). Nevertheless the AKP’s preferred interpretation of labelling

themselves as ‘conservative democrats’, rather than ‘Muslim democrats’, remains

ambivalent. AKP further argues that; “it is less of an ideology and more of an organic

synthesis, that claims to give voice to Turkish people’s values and to bridge the gap

between the state and people” (Sultan.2006). Despite the fact that Erdogan has been

ridiculing secularist and European inquisitions towards the AKP’s democratic

validity, the ‘democratic transformation’ in Turkey triggered an authoritarian AKP

expansion. Although the AKP’s assumptions are advocating a presence of “exercising

collective reasoning on behalf of the public, and further by disassociating itself with

making rationale clear to those whom it is governing” (Tepe.2006); the AKP’s

ambivalence remains consistent when justifying the AKP’s ideological values on

representing Erdogan’s long-term EU accession objectives. Modernity for the AKP is

thus constituted by the ‘conservative democracy’ tag as a means of directing

nationalist visions in ‘The New Turkey’ through the prospect of achieving modernity

in Turkey with the austere median of EU accession.

27

I would like to firstly incorporate the theoretical norms of identity and culture, which

will allow me to portray how Turkey’s projections towards achieving modernity

under the AKP government are estimated both domestically and internationally. The

theory of identity, according to Castoriadis; embeds the “discourse of a

psychoanalytical influence towards cultural criticism, whereby the unconscious

process of formation directly corresponds to the development of subjectivities”

(Castoriadis.1990). The evolution of subjectivities that Castoriadis consolidates

through the process of developing an unconscious process of perspective-lead

institutional formations, are linked with the post-modern remedies of the pro-Islamist

manifesto, utilised under Erdogan. The AKP over-shadowed their secular oppositions

during their post-modern intervals, which celebrated an “anti-essentialist criticism

towards the ethnic, racial, and national conceptions of cultural identity”

(Robins.1996). During the transition between modern to post-modern organisations,

the opportunity for feminism to excel into institutional works in Turkey (Çaha.2001);

rectified perhaps the chronological construction of the self-recognised virtue of a

‘conservative democracy’, in order to promote left-wing populism through the

development of subjectivist manifestations. The historicity on the non-secular voters

and supporters, therefore implement an alternative pro-Islamist ideology

outdistancing traditional secular ideologies.

However some of the alternatives in the post-modern, anti-essentialist norms were

portrayed through a deconstructive critique towards the formation of subjectivities.

The dismissal of the originality and ‘unreconstructed’ forms of serviceable practices,

28

meant that subjectivities are therefore established purely due to the fact that no

alternative forms of psychoanalytical discourses existed to replace them during the

time of disintegrated pro-Islamist political entities; “albeit now in their de-totalised

forms, they can no longer operate within the paradigm of originally generated identity

models” (Hall.1996). In addition; the emergence of such concepts, which maximised

conceptual meanings on modelling the deconstructive critique, consequently failed to

configure into previous regimes; “identity is such a concept – operating ‘under

erasure’ in the interval between reversal and emergence; an idea which cannot be

thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought at

all” (Robins.1996). The fundamental discourse that is enveloped in comparative

Turkish politics can therefore be traced back to an alliterated form of ‘democratic

transformation’. The second alternative to the post-modern celebrations is in respect

to the ‘irreducibility’ of conceptualising identity. The AKP’s political movement

signifies the ‘identity politics’ mediation, through an agency; which represents a

counter conception for an unmediated and transparent ideal. How ‘identity politics’

should exist; according to their representative origins, implicates the question of

incorporating previous ‘theories of knowledge’ into a totality of welfare and

democratisation. Despite this I would argue that ‘identity politics’ should rather be

focussing on the discursive practices, which were exercised in Turkey’s post-modern

‘subjectivation’.

The restored approach on discursive practices and subjectivity formations, “ places its

own point of view at the origin of all historicity – which, in short, leads to a

transcendental consciousness” (Foucault.1970). The AKP’s discursive practices

29

therefore manipulate the hegemonic stability within Turkish society. The prospect of

‘reconceptualization’, which is decentralised and ‘new’ regarding the ‘irreducibility’

concept, influences the formation of a discourse in ‘identity politics’. The

implications derived from the formulation of ‘identity politics” characterises the

discursive practices that precisely cause the identification of ‘transcendental

consciousness’, through the norms of political exclusion. The identification caused by

the politics of exclusion illustrate, “with no limits for discursive practices to evolve

and become more common, the psychoanalytical repertoire for recognising a common

origin” (Robins.1996), We therefore need to acknowledge the psychoanalytical

discourses in ‘identity politics’ as the product of a specific historical and institutional

site that disorganises discursive formulations and practices. Since the process of

articulation for identity and culture paradoxes in Turkey, lack in representing a

totality, the suggestion as to Why identities are constructed; internally rather than

externally, should be asked when applying a psychoanalytically influenced cultural

critique. The idea of homogeneity in Turkish politics thus seems not to be natural, but

rather constructed and materialised through securing common interests and more

importantly, establishing apathy with their political and socio-economic associates.

The predominance of hegemonic representation in Turkey can parallel certain

indifferences with the EU. Both Turkey and the EU share common interests in

resources and ancillary mechanisms, which potentially can coexist and synchronise

under hegemonic cooperation propositions on idealistic objectives.

The constitution of a social identity can be understood as an act of power, which the

AKP have been licencing towards their representatives and executives; “ the unities

30

which identities proclaim are, in fact, within the play of power and exclusion, and are

the result, not of a natural and inevitable or primordial totality, but of the naturalized,

over-determined process of closure” (Bhabha.1994. Hall.1993). A common structure

of identity can therefore be divided into two separate meanings; firstly a conception

for identifying the impact on society with the discourse in discursively operating

outcomes of political tactics, which are manoeuvring social subjects into certain dual

identity discourses. The second distinction realises the productivity of subjectivist

constructions on societies relationship with nationalism, in relation to their orientation

within the social and cultural demographics. Dual identity therefore contributes to the

reality of an ideological position of ‘temporary attachment’, in relation to ones

subjective externality, “changing the subject into a flow of discourse” (Robins.1996).

Populism experienced by the AKP during their campaigning, can be credited for

formulating a new social segment, made up of previously subordinated individual,

psychological, and a collectively refuged social class, under an ideology preparing to

defend and maintain their faith-based segregations into social hierarchy. “If we are

not to fall directly from an economistic reductionism into a psychoanalytic one, we

need to add that, if ideology is effective, it is because it works at both 'the rudimentary

levels of psychic identity and the drives', and at the level of the discursive formation

and practices which constitute the social field; and that it is in the articulation of these

mutually constitutive, but not identical, fields that the real conceptual problems lie”

(Hall.1995).

The discourse in social hierarchy for Turkish nationalism; violates liberalisms plural

principles of identifying cultural diversity as a paramount force in democratic state-

31

systems. The social anxiety on a collective level towards national identity and

securing welfare for the total population under a utopian law, has failed to address the

subordinated secular segments of society, which ultimately disregard the domestic

‘identification’ epistemology on Turkish nationalism. The constructivist argument on

ideas and identities, to direct the actions of the state; provides an excellent deposition

for the Turkish case study, when comparing the Western model of an independent

judiciary to Turkey’s coerced judicial structure. I would like to focus on some of the

internal discourses in cultural diversity that the CHP and the EU commission are

determined to exploit and overcome. The theoretical system regarding state

nationalism and identity is very much a part of what created Turkey’s internal

‘temporary adjustment’ phenomenon. Anthony Smith defines national identity as; “a

nation that has a distinct human population sharing common moral and traditional

values” (Guibernau.2004). The common denominator that could be juxtaposed to

Smith’s interpretation is Islam’s influence across the Arab world and in Turkey, since

religion acts as an advocate for euphoric choices made by individuals in their daily

lives. Other theorists such as Joseph Stalin also conceptualised the system of running

an efficient utilisation for national identity through, “a community of people, which is

not racial or tribal – but historically constituted” (Szpakowski.2007). The primary

discourse that is enduring the cultural segments within Turkish society, or at least is

suggested by positivist appraisals; is religion, and the question of depicting the origins

between religious and secularist traditions that have transformed into modern

ideological formats. The pro-Islamist argument on this dilemma; represents a

discourse that is predominantly owed to secularist origins, which had been engineered

through the European frameworks of modernization. The pro-Islamist agenda further

depicts an “enmeshed complexity of multiple religious references that formulate

32

secularist ideals and norms, thus endorsing the dilemma of secularization”

(Görmez.2012. p. 4). Pro-Islamist academics conceptualise secularization in an

oxymoronic fashion, whereby the term ‘Islamophobia’ is commonly phrased when

addressing the EU’s inquisitions on developing a remedy for Turkish subjectivities,

both in-land and in the Middle East. The major socio-economic and political

transformations in Turkey; endured by the AKP’s pre-2011accomplishments, has seen

an increased ideological manifestation on the Muslim world. Islam’s theology argues

that, “laicism applied to conceptualising religious representations, are subject to

substantial criticism” (Görmez. 2012. p. 7). The potential risk that political Islam

faces, is its re-actualised historic divisions, which are supposedly representing a re-

engineered secular doctrine that ultimately neglect the universality of neoliberal rules

of international law.

33

Chapter 4: The Role Of Cultural Politics Of Accession In Turkey

The psychoanalytical foundations outlined in Chapter 3 should be differentiated from

their misconceived discursive practices and descriptions in order to apply a totality of

national values. We can argue that disintegrated traditional nationalism, married with

the AKP’s modernity objectives, is not perceived to truly represent democratic

fundamentalism. The emergence of segregating Turkish nationalism during the

‘democratic transformation’ process, unnecessarily risks Turkey’s democratic

aesthetics to Europe. The question of, “if and how, modernity’s philosophical

foundations are to be adopted selectively” (Tepe.2006); remains crucial when

corresponding the AKP’s anti-Western Ottoman ideology, to integrate into European

conditions. The rich cultural diversity in Turkey, instead of being utilised and

democratised, is subject to subordination and impositions into social hierarchical

levels, as was done exemplified during the Ottoman era.

Hrant Dink, whom worked under an Armenian newspaper company Agos; exploited

the historic tensions between Armenians and Turks for decades of inequality and

irrationality about the Armenian diaspora in 1915. His messages on re-establishing

Turkish-Armenian relationships on both sides, was seen as an act of anti-Islamic and

secular-minded, social manipulation strategies. Dink’s suggestion that the – falsely

labelled; ‘Genocide’ claims, had to be diplomatically recognised by Turkey in order

34

to create a greater interdependent social and political democratic environment for both

the Turks and Armenians. Dink’s assassination in 2007, perhaps juxtaposes the latest

circumstantial rigidness of involving fundamental human rights and freedom of

speech entitlements into the ‘bigger picture’ of modernity. Idealistically there are

many detrimental; and frankly, disturbing presumptions towards Turkey, made by the

EU and the rest of the neoliberal world. Dink’s final article published 9 days before

his assassination is currently the latest in a long line of publicity briefings and social

enlightenment guidelines that all share a common distinction; “the judiciary does not

protect the rights of the citizen, but instead of the state. The judiciary is not there for

the citizen, but under the control of the state” (Dink.2007). A judiciary system that is

not independent and is fulfilling authoritarian and dictatorial virtues, ultimately risks

Turkey’s democratization and modernization.

The ‘Gezi Park’ protests in 2013 implicate towards the authoritarian, and indeed un-

democratic leadership of Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP’s overall

representation of a Sunni pro-Islamist form of neorealist authoritarianism. The

discursive practice of ignoring social solidarity during the protests; undermined yet

again the AKP’s self-recognised status of ‘conservative democrats’. The AKP’s

political success between 2002-2011 rippled certain outbreaks of ideologically

motivated scenarios that disregarded democratic principality, from extremist and

fascist driven, unofficial cultivated revolts. AKP’s retaliation to the peaceful

demonstrations involved the aligned municipal and civil security forces to conduct

police brutality to the public protests. The protests initially began through conserving

environmental and human rights morals, therefore representing a segment of society

35

that unanimously participated in articulating their moral values towards the AKP

government; “a utilitarian example of a hegemonic monopoly under the AKP regime”

(Damar.2013). Collective surveillance efforts for social justice and freedom of

speech, indeed was dismissed by the AKP; “more often than not, the radicalism in

these protests is located not in what it potentially produces, but in what it contests.

Therefore, the condition of existence of the constructed ‘Gezi spirit’ is expressed with

contestation, rather than production” (Damar.2013).

The AKP’s anti-democratic proceedings, highlights the incapability for maintaining

democratic values and addressing moral welfare scenarios through the expressions

and voices of the public. The AKP should have engaged with the vibrant dynamics of

social apprehension so that it could have acknowledged a first hand example of

satisfying democratic aspirations, and perhaps take one step closer into European

considerations. AKP’s populism therefore deteriorated rapidly, mainly among the

dynamic youth and secular-minded traditionalist social segments. “International law

recognises the rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression according to;

Article 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey; Article 20 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights; and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human

Rights” (Yaman.2014. p.8-9). Erdogan’s dictatorial arrogance also demonstrated

further legislative backlashes for Turkey’s EU accession. Coerced and compelled

mainstream mass media entities not broadcasting the protests, and more significantly

blocking social media platforms during the protests to prevent communication with

international disclosures (Yaman.2014. p.15); ultimately, cost the AKP government a

significant popularity rating both domestically and internationally.

36

The pragmatic scenarios concerning the subjective cultural diversions in Turkey,

implicate towards a formation of dual-identity that relates to the extreme reactions of

a relatively new radicalised movement, Salafism. Salafism rejects the role of

philosophy, culture, and interpretation; therefore seeking to underpin the religious

theology into constitution by isolating the individual comprehension on universal

moral values. Taking into account Turkey’s growing influence in the Muslim world,

an alternative route to tender the tensions between the different religious discourses

between Europe and Turkey is offered. However, Turkey’s protocols regarding the

absence of separation between religion and the state-system, embeds the tutelage of

religious authority in the state. Turkey therefore would first need to overcome its

domestic polarization of the religious and cultural differences in social hierarchy.

Despite roughly 98% of the Turkish population to be of Islamic beliefs, the majority

Sunni Muslims that make up most of the population are politically rivalled by the Shia

oriented Islamic creeds. The demographic interpretations for the highest proportions

of Shia Muslims in Turkey, as the Kurds, have historically experienced political and

social forms of oppression since the Ottoman Empire. Ironically, AKP’s neo-

Ottoman ideology is still cursed with the difficulty of representing a formal

democracy towards its subordinated Islamic branches.

The European spectrum, have on many occasions; raised their distressed deviances

towards Turkey’s accession probabilities. The EU recognise Turkey’s participatory

democratic regime as a means of what causes the cultural discourse and alienated

social hierarchical categories, which ultimately undermine what the EU expects from

37

an enlargement candidate. Turkey must adopt a formal democratic approach to satisfy

the EU’s conditionality and to further increase the probability of accession and

eventual concession. Germany and France are two of the most powerful states that

fabricate the sovereignty of EU liberations, and unfortunately for Turkey, are the two

main oppositions towards Turkish accession. The cultural heritage in the EU

recognises Christianity as the rudimentary necessity for accession considerations.

Turkey being a predominantly Islamic nation; therefore won’t satisfy certain

ontological paradigms that exist in the EU. Nevertheless, France is home to the

highest percentage of Muslims in Europe, and Germany also is home to over 1 million

Turks, who have established certain foundations in the German public sector

branches. The paradox is not necessarily down to Turkey’s religious identifications;

rather it is to do with the AKP’s pro-Islamist ideology that agitates the prospect of

involving an anti-secular entity into an established totality of Western traditional

liberal judiciaries. The prospect therefore of de-radicalisation is brought into

consideration, since; perhaps the austerity of the Turkish political domain could

venture greater diplomatic and economic security opportunities on a mutual

compromise. Nevertheless, the AKP has not accounted its historic de-radicalisation

from the RP/FP movements into their contemporary political autonomy, moreover;

“AKP ideology still espouses the establishment of an Islamic state, with weak

democratic credentials” (Aydin&Resem. 2007. p.107). The EU therefore will inspect

closer towards the organisations of the expanding Kurds in Europe, along with the

suspicions on operational alignments with the AKP’s ideological commonalities with

other radical pro-Islamist groups in the Middle East, most notably Al Qaeda. In order

to overcome what the AKP signify as, “a manifesto against Turkey’s

38

democratization” (Koenig.2006); a mutual cooperation between Europe and Turkey

must be implemented into future accession negotiations.

The paradox that over-shadows the accession process is a psychoanalytic discourse, as

referred to in Chapter 2. The enigma of the European perspective towards Turkey

indicates their ambiguity that Turkey is in fact, not authentically western, rather

interloper within the European community; “A Turk reads the Koran, he doesn’t go to

the opera” (Zafer.1993). Despite the European psychosis towards Turkey and indeed

towards the ‘Other’ (pre-modern) states, Turkey’s NATO membership should be

regarded as a tool to discourage certain judgements made by certain EU member

states. I emphasise on Turkey’s role in NATO since the civil psychoanalytical

representations are not equal or rather, are un-representative on a wider perspective of

identification towards what the roles and contributions of states and their diplomacy

are in reality. The political opaqueness during the accession negotiations on both sides

perhaps is what deteriorates the anatomy of what the EU is representing. Turkey’s

geopolitical location acted as a strategic asset for the ‘West’ during the Cold War era;

“barrier to the Soviet Union and bridge to the Middle East” (Dankwart.1987). In

addition, Turkey’s NATO military commitments and reliabilities, and their militaristic

cooperation with the West during the Gulf War, also demonstrated their engagement

with the mandates of the ‘New World Order’. It is therefore crucial for Turkey to

continue their negotiation strategies and dialogues with the EU commission by

accentuating their symbolic role in contemplating the “fluctuating European security

environments” (Falk.1993), with militaristic, humanitarian, and socio-economical

reinforcements.

39

Chapter 5: Concept Of Democracy In A Non-Democratic Environment

We have researched the theoretical and pragmatic aspects of how the pro-Islamist

political entities have disintegrated to form a new coalition under the AKP

government. The traditional secular norms governed under the process known as;

‘Turkification’ established by the legacy of ‘Kemalism’, has been replaced by the

neo-Ottoman agenda and the moderate Islamic foreign policy that is governed under

the AKP. The military interventions that took place on Turkish sovereignty during

1960, 1971, and 1980, proposed a revolutionized multi-party system to operate within

Turkish politics. The anti-secularist alternatives seen during Turkey’s political re-

appropriation, demonstrates the ‘democratic transformation’ process to be very much

a reality rather than a psychoanalytical phenomenon. The paradigm therefore of

democracy being exploited to authenticate this ‘democratic transformation’, questions

the displacement of assuming a democratic process, which actually is executed in a

non-democratic environment. The polarization that took place between the members

of parliament and indeed the public, have thus caused this displacement of political

autonomy in Turkey to prosper.

One aspect made very clear by the European Parliament of Law, is in regards to

Turkey’s leadership on taking the initiative for categorising and repairing their

domestic democratic responsibilities during a growing ‘state-crises’ scenario. A

40

collapse of the state system in Turkey would create detrimental externalities, if an

agreement to the EU rule of law; is not sufficed. The necessity to restore Turkish

democratic morals must see fundamental changes in human rights, freedom to

minorities, journalists, woman, and multiculturalism. The EU commission clearly

hasn’t forgotten the allegations made towards the AKP government in 2007, along

with the impact of the ‘Gezi’ protests. With further secrecy on domesticated national

law in Turkey; the channelling of false circumstantial counter-allegations, to cover up

previous and present, high-level corruption and social dissatisfaction actions, are yet

to be articulated by Prime Minister Erdogan on the international stage. Erdogan

dismisses the imposition of such apprehensions by the EU commission as

‘Islamophobic’ accusations, which are hyper-mediated through the Western mass

media corporations and Think-Tank’s. Erdogan’s remarks contain in fact the essence

of how chapters 23 & 24 of the acquis are ridiculed in Turkey, and indeed are violated

and mismatched when questioned by society. The marriage between religion and

politics under the AKP’s portfolio; clearly manifest the distinguished democratic

values that are perceived from both entities.

The idea of re-engagement and re-consideration towards Turkish accession debates

for EU membership, were subsequently resumed in 2014 through primarily re-listing

and re-assessing the AKP’s foreign policy on the EU. The increased Euro-scepticism

towards Turkey’s diplomatic intentions and political objectives; proclaimed through

expanding economic participations with Middle East and the Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation (SCO), created room for further impediments during the resumed

negotiations. “Europe needs Turkey more than we need them” (Baker.2014); at this

41

point Erdogan’s ambiguous quote dictates his vision on a potential local super-power

role that Turkey would commence in. Nevertheless it is important to analyse, whether

or not, Erdogan’s logic is in relation to the EU’s economic recovery, or perhaps a

more cenacle acumen in power politics and unipolar sovereignty. The Turkish

ambassador to the EU, Selim Yenel; had indicated the Draft Law legislated under the

High Council of Prosecutors and Judges, as being ‘dismissed’, therefore threatening

the transparency of intelligence between the EU’s ‘Strasbourg Convention for the

Protection of Individuals’ (SCPI), and the Turkish intelligence bureau ‘MIT’. Andrea

Schmidt, the deputy head of political affairs for the EU delegation to Turkey, stated;

“The adoption and implementation of legislation on the protection of personal data in

line with EU standards would be an important step in our relations and Turkey's

accession process… We do hope that the final text will safeguard the independence of

the Data Protection Board as required in the EU acquis” (Tekdal.2015). The lack of

transparency between the SCPI and the MIT, regarding personal data protection

legislations; had created room for an alternative opportunity of revised negotiation

thresholds to take place, which could then be administrated to a re-discovered process

of diplomatic solidarity.

Earlier I had established an escapade on the historic and current intentions of the AKP

adopting political Islam as a means of promoting democracy in Turkey. Just as the

AKP engaged in widening populist campaigns throughout Turkey for re-securing

political authority, the EU had also imposed a similar regime towards Turkey’s

accession considerations. The transformation of democracy has therefore two scopes

to evaluate in order to agree on a consensus for applying the most achievable and

42

relevant transformation techniques on developing and restoring the neoliberal

democratic ethos in Turkey. Monitoring the traditions of a state system, signals a lack

of individual initiative for introducing a European democratic function into Turkish

politics, along with promoting their democratic values as a hegemonic orientation.

This would be useful for liberating the existing political and socio-economic energy in

Turkey, since the differing traditions of both the EU and Turkey are going back to the

point of Turkish initiative promptness that is expected by the EU commission, which

also may apply to, “proposing the transformation services that the EU label as a

crucial format towards an accession leeway” (Aktar.2002). The minimum

requirement of human rights is proposed by the EU commission and legitimized

through the Acquis Communautaire’s; Chapter 23&24, which guarantees the

conservation of modern and pre-modern democratic values. This is due to the

functionality within a modern society being generally built upon the destruction of

modern traditional values of the ‘Other’ state. “Juxtaposition to the ‘Other’ remains

the essential, albeit never the sufficient, condition of self-understanding; the modern

dynamism differentiated itself from the ‘natural artifice’ of the pre-modern order”

(Robins.1996). The historic prerequisite on ‘Westernization’ after the post-WWII era,

and the significance for reinstating traditional and oriental cultural dynamics, I would

argue, are still evident in certain EU member states such as France, Germany as

discussed earlier; “The story of how this temporal contrast became distinguishing

itself from the static and immobile Orient, is now a familiar one” (Robinson.1996).

The retrospective correlations of “the post-WWII era’s evolution into the post-modern

Europe, and its current judicial status under the EU; is perhaps a utopian transition”

(Aktar.2002); which subsequently provides an outlook towards the coexistence of

both modern and pre-modern democratic values to clash. These values must be

43

recognized and rediscovered through the accession negotiations since an influx of an

alternative traditional system; which could potentially react as a catalyst in the process

of rediscovering Turkish traditional democratic values; had similarly existed in

Western Europe, during the fabrication of their post-modern sovereignty.

The constructivist outlook, assuming the cultural and social aspects of distinguishing

values; rectifies the importance of both neo-traditional and anti-secular democratic

values that are championed by the AKP. It is therefore crucial to determine the

attitude towards local democratic values by considering Turkey’s geopolitical

situation (diplomatic strategy, economic strategy, security strategy), and also to

estimate the Turkish interest in non-EU markets such as the Middle East, North Africa

and Russia, which the EU could participate in through the median of progressing

Turkish diplomatic relations. The Frankfurt Bank and the European Central Bank

(ECB) therefore must review the Maastricht criteria by altering their convergence

policies, since considering the Turkish example would sustain a social solidarity

mechanism. This consideration however would defy the pre-modern solidarity that

exists in Turkey, therefore misleading the existence of social solidarity and creating a

shortage in alternatives. The solidarity networks in Bulgaria for example indicate the

mismatch in European post-modern dynamics, due to Bulgaria’s communist history

under the Eastern Bloc; Bulgaria also faces similar dilemmas for the EU to overcome

diplomatically. Nevertheless, I would like to present the universality of EU

conditionality that Turkey acknowledges as being punitive on their behalf, and that

rather the EU commission’s approach on accession negotiations, are implemented

genuinely in a homogenous protocol. “The significant degree of scepticism about or

indifference or opposition to the EU in most, if not all of the central and eastern

44

European candidate countries, does not mean the new member states will fail to meet

the challenges posed by accession. But it does suggest that unless there is some as yet

unforeseen groundswell of public support in the new member states for membership

in the EU, the governments of several of the new members will not be able to draw

upon an inexhaustible supply of political support, and may encounter significant

resistance, as they address those challenges. That is likely to be true especially, of

course, if the EU comes to be regarded as having been punitive or miserly in its terms

of accession and if, in addressing the various challenges of accession, the

governments are required to impose significant costs on their citizens”

(Cameron.2014). Such replacements of social solidarity is ultimately replaced from

pre-modern solidarity networks before intergovernmental industrialisation and

convergence criterion, can introduce Turkey into the third stage of the Economic and

Monetary Union requirements, and adopt the Euro as their national currency.

July 2014 hosted the general elections in Turkey whereby Erdogan’s AKP received

over 46% of the votes, which was higher than expected. His political success and new

role of Prime Minister inevitably injected motivation in excelling his domesticated

authoritarian, and increasingly unpredictable regime. The statements made by

Erdogan towards the accession process have proven to further unrest the certainty in

participating in alarming EU negotiation deadlines. Despite the visa liberalisation

leverage that the EU have over Ankara, ratifying such a hand excessively would be

mutually costly, therefore the most rational basis on carrying out negotiations is to

endure the most rational and constructive options, as discussed; during the regional

instability in Syria and Ukraine. Turkey’s significance as a NATO member since

45

1952 is also paramount since not only assembling the second largest army in NATO,

but also the energy security that Europe is dependent on for Cypriot energy reserves,

“which are only intact due to on-going peace processes between the Greek and

Turkish officials” (Baker.2014). Furthermore, Erdogan’s decision on prohibiting

Twitter and YouTube access within Turkish boarders, despite violating the conduct of

Chapters 23 & 24 of the acquis, yet again; overshadows the lack of criticism made by

Europe’s veto capitals. Berlin, London, and Paris, rectify the decisions made by the

EU to minimize short-term political considerations, since both Turkey and the EU

have far-reaching mutual interests. Sinan Ulgen, the chairman of a foreign policy

think-tank (EDAM) said; “International leaders will need to deal with the person who

is running Turkey, all the more as he is confirmed as the strongman” (Baker.2014).

My analysis on Prime Minister Erdogan’s words suggests that Turkey’s economic

upper-hand within the Middle East and Central Asian regions, is what fuels his

ambition for outweighing European expectations, therefore proposing to re-negotiate

the terms legislated by the European commission to satisfy the AKP’s monopolistic

heritage.

46

Chapter 6: The ‘Insulator’ State: Economics & Geopolitics in Future Prospects

of EU Accession

The European commissions transformation of democracy rectifies a realist struggle

for power among the traditional values exercised by the AKP, which I would argue

are seen as an anarchic political party that promotes rational economic disciplines

through their ordered preferences, as outlined in Chapter 1. The selection of the most

rational forms of utilising economic projection (i.e. economic diversification) and

diplomatic enlargement, projects the monophonic autonomy in Turkey to protect their

modernity ambitions. The power politics and economic security dilemma that the

AKP endure; to enhance political power and promote security through their political

finesse, underestimate the role of the EU’s promotion of cooperation and emphasis in

restoring accession techniques and rapprochements (Grigoriadis.2015). Turkey’s

diplomatic relations with the Arab world and Central Asian countries suggest the

influence of Turkish autonomy and diplomatic leadership to potentially inspire its

non-EU political partnerships. The Islamic states that observe Turkish accession

possibilities will be anxious to see how an Islamic country will operate and configure

into an essentially Christian hub. Europe therefore will be more engaged as an

economic structure rather than a political one, since cross-national criterions have not

yet been established within the Eurozone entirely. At this point it is important to

question the efficiency of how a framework of democracy can spawn into a

multicultural society on a scale whereby alluring into non-familiar post-modern

values and identities, either harbour traditionalist or pre-modern social scenarios in

Turkey; or rather, implement conditionality dictating on plebeian authorities that are

47

advocated by the EU commission. The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism

qualifies as a significant discourse that is necessary to correlate during the

negotiations.

The AKP’s hybrid political framework suggests that the ‘ally’ role taken up by the

‘West’, would offer a subsequent agreement on mutual efforts towards decreasing the

overall power of the military. A lesser politically active military would enable the

achievement of a system of democratic governance under the neoliberal ethos;

therefore legitimizing the pro-Islamist social and political forces to dominate Turkish

politics, and for the ‘EU’ to benefit from Turkey’s insulated diplomatic safeguarding;

“disassociation from the anti-Western discourse went hand in hand with the complete

abandonment of the anti-globalization discourse” (Aydin&Resem. 2007. P.114). The

Turkish financial crisis in 2001 had eliminated the possibility of upholding an anti-

Western and anti-globalization discourse, since Turkey had to adhere to strict IMF

protocols promoting foreign investment and privatization of state owned enterprise.

The engagement with emphasizing the AKP’s policies towards foreign diplomacy

indicated a broader cross-classed alliance scheme of uniqueness towards achieving a

competitive edge compared to their secular oppositions, through a series of classifying

mass campaigning strategies; “ the more dynamic and prosperous segments of society

that were benefiting from the globalization process, in material terms; as well as the

more disadvantaged and underprivileged segments of society” (Önis.2006). This

meant that the AKP could neither afford to adopt an anti-globalization discourse, nor

become engaged in constant quarrels with the secular counterparts, if their project of a

‘democratic transformation’ should succeed.

48

The economic factors that are on offer for both the EU and Turkey to quantify; play a

significant role in the accession projections. The exportation of labour forces from

Turkey into Europe is a key concept that is anticipated by the AKP. International

migration is clearly a process structurally central to both sending and receiving

societies, and it signifies a sending country’s penetration by, and incorporation into,

the world economy; “development and underdevelopment as a part of a single integral

totality, which simultaneously depends on and recreates conditions for worldwide

economic inequality” (Papademetriou.1991. p.8). The income inequality indexes for

Turkish workers who live in Turkey, causes Turkish workers to seek job opportunities

that implement greater austerity services in developed European economies. This

would be costly for both sides, as the EU is already suffering from visa liberations

that each individual possesses as a EU citizen; therefore allowing them to have free

mobility within the European labour markets. The immigration levels would fluctuate

significantly when considering a nation of 75 million people to accession, without

taking any precautions for sustaining the mobility of labour at equilibrium. Per contra,

Turkey is beneficing from the mobility of labour through its prospering Tourism &

Travel industry, with the aid of the regulated Turkish Airlines marketing and financial

subsidies from the AKP, which has made an impact in Turkey’s global transportation

network and recognition across the tourism industry. Visitor exports are a key

component of the direct contribution of Tourism & Travel. In 2013,Turkey generated

67.5bn TRY in visitor exports; in 2014, this was expected to grow by 8.4%, and the

country was expecting to attract 40,457,000 international tourist arrivals. By 2024 the

international tourist arrivals, is forecast to total 78,281,000, generating expenditure of

111.7bn TRY, an increase of 4.3% per annum (Turner.2014). Furthermore, the

49

privatization of state owned enterprise has seen rapid growth for Turkey’s capital

accumulation, through the opening up of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

opportunities to take place under the AKP government. Nevertheless, the rapid

privatization of both public and private sector industries, have mainly seen interest

from overseas corporate entities. The recent public outbursts in Turkey also had

disturbed the social instability that inevitably affected certain local businesses and the

networks of tradesman, especially in real estate and social services. Hence, these

matters are one of the dominant threats to Tourism & Travel developments and the

overall economic development for Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey may need

international help from the median of the EU in order to support, in the years

immediately ahead, an alternative to prevent certain negative socio-economic

externalities.

The economic problems facing Turkey are common to many developing countries

that have attempted a rapid diversification protocol to their economies. Unfortunately,

accelerated industrialization resulted in a rather capital-intensive form of development

throughout Turkey’s accession proposals since 2004. Since 2002 there has been an

impressive aggrandizement within the global capital accumulation, which has

subsequently generated inflation within the balance of payments (exports/imports) of

the More Economically Developed Countries (MEDC). The global financial recession

in 2008 and the chronological disobedience towards the New World Order, as seen in

terrorism and anti-globalisation movements, caused the MEDC’s to ease the pressure

of capital accumulation through the IMF and WTO for the developing economies. For

the past 12 years Turkey has beneficed from the lowered global exchange rates in

50

their economy, most notably in their subsidies on social welfare (Bengü.2013).

Nevertheless, Turkey’s economic performance has fallen in the past 5 years as other

Developing economies have seen an average of 5.33% growth rate, versus Turkey’s

below average 1.9%. Turkey’s employment rate of just 50% versus the Eurozone’s

73%, according to the OECD figures on national employment ratios between 2009-

2013 (Bengü.2013); can be linked with measuring the immigration quotas in Europe.

Turkey’s budget deficit will demand roughly 220bn USD in 2015, whereby 55bn will

be subsidised for balancing their import/export balance of payments, with the

remaining sum to balance their outstanding foreign debt (Bengü.2013). Subsequently,

Turkey will be enduring a difficult economic period as the crevasse in the balance of

payments increases, during a weaker performing economic growth forecast. It is

therefore possible to correlate Turkey’s outstanding budget deficit; along with the

increasing national debt on import/export markets, with the AKP’s monetary policy

that involved FDI to regulate and influence the domestic market conditions in Turkey.

The dependence on foreign capital to circulate a healthy cash flow in Turkey, make

them a financially-dependant candidate for the EU to validate. The already inefficient

and venerable Euro, with the assertion of Turkey; would prove to fluctuate the

economic persistence of the ECB. Nevertheless, the AKP have been exercising certain

economic remedies to overcome their detrimental budget deficit agenda. The

government has decided to uplift the taxes on FDI funds, which own the majority of

shares in Turkish private industries. The oligopolistic nature in the Turkish economic

reforms, which the AKP have established, ironically is opposite to the AKP’s

monopolistic political autonomy.

51

Turkey’s budget deficit therefore has outweighed their national revenue, which

creates the equity gap that is in urgent need of balancing. These economic trends were

evident in 2007, most notably in Spain and Greece; which lead to their inevitable

economic crises in the Eurozone. The unconventional economic crises that are a

constant threat to the economic welfare and political solidarity in international

relations; is eminent on the credibility of the global financial markets, which

ultimately the ECB will try to prevent. The decreasing economic growth in Turkey

over the past 5 years, has proposed a new alternative for Erdogan to consider. The

SCO is the main alternative route that Turkey can endure their modernization

aspirations by engaging with a foreign international communitarian alliance. Erdogan

in January 2013 had talks with Putin about Turkey’s potential membership into the

SCO from its current commentator participation; “I joked with Putin, Time to time

you joke with us and ask what we are doing with EU. Now it is my turn to joke.

Come, accept us into the Shanghai Five and we will reconsider the EU”

(Danay.2013). Russia and China are the key players in the SCO, China’s economic

strength backed by Russian security departments in both energy and diplomacy

aspects; collaborate a recipe that Turkey sees beneficial and inviting. Two

perspectives can therefore be deduced from Turkey’s discussion with the SCO

regarding their accession and the EU; “Firstly the liberal conceptualisation on foreign

policy through norms that claim Erdogan’s proposals for Turkey’s involvement in the

SCO through normative demands, which are limiting the AKP’s objectives both

internally and externally. On the other hand the second perspective was initiated

through the conservative protocols, which approach the prospect of EU accession in a

more instrumental framework that claims the EU wouldn’t meet Turkish expectations,

due to the process of diplomatic decline between both entities” (Danay.2013). The

52

conservative approach consists of sympathy towards Erdogan’s discourse, since an

alternative alliance system can be integrated more profoundly into the AKP’s foreign

policy. As outlined in Chapter 5, the ECB and the Frankfurt Bank must overview the

potential advantages and disadvantages for Turkish accession with their convergence

criterions. There is a more paramount issue however regarding Turkey’s accession,

which as the majority of this thesis embeds; the evaluations of the European

commission for justifying the achievability and accountability on accession terms and

conditions, which are enlisted in the EU acquis. The importance of social solidarity on

both the cultural and psychological perspectives on Turkish full-time membership is

therefore the discourse between the neorealist-neoliberal debates, which pragmatically

threatens the accession negotiations to mutually satisfy an agreement.

53

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Ultimately the accession process for Turkish membership to the EU, chronologically

manifested into a form of ‘hard’ power politics between Erdogan’s dictatorial ego and

the EU’s persistence on maintaining liberal democratic values to be implemented into

a regime that exercises such values in an adverse methodology. Currently Turkey is

undergoing a severe coercion of foreign interest, both economically and

diplomatically. The US interest in the Middle East has diverted Turkey into the

democratization project, which is remaining to be the differentiating diversion for

proceeding Turkey’s modernization under the AKP government. The ‘insulator’ role

as outlined in Chapter 6, makes Turkey a particularly inconsistent candidate for EU

accession, since implementing a fixed and adamant foreign policy for EU accession is

not prioritised in Turkey’s short-medium term objectives. The EU’s dependence on

energy security across Central Asia and the Middle East, therefore allocate Turkey the

upper hand when comparing the prosperities and stagnations for both entities.

Turkey’s economic dependence against the potential economic advantages that are

speculated through the EU’s enlargement project; creates a bilateral perspective of

seeing each other as assets in the long run. Subsequently, quantifying the most

profitable outcome during the negotiations will aim to reach a compromise. The lack

of transparency in the historicity of Turkish politics is further clouded by the

contemporary non-European diplomatic engagements that Turkey is pursuing. In

conclusion, Turkey’s accession when observed through a neoliberal doctrine; suggests

a mutually beneficial encounter to commence into. Nevertheless the ideological

54

discourse pragmatisms that I have portrayed throughout this thesis; depict that the

psychoanalytical and comparative discourses are corroding the articulations for the

negotiations. The neorealist-neoliberal debate henceforth juxtaposes the discourse in

applying theoretical frameworks into reality, which guarantees an assimilation of two

separate conceptualisations of exercising democracy to construct an asymmetric

model of modernity. Political Islam therefore is situated at the heart of the discourse

paradigms. In order for Turkey to excel into the final frontier of accession, it must

first establish its transparent national identity to the rest of the international spectrum.

Without attending their domestic cultural and hegemonic discourses, Turkey will

remain to be the ‘insulator’ safeguard for the EU and forever an indirect participant of

the democratization project of globalisation.

55

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