turkey-russia tensions: it is different this time

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Turkey-Russia Tensions: It is Different This Time

On October 3, a Russian Su-30 entered Turkish airspace after a bombing run in northern Syria. The jet departed after two Turkish F-16s scrambled in response. The move was interpreted as deliberate by Turkey, while Russia claimed that it was merely a navigation error. In response, the Russian ambassador in Ankara was called to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in protest, after which Minister Feridun Sinirlioğlu’s made a direct phone call to his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.

A second incident took place on October 4, during which an unidentified MiG-29 coming from Syrian airspace locked its radar on Turkish jets for a duration of five minutes. The following day, another unidentified jet “painted” eight Turkish jets with its radar lock, after which missile systems inside Syria locked on to Turkish planes for about four minutes.

In response to such continued escalation, NATO has stepped up its criticism of Russia, with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg denouncing the violations as “deliberate.” The White House also stepped in, criticizing what it sees as “provocation”; U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that the incident could lead to more intense escalation if violations continued.

Turkey expressed its outrage to these repeated incidents, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saying it would be “pointless to call [Russian President] Putin at this stage” to negotiate. Conversely, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently stated that the Turkish side has proposed a joint working group to better coordinate Russian and Turkish aerial operations in the region.

Russian planes have entered Turkish airspace off its Black Sea coast several times since Moscow’s intervention in Crimea. Turkish airspace has been briefly violated – most recently on March 15, 2015 – as part of the Russian strategy to test NATO members’ aerial response times (i.e., how fast they are able to notice the violation and how quickly they can scramble jets).

However, there are three main reasons why the most recent such episodes are different:

1. The Turkish jets being harassed were returning from bombing PKK positions in Qandil. Experiencing aerial denial during what Turkey sees as counter-terrorism operations is a source of immense annoyance in Ankara.

2. Russian aerial operations in Syria are confined to areas dominated by groups supported by Turkey. Ankara defines these groups as “moderate opposition”; the fact that Russia sees them as dangerous as ISIS complicates

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Russian Su-30

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Turkish policy there. Indeed, Turkey has spent a substantial amount of money and equipment to rally such groups over the last few years; Russia’s actions are undoing much of Turkey’s efforts.

3. It is unclear whether Turkey has been dealing with Russian aerial assets in Syria or Syrian assets that have established a more confrontational posture having been emboldened by Russia’s presence. Ankara can manage being threatened by Russia; however, a Syrian challenge against Turkish jets can be seen as a long-term message regarding the future of Syrian regime’s outlook towards Turkey over the foreseeable future.

TURKEY IS REDISCOVERING NATO

For Turkey, any major strategic overture on the part of Russia has always been a source for concern. This has been hardwired into Turkish security policy following more than two centuries of on-and-off war with Tsarist Russia during the Ottoman period – as well as the fact that both empires experienced disintegration largely as a result of fighting one other.

It was another Russian threat after World War II – Stalin’s territorial demands in eastern Anatolia – that forced Turkey into NATO. Therefore, it could well be argued that Russia has always been the top consideration of Turkish security and defence policy. While relations over the past two decades have been manageable by emphasizing tourism and trade, Russia’s reassertion of its “strategic buffer” in Ukraine and Syria inevitably leaves Turkey in a difficult position.

In addition to being a source of outrage, Turkey perceives Russia’s recent moves as a direct threat to its operational range in the region – viewing Russia’s aerial presence in Syria as an impediment to its fight against the PKK. In other words, Turkey define Russia’s presence in Syria as a national security threat, which it is pushing to render a threat to NATO itself under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Just as Stalin essentially forced Turkey to become a member of NATO in 1952, Putin seems to be unintentionally reminding Ankara that it is a NATO ally. Having at times since its accession prioritized an independent national security policy and military-industrial complex, Turkey has once again returned to its origin point, believing that the best way to balance against Russia is to act together with NATO.

To that end, President Erdoğan visited Brussels on October 5, in part to discuss the ongoing refugee crisis, as well as to gauge the alliance’s interest in balancing Russia’s moves along the Turkish border.

The fact that Russia has simultaneously tested Turkish and Israel aerial readiness creates a policy problem for the United States. In the next few months, it can be expected that Turkey will “rediscover” NATO and will attempt to regenerate a working military relationship with Israel – perhaps not as strong as it was in the late 1990s, but nonetheless a departure from current policy.

BLACK SEA

RUSSIA

TURKEY

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WILL THE KURDS REACH OUT TO THE RUSSIANS?

There are several layers of risks for Turkey associated with Russia’s entry into the Syrian theatre. The biggest threat relates to the Kurds – i.e., the dreaded “Kurdish belt” spanning along Turkey’s southern and eastern borders, with the Syrian PYD and Turkish PKK pushing the unification of the Kurdish enclaves into one autonomous federal entity.

Turkey fears the emergence of a Kurdish “Bismarck” who finally unites the Kurds into a single nation-state. As Turkey is strongly opposed to any attempt towards unification of Kurdish enclaves, secular Kurds may turn to Moscow for military/aerial deterrence support to discourage Turkey from blocking such a move. Although Moscow has no direct interest in the unification of Kurdish enclaves, balancing against Turkey (and therefore NATO) by way of the Kurds may give Russia a freer hand in relieving Latakia and Tartus as its permanent bases in Syria.

Turkey also imports about two-thirds of its natural gas from Russia. Any significant Turkish response against Moscow will result in gas supply cuts or price hikes as winter approaches. Moreover, any substantial restriction in natural gas will slow Turkey’s economic growth by slowing industrial production – which relies on gas as well.

THERE IS LITTLE TURKEY CAN DO ON ITS OWN – AND IT NEEDS TO MAKE A DECISION

There is little Turkey can do on its own to counter Russian moves in Syria. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the confiscation of the Sevastopol naval base, Turkey has found itself direly outnumbered and outgunned in the Black Sea. Similarly outgunned in Syria (in aerial terms), Turkey could either completely withdraw from the conflict and pursue an appeasement policy towards Russia, or press for greater NATO involvement there and actively mobilize the alliance.

The latter option is contingent upon the willingness of the United States to become involved, as well as Washington having a plan and the commitment to engage. The dual traumas of the March 1, 2003 Turkish parliamentary bill (which prevented U.S. military forces access to Turkey) and the subsequent detainment of Turkish special operations forces in Sulaymaniyah still inject a sense of mistrust into bilateral relations. Moreover, the U.S. military has developed a sense over

the last five years that Turkey is not a reliable NATO ally when it is not directly threatened, and only recalls its NATO membership when it needs defense.

Turkey’s most important and urgent task is to make a medium-term risk assessment of the costs and benefits of continued involvement in Syria, unification of the Kurdish enclaves and to what extent it can cooperate with or appease Russia on these matters. In this risk assessment, the biggest concern should be the economic/growth fallout from any natural gas restrictions.

If Turkey ultimately decides to “go NATO,” it has to clear the air with other NATO countries and re-establish a working relationship and mutual trust with allied military forces. The NATO option will also require relations with Israel be brought at least to a working minimum from a military point of view; this is especially important for the purposes of coordinating radar intelligence on Russian aerial operations with a direct focus on NATO’s aerial defence architecture.

However, before taking the deterrence route, Turkey must exhaust all other diplomatic options with Russia to find at least the minimum amount of policy convergence – e.g., on the future of Assad and the regime, any future transition process, the status of the Russian bases in Syria, and Iranian involvement in the prospective transition phase.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan

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ATTRIBUTIONS

[cover] This work, “cover”, is a derivative of “Press-Conference of Vladimir Putin, (2015-07-10) 01” by Пресс-служба Президента России, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported Licence; “Aircraft Fighter Jet F-111 AFTI NASA 0” by NASA photographer, released into the public domain; “Flag of Turkey” by Armagan TEKDONER, released into the public domain; “Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan” by World Economic Forum from Cologny, Switzerland, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license; and “Russian Flag” by falco, released into the public domain.

[page 1] “Russian SU-30” by Sergey Krivchikov [GFDL 1.2 (http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/fdl-1.2.html) or GFDL 1.2 (http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/fdl-1.2.html)], via Wikimedia Commons

[page 3] ”President Recep Tayyip Erdogan” Gobierno de Chile [CC BY 3.0 cl (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/cl/deed.en) or CC BY 3.0 cl (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/cl/deed.en)], via Wikimedia Commons

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turkey-russia tensions: it is different this time

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