turkey's new regional security role: implications for the united states

8/20/2019 Turkey's New Regional Security Role: Implications for the United States

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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

TURKEY’S NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ROLE:IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Richard Weitz

September 2014

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FOREWORD

Since the Cold War era, when the United Statesbegan heavily investing in Turkey’s military and de-fense operations, the United States and Turkey haveenjoyed a fruitful and mutually benecial relation-ship. Because of Turkey’s geographic location, politi-cal stability, and recent economic success, the countryhas served as a strategic ally in U.S. foreign policy.The Arab uprisings in particular have challenged theTurkish-U.S. partnership. For a country that was al-ready struggling to balance its position as a regionalpower with the imperative of maintaining good rela-tions with its Western allies, the increasing instabilityin the region has forced Ankara to rely more on theUnited States than it would prefer. Although the Syr-ian conict has underscored to Turkey the value of its

security ties with the United States, the war has alsoexposed deep differences between the two countrieson fundamental issues. While presently partially bur-ied, these differences could easily rise to the surface incoming years.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD WEITZ is Senior Fellow and Director ofthe Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hud-son Institute. His current research includes regionalsecurity developments relating to Europe, Eurasia,and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign and defensepolicies. Dr. Weitz is also an expert at Wikistrat anda nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for a NewAmerican Security (CNAS). Before joining Hudson in2005, Weitz worked for the Institute for Foreign PolicyAnalysis, Center for Strategic and International Stud-ies, Defense Science Board, DFI International, Inc.,Center for Strategic Studies, Harvard University’sKennedy School of Government, and the U.S. Depart-ment of Defense. Dr. Weitz has authored or editedseveral books and monographs, including Rebuilding

American Military Power in the Pacic: A 21st-CenturyStrategy (2013); Global Security Watch-China (2013); twovolumes of National Security Case Studies (2012 and2008); War and Governance: International Security in aChanging World Order (2011); The Russian Military To-day and Tomorrow (2010); Global Security Watch-Russia (2009); China-Russia Security Relations (2008); Mis-managing Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis (2008); The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis (2007); and Revitalising U.S.–Russian SecurityCooperation: Practical Measures (2005). Dr. Weitz holdsa B.A. with Highest Honors in government from Har-vard College, an M.Sc. in international relations fromthe London School of Economics, an M.Phil. in politicsfrom the Oxford University, and a Ph.D. in political

science from Harvard University.


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SUMMARY

Until a few years ago, the relationship betweenWashington, DC, and Ankara, Turkey, was perenni-ally troubled and occasionally terrible. Turks stronglyopposed the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq and have sub-sequently complained that the Pentagon was allowingIraqi Kurds too much autonomy, leading to deteriorat-ing security along the Iraq-Turkey border. Disagree-ments over how to respond to Iran’s nuclear program,U.S. suspicions regarding Turkey’s outreach effortsto Iran and Syria, and differences over Armenia, Pal-estinians, and the Black Sea further strained ties andcontributed to further anti-Americanism in Turkey.Now Turkey is seen as responding to its local chal-lenges by moving closer to the West, leading to theadvent of a “Golden Era” in Turkish-U.S. relations.

Barack Obama has called the U.S.-Turkish relationshipa “model partnership” and Turkey “a critical ally.”Explanations abound as to why U.S.-Turkey ties haveimproved during the last few years. The U.S. militarywithdrawal from Iraq removed a source of tensionand gave Turkey a greater incentive to cooperate withWashington to inuence developments in Iraq. Fur-thermore, the Arab Awakening led both countries topartner in support of the positive agenda of promotingdemocracy and security in the Middle East. Americansand Turks both want to see democratic secular govern-ments in the region rather than religiously sanctionedauthoritarian ones. Setbacks in Turkey’s reconciliationefforts with Syria, Iran, and other countries led Ankarato realize that having good relations with the United

States helps it achieve core goals in the Middle Eastand beyond. Even though Turkey’s role as a providerof security and stability in the region is weakened as


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a result of the recent developments in Syria and theensuing negative consequences in its relations to other

countries, Turkey has the capacity to recover and re-sume its position. Partnering with the United States isnot always ideal, but recent setbacks have persuadedTurkey’s leaders that they need to backstop their neweconomic strength and cultural attractiveness with thekind of hard power that is most readily available tothe United States. For a partnership between Turkeyand the United States to endure, however, Turkeymust adopt more of a collective transatlantic perspec-tive, crack down harder on terrorist activities, andresolve a domestic democratic decit. At the sametime, Europeans should show more exibility meetingTurkey’s security concerns regarding the EuropeanUnion, while the United States should adopt a moreproactive policy toward resolving potential sources of

tensions between Ankara and Washington that couldsignicantly worsen at any time.


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secure region, which would provide Turkey with the“strategic depth” Ankara needed to become a great

power. Turkey’s rapid economic growth is facilitat-ing the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces(TSK) and the country’s domestic defense industry.Its large, predominately moderate Muslim popula-tion provides Ankara with one of the largest and mostreadily deployable armies in Europe. Turkey’s loca-tion astride multiple global hotspots—the Balkans, theCaucasus, the Middle East, etc.—widens NATO’s geo-graphic perspective. Turkish strategic thinkers havetraditionally seen their country as surrounded by un-stable, potentially hostile geographic regions. Turkishforeign and defense policy has sought to reduce thisinstability—and ideally transform Turkey’s pivotalgeopolitical position from that of a liability into anadvantage—by partnering with the United States and

other NATO countries. Being more exible, however,recent Turkish foreign policy has also become less pre-dictable, which complicates Ankara’s relations withWashington and other traditional partners. WithinTurkey, newly empowered societal actors such as eth-nic lobbies, business associations, inuential civilianpoliticians, and a resurgent religious establishmenthave pushed for changes in long-established foreignand defense policies. Conversely, the Turkish mili-tary, previously the dominant security actor, has lostinuence, weakening a traditional force favoring closeties with the United States. The AKP has managed toexploit Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union(EU) to justify stripping the TSK of political powers.


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EUROPEAN SECURITY

Turkey has presented both a challenge and an op-portunity to NATO and the EU as they restructuretheir roles, missions, and capabilities to address Eu-rope’s 21st-century security challenges. Since NATO’sfoundation in 1949, the Alliance has played a crucialrole in Turkey’s security strategy and contributed toits integration with both Europe and the United States.During the Cold War, the Turkish government reliedon its NATO membership and its bilateral alliancewith the United States to backstop Turkey’s security.The pro-Western elite that dominated the country’sforeign and defense policies viewed Turkey’s aflia-tion with NATO and ties to the United States as den-ing and ensuring its status as a core member of theWestern camp.

NATO simultaneously defended Turkey againstthe Warsaw Pact and beneted from Ankara’s effortsto deter Soviet adventurism. Though confrontationsoccurred between Turkey and fellow Alliance mem-ber Greece over Cyprus and other issues, these con-icts actually highlighted NATO’s additional value inmoderating differences between Athens and Ankara.Turkey has not only benetted from NATO’s support,but has also contributed heavily to the Alliance’s effortto promote security in the Euro-Atlantic region andbeyond. Turkey serves as the organization’s vital east-ern anchor, controlling the straits between the BlackSea and the Mediterranean Sea and sharing a borderwith Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Although the Cold War isover, NATO’s importance for Turkey remains. With

much of Europe paralyzed due to the Euro crisis andwith U.S. attention drifting eastward, Turkey has theopportunity to emerge as one of NATO’s new leaders,


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providing Ankara adopts more of a collective transat-lantic perspective and stops trying to import its bilat-

eral disputes with Israel and the EU into the Alliance’smultinational deliberations. Having been a memberof NATO since 1952, an aspirant for EU membershipfor over a decade, and disposing of one of Europe’smost powerful military forces, Turkey must perforcebe a key component of any effective European secu-rity architecture. Yet, nding an appropriate place forAnkara in the evolving EU-NATO balance has provenexceptionally difcult given the country’s continuedexclusion from the EU and dispute with the govern-ment of Cyprus.

Turkish ofcials have waged a protracted battle toinuence EU security decisions and compel Greek Cy-priots to reach a political settlement with their Turkishminority. In pursuit of these ends, they have proved

willing to block EU-NATO cooperation on importantsecurity issues. A recurring problem is that Turkey isa member of NATO but not the EU, whereas Cyprusbelongs to the EU but not NATO. The two countrieshave used the consensus rules of each organizationto prevent one organization from cooperating withthe other on important security issues. In particular,Turkish objections to the possible leaking of sensitiveNATO military information to Cyprus have limitedties between the EU and NATO since Cyprus joinedthe Union in 2004. With no security arrangement inplace, EU ofcers on the training mission for Afghanpolice are forced to improvise on the ground for theirown protection with local International Security As-sistance Force (ISAF) commanders.

These mutual antagonisms have constrainedNATO-EU cooperation in general, and disrupted the joint NATO-EU security missions in Afghanistan,


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Kosovo, and in the Gulf of Aden in particular. Forexample, there is no comprehensive EU-NATO agree-

ment on the provision by ISAF of security for the Eu-ropean Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)staff and no possibility to exchange classied andoften critical information. Consequently, EUPOL hashad to conclude individual agreements with Provin-cial Reconstruction Team (PRT) nations and has evenbeen obliged to hire a private company to guaranteeits security and to maintain an extremely tight secu-rity policy. Moreover, Turkey and the United Statesdid not conclude bilateral agreements with EUPOL.

All this has slowed down EUPOL’s deploymentand hampered its effectiveness.1 The AKP’s dominantform of security discourse, with frequent references tomultilateralism, soft power, and critical dialogue, re-sembles more closely that used by EU rather than U.S.

ofcials, who try to “keep all options on the table,”including the use of military force. But Turkey has al-ways relied on the United States as well as NATO toprovide such power when it is needed. For example,Turkey insisted on giving NATO control of the 2011Libyan intervention.2 Having NATO, rather than an adhoc coalition or one led by the EU or United States, willlikely remain Ankara’s preference as long as Turkey isexcluded from the EU.3

NATO

When NATO was formed in April 1949, Turkeywas not initially invited to join. Washington was re-luctant to commit to defend distant Turkey, and had

also rejected Turkish proposals for a bilateral allianceor a unilateral U.S. security guarantee. NATO’s WestEuropean members did not want to risk diluting the


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U.S. economic and other assistance they were receiv-ing. Although some Turkish leaders wanted to pur-

sue a more neutral foreign policy following NATO’ssnub, Turkish policymakers continued to pursueNATO membership, believing the Alliance offeredTurkey the optimal Western anchor. Turkey’s keycontribution to the U.S.-United Nations (UN) KoreanWar effort augmented Ankara’s renewed membershipcampaign. In September 1951, NATO invited Turkey,along with Greece, to join the Alliance. The UnitedStates was hesitant to extend its involvement in theMiddle East due to its commitments in Europe andAsia.4 Yet, with the outbreak of war in Southeast Asia,the decline of British inuence in the Middle East, andthe threat of Soviet aggression in the Mediterranean,the United States began to not only see the importanceof the Middle East but also the importance of Turkey

as a potential ally. At the time, several factors impededTurkey’s admission into NATO. Inuential Europeanleaders considered Turkey as part of the Middle Eastand did not want to extend the Marshall Plan to Tur-key.5 Nonetheless, London, United Kingdom (UK),and Washington pushed for Turkey’s admission intoNATO, primarily because of its “guardianship” of theDardanelles and Bosporus. Under the Montreux Con-vention, Turkey could close these straits to the SovietNavy in wartime.6

Turkey has since made major contributions toWestern security. During the Cold War, Turkeyhelped constrain the Soviet Navy in the Mediterra-nean, provided one of the largest armies in Europe,and hosted key NATO military facilities. NATO

planners were concerned with strategic weaknessesthat could be exploited by the Soviet Union if warwere to erupt between the Alliance and the Union of


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Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). NATO’s boundariesstretched from the North Cape in Norway to Mount

Agri in eastern Turkey, and while central Europe wasthe primary focus of NATO’s defense, its northernand southern anks were dangerously exposed. Notonly did NATO have to contend with Soviet ambi-tions in the Mediterranean, but it also had to deal withthe deterioration of British inuence in the MiddleEast and the disunity between the Arab states. TheMiddle East and the Mediterranean are also importantbecause of vital transportation and communicationslines and the raw materials located in the region.7 Inaddition, Turkey not only played an important rolein intelligence gathering, early warning, forward bas-ing, logistics, and training, but also served as a valu-able link between the Middle East and the West. Thiswas demonstrated during the U.S. landings in Leba-

non in 1958 and the Jordanian civil war in 1970. Un-til its military intervention in the Cyprus crisis, Tur-key was “a strong element of stability in the easternMediterranean.”8

The end of the Cold War, however, changed thisrelationship.9 Turkey cooperated with the UnitedStates in the 1991 Gulf War and contributed to NATO-backed missions in the former Yugoslavia and Libya.But as the 1990s unfolded, Turkey suffered escalatingterrorist violence in the southeast region, a major eco-nomic crisis, increased political polarization, a secu-rity vacuum in neighboring northern Iraq (which thePKK exploited), and perceived diminished Westerninterest and support.10 The September 2001 (9/11) at-tack on the World Trade Center marked a new era in

NATO’s history, but it also led to a change of Turkey´srole within the Alliance’s structure. The more diversesecurity environment in the post-9/11 world has led


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to NATO engagements far beyond the Euro-Atlanticarea, and provided new importance to Turkey, given

its geographical and cultural position in contempo-rary “out of area” missions.11 There are three main de-velopments that gave Turkey a more signicant rolein the organization. First, NATO’s attention expandedto include a wider geographical focus, reaching coun-tries with a strategic distance away from the Euro-At-lantic geography. This included a specic focus on theMiddle East and countries located in Turkey’s neigh-borhood. Second, the allies reached a consensus to in-clude terrorism in NATO’s agenda, creating a need fornew means and strategies, which largely depended onlocal knowledge that Turkey could contribute regard-ing its region. Third, Turkey has close physical andother connections with Afghanistan.12

Turkey brings other important assets to the NATO

Alliance. It is the only predominantly Muslim memberof NATO and boasts one of the world’s most dynamiceconomies. The country’s rapid growth is allowingthe country to enhance its military forces through bothforeign purchases and an improving domestic defenseindustry. Thanks to its large population and the geo-graphically broad perspective of its national securitycommunity, Turkey has one of the largest and mostreadily deployable armies in Europe. With a force ofover 600,000 personnel and a military budget of closeto $19 billion, Turkey has the second largest militaryin NATO.13 Turkey borders three security hotspots ofconcern for the Alliance: the Balkans, the Caucasus,and the Middle East. Turkey has contributed heavilyto the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan, commanding

ISAF on multiple occasions and stationing more than1,700 troops in Kabul. Turkey has made substantialcontributions to the reconstruction of the country.


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One such example is the Vardak Provincial Construc-tion Team, which was established in November 2006.

Under its auspices, Turkey had provided $200 mil-lion worth of aid by 2008.14 At the same time, Turkeyhas deployed soldiers to Afghanistan to train Afghansoldiers and police belonging to the Afghan NationalSecurity Forces. Turkey’s training mission, its eco-nomic assistance, and its regional diplomatic initia-tives aimed at reconciling Afghanistan and Pakistanare essential to promoting Afghanistan’s security andpost-conict reconstruction. President Abdullah Gülhas said that, “As stakeholders in the region, we can-not expect that the United States and other Westernpowers solve the problems by themselves. We shouldshoulder our responsibilities.”15 In addition, by con-structing roads, Turkish rms are building strongereconomic relations and diplomatic ties between Af-

ghanistan and other countries.16

With its involvementin the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Turkey can notonly take a stand against Taliban extremism, but alsoprovide NATO with leverage against Iran.17

Turkey’s inuence in the Balkans, another area ofconcern for NATO, remains strong, especially sinceAnkara has improved relations with Serbia. Turkeyhas made contributions to the Kosovo Force (KFOR),the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina(SFOR), and the follow-on mission led by the Europe-an Union Force Althea.18 For years, Turkish warshipshave been helping patrol the Black Sea and easternMediterranean against terrorists and other threats tothese vital lifelines. Ankara has supported expandingNATO’s roster of members and partners since the Al-

liance’s enlargement promotes stability in neighbor-ing regions. Current Turkish efforts focus on assistingGeorgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and


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Herzegovina in their efforts to join NATO at somepoint. In terms of NATO’s “new missions,” Turkey

is playing a vital role in promoting NATO’s energysecurity by serving as a vital conduit for oil and gasreaching Europe from Eurasia, especially the Caspianbasin and Russia. Turkey’s energy partnership andoverall good relations with Russia, despite differencesover the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty(CFE) and Syria, have helped buffer Russia-NATOtensions on many issues. In the future, Turkish diplo-mats could help resolve the protracted conicts in theformer Soviet Union involving Armenia, Azerbaijan,and Georgia.

Ankara has also played a critical role in the Eu-ropean Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), whichis designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranianshort- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S.

assets, personnel, and allies in Europe.19

When theObama administration announced the EPAA, it wasin Turkey’s interest to integrate the U.S. program intoNATO to present a transatlantic missile defense proj-ect as a NATO rather than a U.S. plan to its neighbors.In September 2011, Turkey agreed to host in Malatyaa forward deployed AN/TPY-2 early warning radarsystem, operational since January 2012, as part of theEPAA ballistic missile defense program. Turkey hasalso played an important role in advancing NATO’ssecurity in the Middle East. From August 2004 to June2013, Turkey hosted NATO’s Allied Air CommandHeadquarters. This Air Command, located in Izmir,was part of Allied Joint Force Command Naples andsafeguarded almost three million square miles of air-

space across NATO’s southern region. The Air Com-mand in Turkey played an important role in OperationUNIFIED PROTECTOR against Libya.20 Turkey today


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hosts NATO’s Land Command headquarters, whichis also located in Izmir, in addition to one of NATO’s

six “Rapid Deployable Corps,” which are high readi-ness headquarters that can be quickly removed to leadNATO troops on missions within or beyond NATOterritory.21 As part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrange-ment, Turkey is reported to host U.S. tactical nuclearweapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.22 Turkeyand NATO have been aligning their policies towardSyria throughout the crisis there. Turkey is playinga crucial role in promoting NATO’s energy securityby serving as a vital conduit for oil and gas reachingEurope from Eurasia, especially the Caspian basinand Russia.

From Washington’s perspective, Turkey has anexemplary nuclear nonproliferation record. Neitherthe collapse of the Eastern bloc, nor the wars involv-

ing neighboring Iraq, which under Saddam Husseinsought nuclear weapons and used chemical ones, norIran’s nuclear ambiguous ambitions have promptedTurkey to pursue nuclear weapons. Of particular im-portance to Turkey’s foreign policy are arms controland disarmament treaties. Turkey became a party tothe Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaponsin 1979 and to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in2000. Turkey also joined the Chemical Weapons Con-vention in 1997 and the Biological Weapons Conven-tion in 1974. In 1996, Turkey became the foundingmember of the Wassenaar Arrangement regardingexport controls of conventional weapons and dual-use equipment and technologies. Turkey joined theMissile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zang-

ger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Groupin 2000, and the Australia Group that seeks to ensurethat exports do not contribute to the development of


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chemical or biological weapons that same year. Tur-key supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),

which was launched by President George W. Bushduring a speech in Krakow, Poland, in May 2003.Turkey joined, as initial partner state, the “Global

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” (GICNT),launched by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Bush, fol-lowing a joint statement in St. Petersburg, Russia, in July 2006. Turkey hosted the Initiative’s second meet-ing in Ankara in February 2007. Turkey became a sig-natory to the Hague Code of Conduct against BallisticMissile Proliferation (HCOC) at the conference heldin The Hague, the Netherlands, in November 2002.Furthermore, Turkey joined the “Convention on Pro-hibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-ventional Weapons” (CCW) and its three Protocols(Protocol I, Amended Protocol II, and Protocol IV) in

2005. Under the provisions of the Convention, Turkeyis obligated to destroy its stockpiled anti-personnelland mines by 2008 and to clear mined areas by 2014.In order to destroy the stockpiled anti-personnel landmines, the “Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Dispos-al Facility” was built and has been operational sinceNovember 2007.

Turkey’s nonproliferation bona des were high-lighted by the March 26-27 Nuclear Security Sum-mit in Seoul, Korea. Turkey’s delegation reportedprogress in adopting international treaties againstnuclear terrorism, supporting UN and InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts in these areas,holding training courses for its customs and nuclearworkers on nuclear security issues, participating in

anti-nuclear smuggling initiatives, shipping danger-ous highly enriched uranium spent reactor fuel to theUnited States for more secure storage, and upgrading


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Protocol, which envisaged eventual EU membership;in 1995, Turkey joined the EU Customs Union. Tur-

key gained the right to export its goods duty free toEU countries though the freedom of movement wasrestricted to goods; Turks wishing to enter the EU stillrequire an entry visa.

Negotiations toward Turkey’s accession to the EUofcially began on October 3, 2005. This process re-quires that the parties negotiate and close all 33 chap-ters of the EU acquis communautaire (the corpus of EUlaws and policies). The opening and closing of indi-vidual chapters is subject to unanimity among the 27EU member states, as is the nal decision to concludean Accession Treaty, making the whole process vul-nerable to national vetoes and blackmail. All 27 EUgovernments must vote to open and close each chap-ter as well as to admit each new member.24 As of now,

only 13 chapters have been opened to Turkey; theEuropean Council suspended eight chapters in De-cember 2006. Austria, Cyprus, France, and Germanyhave blocked another nine chapters.25 Turkey startedaccession negotiations with the EU at the same timeas Croatia, which will soon join the EU. Fifteen othercountries have joined the EU since 1987, when Turkeyapplied for full membership. Not only has Turkey’smembership drive stalled while the EU has grownfrom 12 to 27 countries, but the EU has declined otherTurkish priorities, such as being extended the visa-free entry privileges offered by all EU members to oneanother’s citizens under the Schengen Treaty. EgemenBagis, Turkey’s Minister for EU Relations, has calledthese travel restrictions “not fair” since “Turkey is the

only EU candidate country, whose citizens are stillsubject to visas.”26


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Since coming to power more than a decade ago,the ruling AKP has used the EU entry requirements

as a justication and catalyst to promote economicand political reforms at home that have also servedto strengthen the Turkish economy and to curtail thepower of the Turkish military. Public opinion pollsshow that Turkey’s EU membership drive continuesto enjoy strong support among the country’s elitedespite falling popular support for membership. Ina January 2013 opinion survey, 87 percent of expertsstill favored joining the EU, while only 33 percent ofthe public were in favor of persisting.27 The other mainpolitical parties still ofcially support Turkey’s questfor EU accession.

Yet, the question of Turkish accession has beenproblematic for many years. Many Europeans havebeen concerned about Turkey’s poor human rights

record, restrictions on media freedoms, potential mis-carriages of justice, constraints on Kurdish rights, andnonrecognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Disputeswith EU countries over various Turkish domesticand foreign policies have led Turkish leaders to losefaith that Ankara will soon be invited to join as a fullmember. EU members have become preoccupied withorganizational reform, economic restructuring, andintegrating recent members. Efforts to develop a Eu-ropean Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) distinctfrom NATO have presented challenges for Turkeydue to its limited inuence on EU decisionmaking. Inaddition, many Europeans characterize the accessionnegotiations that formally began in October 2005 as adecades-long process that might not lead to full mem-

bership even if Turkey completes them successfully.Numerous domestic and external issues have neg-atively affected the negotiation process. Supporters of


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EU membership for Turkey argue that the AKP hasmanaged to stabilize the economy and suppress the

scope for military coups since it came to power in 2002.It has built good ties with international donor organi-zations and can count on the support of the EuropeanCommission in its dispute with the ConstitutionalCourt in regards to its legitimacy.28 Critics argue thatTurkey is mostly located in Asia. Also, the proxim-ity to security areas such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria doesnot appeal to some EU leaders. They argue that EU’sSecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not ready toshoulder more responsibility in the Middle East, andthat Turkey’s membership would link the otherwisefairly peaceful and quiet EU more strongly to a veryvolatile region in security terms. As for Turkey’s newpolitical stability, critics argue that the AKP achievedthis through suppression of government critics. The

recent mass protests against the Erdoğan governmenthave reinforced these concerns.Public opinion in several EU countries, such as

Austria and France, has opposed Turkey’s member-ship. This fact became signicant when both govern-ments announced they would hold referendums onTurkey’s accession. In addition, the 2004 entry intothe EU of the Republic of Cyprus, not recognized byTurkey, further complicated matters since, once hav-ing joined, Cyprus could veto Turkey’s entry. The Cy-priot government has blocked six chapters of Turkishaccession negotiations, arguing that Ankara needs tonormalize relations with them before being consid-ered as a potential EU member.29 When Cyprus heldthe rotating EU presidency during the last 6 months

of 2012, Turkey–EU relations froze solid with no prog-ress in their negotiations and minimal ofcial contactbetween Turkey and the EU. Leading EU countries,


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such as France and Germany, openly expressed theirunease regarding Turkey’s joining the EU and instead

proposed establishing a “privileged partnership”for Turkey short of membership, which Ankara hasrejected. As a result, talks between Ankara and Brus-sels became rather quiet, stale, and unproductivethroughout the following years and leading up to thepresent. Turks have become frustrated by these nego-tiations, which have been stalled for years. The EU’sprotracted crises have also considerably decreasedTurkish interest in the organization.

The ofcial reason given for suspending the acces-sion negotiations with Turkey was Ankara’s refusal toapply the Customs Union between the EU and Tur-key to the Republic of Cyprus.30 Vessels ying Cypriotags are barred from entering Turkish ports.31 On July20, 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied a third of the

island after a Greek initiated coup attempted to securepower and annex the island to Greece.32 The Turkishgovernment seized for its citizens the northern sectionof the island, which they then self-declared to be theTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The rest of theisland, besides the small segment that is currently be-ing occupied by UN Peacekeeping forces, is knownas the Republic of Cyprus. The problem is that theTurkish government refuses to recognize the Republicof Cyprus because of their dispute over the rightfulpossession and subsequent governance of the islandas well as the Northern Cyprus blockade currently inplace. The Republic of Cyprus has been a member ofthe EU since 2004 and, as a result, many EU countrieshave banded together in support of that entity. The

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognizedby the international community, including the EU, asan “occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus.”33 Tur-


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key does not recognize the ethnically Greek Republicof Cyprus. EU nations such as France and Germany

have unequivocally said to the Turkish governmentthat they need to treat Cyprus the same as any otherEU member state, starting with recognizing them as asovereign nation. However, leadership from Ankarais standing its ground rmly in refusing to make suchacknowledgments, even if it means possibly terminat-ing their chance at joining the EU.34

France has played a lead role in impeding Turkey’saccession in recent years. The French government ledthe effort in 2006 to suspend the negotiations afterTurkey refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus.France vetoed 11 out of the 35 chapters, which causedthe accession talks to virtually halt (only eight remainsuspended as of early-2013).35 Relations rapidly dete-riorated when the French Senate approved a bill that

would punish those who deny internationally recog-nized genocides. Turks saw this legislative measureas an explicit reference to their denial of the Armeniangenocide in 1915.36 Many Turkish ofcials argued thatthe bill was a campaign strategy by then French Presi-dent Nicholas Sarkozy aimed at recruiting votes fromthe Armenian population in France.37

In retaliation to the proposed bill, Turkey imposedimmediate political, military, and economic sanc-tions. For example, Turkey did not renew permissionfor French military planes to use Turkish airspace.38 These sanctions were quickly lifted and a French courteventually negated the bill, but relations between thetwo countries remained cold throughout the Sarkozypresidency.39 However, since Sarkozy left ofce in

2012, France has had a revamped policy regardingTurkish accession. President Hollande has openlystated his support for Turkey’s becoming an EU mem-


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ber at some point.40 Following his election in 2012, hisadministration advocated opening some of the eight

chapters of the accession talks that were closed.41

InFebruary 2013, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius toldhis Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoğlu of his will-ingness to open Chapter 22 of the acquis regarding “Re-gional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instru-ments.”42 According to the European Commission, thischapter consists:

mostly of framework and implementing regulations,which do not require transposition into national legis-lation. They dene the rules for drawing up, approv-ing and implementing Structural Funds or CohesionFund programs reecting each country’s territorialorganization. . . . Member States must have an insti-tutional framework in place and adequate administra-tive capacity to ensure programming, implementing,

monitoring and evaluation in a sound and cost-effec-tive manner from the point of view of managementand nancial control.43

This was followed by Angela Merkel’s trip to An-kara in late-February 2013, where she not only sup-ported the opening of Chapter 22, but also suggestedpotentially opening other chapters to advance the

accession talks.44 Germany’s backing of France in welcoming the re-

sumption of accession talks between Turkey and theEU was a major shift for Berlin. Germany has longbeen an opponent of Turkish accession despite havingone of the largest Turkish populations outside of thenative country. Chancellor Merkel was the rst to pro-

pose a “privileged partnership” between Turkey andthe EU as an alternative to full membership. ManyGermans have long held a position of not wanting


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Turkey to become a member state, despite its boom-ing economy and critical geographic location. Other

EU ofcials have expressed concerns about the EUneeding Turkey more than vice versa due to Turkey’smore dynamic economy and increased foreign policyoptions. German ofcials have also adopted a morepositive attitude toward Turkey’s accession drive. In2012, German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle,said that:

We, the Europeans, should open chapters to negotia-tions with Turkey in the rst half of 2013. Otherwise,in the upcoming term, our interest in Turkey may begreater than Turkey’s interest in us.45

Gunther Oettinger, Germany’s EU commissioner, saidthat the EU could eventually “crawl to Ankara on itsknees to beg the Turks to join the EU.”46

Meanwhile, Turkish ofcials are maneuvering,such as by threatening to abandon the EU and seekmembership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion (SCO), to give Ankara more leverage in the acces-sion negotiations. On October 12, 2011, the EU Com-mission released a “Positive Agenda” document thatlisted and rated progress being made between Turkey

and the EU. It offered favorable conclusions regard-ing Turkey’s political reforms in key areas. The newEU approach is seen as a complement rather than asubstitute for EU membership, since it could impartnew momentum to the accession process as well asprepare Turkey better for it. The positive agenda in-cludes eight areas of joint interest: political reformsin Turkey, visas, the EU acquis, migration, energy,trade, foreign policy dialogue, counterterrorism, andfurther participation of Turkey in EU programs. Joint


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EU-Turkish Working Groups have been formed to seehow progress can be made regarding these issues. The

newly created EU External Action Service has estab-lished a special Turkey team to support this process.Turkey’s excellent economic performance during

the past decade, contrasted with the overall economicweakness within the EU, has made Ankara a more at-tractive partner for the Union. In fact, former Turk-ish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış has expressed theopinion of many Turks when he argued that Turkeyshould delay negotiating with the EU over accessionsince Turkey’s bargaining position will improve as theTurkish economy continues to perform much betterthan the EU average. Turkey’s economy is projectedto grow for the next decade at an average rate of 6.7percent per year.47 It would already rank as the sixthlargest among EU members. Turkey’s geography also

makes it a natural conduit for EU trade and investmentowing eastward to Eurasia and the Middle East, andoil and gas from the Caspian Basin entering the EU.48

As a partial EU member, Turkey offers a largemarket for European goods and simultaneously actsas a gateway to markets in the Middle East and NorthAfrica.49 For Berlin, this is especially crucial, giventhat Germany sustains its economy through exports.50 Conversely, Ankara’s continued interest in joiningthe EU results in part from Turkey’s economy stillbeing oriented toward Europe. Although the percent-age of Turkish trade involving the EU has continuedto decline over time, some 38 percent of its importsoriginated from the EU in 2011, whereas 46 percentof Turkey’s exports go to EU members.51 Those shares

amounted to $85 billion and $58 billion, respectively.52 These trade volumes have kept increasing despitethe current Euro crisis and the more rapid growth of


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Turkey’s economic links with Russia and many othercountries. Turkey’s imports from the EU increased by

35.1 percent and 19.8 percent in 2010 and 2011, respec-tively, while exports grew 18.4 percent and 12.7 per-cent in those same years. Approximately two-thirdsof Turkey’s foreign direct investment still comes fromthe EU.53

But one might wonder how long Germany willhold this more exible position. Merkel’s encouragingapproach toward Turkish accession was partly due tothe forthcoming German national elections in 2014.In the 2009 election, the Christian Democratic Party(CDP) eased its anti-Turkish position in order to ap-peal to the 690,000 Turkish voters54 and 3 million resi-dents of Turkish origin living in Germany.55 The CDPmight be preparing for a similar electoral gambit onthis occasion. In addition, although Germany has now

come out in favor of opening of a new chapter in ne-gotiations, the German government has conditionedexpanding the renewed EU-Turkey talks to coveradditional chapters to Turkey’s applying its AnkaraAgreement to the Republic of Cyprus.56 By enunciat-ing this condition, the Merkel government has indi-cated its willingness to engage more with Turkey inthe eld of European integration, but stands rm onthe matter of its accession to the EU. Indeed, the chap-ter opened is relatively minor and not subject to muchcontroversy, unlike the chapters concerning humanrights or Cyprus. Hence, Merkel’s change of positionis more symbolic than signicant.

Many other EU leaders naturally want to focus onaddressing the EU’s internal problems before serious-

ly discussing Turkish accession.57 Germany’s reactionto the recent thaw between France and Turkey is fur-ther complicated by the differing views among parties


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within Germany. Merkel’s CDP is much less favorablydisposed to accession than the Free Democratic Party

and the Social Democratic Party, which both ofciallyfavor full Turkish accession into the EU.58 The CDPprefers granting Turkey only partial membership inorder to maintain good relations with one of Germa-ny’s biggest economic partners.59 Even though Merkelreassured Turkey about the accession process, she didnot promise full accession.60 Finally, despite the po-litical pivots made by Germany and France, Turkeystill faces many hurdles in the accession process. Forexample, France is still blocking four Chapters, whileCyprus is blocking another six, making full accessionimprobable in the near future. 61

TROUBLED TRIANGLE: NATO, THE EU,AND TURKEY

Despite the difculties with making progress in theEU admission process, European leaders are awarethat Europe’s security cannot be separated from Med-iterranean security, and there have been various at-tempts to establish a sustainable relationship betweenEU and Turkey. The task of redening a security rela-tionship between EU and Turkey has proved difcult,mostly because of EU’s internal problems with den-ing the limits of integration and responsibility withindefense and security policy. As a result, it will mostlikely continue to be in Turkey’s interest to maintainNATO as the most powerful institution for defenseand security in Europe even while Turkey continuesto participate in military and civilian ESDP missions.

Indeed, Turkey has been the most active participantin ESDP missions among countries outside of the EU,and more active than many EU-states as well.62


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In 1992, Turkey was granted associate status inthe Western European Union (WEU) as a means to

allow for an EU-Turkey security partnership to de-velop even without granting Turkey full membershipin the EU. Turkey was directly involved in planningand preparing WEU operations in which NATO assetsand capabilities were to be used, thanks to Ankara’sstatus as one of the six “associate members” (Turkey,Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and the CzechRepublic) that had membership in NATO and theWEU. Turkey could attend its bi-weekly ambassador-level meetings, send ofcers to the WEU defense plan-ning cell, and have Turkish parliamentarians attendthe sessions of the WEU Assembly. Turkey also hadthe right to participate fully in WEU decisions whenthey involved collective NATO assets.63 But Ankaralost this favorable situation when the EU decided to

end the WEU’s role in the ESDI and develop the ESDPwholly within the EU instead. Turkey subsequentlyfound itself marginalized in the European securitysystem and feared that the EU could potentially oper-ate in its areas of interest without Ankara’s having anyinput to the decision.64

NATO and the EU have sought to cooperate moreeffectively to address European security challenges.This collaboration has included sharing high-valuebut scarce assets, developing mutually protable di-visions of labor, and conducting joint operations, asin Kosovo, Afghanistan, and against Somali pirates.A priority is to avoid the creation of gaps, needlessredundancies, institutional rivalries, or tensions be-tween countries belonging to one but not the other—

such as Turkey and the United States. After decadesof informal talks between their ofcials and membergovernments, NATO and the EU established formal


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institutionalized relations in 2001 in response to theEU’s expanding range of security and defense activi-

ties, as manifested in its ESDP. (Technically, it is theESDP rather than the EU per se that has institutionalties with NATO).65 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty haddesignated the WEU as the EU’s defense component.Its main responsibility was to undertake the “Peters-berg tasks” (humanitarian missions, search and res-cue operations, crisis management, peacekeeping,peace enforcement, and environmental protection).Maastricht also established an intergovernmentalCommon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). NATOand the WEU had developed extensive cooperationover the preceding decades. Welcoming potential EUcontributions for the Petersberg tasks despite NATO’salso performing the same types of missions, NATOgovernments agreed in 1994 that the WEU could use

NATO collective assets, following the approval of theNorth Atlantic Council (NAC), for Petersberg-typemissions under the EU Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy. The Alliance likewise approved the concept ofCombined Joint Task Forces, whose “separable butnot separate” deployable headquarters could be usedfor EU- as well as NATO-led operations. In June 1996,the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Berlin soughtto promote an ESDI within the Alliance in an effortto encourage European members to assume more ofNATO’s roles and responsibilities by strengtheningtheir defense capabilities. Under what became knownas the “Berlin Plus” agreement, the ministers furtheragreed to make NATO assets available for WEU-ledcrisis management operations.

Meanwhile, European governments also tooksteps to strengthen the EU’s security and defense roleindependent of NATO. At their December 1998 sum-


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mit in St. Malo, France, the British and French govern-ments issued a joint statement that afrmed the goal

of establishing an ESDP within the EU. The followingDecember, however, the European Council meeting inHelsinki, Finland, transferred the EU crisis manage-ment role from the WEU to the EU. At the November2002 Prague Summit, the NATO members consentedin principle to making NATO assets and capabilitiesavailable for EU-led operations in which the Alliancewas not militarily engaged. The EU-NATO Declara-tion on ESDP issued in December 2002 dened the po-litical principles that would govern their relationship:effective mutual consultation; equality; institutionaldecisionmaking autonomy; respect for member states’interests; and the coherent, transparent, and mutu-ally reinforcing development of their military capa-bilities.66 The declaration afrms NATO’s continued

role in crisis management and conict prevention (aswell as collective defense), while stating that the EU’sgrowing activities in the rst two areas will contributeto their common goals.

In March 2003, NATO and the EU nalized adop-tion of the Berlin Plus agreements that allows theEU to use NATO’s collective assets and capabilitiesfor EU-led crisis management operations, includingNATO’s command arrangements, logistics assistance,and assistance in operational planning, when NATOas an institution is not involved in the operation. OnlyEU members that are either also NATO members orthat have joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)Program, and thereby established a bilateral securityarrangement with NATO, are eligible to use these

NATO assets.67 At the end of that month, the EU be-gan its rst Berlin Plus operation when its OperationCONCORDIA replaced the NATO-led Operation AL-LIED HARMONY in the former Yugoslav Republic


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of Macedonia. After the transition, some NATO as-sets supported the EU-led follow-on operation.68 An-

other Berlin Plus operation began in late-2004, whenthe EU’s Operation ALTHEA replaced the NATO-ledStabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.69

As originally formulated, the Berlin Plus agree-ment Arrangement between NATO and the EU meantthat the non-EU European NATO allies could contrib-ute to EU-led operations without participating in thedecisionmaking process regarding these operations.Consequently, Turkey decided to use its decisionmak-ing powers in NATO to stall implementation of Ber-lin Plus agreements to force the EU to accept a morefavorable arrangement from Ankara’s perspective. InDecember 2001, Turkey, the UK, and the United Statessigned the Ankara Document, which guaranteed thatNATO members not in the EU could participate in

ESDP decisions when contributing to them. The EUheads of state and government adopted the documentduring their Brussels Summit in October 2002 as the“ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on theInvolvement of the non-EU European Allies.” ThisNice Implementation Document served as the basisof the December 2002 NATO-EU Joint Declarationthat was adopted by the North Atlantic Council onDecember 13, 2002, and the decision of the December2002 European Council session in Copenhagen, Den-mark, that the Berlin Plus agreements would applyonly to EU members that also belonged to NATO orhad joined its PfP Program. The Copenhagen Summitalso agreed that Turkey could participate in EU-ledoperations in its geographic vicinity if Ankara wanted

to do so.70Turkey has since become the largest contributor toESDP missions of any non-EU country and has even


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contributed more than some EU members. Accordingto many Turkish ofcials, however, the EU failed to

live up to this commitment, resulting in Turkey beingasked to contribute to ESDP operations that Ankarahad little input in planning or initiating. In December2002, the EU issued a declaration of intent to estab-lish nine 2,000-troop battle groups by 2007 as rapidreaction units for foreign crises. The EU has had twobattle groups on permanent standby since 2007, butthe failure of EU member governments to agree re-garding how, when, and where to employ them hasprevented them from ever being used.71 In November2004, the Turkish government declared its intent tocontribute forces and capabilities to the battle groups,but in June 2007, Ankara withdrew its air and navalcontributions due to its exclusion from ESDP deci-sionmaking structures.72 Further use of the Berlin Plus

agreements has been limited due to their inapplica-bility to the short time frames intended for many EUcrisis-response operations as well as their political andstructural complexity.73 By contrast, in the ground op-erations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as in themaritime counterpiracy mission off Somalia, whenEU and NATO missions have overlapped, the EU andNATO have established various ad hoc commandand communications arrangements for these paralleloperations.74

Since 2007, NATO and the EU have had some twodozen common member countries. But since bothinstitutions decide many important security and de-fense issues by consensus, countries that have mem-bership in one organization but not the other can exert

substantial negative inuence on the level of coop-eration between the institutions. At present, NATOmembers Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the


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United States are not EU members, while the tradi-tionally neutral or nonaligned EU members Austria,

Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are notNATO members, though four of the ve (Malta sinceApril 2008 but still not Cyprus) have joined NATO’sPfP, which allows for institutionalized cooperationbetween members and partners in support of NATOgoals. All these countries participate in ofcial NATO-EU meetings. With Malta’s entry into PfP in 2008 andFrance’s re-entry into NATO’s Integrated MilitaryCommand in 2009, Cyprus has become the main out-lier within the NATO-EU partnership. Cyprus is not aPfP member and, partly due to a Turkish veto, does nothave a security agreement with NATO for exchangingclassied documents. As a result, it uniquely cannotparticipate in ofcial NATO-EU meetings, though in-formal meetings including Cyprus do occur. The row

has led Greece and Cyprus to object to any Turkishparticipation in the development of the ESDP whileTurkey has blocked the Greek Cypriots from joiningEU-NATO meetings and from taking part in ESDPmissions using NATO intelligence and resources.

Turkish objections to sharing sensitive NATOmilitary information with the government of Cyprus,which joined the EU in May 2004 despite its fail-ure to adopt a UN-backed political settlement withthe island’s Turkish minority, has limited formalNATO-EU intelligence sharing since then.75 The Cy-prus government, sometimes assisted by Greece andother EU members, has retaliated by blocking Tur-key’s participation in certain EU defense activities,such as the work of the European Defense Agency. A

recurring justication is that Turkey has not compliedwith its obligations under its accession negotiations toopen its ports and airports to Cypriot-registered ships


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and aircraft.76 The dispute has impeded a range of pos-sible EU-NATO cooperation. The various EU-NATO

institutional arrangements and meetings in Europehave been constrained by an inability to hold formalsessions with an agreed agenda or the authority toreach substantive decisions.77 These mutual antago-nisms have also disrupted the joint NATO-EU secu-rity missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and in the Gulfof Aden off Somalia. Thanks to its full membershipin NATO, Turkey has the ability in principle to denythe use of any NATO collective assets for any futureEU-led mission.

When the December 2000 EU Summit in Nice,France, decided to exclude non-EU-NATO membersfrom the EU’s security and defense decisionmakingmechanisms, Ankara’s national security communityworried that it could have little impact on EU policies

that could affect Turkey’s security. It also anticipatedthat the EU would therefore pay less attention to Turk-ish concerns than would the WEU and NATO. Moregenerally, Turkish policymakers were concerned aboutthe EU’s lack of will and ability to defend Turkey. Inaddition to the often grudging support for Ankaraagainst the PKK terrorists and periodic denunciationsof an “Armenian genocide” that many Turks denyever occurred, many West European governmentsproved reluctant to render Turkey military assistanceduring the 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq. Due toits persistent capabilities-expectations gap, moreover,the EU did not (and still does not) look like it wouldsoon develop more robust military assets comparableto those available to NATO, thanks largely to its U.S.

membership. Conversely, there was the theoreticalpossibility that, in a confrontation between Turkeyand Greece, the WEU would be obliged to side withAthens simply due to its EU membership.78 Finally,


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some Turkish policymakers resented that, due to thebarriers placed on Turkey’s desired accession to the

EU, the former Soviet bloc countries that would soon join the EU would have more inuence on the orga-nization’s European security policies than Turkey, along-standing Western ally within NATO.79

Turkey aspires to a leadership role in the Alliance,but Turkey’s contributions risk being overshadowedby its petty efforts to limit NATO’s ties with Israel andthe EU. Turkey’s love-hate relationship with the EUis a major complicating factor for Turkey’s NATO re-lationship. Even setting aside its frustrated EU mem-bership ambitions, Turkey’s security relationship withthe EU remains so problematic as to threaten its tieswith NATO. The most immediate problem is the para-lyzing effects of the Turkey-Cyprus dispute on insti-tutional cooperation between NATO and the EU. The

dispute with the EU, along with those with France andthe United States in recent years, helps explain whyopinion polls show that popular support for NATOis lower in Turkey than in any other member country.Turkish diplomats initially refused to allow EU lead-ers to attend NATO’s May 2012 heads-of-state summitin Chicago on the grounds that the EU was makingno greater contribution to NATO than the 56-mem-ber Organization of Islamic Conference, then led byEkmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turkish national, and otherinternational organizations. In the end, the EU lead-ers were allowed to attend some NATO sessions butnot others.

Turkey’s relations with NATO have also sufferedfrom various other problems, including de facto Turk-

ish-Russian collusion to limit NATO’s presence inthe Black Sea, diverging threat perceptions regardingIran, and Ankara’s opposition to the appointment of


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Rasmussen as NATO’s Secretary General due to hisstance, when head of the Danish government, on the

Danish cartoon portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad.Nonetheless, Turkish policymakers denitely pre-ferred having a transatlantic institution of which An-kara was a core member dominate European securitythan having EU structures potentially displace it.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Turkey’s geostrategic position between Europeand the Middle East has made the country an impor-tant NATO ally and an essential partner for both theUnited States and European countries. With its secularvalues, it has been important for Turkey to preserveits Western ties. Although Turkey has never ignoredits proximity to the Middle East, Ankara tended to col-

laborate the most with Iran, Israel, or other non-Arabstates. But during the past decade, Turkey broke withIsrael and reengaged in the Arab world after years ofestrangement.80 In Washington and Ankara, expecta-tions were high that Erdoğan’s successful “TurkishModel”—a moderate Sunni government with a dy-namic economy tied to the United States--could beexported.81

The Obama administration assigned Turkeyan important role in advancing U.S. interests in theMiddle East while allowing Washington to stay inthe background in a component of a “lead from be-hind” foreign-policy strategy.82 For both Turkey andWashington, trying to manage the difcult politicaltransitions in the Middle East has become the primary

issue in the Ankara-Washington relationship.83 Thispartnership has seen both progress and setbacks. Withfresh self-condence, the government in Ankara tried


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to meet these expectations using the soft power of itsmodel along with skillful diplomacy. Of course, given

the situation in the region today, the “zero problems”phrase has become something of a joke for Ankara.Following some transient improvements, Turkey’s re-lations with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, Egypt, and otherMiddle Eastern governments have regressed to theirtroubled mean and sometimes even worse. Ankarais the only government not to have an ambassadorin Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv simultaneously.At the cost of some popularity, Erdoğan is seen asthe champion of radical Sunni policies in the MiddleEast rather than a renewed Ottoman leader. Turkey’stroubles with its neighbors have helped drive Ankaraback toward the United States, which has the hardpower even if it chooses not to use it, but Turkish-U.S.differences regarding many Middle Eastern issues

are acute.

Syria.

Since the Syrian crisis began, Turkey and theUnited States have been effectively coordinating theirpolicies. They rst sought to induce Bashar al-Assad,whom Washington was trying to wean away fromIran, to introduce reforms demanded by the moder-ate protesters. But after Assad only made g-leaf re-forms designed to divide the opposition and reduceforeign resistance, Washington and Ankara demand-ed a change of regime in Damascus. They have sinceimposed various sanctions on the Syrian government,but these measures have been challenged by China,

Iran, and Russia. Although Turkey and the UnitedStates have followed similar paths regarding Syria,the journey has proven far costlier to Turkey. Bilateral


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trade between Turkey and Syria reached $2.5 billionin 2010, making Turkey Syria’s largest trading part-

ner, but has since collapsed, as have various Turk-ish visions of establishing a free trade agreement, acustoms union, or other region-wide economic struc-tures. In addition, Turkey has accepted more than600,000 refugees from its neighbor in accordance withAnkara’s “open door” policy to those eeing the civilwar.84 Additionally, both the Syrian National Counciland the Free Syrian Army have used Turkey as a basefor organizing their resistance against Assad’s forces.Turkey has also supported the war against Assad byquietly allowing the passage through its territory ofvolunteers from Muslim countries to ght in Syria.In addition, some sources claim that the Syrian reb-els have received weapons and other military supporttransported through Turkey and funded by Qatar and

Saudi Arabia. The Turkish government has deniedthis claim on several occasions.85 Even so, the confron-tation with Syria has contributed to negating Turkey’s“zero-problems” policy toward its neighbors. In con-trast, the United States had few economic or diplomat-ic ties with Assad’s regime, so lost little in calling forhis removal and imposing sanctions on his country.

It is easy to forget that the relationship betweenTurkey and Syria signicantly improved after theAKP came to power in November 2002. When PrimeMinister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu be-gan their intense effort to improve the relations withthe country’s neighbors, Syria became one of the mostimportant targets. The Turkish effort to strengthenrelations with Syria resulted in frequent meetings be-

tween Erdoğan and Assad bolstered by growing dip-lomatic and commercial ties between the two coun-tries. On December 22, 2004, Turkey and Syria signed


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a free trade agreement (the Association Agreement) inDamascus, which entered into force in January 2007.86

In many ways, Syria became a showcase symbol ofTurkey’s new foreign policy strategy of zero problemswith neighbors. But Erdoğan misjudged when hebelieved he could persuade Assad to accept neededreforms.87 As the situation in Syria became worse dur-ing the summer of 2011, Davutoğlu went to Damascusto encourage Assad in person to end his repressivepolicies. The mission failed. Following Assad’s con-tinuing use of violence against his own people, Tur-key drastically changed its policy toward Syria. Bothcountries withdrew their diplomatic representativesand suspended the Association Agreement.88 Erdoğanbecame one of the rst leaders to call for Assad toleave power.89

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and Tur-

key’s willingness to harbor Syrian rebels and refugees,Turkey has been subjected to a series of cross-borderattacks. In an April 2012 incident, Syrian soldiersopened re on Syrian rebels and refugees in the Turk-ish town of Kilis, killing two Syrian refugees andwounding some two dozen people.90 The downing ofa Turkish ghter plane over Syrian air space in June2012 was but the most prominent of several incidentsof the deteriorating security situation between thetwo countries.91 Following the incident, the Turkishgovernment decided, with Washington’s encourage-ment, to request assistance only under Article 4 of theNorth Atlantic Treaty, which provides for urgent con-sultations if a NATO member considers its securityinterests threatened.

Turkey did not seek Article 5 protection, whichcalls for collective defensive actions to counter threats,because few NATO members want to employ military


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force against Syria. The Alliance justied deployingPatriot air defense missiles in southern Turkey as a

purely defensive “precautionary measure” to counterany threat emanating from Syria.92 NATO’s PatriotAdvanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile InterceptorBatteries are some of the most sophisticated air andmissile defense systems in Western inventories. Com-bined with the high accuracy of their radar sensorsand targeting systems, the Patriots can intercept for-eign warplanes and short-range ballistic missiles asfar as 100 kilometers (km) away, allowing them tocommand an area well beyond the Turkish-Syrianborder—all of northern Syria to include the embattledtowns of Aleppo and Homs.93

While the earlier 1990 and 2003 Turkish requestsfor Patriots from NATO provoked major intra-Alli-ance divisions, on this occasion the NATO decision-

making process went more smoothly. Davutoğluand other Turkish diplomats engaged in lengthy andcomprehensive consultations with the other NATOgovernments even though only Germany, the Nether-lands, and the United States have the PAC-3s.94 NATOlargely has remained aloof from the Syrian crisis,but with the Patriot systems have come hundreds ofNATO troops to operate, maintain, and protect the Pa-triot interceptors, their radars, and their other supportelements. In effect, the NATO personnel have becomea “trip wire” that makes NATO military interventionmore likely following future Syrian-Turkish borderclashes. This tactic has seemingly worked. Since themissiles arrived, there have not been any further major airstrikes against Turkish territory. The Syrian mil-

itary has likely been more cautious in its operationsnear the Turkish border. Even so, NATO has not triedto use its Patriots to establish a no-y zone over Syr-


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ian airspace, which the systems have the capacity todo. Such a step would make it easier for the guerrillas

to establish camps and troop concentration across theborder in Syrian territory.Some Turkish ofcials and commentators have

called for Turkish military intervention to protect Syr-ia’s civilians or Ankara’s economic and security inter-est.95 The Turkish government has reinforced its bor-der and authorized more exible rules of engagementfor the TSK to respond to potential threats from Syrianforces approaching the Turkish border. Turkey hasexperienced numerous cross-border attacks by Syriangovernment forces, terrorist attacks by groups linkedto the Assad regime, and a surging number of Syrianrefugees taking up residence in Turkey—whose num-bers have exceeded by several orders of magnitudethe burden Turkish leaders said at the beginning of

the war they could tolerate. If Turkey does intervenemilitarily, the Obama administration would likelyagain follow its “lead from behind” strategy and, as inLibya, provide primarily low-prole intelligence andlogistics support for the Turkish military. Washing-ton has been concerned that the failure to uphold itsperceived “red lines” in Syria will decrease U.S. cred-ibility and encourage Iran, North Korea, and othercountries to challenge other declared U.S. red lines.But although Ankara and Washington have had theiropportunities to intervene more directly in the Syr-ian conict, they repeatedly have declined to exploitpossible pretexts for employing their armed forces toremove Assad.

Neither Turkey nor the United States wants to

intervene militarily in the Syrian war. Ankara hasdeclined to exploit several opportunities that wouldhave served as pretexts, including cross-border shoot-


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ings and shelling against refugees eeing into Turkey.On paper, the TSK should be able to defeat the di-

vided and weakened Syrian military, but the Turkishmilitary has fought only irregular PKK guerrillas forthe past few decades and lacks experience in invadingand occupying a foreign country. An invading Turk-ish military might be welcomed as liberators by SyrianSunnis, but the country’s Kurds and Alawites wouldmore likely respond negatively to a Turkish occupa-tion force and perhaps even respond with an anti-occupation insurgency such as those that harassed theU.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps the mainTurkish concern is that, once Turkish forces occupySyria, they will become bogged down trying to sup-press the ghting among the various factions.

The Syrian regime is not without means to retaliatefor whatever measures Turkey and the United States

adopt in support of Assad’s opponents. In partner-ship with Iran, the Syrian government could resumeits pre-1998 practice of providing extensive supportfor the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Many PKKoperatives were born or based in Syria. The recentupsurge in PKK attacks against Turkish targets maybe a Syrian-Iranian warning to Ankara to moderateits pressure on Assad. Even excluding the PKK factor,a Turkish decision to intervene on behalf of Assad’sopponents risks labeling Turkey as a regional cham-pion of Sunni Arabs, despite Turkish efforts to denethe Syrian crisis as a humanitarian issue rather than asectarian one. Although Turkey and the United Stateshave called for Assad’s removal, the incumbent presi-dent is not the center of gravity, in Clausewitzian

terms, of the war, as Maummar Qadda was in Libya.Whereas Qadda’s death ended his unique regime,in Syria the regime’s power resides with the security,


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business, and political elites. This system of collectiverule, which has a sectarian orientation due to the large

numbers of minority Alawites among the elite, couldeasily result in a continuation of Assad’s policies evenif the incumbent president leaves ofce.

The Turkish authorities have allowed members ofthe opposition Syrian National Council and the FreeSyrian Army to organize on Turkish territory, but thedisunity of the Syrian opposition factions remains aproblem. Even many Syrians are reluctant to embracethese opposition bodies for fear that they will becomedominated by Sunni extremists. Although Turkishand U.S. ofcials have sought to purge al-Qaeda op-eratives from their ranks, the Turkish authorities haveproven less sensitive to the concerns of Syria’s non-Sunni ethnic and sectarian groups. Turkish and U.S.ofcials have long been considering the option of es-

tablishing a border buffer zone or safe areas deeperinside Syrian territory, where refugees could nd safeshelter without entering Turkish territory. But the ex-perience in the Balkans in the 1990s made clear that,unless backed by air strikes and robust ground forces,the adversary will not respect these safe havens.

Both governments would like to avert furthercivil strife and achieve a rapid transition to a stableand prosperous Syria under a new government. Theyalso want to prevent extremist groups from exploitingthe chaotic situation to break Syria apart or transformthe country into a terrorist safe haven. U.S. ofcialsshare Turkish worries about the adverse regional re-percussions for Kurdish autonomy in Syria. If Assadis overthrown and the Syrian state disintegrates, then

the Iraqi government and state might soon follow,creating the possibility of greater ties among Kurdsin Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and potentially Iran. Turkish


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leaders note that a continuation of the Syrian ghting,which has already spread to parts of Lebanon, risks

provoking a wider sectarian war that will hurt Tur-key even if its troops refrain from directly interveningin Syria. Meanwhile, the Kurds in Syria are gainingthe kind of autonomy enjoyed until now only by theKurds of northern Iraq. In order to concentrate Syrianforces elsewhere, the regime has withdrawn its troopsfrom Kurdish-dominated towns in northern Syria andallowed a major Syrian Kurdish movement, the Dem-ocratic Union Party (PYD), to take charge of municipaladministration to prevent the Syrian Free Army fromseizing the region.96 Turkish ofcials suspect the PYDof having links with the PKK. Erdoğan warned that,“We will not allow the terrorist organization to posea threat to Turkey in Syria; it is impossible for us totolerate the PKK’s cooperation with the PYD.”97 U.S.

ofcials are also worried about the adverse regionalrepercussions for Kurdish autonomy in Syria. If Assadis overthrown and the Syrian state disintegrates, thenthe Iraqi government and state might soon follow,creating the possibility of greater ties among Kurds inSyria, Iraq, Turkey, and potentially Iran. U.S. ofcials join Turks in asserting that:

we are equally clear that we don’t see for the futureof Syria an autonomous Kurdish area or territory; wewant to see a Syria that remains united . . . any move-ment towards autonomy or separatism . . . would be aslippery slope.98

Given the reluctance to employ direct militaryforce against Syria, the Turkish and U.S. governmentsfavor less costly options that nonetheless go beyondthe current sanctions. The United States and severalEuropean governments have been providing com-


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munications equipment, training, and other formsof nonlethal assistance to the guerrillas. Some Gulf

countries reportedly are supplying weapons as wellas ghters and trainers. As a result, the Assad regimehas remained in power thanks to even greater supportfrom Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, whosedecision last year to send large numbers of armedghters to Syria saved Assad at a critical time in thewar. The Syrian regime has skillfully polarized theconict to exploit popular fears that an insurgent vic-tory would result in Sunni extremists dominating thenew regime, which would suppress Syria’s non-Sunniminorities and transform the country into a Taliban-style regime and an al-Qaeda bridgehead.99 The oppo-sition has been divided into feuding political leadersand indeed depends on al-Qaeda-afliated groups forits best ghters. Since neither Turkey nor the United

States is prepared to send large numbers of groundforces to Syria to attain these goals, they are increasingthe likelihood of post-Assad civil strife in Syria, withadverse consequences for neighboring countries.

The Syrian conict has had an ambiguous impacton Turkish-U.S. relations. It has directed their poli-cymakers to focus on strategic issues at a time whenboth sides are eager to diversify the partnership. Sincethe Syrian Civil War, Ankara and Washington havebeen preoccupied with harmonizing their MiddleEast and Syria policies. The conict presents bothcountries with the prospect of relying on a weak, di-vided, and increasingly extremist guerrilla force, orusing their own forces directly in Syria, which wouldentail a difcult post-conict stabilization and prob-

able state-building missions. For the past few years,Turkey and the United States have undertaken manylimited measures designed to remove the Assad gov-


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ernment, but none have succeeded. They have pur-sued the relatively low-cost policy option of seeking

to induce Assad to give up voluntarily in some formof managed political transition to a broader and morerepresentative regime. Yet their efforts to organize acredible Syrian government-in-exile have been frus-trated by divisions and jealousies among Assad’s op-ponents. With extensive Turkish backing, the militaryopposition has grown stronger, but has proved unableto achieve decisive victories. If anything, the militarybalance has shifted in favor of the Syrian government,though Assad’s forces lack the strength to win thewar quickly.

Neither the Turkish nor the U.S. governments haveconsidered Assad’s removal a sufciently vital nation-al interest as to warrant the use of their own troopsin Syria. Turkey would like the Pentagon to do it, but

U.S. policy has focused on keeping the conict largelycontained within Syria, which has succeeded thus far,and more recently securing the elimination of all itschemical weapons. U.S. policymakers have increas-ingly recognized the dangers of repeating past policyfailures in Syria. As in 1979, the United States risksreplacing an odious dictator who nonetheless has notthreatened core U.S. national security interests withan extremist religious regime whose members wouldbe ideologically prone to attack the United States andits regional allies in Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. As inthe 1980s when Washington inadvertently allowed al-Qaeda to exploit the war against the Soviet occupationof Afghanistan to develop a powerful regional baseand network, in Syria the United States risks the trans-

formation of a popular uprising against an unfriendlyregime into a Sunni-dened jihad that could easily ex-tend against American and other Western targets.

8/20/2019 Turkey's New Regional Security Role: Implic

turkey's new regional security role: implications for the united states

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