Type of submission: Article

Title: A case study of the socialisation of human rights language and norms in Maldives: Process, impact and challenges

Authors:Ahmed Shahid, University of Sydneygaafarushahid@gmail.com

Dr Hilary Yerbury, University of Technology, Sydney.Dr Yerbury will act as corresponding author.Hilary.Yerbury@uts.edu.auPh: +61-2-9958-2618Mailing address: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Technology, Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia.

Notes on contributors:Ahmed Shahid is former Secretary General of the Human Rights Commission of Maldives; He is currently a PhD candidate at the Sydney Law School, University of Sydney.

Dr Hilary Yerbury is a member of Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Research Centre, at the University of Technology, Sydney. She has a long standing interest in developing civil society and working for positive social change, especially involving young people.

SummaryThe introduction of the language and social values expounded through the discourse of human rights, within the domestic societal and political structures of countries where they were previously alien or unknown, presents a fascinating set of dynamics highly relevant and valuable for furthering human rights advocacy. This paper maps out the discourse of the emergence of human rights language in Maldives – a small country with a history of human rights violations and no democratic accountability mechanism until recently – within the context of recent political and societal changes, employing the “spiral model” of human rights socialisation developed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink. The study analyses the available historical accounts of the recent democratic transformation in Maldives and how the language of human rights has been institutionalised and mainstreamed during this period, with particular emphasis on the process of social acceptance and internalisation of the language of human rights.

Key words: Human rights; Maldives; Spiral Model; Democracy.Funding statement: N/A

Acknowledgements: N/A Conflict of Interest: N/A

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A case study of the socialisation of human rights language and norms in Maldives:

Process, impact and challenges

Introduction

Human rights occupy a prominent position in today’s political and moral discourse, both

at the domestic and international levels. Domestic political actors use the language of

human rights as a tool to legitimise and explain their actions and demands. Its power and

attractiveness is derived from human rights’ inherent “resistance to being explained away

by reference to historical, social or economic context” (Wildenthal, 2012: 2). Human

rights and fundamental freedoms constitute a dominant structure of modern society,

which is considered as a crucial social and legal institution which serves to protect its

structure against self-destructive tendencies (Verschraegen, 2002). The language of

human rights is not only reflective of the social reality, but also is creative and

constitutive of that reality.

The objective of this paper is to map the discourse of human rights in the recent political

transformations in Maldives, particularly during its transition to pluralist democracy in

2008 and the subsequent political upheavals which resulted in the overthrow of the first

democratic government in 2012. The vernacular of human rights has been prominent

during all these phases of political change, used by political agents as well as the wider

society in Maldives.

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Human Rights background in Maldives

Maldives, an archipelago of 1190 islands strewn across the Indian Ocean, with a

population of just above 300,000, has a history of low-intensity human rights violation

for a long time, particularly since its independence in 1965. However, this situation has

not been of concern to international human rights norms advocates, due to the country’s

small size and geo-political insignificance.

As a member of the United Nations since September 1965, Maldives has been a party to

the international human rights norms outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (UDHR) and have already signed up to and ratified a number of international

human rights conventions (ICERD- 24 April 1984; CRC- 11 February 1991; CEDAW – 1

July 1993).1

President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who ruled the country from 1978 to 2008, was no

friend of human rights, and continued to prosecute and silence any form of dissidence.

There was no discernible political opposition, and fundamental human rights were not

respected by the government (Amnesty International, 1991). Those who opposed the

regime had to operate with extreme restraint for fear of imprisonment and/or torture.

There were no public discourses on human rights norms.

A new constitution enacted in 1998 included a full chapter that “guaranteed” some

fundamental rights of citizens for the first time.2 The first article of chapter II (Art 13)

1 Maldives placed a number of reservations to these Covenants; Art 7, 16 of CEDAW; 2(1), 14, 21 of CRC). These reservations reflected the level of incongruence of the socially and politically accepted norms and values vis-à-vis the international human rights regime.

2 Maldives adopted its first written Constitution in 1932, amidst the growing power rivalry among the royal families and political elites. This Constitution lasted for only a few years. The country subsequently adopted new constitutions in 1934, 1940, 1942, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1964, 1976, 1968 (amended in 1970, 1972 and 1975), 1998 and 2008. The first express reference to human rights was made in the Constitution of 1998, which included a full chapter titled “Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens”.

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guaranteed equality of citizens before the law, and the subsequent articles established a

whole range of general human rights norms, including the right of citizenship, right to

protection under the law, presumption of innocence, inviolability of person and property,

right to privacy, right to education, right to property, right to work, freedoms of

expression, assembly and association, and right of pension.

While the language of human rights found its way into the constitutional text in 1998,

without proper social recognition of these norms, no one in Maldives celebrated this

development as a triumph in terms of guaranteed human rights on the ground. Neither the

government nor the society in general internalised these constitutional provisions and

interpreted and recognised them as binding obligations on the part of the State to protect

these rights. A large part of this indifference and apathy lay within the text of the

constitution itself (Government of Maldives, 1998).

For example, although article 4(1) places the powers of the State in the citizens,

subsequent articles effectively establish the President as the supreme authority of the

executive, legislative and judicial branches of the State. Hence, these supreme powers of

the President can effectively destroy the constitutional rights of the individuals at will.

Added to this is the weakness of the judiciary, where judges have very limited safeguards

against undue influence by the government, and are effectively required to be bound by

the interpretations of the law made by the executive.3

3 Submissions made to the Special Rapporteur on Torture in 2005, made public in 2006, tell of the removal of judges who declared a defendant’s statement inadmissible because it was extracted under torture, and of a judge who responded to the protests of a defendant by saying he was only following the directions of the government. See also: Asian Centre for Human Rights, 'Maldives: Judiciary under the President's Thumb', [Briefing Paper], (updated 28 February 2007) <http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/Maldives-BP-0107.htm>, accessed 10 January 2013 .

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Methodology and approach

In order to contextualise the emergence of the language and norms of human rights in the

Maldivian political and societal milieu, this paper makes reference to the historical and

political developments and the underlying narratives of struggle for democracy and

human rights in the country.

The biggest challenge for a scholarly analysis of the human rights and political situation

in Maldives has been the paucity of scholarly work on Maldives. However, information

on the socio-political developments in the country during the last decade have been

widely published and available in the form of online news archives of local newspapers,

blogs and government documentation both in Divehi, the national language, and in

English. Likewise, a number of crucial reports and statements published by the

international community and transnational organisations are available.

This paper relies heavily on these sources for mapping out the timelines and

developments in the area of political development, social change and human rights norm

acceptance. Reference is also made to the constitution and other legal and administrative

materials relevant to this discourse. This information is then mapped using the “spiral

model” (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999), to give a picture of human rights socialisation

and norm adoption in Maldives.

Spiral Model

The “spiral model” of human rights change provides an ontological framework for the

internalisation of human rights norms by states, and clearly outlines the stages of

evolution of state action. In this model the states change their attitude towards human

rights and eventually adopt the language of human rights mainly through a reactionary

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spiral, which leads towards the socialisation of the norms in the domestic sphere. Change

is driven mainly by pressure from domestic actors, transnational organisations and other

states.

The “spiral model” has five phases. The first phase, Repression, is one where a state

denies the validity of the assertions of local advocacy groups, leading to claims from

international human rights groups. In the second phase, Denial, the state rejects the

demands of international groups by claiming national sovereignty. In these phases, local

groups are developing support from transnational groups, which in turn put pressure on

the government. In the third phase, Tactical Concessions, the government begins to make

concessions to both local and international groups and in this process the discourse of

human rights enters the dialogue. In the fourth phase, Prescriptive Status, institutional

changes begin to be introduced, with laws being made, international agreements ratified

and issues of human rights become legitimate subjects for debate. In the fifth phase, Rule

Consistent Behaviour, the government’s practices internally and externally conform to

international norms for the observance of human rights; they are formalised in the

institutions of government and are recognised as habitual practices domestically and

internationally (Risse and Sikkink,1999: 32).

Risse, Sikkink and Ropp’s “spiral model” has been applied in case studies of many

countries (eg Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 2013, Anaya

Muñoz, 2008, Fleaya 2006, Shor, 2008), covering a wide range of forms of democracy

and many stages of economic and social development. Thus it is an appropriate tool to

use in this exploration of the socialisation of human rights language and norms in

Maldives.

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Human Rights norm-acceptance in Maldives

Phase 1: repression and activation of the network

The “spiral model” starts from a position in which the State being studied continues to

oppress and violate the human rights of its people, with very little opportunity to openly

advocate for human rights in the domestic sphere.

Maldives was in such a state until the late 1990s and early 2000s. No political parties

were allowed to register or function in the country and the only domestic opposition

existing was unrecognised, unorganised and very weak, with little or no opportunity for

open advocacy or dialogue with either the state or the outside world. Systematic

oppression and human rights violations generally went unreported and unnoticed by the

international community.

Human rights language remained generally outside public discourse, including the media

which was effectively controlled by the government. While the 1998 Constitution was no

more than “a structure built on loose sand” (anon., 2001), Maldives was experiencing

continuing allegations of flagrant violations of human rights perpetrated by the State.

Freedom of speech and assembly were extremely restricted, with any form of dissent

effectively subdued by force and intimidation. There were a number of reports of

members of parliament and ordinary citizens who were arrested and tortured by the state

for expressing views against the government or the President, or for not-so-obvious

“crimes” such as trying to setup political parties (Amnesty International, 2001a, 2001b,

2002). In the meantime, increasing demands for democracy and people’s empowerment

were also becoming louder.

In the absence of free media, the language and discourse of rights survived mainly as an

“underground” movement (Shaheed and Upton, 2008). There was no significant progress

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in terms of the realisation of fundamental human rights for the citizens and while

Amnesty International and other international human rights groups continued to condemn

the government’s gross violations of human rights on an intermittent basis, such acts

continued (Amnesty International, 1998, 2003).

An open movement calling for democracy was just emerging by the dawn of the 21st

century. The violent events of 19-20 September 2003 sparked widespread demonstrations

and unrest in the capital, Male’, and increased the rigour of demands for democratic

change in the country.4 The people also started demanding the government to investigate

human rights violations and guarantee human rights and freedom as well as accountable

and democratic governance. The availability of internet and better connectivity helped

these demands to become more organised and better communicated to the outside world

(Harrison, 2003).

With these initiatives from domestic opposition groups, the issues of rights violations

slowly started filtering into the agenda of the transnational networks and other national

governments, kick-starting the first phase of the spiral process.

Phase 2: denial

When the domestic and transnational advocacy groups raise the issues of human rights

violations, triggered by significant and serious cases of violation, as was the case in

Maldives, the state comes under more scrutiny from both domestic and international

human rights community. These initial reactions lead to augmented efforts at compilation

and dissemination of the human rights issues to a wider audience, and lobbying for other

4 On 19 September 2003, an inmate of the Maafushi Prison was tortured to death. The government, it was alleged, tried to cover up the matter. However, when news reached other inmates of the prison the next day, they started a full-scale riot inside the prison. Later, security guards opened fire on the inmates, killing 3 and seriously wounding 17 others.

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governments and organisations to pressure Maldives government to change its approach.

According to the model, at this stage, discursive activities and moral persuasion of the

Western states usually result from some level of political pressure.

However, the initial reaction of the norm-violating states at this stage is almost always

denial and refusal to accept not only the claims against the state, but also the validity of

the human rights norms. Some states would go as far as to deny that international norms

have any jurisdiction domestically, and even to allege external powers are trying to

intervene in the internal affairs and may even succeed in stirring a high level of

nationalistic sentiments. The Maldives government took such a stand initially, ignoring

the calls for greater freedoms and taking extra and more drastic measures to crush the

domestic resentment. The government, far from accepting and addressing the systematic

and structural issues, resorted to portraying them as isolated incidents (Asian Centre for

Human Rights, 2005). However, the fact that a State has openly denied the allegations of

human rights violations also indicate that the external pressure is having some impact on

the government’s credibility and acceptance both domestically and internationally. The

government employed substantial State resources and time to defend its position, by

hiring international PR firm Hill & Knowlton to present the country’s human rights image

in “a more positive light” (Sourcewatch, 2011), while the opposition continues to get

further momentum openly advocate for political and legislative change.

In August 2004, a peaceful demonstration calling for the implementation of political

reforms was forcefully quashed, and several hundred were arrested and a State of

Emergency was declared. While the government insisted that it had to take action to

restore peace and calm, and to control a violent mob that attacked government property

and police officers, this response by the government was widely condemned by the

international community as being grossly disproportionate (Raman, 2004). New and

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existing NGOs and civil society groups also started making demands for a more open and

democratic society and at the same time creating awareness on issues of human rights,

particularly torture and inhuman treatment. Although the state machinery were in denial

of the reality of human rights abuse in the country, the general public and international

community became more vocal on these issues.

Phase 3: tactical concessions

When the pressure on the norm-violating state is significant, to pacify criticism they tend

to introduce cosmetic changes to the domestic human rights situation which often results

in some temporary relief. It is important to note that improvements in human rights

conditions domestically require some measure of political transformation. Therefore,

domestic structural changes go hand in hand with the internalisation and acceptance of

human rights (Risse and Sikkink, 1999). Thus the registration of political parties was

allowed in Maldives for the first time in June 2005, although there had been no explicit

legal prohibition, and this saw the registration of a number of political parties opposed to

the government.

In 2006, the government also engaged in dialogue with the opposition to find a solution to

the ongoing political crisis in Maldives. Among the terms agreed in the Westminster

House Agreement include the release of more than 80 political prisoners and speeding up

the process of drafting the new Constitution. Moreover, the government also agreed to

amend President Gayyoom's decree on the freedom of assembly to bring it in line with

international human rights standards, to desist from arbitrary arrests, and to implement

reforms in the judiciary and police (ACHR, 2006).

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At this stage, governments act solely from an instrumental or strategic position. When the

government took these tactical steps, it increased the momentum of the process of human

rights norm socialisation and also moved the focus more towards the domestic actors who

are by now more empowered and legitimated. This situation also created more space for

domestic opinion on the subject of human rights and democratic governance.

As the model suggests, by this stage, the systematic use of oppression was found to be

less of an option for the government, simply because people were becoming more

organised under their ideological and political platforms and were less hesitant of

punishment by the state. This meant that the spiral had gained substantial momentum by

this time. As people tend to believe what they themselves say in public, public

pronouncements of political commitments to human rights by political actors are likely to

increase their own convictions of the normative value of human rights. Hence, opposition

forces gathered their legitimacy and rallying principles based on the ideas of human

rights. This made it extremely difficult for the government to go back to any earlier

position after initial tactical concessions were made. In this stage of the model,

instrumental and communicative rationality exert combined pressure on the government

to comply with its human rights obligations (Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

Another crucial development in this phase was the establishment of the national human

rights institution. The Human Rights Commission of Maldives (HRCM) was established

by Presidential Decree on 10 December 2003, its 8 members appointed directly by the

President, with the mandate to investigate human rights violations and promote a culture

of respect for human rights in the country. The HRCM conducted investigations into

various complaints of human rights violations and made recommendations to the

government, although it lacked the authority to award compensation. The Human Rights

Commission Act was adopted in 2005 (amended in 2006) and a new commission of 5

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members was appointed in 2006, through parliamentary endorsement, with a more potent

legal mandate to investigate human rights violations (Human Rights Commission of the

Maldives).

Phase 4: “prescriptive status”

By the time the socialisation process reaches the fourth phase, human rights norms

become so much a part of the public discourse, all actors involved begin using the

language to describe and comment on the actions of others as well as their own

(Rittberger and Mayer, 1993). Here argumentation is employed to put across the message

of social change, and the prescriptive status is contributed possibly by the discursive

process of argumentation and persuasion as well as through instrumental or rhetorical

support.

Among the most observable indicators of the prescriptive status, according to the model,

are the ratification and accession to international human rights covenants and protocols,

further institutional and legal mechanisms for promotion and protection of human rights,

and further acknowledgement by the government of the validity of the human rights

norms and engagement in dialogue with stakeholders on critical matters of human rights.

It was during this phase in Maldives, that the HRCM and civil society groups initiated

human rights awareness programs targeted at various sectors of the society, and which

helped increase public discourse on human rights. As an indication of its solidarity with

the international human rights regime and to dispel the allegations of systemic violations

of human rights in the country, the government ratified more international human rights

treaties, including CAT (20 April 2004), OPCAT (15 February 2006), ICCPR and

ICESCR (19 September 2006). In June 2004, the government also announced a

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comprehensive agenda of political reform, which among other things, included the

drafting of a new constitution with guaranteed human rights, and separation of powers.

As the model indicates, the players were prepared to make concessions as a way to

maintain their position in a human rights and political freedom agenda. However, due to

the tense political environment at the time, not all parties were forthright in making their

positions clear in the arguments and discourse. The government, however, became more

and more receptive of criticisms of its policies and there was also widespread formal and

informal consultation and debates on the nature and content of the new constitution being

drafted.

The new Constitution was adopted on 7th August 2008, and included one whole chapter

on human rights comprising 54 articles, covering all broad areas of internationally

recognised human rights. Unlike its predecessor, the new Constitution employs the

language of individual rights and freedoms, which are addressed generally towards all

persons (instead of citizens), giving it a broader application (Government of Maldives

2008b). Moreover, Article 18 clearly articulate the duty of the State to protect and

promote the rights and freedoms provided in the Constitution. The Constitution also

removed all gender-based discrimination clauses in the previous constitution.

The subsequent articles stipulated most of the universally recognised fundamental rights

including; equality, right to life, ESC rights, right to privacy, freedom of expression,

freedom of assembly, right to strike, right to work, right to education, right to fair

administrative and judicial action, and a whole set of rights related to arrests and trials.

Unlike the previous constitution, the Constitution provided a firm basis for protection and

promotion of human rights in Maldives, and the government as well as the opposition

increased their use of the language of human rights to put forward their arguments for

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both domestic and international consumption (anon., 2005). Human rights discourse

became mainstreamed and institutionalised.

Phase 5: rule consistent behaviour

In this phase of the “spiral model”, human rights language and norms are generally

internalised by the government and political actors, and gross violations of human rights

see a sharp decline. The experience in Maldives demonstrated a significant move towards

achieving this phase, particularly after the first democratic elections held in 2008.

The policies of the democratically-elected government of President Mohamed Nasheed

increasingly aligned to the fundamental human rights enshrined in the Constitution and

national institutions, such as HRCM and the civil society became increasingly vocal and

involved in the education and propagation of human rights knowledge among the public,

state officials, police and prison officers, lawyers, judges, journalists and teachers.

Statistics of alleged human rights violation cases submitted to the HRCM showed an

overall increase throughout 2008, a large part of which was attributable to the increased

awareness of the rights-holders and their empowerment to make demands from the State.

Gradually, the nature of allegations began to shift from torture and mistreatment to

Economic, Social and Cultural rights, including employment, housing and property

related matters.5

The government’s social initiatives such as housing development and the introduction of

old age pension and universal health insurance schemes were carried out under the rubric

of state obligation to fulfil the realisation of human rights. Media, including TV, radio,

print media and online media were exercising press freedom without any State control.

5 The authors' analysis of HRCM reports. Reports available at http://hrcm.org.mv/dhivehi/publications/Annual_Reports.aspx

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Maldives climbed 53 places (from 104th place in 2008 to 51st place in 2009) in the annual

Press Freedom index, compiled by Reporters Beyond Borders (2009), which was reported

by the Guardian as the largest advance to date by any country (Wellman, 2010).

Maldives also achieved recognition in the international human rights community. It was

elected to the UN Human Rights Council on 14 May 2010, with 185 votes out of 192.

Maldives also received a high level of endorsement from the international NGOs, with

UN Watch and Freedom House reporting that out of fourteen candidate countries from all

regions, only five, including Maldives, “have human rights records that merit a seat in the

Council” (Restrepo Ortega, 2010). In November 2010 Maldives also completed the

Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which scrutinised State human rights compliance.

During the review, statements were made by 49 delegations in the Council, and a number

of delegations commended Maldives for the self-critical approach taken in its national

report and presentation (UN OHCHR, 2010). State actions increasingly became

scrutinised by the general public through the lens of human rights.

Habitualisation achieved or the spiral blocked?

According to the spiral model, habitualisation of human right norms is achieved when

compliance becomes a habitual practice of the State, with institutional mechanisms

upholding these values regardless of the individuals holding authority. The

transformation in Maldives seemed to have missed the mark in some core areas.

From 2008 and the first democratic election, the government’s positive attitude towards

upholding the values of human rights and civil society’s continued promotion of human

rights awareness immensely helped the general public to “speak” the language of human

rights. However, the general move to democratisation and empowerment on many fronts

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also took the focus away from efforts to sustain and entrench the improvements in the

human rights condition and strengthen its embedding in society. Instead, the government,

the opposition and civil society became more and more entangled in a struggle for power.

Since the former opposition groups, who initiated the human rights campaign, were now

in government, their challenge of living up to their own rhetoric became a yardstick for

measuring their political genuineness. This situation also provided ammunition for

radicalised religious groups and political opponents to stir the societal sentiments with

accusations of human rights violations by the government.It was widely perceived during

this period that the government was slowly becoming less sensitive to the core human

rights norms and obligations, and increasingly resorting to breaking the trust through

indulging in norm-violating activities.

One crucial institution that suffered the biggest setback during the formative years was

democracy itself. On 7 February 2012, the democratic government was overthrown and a

new government backed by the “23rd December Coalition”, headed by former Vice

President Mohamed Waheed Hassan, was formed.6 While human rights norms remained

enshrined in the text of the Constitution, absence of real democratic credentials of this

new government coupled with the weakness and incompetence of the judiciary was seen

as likely to erode public confidence in human rights.

Many within and outside the country maintains that since the replacement of the elected

government, there has been an discernible reversal of the use of positive human rights

language by the government, and a clear backtracking on many crucial areas of

fundamental importance. For example, in January 2013, the government ratified a law to

6 “23rd December Coalition” was formed by political parties and some civil society groups who rallied on a platform to “defend Islam in the Maldives”, who made 5 unequivocal demands to the government on 23 December 2011. For details on these demands, see http://minivannews.com/politics/coalition-condemns-government-for-not-complying-with-demands-and-respecting-islamic-principles-30412 ; http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/40026

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significantly restrict peaceful assembly, despite considerable opposition from some

members of parliament and criticism from non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

(Naish, 2013). The government has also given a high priority to implementing capital

punishment in Maldives (Bosley, 2012) where a moratorium had been in effect since

1953. The government has also been openly pushing for a new bill to limit the

Constitutional right to remain silent which has the potential of removing the safeguard

against criminal confessions under torture (Mohamed 2012). The judiciary continues to

remain unreformed and politicised (Abdulla, 2012), despite the widespread calls for

comprehensive judicial reforms (International Commission of Jurists, 2011; Sekaggya,

2013). The country has fallen 21 places in the Press Freedom Index from 52nd position in

2010 to 73rd position in 2011-2012, and another 30 places down in 2013 from 73rd to 103rd

(Reporters Beyond Borders, 2013).

While the new regime has maintained that they are more human rights-friendly and

keener to uphold the rule of law, human rights advocates have continuously expressed

concern about the deteriorating human rights situation (anon., 2012). Despite the

government’s establishment of a new Ministry for Human Rights in May 2012, human

rights advocates such as the International Federation for Human Rights (fidh) reported

that the new government has been accused of a wide range of human rights violations,

from violent repression of street protests, arbitrary arrests, sexual harassment of female

protestors, torture and harassment of pro-opposition media, to legal and physical

harassment of members of the opposition, including members of Parliament

(International Federation for Human Rights, 2012).

Based on the outcome of the Maldives Government’s Commission of National Inquiry

(CoNI) (2012), the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) also seem to have

softened its language on the human rights abuses in Maldives, although it has decided to

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continue to monitor the situation in Maldives (2012). Meanwhile, Amnesty

International’s report titled “The other side of Paradise” illustrates the increasing

violations and abuse of human rights in Maldives since February 2012 (Amnesty

International, 2012). Increasingly foreign governments have demanded proper respect for

human rights in Maldives (Carrell, 2012).

This analysis of the historical developments in Maldives shows that, the institutional

mechanisms established to ensure the sustainability of the human rights agenda did not

live up to expectations during the crucial period of transition to a functioning democracy.

Genuine pressure from above and below was not sustained at a sufficient level, at this

critical juncture, which potentially jeopardised final stage of socialisation.

Since the narrative above bespeaks concerns about the overall negative environment of

respect for human rights in Maldives, it is pertinent to identify some of the possible

explanations for the seemingly “blocked” spiral, which failed to fully reach the phase of

rule consistent behaviour. For this analysis, the variables that contribute to the “spiralling

process” of adopting norm-consistent behaviour such as domestic structural context,

domestic salience of the norms, material interests, and international influence on the state

are reviewed here to identify the dynamics and potential factors that blocked or disrupted

the spiral.

A review of domestic and international factors

According to Risse-Kappen (1995), and Lutz and Sikkink (2001) domestic structural

context is crucial in shaping the receptiveness states to international pressures to comply

with the human rights norms. According to the spiral model, if the domestic structures are

not sufficiently strong and well connected, the state may fail to implement the

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international norms, despite its own willingness to do so. The institutional structure

established during the transition from the early years of the 21 st century in Maldives was

seen generally to be weak and inchoate. This was most clearly the case with the judicial

system, and a number of other oversight bodies. Although Risse and Sikkink (1999)

maintain that domestic and transnational actors in the human rights socialisation process

may be able, under certain circumstances, to change the domestic structures themselves

because these structures are inherently responsive to both internal and external pressure,

that did not occur in Maldives.

Cortell and Davis (1996) provide insights into norm salience, describing the inherent

qualities of the particular norms which give the advantage of easier marketability and

acceptance in the domestic politics. They also identify the possible pathways through

which norms can acquire domestic salience, including national political rhetoric, the

material interests of domestic actors, domestic political institutions, and socialising forces

(Cortell and Davis 2000). As for the norm salience indicators, Maldivian socio-political

environment has used the language of human rights very frequently during the last

decade, in a manner that indicates the general acceptance of the human rights norms as

part of the accepted social and legal values in the country. However, human rights also

found its antagonists in the country, particularly after the democratic transition. A number

of these groups persistently attempted to paint human rights as “Western”, “alien” and

“anti-Islamic”. The domestic environment of Maldives did not provide an environment

conducive to dialogue and understanding between groups with diverse views.

While states are faced with international pressures and constraints to comply with

particular norms, they also calculate the material interests that could be gained by

adopting certain norms. Thus internalisation and adaptation of domestic practices provide

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the state the opportunity to enhance their position, and international image. As a small

developing country, the political leadership has always been generally sensitive to the

way other countries assess the image of Maldives. Likewise, the economic benefits of aid

were seen as a worthwhile goal to be pursued, particularly after the December 2004

tsunami. Likewise, it was also evident in the case of Maldives that the political elites

were also driven by their own sense of self-image and their desire to be seen as on

morally high ground compared to their political opponents, in addition to their patriotic

concerns for the reputation of the country or the normative acceptance of the value of

human rights and democratic norms (Shaheed and Upton 2008). These forces apparently

played a crucial role in the early stages of the change. However, the momentum was not

maintained throughout the whole process.

International influence on the State plays a crucial role in driving the norm spiral. The

level of integration of the State to the international community and the preparedness of

the political leadership to take steps to interface with the demands of international

community play a crucial role in norm socialisation. The position of Maldives on this

front was less than adequate, particularly taking into account the absence of a regional

human rights mechanism, insufficient human rights advocacy by the neighbouring states

and low priority given by other States on the proper adherence of human rights in

Maldives. The geo-political value-priorities rendered by the Western states were largely

incongruent with the domestic political preferences, resulting in an apathetic approach

towards norm acceptance.

The analysis of the development of human rights language and norms in Maldives

generally underlines that, although institutional mechanism were established to guarantee

and safeguard human rights, the process failed to fully incorporate these values into the

standard operating procedures of domestic institutions, as Risse and Sikkink (1999)

20

suggest. Institutional weakness, particularly in the justice system, as well as the

politically uncompromising stance taken by all parties led to the “blocking” of the

forward momentum of the spiral.

Application of the “spiral model” in the context of Maldives

The “spiral model” applied in this study of the human rights socialisation in Maldives

provided some significant insights into the process that introduced human rights language

and norms to the society.

The first three phases of repression, denial and tactical concessions followed the path as

described by the model. The domestic actors and transnational advocacy networks as well

as other states provided the needed impetus for these stages to move on a progressive

trajectory. The behaviour and interactions between the political actors and agents during

these phases facilitated the creation of a snowballing effect, leading to a highly

accelerated reform agenda. One might argue that in Maldives, there was no cataclysmic

event, such as war, to prompt the third phase. However, in a country not used to violence

among and between its citizens, the events of 19-20 September 2003, which resulted in

the death of four prisoners and wounding of 17 others by the police was an event that

shocked the population, and triggered a concerted movement to reform the existing

system of impunity.

The fourth phase, the prescriptive phase was mired in difficulties, particularly in fully

operationalising the discursive and communicative behaviour between the government,

the public and the international community. This penultimate phase in particular required

more time, and better communicative consistency. The weakness in this phase prevented

a proper transition to the next phase of rule-consistent behaviour.

21

During this crucial prescriptive phase, as the analysis has suggested, insufficient attention

was given to building and entrenching institutions necessary for the long-term

sustainability of the new democracy. The manner in which the new judiciary was set up

and the process of selection and appointment of judges were strongly criticised by

domestic as well as international actors (Velezinee 2013). In particular, the fact that the

Judicial Services Commission (JSC) ignored the constitutional requirements for the

appointment of judges was flagged by individuals, civil society and international

community as a critical error which required immediate rectification UN OCHR, 2013;

Naseem, 2013). These factors eroded public confidence in the justice system, and this

opened the way for the emergence of a culture of impunity that was conveniently seized

by the general public as well as the government institutions (Government of Maldives,

2012; US Dept of State, 2012; Velezinee, 2012).

Insufficient attention was also given to campaigns of public awareness and education on

the new system of governance, civic responsibility and human rights norms. Although the

language of human rights was included throughout the political discourse, perhaps, the

elements of communication, argumentation and persuasion were insufficiently focused in

the moral discourse leading up to the reforms. Weakness of the civil society contributed

to the status quo, and to a culture of apathy and indifference (Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

This situation also, perhaps, provided room for anti-human rights elements, inside and

outside the country, to promote their alternative viewpoint.

Despite the shortcomings in the prescriptive phase, Maldives seemed to have moved on to

the ultimate phase of rule consistent behaviour. For a few years after the 2008 democratic

elections, the country was considered by the international community as well as domestic

human rights actors, as a paragon of human rights norm compliance. And for the purpose

of this analysis, there could have been no doubt that Maldives had reached the final and

22

ultimate phase of human rights socialisation. However, this phase lasted only a short

period of time.

A significant reversal of human rights norm compliance is seen after the change of

regime in 2012. In many ways, the current situation resembles the time when the country

was earlier undergoing the denial phase in the model. It is instructive that the current

position of Maldives in the Press Freedom Index is almost identical to the one it held in

2008 – 103rd compared to 104th. This could be seen as symbolic of a return to the first

phase of the model. The current state of affairs, perhaps, necessitates an iterative

reenactment of the tactical and prescriptive stages before the country can once again

reach the final phase of human rights norm compliance behaviour.

Yet, this suggestion of the need for iterative reenactment of earlier phases of the spiral

does not imply that the situation is as it was before 2008. A crucial question about the

changes in human rights practices within states over time is about the changes in the

individual state actors’ behavior as well as the collective conscience of the state actors

(Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

While the discussion on the socialisation of human rights should cover all human rights in

general, it is crucial to identify that different sets of rights play out differently at various

stages. For instance, in most discussions on the human rights dimensions on political

change and democratisation, more focus is placed on civil and political rights. When a

state goes through a significant level of internalisation of human rights, more general and

broader rights are demanded and internalised. This was beginning to occur in Maldives

and to some extent, norms, standards and expectations around more general rights have

become part of the on-going discussion in society.

23

Then again, Manokha (2009) shows the position of human rights norms as a global

phenomenon, and the ability of multiple agents to exercise their power on others to

conform and comply with these norms. In this view, States find it beneficial to change

their human rights compliance stance, sometimes with or without any external coercion

or pressure. Here too it is clear that the situation is no longer as it was before the

democratic elections of 2008. Although criticism of human rights abuses have continued

to come from local groups such as the Maldivian Democracy Network and advocacy

networks such as the International Federation for Human Rights and Amnesty

International, any criticism of actions of Maldives government which do not comply with

international human rights norms from other governments has been muted. 7 Thus, with

little to no external pressure to change their stance, there may be little reason to move

beyond the phase of tactical concessions.

Conclusion

The “spiral model” of human rights norm socialisation provided significant insights into

the process in Maldives. Nonetheless the socio-political factors unique to the country and

the manner and speed of the change process foreshortened the explanatory power of the

model in the context of Maldives, particularly the factors that prevented or delayed the

full socialisation of human rights norms in the country.

The transition of governance in a period of just a few years was regarded by many as

phenomenal and unprecedented. The introduction of political pluralisms, separation of

powers, constitutionally guaranteed human rights, various institutional oversight

7 An exception to this was the campaign in early March 2013 to overturn the sentence of flogging given to a fifteen year old girl who had been sexually abused. Maldives government did eventually add its voice to support for the girl, in spite of the opposition from religious groups in the country.

24

mechanisms, freedom of expression and free media, introduced a new vitality to the

social milieu, and at the same time introduced a number of elements that effectively put a

brake on the speed and acceleration of the process of change.

A serious gap in normative convictions of many political actors in Maldives, particularly

in accepting and adopting human rights norms was clearly discernible. Human right

language served an important instrumental purpose during the struggle to gain democratic

legitimacy and credibility, both domestically and among the international advocacy

networks. However, there were no obvious manifestations that political actors wanted to

sustain those values as an integral part of the changes introduced.

Notwithstanding the energy and enthusiasm of the various social actors and the

transnational advocacy network during the early years of the change process, the full

scale development of rule consistent behaviour, predicted and explained by the “spiral

model” failed to materialise in Maldives, particularly because of the abrupt changes of

February 2012. Although the transnational human rights advocates continued to highlight

the deteriorating human rights situation, the deficiencies and the absence of continued

pressure, especially from major Western states, seriously weakened the desire for the new

regime to fully adhere to and observe the human rights values.

The case study of socialisation of human rights language and norms in Maldives reveals

the enormity of the challenge of social mobilisation required to entrench these values in

the societal milieu. While domestic and transnational advocacy plays a crucial role in the

all phases of the socialisation process, particular attention to strengthen and entrench the

human rights values in the institutional mechanism requires a high level of commitment

from domestic political actors.

25

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