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MERCHANT MARINE · ATWAR .

¥NAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON

TO THE PRESIDENT: The War Shipping Administration was established by

Executive Order 9054 on February 7, 1942, under the first War Pow~rs Act 1941 within the Office for Emergency Management, Executive Office of the President. The Ad­ministrator, appointed by and responsible to the President, was named on February 9, 1942.

Under the terms of the Executive order, as amended, the War Shipping Administration was authorized to control the operation, purchase, charter, requisition, and use of all ocean vessels under the flag or control of the United States, except combatant vessels, auxiliaries, and transports of the armed services and the vessels engaged in coastwise, inter­coastal, and inland waterways transportation, which were under the control of the Director of the Office of Defense

· Transportation. This report covers the operations of the War Shipping

Administration from its inception to December 31, 1943, in .general, but more particularly in detail for the 1943 calendar year and in some instances the early part of 1944. Many of the accomplishments of WSA must remain covered by the cloak of national security.

No report can reflect the full credit due the men and women who have built and who have sailed our fighting merchant ships into the very teeth of our enemy. Their story is being written in the successful efforts of their brothers in the armed services. Our merchant seamen have delivered the goods, on time and enough.

Sincerely yours,

~~~~~ E. s. LAND, Hyper War Foundation

1400 Cypress Circle Lafayette, CO 80026- 1244

Administrator.

Y'' '

War and Ships

THE outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 immedi­ately imposed upon the maritime industries of the United States unprecedented problems in ship operations and ship­building. When the full impact of the war struck the United States directly with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American Merchant Marine was confronted with responsi­bilities of such magnitude as to make any appraisal of the job ahead seem incredible.

Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the United States Maritime Commission was established as an independent agency to direct and control all phases of overseas shipping and shipbuilding. It became apparent immediately when this Nation entered the war that a special agency to deal with the operational problems peculiar to war was necessary to supplement the Maritime Commission. That need brought about the creation of the War Shipping Adminis­tration on February 7, 1942, which took over from the Mari­time Commission virtually all of the Commission's major statutory functions with the exception of shipbuilding. Thus WSA became the Government's ship operating agency and the Maritime Commission its shipbuilding agency.

When WSA came into being, it faced immediately an acute shortage of American flag tonnage. The entire ocean­going dry cargo merchant fleet, placed under WSA control at its inception, was approximately 900 dry cargo ships aggre­gating about 6,700,000 deadweight tons and about 440 tankers of approximately 5,150,000 deadweight tons, a total of 1,340 ships of 11,850,000 deadweight tons. This was but a slight increase over the merchant fleet under United States c.Ontrol before the start of war in Europe.

Prior to April18, 1942, when all American flag vessels were made subject to requisition and operation by the Government, cooperation by American ship operators in the transport of military, lend-lease, and other cargoes had been principally on a voluntary basis. The Maritime Commisison had estab-

3

lished a Division of Emergency Shipping to supervise and direct movement of both import and export cargoes but the active participation by the United States in the war necessi- t' tated total Government control o£ all oceangoing tonnage.

The result of the general order o£ April 18, 1942, was to make all ships subject to requisition by the War Shipping Administration. Qualified ship operators became operating agents for the Government. By the end of 1943 there were approximately 130 American ship operators serving War Shipping Administration in that capacity.

WSA Faces Huge Job

THE responsibility of the WSA under the Executive Order of February 7, 1942, extended to all phases of shipping in­cluding the purchase or requisition of vessels for its own use or the use of the Army, Navy, or other Government agencies; the repairing, arming, and degaussing of WSA controlled vessels and Allied vessels under lend-lease provision; con­version of vessels to troop transports, hospital ships, and for other special purposes; training and providing ship per­·sonnel, operating, loading, discharging and general control vf the movement of these ships; administering of marine and war risk insurance laws and funds, and the control o£ ter­minal and port facilities, forwarding and related matters.

WSA's Major Responsibilities

THE most important responsibility of the WSA has been, and will continue to be for the duration of the war, the shipping requirements of the Army and the Navy. The second esponsibility is to fulfill the commitments which have been made £or transport of lend-lease commodities to other United. Nations, principally to Great Britain and Russia. The third is to meet the quotas set by the War Production Board £or importation of raw materials essential to the Nation's war industries and necessary to the civilian popu­lation. The fourth is to meet goals established by the State

4 ..

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Department and the Foreign Economic Administration for shipments to Latin America and other countries.

During 1942 and early 1943 the Nation and WSA faced a most crucial period. Increasing participation by the United States in the war in both Europe and in the Pacific created continuously growing demands for tonnage. The submarine menace, particularly in the Atlantic, was taking a heavy toll of United Nations ships, including a considerable percentage of American flag vessels.

The public felt the impact of war as ships were withdrawn from normal trade in rubber, coffee, spices, aluminum ore, sugar, and other commodities. War came to the United States as tankers burned in sight of our Atlantic Coast cities. Homes were cold, and there was no second cup of coffee.

Efficient use of United Nations tonnage through coopera­tion principally between the United States and Great Britain, with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board as the coordinating agency, was adopted to eliminate over­lapping or duplicating use of the dwindling supply of ship tonnage.

Not Too Little-Nor Too Late

EARLY in 1943, however, defense measures against enemy submarines had become more effective, and greater naval protection was available to merchant ships. New construc­tion was increasing materially and efficiently in ship and port operations was improvng under WSA direction. Con­sequently, during last year all demands of the Army and Navy for tonnage were met, to the point that no essential military cargo was delayed on United States piers for lack of ships. During the same period all commitments for the transport of lend-lease goods were met and those to Russia exceeded commitments by more than 35 percent. At the same time WSA has met all quotas for importation of raw materials set by the War Production Board where the mate­rials were available for transport. The quotas established by the FEA for shipments to Latin American countries also

5

have been satisfied. Coffee was removed from the ration list and sugar rations were increased. America was winning the war of transportation.

During 1943 shipments from the United States totaled 46,971,000 long tons (2,240 pounds) of dry cargo-42 per­cent more than in 1942-and the total of petroleum products carried by tankers to the battle fronts was 15,086,000 long tons.

Exclusive of Army and Navy shipments, WSA controlled ships carried 27,432,000 long tons o£ dry cargo. This in­cludes lend-lease and civilian commodities and is an increase of nearly 2,000,000 tons over similar dry cargo carried in 1942. The destinations of this dry cargo are shown in the following tabulation :

Ocean-borne shipmenh from United States in dry cargo vessels by foreign trade area of destination 1942 and 1943

[Tons of 2,240 pounds. E xcludes U. S. Army and Navy cargo]

Area of destination 1942 1943

--------------------------------------------1-------Total all areas .. . --- -- --- -- ...... ·- - --- -- ----- -- --- -- - ------ - 25, 809,000

Atlantic short trades _____ _________ ----- -- ---- - -- ---·-- - - -- ----Caribbean ... ...... . .. .. ---- --- ---·------- -· ----- -- -·- --- --------East Coast Sooth America _________ ------ ---------- - --- --- - -- ·---Pacific short trades ...... .. .. __ ___ _____ -- - ------ ----- ---- ---- -- --West Coast South America ___ _____ -------------- - ---------- -- ----United Kingdom and Eire __ _________ __________ - --- -· ------------Russia-trans-Atlantic. __ ___ ____________ --------- -------· .• ------ _ North African theater____ __ ____ __________________ __ ---- --------West Africa.------- -- - --- -------- -- - --- - .. ------ - _______ -- ---- - --South and East Africa ___ _______ __ __ -- --- -- - ---- -- --- ---- - ----Red Sea and East Mediterranean __ __ _____ ------ --------- --- - -- --Persian GulL .. . ••. . . .. . ·---- --- --- - --- -- -- --- -- ----- -- - -- - --- -- _ India and Ceylon _________ __ - ---- --- --- - - ----- -- · --- ---- ------ _ South and Southwest Pacific ------ - ------------- ------------ __ _ Trans-Pacific Russia .•... ----- - ------------- --- -------- -- - -- -- --Scandinavia .. . . --- --- - ... __ .• . _. __ ._ . . _ . . .. ___ _ . . _ ..•. ---- __ ------Dutch East Indies, Straits Settlements and Philippines ------- ---

Return Trips Pay Off

3, 047,000 4,143,000 1, 684,000 1, 379, ()()()

464,000 6, 646,000

938,000 932,000 315,000 438,000

2, 061,000 1,152,000 1, 088,000

769,000 645,000 17,000 91,000

27,432,000

369,000 3,199, 000 1, 647,000 1, 256,000

512,000 9, 736,000

642,000 1, 648,000

288,000 533,000

1,483, 000 1,847, 000 1, 427,000 1, 055,000 1, 973, 000

17,000

DESPITE the ever-increasing demand for tonnage for military purposes, WSA was able to maintain an increased flow of

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essential commodities into the United States. The import o£ 20 such essential commodities amounted to 15,366,793 long tons in 1943 as compared to 12,179,545 long tons in 1942, an increase of 26.17 percent. The comparative imports of these 20 commodities are shown in the following summarized tabulation :

Ocean-borne arrivals of selected commodities 1942 and 1943 [Tons of 2,240 pounds]

Commodity 1942 1943 Percent change

--------------------------------Total, 20 commodities ___________________________ __ 12,179,545 15,366,793 +26.17

Balsa logs and lumber _________________________________ _

Bananas __________ ----------- ______ --------------------Bauxite ....•. _. ______ ..... _ .. ____ . _____ .. _______ ._. __ . __ Burlap (bags and bagging) _____ ________________________ _ Castor beans ______ . _________ . _____________ ....... __ .. __ _

Chrome ore---------------------·---·------------------­Cocoa .•.•............•.. ------------------- -------------Cof!ee _____________ --------. __________________________ . Copper ___________ _____________________________________ _

Hides and skins (except rabbit) ________________ ________ _ Lead ____________ ----------------------------------·-----Linseed (flaxseed) ______________________________________ _ Mahogany logs and lumber ____________________________ _

Manganese ore _______________ ---------------------------Nitrates •.... _--- .. ---------.----.----------------------Quebracho and tanning material (excluding quebracho

wood) __________ --------------------------------------Sisal and henequen _____________________________________ _

Sugar ________ ._. _____ . __ -.. ----.------------ .. -----------WooL _______ ---------------------_--------- ___________ _ 'line ___ --------·----------------------------------------

9,379 524, 197

1, 999,612 156, 160 107,997 928,958 119,782 787, 104 770,512 212,954 267,164 238, 151 76, 124

1, 183, 333 810,505

165,980 186,263

2, 856,277 556,218 222,875

14,367 404,237

3, 592,616 264,448 146,088 857, 218 261,012 969,552 775,546 179.380 129,797 91,596

138,739 1, 268,687

696,173

143, 350 179,584

4, 444,442 369,824 440,137

+53.18 -22.88 +79. 67 +69.34 • +35. 27 -7.72

+117. 91 +23.18

+.65 -15.77 -51.42 -61.54 +82. 25 +7. 21

-14.11

-13.63 -3.59

+55. 60 -33.51 +97. 48

Imports into the United States in 1942 were 17,509,000 long tons, including the 20 commodities mentioned above. In 1943 the total imports were 19,480,000 long tons, an increase of almost 2,000,000 long tons over the previous year. More than 80 percent o£ the 1943 total was carried in WSA con­trolled ships.

Of the total dry cargo exports in 1943-the equivalent of 6,000 Liberty shiploads or 1,000,000 freight carlo.ads o£ war material and other necessities-American ships carried 36,-

7

596,000 tons, of which 96 percent was c-arried in WSA vessels and 4 percent in Army- or Navy-owned ships. 0£ the 35,-312,000 long tons carried by WSA ships, approximately 50 percent was military cargo allocated to the Army and Navy.

Ships o£ other nations carried 10,375,000 of the 46,971,000 long tons o£ dry cargo exported from the United States dur­ing 1943. The greatest part of the cargo carried under foreign flag was transported by ships of the United Kingdom and Russia, which handled about 9 million tons, the remaining 1 million being divided among the ships of other United and neutral nations.

WSA Delivers the Goods

THE great bulk of lend-lease shipments was carried in WSA­controlled merchant ships in 1943. In that year those ships made 2,876 sailings with lend-lease supplies. 0£ that total 2,267 sailings were for Great Britain, her colonies, and dominions, 328 for Russia, and 281 for other lend-lease countries.

In 1942 an average o£ 12 percent of ships carrying lend­lease supplies to Russia were being sunk. It was a serious but not crippling blow to the United Nations' cause. At the end of 1943 barely 1 percent of the lend-lease carrying vessels were being lost.

This improvement in shipping conditions to the Soviet Union and better protection of the convoys were vital con­tributing factors to Russia's ability to seize and maintain the military initiative against the Nazis.

Ships-More Ships

DESPITE the comparatively heavy losses o£ tonnage due to enemy action, the merchant fleet under WSA control con­tinued to expand throughout 1942 and 1943. Most of the ~ acquisition of new ships came from the Maritime Commis­sion's enormous shipbuilding program. Without these new vessels coming in ever-increasing volume from American

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shipways, the tide of war undoubtedly could not have been swung against the enemy in all theaters, an achievement that has been made possible through delivery on time and in sufficient quantities of men, essential material, and supplies for war, including planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, and oil.

As a further result of America's shipbuilding program, the War Shipping Administr'ation now operates the largest fleet of merchant vessels in world history. At the end of 1943 that fleet consisted of about 2,300 dry cargo ships aggregating nearly 22,000,000 deadweight tons, and 580 tankers of 7,-627,700 deadweight tons, a total fleet of almost 3,000 ships which is continuing to expand rapidly. By mid-1944, WSA controlled some 3,400 vessels totaling well over 35 million deadweight tons.

The increase in merchant ship tonnage produced in American shipyards and placed in United Nations war service by the end of 1943 more than offset all losses sustained by all the United Nations since the beginning of the European war in September, 1939. The bulk of this increase, of course, operated under the American flag.

The WSA-controlled dry cargo fleet in early 1944 was made up of ships acquired as follows: 70 percent from new con­struction, 23 percent from existing vessels owned by Ameri­can shipping companies, and 7 percent from foreign nations. This fleet represented 73 percent of the vessels built for or acquired by the War Shipping Administration since Decem­ber 1, 1941. Disposition of the other ships, representing 27 percent of those acquired or built, was as follows: 9 percent transferred to lend-lease nations under charter with title remaining in the United States, 7 percent transferred to the Army and the Navy to serve as combat loaders, troops ships, hospital ships, and other auxiliaries, and some 11 percent sunk.

In addition to the WSA-controlled merchant fleet, more than 500 dry cargo ships and tankers had been transferred by WSA either by title or under charter to the Army and the Navy by December 31, 1943. These ships were acquired

607051-44--2 9

from owners or were constructed as part of the Maritime Commission program and aggregated more than 4,500,000 deadweight tons. In addition, many hundreds of small craft were acquired for the armed forces.

New Fronts-More Ships

ALTHOUGH the fleet of merchant ships under WSA control and the auxiliary fleets of the Army and the Navy were constantly increasing, rapid expansion of the Nation's fight­ing forces and the constant broadening of combat areas r_e­quired most careful allocation of ships to various uses. The picture was changing daily.

The invasion of North Africa, for instance, required diver­sion of an enormous fleet of merchant ships from other em­ployment to carrying men and supplies from the United

......

Kingdom and the United States to the North African combat ~, .area for a considerable period of time. This invasion with­drew from other service enough United States merchant ves-sels to curtail severely shipment of any other type of cargo, !::.'

particularly that for civilian use. On the other hand, the rapid overthrow of the Axis armies

in North Africa-considerably ahead of the original sched­ule-made large numbers of ships again available for other uses. Only through flexibility in the WSA system of han­dling these vessels was loss of precious ship time averted.

The Big Shippers

DuruNG 1942 and the early part of 1943, the WSA-controlled merchant fleet devoted 41 percent of its capacity to carrying Army cargo, 13 percent to Navy cargo, 30 percent to the transport of lend-lease material and commodities, and 16 percent to handling essential raw materials and civilian ne­cessities for the United States. From month to month this ratio changed slightly but at the end of 1943, 49 percent of the WSA fleet was carrying Army cargo, an increase of 8 points over previous months; 10 percent was devoted to Navy

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Britain for emergency distribution to the European and African fighting fronts. The same methods utilized on the West Coast also made available to the United Nations fight­ing forces in the various Pacific areas a considerable increase of vitally needed munitions and supplies.

So efficiently have these ship space-saving methods been developed that in one month alone early in 1944, the saving~, which is really free transportation on tankers and in-transit vessels, equalled the capacity of approximately 55 ships. During that month, 14,325,000 cubic feet of additional dry cargo, including various types of aircraft, was carried on decks of tankers from New York and about 4,900,000 cubic feet from West Coast ports. Added cargo to in-transit ships at New York awaiting convoy amounted to about 670,000 cubic feet, while dry cargo ships discharged more than 65,000 tons of surplus bunker fuel oil in the United Kingdom with no loss of cubic space in any of the vessels. Efficient use of loading ideas and a speed-up of turn-around time in port added the equivalent of 125 ships to the East Coast fleet during each of the 3 months preceding the invastion of France.

Although measures adopted by the WSA have enabled it to meet all of the high priority demands for shipping throughout 1943 and the greater part of them in 1942, there has been no surplus of ships at any time, nor is there any prospect of a surplus in the near future. The greatest short- -age existed at the outset of United States participation in the war, a dearth of tonnage that was aggravated by the intensified campaign conducted by the Axis submarines in the Atlantic.

We Still Need Ships

THE MORE active the Nation's armed forces have become, the

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more ships are required in the widespread military theaters <'

for attack operations. These operations are necessarily wasteful of the running time of ships assigned to them, which places a greatly increased demand on the remainder of the

12

fleet. By early 1944, some 5 million tons of merchant ships were in shuttle service in the various war theaters.

Despite the constant growth of the WSA merchant fleet throughout 1943, the anticipated demands in 1944 for military movement, coupled with the likelihood that programs for

• ~ relief and supplying of conquered territories will require a considerable amount of ship space, indicate that an added strain will be placed on the Nation's shipping facilities. Re­gardless of this, it is expected that the War Shipping Ad­ministration can continue to meet successfully the top priority shipping requirements, although the tonnage situa­tion will remain tight for many months.

Shipbuilders Meet Demands

THE greatest contribution of relief for the shipping shortage has been made by American shipbuilders, and acquisition of additional tonnage for the WSA fleet at virtually the same level as in 1943 seems to be assured throughout 1944. Not only have American shipyards met the challenge of the Axis powers on the oceans, particularly on the Atlantic, by in­creasing production on an unprecedented scale but the toll of sinkings since Pearl Harbor has steadily decreased.

In the first half of 1942, approximately one-third more tonnage for the United States merchant fleet was built than was sunk. In the last half of 1942, more than three times as much tonnage was built than was lost through sinkings. In the first half of 1943, more than five times as much tonnage was constructed as was sunk, and in the last half of that year buildings outstripped sinkings on about a 10 to 1 ratio. This applies to dry-cargo vessels. The ratio on tankers was not as great hut construction showed a continuous increase over sinkings.

~ At the end of 1943, sinkings of merchant ships, both United States and United Nations, had reached the lowest level since war began and destruction of Axis submarines had reached the peak level since the United States had entered the war.

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Although increased activity on the part of Axis submarines early in 1944 indicated a final frenzied attempt on the part of the enemy to shut off as much as possible of the flow of sup­plies to the European war theater, WSA has o-utlined a pro~ gram to utilize to the fullest extent a merchant fleet rapidly approaching 4,000 vessels.

The bulk of the export cargoes from the United States, of course, cross the Atlantic destined for Europe and North Africa. American flag ships, however, carried relatively large quantities of cargo throughout the Pacific, particularly to Australia and the Hawaiian Islands. The relative volume of flow on the sea routes that reach to every quarter of the globe is shown on the War Shipping Administration map accompanying this report. The width of the flow lines on the map indicates the relative tonnage of the outbound traffic in the various services but the lines do not represent actual routes.

New Routes-New Ports

THE outstanding difference between the routes traversed in 1942 and in 1943 is that in the latter year the Mediterranean route was reopened, shortening the trip to India and Southern European bases of supplies by about 50 percent. Reopening of this route to United Nations ships was the equivalent of adding more than 200 vessels totaling more than 2,000,000 deadweight tons to the merchant fleets in the service of the United States and the Allies.

Reopening of the Mediterranean route, for instance, meant that ships homeward bound from Australia have delivered Australian wheat and Indian and South African coal to Italy, then have returned to the United States across the Atlantic with whatever cargo may be available, such as metal scrap from the battle-fields, or in ballast. This has resulted in a great saving of ship time.

This maximum utilization of tonnage is the result of a constant and careful study of the over-all shipping situa­tion by the expert organizations set up by WSA and the

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enabling WSA to eliminate delays arising from congested conditions and to program requirements of the various areas adequately.

In handling ships, the WSA is dealing with a movable inventory of constantly changing positions all over the world. Under peacetime conditions, there is ready com­munication between ports and between ship and shore. In normal times ships sail and arrive on regular schedule. For the most part they use major ports, usually well provided with trained stevedores, good repair facilities, and adequate wharfage.

In time of war, however, communications between ship and shore and between ports are decidely limited, particu­larly in the active war zones where radio silence often is imperative. Communications channels often are congested. Convoys make orderly scheduling of ships impossible. Fa­cilities of even the best ports are seriously taxed by convoy arrivals. Second- and third-rate ports and, in emergencies, harbors with no facilities at all must be used to supply com­plete military units in war theaters. And the handling of military cargo with items of great weight, such as tanks, or bulk, such as airplanes, creates difficult and often unprece­dented problems in loading and unloading ships, particularly in ports which lack adequate cargo handling :facilities.

Bringing Home the Bacon

MAXIMUM utilization of available ship tonnage for imports of essental raw materials is one of the principal ship opera­tions problems created by war. Through coordinated work of the WSA organization, routing of vessels homeward bound after delivery of war material throughout the world has resulted in a comparatively orderly flow of commodities required for the Nation's war production and by the civilian population as well. This routing and loading of ships for the in-bound voyage involves, for instance, picking up of nickel in New Caledonia, bauxite in Trinidad and the Guianas, rubber from Ceylon, sisal from the East Coast of

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Africa, copper from the Belgian Congo and the West Uoast of South America, as well as various other commodities in numerous parts of the world. For civilian consumption par­ticularly, the in-bound movement of coffee, sugar, and cocoa has been a matter for prime consideration at all times. Changing rationed food quotas reflected the efficiency of return voyages.

Essentials Come First

DUE to the fact that most ships out-bound are routed in ac­cordance with military necessity, the vessels travel to areas where there is not sufficient essential cargo to load the ships "full and clown') for the return voyage. To load these ships with nonessential cargo causes double delay, first in loading and second in unloading the nonessential cargo at the home port. Rather than waste ships and ship time in this manner, WSA policy has been to bring the ships back in ballast to a

r point on their homeward route where essential cargo is avail­able. This system eliminates need of sending additional ton­nage to that port to pick up the essential material, saving hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping space.

In event no such essential cargo is available in ports on the ship's homeward route or at points where a reasonable detour can be made, the vessels are moved in ballast to the home ports. This results in starting the vessels out again from United States harbors with ammunition, tanks, planes. and other vital battlefront materials as much as 3 or 4 weeks sooner than if they had been held for in-bound cargo or diYerted too far from the most direct return route.

The "\YSA organization gathers accurate and up-to-the­minute information concerning ship positions, port opera­tions, origin of essential imports, and many other factors than entered into an orderly direction of ship movements.

The information assembled and disseminated to the proper control officials makes it possible to calculate the number and names of ships anilable for assignment to Army and Navy lLSe and for other purposes including civilian service. From

607051-44-3 17

OUR MERCHANT SHI

U.S.S.R.

CHINA

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llll Axis Controlled

...::; Comparative Flo• ~ including Lend

NEW WSA WORLD

Width of flow lines on this map indicates relative density of outbound traffic in the various services, but the lines do not represent actual ship routes.

Outstanding difference from last year's shipping map is reopening of the Mediterranean route and acquisition of French and Belgian ports.

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DELIVER THE GOODS--

--..

"' ~ar Carga•s, '

MAP RECORDS GAINS

An interesting example of the use of this route is that ships home-bound from Australia deliver Australian wheat and Indian and South African coal to Italy, then return across the Atlantic in ballast. This saves weeks of ship time.

19

this information it is possible to determine how many yessels should be dispatched to various areas in a given period.

Foreign port representatives cable information as to the number of ships in each foreign port, indicating any that may be idle, those that are loading or unloading and what vessels are being repaired or awaiting convoy. Tlus cabled informa­tion, together with that received from the Navy, the War Department, the State Department, and other sources is con­solidated into reports distributed daily to control officials. Gathering and analysis of this ship movement information and its utilization have made possible orderly and intelligent employment of available ship tonnage.

Teamwork Moves Supplies

CoRRELATED with the activities of those divisions of the WSA organization which direct the movements of vessels on the seas are the activities of other divisions which supervise and regulate the :forwarding o:f export materials from their point of origin to the Nation's ports. By close cooperation with the Army, the Navy, and other agencies o:f Government, as well as with representatives of foreign countries, a control over the movement of all types of cargo from point~ inlai1d to the ports has been established. This prevents congestion of port facilities, delays in unloading o:f railroad cars and expedites ship loadings. There have been no sm·ious port----­con~estions in the outward movement of cargo for many months. There has been but one serious case during the war and that was of short duration.

Utilization of port facilities as near as possible to the origin of the cargo is another policy of the WSA. In recent months this has been emphasized and at the end of 1943 further steps \H're being taken to utilize to the :fullest degree virtually all port :facilities, large or small. In addition to minimizing the chance of b~ttleneck in movement of cargoes, this plan also has served to spread the work so as to tap as many sources of manpo\Yer as possible. It also conserves space on badly

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congested overland transportation lines, such as railroads and motor carriers.

'" In this way through its various divisions, WSA has been

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able to maintain a steady and orderly flow of out-bound cargoes from their inland points of origin to the ports of destination and utilize to the fullest possible extent the con­stantly increasing fleet of merchant ships.

Healing Battle Scars

THE thousands of merchant ships under the American flag as well as in the service of the other United Nations have been subjected to punishment and hardships during the war years that the average vessel would not encounter in normal use in a period 5 to 10 times as long. In 1942 and the spring of 1943, and to a less degree recently, bombs, mines, and tor­pedoes inflicted severe damage to many ships which "lived" to make port and return to their war job. As a result, one of the most important functions in keeping the ships sailing has been to repair and service them expeditiously.

Upon the United States has fallen the greater part of this burden, just as this Nation has had to assume the major por­tion of the shipbuilding task. WSA took over from the Maritime Commission its Division of Maintenance and Re­pair, greatly expanded it and created in addition a Division of Foreign Repairs and Salvage Operations which operates throughout the world.

There was also created the Office of Coordinator for Ship Repair and Conversion with headquarters in New York City and operating jointly for Navy and WSA. The co­ordinator maintains an orderly flow of work to approxi­mately 80 repair yards througho.ut the United States so that congestion is prevented and ship repairs are made in yards able to handle them in the shortest possible time.

In 7 months of 1942, nearly 4,000 merchant vessels were handled by the Maintenance and Repair Division, and in 1943 the total number grew to about 11,000. These totals include

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ship conversions and all types of repair from minor work to major overhaulings necessitated by torpedoings, mines, and other enemy action. Of the 11,000 ships so handled in 1943, approximately 2,000 were for other nations under lend-lease account, and about 9,000 for WSA.

The Division of Foreign Repairs and Salvage which was not established until June 1943 assisted in effecting repairs in other countries to approximately 775 WSA controlled vessels. These repairs were made with parts and materials which in many cases were shipped from the United States to the foreign countries, some were sent by air saving critical shiptime. An 8,500-pound turbine rotor sent by air from New York to Panama saved 21 days for a tanker with 141,000 barrels of oil for Navy use in the Pacific campaigns. In addition, stock piles of repair materials which are needed most frequently were established at strategic points through­out the world.

Salvage operations also have been carried on by this divi­sion and all usable parts have been removed from ships dam­aged beyond repair to be utilized on other vessels. Some enemy ships, badly damaged, have been salvaged in coopera­tion with the Navy salvage force and in some instances sunken vessels have been raised and returned to operation.

A Fighting Merchant Fleet

CoNVERSION of merchant ships for special services, such as auxiliaries to the armed forces, has been one of the principal jobs of the WSA and maintenance and repair yards. An­other important function closely related to maintenance and repair is the defensing, arming, and degaussing of merchant ships. This work is done in close cooperation with the Navy and under direction of a liaison officer from the Navy. Proper protection and armor for merchant vessels has been one of the contributing factors in the reduction of losses from enemy action. Despite this reduction in losses, WSA is continuing the policy of properly defensing, arming, and

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chant fleet have been delayed for lack of a crew. In the latter part of 1942 there were as high as 15 to 18 ships delayed in a fortnight but those delays have decreased constantly until there were not more than 1 or 2 each fortnight in the latter part of 1943, and those delays were occasioned largely because of a lack of 1 or 2 men in certain specialized ratings, who had to be transferred from one port to another.

Sailings on Time

SHIP delays have ceased for all practical purposes to disturb our overseas transport of troops, munitions, and material of war. Regardless of the continuing production of ships at a peak level established in 1943, it is expected that the Recruitment and Manning and Training groups of WSA will be capable of providing sufficient manpower throughout the remainder of the war period to prevent any increase in delayed ship sailings.

During 1943, there were 55,013 men graduated and assigned to merchant vessels under the vVSA training programs. Of these 1,126 were graduates of the United States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps, 614 being deck officers and 512 engineer officers, while State maritime academies provided 368, of which 217 were deck officers and 151 engineer officers. The United States Maritime Service graduated 53,519 of all rat­ings from officers to unlicensed seamen. In 1942 there were approximately 12,500 graduates of all ratings.

From its establishment on May 5, 1942, through December 31, 1943, the Recruitment and Manning Organization had handled 103,300 referrals of men for assignment to ships, both seagoing and in harbors, rivers, and the Great Lakes. These referrals included the majority of the men graduated from the training schools, some of whom, however, were han­dled directly by unions or ship operators and were not placed through the Recruitment and Manning Organization.

Up to the end of 1943, well over 100,000 men had been added to the pre-war personnel of the deep sea merchant fleet. Of

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these, approximately 50,000 were derived from vVSA train­ing, about 25,000 were recruited by the Recruitment and Manning Organization, another 15,000 were recruited by the maritime unions and the ship operators, and about 10,000 Great Lakes and inland waterways sailors had been moved by the Recruitment and Manning Organization to deep-sea vessels. At the close of 1943 there were approximately 135,000 men employed on the oceangoing merchant vessels controlled by WSA and as civilian crews on Army trans­ports. To July 1, 1944, there has been an increase of 15,000 to 20,000.

During the time that this active training and recruitment program has been constantly adding men to the oceangoing Merchant Marine Service, losses have been suffered which are estimated to have taken from 30,000 to 35,000 men off the ships. Of that number approximately 5,600 are dead, miss­ing, or prisoners of war due to enemy action at sea, another 5,000 are believed to have suffered disabilities which have taken them out of service at least temporarily, and between 20,000 and 25,000 have left the merchant ships to take jobs on shore or for other reasons.

Beyond the Call of Duty

MEN in the United States Merchant Marine have proven their courage, ability, and devotion to duty under the most trying conditions.

Cadet-Midshipman Edwin J. O'Hara was serving aboard a merchant ship attacked by two enemy surface raiders. With boilers blown up, engines destroyed, his ship ablaze from stem to stern and gun crew injured or mortally wounded by shell fire, O'Hara, single-handed, served and fired the ship's gun with five remaining shells scoring direct hits near the waterline of one of the raiders. He went down with several of his gallant shipmates.

A young quartermaster, Edwin F. Cheney, released and launched, single-handed, a life raft from a sinking tanker.

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He maneuvered the craft throughout the blazing, oil-covered sea to open water by swimming underwater. Though se­verely burned, he guided four shipmates to safety and rescued two others who were injured and helpless.

Oscar Chappell, an able seaman, was on a ship that was torpedoed three times in less than a minute. Chappell, in­jured by the explosions and with head and shoulders covered with blood, stayed at his post at the helm. He saw seven shipmates on the forecastle, heads trapped by flames soaring toward them and escape shut off. He turned the vessel about, drawing the flames upon himself, but gave his ship­mates a chance to jump clear of the blazing sea of oil.

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More than 100 men, including these 3, have been awarded the United States Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medal for deeds of magnificent courage, self-sacrifice, and outstanding seamanship above and beyond the call of duty, an inspiration to the men who follow the sea. ...

Calling All Men ~

THE vVSA has maintained strategic pools of marine labor at key ports on the East Coast, the Gulf, the West Coast, the Great Lakes, and on the Mississippi River system. In addition, replacement manning pools are maintained at many foreign ports throughout the world, such as in the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and the south- ___ west Pacific. These men are assigned as crew replacements on WSA controlled ships which run short of personnel dur-ing an overseas voyage.

In cooperation with the Allied Governments, WSA has sought to return to service seamen who had deserted their foreign flag ships in United States ports. In April 1942 there were in the United States approximately 6,000 seamen who had left their ships under various Allied flags since the beginning of the war. The great majority of these have been returned to service and at the end of 1943 only a mere fraction of the former volume of desertions were being reported.

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sonnel in the history of the fleet, despite handicaps imposed by war.

Holding the Line

THE WSA, in requisitioning ships, established a basic value for the tonnage taken for title and basic charter rates for the vessels requisitioned for use.

Experience in the last World War proved that a proper control of ship values was necessary to prevent an inflation­ary spiral and its resultant effect upon the Nation's entire economy, particularly as reflected in prices of commodities imported from other countries.

Ship prices rose in 1940 and 1941 due to heavy losses sus­tained by the Allied Nations and a shortage of merchant tonnage available for constantly increasing cargo move­ments.

With the requisitioning of ships, the profit incentive was minimized as a consideration in determining the utilization of ships as the operators were paid fixed fees as operating agents for the Government, in addition to the prescribed charter rates for their vessels. The WSA assumed all oper­ating responsibility and insurance liability for war-risk losses.

Basic time charter rates set by WSA were $4 per dead­weight ton on 20-year-old vessels of 8 to 10% knots com­pared with $5.75 in the last war and a world market rate of $10.20 in 1941.

The WSA valuation for ships was set at $65 per dead­weight ton for 20-year-old 8%-knot vessels as compared to the 1917 Shipping Board value of $160 per deadweight ton and the 1941 world market rates which reached a high point of $139 per deadweight ton. These rates and values were continued in effect through December 1, 1943.

Determination of these rates and values was reached by WSA after long negotiation with ship owners and was based on a price formula computed on ship values not enhanced by war demand. Although ship owners declared that the

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rates were not entirely satisfactory to them, the determina­tions by WSA were accepted by the great majority as being necessary to halt the inflationary trend already manifest as a result of the war.

The Comptroller General o£ the United States in a report to the Congress held that the rates were too high, thus placing the WSA in the middle position between the Comptroller General and those ship operators who felt the rates were too low.

The Scales of Just Compensation

To REACH a determination o£ just compensation, the Presi­dent of the United States on O~tober 15, 1943, appointed an Advisory Board on Just Compensation made up o£ three Federal circuit court judges. On December 7, 1943, this Board reported and established standards in general con­sistent with the rates and values originally set by the War Shipping Administration. The report further gave basis £or certain reductions in light o£ changed conditions and the increasing age o£ vessels, and steps were taken early in 1944 which resulted in a reduction o£ the former basic value of $65 per deadweight ton to $56.25. At the same time the WSA established basic bareboat charter rates at $1.25 per deadweight ton as compared with $4.15 in the last war and $6.60 allowed by the courts following the last war. This latter action, it is estimated, will save the Government ap­proximately $50,000,000 additional in charter hire, insurance, and other costs arising out of the requisition program. While a portion o£ this saving will be passed on to the public in reduced freight rates, the greater portion will accrue to

r the Government as charterer and the largest shipper of cargo. One other effect· of this fixing of charter rates was to pre­

vent a runaway abnormal rise in ship prices by fixing a ceil­ing on ship earnings. It also prevents undue speculative activity in the ship market which can result only in serious dislocation and uncertainty for ship operators.

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The effect of this stabilization will be felt in the post-war ship market by preventing too great a discrepancy in invest­ment made by ship owners before, during, and after the war. As a further stabilizing factor, legislation has been intro­duced in the Congress to establish a floor under ship prices following the war. This is intended to apply to Government­owned vessels sold either to American operators or to those of foreign nations.

WSA Covers War Risks

SooN after the creation of the War Shipping Administration and determination had been reached to requisition all vessels, the functions of the Wartime Insurance Committee of the Maritime Commission were transferred to WSA. Under terms of the Merchant Marine Act, a revolving fund had been set up for the purpose of permitting the Government to enter the insurance field at such time as an emergency might increase commercial insurance rates prohibitively. This condition arose when heavy losses at sea were being suffered as a result of the war.

In addition to insurance on ships and cargoes, WSA pro­vided for Government paid war risk insurance on seamen in the amount of $5,000 and also for payment to seamen for loss of personal effects.

WSA expanded its wartime insurance operations to the degree necessary to provide proper protection to the Govern­ment as well ~ the ship owners. In 1942 it operated with a deficit of more than $12,000,000 but by the end of 1943 the operations showed a credit which amounted to nearly $35,-000,000 in receipts over the paid and accrued liabilities for a 2¥2-year period, part of which extended back into Maritime Commission jurisdiction.

Within the Law

OPERATIONS of a Government agency, such as WSA, with expenditures in excess of $2,000,000,000 annually involve

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many legal questions. To handle these a division with six major units and offices in three of the major ports of the United States; San Francisco, New Orleans, and New York, as well as in the four principal zones of military operation; United Kingdom, the Mediterranean, India, and the South Pacific. Included within the division is a legislative section which prepares formal reports on bills or proposed legisla­tion for the committees of Congress and the Budget Bureau. During 1943, the legislative section followed the progress of more than 500 bills, resolutions, and Executive orders and prepared in excess of 100 formal reports for the Congress.

Enough To Do the Job

THE WSA organization has been built and geared to solve or at least minimize wartime problems and handle them as expeditiously as possible. The organization in Washington on December 31, 1943, consisted of 1,159 employees, about one-quarter of the 4,615 which made up the entire personnel of the world-wide organization at that time. Of this latter number, 3,157 were engaged in field service throughout the United States and 299 were engaged in foreign service. A considerable portion of the experienced personnel of WSA was acquired from the Maritime Commission, and various service divisions of the Commission function in a dual capac­ity for both WSA and the Commission, thus conserving man­power and avoiding duplication of effort . .

How WSA Works

IN THE organizational setup of WSA under the Administra-,. tor are three Deputy Administrators; one in charge of vessel

utilization, planning and policy which covers virtually the entire field of vessel operations; another in charge of labor relations, manning, training, and recruitment, which organi­zation provides the trained manpower to operate the world's largest merchant fleet, and a third in charge of construction, which is primarily a Maritime Commission function but

31

affects WSA operations to the extent that close integration of the building program with operations is necessary.

Under the Deputy Administrator for vessel utiliization, planning and policy are 7 Assistant Deputy Administrators who in tnrn have immediate supervision over 27 divisions covering all phases of ship operations and their myriad ramifications, procurement, and oper:ation of small vessels, lnamten'ance, salvage, and repair of ships, ship control, tanker operations, fiscal affairs and the Pacific area.

Under the Deputy Administrator for Labor Relations, Manning, Training, and Recruitment are the Medical Director, and three Assistant Deputy Administrators, one for training, another for recruitment and manning, and the third for maritime labor relations. Under the immediate supervision of these three officials are 10 divisions.

Paying the Freight

ToTAL obligations and disbursements by WSA-actual and estimated-since its inception on February 7, 1942, to the end of the 1944 fiscal year-June 30, 1944-are $5,107,729,916. Of this amount, purchase, charter, and operations of vessels, re­conditioning, outfitting, defense installations, operation of warehouses and terminals and other expenditures from the revolving fund are $2,683,048,532. Expenditures for these purposes in 1942-from February 7 to June 30-were $183,-527,851; in 1943, $1,242,554,696; and in 1944, including es_ti­mates to June 30, $1,256,965,985.

Obligations and expenditures from the maritime training fund for the entire period were $168,758,241 of which $39,-285,226 was expended in 1942, $60,273,015 in 1943, and in the year ending June 30, 1944, actual and estimated, $69,200,000.

Total obligations in support of State maritime schools amounted to $875,072, of which $180,814 was expended in 1942,$344,258 in 1943, and expended and obligated up to June 30, 1944, $350,000. -

The marine and war risk insurance fund for the entire

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period shows an excess of $56,644,098 in receipts over dis­bursements.

Funds expended or obligated for lend-lease purposes in 1942 were $367,264,498; in 1943 they were $667,894,513; and in 1944, including actual and estimated, $1,276,533,158, mak­ing a total lend-lease activity by WSA show obligations o£ $2,311,692,169.

Source of these funds were from authorized appropria­tions, transfers, or allocations.

In making budgetary setup for appropriations £or the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, WSA shows a balance in the revolving fund o£ $821,000,000 to be carried over. This amount is available because of a reduction in the original esti­mates of expenditures £rom July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944, $650,000,000 of which is due to reduction in vessel operating expense and the decrease of submarine and other enemy action on the seas, with the resultant drop in the volume of repairs.

Because of the rapid acceleration of the Maritime Com­mission's shipbuilding program and the resultant increase in the number of ships acquired from that source, the original estimate of $185,000,000 for purchase o£ vessels in the fiscal year starting July 1, 1943, was reduced to $56,200,000.

Unfinished Business

As THIS is written, rumors and "armchair" predictions o£ the impending collapse of our European enemy has caused many to question the continuation of our ship construction and operations program. People forget that the Merchant Marine's job will not stop with the declaration of peace in Europe.

Six million o£ America's fighting sons are overseas, and they are likely to remain to complete the task o£ creating a lasting peace after the day of victory. They must be supplied and they must return home. The Merchant Marine will con­tinue to deliver the goods.

Even with the internal downfall o£ the German nation and the occupation of the European Axis countries, there will

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remain the task of winning the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Few recognize the fact that a considerable portion of our merchant fleet will be needed to rehabilitate the continent of Europe. Nor do they stop to realize that the distance from United States ports to the coast of China, to the Philippines, and to Japan is between two and three times that from our Atlantic Coast to the European war theater. It will take two or three times the merchant tonnage to bring a weight of arms equal to those now blasting the Germans, to bear on the Japanese scattered on hundreds of islands and the main­land of Asia.

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The task of the Merchant Marine, the War Shipping Ad­ministration, and the Maritime Commission is not completed and we cannot rest on our oars until the job is done. The task of rehabilitating the Far East will not be an easy one. What destruction was not completed as the Japanese ad- • vanced will be completed as they are forced back on their heels by the might of Allied arms, delivered to our fighting men by America's merchant fleet.

Today, when the emphasis of battle and America's pro­duction might is delivering the knock-out blows in Europe, more than 5 million deadweight tons of the merchant fleet are engaged in short-run shuttle service for our armed services. What that tonnage will be when our might is turned to the west is not known. It can be assumed that greater distances of ocean, and hundreds of Pacific beach­heads will require proportionally larger tonnages for this service.

Today, scores of merchant ships are carrying supplies across the narrow stretch of water from England to Nor­mandy. Increase that distance a hundred or a thousandfold :; and the need for more and more ships, and more and more ~ merchant seamen in the Pacific becomes real.

Ship construction and ship operation in mid-1944 is un­finish~d business with number one priority.

U. 1. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1944

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