ukraine’s presidential elections,...

Ukraine’s presidentialelections, 2019the main candidates

tadeusz iwański, Krzysztof nieczypor

Ukraine’s presidential elections, 2019 the main candidates

tadeusz iwanski, Krzysztof nieczypor

WaRsaWseptembeR 2018

© copyright by Ośrodek studiów Wschodnichim. marka Karpia / centre for eastern studies

cOntent editORadam eberhardt, Wojciech Konończuk

editORanna Łabuszewska

cO-OpeRatiOnKatarzyna Kazimierska

tRansLatiOnJim todd

GRaphic desiGn paRa-buch

phOtOGRaph On cOVeRe.Kryzhanivskyi/shutterstock.com

dtpGroupmedia

pubLisheRośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. Marka karpia centre for eastern studies

ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl

isbn 978-83-65827-26-5

Contents

Theses /5

I. Biographies of The major CandidaTes /11

1. YULia TYmoshenKo /111.1. Business career /111.2. political career /111.3. further information /13

2. anaToLiY hrYTsenKo /13

2.1. military career /132.2. political career /142.3. additional information /15

3. peTro poroshenKo /15

3.1. Business career /163.2. political career /163.3. additional information /17

4. YUriY BoYKo /17

4.1. Business career /184.2. political career /184.3. additional information /19

5. oLeh LYashKo /19

6. VadYm raBinoVYCh /20

7. sVYaTosLaV VaKarChUK /20

8. VoLodYmYr ZeLensKiY /20

appendixsupport for candidates in the presidential election (august 2018) /21

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Theses

• For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, seven months before the presidential election, it is difficult to determine not only which candidate is most likely to win, but also which candidates will make it to the second round.It now seems impossible that any politi-cian will win in the first round (to be held on 31 March 2019),asaccord-ingtotheopinionpollsall thecontendershaverelatively lowpublicsup-port(seeAppendix).Inaddition,apartfromYuliaTymoshenko,theformerPrimeMinisterwhoiscurrentlyleadingthepolls,andAnatolyTyahnybok,the former defence minister and second most popular candidate, the dif-ferencesinsupportfortheotherseriouscandidates–includingincumbentPresidentPetroPoroshenko,thepopulistOlehLyashkoandthepro-RussiancandidateYuriyBoyko–arenegligible,oftenatthelevelofstatisticalerror.

• AlltheopinionpollsclearlyshowthatYuliaTymoshenkohasthemostsup-port. The other important candidates change positions depending on thetimeandplaceofthepoll,buttheirsupportisrunningonaverageatlessthanhalfofthatfortheformerpremier.Morethan20%ofthevotersdonotknow,ordonotwanttorevealwhotheywillvotefor;morethan10%wouldchoosesomeonewhoisnotmentionedinthepolls,andalmosthalfwouldlookforalternativesamongnewcandidates.Inaddition,theelectoralcam-paign,theactivephaseofwhichwillbegininSeptember,hasbeentakingplaceinanatmosphereofconsiderabledistrustonthepartofUkrainiansocietytowardspublicinstitutions,thegovernmentandthepoliticalclass.AlthoughthisisnotanewphenomenoninUkraine,the‘revolutionofdig-nity’alsoarousedexpectationsthatthepoliticianswereunabletomeet.

• In Ukraine there is a great demand for new faces and people who have not been compromised by participating in politics.Currently,thereisspeculationaboutaclashintheelectionsbetweentwocandidatesnotas-sociatedwithcurrentpolitics:SvyatoslavVakarchuk,theleaderofthecultrockbandOkean Elzy,whorepresentsthepro-reformandpro-Westernop-tion;andthesatiristVolodymyrZelensky,whohostsapopularprogrammeon the 1+1 TV station owned by the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. Neither ofthemhasannouncedarunintheelection,butsomeoftheirpublicactivi-tiescouldbereadasexpressingadesiretoparticipate.Bothhavethesup-portofaround15to17%ofthevoters.Iftheyultimatelydecidenottostartintheelections,theirchoiceoffavouritesfromamongtheregisteredcan-didateswillbeofconsiderableimportancetoundecidedvoters.

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• The main contenders, apart from the pro-Russian candidates, basi-cally do not differ in their declared views concerning the country’s strategic development. Each of them has declared their support forUkraine’sintegrationwiththeEUandNATO,forcontinuingthereformsandmodernisingUkraine’spolitical-economicmodelalongWesternlines,andforthereintegrationofoccupiedCrimeaandpartsoftheDonbas.Itisworthemphasisingthatsince2014,asaresultoftheconflictwithRussiaand the de facto loss of these territories, the pro-Russian option, while still strong in southern and eastern regions, has been substantially weakened on the national level, and can only rely on about 15–20% of the vote.

• Thelowsupportforthecurrentmajorcontendersforthepresidency,thehighproportionofvoterswhohavedeclaredtheirreadinesstovotebuthavenotyetdecidedwhotovotefor,andthelackofanyclearlydefinedelectoralstrategiesatthisearlystageofthecampaign,allmake it difficult to pre-dict the possible result of the election.Asaresult,thefinalcompositionofthepresidentialelection’ssecondroundmaybedecidedbyunexpectedevents(scandals,disasters,increasedactivityinthemilitaryoperationsintheDonbas,etc.)thatcouldoccurintherun-uptotheelection.

• All the major candidates for President, including the poll leaders, havetheirstrengthsandweaknesses.The leader Yulia Tymoshenko benefitsfrom the fact that her political party Batkivshchyna (Homeland) has themostextensivenetworkoflocalstructures.ThispartyisoneoftheoldestandmostactiveinUkraine,hashighrecognition,andiswellrootedinthevoters’consciousness,sotheformerPrimeMinistercanappealtohercoreelectorate,mainlyinsmalltowns.Thesearemostlyolderpeople,whoturnoutforelectionsinadisciplinedmanner.Tymoshenkohasbeeneffectivelycriticising the current government for raising municipal fees; she is notostentatiousindisplayingherpersonalwealth,andhasnotbecomeentan-gledincorruptionscandals.Sheisthebeneficiaryoftheerrors,omissionsandpainfulchangesmadebythegovernmentsincetherevolution.Ifthereisa lowturnoutanda large,uniformdispersalofvotesamongtheothercandidates,Tymoshenkocouldgainanadvantagewhichwillmakeheren-tryintothesecondroundmoreprobable.

• Atthesametime,Tymoshenko has many limitations that may prevent her from winning.First,sheisoneofthelongest-standingpoliticiansonthe Ukrainian political scene,and thecurrentpublic sentiment doesnot

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favour such candidates. Secondly, although it has been difficult to proveher participation in corruption scandals, it has been equally difficult toestimate the size or establish the origin of her undoubtedly large assets.Tymoshenkoisalsothesubjectofmanyallegationsofcorruptionandreap-ingthebenefitsofobscurefinancialschemesfromasfarbackasthelate1990s,whenshebecametheheadoftheUnitedEnergySystemofUkraine(YESU).Thirdly,theformerPrimeMinisterhasahugenegativeratingofnearly30percentofvoterswhowouldnotvoteforherunderanycircum-stances,effectivelymakingitdifficulttobroadenherelectoralbasebeyondhercoreelectorate.Tocounteractthis,Tymoshenkohasalreadyofficiallybegunhercampaign,makingspeechestargetedatthemiddleandurbanclasseswhilestillfullofpopulism,inwhichshehasunsuccessfullysoughttopromoteherselfasamoderntechnocrat.Fourthly,Tymoshenkoalsosuf-fersfromtheodiumofherobscurerelationshipwithVladimirPutin,bothfromtheelectioncampaignin2009-10,andfrombehindthescenesofthegasagreementsheconcludedwhichprovedunfavourableforUkraine,notto mention her long-time collaboration with Viktor Medvedchuk, a closeassociateofPutin.Although at presentTymoshenko may be considered the strongest contender in the presidential race, one should also bear her limitations in mind, as well as the fact that the presidential camp and its state & propaganda machine has not yet started its campaign to discredit the former Prime Minister.

• ThesecondmostpopularcandidateisAnatoliy Hrytsenko,areservecolo-nel, a former deputy, a former defence minister (2005-7), and chairmanandheadoftheCivicPositionparty.Hrytsenko’shighratingsderivefromthefactthathecombinesthefeaturesofastrongpersonalityandamilitaryman(whichwillberelevantincaseofwarwithRussia),andatthesametimethatofanexperiencedpolitician,albeitonewhoisnotyetofthefirstrank,andwhohasnotbecomeentangledincorruptionscandals.Inurbancircles,hispopularityisalsoboostedbythefactthatheismarriedtoYuliaMostova,awell-knownandesteemedintellectualandjournalist,andheadoftheinfluentialDzerkalo Tyzhniaweekly.Hrytsenko’sadvantageincludehis low negative rating (less than 9%), and in simulations of the second-round runoff, he would beat all the other candidates. At the same time,Hrytsenko’sfinancialresourcesarebothunclearandinsignificant,asevi-denced by his lack of activity in the public space. Hrytsenko, unlike Ty-moshenkoorPoroshenko,isnotamanofmeans,sohewillbeforcedtofinda‘sponsor’or‘groupofsponsors’,withoutwhichhewillnotbeabletorunaneffectivecampaign.Itseemsatpresentthatsupport for Hrytsenko is

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based mainly on the fact that he has poor name recognition (although that recognition is positively associated), as well as his military expe-rience, and his lack of a corrupt past or any connections to oligarchs.Hisimagehasbeenpositivelyinfluencedbyhisattemptstogatheraroundhimselfthemostimportantpro-reformforcesfrombothinsideandoutsideparliament.Atthesametime,however,thisperceptionmaychangewhen–asseemsinevitable–hisagreementswithhis‘sponsors’cometolight,andwhenthepresidentialcamp’scampaignbeginsitsactivephase.

• AlthoughtheincumbentPresidentPetro Poroshenkocomesonlyfourthorfifthinthepolls,his real power also lies in the formal and informal influences arising from the office he holds.Theheadofstate,atleastatthisstage,has the support of the most powerful Ukrainian oligarchs and the media they control (mainlytelevisionstations,whicharethepri-marysourceofinformationfor90%ofthepopulation).Duringtheactivephaseofthecampaign,hisresultmayalsobeinfluencedbylocalgovern-mentattheprovincialanddistrictlevels,aswellasbysomeofthemayorsofthelargestcities,andparliamentarydeputiesfromsingle-mandatecon-stituencies, to whom Poroshenko will propose beneficial cooperation forthepost-electoralperiod.Thecurrentlowpublicsupportforthepresidentderives partly from overly inflated social expectations after the ‘revolu-tion of dignity’, and partly from unrealised promises and the corruptionscandalsinwhichhisclosestbusinesspartnersareimplicated.Forthesereasons,unless he achieves some new, undeniable successes, the Presi-dent’s chances of re-election will be small.PoroshenkohasinvestedhishopesinthemergerofthethreeOrthodoxchurchesexistinginUkraineintoasingle,canonicalstructure,whichseemslikelylaterthisyear.Ifthathappens,hewillpresentthisasasuccess,althoughitisfarfromcertainthatthiswillprovidehimwiththeincreasedsupportneededtoguaranteehisvictoryintheelections.

• Poroshenko’s signs of weakness have not gone unnoticed by his politicalpartnersortheoligarchs,whosesupportforhimisnotunconditional,andwhocouldchoosetosupportthecampaignofamorepromisingcandidate.AnotherchallengeforthePresidentisretainingthesupportoftheWest,whichhasbeenanimportantsourceofhislegitimacysincetherevolution.AlthoughPoroshenkohasbeentryingtoconvincetheUSandtheEUthatheisthebestguarantorofthepro-reformcourse,hiscredibilityisevapo-rating,andtheWesternpartners’tonetowardsKievisbecomingtougher.Finally,anotherproblemforthePresidentishishighnegativerating(over

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50%at itshighest),andifheweretoreachthesecondroundoftheelec-tions,hewould losetoanyotheropponentapartfromthosewhoareex-plicitlypro-Russian.At thepresentstage,Poroshenkoseemsdeterminedtowinre-election,butthesituationmaychangeifthelevelofsupportforhimhasfallentothelevelofstatisticalerrorbytheendoftheyear.Hence,while this is unlikely at the moment, it cannot be ruled out that he willabandonhiscandidacyattheturnof2019.

• Thereisacertainprobabilitythat,infavourablecircumstances,acandi-date from the pro-Russian camp couldplayanactivepart inthebattletoreachthesecondround.Therearecurrentlytwosuchpoliticianscon-tendingforthehighestofficeinthecountry.ThefirstisYuriyBoyko,theleaderoftheOppositionBloc,aparliamentarypartywhichismadeofupofthe‘leftovers’ofthePartyofRegions.Thepartystillhasitsregionalstruc-tures,mainlyintheeastandsouthofthecountry,aswellasconsiderablefinancialandinformationalresources(thepopularUkrainaandInterTVchannels). The second pro-Russian politician is Vadym Rabinovych, theleaderofForLife,anextremepopulistpartywhichhasnopoliticalstruc-tures, and whose only real resources are the NewsOne television stationandtheextrovertpersonalityofRabinovychhimself.Bothpoliticiansto-getherhavealmost16%supportinthepolls,andinrecentweekstheyhavetaken action to combine forces. In addition, the Rabinovych project hasthesupportoftheKremlin,whichexplainstheaccesstothepartyenjoyedby Putin’s old associate, the abovementioned Viktor Medvedchuk. BoykoandRabinovychhavealotofsupportintheeastofthecountry,andquiteasignificantamountinthesouth.If they can team up effectively and put forward a single candidate (most likely Boyko), his chances of mak-ing it to the second round are not negligible, especiallyasthepatrioticandpro-Westernelectorateisundergoingfragmentation.Inaddition,iftheEcumenicalPatriarchofConstantinoplegiveshisconsenttothecreationinUkraineofacanonicalUkrainianOrthodoxChurch,thatcouldfurthermobilisefollowersoftheRussianOrthodoxChurch,thatis,supportersoftheOppositionBlocandForLife.SuchasolutionmayevenbefavouredandsupportedbyPoroshenko’sadministration,asthecurrentPresidentcouldmore easily beat a pro-Russian candidate than Yulia Tymoshenko in thesecondround(assuminghemakesitthatfar).

• It is still too early to say which candidate has the best chance of be-coming President in spring 2019.The decisive phase of the campaign will begin in the autumn, and the major contenders will emerge by

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the end of the year.TheimportanceofMarch’spresidentialelectionissoimportantthatthepoliticalpartyassociatedwiththewinnerwillhavethebestchanceofgettingagood–andperhapsthebest–resultinthegeneralelectionsscheduledforOctober2019.

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I. BIographIes of the major candIdates

1. YULIa tYmoshenKo

YuliaTymoshenkowasbornin1960inDnipropetrovsk.HermotherMariyaHry-hjan(Grigian),néeNielepova,wasaUkrainianorRussianwoman;herfatherVo-lodymyrHryhjan(Grigian),wasaLatvianofJewishorigin(hetookthesurnameof his mother, an Armenian), who rapidly abandoned his family. In 1978, YuliastartedstudiesintheDnipropetrovskMiningInstitute(specialisinginautoma-tion&telemechanics),andtwoyearslatershetransferredtotheFacultyofEco-nomicsoftheUniversityofDnipropetrovsk,fromwhereshegraduatedin1984.In1999shereceivedadoctoratefromtheKievNationalUniversityofEconomics.In1979shemarriedOleksandrTymoshenko,andayearlatergavebirthtoadaugh-ter,Yevheniya.Shehasbeenseparatedfromherhusbandforovertwentyyears.

1.1. Business career

AftergraduatingTymoshenkoworkedasaneconomistintheDnieperLeninMachine-BuildingPlant(weaponsmanufacture).In1988sheandherhusbandopenedavideorentalstore,whichmarkedthebeginningofherbusinessca-reer.ThenshebegantoinvestintradingpetroleumproductsontheRussiancommodity and raw materials stock market. From 1991 to 1995 she was thedirectoroftheUkrayinska Benzynacorporation,providingfueltotheagricul-turalsectorintheDnipropetrovskoblast,initiallyincollaborationwithViktorPinchuk,andlaterwithPavloLazarenko,whowasresponsibleforagricultureintheoblastgovernment.Atthesametime,togetherwithherfather-in-law,andunderLazarenko’spatronage,shecreatedtheUnitedEnergySystemsofUkraine(YESU)corporation.ThankstothesupportofLazarenko,whobecamedeputyprimeministerandthenPrimeMinister(1995-7),YESUwonadomi-nantpositionasadistributorofRussiannaturalgastoUkraine.TymoshenkoassumedaprominentplaceamongUkraine’sleadingoligarchs.

1.2. Political career

In1997TymoshenkowonamandateintheUkrainianparliamentandjoinedthethen-marginalHromadaparty,whichwasLazarenko’sparliamentarybase,andturnedit intoaformidablepoliticalforce.AfterLazarenko’sarrestinJanuary1999,Tymoshenkodistancedherselffromherbusinessandpoliticalpatronbybringing about a split within Hromada and creating the Batkivshchyna party.Duringthepresidentialcampaignin1999shejoinedthecampofLeonidKuchma.

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Towardstheendof1999shebecamepartofthegovernmentofViktorYush-chenkoasdeputyprimeministerforthefuel-energysector.ShewassackedinFebruary2001,andthenarrestedonchargesofarrangingtheillegalimportofRussiangasviaYESU.Afterafewmonthsshewasreleased,andfromthenonwasaswornenemyofPresidentKuchma.

In2004shewasoneoftheleadersofthe‘OrangeRevolution’,declaringtotheendherrefusaltocompromisewithYanukovychorKuchma,astancewhichbroughtherenormouspopularity.InFebruary2005shebecametheheadofthegovernment,butsooncameintoconflictwithPresidentYushchenko’s team,especiallywithPetroPoroshenko,withwhomshecompetedforthepositionofprimeminister.InNovember2007sheagainbecameheadofthegovernment.Atthebeginningof2009therewasagascrisisasaresultoftheinterruptionofgassuppliesbyRussiatoUkraine.TheformalcauseofthisdisputewastheaccusationthatKievhaddefaultedonitsrepayments.Anewgascontractwasonlysignedafterseveraldays,andtheconditionsof thisnewcontractwereextremelyunfavourableforKiev.

In February 2010 Tymoshenko lost the presidential election to Yanukovych,whenshewon45.5%ofthevoteinthesecondround.Amonthaftertheelec-tions,theparliamentpassedavoteofnoconfidenceinhergovernment.Afterafewweeks,lawenforcementauthoritiesinitiatedanumberofcriminalpro-ceedingsaccusingTymoshenkoofabusesbothduringherpremiershipandinher business activity (the main allegations concerned her signing of the gascontract). In August 2011 she was temporarily arrested, and in October sen-tencedto7yearsinprison.Afterthe‘revolutionofdignity’shewasreleasedonthebasisofaspeciallaw.

Afterleavingprison,Tymoshenkowasreceivedrathercoollybythepublicandherformercolleagues,whohadnowgainedindependentpoliticalpositions(Ar-seniyYatsenyuk,OleksandrTurchynov).Whileremainingintheshadowofcur-rentpoliticalevents,Tymoshenkohasavoidedexpressingclearstatementsandopinions(forexample,onhowtoresolvetheconflictintheeastofthecountry,oronthedevelopmentofrelationswithRussia).Shehasbeguntorebuildherparty,andthankstoherambivalentattitudetothemostimportantissuesinthecountry,shehasbecomethebeneficiaryofboththemistakes&omissionsandthepainfulsocialreformsintroducedbyPoroshenkoandhisteam.

Whenlaunchingherelectioncampaign,Tymoshenkoavoidedmakingspecif-ic proposals, and has focused on promoting her new image and announcing

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‘anewcourseforUkraine’,butshehasnotspecifiedthedetailsofhervisionforthedevelopmentofthecountry.

1.3. Further information

Tymoshenko grew up in a Russian-speaking environment, lacking any na-tionalconsciousness,andsheonlystartedtolearntheUkrainianlanguageafterstartingherpoliticalcareer.Shehasgreatpoliticalandoratorytalent,andisagoodorganiser,butsheisalsoinclinedtoretaliate.Sheisdecisive,ambitious,headstrongandreadytosuffer.Shehastwiceagreedtobeimpris-oned,eventhoughshecouldhaveescapedabroad.Ananalysisofheractivi-ties over the past two decades indicates thatshehasnodeclared,constantpoliticalpositionsand, ifnecessary,shewouldbeabletochangethemdia-metrically.

2. anatoLIY hrYtsenKo

AnatoliyHrytsenkowasbornin1957inthevillageofBohachivka(Cherkasyoblast).HisfatherStepanHrytsenkofoughtinWorldWarII.Itwasprobablyhisfather’sexamplewhichlaybehindAnatoliy’sdecisiontostartamilitaryca-reer.Hehasbeenmarriedtwice,andhasfourchildren:withhisfirstwifeLud-mila,asonAleksey(born1979)andadaughterSvitlana(born1982);andwithhissecondwifeYuliaMostova,awell-knownandinfluential journalist,andeditor inchiefof theweeklyDzerkalo Tyzhnia,adaughterAnna(born2004)andasonHlib(born1998,fromMostova’spreviousmarriagetoOleksandrRa-zumkov,andadoptedbyHrytsenko).

2.1. Military career

Heisamilitaryengineer,graduatingasadoctoroftechnicalsciences.In1974hegraduatedfromtheSuvorovMilitarySchoolinKiev(nowtheIvanBohunMilitaryHighSchoolinKiev),andin1979fromtheKyivHigherMilitaryAvi-ation Engineering School (with honours); he was a lecturer there from 1984to1992.Hisdefectivevisionpreventedhimfrommakingacareerasapilot,anddeterminedtheanalyticaltrackofhislaterprofessionalcareer.From1992to 1994, he was deputy head of the analytical directorate of the Science andResearchCentreoftheArmedForcesofUkraine’sGeneralStaff.Atthesametime he was sent for training to the United States, where in 1993 he gradu-atedfromtheInstituteofForeignLanguagesoftheDepartmentofDefense,andayearlaterhebecamethefirstcitizenofUkrainetograduatefromtheeliteAir

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WarCollege.In1995,hegraduatedfromtheAcademyoftheArmedForcesofUkraine.In1999heretiredfrommilitaryservicewiththerankofcolonel.


AnimportantelementinHrytsenko’slifewashisfriendshipwithOleksandrRa-zumkov, an adviser to President Kuchma, as well as the husband of his futurewife.In1997HrytsenkotookoverleadershipoftheanalyticalserviceoftheNa-tional Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, in which Razumkov served asdeputysecretary.Afterthelatter’sdeathofhissuperiorin1999,Hrytsenkobe-cametheheadoftheUkrainianCentreforEconomicandPoliticalResearchfound-edbyRazumkov(whichsince2000hasbeenknownastheRazumkovCentre).

In 2004 he joined Viktor Yushchenko’s electoral team, in which he directedthe analytical team, and as such was responsible for the preparation of theelectoralprogrammeandthereformplan.ForhisservicesduringtheOrangeRevolution,YushchenkoappointedhimdefenceministerintheTymoshenkogovernmentinFebruary2005.HeretainedthispostintheYekhanurovandYanukovychcabinetsuntilDecember2007.

Intheearlygeneralelectionsin2007heranonthelistofthepro-presidentialOurUkraine–People’sSelf-Defenceblock.Inparliamenthebecamechairmanofthecommitteeforsecurityanddefence.Ashehimselfexplained,therea-sonforhissackingasdefenceministerwashisallegedrefusaltoselllandbe-longingtotheministrytoPresidentYushchenko’ssonatknock-downprices.Thereafter,therelationshipbetweenthepoliticianscooledoffconsiderably.In2008heheadedtheCivicPositionparty,andtwoyearslaterraninthepresi-dentialelections,inwhichhereceived1.2%ofthevote.Hrytsenko’sgrouptookpartinthe2012parliamentaryelectionsaspartoftheUnitedOppositionBat-kivshchynacoalitionledbyTymoshenko,whoatthattimewasstillinprison.

In January2014Hrytsenkocriticisedtheorganisationof theprotestsontheMaidan,urgingtheorganiserstotakedownthe‘tentcity’assupportforthedemonstrationsstartedfalling.Justafewdayslater,however,hecalledonpeo-plewholegallyownedarmstoprotecttheMaidan,andannouncedthatifat-temptsweremadetobreakuptheprotests,hewouldbereadytostandinthefrontlineandofferactiveresistancetothegovernment.

InMay2014hestoodagaininthepresidentialelections,receiving5%support,whichgavehimfourthplace;inthesameyearhisCivicPositionpartyfailedto

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passthe5%electoralthresholdintheparliamentaryelections.Since2015hehasbeenalecturerattheKiev-MohylaAcademy.

Asheannouncedthathewouldruninthepresidentialelections in2019,hepromisedtodefendUkraineagainstaggressionfromtheeast,adoptedahardstance towards Russia and the self-proclaimed republics, and said he woulddealwithcorruptionandtheoligarchicsystemofpowerinthecountry.How-ever, he lacks the personnel and financial backing to carry out this latterpromiseinparticular.

2.3. Additional information

HeisaradicalsupporterofUkraine’scurrentpro-Westerncourse;hesupportsmembershipintheEUandNATO.Hispersonalityischaracterisedbyitsinde-cisiveness,whileatthesametimehisopinionsarepronouncedverycategori-cally.HispositionduringtheEuromaidanremainsunclear;hecalledfortheproteststobedissolved,thenfortheformationofarmedpatrols,andthenforterroristactstobecarriedoutinRussia(aninvestigationagainsthiminRussiaisongoingwithregardtothislatterstatement).AlthoughtheallegationsthatheweakenedtheUkrainianarmy’smilitarypotentialasaresultofhisactionswhileheadofthedefenceministryarepoorlyarguedandinconclusive,manypoliticianshaveaccusedhimofsupportingandparticipatingintheevacuationofthespecial‘Berkut’troopsfromgovernmentbuildingsafterPresidentYanu-kovychfledthecountry.

3. petro poroshenKo

PetroPoroshenkowasbornin1965inBolgrad(Odessaoblast),thesonofOlek-siyandYevheniyaPoroshenko.ThefuturePresident’sfatherwasbornin1936inSafyany(avillagenearIzmail)asacitizenofRomania.From1982to1989PetroPoroshenkostudiedattheFacultyofInternationalRelationsandInter-nationalLawattheUniversityofKiev.From1989to1992hewasanassistantatthatuniversity’sDepartmentofInternationalEconomicRelations.In2002heobtainedhisdoctoratefromtheOdessaNationalLawAcademy.Duringhisstudies(1982–4)hedidhismilitaryserviceatanairdefenceunitinAktöbe/Aktyubinsk(Kazakhstan),andlaterattheMilitaryAero-TechnicalSchoolinVasylkivnearKiev.

He is married to Maryna Poroshenko (née Perevedentseva, born 1962), whograduated from the Kiev Medical Institute and is the daughter of a Soviet

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former deputy minister of health. They have four children: Oleksiy (1985),Yevheniya&Oleksandra(2000)andMykhailo(2001).ViktorYushchenko isgodfathertotheirtwindaughters.


In1993Poroshenkoandhispartners(includingIhorKononenko,afriendfromthearmy,andnowoneofhisclosestcollaborators),aswellashisfather(andpresumablyhisbrotherMykhailo),createdtheUkrPromInvestholdingcom-pany,whichfromtheoutsethasspecialisedinconfectionery(andlaterotheragriculturalprocessingindustries)andtheautomotiveindustry.Poroshenkowasitsdirector-generaluntil1998,whenuponbecomingaparliamentarydep-utyhehandedthepositionontohisfather,whileretainingthetitleofhon-orarypresident,andalso(asitseems)adecisiveinfluenceonthecompany’sbusinessdecisions.

Between1996and1998,thecompanytookoverthemainUkrainianconfection-eryfactoriesandquicklysetthembackontheirfeet.In1996theUkrPromIn-vest-Konditer confectionery holding company was created, and renamedRoshenin2002;thisisPoroshenko’sflagshipcompany,whichhasfactoriesinVinnitsa,Kiev,Mariupol,Kremenchuk,Lipetsk(Russia),Klaipeda(Lithuania)andHungary.Whenhestartedhispoliticalactivity,Poroshenkomadeoverhissharesinthecompanytoatrustfund,PrimeAssetsCapital.Forbesmagazinehasestimatedhisassets’valueatUS$1billion.


Poroshenkostartedhispoliticalcareer in1997intheSocialDemocraticPartyofUkraine(United),whichwasthepoliticalbaseforPresidentLeonidKuchma.In2000helosttheracetoleadthepartytoViktorMedvedchukandHryhoriySurkis, left the party and created his own, the Ukraine Solidarity Party. Inthesameyear,hebroughthispartyintothenewPartyofRegionalRevivalofUkraine(laterknownsimplyasthePartyofRegions).Hewasoneoftheparty’sco-foundersandleaders.In2001heleftthePartyofRegionsandcreatedhisownSolidarity party, which however remained a marginal structure. The reasonsforPoroshenko’sturnaroundareunclear;mostlikelyitwasaresultofhisre-movalfromtheleadershipofthePartyofRegions.Attheendof2001PoroshenkobroughthispartyintotheViktorYushchenkoElectoralBloc/OurUkraine,be-comingoneofYushchenko’sclosestcollaborators.In2004,hewasdeputychiefofstaffinYushchenko’selectionteamandoneofthesponsorsofhiscampaign.

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In2007-9hewasthechairmanoftheboardoftheNationalBankofUkraine.In2009-10hewasforeignministerintheYanukovychgovernment,andfromMarchtoDecember2012heservedasministerforeconomicdevelopmentandtradeinthegovernmentofMykolaAzarov.

DuringtheEuromaidan,hesupportedtheprotestsfinancially,whileatthesametimetryingtokeephisdistancefromotheroppositionpoliticians.Duringthedemonstrationshespokeindependently,andhisattitudewonhimgreatpopu-larity.WhenapollinMarch2014gavehimasignificantadvantageoverotherpotentialcandidatesforthefirsttime,hedecidedtotakepartinthepresidentialelectionsinMay,whichhewoninthefirstround(with54.7%ofthevotes).

Just before the parliamentary elections in October 2014 Poroshenko revivedhispreviouspartyunderthenameofthePetroPoroshenkoBloc(BPP),whichwon21.8%ofthevotes.AftertheresignationofPrimeMinisterArseniyYatse-nyuk,Poroshenko’spartyformedagovernmentwiththeNationalFrontpartyledbyVolodymyrHroysman.


In his youth Poroshenko practiced judo and sambo. He is a member of theUkrainianOrthodoxChurch(whichacknowledgestheauthorityofthePatri-archofMoscow);themediaagreesthatheisasincerebeliever,regularlyat-tendingreligiousceremonies.Hehashadamagnificentliturgicalchapelcon-structedathisresidenceinKozin,nearKiev.

Poroshenko is an experienced politician and entrepreneur; the basis of hispositionishisfinancialindependence.Heiscautiousandcharismatic,butasapoliticianismoreofanadministratorbynature.Heisagoodspeaker,buttendstobeimpulsiveandtemperamental(somesaydownrighthysterical).Heisastrongsupporterofthepro-Europeanoption(althoughhisinterestsmostlytiehimtomarketsintheCIS).

HespeaksEnglishfluently.Heplaystennis.Heisinterestedinpainting,espe-ciallyImpressionism.

4. YUrIY BoYKo

Yuriy Boyko was born in 1958 in Horlivka (Donetsk oblast), the only son inafamilywhoseprivacyhecloselyguards,avoidingmakingpublicstatements

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aboutthem(nothingisknownabouthisparents).In1981hegraduatedfromtheMendeleevChemical-TechnologicalUniversityinMoscow.In2001healsograduatedfromtheVolodymyrDalEasternUkrainianNationalUniversityinLugansk,obtainingthetitleofengineer-economist.WhilestudyinginMoscowhemarriedhisclassmateVera,asportschampioningymnastics,withwhomhehasthreesons,Anatoliy,YuriandMykola,andthreedaughters,Yaroslava,UlyanaandMaria.


Aftercompletinghisstudies,hereturnedtoUkraineandstartedworkingintheZaryachemicalplantinRubizhne(Luganskoblast)producingmilitaryin-dustrialexplosives.Duringhisemploymenttherein1981-1999herosethroughtheranksandbecamedirectoroftheplant.From2001heworkedinmanage-mentpositionsinoilbusinesses.In2002,hebecamepresidentoftheNaftohazstatecompany;however, threeyears laterhewasdismissedbyadecisionofPrime Minister Tymoshenko, who accused Boyko of having ties to RusUkr-Energo, a company which profited from importing gas from TurkmenistanandRussia.Thecompany,whichwasownedbyGazpromandthebusinessmanDmytroFirtash,posedadirectthreattoTymoshenko’sinterests.Oneimpor-tantprovisionoftheRussian-Ukrainiangascontractof2009wastheremovalofagentstradinginnaturalgas.InthecourseofaninvestigationbytheUSDe-partmentofJusticein2005,itcametolightthatBoyko,alongwithhisbusinesspartner Dmytro Firtash, had participated in creating RusUkrEnergo, whichwas accused of collaborating with Semyon Mogilevich, one of the leaders oftheRussianmafia.


In2001Boykowent intopoliticsaspartofSerhiyTyhipko’soligarchicpartyTrudova Ukraina[LabourUkraine}.From2003to2005,hewasdeputyminis-teroffuelandenergyintheYanukovychgovernment(andservedatthesametimeaspresidentofNaftohaz).Tymoshenkodismissedhimin2005,butayearlaterhebecametheheadoftheMinistryofFuelandEnergyintheYanukovychcabinet.In2007hejoinedthePartyofRegionsandwaselectedasadeputyonitslist.In2010heagainbecameenergyministerintheAzarovgovernment,andfrom2012to2014hewasDeputyPrimeMinister.In2014heranforPresi-dent ofUkraine,receiving 0.19%of thevote. InOctober of thesameyearhebecameheadoftheOppositionBloc,agroupinglargelymadeupofformerpoli-ticiansfromthePartyofRegions.

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AlthoughBoykowasaprominentmemberoftheYanukovychregime,hewasnot, unlike many of his colleagues, accused of treason or corruption. Boykowasnotonthelistofpersonscoveredbysanctions,andtheinvestigationsintohim(concerningtheembezzlementofstateresourcestopurchasedrillingrigsin2011)havebeendiscontinued.TheUkrainianspecialservices’lackofinter-estintheOppositionBloc’sleaderismostlikelytheresultofapoliticalcalcu-lationbyPoroshenko’steam.Inaccordancewiththeseassumptions,ifBoykomakesittothesecondroundofthepresidentialelectionhewillbeaconveni-entrivalforPoroshenko,whowouldstandamuchgreaterchanceofwinningagainsthim.


Inpolitics,Boykopositionshimselfasacoolandrationaltechnocrat,aswellas being a strong and decisive politician. During a session of parliament, herespondedtoasuggestionbythepopulistOlehLyashkothathehadbetrayedtheUkrainianstatetoRussiainanunusualfashion:heknockedhisadversaryout,andcalmlyreturnedtohisseatwithastraightface.

Boyko is generally considered to be a representative of Russian interests inUkraine.Hefavoursestablishingcooperationandnormalisingdiplomaticrela-tionswithRussiaasfastaspossible.Hepubliclypresentshimselfasapragmat-icpoliticianinterestedinstabilisingthesituationinthecountryandimprov-ingthelivingconditionsofordinarypeople.Heisanavidicehockeyplayer.

*

Three further candidates also enjoy relatively high support in the polls. Al-though their chancesofbecomingPresidentarenot toogreat, theirsupportofothercandidatesmayhaveasignificantimpactonthecourseofnextyear’selections.

5. oLeh LYashKo

HewasborninChernihivin1972.TheleaderoftheRadicalPartyhasgainedpopularitybyhisuseofnationalistandpopulistslogans,appealingmainlytotheruralandpoorlyeducatedelectorate.Hefavoursauthoritarian,strong-armgovernmentsandano-holds-barredfightagainstcorruption.HeisfundedandsupportedbymediaoligarchsclosetotheformerPresidentYanukovych(pri-marilyRinatAkhmetov).

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6. VadYm raBInoVYch

HewasborninKharkovin1953.HeisPresidentoftheAll-UkrainianCongressof Jewsanda founderof theEuropean JewishParliament.He is thefounderandleaderoftheForLifeparty.Heistheeditorinchiefofthe112newschan-nel(andhostshisownprogrammeonit),whichismostlikelycontrolledbythepro-RussianpoliticianViktorMedvedchuk.Inthepasthehasbeenconvictedofarmstraffickingandmoneylaundering.

7. sVYatosLaV VaKarchUK

HewasborninMukachevoin1975.HeistheleaderofthepopularrockbandOkean Elzy. He is the son of Ivan Vakarchuk, a scientist, rector of the IvanFranko University and a former minister of education and science. In 2004hebecameinvolvedinYushchenko’selectoralcampaign,andtookpartintheOrangeRevolutionandtheEuromaidan.Hehasbeenpubliclyactiveforsev-eralyears,holdingmeetingsandcommentingoncurrentpoliticalevents.Heisasupporterofthecurrentpro-WesterncourseofUkraineanditsmembershipinWesternstructures.Hehasnotofficiallyconfirmedhisparticipationintheelections.

8. VoLodYmYr ZeLensKIY

HewasborninKryvyiRihin1978.Apopularcomedianandactor,co-creatoroftheKvartal-95cabaret,andthesitcomSluga Narodu[ServantofthePeople]onthe1+1TVchannelownedbytheoligarchIhorKolomoisky.Hispublicactivityincludesorganisingcollectionsandassistanceforsoldiersinvolvedinthecon-flictintheeastofthecountry.Littleisknownabouthisrealpoliticalopinions.Fromtimetotime,hebothconfirmsanddenieshisparticipationinthepresi-dentialelection,whichprobablymeansthedecisiononhisparticipationintheelectionshasnotyetbeentaken.

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appendIx. Support for candidates in the presidential election (August 2018)

All, %Percentage of those

who intend to vote ,%

percentage of those who intend to vote

and have made their choice, %

Yulia Tymoshenko 11.1 14.4 17.7

Anatoliy Hrytsenko 6.7 8.7 10.7

Yuriy Boyko 6.4 7.2 8.9

Oleh Lyashko 5.9 6.9 8.5

Petro Poroshenko 5.3 6.8 8.3

Volodymyr Zelenskiy 6.2 6.5 8.0

Svyatoslav Vakarchuk 5.7 6.5 8.0

Vadym Rabinovych 3.7 4.8 5.9

Andriy Sadovyi 1.6 1.9 2.3

Oleh Tiahnybok 1.3 1.7 2.1

Valentyn Nalyvaichenko 1.2 1.5 1.9

Roman Bezsmertnyi 1.1 1.4 1.7

Serhiy Taruta 0.7 0.8 0.9

Arseniy Yatsenyuk 0.8 0.8 0.9

Vitaliy Skotsyk 0.3 0.3 0.3

Another candidate 9.6 11.2 13.8

Hard to say 17.4 18.8

I would not vote 15.2

source: Rating Group

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