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AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

26THAAPAM ANNUAL ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE,

WHITESANDS HOTEL, MOMBASA, KENYA 7TH 11THMARCH,

2005

TOPIC : DEMOCRATIZATION, GOOD GOVERNANCE ANDADMINISTRATION REFORM IN AFRICA

DR PAUL N. NDUE

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

This paper examines the often neglected relationship between

democratisation and governance on one hand, and administrative reform

on the other, that has characterised the literature. It argues that

administrative reform is an essential prerequisite to democratisation and

governance and that any attempt to delink the three concepts will make

democratisation and governance a farce. In other words, any political

reform at democratizing institutions, in particular the founding of a pluralistic

democracy, will only be fully effective insofar as it is accompanied by far

reaching administrative reforms which effectively redistribute power. The

paper also discusses the implications of this link between democratisation,

governance and administrative reform for public administration in Africa.

1- WHAT IS DEMOCRATISATION?

The concept democratisation defies precise definition. In its

minimalist/formalist definition or delineation, democratisation has the

criteria of regular electoral competitions, usually in a multiparty political

system, and thus governmental succession by constitutional, electoral

procedures, guaranteed in the rule of law. On the other hand, the

maximalist socio-economic delineation of democratisation include the

criteria such as redistributive socio-economic reforms, broadened popular

participation, social justice and human rights (Qadir et. al., 193:416).

According to Elly Runierse (1993) three stages of the process of

democratization may be discerned. First, is the political liberalization, which

has been defined as the process in which the fear of repression is relaxed

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and there are constitutional guarantees of a range of political freedoms

(especially the recognition of the right of opposition groupings to function

and to express dissent) in which there is greater independence for

legislative assemblies where they still exist, and freedom of the press.

(Healey and Robinson, 1992:22). To Qadir et. al. (1993:416), political

liberalization is a process of political change controlled from the top down,

as means of preserving most of the status quo. They seem to be cynical of

political liberalization, which they regard as the game the elites play to

manage the granting of very carefully selected concessions a cosmetic

exercise and does not install the fundamentals of democratization. Qadir

et al. (1993:416-417) however concede that political change escapes from

elite control to encompass broader social forces and its purpose is

transformed from the preservation to the status quo of interests to genuine

reform. They conclude that the processes of democratization and political

liberalization are distinct, and only the truly deserving cases should be

referred to as democratization, where ultimate outcome of the process and

its agency are almost the reverse of political liberalization (Qadir,

1993:417). Anything short of this is to trivialize the concept of

democratization, and worse still, to mislead people. (Qadir et. al., 1993:

417) Adrain Ledtwich (1993:616) takes their warning further by pointing that

faith in the economic and political liberalism of the minimal state as the

universally appropriate means of development is deeply flawed. Perhaps a

more forceful and cynical attempt to press home the point that

democratization and political liberalization are not the same and are

therefore distinct has been made by lemarchand (1992:183-184):

For, if by liberalization is meant the dismantling of dictatorships, there are

good reasons to assume that liberalization can occur without

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democratization and that in some parts of Africa the disintegration of

authoritarian rule may be followed by anarchy or intensified corruption.

Second, it is the process of growing political accountability which has been

viewed as a move towards more inclusive politics, even within a single-

party system, through the introduction of measures to extend societal

participation in political decision-making (Healey and Robinson, 1992:151).

Third, is to regard democratization as a historical process rather than an

end state that seems to involve the introduction of universal suffrage and

genuine political competition with free and fair elections to decide who will

take power (Healey and Robinson, 1992:151).

II DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Democratization has been linked to good governance, which the World

Bank defines as the exercise of political power to manage a nations

affairs (World Bank, 1989:60) and also regards as synonymous with sound

development (World Bank, 1992-1). The relationship between

democratization and good governance, supported and promoted by

institutions such as the World Bank, United States, British and French

governments, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), the European Council and the Commonwealth Secretariat, is

based on the fact that the latter (good governance) has the ingredients,

features, the functional and institutional prerequisites as well as the building

blocks of democratization. These include an efficient public service; an

independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the

accountable administration of public funds ; an independent public auditor,

representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels

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of government; a pluralistic institutional structure; and a free press (World

Bank, 1989:6, 15, 60-61, 192). According to Leftwich (1993; 1994) the

concept of democratic good governance has the three main levels of

meaning which can be classified into systemic, political and administrative.

First, from a systematic angle, good governance is government that

embraces the formed institutional structure location of authoritarian

decision making in the modern state power. In this sense, good

governance denotes the structures of political and crucially, economic

relationships and rules by which the productive and distributive life of a

society is governed (Leftwich, 1993:611; Leftwich, 1994:371). In short,

good governance means a democratic capitalist regime presided over by

a minimal state which forms part of the wider governance of the New World

Order (World Bank, 1989; World Bank, 1992; Healey and Robinson;

Leftwich 1994).

Second, from a political sense, good governance presupposes a regime or

state which enjoys legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic

mandate and built on the traditional liberal notion of a clear separation of

legislative, executive and judicial powers. Whether in a presidential or

parliamentary system, this presupposes a pluralist polity with a freely and

regularly elected representative legislature, with the capacity at least to

influence and check executive power (Leftwich, 1993: Leftwich, 1994).

Third, from an administrative point of view, good governance means an

efficient, independent, accountable and open audited public service which

has the bureaucratic competence to help design and implement

appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is. It also

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entails an independent judicial system to uphold the law and resolve

disputes arising in a largely free market economy. The administrative

aspect of good governance focuses on four main areas of public

administration in general and public sector management in particular. They

are:

- accountability, which in essence means holding officials responsible for

their actions;

- a legal framework for development, which means a structure of rules

and laws which provide clarity, predictability and stability for the private

sector, which are impartially and fairly applied to all, and which provide

the basis for conflict resolution through an independent judicial system;

- information, by which is meant that information about economic

conditions, budgets, markets and government intentions is reliable and

accessible to all, something which is crucial for private sector

calculations;

- insistence on transparency, which is basically a call for open

government, to enhance accountability, limit corruption and stimulate

consultative processes between government and private interests over

policy development (World Bank, 1992; Leftwich, 1993; Leftwich, 1993).

Viewed from the foregoing connotations of good governance, it is no

wonder that the concept is inseparable from the process of

democratization.

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III - WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM?

Like democratization, the concept of administrative reform does not lend

itself to a clear-cut definition. However, the definition, which is commonly

used because of its comprehensiveness and scope, is the one offered by

Gerald Caiden (1969). According to Caiden (1960:65) administrative reform

is the artificial inducement of administrative need to improve on the

status), artificial transformation (departure from existing arrangements and

natural change processes), and administrative resistance (opposition is

assumed). Administrative reform is political rather than merely

organizational. It is a political process designed to adjust the relationship

between a bureaucracy and other elements in society or within the

bureaucracy itself (Montgomery, 1967:17). Succinctly put, administrative

reform is:

Power politics in action; it contains ideological rationalization, fights for

control of areas, services, and people, political participants and

institutions (Caiden, 1969:9).

Administrative reform has a moral content in that it seeks to create a

better system by removing faults and imperfections. It is usually

undertaken to change the status quo for the better. It aims at making the

administrative and political structures and procedures compatible with

broader goals. Administrative reform sets additional political values to be

used as yardsticks against which administrative performance may be

judged. The crux of administrative reform, therefore, is innovation and

wealth creation that is, injection of new ideas and new people in a new

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combination of tasks and relationships into the policy and administrative

process. Administrative reform may occur where two conditions are met.

- a set value with which the existing bureaucratic arrangements, public

personnel and values are seen to be in conflict.

- The concern by politicians and the general public that the existing

bureaucratic structures cannot realize new goals set for them.

Consequently, administrative reform may involve centralizing or

decentralizing initiatives or both: the denominators are away from or

towards the centre (Caiden, 1969; United Nations, 1973; Dror, 1976;

Leemans, 1976).

Administrative reform involves system diagnosis, that is, examination of

administrative systems to detect what is wrong and what can be improved.

Given that all systems are imperfect, system diagnosis is not difficult.

Getting the right solution is something else. As in medicine, the same

symptoms may have several possible causes, some of little consequence,

others serious. A wrong diagnosis may prove quite harmful. Every system,

like patient, needs careful examination and the selection of those remedies

that best fit in peculiar circumstances, not a superficial examination,

acceptance of the clients own diagnosis, and hasty reference to standard

texts (Caiden, 1978: 114; Caiden, 1988).

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IV DEMOCRATIZATION, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND

ADMINISTRATION REFORM AS A MEANS OF INNOVATION AND

WEALTH CREATION.

Democratization, good governance and administrative reform are related in

a number of ways first, they are all concerned with institution and capacity

building. The process of democratization and the concept of governance

involve institution and capacity building aimed at not only the improvement

of governmental capacity but also the creation of more efficient and more

autonomous state and civil institutions, capable of ushering in development

in the Third World. The over-development of the post-colonial state, with

the vast expansion of its size, regulatory powers and administrative

responsibilities led to the erosion of its efficiency, authority and economic

viability and these are supposed to be corrected via institution and

capacity building methods of rolling the state back (decentralization,

privatization, and deregulation) and liberalization. For instance, with

economic liberalization, the corruption and other administrative weakness

encouraged by over-regulation would be minimised, if not eradicated

(Jeffries, 1993). Administrative reform, in the other hand, is also concerned

with incorporated, foster and protect (new) normative relationships and

actions patterns, (b) perform functions and services which are valued in

the environment, and (c) facilitate the assimilation of new physical and

social technologies. Such organizations are instruments of planned change

in the administrative system. They bring about reform by their linkages

(enabling, functional, normative and diffused) with their environment. Their

effectiveness depends on the quality of their leadership and the

appropriateness of their internal structures. Quality leadership can be

trusted to decide on correct tactics while appropriate structures will ensure

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survival. In short, to distinguish institution and capacity building

characteristics of democratization, good governance and administrative

reform concentrate their energies on building a few key strategic

instruments in an administrative system and maximise the use of scarce

reform resources. The three concepts also draw attention to factors such

as legitimacy, leadership, timing, rationale, appropriateness, goals and

reform resources which can be incorporated into useful reform monitoring

guides.

Secondly, democratization, good governance and administrative reforms

are being embarked upon to promote development in the Third World.

Caiden (1973), for instance, has asserted that development is enhanced by

administrative reform programmes in four ways. First, reform proposals

challenge bureaucratic inertia and reactionary administrators and although

defence mechanisms may temporarily suppress change, things can never

quite be the same and peace tokens have to be made if the situation is to

be kept in hand. Second, reform programmes attract enterprising

administrative talent and provide valuable experience for a new generation

of administrative aspirants. Third, reformers promote badly needed

administrative modernization which is likely to set off a chain reaction in

functional reforms as changes in techniques, skills and attitudes in

specialized fields seems more attainable than possibly the harder changes

to carry through in administration. Fourth, administrative reform introduces

some inventiveness in outmoded systems, obsolete institutions, inert

bureaucracies and in an environment of official indifference, technical

ignorance, political intransigence and public apathy. Hence administrative

reform demands most of administrators in countries unable to sustain

administration at minimal and unacceptable levels:

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encased in outmoded legalistic codes, obsessed by mimicry of great

powers, deficient in administrative talent, or suffering from excessive

institutionalised poverty, where reform, even if partial, sporadic, episodic,

and periodic, is cumulative in transforming and modernizing administrative

systems for development purposes (Caiden, 1973: 344).

Fifthly, administrative reform is premised on the fact that lasting change is

the product of sharing and participation. Proposals for administrative reform

need to be formulated with the active involvement of those likely to be

affected to reduce resistance. Human behaviour, it must be pointed out,

cannot be effectively changed through coercion (Caiden, 1978: 114).

On the other hand good governance and democratisation have been

regarded as remedies for the difficult problems of development. For

instance, the 1989 World Bank report on Africa 1989 has argued that a

crisis of governance underlay the litany of Africas development

problems and good governance, which was meant as the exercise of

political power to manage a nations affairs (World Bank, 1989: 60) is to

become magin world, pluralistic institutional structure (World Bank,

1989: 60). In other words, good governance and democratisation are to

promote a legal framework for development, capacity building, and the civil

society, which is linked to the fostering of accountability, legitimacy,

transparency and participation as it is these factors which empower civil

society and reduce the power of the state (World Bank, 1992; Williams and

Young, 1994 : 87).

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Some scholars have, however, questioned the validity of democratisation,

governance and administrative reform in promoting development in the

Third World, especially Africa. According to Leftwich (1994), effective

development has often required that some quite radical steps are taken

early on in a development cycle. These might include land reform or wage

restraint, which are precisely the kind of measures which may alienate

major socio-economic groups whose consent is necessary for stable

democracy. There is also abundant empirical evidence which seems to

show that many of the successful examples of late development since the

mid-nineteenth century, as in Germany, Japan, Korea or Thailand, have

occurred under conditions which have not remotely approximated

competitive democracy, though some have moved or are now moving in a

democratic direction, as in Indonesia or Korea (Leftwich, 1994 : 364).

Democratization cannot result into coherent development strategies in

Africa where there exists debilitating conditions, like the incapacity of most

states to exercise effective jurisdiction over their societies, low levels of

legitimacy, consensus and elite commitment, absence of a robust and

substantial middle class, powerful middle working class which push for and

protect democratic advance, limited civil society that is seldom independent

and has often enmeshed with the state, the fractures nature of many

African societies and their politics by ethnic, religious and regional

pluralism, sustained economic crisis and subsequent liberalization that

have a heavy price on the poor, rumours of coups and counter coups as

well as a proliferation of political parties that emerged with the opening up

of democratic possibilities over 200 in Zaire, 100 in Cameroon, 71 in the

Congo, 30 in Angola and 26 in Cte dIvoire (Leftwich, 1993:617). With

these conditions in Africa and some other Third World countries, Leftwich

(1994:364), sounding rather pessimistic, cautions that:

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Democratization in the socio-political and economic conditions which in

much of the third world and elsewhere is likely to engender political

turbulence and also blow stable market friendly development strategies

wildly off course. As the 1990s unfold, therefore, it seems likely that we

shall see a period of democratic reversal, not consolidation, much of the

developing world and parts of Eastern Europe.

Richard Jeffries (1993:30) has also pointed out that democratisation may

not result in development. He argued that although democratic regimes

are electorally accountable and popularly responsive in Africa, they have

generally been responsive not to the interest of an indigenous, market-

oriented group, but rather to:

- pressure from urban-dwellers to expand government employment;

- clienteles networks pressing for redistribution (rather than concentration)

of capital, often along ethnic/religion lines;

- rent-seekers. Consequently, it is important for one to recognise the fact

that:

democratisation in an African setting is unlikely in itself to reduce

corruption/prebendalisation or the pressures for (from a development

perspective) wasteful government expenditure. Groups of electors support

particular parliamentary candidates, precisely in the hope that they will

succeed in prebendalising government offices in their favour Elected

civilian regimes in African states are, then, under intense popular pressure

to be economically irresponsible and short-sighted (Jeffries, 1993 :30).

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These criticisms notwithstanding, it is pertinent to point out that

instrumental to the success of democratisation, governance and

administrative reform is the building of civil institutions: viable political

parties which openly function and contest elections as well as a free and

dynamic press which would curb clientelism and corruption, thus making

both the private sector and government accountable for their conduct. By

exposing the misdeeds and mistakes, a free press would not only induce a

new and creative proposals and policy options. Another key of the success

of democratisation is the ability of both government and opposition to build

bridges of compromise and mutual political accommodation.

Third, democratisation, governance and administrative reform are

concerned with administrative improvement, effectiveness, efficiency and

rationality. In this connection, the concepts extol the virtues in revamping

the performance and strengthening the civil service and local government

units as well as improving the performance of state-owned enterprises

through corporate plans, performance contracts, privatisation and

recapitulisation. Since democratisation, governance and administrative

reform seek to challenge social mores and long-standing policies,

procedures, attitudinal and behavioural patterns, there is always

considerable resistance and foot-dragging in any attempt to implement

them.

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V CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

IN AFRICA

One of the distinct political trends or phenomena, which has characterised

world politics over the past decade, has been the ascendance of

democratisation. The process of democratisation fosters and promotes an

environment which not only encourages but also sustains the rule of law,

human rights, popular participation, public accountability, transparency in

government all leading to wealth creation. Democratisation therefore

requires not only institutional pluralism, but also independent institutions,

such as an independent judiciary, an impartial civil service, an effective

parliament and a strong and autonomous local government structure.

To achieve this, there is the urgent need to reorganise and restructure

public administration. First, the civil service and local government units

have to be delinked from the government of the day. Secondly, measures

have to be undertaken to strengthen democratic control over public

administration and increase its accountability to democratically elected

bodies. Administrative reform is therefore undoubtedly and inseparable part

of the democratisation and governance processes.

Second, democratisation, governance and administrative reform will be

meaningless if the government of the day fails to realise that family and

ethnic ties that strengthen communal actions have no place in central

government agencies where staff must be selected on merit, and public

and private monies must not be confused (Wold Bank, 1989: 60). Efforts

must be made to develop a cadre of public officials committed to an ethic of

public service as well as more efficient and capable government

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bureaucracy (Jeffries, 1993). Corruption, rent-seeking, prebendalisation or

pressures for wasteful government expenditure, nepotism, favouritism,

patronage and clientelism must be reduced or controlled. The supposedly

democratic character of Fourth Republic must be insulated from the

bonanza of embezzlement and irresponsible expenditure.

Third, democratisation, governance and administrative reform depend on

building administrative capacity at all levels both by involving a wider

ranger of organisations and by decentralizing authority and responsibility.

Esman and Montgomery (1980) have pointed out that human resource

development programmes requires a variety of organisational

arrangements for eliciting the participation of those that are to be affected

by the projects, and for assuring that resources reach the intended groups.

In addition to using centrally financed and managed bureaucracies,

programmes should be administered through modified bureaucracies that

can be realised from conventional central controls to extend their reach in

unconventional ways. Local authorities often have linkages of interaction

with local groups that central bureaucracies do not know about and cannot

reach. Market mechanisms may be used effectively to deliver services with

only modest government intervention.

Many voluntary organisations have ties and channels of distribution to

groups that are frequently identified as beneficiaries of social and economic

development projects, and through which experimental, pilot, and

demonstration projects can be carried out. It is therefore necessary to build

the administrative capacity of, and involve in planning and administration,

what Esman and Montgomery (1980) call organised special publics, for

example, interest groups such as credit unions, womens clubs, labour

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unions, co-operatives and the like. Thus, constituencies are created that

will support projects for their members and act as channels of interaction

between beneficiaries and the agencies sponsoring development projects.

Once mobilised, these organisations can also begin to generate their own

projects, thereby supplementing and extending the impact of government-

sponsored ones. Because complex and uncertain projects cannot be

controlled entirely from the centre, administrative capacity must be

strengthened through decentralisation. Much more attention should be

given to alternative means of decentralizing authority, responsibility, and

resources through field administration, creation of local administrative units,

delegation of functions of regional, special-purpose, or functional

authorities, and devolution of functions to local government units

(Rondinelli, 1982).

Fourth, the success of democratisation, governance and administrative

reform depends on politicians and administrators attitudes toward error.

Under conditions of uncertainty, errors and mistakes are not only likely,

they are to be expected. The concept of development administrative reform

be designed in such a way that errors and mistakes can be uncovered as

they proceed; they can then be redesigned and revised incrementally.

Learning by doing can become an acceptable managerial approach only

when it is explicitly recognised that democratisation, governance and

administrative reform are basically experiments. Incentives and rewards

must be provided to encourage innovation, experimentation and creativity.

Only uncorrected errors should be considered evidence of poor

management. Consequently, politicians and administrators must

continuously monitor and evaluate the processes of democratisation,

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national interest. This is best explained: either by revolution, conquest or

coup by modernising elites (e.g. Thailand from 1923, China from 1949,

Korea from 1960, Taiwan from 1949, Indonesia from 1966), or by an

electoral process that has nonetheless consistently yielded one dominant

party of government (as in Botswana, Malaysia and Singapore).

Third, whether democratic or not, a developmental state has all been de

facto or de jure one-party state for much of the past thirty years, although in

general the democratic group (Botswana, Singapore and Malaysia) have

had better human rights rating than the non-democratic group has been

ruled by military-backed authoritarian regimes (Thailand has had short

democratic interludes), the democratic states have been ruled either by a

single party (the BDP in Botswana and the PAP in Singapore) or in

Malaysia, by a coalition in which a single party (UMNO) has dominated.

The effect has been to concentrate very considerable and unchallenged

political power at the top in these states, thus usually enhancing political

stability and continuity in policy (Leftwch, 1993; Leftwich 1994).

Finally, elite determination and the relative autonomy of the state has

helped to shape very powerful, highly competent and insulated economic

bureaucracies with authority in directing and managing economic and

social development. Examples of these Economic Planning Board of

Korea. What differentiates these economic institutions in developmental

states is their real power, authority, technical competence and insulation in

shaping development policy. Their existence, form and function should be

understood as a consequence of the politically-driven urgency for

development and the politics of a strong state (Leftwich, 1994 : 379). It is

important for us to note that the concepts of democratisation, good

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governance and administrative reform run counter to the idea of a

developmental state. While the former concepts eulogise the minimal state,

a Weberian-type bureaucracy, rigorous respect for human rights, a rich and

diverse civil society, political pluralism and a sharp separation of economic

and political life, the latter, whether democratic or not, espouses a strong

and determined state which protects powerful and competent bureaucracy

that largely shapes and directs development policy, a dubious (and

sometimes appalling) civil and human rights, the suppression or control of

civil society and a fusion at least at the top of the political direction of

economic power.

As an agenda for future research, it is pertinent for one to know whether

democratisation, governance and administrative reform have promoted

accountability, popular participation, transparency, legitimacy and the

empowerment of civil society and the subsequent reduction of the power of

the state as well as the feasibility of the idea of a developmental state in

Africa.

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