Trident: Protecting Britain or Britannia

Undergraduate Dissertation Completed as a Requirement forInternational Relations BA

Ryan Baldry

Abstract

This thesis attempts to answer the question of whether or not Britain’s nuclear weapons Programme, Trident, is actually providing adequate protection for Britons or if it is merely being used to protect Britain’s position and image, Britannia, on the world stage and in institutions such as NATO and the United Nations Security Council. Since the 1980s, under Thatcher’s Conservative Government, Trident has been at sea protecting Britain from the threat of nuclear attack. However, in today’s changing international system, it is argued by many parties, governmental and private, that the programme is no longer required. By looking at sources such as parliamentary reports, party manifestos and legal documents such as treaties, it will be possible to see the reasoning behind one of the countries largest military expenditures.

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‘I have to subscribe to the view that the abandonment of our nuclear

deterrent would be extraordinarily ill advised and indeed a national act of

folly. We cannot know [...] that any situation will arise in the coming

decades where we will need the threat of our deterrent, but equally we

cannot know that no such situation will arise and indeed arise quite

quickly.’

-William Hague

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INTRODUCTION 5

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7

METHODOLOGY 21

CASE STUDY 22

CONCLUSION 33

BIBLIOGRAPHY 36

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Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, British influence on the world stage has

been seen to reduce as the international community looks towards the United

States for leadership on global issues. However, as this paper will argue, this has

not stopped consecutive British governments from attempting to halt this

decline and ensure Britain’s continued relevance and influence through the use

of the Trident nuclear at-sea deterrent. Before the Cold War, Britain renewed its

ageing nuclear deterrent, Polaris, and replaced it with another American system

called Trident. Based on the same concept and agreement with the US, the 1958

‘Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence

Purposes’ (or the ‘Mutual Defence Agreement), Trident would allow Britain to

maintain its constant at-sea deterrent for a further 50 years1. To date, the UK has

maintained a nuclear presence at sea since 1968.2

The aim of this thesis is to look into whether or not the United Kingdom is

maintaining its nuclear deterrent because of the influence of key government

departments, specifically the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO). In short, whether or not the Trident programme is

in fact protecting the citizens of the state or the position of the institutions within

1 United States and United Kingdom Governments. 1958. “Agreement between the United Kingdom and United States for co-operaton of the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes.” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 3 July. Accessed August 9, 2014. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/56_4.pdf?_=13166279132 Governments of the United Kingdom and United States. “Polaris Sales Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom.” American Society of International Law 2, no. 3 (May 1963): 595.

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the state and thus the reputation that Britain attempts to project onto the world

stage.

This thesis will approach the debate by analysing each aspect of it in turn. Firstly,

it will explore the theoretical explanations as to why the Trident programme still

operates. This will be achieved by analysing the theories of defensive realism,

constructivism and path dependency. Together, these will be able to

appropriately explain the reason for the political decisions to maintain the

programme. Secondly, this thesis will explain the methodology behind the paper

and discuss the various sources and materials that will be utilised in the

exploration of the subject. Thirdly, this paper will explore the key case study of

the Trident programme. This will entail the discussion of its establishment

within British Foreign Policy, its history, political implications and the

uncertainty of its future. Finally, this paper will conclude by bringing together

the key arguments put forward in this paper and suggest that the Trident

programme is primarily being used by consecutive British Governments in order

to maintain its place on the world stage and that the system itself has a reduced

place on the current world stage as it represents the mind set of a cold war

nation with cold war fears and perspectives of the international community and

its self.

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Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the extent to which Britain is still relevant

in the international stage or if British foreign policy is constructed around its

relationship with the United States. The Trident nuclear programme is seen to be

used, by the British government as a way to stay relevant in the international

system.

British Foreign Policy towards the United States of America is an area of

diplomacy and domestic interest that is becoming the subject of increasing

debate. There are some academics and parliamentarians that believe that the

‘special relationship’ is no longer relevant. On the other hand, there are a number

of individuals who still believe that the relationship with the United States

remains vital to British national interests. The key questions that this thesis will

attempt to answer are to what extent does British Foreign Policy and its relations

with the United States depend on the Trident Nuclear Deterrent program?

Secondly, the question of whether or not this program is still required in today’s

international system or whether its reasoning has been constructed by

consecutive British Governments in order to maintain a level of influence in the

international system will also be asked. The primary aim of this thesis is to

discuss the Trident Nuclear Missile Programme as a tool of British Foreign Policy

and analyse the way in which it is seen by the British executive and the political

establishment through the lens of Structural Realism, Constructivism and Path

Dependency Theories.

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To be able to understand the intricacies of this relationship, these theories will

be outlined and critiqued. Alongside these theories, this paper will explore the

concept of path dependency and how this applies to Britain and its foreign policy

aspirations. These theories will shed light on why Britain is persistent to

maintain its position on the world stage and relationship with the United States.

However, there are shortcomings associated with each theory that raise a

number of issues concerns regarding their ability to effectively critique this

relationship. These will also be discussed at a later stage of this chapter.

Structural Realism, in combination with Constructivism and Path Dependence

Theory, help to explain why successive British governments have maintained

their commitment to Trident despite the changed global security circumstances

and the threats that the UK faces. For example, the threat that allows for

Trident’s existence has been constructed throughout the post-cold war period.

This claim relates to constructivism and path dependence because of the way in

which the level of threat to the UK has been constructed by consecutive UK

governments and their respective departments to justify its expense. This is

enforced by Path Dependence theory because it is the institutional memory of

the government departments, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and

Ministry of Defence that strive to ensure Trident’s survival in order for them to

maintain their current levels of stature and funding.

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In an age of increased stability and interdependence, there is little need for a

deterrent aimed at deterring a national security threat such as the USSR, which

no longer exists. There have also been strong influences on foreign policy

decisions by the domestic political establishment and the political elite within

the bureaucracies of government institutions and departments such as the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence.

This paper will begin by outlining the three theories in question and offering a

critique of each on order to identify any weaknesses that they may possess. It

will then go on to offer a conclusion regarding the effectiveness of these theories

in relation to the question being posed by the thesis.

Often referred to as Neo-Realism, Structural Realism ‘is [about] the structure or

architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power’.3 In

the case of this thesis, the structure in which the United Kingdom is attempting

to retain its power in is the United Nation’s Security Council and its importance

to the United States. The only way that Britain feels it can retain its relevance is

to remain a nuclear power.

This thesis will be utilising Kenneth Waltz’s concept of Defensive Realism that

states ‘it is unwise for states to try to maximise their share of world power,

because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The

3 John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism." In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.79.

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pursuit of hegemony […] is foolhardy’.4 Waltz’s theory can be directly applied to

this thesis because there is the assumption that the United Kingdom is assuming

a Defensive Realist position in the international system as the state is attempting

to purely maintain its current level of influence rather than increase it. This

particular strand of realism is of interest to this thesis because it could be argued

that the Trident programme that is used by the United Kingdom is purely an

attempt at maintaining the position of Britain in the international system rather

than an attempt to gain greater powers. If the UK was to disband this

programme, it is likely that the relationship would falter, as Britain would lose its

status as a one of the United State’s greatest strategic allies because Britain

would cease to be a nuclear power and would also not be partner to nuclear

agreements which have proved to be financial beneficially to the United States.5

In another article, Keohane suggested that ‘state power will remain crucially

important, as will the distribution of power among states’.6 The point made here

by Keohane is important because it directly compliments the key question of the

thesis that asks why states desire this power? More importantly, it is possible to

argue the reasons as to why the United Kingdom is seeking to maintain its

prestige and influence on the world stage. By utilising this argument, it will be

possible for the thesis to further analyse the US and UK relationship in terms of

power relations and the UK’s desire to maintain their place in the international

4 John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism." In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.78.5 HC Deb 11 March 1982, c9766 Robert Keohane and Joseph S Nye. "Globalisation and Domestic Governance." In Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World, by Robert Keohane, 204-208. London: Routledge, 2002, 204.

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community. As previously mentioned, here Keohane is stating that despite the

increasing amount of interdependence and cooperation that exists within the

international system, the power that an individual state can wield still holds

significant value. For example, Keohane suggested that the ideal international

system would consists of a number of states where no single one can wield a

great amount of power, such as a hegemon, but that states rely upon one another

through interdependence and reliance. This is particularly interesting in the case

presented in this thesis because the United States, although still powerful, does

not wield a great deal of power without the contribution of other states in the

form of coalitions. Should Britain shut down the Trident programme, the United

States would no longer be able to rely upon it in the international system and

would thus have to seek for a powerful coalition partner elsewhere in the

international system. This also works the other way around where Britain would

lose America as a key diplomatic and military partner and would then have less

influence and stature on the international stage. If Britain loses its nuclear power

status, it may lose its place on the Security Council. Through this assumption it

can be concluded that Britain is maintaining its position as a nuclear power

because it still wants to be able to influence actions of others through both hard

and soft power when needed. It would be considerably difficult for the state to do

this should its nuclear capability be removed. However, it could be argued that

its relationship with the United States is ‘special’ because it is in the national

interest of the United States to ensure that the economic benefits of the

relationship continue to weigh favourably on the US.

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Another important fact for the British Government is that should Trident be

removed, France will be the only European power to still possess nuclear

capability. This implies that interest in the United States would immediately turn

to France and it is likely that there would be a new ‘Special Relationship’ that

does not directly involve the British Government. This would also have a

devastating impact upon the status of the UK in the international system because

it would no longer be as influential without nuclear weapons. Despite the

seemingly strong argument that Structural Realism puts forward, there are still a

number of questions that the theory raises.

One of the major critiques of Structural Realism is provided by Steve Forde who

argues that Structural Realism emphasises the structure of the international

system and fails to take into account the effects of other factors such as

economics, human nature or domestic politics.7 This is an interesting criticism

because it raises a number of problems for the thesis in question. The first of

which is the link between the Trident Program and domestic politics. A second

criticism that can be identified is the lack of definition with regards to the

‘anarchic system’ that is so often mentioned in realist schools of thought. With no

agreed upon definition of what constitutes anarchic, it will prove increasingly

challenging for this paper to be able to identify the system with which the United

Kingdom is operating in and what it is aiming to achieve with the construction of

the Trident Programme.8

7 Steve Forde, ‘International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism’, International Studies Quarterly, 1995, Vol. 39, No.2, p. 142.8 Steve Forde, ‘International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism’, International Studies Quarterly, 1995, Vol. 39, No.2, p. 146.

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However, it could also be argued that the UK’s place on the world stage is

entirely constructed by consecutive governments and that the Trident

Programme exists solely to maintain this constructed position. For example, due

to path dependency, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office would

identify new global threats and put forward cases as to why Trident is still

required. Even though the original threat, that of the Soviet Union, has long

dissipated. Theories such as constructivism and path dependency have the

potential to assist in the analysis of this constructed political reality. Combined,

these theories are beneficial to this thesis because we allow greater insight into

the reasoning behind the continuation of the Trident programme. As this next

section will demonstrate, the aforementioned theories will contribute to the

analysis of the United Kingdom’s position that has already been provided by

Structural Realism.

Christian Reus-Smit states that constructivism is ‘characterised by an emphasis

on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of

identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship

between agents and structures’.9 This is particularly relevant because it helps to

explain the way in which the ‘agents’ or politicians, act within the ‘structure,

which in this case is the political establishment. This notion of a constructed

reality within the international system is one that was discussed on a number of

occasions by Alexander Wendt. In the article Anarchy is What States Make of it,

9 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism” In Theories of International Relations by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.217.

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Wendt utilises an argument made by Peter Berger who aims to outline the ways

in which states operate in the international system. 10 Berger stated that ‘the

commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is

an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors

collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the

structure of the social world’. 11 By applying this theory to the case of Britain,

Berger’s observation is of particular interest to this thesis because it suggests

that Britain’s reputation is crucial for the development of a specific role in the

international system. It could be suggested that Berger argues that the idea of

British influence on the world stage has become engrained in the minds of those

within the political establishment because it is through this outlook that the

wider world is observed and acted within. Due to the institutional memory of the

bureaucracy, government departments and institutions have constructed their

own reality regarding what their role may be in the international system. Due to

the age and prestige of these departments, this construction is likely to have

arisen from the department’s experiences during the height of the British Empire

and influence in Europe.

The idea of institutionalism is often overlooked with international relations as it

is assumed that the state will make a decision that is then immediately enacted.

However, it is the case that ‘no matter how influential… a single leader cannot

implement foreign policy by himself or herself’.12 Constructivism takes into

10 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It” in International Organisation, vol. 46, no.2, pp. 398. 11 Peter Berger, “Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge”, European Journal of Sociology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1966, pp. 32-40.12 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007, p.65.

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consideration a number of elements that could all affect the decision making

process. This element of constructivism is particularly significant because it is

important for this thesis to understand the influence that the political institution

can have on the decision maker. For example, government departments such as

the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence will be able to exert a great deal of

institutional pressure in order to influence the decision making process.

However, constructivism is also not without its problems. Primarily, there has

been an issue where the ‘meaning of constructivism has been shaped by specific

debates within IR’.13 Christian Reus-Smit observes:

‘Institutionalised norms and ideas define the meaning and identity of the

individual actor and the patterns of [...] activity engaged in by those

individuals [...] and it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and

instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we

define our identities and interests.’14

In other words, the ideas that actors, in this particular case the United Kingdom

can become engrained in the minds of politicians through institutional memory

and traditions. This is an area of particular interest because it reiterates the

conclusion that constructivism is unique to the individuals who are involved in

the construction of particular realities and political structures.

13 K. M. Fierke, "Constructivism." In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.189.14 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism” In Theories of International Relations by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p.225.

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This makes critiques of the theory substantially more difficult as it is difficult to

find an agreed upon definition of what the academic community sees as the

definition of the theory of constructivism. In other words it is a highly contested

concept.

This issue was then complicated further by J. Samuel Barkin who suggested that

constructivism is not necessarily a theory in itself, but a methodology or

epistemology. It is possible that Barkin reached this opinion because it could be

argued that constructivism is merely a means to understand why an actor

behaves in a particular way that fits into the larger scope of another theory.

Barkin continued to suggest that there should be a ‘perceived tendency for

constructivists to be idealists or utopians’.15 This proves to be an interesting

point in regards to the question of British Foreign Policy because it is possible to

conclude that other than those outside of the political elite, it is relatively

unknown as to why the Trident Programme is still being operated. Reus-Smit

suggests that only those involved will know the reasons as it is they who have

‘constructed’ a reality in which it is still important to maintaining the United

Kingdom’s position on the world stage. However, this construction is not

voluntary. It is a result of past experiences, values, norms and institutions. Thus

enforcing the claim that it is a Path Dependent event.

15 J. Samuel Barkin, ‘Realist Constructivism’, International Studies Review, 2003, Vol. 5, No. 3, p.325.

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Path Dependency is another concept that is derived from historical

institutionalism. This will compliment this thesis because of the theory’s ability

to suggest reasons as to why a policy decision will be difficult to overturn or

block because of the way in which the political institution has been socially

constructed.

One understanding of path dependence, suggested by Paul Pierson, argues that

‘particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to

reverse’.16 Path dependency originally began as a theory aimed primarily

towards the sphere of economics in the sense that individuals would utilise the

theory of path dependence in order to increase their returns. However, it has

since become an increasingly prevalent theory within political science because of

its ability to analyse the behaviour of the political establishment using historical

context as it takes into account the rate of ideas on institutions.17 This goes

beyond the narrow explanations of realisms that focus on the role of state

interests.

This theory is of increasing relevance to the thesis question of British Foreign

Policy because the Trident programme is a politically and financially costly

investment. This then helps to explain a policy puzzle; why does the British

establishment commit itself to an expensive nuclear deterrent system. Pierson

suggests that because institutions protect themselves, they ‘may create rules that

16 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 251.17 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 251.

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make pre-existing rules hard to reverse’.18 Scott E. Page argues that path

dependence means that current and future states, actions, or decisions depend

on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions’ then reiterates this point.19

However, despite the support that path dependency may demonstrate towards

this thesis, there are two criticisms that can be made.

The first of such criticisms is that the foundations of path dependency theory are

based on a limited number of case studies and hypotheses.20 This is one of the

key criticisms that Pierson identifies within his article and is particularly

relevant to the case study in question. He goes on to observe that:

‘[Path Dependency] is institutionalist because it stresses that many of the

contemporary political implications of these temporal processes are

embedded in institutions-whether formal rules, policy structures, or norms.

Of these two elements, the institutional side generally has received greatest

attention’.21

This is an important description of the theory because it demonstrates a

significant institutionalist focus and simplifies the influence of other factors such

as the individuals involved in the process. This means that by choosing to

observe case studies from the institutional level, there is a chance that key,

18 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 258.19 Scott E. Page, ‘Path Dependence’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006, No. 1, p. 88. 20 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 265.21 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 265.

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influential factors throughout the decision making process can be overlooked.

For example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence

could both be seen to hold significant powers of influence within British

Government and their ability to obstruct the actions of elected politicians must

be considered. The influence they hold could be due to the individual’s

personality, political ideology or past experiences. One final supporting piece of

evidence for path dependency is that the academic community has changed since

Pierson wrote the article critiquing the theory. Now, there are numerous articles

and scholars which all identify the importance of the theory22.

Based on the aforementioned theories and debates, it is possible to conclude that

the three theories of constructivism, structural realism and path dependency all

successfully contribute to the explanation of the case study in question.

Structural realism goes some way in explaining the rational as to why the Trident

programme remains in service. The defensive realist approach supports the

notion that Britain is attempting to retain its place in the international

community by committing vast amounts of resources to the maintenance of the

international status quo.

However, in order to maintain this programme, it is essential that there is a

reason for Trident’s existence. It is for this purpose that constructivism can

provide an explanation. Constructivism puts forward the idea that particular

individuals or groups can create certain cultural realities. In this case those

individuals and groups are politicians and the political establishment. In this

22 Howlett, Michael, and Jeremy Rayner. “Understanding the Historial Turn in Policy Sciences: A Critique of Stochastic, Narrative, Path Dependency and Porcess-Sequencing Models of Policy Making over Time.” Policy Sciences (Springer) 39, no. 1 (March 2006): p.2.

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case, the idea that the Trident Programme delivers a consistent deterrent against

threats to national security is the idea that has been created. Once the ‘reality’

has been constructed, the theory of path dependence attempts to suggest

reasons as to why the programme remains rather than being changed.

Path dependency suggests that once a decision has been made, it can be

exceptionally difficult to reverse when such a vast amount of resources have

been committed to the decision. This means that there may have been efforts by

the political establishment to limit the reversal of the programme in order for

them to maintain their funding and influence over the political decision making

process. From this, it is possible to see why the topic of Trident divides political

opinion in such a drastic way and makes the topic difficult for all parties in

Britain.

Finally, it is important to note that only together can these theories be

successfully utilised in order to full understand the ways in which British foreign

policy is made and conducted. Individually, the theories may not necessarily be

able to offer a satisfactory analysis because each theory overlooks a particular

aspect that the other may cover.

Methodology

The purpose of this analysis will be to identify the root causes of controversy

within the Trident programme and to discuss whether or not the programme is

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merely trying to protect British interests on the world stage rather than

contribute to the protection of the population.

This thesis will be conducting a case study analysis of the United Kingdom’s

constant at-sea nuclear deterrent, Trident. The case study will lead into an in

depth study of the UK-US relationship, will analyse why decisions to renew the

nuclear programme have become one of the most divisive topics in British

politics. Although some data will be used, the majority will be qualitative23. I will

be conducting this study by looking into a wide range of primary and secondary

sources to look for the answers posed by the thesis question. Primary sources

will include official government documents and departmental reports,

Parliamentary debates between MPs and Ministers of State, the 2010 manifestos

of all Westminster parties (which will include the Coalition agreement that was

created between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives following the

2010 General Election) and House of Commons Library research papers. In

terms of the secondary sources that will be used, I will be utilising think tank

reports, opinion articles by key politicians and political commentators. Some of

these figures will include politicians such as Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime

Minister, and Liam Fox who has held the office of Secretary of Defence.

Case Study

Since coming to power in 2010, the Conservative led coalition government has

been discussing potential replacements for, or refurbishments of, the Trident

programme. Predictably, this has not been a straightforward decision as the

23 Greetham, Bryan. How to write your undergraduate dissertation. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.181.

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ideological difference of the two parties hindered the negotiation process. There

is popular opposition and support for the programme on all sides of the political

spectrum. This is one of the key reasons as to why the decision to renew the

programme has been postponed until after the 2015 election24. The politics of

agreeing to disagree will also be discussed as a contributing factor to the

postponement of a decision as it is crucial to understand the influence of

coalition on the process of decision making in all sectors of government.

However, it is not necessarily the reasons for this postponement that will be

discussed in this chapter, but rather the factors that lead to Trident becoming

such an increasingly polarized topic within British Politics and more specifically,

the way in which it became an essential aspect of British Foreign and defence

policy. To do this, there will be an in depth analysis of the key parties involved in

the decision making process and what they gain to win or lose should a decision

be made.

This chapter will begin by outlining the issues and explaining what is at stake for

the British Government and its Trident programme. Secondly, it will present a

brief history of Britain's nuclear deterrent programme, focusing on the debates

in foreign policy circles but also on the positions of political parties. Next, this

thesis will explain the role of Trident in sustaining the special relationship and

then a significant section of this case study will focus on examining the current

debate about the imminent renewal of the programme. Finally, it will discuss

what is at stake, what is the degree of consensus between the parties, examine

24 House of Commons Library. The Trident Successor Programme: an update . Update, International Defence and Affairs Section, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.3.

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the cost-effectiveness of the programme and how, if at all, it would contribute to

the special relationship.

Some analysts and politicians argue that Trident is an outdated programme that

no longer serves the military needs of the UK. For example, this is the current

opinion of the UK Green Party who claims that Trident is ‘immoral’25. This is also

in line with a number of MPs on both Labour and Liberal Democrat benches who

have claimed that the renewal programme would go against their beliefs and

break Britain’s treaty obligations. The most apparent of these being nuclear

disarmament. However, the maintenance of the special relationship with the US

is amongst the key reasons as to why the leadership of the three main parties,

which often needs to be differentiated from the parliamentary party and its

members, argue in favour of the renewal of Trident, albeit on varying scales. The

extent to which the political parties within Britain agree on the necessity of

Trident will be discussed at a later stage of this chapter.

To be able to understand the ways in which Trident has such far-reaching

implications in British politics it is important to understand the reasons as to

why the programme was introduced in the first place and the process that it has

undergone to become one of the nations most prized assets. As noted in the

Trident Commission’s Final Report, ‘the UK’s approach was heavily influenced by

a sense of global status [and] the need to be taken seriously by the Americans’26.

25 Green Party. Green Party General Election Manifesto 2010. Manifesto, London: Green Party, 2010, p.43.26 British American Security Information Council (BASIC). The Trident Commision: An independent, cross-party inquiry to examine UK nuclear weapons policy. Inquiry, London: BASIC, 2014, p.10.

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This alone is an important factor to take into consideration when discussing the

uses of the Trident Programme because one of its key aims was to encourage a

relationship with the United States. Before the introduction of the Trident

Programme in the late 1980s, the British Government had invested in its

predecessor programme, Polaris. This programme was the first of its kind where,

as a result of the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of

America for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence

Purposes, the two countries would share knowledge, personnel and materials in

order to progress the nuclear powers of both nations27. In 1980, it was

announced by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher that it would

be replacing the Polaris programme with a new American deterrent that used an

updated Trident missile launching system28. Despite strong Labour opposition to

the programme, Thatcher went on to win the 1983 General Election with a

substantial majority in the House of Commons and 42% of the vote that allowed

the programme to be implemented upon her return to parliament29.

With the development of Trident, it was then possible for the UK to retain its

position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

27 United States and United Kingdom Governments. “Agreement between the United Kingdom and United States for co-operaton of the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes.” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 3 July 1958. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/56_4.pdf?_=1316627913 (accessed August 9, 2014).28 The Defence Council. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force. Advisory Paper, London: The Defence Council, 1980, p.2..29 ouse of Commons Information Office. General Election Results, 9 June 1983. Factsheet, London: House of Commons, 1984, p. 1.

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and as a key contributor to the NATO task force30. This aspect was of great

importance to both the MOD and the FCO. Through this agreement, they would

be able to play a larger role on the world stage through their renewed

importance in global institutions. With the Trident programme behind them,

negotiations and agreements would be easier to arrive at and would thus allow

both institutions to use these experiences to influence policy making on the

domestic scale to a similar extent.

This meant that even in the era of apparent declining British influence on the

international stage the British state still had an important role to play in the

arena of international diplomacy and peace keeping. However, despite the

clauses in the Trident sales agreement which would allow Britain to retain a final

say over how and when its missiles were to be used, in the event of a sever threat

to the security of the nation, critics still stated that the defence system was

entirely dependent on the following of American foreign policy decisions31. It is

this criticism that would be raised upon the programmes renewal in 2014. This

demonstrates the extent to which consecutive British Governments and their

bureaucracies have relied upon nuclear military technologies as a means of

holding onto their position on the international stage even at the risk of

appearing to be beholden to the American government for the ability to possess

nuclear weapons. As the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament stated in a recent

briefing: ‘…a direct involvement in Britain’s nuclear weapons technology, the US

30 The Defence Council. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force. Advisory Paper, London: The Defence Council, 1980, p.5.31 The Defence Council. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force. Advisory Paper, London: The Defence Council, 1980, p.1.

25

exercises significant leverage over the UK’s foreign and defence policy.’ 32 Despite

being strongly opposed to the project at its introduction, the Labour leadership

would eventually reach the decision to maintain the project when they came to

government under the Premiership of Tony Blair as a result of the 2005 Strategic

Defence Review. It is at this stage that it is important to understand the stances

of the key Westminster parties on the idea of maintaining Trident as a nuclear

deterrent now that the programme is approaching the renewal timeframe.

In their manifestos for the 2010 General Election, each of Westminster’s main

parties outlined their plans for Trident in the event that they were elected. The

standpoints of these parties is of particular interest to observe because what is

stated here, in the case of Labour in the 1980s, will usually differ from the stance

they take once in a position of power in the government.

The Conservatives stated that they were “committed to a full replacement for

Trident” which would consists of four new nuclear submarines based on the

Trident missile system33. This was of course an obvious policy considering that

the programme was originally introduced under Thatcher’s Conservative

government in the 1980s. What is also unusual about this stance is that under a

programme of cuts and spending reductions that they had planned, the funding

for the Trident Programme would not be touched in any way despite being one

of the largest expenditures by the government and the Ministry of Defence. The

Liberal Democrats stated that they would not “commit to replace the Trident

32 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Mutual Defence Agreement. Briefing, London: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2014, 2.33 The Conservative Party. Invitation to Join the Government of Britain - The Conservative Manifesto 2010. London: The Conservative Party, 2010, p. 106.

26

nuclear weapons system on a like for like basis”.34 This is not an unpredictable

stance for the party to take. The Liberal Democrats are well known for being the

party that occupies the centre ground on the spectrum of political ideologies in

Westminster. The stance of making no commitment but instead carrying out

reviews was a way of maintain popularity on both the left and right of the party.

This way they could suggest the programmes maintained but on a smaller scale

than that which is currently in place. Both of these views then differ from what

was finally agreed upon in the Coalition Agreement of 2010. In this agreement

between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, a compromise was settled

upon whereby “the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for

money”. However, the coalition standpoint will be discussed in greater depth at a

later point in this chapter.35 Labour has said that, if they were to have been re-

elected in 2010 under Gordon Brown, “a strategic defence review will look at all

areas of defence, but we will maintain our independent nuclear deterrent”.36

Another party of interest to observe is UKIP (United Kingdom Independence

Party). This is due in part to the fact that the party is made up of those who have

defected from the mainstream parties in Westminster, most commonly from the

Conservatives. Their view of Trident is that it should be renewed as long as it is

renewed with “four British built submarines and US built missiles”.37 This view is

predictable because of the right wing perspective it has of the international

system and the role that Britain should be fulfilling.

34 Liberal Democrats. Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010. London: The Liberal Democrats, 2010, p. 57.35 HM Government. The Coalition: Our Programme for government. London: Cabinet Office, 2010, p. 15.36 The Labour Party. The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A Future Fair for All. London: The Labour Party, 2010, p. 69.37 United Kingdom Independence Party. UKIP Manifesto - Empowering the People. London: United Kingdom Independence Party, 2010, p. 7.

27

What is interesting to observe here is that the parties who have opposed Trident

in the past, once coming to power, decide that it must be kept to some degree

even if it is in a reduced readiness or made up of fewer submarines. Even though

this may be reducing the number of submarines by one. Those such as the Green

Party want to decommission the Trident programme as soon as possible. It is

likely that they hold this opinion because they have never been in government

and have never faced the problems of bureaucratic pressure from Whitehall

departments such as the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Secondly,

they would be ideologically opposed to the idea of nuclear energy and weapons.

Another point to consider is that the Liberal Democrats, despite being opposed

to a like for like replacement, did not rule out keeping the programme operating

in some form. As previously mentioned, the policy of the coalition upon entering

government in 2010 was that the decision to renew Trident would be postponed.

This is important to consider because the politics of coalition weigh greatly on

the foreign policy decisions of the government.

As previously mentioned, the effect of the Liberal Democrats on Conservative

foreign policy decision-making has been clear. ‘Junior partners to a coalition –

like the senior party – can be assumed to seek influence on coalition foreign

policy in order to ensure that it furthers, or at least does not harm, their domestic

political prospects’.38 This point is evident in the example of the British

government because it can be seen how the Liberal Democrat influence has

38 Kai Brummer & Klaus Oppermann, “Patterns of Junior Partner Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16, no. 4 (2014): 557.

28

helped to postpone the decision on Trident renewal until the next parliament.

This is important is it represents a key problem with the politics of coalition for

both sides. The logic of ‘agreeing to disagree’ is evident as neither party wishes

to lose support from their own bases. In this instance, postponement, although

not obviously a policy, was the most effective policy that could have been

implemented, as it was one that would ensure continued support from their MPs,

as neither had the capacity to implement the desired legislation alone.

So that both sides did not appear to the public to be doing nothing on the subject,

reports were ordered into the feasibility of a replacement to Trident and were

carried out by the Cabinet Office. This report concluded that the most effective

policy would be to replace Trident as ‘[no other system] offers the same degree

of resilience as the current posture of Continuous at Sea Deterrence, nor could

they guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances’.39 It is possible to

conclude that the proposals put forward in this review will not be implemented

until the next parliament at the earliest because of the need for a single party to

hold the majority required to put forward the renewal. Also important to note is

that it is not just domestic coalitions that have an impact on the conducting of

foreign policy. International coalitions can be crucial on the world stage and

none are seen to be more important to the UK than the ‘Special Relationship’ that

has evolved between the United Kingdom and the United States of America since

the end of the Second World War.

Whilst discussing the importance of domestic institutions on the making of

foreign policy decisions, it is of course important to identify the importance of

39 HM Government. Trident Alternatives Review. Review, Cabinet Office, London: HM Government, 2013, p.10.

29

the ‘Special Relationship’ in the process. It has been made clear throughout this

paper that the relationship with the United States is one of significant

importance to the United Kingdom. With the Trident missile system being

constructed by America and the warheads being stored in American territories, it

is a relationship that cannot be overlooked. However, it is one that is often

viewed in different ways by parties on both sides of the Atlantic. The British

often view the ‘Special Relationship’ as crucial to British interests and one that is

unique within the international system. In 2009, the House of Commons Foreign

Affairs Committee noted that ‘the US inextricably affects and is affected by the

UKs broader international strategic position and policy’.40 With both the United

States and the United Kingdom having just renewed the Mutual Defence

Agreement, allowing for the continued sharing of nuclear material and

information, it is unlikely that this relationship will become less significant in the

future. Rather, it is likely that this relationship will only strengthen and deepen

as time progresses and the international system maintains its pace of rapid

change and multi-polarity.41

On the other hand, the strengths and benefits of the Special Relationship are

often overstated. Dr. James D. Boys, who gave evidence to the House of Commons

Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested that:

40 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Government foreign policy towards the United States - Eight Report of Session 2013-14. Committee Report, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.11.41 House of Commons Library. UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement . Research Paper, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.5

30

‘[T]he cultural and historical links that exist with the US tend to lead UK

policy makers into an assumption of familiarity and similarity with

respect to the country, and an unwillingness to ask difficult or strategic

questions about the United States’ policy or future direction’.42

This point demonstrates that the British government can often exaggerate the

importance of the UK-US partnership because it believes that it holds intense

links with the US on a variety of levels and platforms. Although this may be true,

these links cannot be used as evidence of an undying relationship when the US

must attempt to focus on other aspects of its own foreign policy, for example,

that with its South American partners or the relationships that it must build in

the Pacific. Trident then becomes an unusual factor within the relationship

because it can be seen as an extension of American foreign policy and a securing

of their interests in Europe, but equally, it can be seen as an attempt by British

governments in Westminster to maintain the states’ military power that can be

projected onto the world stage. Most notably in the case of the latter, a projection

of power towards Europe and the influence on the Security Council. In a report

carried out by the US Congressional Research Service, it stated that ‘[t]he term

“special relationship” has often been used to describe the high degree of mutual

trust between the two countries in cooperating on diplomatic and political

issues. The special relationship also encompasses close intelligence-sharing

arrangements and unique cooperation in nuclear and defense matters’.43

42 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Government foreign policy towards the United States - Eight Report of Session 2013-14. Committee Report, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.48.43 Congressional Research Service. The United Kingdom and U.S.-UK Relations . Research Paper, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013, p.1

31

Throughout the entirety of the research paper, the term ‘Special Relationship’ is

only mentioned 5 times whereas the British equivalent mentioned the term 13

times. Although this is not concrete evidence for the founding of an argument, it

does demonstrate the aforementioned point that British politicians do apply

imagine the relationship to be special to a greater extent than their American

counterparts. However, this thesis does not argue that the relationship is not

important. To the contrary, this paper believes that the transatlantic partnership

does continue to be an important alliance in an ever-changing and unstable

international system. The relationship that Britain has with the United States is

in line with the defensive realist position that was put forward in the previous

chapters. Through this relationship, the UK government can maintain its global

position even in the face of ever growing threats and other global powers in a

multi-polar world.

Conclusion

In summary, Britain’s governmental institutions, and the politicians themselves,

must accept that the state has become an average power within the international

system and is thus not able to influence global politics in the way it once did.

Despite still holding significant respect from other states, the UK no longer has

the military capabilities that a global superpower requires in order to remain an

effective leader. However, the nuclear programme has existed in some form since

the late 1960s and is thus likely to continue to operate for years to come due to

the way in which the bureaucracy has established itself within the functions of

government. It is possible to conclude from the analysis that has been put

forward in this thesis that due to the power currently held by Whitehall

32

departments, specifically the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office, government policy regarding the nuclear deterrent will

continue to be heavily influenced regardless of the party that holds power. As

this paper has discussed, despite the programme being introduced under a

Conservative government under Thatcher, the programme was supported by

Blair’s Labour government upon the nearing of its renewal and then is not fully

opposed by Liberal Democrats in their coalition with the conservatives. This

alone demonstrates the influence that the path dependency of Whitehall has on

government policy regardless of their original position on the ideological

spectrum.

The theories which have been utilized and developed by this paper all go some

way as to explaining the behavior of government institutions within the British

political system. Despite all being slightly different, the compliment one another

in such a way that together they can create a reasonable explanation as to why

Britain retains the Trident programme. For example, the construction of threats

and the UK’s place on the world stage alongside the defensive realist approach

where the government maintains the programme purely to remain at its current

position of influence. There is very little interest within the government for

gaining more influence and power, solely to remain relevant.

This paper has demonstrated the way in which government institutions can

refuse to accept change by constructing a scenario in which they still play an

important role on the world stage. By utilizing international relations such as ‘the

Special Relationship’ with the United States, Britain can still influence global

33

policy and events through international organisations such as the United Nations

Security Council. It has also been demonstrated throughout this paper that

Trident, despite being an outdated programme, is need of replacement if Britain

wishes to maintain its influence and power projection onto the world stage.

However this thesis identifies that replacement of the programme is a key topic

of debate within the political establishment because no consensus can be agreed

on what the programme should be replaced with. Also, whilst no single party

holds the majority in Westminster, compromise and postponement will be likely

to continue until one party can wield the majority needed to make a decision.

This is an interesting position because the time to identify a successor

programme or life extension plan is running out. This delay in decision is, as

previously mentioned, primarily due to the effect of the current government

coalition on the making of policy. In this case, the Conservatives and the Liberal

Democrats ‘agreed to disagree’ and postponed the decision until the next

parliament. This means that any new programme will not be decided until 2015

at the earliest, if at all.

Finally, it is in the opinion of this thesis that the question put forth at the

beginning of this paper has been answered. Consecutive governments are in fact

protecting ‘Britannia’ rather than Britain. Although Trident is important, it is not

needed on the same scale that currently exists. Unless Whitehall continues to

create scenarios where Trident is still required, it is likely that this will be the

case for future governments, regardless of their position on the political

spectrum.

34

WORD COUNT: 9,428

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