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UnderstandingCentralAmerica’sMigrantCrisisBy:LauraSupanich

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TableofContents

Introduction:................................................................................................................................................3LiteratureReview:.....................................................................................................................................3Methodology:...............................................................................................................................................7DataAnalysis:..............................................................................................................................................8Results:...........................................................................................................................................................9PolicyRecommendations:......................................................................................................................9Conclusion:...................................................................................................................................................9Appendix1:Tables&Graphs............................................................................................................10WorksCited...............................................................................................................................................30

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Introduction:Withthe2016presidentialelectionfastapproaching,immigrationinthe

UnitedStateshasbecomeacontroversialtopic.ManycandidatesfocustheirattentiononthefactorspullingimmigrantstotheUnitedStates,suchaswhattheyconsidereasilyattainableimmigrationbenefits,amnestyprograms,oraneasilypenetrableborderwithMexico.However,littleattentionisgiventothefactorspushingtheimmigrantsfromtheirhomecountries.

In2014,thesouthernborderstateswereoverwhelmedbyasurgeinthenumberofunaccompaniedminorchildrenmigratingfromCentralAmerica.Thatyearalone,nearly60,000unaccompaniedminorswereapprehendedattheU.S.-Mexicanborder.1Thisnumberisnearlytriplethatof2013.2Additionally,98%ofthemigrantswerenationalsofHonduras,Guatemala,Mexico,orElSalvador,whereasin2012,75%oftheunaccompaniedminorsapprehendedattheborderwereMexicancitizens.3TheUnitedStatesstrugglednotonlywithhowtoresolvethisproblem,buthowtopreventitfromhappeningagaininthefuture.Inaddition,manypolicymakersblamed“amnesty”typeprogramssuchasDeferredActionforChildhoodArrivals(DACA)forpullingthesechildrentotheUnitedStates.Alternatively,amajorityoftheminorslisteddomesticfactorsasthereasonfortheirmigration.Forexample,about60%ofElSalvadoranchildrenapprehendedattheborderlistedcrime,gangthreats,andviolenceastheirmainmotivatingfactorsforemigrating.4

Thisinformationsuggeststhatbylearningwhatiscausingpeopletoleavetheirhomes,theUnitedStatesmaybeabletobetteravoidsituationssuchasthe2014CentralAmericanmigrantcrisisthroughproactivechangesinforeignpolicyratherthanreactivechangesindomesticpolicy.Alternatively,theU.S.couldalsousethisinformationtodetermineiftheirexistingforeignpolicyeffortsmightbecausingincreasedmigration.ExaminingandcomparingspecificfactorsinLatinAmericawithimmigrationtrendsintheU.S.willshowwheretheU.S.shouldfocusitsforeignpolicyeffortsinordertobestcurbmigrationfromtheregion. Ihavetwomajorhypothesesregardingthisstudy:first,IpredictthattherewillbenoincreaseinmigrationfromLatinAmericatotheUnitedStatesaftertheimplementationofDACA;andsecond,IpredictthatthereisastrongcorrelationbetweenbothcorruptionandviolenceandmigrationtotheUnitedStatesfromLatinAmerica.

LiteratureReview: HistorysupportsmyhypothesisthatviolenceanddistrustofthegovernmentcancausespikesinmigrationfromLatinAmericancountries,ormorespecifically

1Kennedy2Kennedy3Chisti4Kennedy

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CentralAmericancountries,totheUnitedStates.Duringthe1970’sand1980’s,largenumbersofCentralAmericansbeganmigratingtotheUnitedStatesfleeingcivilwarsandsocialunrestthatwasspreadingthroughtheregion.5U.Sforeignpolicylikelyinfluencedthismigrationspike.TheU.S.sentmillionsofdollarsandprovidedmilitarytrainingtoviolentandoppressiveright-winggovernmentsinCentralAmericathatwereknownforthesystematicviolationofhumanrightsoftheircitizens.6EventhoughCongresswasawarethattheseregimessupporteddeathsquads,masskillingsofinnocentcivilians,disappearances,andassassinationsofpublicfigures,itrenewedsupportyearafteryear.7Theseviolentregimesleftatotalofover250,000Guatemalans,Salvadorans,andNicaraguansdead.8Thosethatwerenotkilledfledthecountry.Morethan465,000Salvadoransand225,000GuatemalanswerelivingintheUnitedStatesby1990,mostofwhichhadarrivedduringthetimeoftheseviolentandcorruptregimes.9

TheUnitedStatescreatedmanypolicies,bothforeignanddomestic,inresponsetothisspikeinCentralAmericanmigrants.First,adomesticresponsewastotakeastrictstanceagainstgangs.Duringthistimeperiod,alargeamountoftheseCentralAmericanmigrantslandedinLosAngeles.Theywerepoorlyintegratedintosocietyandfacedviolencefromthealreadywell-establishedAfricanAmericangangs.Inordertodefendthemselvesfromthesegangs,theycametogetherandformedtheirown.10Meanwhile,inthe1990s,theU.S.tookadditionaldomesticpolicymeasuresandshifteditsimmigrationpolicytobemorerestrictiveandsecuritydrivenandstartedtorapidlydeportcriminals,includinggangmembers.TheU.S.deportedthousandsofdangerousgangmemberseachyearbacktoCentralAmerica.11TheU.S.failedtoconsiderthelong-termeffectsofthesepolicies.Deportationtransformedwhatwasoriginallyarelativelyconcentratedproblemtoawidespreadcrisisthroughouttheregion.Currently,thetwomostdangerousandprominentL.A.gangsofthattimeperiod,MS-13andCalle18,arenowwellestablishedboththroughouttheU.S.andCentralAmerica.12Now,evenifthedeporteeswanttogetoutofthegangs,theycannotbecausetheyarefacedwithmemberswhentheyreturntotheirhomecountries.Thestrictimmigrationpolicychangesdidnotstopmigration,butactuallycontributedtoanothermigrationcrisisdecadeslater.

The picture looks strikingly similar today as it did during the CentralAmericanmigrationinfluxduringthe1970’sand1980’s.In2014,“theIndependentMonitoringGroupestimatedthateverydaybetween200and300SalvadoransleavetheircountryenroutetotheUnitedStatesasundocumentedimmigrants.”13Likein5Goodman6Goodman7Goodman8Goodman9Goodman10Martinez11Martinez12Martinez13MartinezPage33

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the past, there aremany factors that are likely to be pushing citizens from theirhomecountries.CentralAmericaisboththepoorestandmostviolentregionintheworld.14Onlydecadesafterthepreviouscrisis,CentralAmericaisfacinganewtypeofviolentregimepromptedbygangsessentiallytakingoverthestates.“Accordingto theUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,more than180,000peoplehavebeen murdered in [El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras] since 2000, includingnearly 49,000 in the last three years alone.”15According to theUnitedNations, in2014, Honduras ranked number one in the most per capita killings with 90 per100,00 people, with El Salvador at a close second.16Most of these murders areconnectedtogangviolence,aresultoftheeventsdiscussedabove.AccordingtotheSalvadoranMinistry of Public Security and Justice, El Salvador currently has over60,000activegangmembers.17Toputthis intoperspective,ElSalvadoronlyhasapopulationofabout6.1million.18

Themostdangerouspart of the gangnetworks forordinary citizens in theregion is recruitment. Gangs heavily recruit children once they reach theiradolescence.19Whenparentstrytokeeptheirchildrenoutofthereachofgangs,thefamilies as a whole get threatened. “The families are threatened for all sorts ofreasons: because their sons didn’twant to join a gang, because a familymemberfiledapolicereport,becausetheywon’tletagangmemberrapetheirdaughter,[o]rsimplybecause theyvisited theirgrandfather inenemyterritory.”20When familiesabandontheirhomesandmoveelsewhere,thegangsstillfindthem;theyareneverabletofindsafety.Theironlyoptionistofleethecountry.Ifthechildrendonotflee,theiroptionsaregangmembershipordeath.21In2013,gangviolencealoneclaimedthelivesof15,328CentralAmericans.22Takinghistoryintoaccount,itmakessensethat this violence couldbe amajor causeof the extreme influx inunaccompaniedminors.

Poverty is also likely to contribute to themigration from Central America.Another reason involvement in gangs is so widespread in Central America isbecause it offersmoreof a living than the legal economic opportunities available,mostofwhichbarelyreachminimumwage.Therefore,joiningagangmakesabetterliving.

Finally, there isalsoastrongperceptionofcorruptionandlittle faith inthegovernment’s ability to protect citizens from these gangs. “Many say gangs havesources of information among police, attorney general offices, and neighborhoodresidents.”23Thesegangsaresowellarmedtheyareessentiallyacriminalarmy.A14Goodman15GoodmanPage2816Martinez17Martinez18Martinez19Kennedy20MartinezPage3321Goodman22Martinez23KennedyPage4

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recentpolice raidof a clique’s stronghouse revealedanarsenalofmore than tenassault rifles andover adozengrenades.24In addition to the advancedweaponry,they have intricate and effective systems of surveillance and security that allowsthem toexploit local authorities.25Forexample, inMay theSalvadorandirectorofforensicmedicinemadea statement that thegangswereextortinghis techniciansfor entering their turf to retrieve dead bodies.26In addition to the gangs, manycitizensfeartheauthoritiesaswell.

Many right-wingpoliticians in theUnitedStatesblame lenient immigrationlawsforthespikeinmigration.OnecommonscapegoatisPresidentObama’s2012executiveactioncalledtheDreamAct,whichcreatedDeferredActionforChildhoodArrivals (DACA). DACA allows migrants that have been physically present in theUnitedStatessince2007,enteredbeforetheir16thbirthday,anddidnothavelawfulstatus on June 15, 2012, among other qualifications, to receive deferred action,meaning they will not be deported, as well as employment authorization.27It isimportanttounderstandthatthisactiondoesnotgivethemigrantsanytypeoflegalstatus or path to obtaining residency in the United States. President Obama hassinceusedanotherexecutiveaction toexpand theagerequirementsofDACA,andcreatea similarprogramcalledDeferredAction forParentsofAmericans (DAPA),which gives the unlawful parents of U.S. citizen children deferred action andemployment authorization.28However, this action has been tied up in litigationsinceitwascreated,andwasrecentlyheardintheSupremeCourtandiscurrentlyawaitingadetermination.

TheU.S. immigration policy has had an impact on the childmigrant crisis,however,not inthewaythatmostAmericansthink ithas.ManypeopleblametheDreamActforcausingtheincreaseinchildmigrants.Theyarguethatitcausesthemigrantstobelievetheywillbegivenamnestyiftheysurrenderthemselvesattheborder.Thisassertionisamyth.Oneissuewiththisassertionisthatamigranthasto have resided continuously in the U.S. since 2007 in order to qualify for DACA.However,ignoringthelogisticalerrorsoftheassertion,evenblamingtheperceptionof DACA qualification is unfounded. Of the more than 400 children Kennedyinterviewed, only one knew about theDreamAct orObama’sDeferredAction forChildhoodArrivals.29Therefore, it ismore likely thatdomestic factorsarepushingCentralAmericans fromtheirhomecountries, rather thanAmericanpolicypullingthemtomigratetotheUnitedStates.

24Martinez25Martinez26Martinez27UnitedStatesCitizenshipandImmigrationService28UnitedStatesCitizenshipandImmigrationService29Kennedy

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Methodology:Istartedwithabroadapproachbylookingatthenumberofnewarrival

lawfulpermanentresidentsintheUnitedStatescomingfromseveraldifferentLatinAmericancountries,includingMexico,Guatemala,Honduras,ElSalvador,CostaRica,Panama,Venezuela,Colombia,Brazil,Chile,Bolivia,Belize,Peru,Argentina,Paraguay,Uruguay,andCuba.Newarrivallawfulpermanentresidentsarethosethatpetitionandundergovisaprocessingfromtheirhomecountry,anddoesnotincludethosealreadyintheUnitedStatesadjustingtolawfulpermanentresidentstatus.Ichosethiscategorybecausenewarrivalsdemonstratesforeignnationalsleavingtheirhomecountries,whileadjustmentofstatusapplicantsarethosewhohavealreadybeenintheUnitedStatesforanumberofyearsandwouldnotadequatelyreflectthefactorspushingthemtotheUnitedStatesduringanyspecifictimeperiod.IacknowledgethatthiswillnotbeanaccurateassessmentofthosemigratingtotheUnitedStates,asmanymigrantscometotheUnitedStatesbyunlawfulmeans.Unfortunately,thereisnowaytoaccuratelytrackhowmanyundocumentedmigrantsarelivingintheUnitedStates,wheretheycamefrom,orwhentheyarrived.Becausethatdatadoesnotexist,IhaveonlyanalyzedmigrantscomingtotheUnitedStateslawfullyinassumptionthattheundocumentedmigrantswillbefollowingasimilartrend.

NextIdecidedtoexamineawiderangeofpushfactors.Thesefactorsincludepoverty,violence,unemployment,andfaithingovernment.Forpoverty,Iamusingthemeasurementofpercentageofthepopulationbelowthenationalpovertyline.IchosethisstandardbecauseIwanttoexaminethepovertyofthepeoplerelativetotheirowncountriesratherthanrelativetotheworldstandard. Next,forviolenceIamusingthemeasurementofintentionalhomicidesper100,000people.UndertheUNOfficeonDrugsandCrime’sdefinition,thisisanestimateof“unlawfulhomicidespurposelyinflictedasaresultofdomesticdisputes,interpersonalviolence,violentconflictsoverlandresources,intergangviolenceoverturforcontrol,andpredatoryviolenceandkillingbyarmedgroups.”Thisstandarddoesnotincludekillingsinarmedconflictsbyfairlylargecohesivegroupsgenerallyexceedingoverhundredsofmembers.ThisdefinitionencompassesmuchofwhatIamlookingtotargetintheregion,includinggangfightinginCentralAmericaanddrugviolence. Additionally,forunemployment,Iamusingtotalpercentofthelaborforcethatisunemployed.IamdefiningunemploymentusingtheInternationalLabourOrganization’sdefinitionthatunemployment“referstotheshareofthelaborforcethatiswithoutworkbutavailableforandseekingunemployment.” Finally,forfaithingovernment,IamusingTransparencyInternational’scorruptionperceptionindex.Thisindexmeasurestheperceivedlevelsofcorruptioninthepublicsectorforeachcountry.Itoriginallyusedascaleof0to10,withzerobeinghighlycorruptand10beingveryclean.However,in2012,theyswitchedtoascaleof0to100.Therefore,inordertomaintainconsistency,Ichangedallofthenumberstothe0to10scalewithdecimalpoints. Afterexaminingthedata,Ifoundthattherewasnostrongcorrelationbetweentheimmigrationdataandanyofthepushfactors.Irealizedthattheremay

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havebeenothervariablesimpactingmigrationtotheUnitedStates,likegeographicproximity,andneededtonarrowmystudyaccordingly.Dueinparttotherecentmigrantcrisis,andinparttothediversityinmigrationpatterns,IchosetofocusmorecloselyonCentralAmerica.IfoundittobeinterestingthatElSalvadorandHondurashadincreasingmigrationtrends,whileGuatemalawasdecreasing,andPanamaandCostaRicastayedaboutthesame.Idecidedtochoosethesefivecountriestofocusoninordertoseewhichfactorsmayhaveaccountedforthedifferencesinmigrationpatternsincountriessocloseinlocationtooneanother. Finally,inordertodetermineacorrelationbetweenanyofthefourfactorsandtherateofnewarrivals,Icalculatedthecorrelationbetweeneachfactagainstthenewarrivals.ThistoldmewhichfactorhasthestrongestcorrelationwithmigrationfromeachcountryinCentralAmericantotheUnitedStates.

DataAnalysis:AccordingtoFigure1.1,migrationfromCostaRica,Panama,Argentina,Chile,

Bolivia,Belize,Paraguay,andUruguayremainsrelativelyunchangedfrom2006-2016.Brazil,Peru,andGuatemaladecrease,whiletheremainingcountries,includingMexicoinFigure1.2,increaseinmigrationrates.

AccordingtoFigure1.3,thepovertyratesofallofthecountriesduringthepasttenyearsdecrease,exceptforHondurasandElSalvador,andinrecentyearsVenezuela.ThereisacorrelationbetweentheincreaseinpovertyratesinthesethreecountriesandanincreaseinmigrationtotheUS.However,asmigrationtotheUSfromColombiaincrease,povertydecreases.Alternatively,anotherCentralAmericancountrysuchasPanamahasunchangedmigrationrates,yethasadecreaseinpoverty.Finally,CostaRicahasrelativelystablemigrationandpovertyrates.

Similarly,accordingtoFigure1.4,Honduras,Venezuela,andElSalvadorwerethethreemostviolentcountries,withHondurasandVenezuelasteadilyincreasing,andElSalvadordecreasing.

Surprisingly,BelizeandColombiahadthehighestunemploymentratesunderFigure1.5,whilemostofthecountriesstayedrelativelythesameovertheten-yearperiod.Finally,ElSalvadorandUruguaybyfarhadthehighestperceivedcorruptionrates.

Uponexaminationofthenarrowedstudyusingthecorrelationcoefficients,itappearsthatpoverty,faithingovernment,andviolencehavethestrongandmostconsistentcorrelationinCentralAmericawithnewarrivalsintheUnitedStates.Unemploymentconsistentlyhadaveryweakcorrelationcoefficientacrosstheregion.

Finally,uponexaminationofthenewarrivalsfrom2012,theyearDACAwascreated,andforward,itdoesnotappearthatthereisasignificantincreaseinmigrationtotheUnitedStates.

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Results: Basedontheanalysisofmydata,myhypothesesarepartiallycorrect.First,violence,faithingovernment,andpovertyappeartobethefactorsthatcontributemosttomigrationfromCentralAmericatotheUnitedStates.Second,DACAdidnotappeartohaveaneffectonmigrationtotheUnitedStates.

PolicyRecommendations:Basedontheresults that I found, theUnitedStatesshould focuson foreign

policy measures rather than domestic policy measures in its efforts to reducemigration from Central America. Some potential policies are to send aid to theregion tohelp reducepoverty.Thiswillbothprovidepeopleahigher standardorliving as well as help keep people out of gangs since they will be earning betterwages.TheU.S.shouldalsofocusforeignpolicyeffortsonremovingthegangsfromthe region. This would both reduce violence and help to reestablish faith ingovernment. The U.S. could do this by cooperating with the Central Americangovernments, using international organizations such as the OAS, to remove thegangs from their communities. TheU.S. could alsoworkwith theOAS could passresolutions,sanctionthegovernments,orprovideaidtohelpthemregaincontroloftheircountries.Althoughthiswouldtakealotoftimeandefforttoproduceresults,it would be a proactive solution getting to the root of the problem causingmassmigration rather than formulating reactive solutions when confronted with theimmediatecrisisof floodsofchildrenat theborder.TheU.S. shouldnot,however,directlyintervene,especiallymilitarily.AsseenwithwhathappenedintheColdWareraintheregion,thiscouldcreateevengreaterinstabilityandviolenceandresultinevenmorepeoplemigratingtotheU.S.

Conclusion: IftheU.S.weretotreatimmigrationasaforeignpolicyissueratherthanadomesticpolicyissues,itwouldlikelyseemoreresultsinthelong-term.Alltoooften,likeinthecaseofthechildmigrantcrisis, theU.S. findsitself lookingatreactivewhetherthanproactivesolutions. In thiscase,creating foreignpolicy inCentralAmericatodecreasepovertyandviolenceandincreasefaithingovernmentmighthavehelpedtoresolvethechildmigrantcrisis.

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Appendix1:Tables&GraphsFigure1.1NewArrivalLPRsfromLatinAmerica:2006-2015

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Guatemala

Honduras

ElSalvador

CostaRica

Panama

Venezuela

Colombia

Brazil

Chile

Bolivia

Belize

Peru

Argentina

Paraguay

Uruguay

Cuba

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Figure1.2NewArrivalLPRsfromMexico:2006-2016

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Mexico

Mexico

12

Figure1.3PercentageofthePopulationBelowNationalPovertyRate:2006-2016

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Mexico

Guatemala

Honduras

ElSalvador

CostaRica

Panama

Venezuela

Colombia

Brazil

Chile

Bolivia

Belize

Peru

Argentina

Paraguay

Uruguay

Cuba

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Figure1.4NumberofHomicidesper100,000:2006-2016

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Mexico

Guatemala

Honduras

ElSalvador

CostaRica

Panama

Venezuela

Colombia

Brazil

Chile

Bolivia

Belize

Peru

Argentina

Paraguay

Uruguay

Cuba

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Figure1.5PercentageoftheLaborForceUnemployed:2006-2016

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

12.00%

14.00%

16.00%

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Mexico

Guatemala

Honduras

ElSalvador

CostaRica

Panama

Venezuela

Colombia

Brazil

Chile

Bolivia

Belize

Peru

Argentina

Paraguay

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Figure1.6CorruptionPerceptionIndex:2006-2016

Figure2.1Guatemala:Poverty -1Violence 0.492767006Unemployment -0.648580803Corruption -0.381912257

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Mexico

Guatemala

Honduras

ElSalvador

CostaRica

Panama

Venezuela

Colombia

Brazil

Chile

Bolivia

Belize

Peru

Argentina

Paraguay

Uruguay

Cuba

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Figure2.2

Figure2.3

0100020003000400050006000700080009000

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

NewArrivals

NewArrivals

17

Figure2.4

Figure2.5

05101520253035404550

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Violence

Violence

0.00%0.50%1.00%1.50%2.00%2.50%3.00%3.50%4.00%4.50%

Unemployment

Unemployment

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Figure2.6ElSalvador:Poverty 0.769009175Violence 0.360918989Unemployment 0.431534245Corruption -0.922467187Figure2.7

Figure2.8

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Corruption

Corruption

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

NewArrivals

NewArrivals

19

Figure2.9

Figure2.10

0.00%5.00%10.00%15.00%20.00%25.00%30.00%35.00%40.00%45.00%

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Poverty

Poverty

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Violence

Violence

20

Figure2.11

Figure2.12

0.00%1.00%2.00%3.00%4.00%5.00%6.00%7.00%8.00%

Unemployment

Unemployment

3.13.23.33.43.53.63.73.83.94

4.1

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Corruption

Corruption

21

Honduras:Poverty 0.564248662Violence 0.214595126Unemployment 0.065892067Corruption 0.307860532Figure2.13

Figure2.14

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

NewArrivals

NewArrivals

22

Figure2.15

54.00%

56.00%

58.00%

60.00%

62.00%

64.00%

66.00%

68.00%

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Poverty

Poverty

0102030405060708090100

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Violence

Violence

23

Figure2.16

Figure2.17

Figure2.18

0.00%

1.00%

2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

5.00%

6.00%

Unemployment

Unemployment

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Corruption

Corruption

24

CostaRica:Poverty -0.470904745Violence -0.8565138Unemployment -0.181116795Corruption -0.694913505Figure2.19

Figure2.20

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

NewArrivals

NewArrivals

19.50%

20.00%

20.50%

21.00%

21.50%

22.00%

22.50%

23.00%

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Poverty

Poverty

25

Figure2.21

Figure2.22

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Violence

Violence

0.00%1.00%2.00%3.00%4.00%5.00%6.00%7.00%8.00%9.00%

Unemployment

Unemployment

26

Figure2.23

Figure2.24Panama:Poverty 0.929402962Violence -0.4302583Unemployment 0.957764758Corruption -0.733774078

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Corruption

Corruption

27

Figure2.25

Figure2.26

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

NewArrivals

NewArrivals

00.050.10.150.20.250.30.350.40.45

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Poverty

Poverty

28

Figure2.27

Figure2.28

0

5

10

15

20

25

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Violence

Violence

0.00%1.00%2.00%3.00%4.00%5.00%6.00%7.00%8.00%9.00%10.00%

Unemployment

Unemployment

29

Figure2.29

00.51

1.52

2.53

3.54

4.5

2015201420132012201120102009200820072006

Corruption

Corruption

30

WorksCitedGoldberg,Michelle.2014.“OurRefugeeCrisis.”TheNation299(August):4-6.Goodman,Adam.2014.“ALongListofUncertainties.”TheNation229(September):27-32.Kennedy,Elizabeth.2014.“NoChildhoodHere:WhyCentralAmericanChildrenareFleeingtheirHomes.”ImmigrationPolicy(July):1-9.Martinez,Oscar.2014. “TheChildrenwillKeepComing.”TheNation299(August):12-16.UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrimeUnitedStatesDepartmentofStateWorldBankOrganization