understanding competency to stand trial

Running head: LEGAL DOCTRINE OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL1

The Legal Doctrine of the Competency To Stand Trial in the United States Criminal Justice System

Ronald E. Curtis

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

LEGAL DOCTRINE OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 2

As part of the adversarial process of the United States criminal justice system,

competency to stand trial (CST) is founded in the guarantees enunciated in the 5th and 14th

Amendments of the United States Constitution. The 5th and 14th Amendments guarantee a slate of

inalienable civil liberties afforded to all criminal defendants that are designed to prevent abuse of

power by government authorities against the individual. These rights include: (1) an indictment

by a grand jury, (2) a prohibition on double jeopardy, (3) a protection against self-incrimination,

and (4) a right to due process. Under constitutional law interpretation, due process has been

further defined to represent a cache of liberties that protect both the rights of the individual and

the integrity of the legal system. These rights include (1) the right to a speedy trial by a jury of

one’s peers; (2) the right of representation regardless of an individual’s ability to pay; (3) the

right to challenge one’s accusers and to present/cross-examine witnesses; and (4) the ability to

participate in one’s own defense. An integral component of one’s ability to participate in one’s

own defense is the competency of the accused, the focus of this paper.

The legal standard for CST was announced by the United States Supreme Court ruling in

the case of Dusky v. United States (1960). Considered as the Dusky standard, the ruling

determined that the defendant must possess two specific criteria at the time of the proceedings to

be found competent. At the time of trail, the defendant must maintain the ability to assist in their

own defense and possess a reasonable understanding of how the judicial system operates. The

latter encompasses the defendant’s ability to understand the charges against him and should not

be diminished by the defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate. ‘At the time of trial assessment’

establishes precedence that the defendant’s mental capacity at any time other than during the

proceedings should not be considered by the court as an inability to proceed. Factually,

competence is established in the present, while a plea of insanity is considered at the time of the


committed offense. Incompetence and insanity are not considered in the same view under

judicial law. In the case of Godinez v. Moran (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court would solidify the

criteria established in Dusky v. United States (1960) as a standard of competency under the

federal guideline. This decision did not restrict states from developing their own separate

standards for competence, but only set the Dusky standard as a minimum requirement in state

jurisdictions.

In the U.S. judicial system, there exists a presumption of competence to stand trial that

was established by the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) and Medina v. California

(1992). According to this precedence, all defendants are believed to meet the minimal criteria as

established in the Dusky standard. Any defendant who is believed to be incompetent is subject to

the preponderance of the evidence standard, which places the burden on the defense to prove that

there is more than a 50% certainty that the defendant is incompetent under the Dusky standard.

Recent arguments pertaining to CST are hotly debated; the issue is whether there should be a

flexible standard in determining the defendant’s ability to understand the judicial process when

the nature of the offense is complex versus an offense that is relatively simple to maneuver in the

judicial process. As a legal concept, CST only assesses the defendant’s ability to understand their

specific responsibility in the judicial process and the basic process of the judicial system as it

pertains to the committed offense. Unfortunately, there exist systemic issues in how adjudicative

competence is measured in different populations (Fogel, Schiffman, Mumley, Tillbrook, &

Grisso, 2013). If, however, a defendant is found to be cognizant of the judicial process and

wishes to represent themselves, should the court grant the defendant’s request? Or, does this

impose the court to evaluate the defendant under a different standard to determine competency to

waive an attorney?


According to the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Godinez v. Moran (1993), once a

defendant is found CST no other type of psychological evaluation is required if the defendant

wishes to waive their right to an attorney or to enter a guilty plea. As addressed by the Supreme

Court in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), defendants who wish to enter a plea of guilt must

be aware of the charges that have been brought against them and understand the consequences

for the crime. On its merit, the Dusky standard presupposes the standards of “knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent” as cited in Johnson v. Zerbst (1938). However, in 2008 the Supreme

Court ruled in the case of Indiana v. Edwards that there was indeed a higher standard in

determining competency to waive counsel when the defendant suffered from a mental illness.

Additionally, the court made note that a higher standard of competency should be imposed if the

defendant chooses to waive their due process rights and enter a plea of guilt. Unfortunately, the

court failed to define a standard of competency when addressing these specific concerns.

As previously mentioned, the burden of proof in CST is on the defense. If the defendant

is found incompetent to stand trial (ICST), the procedural processes found in Title 18 USC §

4241 are followed in an attempt to restore the defendant to competency. In a delineated process

that begins with submitting to the court the possibility of incompetency (4241a), the defendant is

committed for a thirty day evaluation to determine CST (4241b). Based on a clinical

psychological evaluation, if the defendant is determined CST, the defendant is returned to court

to face proceedings. If there is a determination of ICST, the defendant is committed for a period

of ninety days for restoration (4241d). If the defendant is restored to competency during this

period, the trial resumes. If the defendant is not restored, additional time may be permitted only

if the period of time required is in the foreseeable future, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the

case of Jackson v. Indiana (1972). Prior to this ruling, defendants could be held for an indefinite


amount of time. If the defendant is restored during this commitment period, the defendant is

returned to court. If the defendant is not restorable, a risk evaluation is completed to determine if

the defendant poses harm to another person or property (4246). If the defendant is found to be a

high risk for harmful behavior, an involuntary civil commitment is mandated. If the defendant

poses no harm to others or property, the defendant in released and all charges are dismissed.

However, at any time the defendant is found to be restored to competency, all charges can be

reinstated for judicial review.

The process of restoring competency can be educative or medicinal. The particular

deficiencies of the defendant will determine how the restorative process will be implemented.

For example, for the defendant who simply lacks the knowledge of the judicial process, a

restorative program that focuses on educating the defendant in the legal proceedings would be

the preferred strategy to return them to the court proceedings. For others, however, restoration of

CST may involve the use of antipsychotic medications. This is particularly true if the defendant

has a history of mental illness that limits their ability to function and think rationally when not

taking the prescribed medications for their specific illness. People who suffer from a mental

illness will often stop using their medications once the symptoms are brought under control

believing that they no longer require treatment. During this lapse of prescribed medications

trouble with law enforcement commonly pursues. It has also been shown that people who suffer

from a mental illness are often not aware they need treatment and refuse to take any medications

(Reisner & Makey, 2013). This observation leads us into the topic voluntary versus involuntary

forced medications to restore to competency.

Three U.S. Supreme Court rulings address the issue of voluntary versus involuntary

forced medication in CST procedures. In Riggins v. Nevada (1992) the courts determined that the


use of involuntary medication could only be permitted if state interests took precedence.

Specifically, if by involuntary medication the defendant would be restored to stand trial or the

process would inhibit the person from doing harm to themselves or to others, then the process

was deemed essential to CST. In the Supreme Court case of Washington v. Harper (1990), the

ruling of the court differentiated between a convicted criminal and a person alleged to have

committed a crime. The court made clear that there exist two standards when faced with the

question of forcible medication. In the case of the convicted criminal, involuntary medication

could be enforced (1) if it was in the person’s best interest and recommended by a neutral party

and (2) if involuntary medication was in the best interest of the institution. Involuntary

medication for the person alleged to have committed a crime would only be permissible to meet

the interests of the state. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of Sell v. United States

(2003) that if treatment was appropriate and necessary to secure the interest of the state and did

not inhibit the fairness of the trial, involuntary medication could be administered to a criminal

defendant even if they did not pose a danger to themselves or others. However, the court ruled

that this process would only occur after all other options to encourage medication had been

exhausted.

From its inception in English common law, CST has been a legal standard evolving

within the society in which it operates. Today’s CST standards echo the firmaments of the 5th

and 14th Amendments and guarantee that both the Individual and the State proceed in a learned

and equitable manner. From Dusky to present, CST has become a fixture of American

jurisprudence and should remain of fundamental concern for mental health practitioners who

must continuously advocate for judicial caution when assessing the competency of an accused

individual. Without this emphasis, the civil liberties of all Americans are in jeopardy.


References

Fogel, M. H., Schiffman, W., Mumley, D., Tillbrook, C., & Grisso, T. (2013). Ten year research

update (2001–2010): Evaluations for competence to stand trial (adjudicative competence).

Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 31(2), 165-191. doi:10.1002/bsl.2051

Reisner, A. D., Piel, J., & Makey, M. J. (2013). Competency to stand trial and defendants who

lack insight into their mental illness. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and

the Law, 41(1), 85-91.

understanding competency to stand trial

Documents