No. 42-2006 ICCSR Research Paper Series – ISSN 1479-5124

Understanding corporate lobbying on its own terms

Stephanos Anastasiadis

Research Paper Series International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility

ISSN 1479-5124

Editor: Jean-Pascal Gond

International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility Nottingham University Business School

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Understanding corporate lobbying on its own terms

Stephanos Anastasiadis

Nottingham University Business School

Abstract

There is a great deal of literature on corporate political activity, but rather less on lobbying, one of its main components. Moreover, no clear definition of lobbying exists. This paper develops a definition; then moves to consider ramifications for responsible actions in practice before raising questions for future research

Keywords

Corporate political activity, lobbying

September 2006

Address for correspondence

Stephanos Anastasiadis, Nottingham University Business School Jubilee Campus Wollaton Road Nottingham NG8 1BB Lixsa11@nottingham.ac.uk

Understanding corporate lobbying on its own terms

Introduction

Lobbying has always been controversial. From the time the term was born –

Ulysses Grant introduced the concept with a curse (Silberfeld, 2006) – to the

present day, lobbying has been notorious for ‘back room’ deals with ‘special

interests’. Yet it is essential for the proper functioning of contemporary

democracy.

Corporate political activity (CPA) is what companies engage in when they wish to

influence political processes and decisions. Lobbying forms a big part of this

engagement, but is less well understood than other aspects of CPA.

Industry associations have historically played a dominant role in corporate

lobbying. However, since the 1970s, firms have carried out a great deal of

lobbying on their own behalf (often in parallel with their trade association). In the

U.S., this seems to have been partly a reaction to the political setbacks of the

1960s and ‘70s (see Vogel, 1983). In Britain, “there was a proliferation of direct

political activity by firms” from the 1970s onwards (Grant, 2000, p11) as the post-

war consensus progressively broke down. In the European Union (EU) context,

firms had lobbied almost exclusively through national governments and their

European federations until the 1980s (Coen, 1998, pp77-78). However, by the

1990s even those with a very strong industry association tradition – such as

German firms – had established individual lobbying offices (Grant, 2000). These

Brussels-based offices have evolved over time, taking an increasingly proactive

role (Coen & Willman, 1998, see graphic, p34).

The title of this paper promises to look at lobbying on its own terms. Approaching

lobbying from existing theoretical perspectives – such as the resource-based view

of the firm, or institutional theory – certainly provide good insight and can lead to

useful tools. Logically, however, invoking an existing theoretical perspective

involves donning a particular theoretical lens; thus risking a distorted view. This

paper, by contrast, attempts to understand lobbying phenomenologically; hence

approaching it on its own terms1. Doing so will lend greater precision to the

1 This follows the approach taken by Cumpsty, who in his study of religion as a phenomenon sidestepped psychological, sociological, anthropological and other

concept, which presently has a number of different meanings, often used

interchangeably. This lack of definitional clarity is a problem (McWilliams, Siegel,

& Wright, 2006, p8, make this argument about studies of corporate social

responsibility).

This paper provides a brief overview of corporate political activity, before moving

to discuss lobbying in some detail – including proposing a definition for

understanding the phenomenon. It ends by briefly raising a number of questions

of responsibility in practice, and suggesting possible directions for future research.

Corporate political activity

There is a great deal of literature on CPA. At its simplest, CPA can be defined as

“any business effort to influence public policy” (Windsor, 2006b, p6). That covers

a wide range of possible activities; from political advertising and other forms of

public communication, through to stakeholder management, legal action, funding

political parties, and U.S.-style election campaign financing. It also includes

lobbying. Its relevance to firms, and the field of management studies, is well-

established (e.g., the substantial textbook by Baron, 2006, now in its fifth

edition).

Hillman & Hitt (1999, p826; see also Vogel, 1983) set out governments’ powers

vis-à-vis business. The recognition of such powers provided the first impetus for

CPA: trying to prevent or reduce the costs that governments could impose. In the

words of Adair Turner, former head of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI),

this involved “beat[ing] off unwanted government actions” (cited in Caulkin &

Collins, 2003, p12).

Recent practitioner research has found that “most companies strike an

overwhelmingly defensive tone” when asked about lobbying (SustainAbility &

WWF, 2005, p3). However, business motivation for involvement in the political

sphere has evolved over time, and is no longer principally defensive (for an EU

perspective, see Lorenzi, 2006; McLaughlin, Jordan, & Maloney, 1993; Van

Schendelen, 1994; or Vogel, 1983, for a US perspective).

perspectives, to avoid reflecting or replicating the assumptions inherent in the theoretical starting points. The approach involves taking practitioners’ perspectives as the starting point (see Cumpsty, J. S. 1991. Religion as belonging: A general theory of religion. Lanham: University Press of America.).

Firms now become involved in the political process for additional reasons; such as

raising rivals’ costs (McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002) or engineering benefits

or opportunities for themselves. One recent study develops a model relating firm

performance to market and non-market actions, and concludes that non-market

actions have a positive, significant impact on performance, when measured by

profits, market share and capacity utilisation (Shaffer, Quasney, & Grimm, 2000).

How does the academic literature deal with CPA? There is no singular approach;

not least because it is of interest to a range of disciplines, such as political

science, business strategy, or business and society (Mahon & McGowan, 1998; see

p390 for an example of the political science literature); and no one set of

literature is able to take a complete view. This makes CPA impossible to fully

profile. Nonetheless, there are some patterns in the literature.

Getz’s seminal (1997) review of the field, now nearly a decade old, presents nine

basic theories from social science that are relevant to CPA; Shaffer’s (1995)

earlier work had highlighted five theoretical bases. In the business literature,

some authors take a resource-based view (e.g., Alzola, 2006; McWilliams et al.,

2002; Rehbein & Schuler, 2006; Schuler & Rehbein, 1997; Windsor, 2006b); while

others talk of political arenas (Griffin & Mahon, 2006); some are interested in the

exercise of power (Boddewyn, 2006); others deal with global issue arenas (Levy,

2006); and still others talk of policy networks (Dahan, Doh, & Guay, 2006).

Institutional theory is one of the more significant approaches in the CPA literature

(Boddewyn, 2003; Griffin & Dunn, 2004; Suchman, 1995). The field of economics

has also contributed, with public choice models (Shaffer, 1995), also called

economic exchange models (Lord, 2000). Finally, one of the most significant

approaches in the literature is the stakeholder theory approach (Buchholz &

Rosenthal, 2004; Driscoll & Starik, 2004; Freeman, 1994; Freeman & Reed, 1983;

Hendry, 2003; Mahon, 2002).

The nature of CPA research has evolved over time. One of the first questions

researchers asked about CPA was, why become involved at all? Rehbein & Schuler

discuss the “determinants of corporate political activity” in their paper at the turn

of the last century, citing 20 papers spanning nearly 30 years by way of example

(Rehbein & Schuler, 1999, p145). Earlier literature was more interested in this

‘why?’ question than more recent research has been (though some recent papers

do address the question: e.g., Georgiou, 2005, on standard-setting in UK

accounting; and McWilliams et al., 2002, on CPA as a means of raising rivals'

costs).

Much of the more recent literature2 now focuses either on ‘how’ questions –

determinants of political strategies, which particular strategies or tools companies

use in CPA, and why they choose them (e.g., Hillman, 2003; Hillman et al., 1999;

Hillman & Keim, 1995; Rehbein et al., 1999, 2006; Schuler et al., 1997) – or on

the specific choices they make in strategy and positions in particular

circumstances (examples of this type of literature abound: on climate change

alone, see, e.g., Kolk & Levy, 2001; Kolk & Pinkse, 2005; Kolk & Pinkse, 2006;

Levy & Newell, 2000; Levy & Rothenberg, 2002; Levy & Kolk, 2002, 2005; Levy &

Newell, 2002).

There is also some research available on company-internal processes in CPA;

though as Rehbein & Schuler (1999, p145) put it, “the decision process within the

firm has by and large been overlooked.” This is not least because of practical

limitations such as access to data (McWilliams et al., 2006; Rehbein et al.,

1999)3.

Defining lobbying

Most of the CPA literature at least mentions lobbying as one of the field’s most

significant elements (e.g., Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005a; Bonardi & Keim,

2005b; Gordon & Hafer, 2005; Griffin et al., 2004; Hillman, 2003; Hillman et al.,

1999; Hillman et al., 1995; Peterse, 1990; Suchman, 1995). In fact, while there

are a number of papers dealing with CPA that ignore lobbying, these are relatively

rare (e.g., Keim, Zeithaml, & Baysinger, 1984, focus on comparing political action

committees with constituency-building).

Unsurprisingly, a number of papers deal with lobbying specifically (AccountAbility

& The Global Compact, 2005; Andrews, 1996; Bouwen, 2004; Caulkin et al.,

2 Most notably from the 1980s onwards. Vogel’s (1983) powerful overview of developments in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s is a good example of the turning-point in the literature. 3 One noticeable gap is in research looking simultaneously at multiple arena actions, such as parallel lobbying approaches within the firm on the one hand, and their industry associations on the other.

2003; Coen, 1997, 1999; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Lorenzi, 2006; McLaughlin et

al., 1993; SustainAbility & GPC, 2000; SustainAbility et al., 2005). Writing in the

European Union context, Coen (1997, p21) reports that corporations see lobbying

as the “most effective means of influencing policy;” and Hansen & Mitchell (2000,

see p893) have argued something similar for the U.S. context.

Two related points are worth noting, however.

First, there is a lack of systematic attention to lobbying in the business literature,

when viewed in relation to the CPA field as a whole; particularly given its

centrality. A great deal of the literature may mention lobbying, but comparatively

few papers deal with it in any detail.

On the one hand, this is surprising. Lobbying plays a huge role in corporations’

political actions. They spend a great deal of money on it: in the U.S. alone, for

example, Pfizer spent $54.8m on lobbying between 1998 and 2004, Boeing spent

$71m and the Altria Group spent $125.2m over the same period (SustainAbility et

al., 2005, Fig.1.2, p7). It is generally seen as a key component in firms’ political

activities. Hansen & Mitchell (2000, p893) go so far as to argue that lobbying is

the most “instrumental” act in a firm’s political arsenal.

On the other hand, the relative lack of attention is unsurprising: lobbying is

difficult to operationalise empirically (see, e.g. Hansen et al., 2000, p898); and as

Rehbein & Schuler (1999) point out, much CPA literature relies on publicly

available data: access to non-public data is tricky. This can lead to proxy

measures being used, particularly in quantitative studies, such as the common

practice of assessing influence by measuring ‘access’; which is known to be flawed

(e.g., Rehbein et al., 2006). This has led to detailed study of lower-hanging fruit

in the field, by both management (Keim et al., 1984) and political (Hansen et al.,

2000, p892) scholars. That does not include lobbying.

The second point revolves around the term’s complexity and lack of common

definition: there appears to be some confusion over what exactly lobbying is.

‘Lobbying’ emerged as a concept in the second half of the 19th Century. Silberfeld

(2006, p44) relates how then-President Ulysses Grant would escape the pressures

of his job by taking refuge in a hotel near the White House; and how “those with

an agenda to advance took their issues directly to the president at the [hotel,”

approaching him in the lobby; and leading him to refer to them as “those damn

lobbyists” (ibid.). Lobbying, then, was originally conceived of as the act of special

interests approaching someone with political power. Even then, however, exactly

what lobbyists actually did was nebulous. Over time firms’ political strategies have

become more sophisticated (see, e.g., Van Schendelen, 1994; Vogel, 1983); and

lobbying has thus acquired a(n even) wider range of possible meanings.

There is agreement only that lobbying is a crucial element of political activity.

Some see ‘lobbying’ in very general terms; and for them, ‘lobbying’ is more or less

synonymous with CPA. Others use the term in a highly specific manner; referring

only to the act of discussing particular legislative proposals with individual

decision-makers, be they elected officials or career civil servants. Still others

highlight regional differences, while some authors even offer more than one

definition. Even more confusing, many write about lobbying without providing any

definition. Table 1 provides an illustrative overview of the broad spectrum of

available meanings.

Table 1 – What is lobbying? Some examples

Trying to influence the thinking of legislators or other public officials for or against a specific cause

(AccountAbility et al., 2005, p12)

[‘Lobbying means two things:] Representation based on careful research, usually followed by negotiation with several elements of central or local government – in short, working the system… [and] mobilization of public and media opinion…where you seek to make Government act against its will or where an issue needs to be given higher place in the political agenda – in short, pressure

(Andrews, 1996, pp77-78)

Legislative tasks [facing a group] when a relevant bill is referred to a congressional committee are seek[ing] to maintain and expand the size of its supportive coalition … [and] affect[ing] the content and fate of proposed legislation. … [Both require] providing information directly to members of Congress (or their staff)

(Hojnacki et al., 1998, pp777-778)

Lobbying conveys most information to policymakers concerning policy preferences, is most instrumental and is most likely to result in an exclusive benefit, such as regulatory relief or a government contract

(Hansen et al., 2000, p893)

Direct lobbying includes a set of activities by which firms, or their representatives, attempt to establish communication channels with government representatives or their staffs

(McWilliams et al., 2002, p710)

‘lobbying’ means all activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making process of the European institutions

(European Commission, 2006, p5)

‘lobbying’ is generally used to denote all forms of political strategies in Europe, whereas it has a more specific, tactical reference in the United States

(Hillman, 2003, p463)

trying informally to influence public authorities (Van Schendelen, 1994, p8)

When most people think about corporate political influence, they think of lobbying for – or against – particular pieces of public policy, with particular legislators or civil servants. Yet this sort of direct lobbying is only one of the many ways that companies influence the development and implementation of public policy

(SustainAbility et al., 2000, p6)

Lobbying is itself a collection of activities (Hansen et al., 2000, p898)

Lobbying is ‘Machiavellian marketing’ [quoting Harris & Lock]… political lobbyists routinely utilize marketing concepts and techniques in pressing their case

(Andrews, 1996, p76)

[Lobbying is a] less visible political activit[y] [than other CPA]

(Hansen et al., 2000, p893)

[There is a difference between the EU and the rest-of-the-world:] the common U.S. and other non-European connotations impl[ies] the provision of information to policy makers by individuals representing the firm’s interest – that is, by lobbyists; this information may be conveyed through informal meetings, formal settings, and social settings. The European connotation of lobbying, however, implies political action in general. That is, lobbying in the European sense refers to any proactive political strategy

(Hillman et al., 1999, Footnote 4, p834)

Note: all emphases added

A number of points arise. The biggest difference appears to be in the scope of

activities considered: some see lobbying as something extremely specific and

highly focussed, while others consider that the term accommodates a very broad

range of activities. This can be represented as a spectrum, illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Understanding the nature of lobbying as an activity

Neither extreme is useful. Defining it very broadly effectively makes it

synonymous with CPA; thus rendering ‘lobbying’ redundant as a term. Given the

interest in the literature to lobbying, as distinct from CPA, this is problematic.

Also, ‘CPA’ includes such elements as campaign financing, which nowhere in the

Highly specific

Highly general

literature is understood as ‘lobbying’. This general view is thus insufficiently-

distinguished from the CPA field.

Similarly, defining lobbying as purely specific and issue-based is problematic.

Hillman et al., who describe U.S.-EU differences, set out a range of fora in which it

is possible to convey information in a firm’s interest; and Hansen et al. describe

lobbying as itself being a collection of activities. Further, a number of researchers

describe building up personal connections and reputation as pivotal for the ability

to lobby effectively (Coen et al., 1998; Hillman et al., 1999; SustainAbility et al.,

2000). The highly-specific view is therefore simply too restrictive to be useful.

It therefore makes sense that ‘lobbying’ lies somewhere in the middle of the

spectrum. However, this is not yet enough.

For this reason, it is useful to examine the nature of a lobbyist’s activities as a

guide to understanding the term. At first glance there appear to be significant

differences between U.S. and EU approaches. U.S.-style lobbying seems to be

more related to particular issues, as they arise; with EU-style lobbying being more

interested in ongoing relationships. Hillman & Hitt (1999, see figure 1, p837)

would characterise the former as a ‘transactional’ approach, and the latter as a

‘relational’ one.

However, Hillman & Hitt explore both options in their wide-ranging, and U.S.-

centric, examination of “specific behaviors that firms choose in order to participate

in the public policy process” (ibid., p827). It would therefore be a mistake to see a

binary difference between approaches to lobbying on the two sides of the Atlantic

and leave it at that. There do appear to be differences of emphasis, occasioned by

different political cultures4; but the most one can reasonably say is that U.S. firms

may tend to be more transactional, while EU firms may tend to take a more

relational approach.

4 It is well-established that firms will engage differently with different governments, depending on location (e.g. Boddewyn, J. J. 2006. The internationalization of the public-affairs function in U.S. MNEs: Organization and management, Amsterdam research colloquium 2006: Corporate political activities in an internationalizing economy. Amsterdam, Boddewyn, J. J., & Brewer, T. L. 1994. International-business political behavior: New theoretical directions. Academy of Management Review, 19(1): 119-143.).

Some definitions listed in Table 1 introduce concepts such as ‘direct’ or ‘issue’

lobbying; talk of lobbying as having low (public) ‘visibility’; and raise the issue of

‘formalness’ of process. However, these can be more properly seen as elements of

the lobbying process rather than definitions per se.

In developing a more precise understanding of the term, the simplest approach

would be to say that ‘lobbying is what lobbyists do’. However, that would not

work, for two reasons. First, different lobbyists do different things, even within the

same political context5. Second, some argue that not all elements of lobbyists’

work can be seen as lobbying. For example, Andrews asserts that most of the

work lobbyists do is not lobbying at all; but rather monitoring, case assembly,

non-specific contact-building, strategy and advocacy (Andrews, 1996, p78). A

more elegant approach is needed.

Here, Hillman & Hitt’s (1999) work is useful. They are interested in corporate

political strategy formulation, and their paper develops a number of choices facing

corporations when they decide to engage politically. Once companies have decided

between a ‘transactional’ and a ‘relational’ approach – and then between an

‘individual’ and a ‘collective’ one – their model posits that firms must then choose

between three types of generic political strategies: ‘information’, ‘financial

incentives’ and ‘constituency-building’ (ibid., Fig.1, p837). They distinguish

between a strategy and a tactic; and identify lobbying as a tactic within the

information strategy. They define the “information strategy” as follows:

Those using the information strategy seek to affect public policy by

providing policy makers specific information about preferences for

policy or policy positions and may involve providing information on

the costs and benefits of different issue outcomes… The target of this

political strategy is the political decision maker, and the good

provided is information. An information strategy includes such tactics

as lobbying, both by internal or external professionals and

executives …; reporting research and survey results; commissioning

research/think-tank research projects; testifying as expert witnesses

and in hearings or before other government bodies; and supplying

decision makers with position papers or technical reports. (Hillman

et al., 1999, p834)

5 And looking only at one system has led to problems of definition, as this discussion has shown.

Turning back to Table 1 for a moment: there are three elements to lobbying at

least implicit in all the definitions profiled in the table: information, communication

and reputation. These are not necessarily all present in other CPA approaches.

Information clearly plays a central role – whether a firm is participating in the U.S.

system (e.g., Hillman, 2003; Vogel, 1983) or the European Commission’s ‘forum

politics’ (e.g., Calingaert, 1993; Lorenzi, 2006). It is the ‘payload’, without which

lobbying becomes meaningless, turning it at best into a social event6.

Similarly, communication is patently essential in conveying information on

preferences or positions. Lobbying simply cannot happen without it.

Communication would thus appear to be the process, or action, by which lobbying

happens.

Finally, reputation (or credibility) is indispensable, both to get a ‘foot in the door’

in the first place, and to then have what one communicates taken seriously. Put

positively, “it is only natural that regulators will favour those firms that appear to

want to work with them and can be seen to be professional and reliable” (Coen et

al., 1998, p36)7. Formulated defensively, “companies that do not have a good

reputation within government find it harder to get their voice heard when an issue

arises – the time to start is years before an issue comes to a head” (SustainAbility

et al., 2000, p8). Lorenzi reinforces this view, stressing (2006, p4) that a

reputation for reliability is essential. This is not new: Hillman & Hitt (1999, p836)

report findings from over two decades ago that, “the most important determinant

of success in advocacy and public relations advertising was the credibility or

reputation of the source.” Reputation is therefore both an antecedent to being

effective and one of the outcomes of the lobbying process: in addition to and

separate from any policy outcome. This means that actions to develop and

maintain credibility are an integral part of lobbying.

6 A vignette illustrates. An organisation with an excellent reputation in its field chooses a competent, but politically-inexperienced, replacement as its outgoing head. She treats the many one-on-one meetings arranged by her predecessor as essentially-social, ‘getting-to-know-you’ sessions. Only later does she realise that these events had really been a chance to give key policymakers information about her thinking on the main policy issues of the day, in a cosy private situation. 7 Actors with a good reputation can expect regulators to seek them out. For example, a civil servant may contact a renowned company lobbyist for their thoughts on a particular initiative, prior to any drafting, with the intention of improving the thinking behind it.

Information, communication and reputation are therefore at the heart of what

lobbying is. It is thus possible to modify Hillman & Hitt’s (1999, p833) ‘information

strategy’ somewhat, to develop a definition of the phenomenon of lobbying that

incorporates these core components:

Lobbying seeks to affect public policy by providing key stakeholders

– notably policy makers – with specific information about

preferences for policy or policy positions. It may involve providing

information on the costs and benefits of different issue outcomes, or

more broadly, attempting to set the terms of the debate and thus

channel policy discussions in a favourable manner. Lobbying can

challenge outcomes of decisions already made, through seeking to

redefine the terms of the debate and thereby re-problematising

undesirable outcomes, causing them to be revisited. The good

provided is information. The ultimate target of lobbying input is the

legislator or political decision maker. Lobbying includes a range of

tactics, such as ‘direct’ or issue-specific lobbying; reporting research

and survey results; commissioning research/think-tank research

projects; testifying as expert witnesses and in hearings or before

other government bodies; and supplying decision makers with

position papers or technical reports. In addition to seeking desired

policy outcomes, one goal of lobbying is to develop a strong

reputation, so that decision-makers are inclined to trust the

information provided and turn to the lobbying organisation for

information when developing or discussing policy or policy positions.

Note that the individual dimensions of lobbying can be more or less pronounced in

different circumstances. This definition can be depicted in a diagram, as in Figure

2.

Figure 2: Components-based definition of lobbying

Adopting this definition has two advantages. First, it provides a specific and

delineated area within the CPA field, without being too narrow. Second, it expands

on existing literature, thus avoiding a tedious reinvention of the wheel.

Before ‘pulling out’ the individual components, a few general comments are in

order.

This definition is flexible enough to encompass a range of different activities (in

line with Hansen et al., 2000), capturing the gamut of lobbying activities. It will

tend to encompass less ‘visible’ activities, but does not preclude more public

actions, such as information provision on the pages of a newspaper (the question

of transparency is discussed in some detail below). Further, it allows for both

‘working the system’ and putting ‘pressure’ on authorities to change direction.

Note that the definition makes no claims as to the veracity of any information

conveyed8.

8 It can be argued that content that is persistently inaccurate or personally-attacking in nature will reduce overall effectiveness, as reputation suffers. Many European Commission officials are widely known to discount information from companies, precisely because they believe it to be inaccurate (and see practitioner-based literature); and Smith reports a European Commissioner striking out publicly at Greenpeace for inaccurate and personally-attacking campaigning (Smith, E. 2006. Verheugen accuses green groups of slander, European Voice, 15 June 2006 ed., Vol. 12 (23): p4. Brussels.). This latter example also illustrates the distinction between lobbying and political campaigning: both involve communication and information, but

Exactly how lobbying will look in practice will depend in large part on the features

of the political system within which actors are operating. In the U.S., for example,

political advertising may have a stronger role than it does in the EU, given that

the European environment is polyglot and lacks pan-European media outlets.

It could be argued that legal challenges to legislation (or proposed legislation)

should be thought of as lobbying. However, a legal challenge involves a different

set of players – typically a legal office or team9 – and involves the courts. It

therefore takes place in a different arena10. Further, it does not so much rely on

communication and information as legal interpretation. Finally, while an

adversarial legally-based approach may have short-term success, it is clear from

the literature that success in lobbying is best measured over a longer period of

time, and involves setting the terms of the debate in addition to influencing the

outcome of specific dossiers; something a company bringing a zero-sum game

legal challenge may not be able to do. For these reasons, legal challenges are a

different phenomenon than lobbying.

Companies often form ad-hoc coalitions when they engage in lobbying; and it

could be argued that the definition fails to account for such actions. However,

coalitions surely also rely on information, communication and reputation – one

reason for entering into coalition in the first place may be precisely to improve one

or more of these three components. Acting in a coalition is therefore more a

specific tactic than a separate phenomenon.

This paper has so far defined lobbying in terms of reputation, communication,

information, and policy outcome. It has also addressed several issues associated lobbying requires creation and maintenance of reputation as a prerequisite to being seen as a reliable partner, whereas campaigning does not necessarily; seeking instead to change laws and structures through public pressure. Keim et al deal with this from a corporate perspective in their paper on constituency-building (Keim, G. D., Zeithaml, C. P., & Baysinger, B. D. 1984. SMR Forum: New directions for corporate political strategy. Sloan Management Review, 25(3): 53-62.). 9 Lobbyists are typically part of Government Affairs or Public Affairs, which is usually distinct from a company’s legal department. Levi-Faur & Bachar show that these departments are in diverse locations in different companies in the telecoms and electricity sectors – sometimes in legal affairs, but usually elsewhere (Levi-Faur, D., & Bachar, Z. R. 2006. Corporate regulatory strategies in context: Telecoms and electricity reforms and the new order of regulatory capitalism, Amsterdam research colloquium 2006: Corporate political activities in an internationalizing economy. Amsterdam.). 10 although threatening legal action is certainly a conceivable tactic in lobbying; particularly in a ‘blind and deaf’ meeting (see Table 3, below).

with the definition. It is therefore now time to ‘pull out’ the individual components

and look at them in greater detail.

Components of the definition in greater detail

Policy Outcome refers not only to the outcome in a narrow sense, but to any

outcome in the political environment. To use a military analogy, this component

refers to both ‘individual battles’ and the ‘war’ as a whole; the difference in the

case of lobbying being that the political process never ends.

Figure 3: Locating the Policy Outcome component

By definition the outcome must be included, as it is the purpose of the entire

exercise: the other three components lose their meaning without reference to an

outcome. It is nevertheless given equal weight with the other components (rather

than having a privileged position), because of the emphasis on the longer-term,

ongoing nature of lobbying, and the role that the other components play in

outcomes over the longer-term.

Logically, any single, short-term outcome is relatively unimportant for the

process, which is ongoing11. For example, a firm might lose on a particular issue,

but have enhanced its reputation in the process, thereby making it easier to enjoy

gains later. This supports the view that the outcomes can be direct and/or

indirect.

The Reputation component has already been discussed and does not need a

graphical depiction per se: it is fairly straightforward. The gaining, losing or

11 This does not deny, of course, that it can be of critical importance to individual companies – who may have a lot at stake in a particular case – or to individuals, whose career path may be at stake.

maintaining of reputation depends partly on performance in the other

components; it is both an antecedent and an outcome in the process. Only three

further points need be made now; although the question of personal reputation

will be illustrated and covered in some detail shortly (see Figure 6). The first two

points apply to all participants in the lobbying process; the third is specific to

firms.

The first point is to respond to the question, “reputation with whom?” Lobbying

requires credibility with the lobbied. This will usually be the ‘suppliers’ of public

policy’ (see Bonardi et al., 2005a, p399); but can conceivably be any ‘player’ in

the political environment, depending on context. The notion of policy communities

(see Richardson, 2000) suggests a particular bounded group, within which

reputation is important; though the “policy virus” concept (ibid., from p1017)

indicates that membership of this group could extend beyond the geographic

boundaries within which a lobbyist might hope to influence policy.

The second point is simply that reputation adheres to both organisations and

individuals (see Mahon, 2002, from p417, for further discussion). An individual’s

actions can alter an organisation’s reputation and effectiveness, and vice-versa.

The third point is company-specific, and affects firms entering the political arena.

A firm’s prosperity may depend on its participation in the political process: “the

long run sustainability of competitive advantage requires managing effectively in

the nonmarket environment” (Baron, 2006, p2). However, a corporation’s defining

character is commercial, not political (Grant, 2000).

It is a well-established principle in western democratic systems that affected

parties should be able to contribute to the political process (see discussion,

below). Firms therefore have a ‘license to lobby’, and can be seen as “legitimate

political actors” (Coen, 1998, p75). However, being legitimate – having a

(passive) right to participate – is not necessarily the same thing as having

legitimacy – being seen as a valuable (active) participant.

“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity

are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of

norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p574). It is dependent on

the views of a social group as a collective audience (ibid.). The essentially-

commercial nature of corporations suggests that they have something additional

to prove when entering the political sphere, in order to be capable of effective

action. A company engaging in lobbying therefore logically has a greater need to

establish that it knows how to ‘play the game’ and thus gain credibility (Coen,

1998, suggests this for the EU context). Developing and maintaining reputation is

one way to ensure that a company gains and retains legitimacy. For this reason,

maintaining a good reputation is surely even more important for firms than it is

for other actors in the policy field.

We can now turn to the Communication component – illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Locating the Communication component of lobbying

Generating a clearer understanding of this component does not mean trying to

describe all possible lobbying activities available in the ‘toolbox’: that would be

neither possible nor useful. The choice of exactly how to lobby will necessarily be

tactical, based on highly-specific context-dependent factors such as political

environment, nature of the information available, timing of an issue, and the

personalities of the actors involved. In this respect, lobbying as an activity is not

unlike the African concept of ubuntu: “you know when it is there and it is obvious

when it is absent” (Tutu, 1995, p121)12.

It is therefore more fruitful to define the practice of lobbying, as distinct from the

concept. This can be done as follows:

As an action, lobbying is persuasive, instrumental communication,

conveying information and targeted at influential policy actors, with

12 Ubuntu is a traditional African concept of what it means to be truly human. It refers to a number of positive attributes, and to knowing that “you are bound up with [others] in the bundle of life, for a person is only a person through other persons” (Tutu, op. cit., p122).

the purpose of securing preferred outcome(s) and/or influence over

the regulatory environment.

Such a definition leaves room for a range of different lobbying activities in a

variety of circumstances. While it may well be possible to develop an exhaustive

typology, doing so would not make a substantial contribution to the literature.

Some considerations in tabular form are sufficient, for illustrative purposes.

Table 2: Exemplary issues to consider around lobbying in practice

Issue Comment Highly varied activity Different contexts means no single set of actions can

be definitively understood as lobbying. Who initiates the activity?

An initiative may come from any quarter, and the genesis of any particular activity or initiative may be difficult if not impossible to identify. More important is how parties engage in the process.

Actors’ influence Any actor can be influential, depending on the circumstances. The traditional understanding is that businesses and NGOs lobby governments; but all actors can be both ‘lobbier’ and ‘lobbied’.

Number of actors The number of actors is not relevant, except in terms of the size of the political ‘market’ (Bonardi et al., 2005a).

Site of activity Lobbying can happen wherever there is power to influence the political environment.

Personalities Individual people can, through their particular relationships and personalities, have great influence. Strong personalities are likely to have a disproportionate influence on outcomes (and see discussion around Figure 6).

The fourth component, Information, is illustrated in Figure 5. It would be tedious

to develop a definition of this component, and of little value to go into very high-

resolution detail; not least because every lobbying circumstance is different. Only

one question needs to be addressed: what information is relevant to (the process

of) lobbying?

Figure 5: Locating the Information component in the process

I argue that any information is at-least-potentially relevant to lobbying. The key

lies in the distinction between individuals and the organisations they represent.

It is logical that most information relevant to lobbying will be policy- or agenda-

setting in nature. Examples include position papers, technical reports, surveys,

and hearing submissions; as described above. This helps to establish an

organisation’s reputation, and communicate particular positions, potentially

furthering lobbying goals. Any information of this nature can be considered

‘organisational information’ – in that its provision is linked to the political aims of

one or more organisations – and thus relevant. This is clearly at the core of the

information component, and makes up the vast majority of lobbying content.

However, ‘organisational information’ is usually communicated by individuals13. It

is at this point that reputation becomes relevant again.

Logically, if reputation is an integral component of lobbying, then an individual

lobbyist’s personal reputation is professionally relevant, too; meaning that

information of a personal rather than organisational nature can also be relevant,

despite its being irrelevant to the content of policymaking per se. This may be

particularly the case in the western world’s political centres. For example, Reich

(1998) repeatedly calls Washington a ‘one-company town’, with work and

socialising mixing in an intensive manner. A strong personal reputation can

logically lead to greater opportunity to advocate one’s lobbying message. Under

such circumstances, therefore, personal reputation must be a factor.

13 In meetings or hearings, for example. Refer to the concept of the ‘expert witness’. The individual/ personal element is not relevant in such cases as anonymous comments submitted in response to an online consultation, however; something the EU frequently does in the early stages of policy planning.

Figure 6: The two elements of personal Reputation (within the broader

component)

Personal reputation can logically be broken down into two parts. The first, the

larger section in Figure 6 is a ‘personal-professional’ reputation, based on

attributes like qualifications, experience and communicative ability. The second,

represented by the smaller section, is a ‘personal-private’ reputation for

‘soundness’14, based on others’ perceptions of a range of individual qualities.

The importance of personal reputation can be over-emphasised. Nevertheless, its

potential relevance means that it cannot be entirely discounted. Note that the

personal element seems to play a significant role in public suspicion of lobbying

(see discussion around Table 3, below).

The political function of lobbying

The next section discusses popular criticisms of lobbying and develops a typology

for understanding the process in relation to such criticism. Before proceeding to

that discussion, though, it makes sense to briefly discuss lobbying in a western

political context. This will lead to a short discussion of the pitfalls of the present

14 This could also be thought of as ‘personal legitimacy’. It involves factors such as being seen to hold the ‘right’ opinions; being from the ‘right’ background; and how empathic or pleasant one is perceived to be. A range of information could be conveyed to establish ‘soundness’, depending on the context. It seems reasonable to expect that soundness will be more important in relatively homogenous environments. The term was picked up from the comedy series, “Yes, Minister”.

system, thus setting the scene for the subsequent section on criticisms of

lobbying.

There is a rich tradition in political science of studying political systems, both

theoretically (Dahl, 1971, 1982; Finer, 1966; Grant, 2000; Kingdon, 1984;

Richardson & Jordan, 1979), and in specific/practical cases (Grant, 1983; Grant &

Marsh, 1977; Heclo, 1977). There now seems to be broad agreement in the

literature that the west is pluralist; the previous alternative model, corporatism,

having fallen into disuse even in historically-corporatist European countries like

Sweden (Micheletti, 1991)15.

“Pluralism is a system of interest representation in which the

constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of

multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-

determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories not

specifically licensed, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled by

the State and not exercising a monopoly of representational activity

within their respective categories” (Schmitter, cited in Richardson et

al., 1979, p163)

There are permutations within pluralist theory. For example, Richardson & Jordan

were among the first ‘neo-pluralists’ (Grant, 2000; Richardson et al., 1979); and

Coen (1998, p77) talks of the EU as working to a system of “elite pluralism.”

Note that the role of organised interests in developing policy was not new –

Jennings wrote in 1939 that “much legislation is derived from organized interests

(cited in Richardson et al., 1979, p158). One of the defining features of pluralism

is the existence of competition between interests. Pluralism emphasises the role of

pressure groups in society as a means of providing access to the political system

and as a counterweight to undue concentrations of power.

There are numerous advantages to a pluralist system. Briefly, independent

organisations are “necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself, to

minimising government coercion, to political liberty, and to human well-being”

(Dahl, 1982, p1). According to Dahl, they are an inevitable consequence of 15 It was therefore possible by the turn of the century to write an “autopsy” of corporatism in the west, under the heading, “Corporatism: yesterday’s theory?” Grant, op. cit., pp52 & 51, respectively.

democratic institutions, and a prerequisite for the operation of large-scale

democracy. This is because, as Grant explains, representative democracy allows

only infrequent choices at election-time, whereas “pressure groups permit citizens

to express their views on complex issues which affect their lives” (Grant, 2000,

p35; see also Richardson et al., 1979, from p171). Half a century ago, Finer wrote

that, in a liberal democracy with the right of association,

The advantages of having a profusion of private associations to

check and balance and advise and warn the public authorities are

very obvious. This is an era of mass publics and intricate

technologies. If parliamentary government has been able to adapt

itself satisfactorily to these conditions, this is due solely to its

symbiosis with the Lobby. For better or for worse, such self-

government as we now enjoy today is one that operates by and

through the Lobby (Finer, 1966, p112)16.

Once again, however, companies are in a special position in the political process.

On the one hand, their economic assets give them huge influence in the non-

political world (Grant, 2000, p36). On the other hand, political engagement allows

them to reinforce this market power. It is therefore possible to question whether

they should be allowed to have these dual advantages.

Grant provides three reasons why firms should indeed be involved in the political

process (ibid.). Briefly, companies have a right to participate; and their doing so

leads to better legislation, which is better implemented.

Nevertheless, firms’ special status results in a degree of tension. Peterse (1990)

has described the dilemma. On the one hand, the logic of liberal democracy

means that companies have a right to participate; but on the other hand, that

there is a need to control them to a greater extent than other participants in the

process. In practical terms, this arguably means that firms will find it easier to

lose reputation than non-commercial actors: if firms are to retain reputation in the

political field, they therefore need to take greater care than their counterparts.

16 Finer defines ‘The Lobby’ as the sum of organisations trying to influence the policy of public bodies, without themselves being prepared to govern (see Finer, op. cit., p3). A number of different terms are in use; e.g., ‘the Lobby’, ‘pressure groups’, or ‘interest groups’. It is sufficient for present purposes to regard all such terms as referring to ‘organisations involved in the political process’.

Arguably, their greater power in the process – derived from their dual role –

makes such a state of affairs entirely fair.

Dahl provides a thorough overview of the shortcomings of the pluralist system. He

lists a number of problems with the fact that organisations are active in the

political process (Dahl, 1982, pp40ff) – such as distortion of the public agenda,

stabilising political inequalities, alienating final control from citizens, and

deforming civic consciousness. He goes on to suggest that these problems are

symptoms of some of the dilemmas built into democracy (ibid., pp96ff); such as

‘rights’ vs. ‘utility’, and ‘equality among individuals’ vs. ‘equality among

organisations’ (voting vs. functional representation). This is significant, because it

implies that at least some of the criticisms of lobbying are inherent to the pluralist

system in which lobbying occurs.

One of the greatest criticisms of lobbying has been around its lack of openness.

Openness and transparency: The outside looking in

Popular criticism of lobbying has tended to focus on ‘shady’ back-room deals with

‘special interests’. An excellent example is the furore surrounding the Abramoff

scandal of early 2006 (Economist, 2006a, b; Silberfeld, 2006; Wikipedia, 2006,

provides a profile).

However, not all lobbying takes place in a closed setting, as the literature

reviewed above shows. Different lobbying processes are therefore differently

transparent.

Table 3 provides an overview of different types of lobbying in terms of the degree

to which the process and content are accessible to non-participants.

Table 3: Accessibility of lobbying to ‘outsiders’: Four modes

Transparent Opaque Public 1: ‘Seeing &

Hearing’ 2: ‘Blind’

Private 3: ‘Deaf’ 4: ‘Deaf & Blind’

This table requires some explanation; which comes in the form of a general

introduction, followed by an explanation of each box, with illustrative examples.

These are drawn from a range of political situations – not necessarily lobbying – in

order to be as clear as possible. The physical senses have been chosen as an

analogy, given their close relationship with accessibility in the physical world.

The public/private dichotomy reflects the general circumstances in which lobbying

occurs, and is represented by the sense of hearing. Lobbying is public when there

is generally-available information that the process is happening; and private when

only the participants know about it17.

The transparent/opaque dichotomy represents the content and details, and is

represented by the sense of sight. Lobbying is transparent when it is easy for non-

participants to gain insight into the process and contents, either ‘live’ or after the

fact; and opaque when this information is either difficult to access or entirely

unavailable.

There may be a fine distinction in practice between these ideal types; but they are

conceptually distinct. Note that the choice of terminology can be read has having

normative overtones. Certainly, any process that is not both ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’

can lead to suspicion on the part of one or more interests. Nevertheless, there is

nothing intrinsically wrong with any of the four types (see discussion, below). The

terminology is intended to be illustrative rather than normative, providing a useful

initial typology with which to understand the different types of lobbying in terms

of accessibility.

1. Public and transparent – Seeing & Hearing mode

A non-participant can be both aware of the process and can have access to its

details. They can therefore both ‘see’ and ‘hear’ the lobbying.

An example is evidence given at congressional hearings in the U.S.. The fact that

a hearing is going on is public knowledge, and the observer has full access to the

content conveyed.

17 One could also argue that lobbying is private when it is formally public, but well-hidden.

2. Public, but opaque – Blind mode

A non-participant can be aware of the process, but has no access to its details.

They can therefore ‘hear’ the process, but cannot ‘see’ it.

For example, the European Commission frequently convenes technical working

groups to advise on certain issues. That a particular working group exists is

publicly-available information – as, frequently, is the list of participants: anyone

with internet access can get this information. It is therefore public. However,

participants are routinely required to treat the information and proceedings as

confidential, and the Commission will publish only a fraction of the output of such

a group. The details are therefore obscured, and the process and contents

opaque.

Another example of this ‘mode’ is the habit of European Union governments of

meeting in private and producing only a general record of discussions18.

3. Transparent, but private – Deaf mode

A non-participant is not aware of the process: only those involved know that it is

happening. It is therefore private. However, the non-participant can have access

to the details, which are made transparent – typically after the fact. They can

therefore ‘see’ the details, but not ‘hear’ the process.

An example is of sensitive coalition-building or positioning, such as between a

non-governmental organisation and a business. For example, the environmental

NGO WWF has a number of industry partnerships with large corporations, such as

Lafarge. The details of such cooperation projects are now publicly available, but

the negotiations were very much behind closed doors.

4. Opaque and private – Blind & Deaf mode

A non-participant is neither aware that there is lobbying happening, nor has

access to the details. There is no information to non-participants, on either the

18 This feature of EU decision-making led British liberal MEP, Graham Watson, to remark that “There are only three places in the world where legislative decisions are taken behind closed doors: Havana, Pyongyang and Brussels.” While not an example of the lobbying context, it is a nice example of the mode, and a good illustration of the suspicion attendant to the closed mode. (European Voice. 2006. Different voices, European Voice, 15 June 2006 ed., Vol. 12 (23): p12. Brussels.).

process or the outcome. It is entirely closed to non-participants, who are thus

both ‘blind’ and ‘deaf’.

An example is what is seen in the public mind as the archetypical lobbying

situation: a private meeting behind closed doors between a legislator and a

lobbyist. For example, a corporate representative approaches a government

official whom s/he knows for a ‘quiet chat’ to discuss a matter of concern, perhaps

over lunch. Such a meeting will be both private and confidential.

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with a ‘quiet chat’ (see below): lobbying that

happens behind closed doors is not automatically ‘shady’, as even critics recognise

(e.g. SustainAbility et al., 2005)19. However, when lobbying can be identified as

being in the ‘blind’ and ‘deaf’ mode, suspicions are easily raised. This is not least

because of the danger in such circumstances that the interaction ceases being one

of lobbying and turns into corruption instead (as in the case of Jack Abramoff)20.

It is in the context of such a typology that practitioners and think-tanks often

discuss questions of ‘responsible lobbying’ (AccountAbility et al., 2005; Caulkin et

al., 2003; SustainAbility et al., 2000; SustainAbility et al., 2005). This may be

because it is easier to promote an open process than it is to ensure that the

content of lobbying is honest and in good faith; or that lobbying leads to policies

that were valuable to society (however this were evaluated).

The (social) value of lobbying: Discussion and further research

Examining lobbying according to the modes just presented provides a tool for

locating the process, and may give an indication of what lobbyists are prepared to

say in a particular setting. However, it leaves important questions on content and

outcome unanswered.

Further, it is not useful to evaluate the social value of lobbying purely on its

accessibility to non-participants; or firms according to the mode they prefer to

19 For example, actors may be prepared to go further in closed-door settings than in open ones, implying that closed meetings can be a useful, because safe, environment for exploring options. 20 Indeed, if the public becomes aware of ‘blind and deaf’ mode lobbying, it is likely that it is because of an impending scandal, suggesting that a lobbyist has used the process of lobbying for corrupt ends.

operate in. The ‘deaf & blind’ mode can lead to socially progressive outcomes,

while fully transparent processes may lead to misleading information, rigid

positions, and socially regressive policy. This highlights a potential risk in

focussing on fully open processes: lower quality legislation. To put it

metaphorically, the best outcomes may require shadows within which participants

can float ideas and discuss possibilities. The problems arise when the shadows

breed corruption.

A different series of questions is therefore more interesting. These look at

(particularly corporate) activities in a more profound manner; asking the

politically-laden question of how particular lobbying efforts contribute to the public

good. This ineluctably leads to questions about the outcomes of the process for

society as a whole, and about the nature of the information conveyed during the

process.

Rynes & Shapiro’s (2005) call for greater social relevance from management

academics is one impetus for looking at the social role of corporations in lobbying.

Most business studies literature takes a company-centred approach – though

there are some calls for this to change (Frederick, 1998) – and literature on

corporate lobbying is no exception (Hendry, 2003). Given that corporations

typically become involved in lobbying to generate benefits and/or avoid costs (see

above), it is remarkable that very little of the literature investigates the broader

impact of corporate lobbying activity, such as from a corporate social

responsibility perspective.

In this respect, companies seem to be being squeezed from two sides. On the one

hand, they have a long tradition of treating legislation as something to be avoided

(recall Adair Turner’s words about fending off unwanted government action). They

are justifiably wary of initiatives that would unnecessarily raise their costs, and

may be sceptical of initiatives that could be reversed with a change of

government.

Peterse (1990) argues that corporations acting as legal individuals cannot be

rationally expected to participate in a collective strategy that would be good for

society as a whole unless they also get specific individual benefits, beyond those

generated for the ‘commons’. To this can be added that participation may also be

generated by the threat of additional costs rather than the ‘carrot’ of extra

benefits. His general point remains, however: it may not be in a company’s

narrow interests to engage for the public good.

On the other hand, whilst there has been movement to corporate responsibility for

over a century (see Windsor, 2006a, p98), firms are now increasingly under

pressure to be seen to act responsibly. This change has been caused by the rise of

globalisation (Matten & Crane, 2005), and the concept of sustainable

development. “Why have corporate attitudes towards public policies suddenly

become so important?” ask Caulkin & Collins (2003, p18); “The answer lies in the

changing roles of governments, corporations, trade associations and NGOs under

sustainable development” (ibid.). New understandings of corporate citizenship,

aligned with contemporary developments, are paying particular attention to the

convergence of power and responsibility (Matten et al., 2005; Moon, Crane, &

Matten, 2006). Firms naturally wish to ensure they retain social legitimacy

(Suchman, 1995) and thus feel a need to respond to this pressure21: indeed, “a

firm today cannot appear otherwise” than wanting general social welfare

(Windsor, 2006a, p95).

These two pressures may sit uncomfortably with one another, particularly given

that business power is increasing (Crane & Matten, 2004; Moon et al., 2006). This

is especially noticeable in the rising incidence of self-governance instruments, and

in firms taking on roles formerly carried out by government (Matten et al., 2005).

This implies a need to look at corporate citizenship and lobbying together. Yet

very little literature looks at CSR from a political perspective; and even less with

regards to lobbying. This is a clear gap in the literature.

The rise of voluntary agreements and other forms of self-governance has given

industry unprecedented power over its circumstances (Prakash, 2000, provides an

instructive case study from the chemical industry). Knill (2001, p227) refers to

this as “governance contributions by private actors.” There may be good reasons

for it – such as limited government resources (ibid.), but it raises a number of

questions about corporations’ role in the public policy process and what it means

for the public good. That is why the European Commission’s 2001 Green Paper on

CSR – which promoted voluntary initiatives rather than direct regulations – was so

21 This partly explains the precipitous rise in corporate sustainability reporting over the last decade.

controversial (see Windsor, 2006a, p106). Caulkin & Collins (2003, p4) argue that

“reliance on companies’ voluntary CSR efforts is inadequate to today’s challenge.”

However, the fact is that companies are increasingly involved in governance

(Crane & Matten, 2005). Often the specific issues are highly controversial and are

directly related to issues of core business; one example being the voluntary

agreement between European carmakers and the EU on reducing emissions of

Carbon dioxide22 (Kågeson, 2005, provides a critical perspective). Industry

associations often play a big role in such self-governance initiatives, as Prakash

(2000: North America) and Knill (2001: EU) indicate (see also AccountAbility et

al., 2005; SustainAbility et al., 2005). The link between industry association

lobbying and that done by individual firms could usefully be the subject of further

research23.

Unfortunately for firms, “issue disagreements rooted in value conflicts are

extremely difficult to deal with from an industry or individual firm perspective”

(Mahon & McGowan, 1998, p402). This indicates that the more socially

controversial – and salient – an issue (Bonardi et al., 2005b), the more these two

pressures are thrown against each other. This suggests the possibility of

interesting tensions within the firm itself; and in extremis could conceivably lead

to some form of disconnect between social expectations on a company (and,

possibly, its public statements) on the one hand, and lobbying positions on the

other. How these develop – whether they are a cynical ploy or the result of

internal differences and/or a lack of internal communication – would be an

interesting area for further research.

This could in turn lead to firms resorting to a number of mechanisms to deal with

an issue, such as the ‘pragmatics discourse’ (see Prasad & Elmes, 2005), or

Bonardi & Keim’s (2005b) strategies for keeping issues off the public radar. Such

actions may be informed by ideology, or particular narratives and traditions within

industry. There is therefore also scope to build on the literature on firm strategies

to approach salient issues, from a CSR perspective.

22 A pilot study carried out in Brussels, in April 2006, revealed universal agreement that climate change is of central importance to the future of individual car companies, and to the industry as a whole. 23 In particular, this raises questions about corporations’ role in the lobbying process as a ‘corporate citizen’, notably in cases where firms’ associations lobby for things that are different from those supported by a company’s own lobbying or that are against a company’s own CSR statements.

The nature of the information communicated in lobbying is surely a key to an

organisation’s impact on society. Information can, for example, be one-sided or

balanced, accurate or purposefully misleading. Corporations can be ‘constructively

engaged’ or ‘helpfully unhelpful’ at any stage in terms of the information they

provide – particularly on highly technical issues – irrespective of how ‘accessible’

their lobbying is to non-participants. As Grimaldi (1998, p247) put it, “the problem

with political action by businesses arises when the players engaged in the

democratic process use it as an arena for self interested action unrestrained by

ethical considerations.” Yet companies do claim to act in an ethical manner.

Why do individual companies take particular lobbying positions? What happens

when a company is confronted with a highly salient issue on which it is

vulnerable? How does it reconcile the competing pressures just outlined? These

are relevant questions, for which there are presently few answers.

The material presented above allows researchers to look more closely at lobbying

from the perspective of social responsibility, as they can be clearer about what

they are examining, and can ask more differentiated questions. This provides

space to question the role of the firm in the political process – and particularly in

lobbying, the least visible and most instrumental (Hansen et al., 2000, p893)

element of CPA.

While there is certainly literature in this general area, the foregoing indicates that

we need rich data (Hendry, 2003; and Lorenzi, 2006, make this argument; and

see McWilliams et al., 2006; Rynes et al., 2005). The traditional and dominant

approach in the corporate-political literature may therefore be insufficient,

particularly given the lack of literature on ‘responsible lobbying’. The fact that the

academic literature has to a large extent been overtaken by practitioner work on

the issue (AccountAbility et al., 2005; Caulkin et al., 2003; SustainAbility et al.,

2000; SustainAbility et al., 2005) supports this view.

It would therefore be useful to explore cases where an issue has a high degree of

saliency; is ongoing; is highly relevant; and the firms in an affected sector have

well-established offices in a centre of political power. That would represent an

extreme constellation of circumstances, where political decisions can undoubtedly

be said to affect core business.

Noting that the very great majority of large corporations involved in lobbying

profess a desire to act responsibly, be good corporate citizens, and contribute to

sustainable development, it is also worth asking the more difficult question of how

this works in practice in the political arena. Do firms’ positions promote the public

good? How does a firm go about ensuring that this is the case? Responding to

these questions requires a thorough understanding of the corporate social

responsibility literature; notably the political literature on corporate citizenship.

Conclusion

This paper has contributed to the literature by developing a much needed

definition of lobbying, thereby helping to clarify the field. It has examined the

individual components of lobbying in some detail; contributing to a greater

understanding of lobbying as a phenomenon. It has further contributed by

developing a typology of ‘modes’ of lobbying in terms of transparency; which

helps to predict how different forms of the process will be viewed by the non-

participating public. This is relevant, because lack of transparency is one of the

key public criticisms levelled against lobbying.

Finally, the paper has started the process of drawing the fields of CSR and

lobbying together, by identifying the lacuna and then providing initial comments,

notably from the perspective of corporate citizenship. It is notable that recent

conceptualisations of corporate citizenship (CC) start to marry political notions and

corporate social responsibility: focussing on issues around political processes –

especially lobbying – would be helpful in developing this work further.

The door is now open to a set of research questions on the links between lobbying

and CSR – notably CC. Research can move beyond the binary issue of

(in)transparency in the process, to asking more nuanced questions about the

contents of lobbying and its outcome in terms of the common good – as

practitioner-literature is starting to do. This in turn enables questions about

company lobbying strategies, from a CSR perspective. These could be asked from

a company-internal perspective – understanding the role of lobbying in a firm’s

CSR strategy. However, the focus could also be on a broader societal perspective;

such as examining lobbying in terms of CSR, instrumentally and/or normatively.

Either approach could help to move CSR theory forward.

The paper has therefore made a number of contributions to the literature, and has

provided a solid base for further research. It may also be useful to practitioners.

All actors may find the section on ‘modes’ of lobbying useful, particularly where it

helps distinguish between circumstances in which a particular mode is necessary

for good policy, and where it unnecessarily fuels public scepticism. All actors in the

lobbying process may also be able to use the discussion on individual components

of lobbying to help them focus their lobbying strategies.

Regulators (and civil society) would do well to heed the warning, implicit in the

section on modes of lobbying, about forcing full openness/accessibility: the result

may be the opposite of what were desired.

Firms, in particular, may find two elements of the discussion on reputation useful.

First, the argument on legitimacy – that developing and maintaining a good

reputation is one way to ensure that a firm gains and retains legitimacy, making

effectiveness more likely – may lead to a greater sense of urgency in finding

synergy between publicised corporate commitments and lobbying positions,

regardless of specific lobbying mode.

Second, and related to the question of legitimacy: the role of individual lobbyists’

personal reputation pertains. In some cases, technical expertise may be of

overriding concern; but the argument that the personal-professional, as well as

personal-private, reputation of the individual lobbyist will impact on the firm’s

lobbying effectiveness suggests that companies would be advised to pay greater

attention to such issues when recruiting – for either the firm or its industry

association24. It may be that such issues are not always taken into account.

24 It is conceivable that a company could have an interest in its industry association being relatively weak and ineffectual. For example, where a firm has its own lobbying offices operating in parallel (as is often the case in the EU), and where the company’s lobbying agenda on a crucial policy issue differs significantly from the collective line taken by its industry association, then it could well be in the firm’s interest to undermine its association – and thereby its competitors. A successful firm could effectively raise its rivals’ costs or undermine an unloved common position, without appearing to do so. One way to help this happen is to employ the wrong person for the job of lobbying on the association’s behalf. Whether the motivation is positive or

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Research Paper Series International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility

ISSN 1479-5124

Editor: Jean-Pascal Gond The ICCSR Research Papers Series is intended as a first-hand outlet for research output of ICCSR. These include papers presented at symposiums and seminars, first drafts of papers intended for submission in journals and other reports on ongoing or completed research projects. The objective of the ICCSR Research Papers Series is twofold: First, there is a time goal: Given the quality of ICCSR publication, the targeted journals normally require large time spans between submission and publication. Consequently, the ICCSR Research Papers Series serves as a preliminary airing to working papers of ICCSR staff and affiliates which are intended for subsequent publication. By this, research output can be made available for a selected public which will not only establish ICCSR’s lead in advancing and developing innovative research in CSR but will also open the opportunity to expose ideas to debate and peer scrutiny prior to submission and/or subsequent publication. Second, the ICCSR Research Papers Series offers the opportunity of publishing more extensive works of research than the usual space constraints of journals would normally allow. In particular, these papers will include research reports, data analysis, literature reviews, work by postgraduate students etc. which could serve as a primary data resource for further publications. Publication in the ICCSR Research Paper Series does not preclude publication in refereed journals. The ICCSR Research Papers Series consequently is interested in assuring high quality and broad visibility in the field. The quality aspect will be assured by establishing a process of peer review, which will normally include the Editor of the ICCSR Research Papers Series and one further academic in the field. In order to achieve a reasonable visibility the ICCSR Research Papers Series has full ISSN recognition and is listed in major library catalogues worldwide. All papers can also be downloaded at the ICCSR website.

Published Papers

No. 01-2003 Wendy Chapple & Richard Harris Accounting for solid waste generation in measures of regional productivity growth

No. 02-2003 Christine Coupland Corporate identities on the web: An exercise in the construction and deployment of ‘morality’

No. 03-2003 David L. Owen Recent developments in European social and environmental reporting and auditing practice – A critical evaluation and tentative prognosis

No. 04-2003 Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane Corporate Citizenship: Towards an extended theoretical conceptualization

No. 05-2003 Karen Williams, Mike Geppert & Dirk Matten Challenges for the German model of employee relations in the era of globalization

No. 06-2003 Iain A. Davies & Andrew Crane Ethical Decision Making in Fair Trade Companies

No. 07-2003 Robert J. Caruana Morality in consumption: Towards a sociological perspective

No. 08-2003 Edd de Coverly, Lisa O’Malley & Maurice Patterson Hidden mountain: The social avoidance of waste

No. 09-2003 Eleanor Chambers, Wendy Chapple, Jeremy Moon & Michael Sullivan CSR in Asia: A seven country study of CSR website reporting

No. 10-2003 Anita Fernandez Young & Robert Young Corporate Social Responsibility: the effects of the Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines on a representative self-interested corporation

No. 11-2003 Simon Ashby, Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann Industry self-regulation: A game-theoretic typology of strategic voluntary compliance

No. 12-2003 David A. Waldman, Donald Siegel & Mansour Javidan Transformational leadership and CSR: A meso level approach

No. 13-2003 Jeremy Moon, Andrew Crane & Dirk Matten Can corporations be citizens? Corporate citizenship as a metaphor for business participation in society (2nd Edition)

No. 14-2003 Anita Fernandez Young, Jeremy Moon & Robert Young The UK Corporate Social Responsibility consultancy industry: a phenomenological approach

No. 15-2003 Andrew Crane In the company of spies: The ethics of industrial espionage

No. 16-2004 Jan Jonker, Jacqueline Cramer and Angela van der Heijden Developing Meaning in Action: (Re)Constructing the Process of Embedding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Companies

No. 17-2004 Wendy Chapple, Catherine J. Morrison Paul & Richard Harris Manufacturing and Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Cost Implications of Voluntary Waste Minimisation

No. 18-2004 Brendan O’Dwyer Stakeholder Democracy: Challenges and Contributions from Accountancy

No. 19-2004 James A. Fitchett Buyers be Wary: Marketing Stakeholder Values and the Consumer

No. 20-2004 Jeremy Moon Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility: The UK in Comparative Perspective

No. 21-2004 Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten Questioning the Domain of the Business Ethics Curriculum: Where the Law ends or Where it Starts?

No. 22-2004 Jem Bendell Flags of inconvenience? The global compact and the future of United Nations

No. 23-2004 David Owen and Brendan O’Dwyer Assurance Statement Quality in Environmental, Social and Sustainability Reporting: a Critical Evaluation of Leading Edge Practice

No. 24-2004 Robert J. Caruana Morality in consumption: towards a multidisciplinary perspective

No. 25-2004 Krista Bondy, Andy Crane & Laura Browne Doing the Business: A film series programmed by ICCSR in conjunction with Broadway Cinema

No. 26-2004 Stanley Chapman Socially Responsible Supply Chains: Marks & Spencer in Historic Perspective

No. 27-2004 Kate Grosser and Jeremy Moon Gender Mainstreaming and Corporate Social Responsibility: Reporting Workplace Issues

No. 28-2004 Jacqueline Cramer, Angela van der Heijden and Jan Jonker Corporate Social Responsibility: Balancing Between Thinking and Acting

No. 29-2004 Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon 'Implicit' and 'Explicit' CSR: A conceptual framework for understanding CSR in Europe

No. 30-2005 Nigel Roome and Jan Jonker Whistling in the Dark

No. 31-2005 Christine Hemingway The Role of Personal Values in Corporate Social Entrepreneurship

No. 32-2005 David Owen Corporate Social Reporting and Stakeholder Accountability The Missing Link

No. 33-2005 David Owen CSR After Enron: A Role for the Academic Accounting Profession?

No. 34-2006 Judy Muthuri, Jeremy Moon and Dirk Matten Employee Volunteering And The Creation Of Social Capital

No. 35-2006 Jeremy Moon and Kate Grosser Best Practice on Gender Equality in the UK: Data, Drivers and Reporting Choices

No. 36-2006 Amanda Ball Environmental Accounting as ‘Workplace Activism’

No. 37–2006 Kenneth M. Amaeshi & Bongo Adi Reconstructing the corporate social responsibility construct in Utlish

No. 38-2006 Aly Salama The ICCSR UK Environmental & Financial Dataset 1991-2002

No. 39-2006 Kenneth M Amaeshi, Bongo C Adi, Chris Ogbechie and Olufemi O Amao Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Nigeria: western mimicry or indigenous practices?

No. 40-2006 Krista Bondy, Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon MNC Codes of Conduct: CSR or Corporate Governance?

No. 41-2006 Jan Jonker and Michel van Pijkeren In Search of Business Strategies for CSR No. 42-2006 Stephanos Anastasiadis Understanding corporate lobbying on its own terms