understanding enmity and friendship in world politics corneliu bjola, 2013

8/12/2019 Understanding Enmity and Friendship in World Politics COrneliu Bjola, 2013

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© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/1871191X-12341242

e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 8 (2013) 1-20 brill.com/hjd

Understanding Enmity and Friendship in World Politics:e Case for a Diplomatic Approach

Corneliu Bjola*Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford,

Oxford OX1 3TB, United Kingdom

[email protected]

Received: 7 June 2012; revised: 9 August 2012; accepted: 15 October 2012

Summary is article invites diplomatic scholars to a debate about the identity of diplomacy as a field of study andthe contributions that it can make to our understanding of world politics relative to international rela-tions theory (IR) or foreign policy analysis (FPA). To this end, the article argues that the study of diplo-macy as a method of building and managing relationships of enmity and friendship in world politics canmost successfully firm up the identity of the discipline. More specifically, diplomacy offers a specializedform of knowledge for understanding how to draw distinctions between potential allies versus rivals, andhow to make and unmake relationships of enmity and friendship in world politics.

Keywordsenmity, friendship, diplomacy, collective intentionality

Introduction

What makes diplomacy relevant to the study of international politics? What dis-tinct insights does it offer us for understanding how the world ‘hangs together’relative to more established disciplines such as international relations (IR) or for-eign policy analysis (FPA)? What epistemological boundaries delineate the fieldof diplomatic enquiry and how helpful are they in assisting scholars theorizeabout conditions of conflict and cooperation in world politics or about consider-ations of power, authority and legitimacy as constitutive frameworks of interna-tional conduct? In short, what turns diplomacy into a core analytical and practicalmethod of international engagement? ese questions go to the heart of diplomatic

*) e author is grateful to the John Fell Fund of Oxford University Press for generously funding thisresearch. He would also like to thank Costas M. Constantinou, Gunther Hellmann and the rest of par-ticipants in the workshop on ‘e Transformation of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy’ at the 2012 ECPR

joint session for their constructive criticism on an earlier version of this article. Last but not least, he isgrateful to the anonymous referees and the editors of e Hague Journal of Diplomacy for their very help-ful comments.



2 C. Bjola / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 8 (2013) 1-20

studies, but the answers, unfortunately, are far from clear, despite the richness ofthe diplomatic tradition1 and the robust testimony that is provided by prominent

practitioners in support of diplomatic methods.2

Take, for instance, the case of a recent forum on the present and future state ofdiplomacy and diplomatic studies.3 e articles included in the forum arguedthat diplomacy and diplomatic theory offered critical insights for a more nuancedunderstanding of international relations. However, none of them explained whatdiplomacy stood for as a distinct field of study, nor did they clearly specify whatkind of instruments diplomatic scholars require to examine the work of diplo-mats. For a discipline that aspires to escape the epistemic shadow of IR and FPAand to showcase the value of its conceptual and empirical contributions to theunderstanding of world politics, omitting to outline the core elements of thediscipline’s identity is not strikingly helpful.

is article invites diplomatic scholars to a debate about the identity of diplo-macy as a field of study and the contributions that it can make to our understand-ing of world politics relative to IR or FPA. is debate has long been overdue, butthe timing is right. As Sharp points out, ‘there has never been a better time forstudying diplomacy. e United States is rediscovering it. e European Unionis reinventing it. e Chinese are inscribing it with their own characteristics.

Even the Taliban are thinking about it’.4

e main argument advanced in this article is that current approaches to thestudy of diplomacy offer insufficient resources to diplomatic theory to escapefrom the epistemic shadow of IR and FPA. To compensate for this limitation, thearticle proposes an alternative mode of thinking about diplomacy as a method ofmanaging relations of enmity and friendship in world politics. is thesis is devel-oped in three steps. e first section of the article examines the epistemologicaldifferences between IR, FPA and diplomacy and explains why the issue of

relationship-building may help to consolidate the disciplinary identity of diplo-macy. e second part critically reviews extant theories of enmity and friendshipand discusses their relevance for diplomatic studies. e third section introducesthe concept of collective intentionality as a theoretical anchor for understandingthe diplomatic construction of relationships of enmity and friendship in worldpolitics.

1) Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne, Diplomacy , 3 vols, Sage Library of International Relations(London and ousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).2) Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); and Zbigniew Brzezinski, eChoice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004).3) S. Murray et al., ‘e Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies’, International StudiesReview , vol. 13, no. 4, 2011.4) Murray et al ., ‘e Present and Future of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Studies’, pp. 716-717.



C. Bjola / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 8 (2013) 1-20 3

How to Study Diplomacy?

A discussion about what makes diplomacy distinct from IR and FPA cannot pro-ceed without first clarifying a) whether there is a fundamental difference betweenthe theory and practice of diplomacy, and b) whether the study of diplomacyrequires a distinct epistemology — that is, a distinct set of guiding principles andideas by which to discover and acquire knowledge about diplomatic relations. With respect to the first question, the theory/practice dualism clearly remains apoint of dispute among diplomatic scholars and, one might argue, rightly so. Aspointed out by Jönsson and Hall, the bulk of the literature on diplomacy hasbeen written either by practitioners or diplomatic historians, neither of whom are

much interested in theoretical and conceptual development.5 On the other hand,those engaged in theory — namely IR scholars — have rather been, with a fewnotable exceptions to be discussed further below, oblivious to the study of diplo-macy. As a result, a gap has allegedly emerged between the theory and practice ofdiplomacy, to the extent that the two camps do not comfortably speak to eachother.

is article, however, rejects rigidly following the logic of the theory/practicedualism. A strict separation of theory versus the practice of diplomacy is not help-ful for either. Diplomacy is a way of conducting international relations, thinkingabout these relations and also doing enquiry.6 To claim that the theoretical studyof diplomacy has different objectives and methods than the study of the practiceof diplomacy is to acknowledge indirectly the fact that the former has little rele-vance for the conduct of diplomacy while the latter occurs within a conceptualvoid. is is clearly not the case, as many diplomatic scholars and serving diplo-mats would likely rush to admit. Hedley Bull’s observation that diplomatic theorymay simply be understood as the set of leading ideas produced by diplomats and by those who study them7 provides a more nuanced and accurate interpretation

of the symbiotic role that both theory and practice play in the constitution ofdiplomacy as a field of study.

e second question about epistemology is even more important. Does thestudy of diplomacy require a distinct epistemology for making sense of how dip-lomats work, and if so, of what kind? By unveiling areas of epistemological con-vergence/divergence with diplomacy, IR and FPA, a brief review of the evolutionof diplomatic studies may help to provide a tentative answer to this question. IRemerged at the end of the First World War as a theoretical successor to traditional

diplomatic approaches,8

offering a relatively easy-to-grasp conceptual apparatus

5) Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 7.6) e author is grateful to one of the reviewers for this point.7) Cited in Paul Sharp, Diplomatic eory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2009), p. 6.8) Edward Hallett Carr, e Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International




that was predominantly linked to the realist school of thought. It promised toprovide a more scientific understanding of the ‘general laws’ underpinning inter-

national politics, whether they were rooted in ‘human nature’9

or in structuralconditions of the international system.10 By disputing the analytical ‘reduction-ism’ of diplomatic studies, IR theory claimed to have a superior epistemologicaledge in explaining and predicting international politics. As suggested by Waltz,foreign policy theories promise to explain why states that are similarly placed in asystem behave in different ways, while IR theories examine why states that aresimilarly placed in a system behave similarly despite internal differences.11 Inother words, actors’ behaviour in international politics has been deemed by IRscholars to be predominantly shaped by broader social structures, most notablyanarchy or the market, rather than ‘unit-level factors’ such as the decision-makers’psychology or domestic politics, and therefore, or so the argument goes, analysesof international outcomes cannot be ‘reduced’ to the latter.12

While IR theory managed to distinguish itself against diplomacy on the ques-tion of the causal weight of systemic structures versus internal properties of inter-national actors, foreign policy analysis avowedly parted company with diplomacyon the issue of the method. e advent of the behaviouralist movement13 trig-gered the famous ‘second IR debate’ about the relative merits of scientific versus

historical–sociological methods for understanding international politics.14 edebate ended inconclusively, but it helped to reinject life in the study of diplo-macy, albeit from two distinct perspectives. On the one hand, FPA emerged as a well-structured and ambitious comparative research programme, emphasizingthe ‘scientific’ study of decision-making and organizational processes of foreignpolicy,15 in contrast to the more historical, legalistic and actor-specific accountsof traditional diplomatic scholarship. On the other hand, a norm-driven under-standing of diplomacy inspired a distinct research agenda from the perspective of

the English School intellectual tradition,

16

which focused not necessarily on

Relations (London: Macmillan, 1940). 9) Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: e Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1stedition 1948).10) Kenneth N. Waltz, eory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).11) ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies , vol. 6, no. 1, 1996, p. 54.12) Alexander Wendt, Social eory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999), pp. 11-12.13) Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Policies (New York: Wiley, 1957); and Richard N.

Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1963).14) Hedley Bull, ‘International eory: e Case for a Classical Approach’, World Politics , vol. 18, no. 3,1966.15) Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little,Brown, 1971); K.J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, InternationalStudies Quarterly. vol. 14, 1970; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, MA: Houghton, 1972); and James N. Rosenau, e Scientific Studyof Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1971).16) Hedley Bull, e Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2nd




providing an explanatory/causal theory of international politics, but on develop-ing a framework for thinking and debating about international relations.17

e failure of the IR theory to anticipate the end of the Cold War led manyscholars to revisit the materialist and structural assumptions of traditional IRapproaches, such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism. e rise of the constructivistschool addressed the materialist limitation, hence the redefinition of the conceptof anarchy as what states make of it.18 On the other hand, a new theoreticalagenda of unit-level explanations of international conduct challenged the struc-turalist limitation. e latter objective was taken up by a new cohort of rational-choice FPA researchers who began to develop rational–cognitive refinements ofthe mechanisms by which foreign policy options get specified,19 selected20 andreflected in outcomes.21 However, for a few others, the FPA’s meta-theoreticalassumptions were actually too severe to ignore,22 as they largely overlooked theconstitutive processes of diplomatic interactions, which required an understand-ing of diplomatic methods as structures of power relations that emerged notexclusively prior to actors’ interactions but also through diplomatic engagement.e study of foreign policy as identity construction,23 deliberative process24 andargumentation-based negotiation25 has thus emerged as an important research

edition 1995); Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays inthe eory of International Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966); and Adam Watson, Diplomacy: eDialogue between States (London: Methuen, 1984).17) Hidemi Suganami, ‘e English School and International eory’, in Alex J. Bellamy (ed.), Interna-tional Society and its Critics (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 42.18) Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: e Social Construction of Power Politics’,International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992.19) V.M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific eory and the Ground of International Rela-tions’, Foreign Policy Analysis , vol. 1, no. 1, 2005; Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, Problem Repre-sentation in Foreign Policy Decision-making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).20)

R.D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: e Logic of 2-Level Games’, International Orga-nization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988; Rose McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004); and Richard Carlton Snyder et al ., Foreign PolicyDecision-Making Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).21) David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A eory of Foreign Policy Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 2005).22) Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’, International Studies Quar-terly , vol. 36, no. 3, 1992; and Steve Smith, ‘eories of Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview’, Reviewof International Studies , vol. 12, 1986.23) Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Janice Bially Mattern, Ordering International

Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force (New York: Routledge, 2004); and David Campbell,Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University ofMinnesota Press, 1998).24) Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres’,

American Political Science Review , vol. 99, no. 3, 2005; and Corneliu Bjola, Legitimizing the Use of Forcein International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics Of Intervention, Contemporary Security Studies (Lon-don and New York: Routledge, 2009).25) Nicole Deitelhoff, ‘e Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICCCase’, International Organization, vol. 63, no. 1, 2009; and J. Wilkenfeld et al ., ‘Mediating International




avenue, alongside FPA, providing an intellectual home to a new generation ofdiplomacy-oriented scholars.

In sum, diplomatic studies have been the subject of three distinct disciplinarydivides. It was first left behind by IR on account of its overrating of the role ofagency in explaining international outcomes. It then set itself apart from FPA onmethodological grounds, but it survived as a sub-field of IR under the mantle ofthe English School. Finally, it has recently sought an epistemological compro-mise with constructivist IR by emphasizing the shared interest in the mutualconstitution of agents and structures. As a result, the community of diplomaticscholars has a rather eclectic composition. A number of international historiansand practice-oriented scholars owe their position to the first and partially to thesecond epistemological split. One important other group is the product of theEnglish School legacy. A third group of constructivist-oriented diplomatic schol-ars come out of the third disciplinary rift. Finally, a fourth group is made of moretraditional IR scholars with an occasional interest in diplomatic questions.

e review of the evolution of diplomatic studies is, by necessity, short anddoes limited justice to the complex and dynamic interrelationship of IR, FPA andvarious schools of diplomatic thought. However, the purpose of this review is notto write the history of the IR discipline, but only to provide a helpful background

for mapping the principles underlying a number of competing epistemologies ofdiplomatic study. ree distinct approaches have tentatively gained recognitionthus far. e first approach takes the view that diplomacy is a practical mode ofconducting international relations. e spread of norms of democratic account-ability and the advance of communication technologies have led to the centraliza-tion of foreign policy in the hands of a few decision-makers, thus gradually yetsubstantially reducing the political authority and policy autonomy of diplomats.26 Accordingly, diplomats’ work now largely involves juggling different bureaucratic

scripts, governed by a code of conduct that rewards institutional conformity,protocol compliance and political self-effacement over policy innovation, criticalengagement and diplomatic leadership.27 is approach has captured the atten-tion of practitioners and diplomatic historians interested in the day-to-day man-agement of diplomatic relations. However, the focus on practical matters risksmarginalizing the study of diplomacy to the examination of procedural andbureaucratic issues, largely detached from the broader questions regarding therole of diplomacy in managing power relations in world politics.

Crises: Cross-national and Experimental Perspectives’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 47, no. 3,2003.26) G.F. Kennan, ‘Diplomacy Without Diplomats?’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 76, no. 5, 1997.27) I.B. Neumann, ‘To Be a Diplomat’, International Studies Perspectives , vol. 6, 2005; and Geoff Ber-ridge, Diplomacy: eory and Practice (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 4th edition 2010).




e second epistemological position views diplomacy as an IR ‘torch bearer’ —that is, a theoretically original subject whose importance goes (as yet) unrecog-

nized by others.28

is method is empirically rather than epistemologically driven,and probably because of this it enjoys good support among all of the relevantgroups of diplomatic scholars. ey generally take note of the evolution of diplo-macy as an amorphous field of study at the intersection of IR and FPA, butpromise to overcome stereotypes and marginalization through a ‘broader, virginaland fecund’ research agenda that takes on a number of issues that are neglectedby IR and FPA, such as sub-state diplomacy, multi-stakeholder diplomacy orsustainable diplomacy.29 By developing a research agenda that is distinct from IRand FPA, this approach could help diplomacy to claim a critical disciplinaryidentity, largely drawn from the innovative value of the theoretical contributionsto result from such research. However, this move would come at the price ofconceding most of the interesting theoretical aspects of international politics toIR and FPA. In fact, the identity of diplomacy as a field of study would basicallyrevolve around residual categories left unsettled by IR and FPA epistemic debatesand theoretical accounts.

e third epistemological approach draws on the English School tradition andportrays diplomacy as a ‘thinking framework’ about international politics. is

method encourages theoretical reflections about the various diplomatic approachesthat have structured international systems and societies in world history,30 com-pares arguments about pluralist versus solidaristic values, norms and institutionsguiding diplomatic conduct,31 and offers insights into how diplomats make senseand shape the world via relationships of encounter, discovery and re-encounter.32 On the downside, this approach is underwritten by an epistemological humilityabout what it is possible to know and epistemological pessimism about how pos-sible it is for human beings to reach agreement.33 As a result, it is likely to face

difficulties in stimulating a vibrant and distinct research agenda on diplomaticissues. is limitation is visible at the empirical level, since no recent work inspiredby the English School has made any meaningful theoretical distinction betweendiplomacy and IR. e notable exception is Paul Sharp’s book, Diplomatic eoryof International Relations , which possesses a critical mass of essential ingredients

28) Geoffrey Wiseman, ‘Bringing Diplomacy Back In: Time for eory to Catch Up with Practice’,International Studies Review , vol. 13, no. 4, 2011, p. 711.

29) Stuart Murray, ‘Diplomatic eory and the Evolving Canon of Diplomatic Studies’, InternationalStudies Review, vol. 13, no. 4, 2011, pp. 720-721.30) Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, e Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1984).31) Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution Of International Society (Oxfordand New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).32) Sharp, Diplomatic eory of International Relations .33) e author is grateful to one of the reviewers for this point.




for attracting fellowship, but the jury is still out as to whether the underlyingepistemology of Sharp’s approach will hinder or advance diplomatic research.

In sum, none of the three epistemological positions look very promising inadvancing a strong research agenda that is capable of removing diplomacy fromthe shadow of IR and FPA. e practical approach risks relegating the study ofdiplomacy to bureaucratic issues, the IR ‘torch-bearing’ perspective subordinatesdiplomacy to the study of residual categories that are left unsettled by IR and FPAdebates, while the ‘thinking’ framework inspired by the English School findsreassurance in a certain degree of epistemological humility that sits uncomfort-ably with projects of foundational discipline-building. To bridge this epistemo-logical gap, this article suggests that a more promising alternative would be tostudy diplomacy as a method of building and managing relations of enmity and friendship in world politics. Unlike the other three approaches, the focus on rela-tionship management offers some important advantages. Relations of the consti-tution of enmity and friendship undoubtedly involve practical and bureaucraticaspects, but cannot be reduced to them. ey can also contribute to developing astrong research agenda on diplomacy, but without conceding the issue to IR orFPA. Finally, by zooming in on the power that is wielded by diplomats as rela-tionship creators, such an approach could also help to overcome some of the

reservations that are expressed by scholars of the English School regarding thelimitations of our understanding of how diplomacy shapes the world.

is move thus presents four important advantages that may confer a clear andmuch-needed identity upon diplomacy as a field of study that is reasonably dis-tinct from IR (systemic causes of conflict/cooperation) and FPA (sub-state pro-cesses of decision-making). First, this method would allow diplomatic studies topursue theoretical engagement with IR and FPA from an equal standing. As willbe elaborated in greater detail in the following section, an innovative research

agenda could take shape about how diplomats develop, sustain and rearrangerelations of enmity and friendship in international politics in a manner thatincorporates, but is not exclusively driven by, IR/FPA residual puzzles or by theEnglish School tripartite understanding of international politics.

Second, such an approach will finally recognize the vital necessity of diplo-matic leadership in guarding international society. As demonstrated by Ikenberry,all international orders that have been established in the modern period havebeen the result of diligent diplomatic efforts to reset and manage relations ofenmity and friendship properly after periods of systemic change and upheaval.34

ird, a closer look at the relationship between diplomacy and internationalchange can prove theoretically enlightening for understanding the evolving natureand scope of diplomatic agency. e rise of new actors with international standing

34) G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).




at the sub-national, regional and global levels has already been reshaping the tra-ditional diplomatic functions of representation, communication and negotiation.

is prompts the question of whether the status of diplomats will continue to bedefined institutionally by affiliation to states and international organizations or will primarily be grounded in the actors’ capacity to shape critical relations ofenmity and friendship in world politics.

Fourth, the theory–practice gap in diplomatic studies could be bridged furtherby demonstrating the practical value of theoretically informed accounts of themechanisms and processes by which diplomats steer international politics alongconstructive versus destructive pathways of interaction. In sum, by placing thequestion of enmity or friendship at the heart of the discipline, diplomatic scholars will be in a stronger position to raise and consolidate the profile of diplomaticstudies relative to IR and FPA in an epistemologically consistent, theoreticallyinnovative and practically relevant manner.

e question that remains to be addressed is how to translate this conceptionof diplomacy into sound theoretical and empirical research. Two lines of investi-gation have strong potential for spearheading a vibrant research agenda on howdiplomacy serves to build, manage and rearrange relations of enmity and friend-ship in world politics. First, building on existing research, we need to develop a

better understanding of how diplomats learn to discriminate between allies andrivals. What norms, rules and values do they apply to structure their relations interms of friendship versus enmity? How do they deal with competing relations ofenmity and friendship? Second, little is known about how relationships of enmityand friendship are made and unmade in international politics. is is the area in which diplomatic studies have the strongest potential to make a distinct contri-bution. What does it take to prevent relations among diplomatic actors frombecoming too disruptive? What strategies are most effective for improving diplo-

matic relations and building long-term partnerships? ese questions will beaddressed in the next two sections, which will not provide the answer, but ratherone way of thinking about these matters.

How Do Diplomats Discriminate between Enemies and Friends?

e concept of enmity or friendship does not present marginal relevance for thestudy of diplomacy in as much as it is deeply ingrained in the ontological founda-

tion of the diplomatic method. As pointed out by Der Derian and Sharp, diplo-macy represents a mode of understanding that privileges the plural character ofhuman existence and seeks to mediate political and cultural estrangement.35

35) Sharp, Diplomatic eory of International Relations , p. 10; and James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).




Diplomacy’s origins lie with the first decisions of human groups to reach anunderstanding with their neighbours about the limits of each other’s hunting ter-

ritories and the management of shared resources.36

Territorial constraints gradu-ally led to the recognition by sovereigns that the performance of each one was amatter of permanent consequence to the others.37 Diplomacy is therefore, to a largeextent, about making the ‘other’, a process that has unfortunately been intimatelyconnected to an abuse-prone mechanism of inscription of social boundaries.38 is insight explains Bull’s characterization of diplomacy as a fundamental insti-tution of international order,39 in as much as the diplomatic management ofenmity and friendship relations among various political communities has playedan essential role in the constitution of international society.

Indeed, the rise and consolidation of the modern sovereign state was closelyassociated with the establishment of the institution of the resident ambassador, whose main task was to manage enmity or friendship relations at foreign courts.By the fifteen century, the survival of states — first in Northern Italy 40 and thenelsewhere — critically depended on rulers being able to recruit and maintain thesupport of neighbouring powers. Cardinal Richelieu, the founder of the firstministry of foreign affairs, could not have been more categorical about this:‘I dare say emphatically that it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state

to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, and in all places’.41 Richelieu went even further and provided the first doctrinal basis, the (in)famous raisond’état , for how to differentiate friends from enemies. For him, this distinctioncould not rest on religious affiliation or moral conventions, but only on condi-tions of how best to preserve and enhance the security of the state.42 e protec-tion of the state, as the embodiment of collective will, was therefore the standardfor defining pathways of enmity or friendship.

Richelieu’s method of diplomatic statecraft remains prevalent among IR schol-

ars of a realist orientation, for whom the constraints of the security dilemma andof the anarchic self-help system43 leave little room for friendship in internationalpolitics. As a result, they focus their attention on how to deal with potential rivals

36) Harold Nicolson, e Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London: Cassell, 1988), p. 3.37) Watson, Diplomacy , p. 15.38) Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, European Journal of International Rela-tions , vol. 2, no. 2, 1996; and William E. Connolly, Identity, Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Polit-ical Paradox (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, expanded edition 2002).39) Bull, e Anarchical Society .

40) Garrett Mattingly, ‘e First Resident Embassies: Medieval Italian Origins of Modern Diplomacy’,in Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne (eds), Diplomacy (London and ousand Oaks, CA: Sage,2004), p. 222.41) Armand Jean du Plessis Richelieu, Political Testament: e Significant Chapters and Supporting Selec-tions (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), p. 95.42) Kissinger, Diplomacy , p. 60.43) Waltz, eory of International Politics ; and Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’,World Politics , vol. 30, no. 2, 1978.




and enemies,44 basically by creating and maintaining a favourable equilibrium ofpower in the system, either by increasing the state’s military capabilities or by

building military alliances.45

Realists are right to argue that the protection of pri-mary goals of social existence — that is, security 46 — has been a traditional dip-lomatic function. Even to the present day, no diplomat is worthy of his or hertitle if they ignore protecting the integrity of the state against anything that ques-tions its sovereignty. What this argument seems to be ignoring, however, is thatother factors may play an equal and even more important role in the constructionof diplomatic relations with allies and rivals.

Tellingly, the institution of the resident ambassador was preceded by a net- work of consuls representing the interests not of the sending states, but ofthe merchant communities. In fact, throughout the medieval period, French,Italian and Spanish merchants used to elect consuls (consuli electi ) to supervisetheir commerce and adjudicate disputes in the East. It was only in the sixteenthcentury that consuls started to be appointed by the sending states as officialrepresentatives.47 In other words, global trade, and the distribution of the eco-nomic burdens and benefits that result from taking part in the global economicsystem, represent another set of important drivers for diplomatic action, withmajor implications for the diplomatic management of enmity and friendship

relations. is is so because financial crises48 and economic inequalities49 haveproved to have just as crippling effects for the well-being of states and the inter-national system as security threats. ere is also a growing sense that withoutimproving world trade, there will be no alternative to sustaining global peace andprosperity.50 is is why neo-liberals, unlike realists, see more opportunities fordeveloping relations of friendship in world politics. Growing complex interde-pendence among states makes them less likely to engage in hostile diplomaticrelations, especially when they are exposed to asymmetrical degrees of economic

sensitivity and vulnerability.

51

44) William R. ompson, Great Power Rivalries (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press,1999).45) Morgenthau, Politics among Nations ; and Stephen M. Walt, e Origins of Alliances , Cornell Studiesin Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).46) Bull, e Anarchical Society , p. 86.47) Charles Chatterjee, International Law and Diplomacy (London and New York: Routledge, 2007),p. 250.

48) Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1986).49) Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berke-ley, CA: University of California Press, 1979).50) Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, e Challenge of Global Capitalism: e World Economy in the 21stCentury (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Fabrice Lehmann and Jean-Pierre Leh-mann, Peace and Prosperity through World Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).51) Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Bos-ton, MA: Little, Brown, 1977).




What is less clear, however, is how to explain the sharp deterioration of diplo-matic relations among actors with strong security and economic ties? e diplo-

matic tensions between the United States and its European allies at the height ofthe Iraq crisis in 2003 represent the case in point. According to constructivistscholarship, relations of enmity or friendship are not informed by objectivelydefined projections of security or economic interests, but by inter-subjectivelyarticulated values and norms. ey allow actors to develop positive identifications with one another and other certain conditions that may evolve to prevent statesfrom even considering the use of force against one another.52 e deterioration ofdiplomatic relations during the 2003 Iraq crisis between the United States and itsEuropean allies is therefore explained by the partial disruption of the core valuesand collective identity underpinning the transatlantic security community.53 More radically, David Campbell argued that foreign policy, and by extensiondiplomacy, is not only about the making of the ‘other’, but also, and perhapsprimarily, about the social construction of the ‘self’. More specifically, foreignpolicy serves to ‘enframe, limit, and domesticate a particular identity’, including‘the form of domestic order, the social relations of production, and the varioussubjectivities to which they give rise’.54

e theory of social identity has taken the constructivist argument a step fur-

ther by highlighting the role of status recognition in framing relations of enmityand friendship. Agency is not simply determined by material factors such as secu-rity or wealth, but also by the social matrix within which one constitutes oneselfas a moral subject.55 Denial of equal treatment and legal protection of one’s moralintegrity and dignity prompts feelings of humiliation, shame and anger, whichhave often been a major source of grievance, tension and international conflict.56 Put differently, status recognition addresses a deeply entrenched social need forin-group positivity, which may take benevolent or hostile forms depending on

how the politics of status recognition is being managed. As Gries points out, inChina, for instance, status recognition issues are often discussed in the languageof ‘face’. What makes the diplomacy of recognition with China more challengingis that the zero-sum nature of face-saving and China’s history of victimization at

52) Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Communities , Cambridge Studies in InternationalRelations no. 62 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).53) C. Bjola and M. Kornprobst, ‘Security Communities and the Habitus of Restraint: Germany and theUnited States on Iraq’, Review of International Studies , vol. 33, no. 2, 2007.54) Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity , p. 139.

55) Philip Nel, ‘Redistribution and Recognition: What Emerging Regional Powers Want’, Review ofInternational Studies , vol. 36, 2010; Axel Honneth, e Struggle for Recognition: e Moral Grammar ofSocial Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); and Allen Buchanan, ‘Recognitional Legitimacy and theState System’, Philosophy and Public Affairs , vol. 28, no. 1, 1999.56) omas Lindemann, Causes of War: e Struggle for Recognition (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2010);Reinhard Wolf, ‘Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: e Significance of Status Recogni-tion’, International eory 3, no. 1, 2011; and Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural eory of InternationalRelations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).




the hands of the West combine to make many Chinese view diplomacy as a fiercecompetition between leaders who win or lose face for the nations that they

embody.57

To sum up, existing research tells us that security, economics, identity andstatus recognition are the main drivers of enmity and friendship in worlds poli-tics. What is less understood is how these theories fare from a diplomatic perspec-tive. One possibility is to follow in the footsteps of Iver Neumann58 and ask howdiplomats experience enmity — friendship relations from a security, economic,identity or status recognition standpoint. What kind of scripts of diplomaticaction do these drivers inspire, how do diplomats juggle these scripts and to whatextent are they able to put these scripts into practice? Another important area ofresearch would revolve around examining the ways in which enmity — friend-ship relations are being carried over by diplomats from national to regional orinternational diplomatic environments. For example, how do members of therecently established European External Action Service (EEAS) handle competingrelations of enmity and friendship? What instruments are to be used to reconcilesuch tensions? One could also take the long view à la Sharp59 and examine howdiplomatic relations of enmity and friendship shape international societies. Morespecifically, what type of enmity and friendship relations facilitate or impede the

integration, expansion or concentration of international societies? Last but notleast, an inspiring area of research would also result from exploring the role ofsub-national and non-state actors in shaping diplomatic relations. To what extent,for instance, do social media technologies allow non-state actors today to com-pete with state officials and traditional diplomats in managing enmity and friend-ship relations?

How Do Diplomats Construct Relations of Enmity and Friendship? While conditions for the emergence of enmity and friendship relations have beenrelatively well researched, little is known about the process of sustaining andamending such relations. is is one important area in which diplomatic theorycan demonstrate its analytical contribution, since most of the diplomatic work isabout sustaining relations among international actors via traditional functions ofrepresentation, communication and negotiation. At the heart of the problem oftheorizing about processes of relationship-building is a question about trust: how

much trust is needed to turn a relationship of enmity into one of friendship?Realists and neo-liberals do not pay attention to this, since they assume that state

57) P.H. Gries, ‘Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a China “reat” Inevitable?’,European Journal of International Relations , vol. 11, no. 2, 2005, p. 248.58) Neumann, ‘To Be a Diplomat’.59) Sharp, Diplomatic eory of International Relations .




behaviour is exclusively explained by interests. Constructivists have tackled theissue of trust, but indirectly, via notions of shared values60 and collective

identification.61

Both approaches rest, however, on a notion of trust as an endstate rather than a process. Hoffman tried to circumvent this problem by linkingtrusting relationships to discretion-granting policies,62 which seems like a rathertall order for trust-building. In addition, Hoffman’s approach says little abouthow states may get themselves in a position to grant each other discretion overtheir policies.

A diplomatic perspective can shed better light on the process of relations-mak-ing by pragmatically shifting the focus from the rather elusive question abouttrust to the more tangible issue of diplomatic engagement. e reasoning behindthis comes from the observation that people usually start developing affinitiestowards each other by working and doing something together and then sharingthe success of their collaboration. e concept that best captures theoretically thisdynamic is that of collective intentionality. According to John R. Searle, collec-tive intentionality refers to the beliefs, desires and intensions shared by differentpeople as part of them doing something together.63 An orchestra performing aconcert, an army fighting the enemy, a soccer team applying a common strategyto win the game, or a group of diplomats working together to defuse an interna-

tional crisis — are all cases of collective, not individual, intentionality. As Searlepoints out, ‘the crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing(wanting, believing, etc.) something together and the individual intentionalitythat each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they share’.64 A diplomat in the example above might have, for instance, the individual inten-tion of constantly amending his or her negotiation preferences, yet the collectiveintentionality of avoiding a dangerous diplomatic escalation might restrain himor her from doing this.

In other words, collective intentionality acts as a constraint against disruptivediplomatic behaviour. is is the critical element that recommends the conceptas a theoretical anchor for understanding the processes of making relations ofenmity or friendship. e litmus test for the latter is the degree to which theseparate intentions of diplomats working together are being subsumed by collec-tive intentionality. ere is no doubt that diplomats often represent divergentinterests, positions and issues. However, it is also true that some diplomats man-age to overcome differences more easily than others, such as those from the

60) Adler and Barnett, Security Communities .61) Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political Sci-ence Review , vol. 88, no. 2, 1994.62) Aaron M. Hoffman, ‘A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations’, European Journal ofInternational Relations , vol. 8, no. 3, 2002.63) John R. Searle, e Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 23.64) Searle, e Construction of Social Reality , p. 25.




Anglo-sphere (the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and NewZealand).65 is article argues that the reason they are able to do this has much to

do with collective intentionality. By doing things together over years and sharingthe fruits of collaboration, they have learned that there is something more at stakein acting together than in acting separately. e reverse also holds true. Unsuc-cessful collaboration makes it more difficult for diplomats to build collectiveintentionality and, by extension, it prevents them from developing relations offriendship. In short, collective intentionality is a catalyst for relationships offriendship, whereas the lack of it paves the way for relations of rivalry andenmity.

However, is it sufficient for diplomats to work together in order to developcollective intentionality? e answer is clearly no, as how you work together isequally important for learning how to act in concert. Drawing on the experienceof the Concert of Europe in exercising self-restraint,66 Mitzen argues that thedegree to which collective intentionality constrains individual intentionality iscontingent upon the strength of the actors’ joint commitment to doing some-thing together and the public openness of the commitment. e first conditionnormatively binds participants to the common project. Participants are not justcommitted to pursuing the same goals, but they own each other’s actions, in the

sense that they feel obligated to direct their actions towards what they have com-mitted to do.67 Publicity, on the other hand, allows them to share authority overtheir joint actions by providing them with the information necessary for stayingengaged in the process: what the plan is, what does it entail, who is part of it, andhow is each participant following through?68 In the same way in which transpar-ency enhances regime cooperation by increasing actors’ confidence in each other’sactions,69 publicity creates the possibility for actors to ‘govern together’ by exer-cising joint authority over their collective intentions. In short, the combination

of joint commitment and publicity makes it possible for a collective goal to pullindividual behaviour towards collectively desirable outcomes.70

Searle’s concept of collective intentionality and Mitzen’s theoretical insight ofthe conditions of joint commitment and publicity offer an analytical entrance tofour diplomatic methods of relationship-making. First, the lack of joint commit-ment and publicity leads to a situation of active adversity. Joint commitment is

65) Srdjan Vucetic, e Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations (Stan-ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

66) Mitzen, ‘Reading Habermas in Anarchy’, pp. 12-14.67) Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Governing Together: Global Governance as Collective Intention’, in Corneliu Bjolaand Markus Kornprobst (eds), Arguing Global Governance: Agency, Lifeworld and Shared Reasoning (New

York: Routledge, 2010), p. 58.68) Mitzen, ‘Governing Together’, p. 59.69) R.B. Mitchell, ‘Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes’, Interna-tional Studies Quarterly , vol. 42, no. 1, 1998.70) Mitzen, ‘Governing Together’, pp. 59-60.




either too weak or inexistent to keep actors engaged in working together towardsa common goal, while diplomatic opacity hinders joint problem-solving and

decision-making. is is likely the most precarious form of diplomatic engage-ment, since no effective mechanism exists to manage the processes of negotiationand reconciliation of diplomatic differences. e pre-First Word War Europeandiplomatic situation resembles this case well, partially because of the lack of acommon conception of European order among the Great Powers and partlybecause of the secrecy of their diplomatic actions. e League of Nations, fol-lowed later by the United Nations, meant to address both limitations by providinga common goal for maintaining peace in Europe (collective security) and a trans-parent institutional framework for diplomatic consultation and engagement.71

At the opposite pole, strong joint commitment and publicity reinforce eachother by generating an effective mechanism of dynamic friendship. Not only areactors strongly committed to the common project, but they also share broadauthority in implementing it via a transparent mechanism of reconciling indi-vidual intentions. e case of the European Union provides an excellent illustra-tion of this form of collective intentionality. On matters of environmentalgovernance, for instance, the recently established EEAS has been given the role ofstrengthening the European Union’s global leadership on climate change issues.72

In fulfilling this mandate, the EEAS is expected to bolster the internal policycoherence between the European Commission and the EU member states by act-ing as an informational channel for stakeholders, creating and maintaining ‘high-level contacts with governments, industry, non-government organizations andinfluential think tanks’ and by playing an ‘important outreach role andparticipat[ing] actively in the public debate through seminars and informationsessions’.73

Diplomatic relations are most vulnerable to adjustment when one component of

collective intentionality features an embryonic stage, while the other is reasonably well developed. is means that these relations can evolve in either direction —active adversity or dynamic friendship — depending on the degree to which dip-lomats on both sides understand to restrain individual actions through mutualengagement. e nascent rivalry scenario follows conditions of deficient commit-ment to a common project in the company of relatively transparent mechanismsof diplomatic coordination and decision-making. e current debate regardingthe rise of China fits this model well. While diplomatic relations between Chinaand the United States benefit from the presence of a plethora of institutional

71) Martyn Housden, e League of Nations and the Organisation of Peace (New York: Pearson Longman,2011).72) Council of the European Union, ‘Council of the European Union, 2009, #596’, available online athttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123923.pdf.73) EEAS, ‘Towards a Renewed and Strengthened EU Climate Diplomacy’, available online at http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/docs/2011_joint_paper_euclimate_diplomacy_en.pdf.




arrangements, both at the global (United Nations and World Trade Organiza-tion) and regional levels (Association of South-East Asian Nations and the Asia-

Pacific Economic Cooperation), there is no common understanding yet abouthow the rise of China should be diplomatically addressed. On the US side, thereis uncertainty as to whether China is a status quo power74 or one that tries toreach hegemony without fighting.75 On the Chinese side, Chinese leaders keepsending mixed messages about China refusing to ‘seek hegemony now’, while atthe same time reserving the right ‘neither blindly [to] follow the position of oth-ers nor give way to the pressure of any forces’.76

Finally, joint commitment to a common project and the limited capacity ofauthority-sharing give rise to relations of soft alliances . Joint commitment facili-tates diplomatic engagement, while the limited capacity of authority-sharingundermines it. is paradoxical situation is most visibly illustrated by the increas-ingly convoluted state of diplomatic relations between the United States andPakistan. On the one hand, both countries share the general objective of combat-ing global terrorism, pacifying Afghanistan and maintaining stability and peacein the Indian subcontinent.77 On the other hand, they have failed so far — espe-cially on the Pakistan side78 — to work constructively in developing an effectivemechanism by which diplomats from the two countries can share authority over

the implementation of their common strategic objectives. As a result, US —Pakistan relations have deteriorated to the point that they are now challengingthe very premises of their cooperation.79

e four categories of relationship-making that are outlined above provide anoriginal framework for bridging an important gap in IR theory and FPA: how arerelations of enmity and friendship made and unmade in world politics? Whilecertain factors (security, economics, identity and status recognition) tend to pre-dispose international actors to view themselves as enemies or friends, it is the

diplomatic process by which these determinants are construed and applied inpractice that decides the outcome. In short, agency matters and diplomats are inthe unique position to determine what type of relationship to enter into withother actors, on what terms and what to do about it. is framework provides a

74) A.I. Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, International Security , vol. 27, no. 4, 2003.75) Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New

York: Norton, 1st edition 2011).

76) Wen Jiabao, ‘China Has No Hegemonic Aspirations, UN Hears’, available onlone at http://www .un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=general+assembly&Cr1=debated&NewsID=28222.77) Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (London and New York: Rout-ledge, 2011).78) Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Ridingthe Roller Coaster (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011).79) K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘Pakistan — US Relations’, Congressional Research Service, available online athttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41832.pdf.




useful map for understanding the diplomatic construction of relations of enmityand friendship, but further work is clearly needed.

First, the four processes of relationship-making represent broad analytical cat-egories and hence they require further specification. Each of them can accom-modate a number of subdivisions depending on the intensity of enmity orfriendship in the relationship. For example, there are different degrees of friend-ship within the European Union, which vary according to the extent to which themember states accept to subsume their individual actions under EU collectiveintentionality. Germany is clearly one of the most enthusiastic members to followthis principle, while the United Kingdom is arguably at the opposite end of thespectrum. Similarly, the relationship of active adversity between the United Statesand North Korea is of a different tonality than the one between Iran and Israel.In other words, there is much to learn from investigating the varying levels ofenmity and friendship within each analytical category in order to get a bettergrasp of the type of diplomatic strategies that are responsible for the increase orreduction of collective intentionality within a particular set of relationships.

Second, the question of power continues to remain a blind spot in diplomatictheory. Sharp rightly points out that diplomacy puts people in touch with power,but in a rather paradoxical manner: diplomats largely live and work in the prox-

imity of power, but they rarely exercise the power directly.80 When they do so,they are either assumed to communicate threats and promises in support of cer-tain strategic objectives, or to deploy ‘soft power’ via various instruments of pub-lic diplomacy.81 A collective intentionality approach suggests that diplomats havemore power than they think. ey wield the power to make relations! Unlike theother two forms of diplomatic power, the power to make relations emerges notbefore the actors’ interactions, but through diplomatic engagement. Put differ-ently, diplomats do not exercise power directly over one another, but rather

through relations of enmity or friendship. Forging joint commitments and foster-ing authority-sharing are the key tools of relationship-building, but little is knownabout how they work in practice. is is a major contribution that diplomatictheory is uniquely placed to make to the study of international politics, yet itremains largely under-theorized.

ird, a collective intentionality approach invites serious questions about therelationship between diplomacy and ethics, a debate that has been rather mutedin the literature thus far. Owing partially to the doctrinal legacy of the raisond’état , diplomacy has evolved on a parallel track from the evolution of interna-

tional norms of ethical standards.82 is divide is no longer tenable, as

80) Sharp, Diplomatic eory of International Relations , p. 58.81) Jan Melissen, e New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Houndmills and New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and Joseph S. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , no. 616, 2008.82) Chatterjee, International Law and Diplomacy , p. 73.




considerations of global justice, accountability, duty and legitimacy are increas-ingly prevalent in the diplomatic discourse. As a method of managing relations of

enmity and friendship, diplomacy offers different theoretical angles for under-standing its ethical limits. For example, to what extent is the act of subsumingindividual intentions to collective intentionality morally right? e case of theEuropean Union’s diplomatic compliance with the US rendition programmeprovides a good illustration for this dilemma.83 Similarly, what kind of ethicallimits do relationships of enmity place upon diplomats? Is, for instance, ‘negotia-tion with villains’84 a feasible option for diplomats and if yes, under what condi-tions? In sum, what are the ethical boundaries at which diplomacy turns intoanti-diplomacy?

Conclusions

is article extends an invitation to diplomatic scholars to a debate about theidentity of diplomacy as a field of study and the contributions that it can make toour understanding of world politics relative to IR or FPA. To this end, the articlehas argued that diplomacy has been approached so far from three distinct episte-mological perspectives: as a practical mode of conducting international relations;as a ‘torchbearer’ whose importance goes (yet) unrecognized by others; and as a‘thinking framework’ about international politics. ere is nothing fundamen-tally wrong with continuing to pursue research on diplomatic issues from thesethree perspectives. However, these approaches experience varying degrees of dif-ficulty in steering a strong research agenda that would allow diplomacy to escapefrom the epistemic shadow of IR and FPA. As a way to address this limitation, thearticle suggests that a more promising alternative would be to study diplomacy asa method of building and managing relations of enmity and friendship in world

politics.More specifically, diplomacy offers a specialized form of knowledge for under-

standing how to draw distinctions between potential allies and rivals, and how tomake and unmake relationships of enmity and friendship in world politics. Insupport of this argument, the article has made three points: it has explained whyapproaching diplomacy as a method of managing relations can consolidate theidentity of the discipline. It then examined how diplomatic studies may benefitfrom paying better attention to theories of enmity and friendship. Finally, it has

offered an analytical framework, centred on the concept of collective intentionality,

83) European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for theTransportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners (2006/2200(INI))’, available online at http://www .europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcom/tdip/final_ep_resolution_en.pdf.84) B.I. Spector, ‘Negotiating with Villains Revisited: Research Note’, International Negotiation, vol. 8,no. 1, 2003.




for studying the diplomatic construction of relationships of enmity and friend-ship in world politics. In sum, the article concludes that the successes and failures

of diplomacy have much to do with the skill and competence by which diplomatssucceed in managing complex and dynamic relations of enmity and friendship in world politics.

Corneliu Bjola is a University Lecturer in Diplomatic Studies at the University of Oxford. His research inter-ests cover the role of diplomacy in shaping international change, ethical dimensions of diplomatic relations andtheories of innovation in international negotiations. In addition to various scholarly articles, he is the co-authorof Understanding International Diplomacy: eory, Practice and Ethics (London: Routledge, forthcoming

2013), co-editor of Arguing Global Governance: Agency, Lifeworld and Shared Reasoning (London:Routledge, 2010), and the author of Legitimating the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq

and the Ethics of Intervention (London: Routledge, 2009). Dr Bjola is also the co-editor of the ‘New Diplo-macy Studies’ book series from Routledge.

understanding enmity and friendship in world politics corneliu bjola, 2013

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