understanding foreign policy foreign policy may be examined as a decision-making process...
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Understanding Foreign Policy Foreign policy may be examined as a
decision-making process Understanding the world requires
perceiving actors and events correctly integrating them into a perceptual framework This can be seen as part of the research
process if you are an academic It is intelligence collection and analysis if
you are a practitioner.
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Intelligence and Foreign Policy The process of gathering the
information needed to understand foreign policy is quite simply called intelligence.
If you think of intelligence only as clandestine means and covert operations, you need to realize that all decisions are made based upon intelligence.
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Order out of Chaos For governments, the intelligence
process must cast a wide net of data in order to support its policy mission
Data from a wide variety of subjects, and entities must be collected and examine to see if there is a matter of concern for the policy arena of the analyst.
The analyst must take a chaotic barrage of data and see patterns and behaviors in it.
The Intelligence process The intelligence process is similar to
the research process Yet it has a different set of goals It produces a product for a consumer It anticipates a policy decisions or set of
decisions must be made based on the information
Our understanding of the strategic nature of foreign policy decision making is influenced by our information processing capabilities
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The Intelligence Process
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Use an Example In order to put this material, put it
in context: Why didn’t we see 9/11 coming? What are Iran’s (or North Korea’s)
intentions in foreign policy? What are it’s goals? What do we base our understanding on?
How do we understand our rivals, competitors, and allies?
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Intelligence failures Pearl Harbor German invasion of Sudetenland German invasion of Russia Chinese attack in Korean war The Bay of Pigs 1967 Arab-Israeli war The 1973 Arab-Israeli war The 1982 Argentinean invasion of the Falklands Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 9/11 WMD in Iraq (?) Revolution in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (?) Libya Consulate (2012) (?)
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More About Intelligence failures Sources of Failure
Ambiguity of evidence Collection methods Contradictions Linguistic/cultural/Definitional constraints
Ambivalence of Judgment There is always an expert to support any side of
any issue. Hedging one’s bets becomes a compelling
maintenance of the status quo.
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Organizational pathologies Groupthink Bureaucratic politics Secrecy and compartmentalization
Are there fundamental reasons though? This is why I think they happen
And this…
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Thinking, Perception, and Foreign Policy In order to understand how to act in the
world, we must: Inquire about the nature of the actors and
events around us; Organize, analyze, and evaluate the data
we have available; And, make strategic decisions based upon
our cognitive processing of or perceptions. Which leads us to asking how the mind
does these tasks – which we call cognition.
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Cognition The Mind is a functioning organ
that produces cognition, or thinking
Thinking seems to be a set of processes Perception Memory Reasoning
There are very real limits on these skills/capacities!
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Cognition We process information according
to some basic underlying cognitive algorithms.
These algorithms help us quickly process large chunks of information.
For example:
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How did you know what it was? We process information quickly,
relying on numerous sensory capacities, and cognitive skills.
They often speed up perceptual processing at the expense of complete accuracy
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Perception We tend to perceive what we
expect to perceive. A corollary of this principle is that it
takes more information, and more unambiguous information, to recognize an unexpected phenomenon than an expected one.
Constraints on Perception Perception is constrained by both
the observer and the environment. Availability principle
We evaluate input in terms of our own experience and cognitive memory
Let’s look at perception “atomistically”
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Sensory perception How do we perceive the world? Sensory input is perceived through
various channels 5 (?) Senses
Vision Hearing Taste Smell Feel
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Perceptual Channels These channels have capacity limits That capacity seems to remarkable
close to “7” bits of information. Below 7 we “subitize” Above 7 we estimate
To get around these limits, we recode into chunks.
Read “The Magic Number Seven Plus or Minus Two.
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Count the dots
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There were 3. Now how many?
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There were 8. Now how many?
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There were 6. Now how many?
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There were 16. Why is this different?
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The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Informationby George A. Milleroriginally published in The Psychological Review, 1956, vol. 63, pp. 81-97
“My problem is that I have been persecuted by an integer. For seven years this number has followed me around, has intruded in my most private data, and has assaulted me from the pages of our most public journals. This number assumes a variety of disguises, being sometimes a little larger and sometimes a little smaller than usual, but never changing so much as to be unrecognizable. The persistence with which this number plagues me is far more than a random accident. There is, to quote a famous senator, a design behind it, some pattern governing its appearances. Either there really is something unusual about the number or else I am suffering from delusions of persecution.”
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Vision Modes of visual input
Color RGB / Red Blue Yellow /magenta, cyan, and yellow
Brightness Length
Length x width x breadth = volume Other ?
Depth perception Illusions suggest that the processing
machinery of the brain is highly prone to unusual effects.
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Hearing Amplitude Pitch Timbre
Perhaps just non-pitch non-amplitude noise
The “wastebasket” attribute – everything after you extract amplitude and pitch
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Taste 4 (?) categories (Channels)
Sweet Salt Bitter Sour Umami Possibly fat
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Smell The Seven Odors (?)
Camphoric - Mothballs Musky - Perfume/Aftershave Roses - Floral Pepperminty - Mint Gum Etheral - Dry Cleaning Fluid Pungent - Vinegar Putrid - Rotten Eggs
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Touch Pressure Texture Dryness Heat
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Other senses Kinesthetic sense Balance Pain Time ??
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Put it all together in a Model
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Source: Cognitive Science: http://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i218/s10/SLIDES/Cog_Sci2.pdf
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Cognition We process information according
to some basic underlying cognitive algorithms.
These algorithms help us process large chunks of information.
Our cognitive operations are fairly standardized, and limited – by practice
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Mind-sets A mind-set is an expected pattern They are both necessary and
problematic A mind set is a lens or perceptual filter
that classifies perceptions efficiently for rapid cognition.
As a result, when information lies outside the bounds of the mind-set, one of three things happens: It is misinterpreted It is discarded It bogs down the cognitive process
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Mind-sets tend to be quick to form but resistant to change.
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Image persistence Once you start to form an image, it
becomes difficult to modify it.
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Perception is a learned skill
• Our mind learns to see with stereoscopic vision
• It does so by approximately 2 years of age• Not everyone acquires this ability
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The dot puzzle
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The solution to the dot puzzle
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A more creative solution to the dot puzzle
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Break that cognitive mold!
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Perception and Complex Systems We process information according
to cognitive algorithms We speed information processing
by various shorthand algorithms such as Encoding Mind-sets
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Image persistence
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Image persistence
The eye manages information in Packages
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Can you raed tihs �
• I cdnuolt blveiee taht I cluod aulaclty uesdnatnrd �waht I was rdanieg.. The phaonmneal pweor of the hmuan mnid, aoccdrnig to a rscheearch at �Cmabrigde Uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoatnt tihng is taht the frist and lsat ltteer be in the rghit pclae. The rset can be a taotl mses and you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae the huamn mnid deos not �raed ervey lteter by istlef, but the wrod as a wlohe. Amzanig huh? yaeh and I awlyas tghuhot slpeling was ipmorantt! if you can raed tihs psas it on !!� ���
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Memory Memory is complex and not well
understood yet One simple model contain 3 different
stores: The Sensory Information Store (SIS) The Short-Term Store (STS) The Long-Term Store (LTS)
And 3 processes Encoding (putting information into a store) Maintenance (keeping it "alive") Retrieval (finding encoded information)
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Cognitive Dissonance Cognitive Dissonance is routinely
encountered in thinking It is when information counter to
the beliefs or expectations of the perceiver is is encountered, it is either discarded, ignored, or treated as false.
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Fundamental attribution error When others do something that
bothers us, we see them as evil When we do something that
bothers us, we see this as a matter of no choice, or boxed in by circumstances.
Just think of this in terms of partisan politics!
Decision Making We tend to think of decision
making as a rational process Costs and benefits are weighed
and we pick the highest values option
This has come to be called the “Rational Actor” model
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Organizational pathologies Groupthink Bureaucratic politics Secrecy and compartmentalization In National Security, these may be
more problematic than in research
Perceptions and Foreign Policy Leaders make decisions based on
their perception of power capabilities, not the actual reality of those capabilities.
Their perceptions of other leaders intentions, not the reality of those intentions.
Perceptions & Vietnam Perceptual problems concerning
Vietnam The importance of the objectives to
the US electorate The importance of the
complementary objectives (resolve) for the Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.
Key perceptual events Gulf of Tonkin Tet offensive
Perceptions and Iraq Start with a belief:
Iraq is an aggressive, imperialistic totalitarian dictatorship
The Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait shifts beliefs to the position that Iraq is a threat to all Western interests
The known corroborated evidence on Iraqi WMD programs and the Iraqi intransigence in complying with UNSCOM inspectors reinforces the belief that Iraq is concealing its WMD activities, increasing the apparent threat.
Iraq (cont) Therefore data received is processed by
one’s cognitive processing capabilities and assimilated by one’s belief system Actual data may be ambiguous
A chemical tank truck can indicate A chemical/nerve agent production/distribution capability A pesticide production/transportation/disposal capability
The absence of data can mean two very different things
There are no weapons… Therefore Saddam is a master of concealment,
and all the more dangerous
WMD Schema If you believe that Saddam has WMD, then:
No evidence supports concealment Lack of cooperation with UN means further
efforts to conceal If you believe that Saddam probably
doesn’t have WMD, then No evidence supports no WMD Lack of cooperation with UN can be seen as
defending Iraqi sovereignty in the face of considerable pressure and power – a sign of courage and ‘patriotism’ to the Iraqi people.
He may believe the potential threat of WMD are what are preventing a US attack
What you believe conditions what you see.
Now play President Bush
Bush (41) failed to perceive Saddam accurately in 1990, and he invaded Kuwait.
An attempt to assassinate Bush (41) during the Clinton Administration bolsters the believe that Saddam seeks revenge.
Failure to perceive renewed threats from a Saddam emboldened by 9/11 means that if you underestimate him, the toll can be high – even catastrophic
What are the costs of a mistake? WMD might mean orders of magnitude greater than 9/11
The role of perception Art Jervis challenges the rational-
choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models.
I would say that perception undermines the understanding of situations, not the core logic of decision making
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Some General Ideas on how Perception affects Decision making
From Robert Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79.
Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images."
There are two ways to make mistakes: One is to not change your views in the face of conflicting information, the other is to be too willing to do so. Both scholars and decision-makes are
more likely to do the first (not to change their views). It's easier to integrate contradicting information into your image if it comes bit-by-bit
than if it comes all at once. Misperception is easiest to correct if an actor is miscategorized (but the category
exists in your head) (e.g. Britain was aware of the category of expansionist states, but it didn't think Hitler belonged in it); it is hardest to correct if your mind completely lacks a certain category (e.g. China in the 19th century didn't
know what to make of the West)
If the sender (of a message) has something different on his mind (the "evoked set") than the receiver does, misunderstanding is likely.
The more time I spend drawing up a plan, the more clear it is to me. So I will assume it is equally clear to you, making misperception on your part even more likely.
An action may convey an unintended message if the action itself doesn't turn out as planned. 10/29/2003
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More on Foreign Policy Perceptions
Decision-makers tend to see other states as more hostile than they are. We tend to assume that the behavior of others is more centralized and
coordinated than it is. Similarly, we tend to take the foreign ministry's position as
representative of the government as a whole. When states do something we like, we give ourselves too much credit for
getting them to do so; when states do something we don't like, we attribute it mostly to internal (domestic) forces.
When I don't try to conceal my intentions, I assume that you accurately perceive them.
Suggests that if it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace, it is often even harder for him to see that issues important to him are not important to others.
We tend to forget that a single bit of evidence might support more than one view, including opposing views.
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Decision‑Making Models of Decision Making
Rational Actor Organizational Processes Bureaucratic Politics \
See Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision for an excellent description and analysis!
The Rational Actor Nations may be seen as unified
whole. That the foreign policy process
produces a combined set of preferences
Decision making is accomplished by examining the available option, ranking them, and choosing the one most preferred.
Nations are therefore utility maximizers
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The Organizational Process Model Governmental action is
organizational output Organizational missions Factored problem, and fractional
operating constraints Standard operating procedures Budget feast and famine Dominant inference pattern is
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The Bureaucratic Politics Model Governmental action is the result
of political interaction. Players make a difference (chiefs,
indians, staffers, ad hoc players Parochial interests Stakes in the process/stands on the
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Other Models Full Rational Actor
Limited Information and Rationality “Satisficing” Muddling through Perceptual and cognitive problems
are associated with all decision‑making Mindsets Selective perception Cognitive dissonance