understanding free will
TRANSCRIPT
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Steve Heath
Rev. James Carter, S.J.
Faith, Science, and Religion
4 May 2008
Understanding Free Will
Is there such a thing as free will? This question has been debated, in some form or
another, for centuries. In his dispute with the Manicheans and Semipelageians, St. Augustine
asserted that free will coexisted with God¶s omnipotent and omniscient nature through the act of
grace. During the Reformation, thinkers like John Calvin and Martin Luther championed the
concepts of predestination relegating all humanity to slavery of a predetermined fate and leaving
little if any room for free will. Modern philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and David Hume
grappled with reconciling free will with deterministic implications of empiricism. Newtonian
physics would soon transform and somewhat solidify a determinist stand on debate for centuries,
that is, until twentieth century developments in the fields of quantum physics opened, or
reopened, further possibilities for the issue. Although new philosophic and scientific
developments arose, and continue to arise, to support and challenge arguments over free will,
similarities arise over definition of terms, contextual frameworks and relations between the two.
In this paper I address modern developments in physics and neurobiology, the implicative
consequences on free will that followed such developments, and my own conclusions and
personal interpretations. To compensate for a lack of thorough comprehension on modern
physics, I have relied upon the writings of the physicist, Paul Davies, and the
physicist/theologian John Polkinghorne for formulating a general understanding of the concepts
of chaos theory and quantum mechanics. Discussion on the neurological experiments of
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Benjamin Libet will be supplemented by peer-reviewed journal articles from researchers
analyzing his work, and from those that have conducted similar experiments on readiness
potential . Finally, I must disclose that the conclusion I have settled upon is entirely taken from
an explanation ± or more so, a reconciliation ± of free will and determinism as presented in the
article On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An essay in bridging Neuroscience and Faith by
Palmyre M.F. Oomen. After struggling to find an explanation I could settle upon, I was lucky to
come across Oomen¶s essay which helped bridge my compatibilist leanings and personal
theological beliefs.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEWTON
Before the sixteenth century, the world was understood in terms of ³magic numbers.´
From the sixth century B.C. onwards Euclidean geometry led members of the Pythagorean
School to uncover remarkable geometric relationships within nature ± lending useful application
to the studies of architecture and navigation. As numerical patterns emerged out of nature and
even music, numbers were held in a more mystical and meaningful regard ± God became a great
manipulator of geometric shapes. This ability to mete out and make sense of the physical world
would inspire new philosophic developments like Plato¶s Theory of Forms. (Davies 1992, 93-96)
Overall, the uncovering of mathematics in nature brought the search for truth into the arena of
this world from the heavens where it was once relegated.
Newtonian mechanics caused a revolutionary shift, not only in the way numbers were
looked upon, but also in the philosophical conceptions of how the universe and its creator
operate. Galileo¶s law of falling bodies added the new dimension of time to Euclidean geometry
and would inspire Isaac Newton¶s revolutionary Calculus. Davies explains the great impact this
development would make over the next two centuries:
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The central feature of [Calculus] is the notion of continuous change. Newton made this
the basis of his theory of mechanics, in which the laws of motion and material bodies
were set down. The most striking and successful application of Newton¶s mechanics was
to the motion of the planets in the solar system. Thus the music of spheres was replaced
by the image of the clockwork universe. This image achieved its most developed form
with the work of Pierre Laplace in the late eighteenth century, who envisaged every atom
in the universe as a component in an unfailingly precise cosmic clockwork mechanism.
God the Geometer became God the Watchmaker. (Davies 1992, 97)
Laplace extended Newtonian physics largely into astronomy where he theorized the concept of
gravitational collapse; however, as far as this paper is concerned, his greatest contribution was
the ³Laplacian Demon´ which reinforced beliefs in causal determinism. This hypothetical
construct theorized ³if a being knew at one instant the positions and motions of every particle in
the universe he would have at his disposal all the information necessary to compute the entire
past and future history of the universe´ (Davies 1982, 136).
The significance of this construct on free will, relates to the consequential reality that all
events, including human choices, are predetermined by the causal events that preceded them.
Was this idea that grew out of Newtonian physics the nail in the coffin for free will? Those who
agreed with Laplace¶s construct and denied the possibility of recognizing free will along such
constructs would be labeled hard determinists, or incompatibilists; those who believed free will
could be reconciled with determinism were soft determinists, or compatibilists. A third category
that disputed the Laplacian determinism would gain prominence in the early twentieth century.
FIGHTING THE LAPLACIAN DEMON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
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Donald M. Mackay challenged Laplace¶s Demon on the grounds that: if the all events
were known in a deterministic setting, one would be able to alter his decision to act in
accordance with a causally determined prediction ± or, knowledge of the future allows one to act
otherwise and contradict the rules of strict causal determinism. John Polkinghorne acknowledges
that holes exist in this argument; however, certain aspects of MacKay¶s debate ± which he has
defended in his book The Clock Work Image ± may be employed to explain recent developments
in modern physics and the ensuing consequences for free will (Polkinghorne 1991, 42-43).
Ian G. Barbour, an expert on the relationship between religion and science, describes
Chaos Theory as ³the study of holistic temporal and geometric patterns without reduction to
detailed causal mechanisms (Barbour 1999, 382). In Quarks, Chaos and Christianity,
Polkinghorne said systems studied under the theory contain interactions occurring so frequently
that two types of causality emerge: the ³bottom-up causes´ are reduced to the localized
interactions of the individual parts, while the ³top-down causes´ define the actions of the system
as a whole, and may be referred to as ³pattern information.´ Top-down causes can also be
defined as ³the influence of a system on its subsystems [where] higher-level events impose
boundary conditions on chemical and physical processes at lower levels without violating lower-
level laws´ (Barbour 1999, 383). Due to the incalculable amount of interactions, or ³exquisite
sensitivity,´ within the system, it is almost pointless to take the reductionist approach and only
account for bottom-up causes. (Polkinghorne 1994, 65-71)
The sensitivity of chaotic systems means that they can never be isolated from what goes
on around them. This implies that they can only be properly discussed holistically, that is
to say in terms if all that is going on [top-down causes], not just in terms of localized bits
and pieces [bottom-up causes]. The way they react to small nudges corresponds not to a
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change in energy (for the nudges can be vanishingly small), but to a change in the pattern
of behavior within the confines of possibility represented by the µstrange attractor.¶
(Polkinghorne 1994, 68-69)
Now, in relating all of this to Laplace¶s demon, we see that the very concept of knowing all
interactions in a given system would be nearly impossible to calculate, and given the ³exquisite
sensitivity´ it would not be fruitful to attempt to reduce all future events to the conditions of
bottom-up causes (73). Davies furthers the argument against reductionism by pointing out that
our universe ³should have an expanding horizon in space´ allowing for unaccounted
disturbances to any ultrasensitive system (Davies 1984, 137). Polkinghorne goes on to say that
top-down causes may also help understand the mental/physical separations of the mind and
brain:
I do not for one moment claim that the mystery of mind and brain is near to a solution,
but one major attraction of the µguess¶ I have been suggesting is that it begins to describe
a physical world that we can conceive ourselves as inhabiting. The way we act in our
bodies seems to have this holistic, top-down, character to it. (Polkinghorne 1994, 71)
This concept of discriminating between top-down and bottom-up causes ± and Polkinghorne¶s
proposal of labeling top-down causes as communication of information (Polkinghorne 1994, 69)
± will be addressed later in this paper to understand the concept supervenience and its
implication on the identification of self .
Chaos theory raises some serious challenges to Laplacian Determinism; however, it can
be argued that the theory still has strong roots in determinism. Note: Polkinghorne and others
have suggested that the indeterminacy of ultrasensitive systems may suggest a relationship with
Heisenburg¶s Uncertainty Principle, but this is still a matter of debate (Polkinghorne 1994, 70).
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Before moving on to the next section I will address Davies¶ three possible understandings of
freedom allowed by the determinist perspective: The first suggests human freedom would exist
under the circumstance that if all causes preceding a decision were replicated exactly, and there
is a possibility that an agent could still choose otherwise. This represents the views of the
incompatibilist, and requires a degree of faith since it is impossible to test. The second definition
harkens back to Mackay¶s argument that it would be impossible to know all circumstances;
therefore, freedom is unpredictable to the agent (Largely supported by the implications of Chaos
Theory). This view allows free will¶s compatibility with determinism, and is also shared by the
philosopher A.J. Ayer who, in his essay ³Freedom and Necessity,´ argues that free will should
be defined not by causality, but by lack of constraint. The third view is the dualist approach
which recognizes determinism while maintaining that the mind freely acts without the constraint
of the laws of Newton because it inhabits its own realm distinctive from the physical universe.
There are many arguments and interpretations of this third view regarding the manner of
interaction between the mental and physical realms. (Davies 1984, 139)
THE INDETERMINACY OF QUANTUM PHYSICS
Before the twentieth century it was held that all workings of nature were governed by the
laws of Newtonian Mechanics. However, when observations at the subatomic level could not be
determined through the classical physics, a new field supported by probabilities and
contradictions emerged to challenge the deterministic laws of nature, Quantum Mechanics. To
quote Polkinghorne, what was ³classically nonsensical is quantum mechanically perfectly
intelligible. (Polkinghorne 1991, 87)´
The Uncertainty Principle, a theory central to quantum mechanics developed by Werner
Heisenberg, stated that a particle¶s location and momentum could not be simultaneously
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predicted. Rather, as a particle¶s momentum was more accurately predicted the location became
more obscure, and vice versa. ³Heisenberg¶s famous uncertainty principle assures us that there is
always an irreducible indeterminism in the operation of subatomic particles (Davies 1984, 137).´
This indeterminacy at the subatomic level completely throws off the exclusive bottom-up
approach of Newtonian Mechanics as the inability to predict the motion of a particle puts a kink
in the concept of causal determinism ± especially taken in the context of predicting ultrasensitive
systems. The assumed predictability of the natural world was now subject to the contradictory
laws of its own building blocks.
Quantum Theory opens the door to an undetermined future, but does this hinge upon
human freedom? If uncertainty lies at the roots of all natural laws, then the proponents of free
will have much to answer. Firstly, does uncertainty equate free will at all? If root causes can be
reduced to random chance, like the firing of an electron, so can the foundations of human
decision-making. The cage imposed by causal determinism now exists in a world subjected to
the rules of randomness. How can one take ownership for his own action if those actions are not
caused but subject to a subatomic dice roll? This question calls forth the important issue of
responsibility which from an indeterminist perspective has no meaning. If all choices arise from
randomly-generated root causes then how can one be held responsible? This brings up serious
moral issues relating punishment and justice. (Davies 1984)
Proponents of free will coinciding with quantum indeterminism propose a dualistic
solution to fill in the gaps. They claim that uncertainty, lying at the root of all causes, is
determined by an otherworldly human will, or divine intervention, not subject to the laws of
nature (Sansbury 120). In an essay from Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science Carl Helrich
explained such rationale and its inherent roadblocks:
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The role of human consciousness in the quantum theory has been of interest at various
times. Von Neumann ([1932] 1955) introduced a theory of quantum measurement that
involves the human brain in the last step. He assumed that the only physics was quantum
physics and that, therefore, the interaction with a measuring apparatus was itself also
quantum. The idea went together well if one considered only an ideal situation, but
difficulties arose for realistic conditions and resulted in the propagation of quantum
interferences (entanglements) to a macroscopic level. The resolution was to terminate the
measuring process with an observer having consciousness. The individual¶s
consciousness was claimed to be a unity, which was not subject to the multiplicities of
the quantum theory (Omnès 1999).
The problem with this solution is that it uses unresolved aspects of human consciousness
to resolve difficulties in physical theory. Although it is a rapidly progressing area of
research (in which I am personally involved), our present understanding of the details of
the biophysics of neural transmission is still incomplete. And, as with any research
program, we do not know how far we are from complete understanding or even if that
can ever be attained. (Helrich 559-558)
The quantum indeterminists who favor free will have encountered conflict justifying their cases
with recent scientific developments. In 2006 Gerard µt Hooft of Utrecht University of the
Netherlands introduced a theory that confirmed Einstein¶s belief that even smaller scales of
matter influenced the seemingly uncertain nature of subatomic particles ± thus, establishing a
deterministic root to quantum behavior (Zeeya). A month after µt Hooft presented his findings,
two Princeton University professors, John Conway and Simon Kochen, interpreted his
conclusions as a zero-sum chance for human freedom. Resting the entire possibility of free will
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on the conclusiveness of µt Hooft¶s work, Kochen said, "our lives could be like the second
showing of a movie ² all actions play out as though they are free, but that freedom is an
illusion." (Zeeya)
Conway and Kochen defend the case for free will by countering quantum determinists
with their Free Will Theorem:
Our Free Will Theorem is the latest in a line of argument against such theories. However,
the situation is not as simple as it seems, since the determinacy of such theories can be
conjured out of existence by a simple semantic trick«Bohm¶s theory so exorcised, has
become a non-deterministic theory, which, however, still gives exactly the same
predictions! In fact, the exorcised form of Bohm¶s theory is consistent with our assertion
that particles have free will. We need only suppose once again that a Janus uses
appropriate truly random devices to give the probability distributions P t . If he does so,
then the responses of the particles in our spin experiments, for instance, will not be
determined ahead of time, and so they will be exhibiting free will, in our sense. (Conway
and Kochen 1454)
But should free will be grounded on the indeterminacy of quantum theory or is there a
light at the end of the tunnel for a compatibilist approach? Neurological studies made possible
with the electroencephalograph have created yet another stage for this debate.
LIBET¶S EXPERIMENTS
So far, this discussion has focused on philosophical implications derived from research in
the physical sciences. Free will, as reconciled by both determinists and indeterminists
philosophies, has straddled upon the very certainty of subatomic particles. Now the debate shifts
focus to the biological workings of the human brain. Use of the electroencephalograph to
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measure electric activity in the brain allows research to reduce human actions to the very neurons
that generate them. These studies, replicated with varying results, have generated a whole new
dialogue over the timing and origin of the human decision.
In the 1930¶s scientists began measuring electrical impulses to identify parts of the brain
responsible for basic human functions. In 1963 the University of Ulm¶s Hans Kornhuber and
Luder Deecke conducted timing experiments measuring the correspondence between neural
activity and the performance of simple movements. Their experiments yielded shocking results:
the observed brain activity preceded the action by approximately 500 milliseconds. The scientists
labeled this period of preparatory activity the Bereitschaftspotential , or Readiness Potential. In
the 1980¶s Benjamin Libet of the University of California, San Francisco would test the
correspondence between the Readiness Potential of an action and the conscious decision of the
participant to act (Libet et al. 1983). The findings of these tests have been repeated successfully
although the analyses remain disputed. (Libet 34)
Monitored by an electroencephalograph, participants in Libet¶s experiments were told to
perform a simple task (like raising a finger) while observing the circular motion of a dot on a
screen ± they were free to act whenever they wanted. After acting the patients were instructed to
identify the location of the dot at the exact instant they decided to act. Remarkably, Libet found
that the participants decided to move 350 milliseconds after the Readiness Potential began (as
determined by the EEG readings). This suggested that the patients¶ brains had begun processing
for the action 350 milliseconds before the conscious decision to act (Libet et al. 1983). ³This
struck a blow to the traditional notion of free will, for how can our wills be free if we are only
belatedly aware of their decisions? (Libet 1989, 35) ´ The second conclusion of Libet¶s test
helped answer this.
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Libet also found that the participants underwent a series of attempts to act before the final
execution. EEG readings showed series of Readiness Potential curves that dropped in voltage
around the last 150 milliseconds before the final, stronger curve that induced the action. This and
the patients¶ testimonies of contemplating acting numerous times before doing so, led Libet to
hypothesize that the brain is allowed a 150 millisecond interval of time to veto an action in the
neurological process. He noted that if free will existed it was in this ability to veto action:
We may not be aware of all the movements for which our minds may be readying us, but
we can elect, decisively, not to flick a finger or pick up a gun. Alternatively, it may be
that a conscious trigger is required before any act is executed and that and readiness
potential not given the go-ahead withers on the vine. Either way, the foundation of free
will seems to reside not within our unconscious capacity for generating choices but
within our conscious ability, in the hundred and fifty milliseconds before taking action, to
make up our minds. (Libet 36)
For the compatibilist, Libet¶s findings present an obstacle for free will. In a dissection
and critique of Libet¶s experiments, John M. Ostrowick points out the exact conflict:
When we talk of ³an agent getting what she wants´, the question is whether we are
talking about the causal efficacy of the RP, or the causal efficacy of the mental state qua
mental, or both (assuming that ³wants´ are mental and efficacious qua mental). If the
mental is not efficacious ± and this seems to be Libet's concern ± then the wants and
desires would not be efficacious. Hence, we would say that the agent gets what she wants
because of a non-conscious RP, which is not the same as having free choice on the
compatibilist model. In other words, even if the compatibilist construal of free-will is
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correct, Libet's results seem to show that agents do not have free-will of the sort that
compatibilists describe. (Ostrowick 277)
He criticized Libet for his equation of free will with the µability to veto¶ found in the last 150
milliseconds before an action. According to Ostrowick, Libet¶s idea of free will only exists in
situations where one changes his mind ± by asserting a veto after the readiness potential and its
subsequent point of volition (Ostrowick 281). Libet acknowledged this interpretation of free will:
[The Studies] produced evidence that the brain appears to initiate a freely voluntary act
well before the subject is aware that he/she wishes or feels the urge to act. The recorded
readiness potential (RP) precedes by 350 ms the subject¶s report of being conscious of the
wish (W ) to act. However, W precedes the act by 150±200 ms, so there is time for the
conscious function to control the final outcome; it can stop or veto the process so that no
act occurs. (Libet 1985)
However, Ostrowick finds it unreasonable for Libet to not conclude a preceding neural activity
for the veto ± which is viewed as a conscious event like the point of volition (preceded by the
Readiness Potential) (279). Ostrowick concludes that measuring the point of volition served only
to allow for the construction for a potential for veto. Both stages, he argues, have no true value to
the decision, governed entirely by the readiness potential, and are therefore epiphenomenal
within the process (282).
We know that we can control ourselves in some sense, and veto our decisions. But I
believe that what we decide and what we veto (if Libet's interpretation stands) is a non-
conscious result of our non-conscious self-structures (see e.g. Dennett, 1993:199 et seq.).
Hence, I believe that Libet's results are strong evidence against free-will. (Ostrowick 285)
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The central argument around these tests lie in whether our decisions result from a
conscious present decision or a subconscious decision formed from past events ± Sigmund Freud
would argue the latter. Ostrowick has closed Libet¶s window for free will on the grounds of
determinism (because actions do not stem from the agent¶s present µwants¶ but rather from the
causal chain of subconscious neural activity) and indeterminism (because volition has no role in
the non-vetoed act, hence it is epiphenomenal, or a meaningless byproduct.) Libet, who has
since accepted an indeterminist possibility involving Field Theorem, defended his position that
the Veto, as a conscious mental action, does not necessitate pre-neural activity (Libet 1999).
In the light of neurological experimentation arguments of free will have centered on the
search for causal neurological chains to promote a determinist conclusion against free will. From
this perspective any theories in favor of free will must solicit indeterminist links in the chain of
neuronal behavior ± as Libet suggests with his µveto.¶
But why should determinism spell the doom for free will? The working definition we
have assumed for free will is the ability to have chosen otherwise. This definition presents many
obstacles for the determinist who views uncertainty as merely a lack of knowledge of prior
circumstances. Perhaps, we should alter the discussion to understand free will under different
definitions.
AYER¶S FREE WILL AND NECESSITY
To conform to the causal laws of nature the twentieth century British philosopher A.J.
Ayer proposed a new compatibilist definition for free will. ³It seems that if we are to retain this
idea of moral responsibility, we must either show that men can be held responsible for actions
which they do not do freely, or else find some way of reconciling determinism with the freedom
of will. (Ayer 114)´ For Ayer, this task required defining free will, by not what it is, but by what
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it is not. Those who deny the existence of free will in the light of determinism would define free
will as the contrast of causality, for how could an entirely free choice be made if it results from
prior causes. But, perhaps this conclusion is the consequence of a metaphorical misunderstanding
or causality:
We tend to form an imaginative picture of an unhappy effect trying vainly to escape from
the clutches of an overmastering cause. But, I repeat, the fact is simply that when an even
of one type occurs, an event of another type occurs also, in a certain temporal or spatio-
temporal relation to the first. The rest is only metaphor, and not because of the fact, that
we come to think there is an antithesis between causality and freedom. (Ayer 118)
Instead of causality Ayer prescribes constraint as free will¶s necessary contrast. ³All causes
equally necessitate,´ but this does not mean that ³all causes constrain´ (116). A difference exists
between the scenarios that a man crosses the room to get a book and a man who crosses the room
because he is held at gun point. Only to the latter may it be said that the agent acted out of
constraint and, therefore, against his free will (Ayer 115-116). For the first scenario getting the
book may have caused the man to move; however, obtaining the book did not constrain him:
³There is an invariable concomitance between the two classes of events; but there is no
compulsion, in any but a metaphorical sense. (117)´ Just because behavior may be explained, it
does not hold that it was not freely acted:
To say that I could have acted otherwise is to say, first, that I should have acted otherwise
if I had so chosen; second, that my action was voluntary in the sense in which the actions,
say, of the kleptomaniac are not; and thirdly, that nobody compelled me to choose as I
did: and these three conditions may very well be fulfilled. (Ayer 117)
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Under this logic, Laplace¶s demon does not threaten free will at all. Predicting future events in a
determinist setting requires the calculation of human actions, dismissing the fatalist case for their
inconsequentiality. Furthermore:
What it does entail is that my behavior can be predicted: but to say that my behavior can
be predicted is not to say that I am acting under constraint. It is indeed true that I cannot
escape my destiny if this is taken to mean no more than that I shall do what I shall do.
But this is a tautology, just as it is a tautology that what is going to happen is going to
happen. And such tautologies as these prove nothing whatsoever about the freedom of the
will. (Ayer 118)
Ayer offered a softer view of a perceivably harsh deterministic world. As an atheist, he did not
offer any theological terminologies or positions in his essay. He even hints that obedience to a
supreme being would constitute a constrained action since ³I have acquired a strong habit of
obedience that I no longer go through any process of deciding whether or not to do what the
other person (or being) wants.´
The next focus of the discussion bears strong theological ties. Similar to Ayer¶s proposal
it requires a sort of redefining and re-conceptualizing of terms. It also attempts to reconcile free
will within a determinist setting ± specifically that brought about by neurological breakthroughs.
PARELLELS IN THOMISM AND NEUROSCIENCE
The discussion for free will takes on a dismal setting in the light of the neurological
studies of the twentieth century. Libet¶s own rationalizing for a type of µveto-action¶ freedom
stands on shaky grounds as others have argued for its invalidity or further roots in subconscious
determinism. But Palmyre M.F. Oomen, the Director of Theology and Science at the University
of Nijmegen, has provided a more hopeful interpretation that bridges the determinist conclusions
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of neuroscience with the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Arguing against the idea that free will
must require unpredictability, Oomen explored the concepts of self and mind under the contexts
of philosophical principles like Supervenience, to equate free will with the idea of self-
determination .
As science has confirmed, the human brain is an extremely complex system of neural
activity. Earlier we discussed Polkinghorne¶s approach to viewing ultrasensitive systems with
two types of causes: bottom-up and top-down. The same approach must apply to understanding
the complex relationship between the brain and mind, and this is facilitated by the concept of
Supervenience.
The notions of causality through energetic interaction of constituents on the one hand,
and of causality through the top-down effect of active information on the other, have
about them something of the flavor of the material and the mental in a complementary
relationship. There might be here a glimmer of how mind and brain relate to each other.
(Polkinghorne 1998, 62)
A supervenient property is one that emerges out of the deductive properties within a
system. In music, the various tones, or notes, individually have distinctive characteristics, but
when they are arranged another property emerges, melody. Just as a melody may stimulate
inspiration, supervenient properties can take on causal roles apart from those of the smaller parts
in the system. (Oomen 379-380) The mind must be viewed in a similar fashion.
The mind is not separate from the neurons (and from all other things involved in the
physical contacts among the neurons), but nevertheless the mind has properties that
cannot be reduced to them. It has added (supervenient, or emergent) properties. And,
because there are plausible reasons to think that some emergent properties play causal
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roles within their own domain (as the piece of music does), the fact that the mind requires
a material basis does not preclude it per se from playing a causal role within its own
domain. So, it is conceivable that ³mind matters.´ (Oomen 380)
The supervenient properties of a system may exhibit causes affecting the smaller parts of that
system. This is important for understanding Thomas Aquinas¶ view of the soul as the form of the
body (Aquinas Q 13, Sec. 1). This supervenient relationship also avoids resorting to dualist or
hard determinist perspectives. Aquinas said the soul possesses certain appetites which can be
viewed as other emerging properties of the bodily system ± free will is included as one of these
(Aquinas Q 78).
Self-organization occurs when properties within a system emerge to maintain order and
coherence ± a task not accomplished by external or centralized forces ± in adapting to its
environment (Oomen 382). Thus, the emerging soul maintains the adaptive nature of the body by
acting on its reductive processes. Oomen argues that consciousness forms out of this need for
the bodily system to adapt and consequently form a unity within the system.
Within this system implicit criterion emerge to govern the functions within the system. In
biology this is referred to as an immanent valuation principle within a species as it dictates the
most efficient execution of tasks. ³That is to say, something is involved that indicates a
development in one direction as more attractive than a development in a different direction, so
that the one is felt as more beneficial than the other. (Oomen 384)´ Aquinas would refer to this
as aspiring for the good (Aquinas Q 13).
From here Oomen presents his definition for the soul, self-determination. ³Apparently,
one of the essential characteristics of freedom is that it has to do with remaining loyal to the
things one considers to be good. (Oomen 385)´ To him, freedom is not dictated by whether an
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agent could act otherwise, but rather it is defined by the agent¶s ability to choose the same self-
determined option if allowed to choose again. This determinist assertion claims that uncertainty
undermines human freedom which is governed by the supervenient property to do what best
benefits the agent (as far as he can perceive).
Here, freedom means that I am free if I am not forced to refrain from what I consider
good, if I am not tempted or forced to betray my deepest convictions (myself), if I am not
alienated. In this sense, freedom means an unthwarted orientation of the will on that
which is thought of as good. (Oomen 386)
This definition aligns freedom with commitment. Although this may seem paradoxical, consider
the following example: If I am concerned about my weight I will choose to eat a healthy meal
over one rich in calories. To say that freedom equals indeterminism would suggest that in order
to be free I would, in the exact circumstances, might just as well choose to eat the unhealthy
meal. This could easily happen; however, Oomen claims that in the second scenario I would not
be acting freely because choosing the unhealthy meal would be contradicting the rules I have set
up for myself ± in fact, I would be enslaved to the allure of the unhealthy meal.
But what is the good ? The good can be compared to the ³strange attractor´ mentioned by
Polkinghorne. The good has a top-down effect on the entire system inducing the will, as
information, to act as a valuation system for the entire body. ³You are attracted by it; you want
it. It forms your will. It is therefore an attraction that does not compete with your self, does not
alienate you from your self, but in fact constitutes you as a subject, as a self. (Oomen 386)´
MY CONCLUSION
I must say that I align with Oomen on the discussion of the human will. Before
embarking on this project I cannot say that I even had an opinion on whether or not free will
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exists. I have thought about it and have even read some materials in philosophy classes;
however, the entire question baffled me to the extent that I could not form a coherent answer for
myself. The question of free will has led me through the physical and neurological sciences in
search of a reconciliation with determinism. Quantum physics and the neurological studies of
Benjamin Libet all proposed different answers; however, it seems that they were never asking
the right question: Could free will be uni-directional as it inspires for a single goal? I only
arrived at my answer through the theological teachings of Aquinas.
As for indeterminism, I cannot imagine freedom existing as a random throw of the dice.
It appears some believe that this is the only option for it, although I must counter that the
definitions for freedom given by A.J. Ayer and Palmyre Oomen give more hope and meaning to
free will ± whether or not it is defined as the contrast to constraint or simply as self-
determination. Whether or not indeterminism even exists at the quantum level, I cannot say for I
am not in expert in that field. However, I have no qualms over siding with Einstein and Bohm
who believed that even the uncertainty of subatomic parts could be determined through the
knowledge of hidden variables.
I believe the most beneficial piece of knowledge I have gained from this process has been
in Oomen¶s definition of freedom as self-determination. I have heard this from others, but not in
the way he described it. In application to everyday life, it is easy to act unjustly and excessively
under the false auspices of µfreedom¶; however, this is not true freedom. My freedom is only
exercised when I am able to act justly for the ultimate good without being constrained by
everyday temptation.
Today¶s apathetic and lazy society, myself included, could greatly benefit from this
perception. Our government could greatly benefit from this perception! Living in vice without
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care for our fellow brethren is not living freely ± in fact, it constrains the very soul that emerges
out of the entire human system. As this system is an ultrasensitive system in itself, every human
agent is responsible for maintaining that his actions align with the values of humanity. This very
profound interpretation has helped me to better understand the magnitude and beauty of Christ¶s
message through Resurrection.
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Works Cited
Ayer, A.J. ³Freedom and Necessity.´ Free Will. Ed. Gary Watson. Oxford, NY: OxfordUniversity Press, 2003. 110-118.
Barbour, Ian G. ³Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and
Philosophical Reflections.´ Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion. 34. 3 (1999): 361-398.
Barbour, Ian G. When Science Meets Religion. New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
Conway, John and Simon Kochen. ³The Free Will Theorem.´ Foundations of Physics. 36.10
(2006):1441-1473.
Davies, Paul. 1992. The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World. New York:Simon & Schuster.
Davies, Paul. 1984. God and the New Physics. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Helrich, Carl S. ³On the Limitations and Promise of Quantum Theory for Comprehension of
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Libet, Benjamin. ³Neural Destiny.´ Sciences. 29.2 (1989): 32-36.
Libet, Benjamin, C.A. Gleason, E.W. Wright and D.K. Pearl. ³Time of conscious intention to act
in relation to onset of cerebral activities (readiness-potential); the unconscious initiationof a freely voluntary act.´ Brain. 106 (1983): 623±642.
Libet, Benjamin. ³Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary
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Libet, Benjamin. ³Do we have free will?´ Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6(1999): 47±57.
MacKay, D.M. 1974. The Clock Work Image. Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press.
Oomen, Palmyre M.F. ³On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An essay in bridging neuroscience
and faith.´ Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion. 38.2(2003): 377-392.
Polkinghorne, John. 1991. Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology.Philadelphia: Trinity Press International
Polkinghorne, John. 1994. Quarks, Chaos and Christianity. Allentown, PA: Triangle Press.
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Polkinghorne, John. 1998. Science and Theology: An Introduction. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
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Sansbury, Timothy. ³The False Promise of Quantum Mechanics.´ Zygon: Journal of Science and
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Zeeya, Merali. ³Free will ± you only think you have it.´ New Scientist. 190.2550 (2006)