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U n d e r s t a n d i n g the At t r ibu te s of God



Contr ibut ions to Ph iloso phical Theo logyEdited by Gijsbert van den Brink, Vincen t B rummer and Marcel Sarot

Advisory Board:

David Brown

Paul Helm

Eberhard Her rman n

Werner Jeanrond

D. Z. Phillips

Christoph Schwöbel

Sant iago Sia

Alan To r rance

Nicholas Wol ters tor f f

V o l . 1

PETER LANGFrankfur t am Main · Berlin · Bern · NewYork · Paris · Wien



G i j s b e r t v a n d e n B r i nk

Marce l Sa ro t(eds.)

U n d e r s t a n d i n gt h e Attributes o f G o d

P E T E R L A N GE u r o p ä i s c h e r Ve r la g d e r Wis s e n s ch a f t e n



D ie Deu t s c he B ib l i o thek - C I P - E i n h e i t s a u f n a h m e

Unders tand ing the a t t r ibu tes of God / Gijsber t van den B r i n k ;

Marce l Sarot (eds.). - F r a n k f u r t am M a i n ; B e r l i n ; B e r n ; NewYork ; Paris ; W ien : Lang , 1999

(C on t r i bu t i ons t o ph i lo s o ph ic a l t h eo log y ; V o l . 1 )

ISBN 3-631-34466-X

Revised t r ans la t ion of the Dutch work

„Hoe i s uw Naam ? Ops te l len overd e e igenschappen van God."

G. van den Br in k and M. Sarot (ed.)Pu b l i s hed b y Ui tgever i j Kok, 1995

© U i t g e v e r s m i j J . H. K ok B . V .

ISSN 1433-643X

ISBN 3-631-34466-X

US-ISBN 0-8204-4308-5

© Peter L a n g G m b H

Europä ischer Ver lag d e r Wissenschaf ten

F r an kf u r t a m M a i n 1999

A ll rights reserved.

A ll parts of t h i s pu b l i c a t i on a re protected b y copyr igh t . A n y

u t i l i s a t ion ou ts ide the s t r ic t l imits of the copyr igh t law, wi tho u tthe permiss ion of the pub l i she r , i s fo rb idde n a nd l i a b le toprosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions,

t r an s l a ti on s , m ic ro f i lm in g , an d storage and processing inelectronic retrieval systems.

Pr in ted i n G e r m a n y 1 2 3 4 67



Table of Content s

Table of C o n t e n t s 5

A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s 7

1 Con tempora ry Ph i lo soph ica l Theo logy 9

Gijsbert van den Brink & Marcel Samt

2 Bestowed Fe l lowship 33

The Love of God

Vincent Brummer

3 A l w a y s on Time 53

T h e I m m u t a b i l i t y o f G o d

Antonie Vos

4 As Thy New Horizons Beckon 75

God's Presence in the World

Luco J. van den Brom

5 The One and O n l y 99

The S imp l ic i ty o f GodGerrit Immink

6 A Moved Move r? 1 1 9

The ( Im)pas s ib i l i ty o f God

Marcel Sarot

1 Capable of A n y t h i n g ? 139

The O m n i p o t e n c e of God

Gijsbert van den Brink

8 'Y o u K n o w W h e n I Sit D o w n a n d W h e n I Rise Up' 161

The Omnisc ience of God

Eef Dekker

I n d e x of Names 179

Inde x of Sub jects 183



Acknowledgments

This book is the first v o l u m e in the se r ies 'Cont r ibut ions to Philosophical Theol-

ogy, ' brought out by the Publishing House Peter Lang GmbH in Frankfurt aM,

and edi ted b y Prof V i n c e n t B r u m m e r , Dr Gijsber t van den B r i n k and Dr Marcel

Sarot from the Faculty of Theology at the Universi ty of Utrecht . All volumesi nc l uded in the series wi l l b e devoted to the phi losophica l ana lys is of conceptua l

issues aris ing in views of life, re l ig ious th inking and theology. The editors of the

series are mu c h in d e b t e d to Mrs Ute W i n k e l k ö t t e r for her encouragement and he r

enthusiastic cooperation through all the stages of preparation.

This first v o l u m e in the series is a comple te ly revised an d updated t ransla t ionof a Dutch collection of essays, Hoe is U w Naam ? O pstellen over de eigenschap-

pen van God, p ub l i shed by Kok, Kampen in 1995. W e t h an k Mr Cees-Jan Visser

of Kok for ma king this English edi t ion possible . In principle, all the contributors

of the pre sen t v o l u m e are r e spons ib le for the Eng l i sh texts of their own articles.

O ne article was translated by Revd. Dr Peter Staples; this translation was

f inanced by the Facu l ty of Theology of Utrech t U niv e r s i ty . We a re gratefu l both

to Dr Staples and to Utrecht Universi ty, which has through the years in many

respects been a s t i m u l a t i n g e n v i r o n m e n t fo r phi losop hica l theo logy. Mr Gerri t

Brand, Prof Vincent Brümmer, Dr Eef Dekker and Dr Michael Scott have indi f fe ren t stages of the pro jec t comm ented on parts of the m anu scr ip t . The ir he lp

has proved invaluable . Mr Maarten W isse has rendered the sketches in the ma n u -

script of Dr Dekker ' s ar t ic le in to d ig i ta l ized p ic tures . The 'S t ich t ing Aan pakken '

was so kind to subsidize th e present publication with a subsidy of Dfl. 1.000. W e

are very gratefu l to t h e m.

Finally, we believe that in the end we owe everything to God. Soli Deo

gloria!Gijsbert van den Brink & Marcel Sarot

.



7. Capable of anything?

The Omnipotence of God

Gijsbert van den Brink

1 The Bible on God's Power

Wo rds like ' a lm ighty ' and 'the Alm ighty ' are no t very co m m on in the Bible . Unl ikethe nouns 'almightiness' and ' omn ipo t en c e , '1 however, they are not completely

absent ei ther . As far as the Ne w Tes t am en t is co ncerned m ost t ranslat ions co ntainexac t ly t en exam p les , o f which nine oc cur in the book o f Re velation, and o ne in 2Cor inthians (6:18). In all cases, w hat we are d e aling w ith is a rend ering of the G reekterm pantokrator, w hic h m eans so m ething l ike: ru ler over a l l . In mo st t ransla t ions(classic as wel l as c o n t e m p o r a r y )of the O ld Tes t am en t , we en co u n t e r th e t ermino l -o gy of o m n ip o t en c e m o re r eg u la r ly - in theKing James Version for instance no less

than f i f ty t im es, thirty of w hic h are in the boo k o f Job. Here one m ust o f course a lsoenquire in to the roo t wo rds that l ie be hind the translat ions. These turn out to be theHebrew words shaddai and sebaoth, p r eceded in m o s t cases by a d iv ine nam e o r

ep i thet . The p rec ise m e aning o f bo th words i s, howeve r , s ti ll a m at ter o f c ont roversya m o n g O ld Testament scho lars .Int e res t ingly , th is co rp us o f factual data about th e occur r ence o f o m n i p o t en c e

termino logy in the Bible has been subject to two di f ferent interpretations. Those

who subscr ibe to the m ost r ece nt interpretat ion2 beg in by s ta t ing that o m nipo tencet e rmino logy is str ikingly less p r o m i n e n t in the Bible than in m u c h o f everydayrel ig ious language. They p o i n t o ut that th e n o u n O m n i p o t en c e ' is even who l lyabsent from th e Bi b l e and that , where in the Old Testament ' the Almighty ' isspoken o f, it is not a t all ce r tain w he the r this translation do es just ice to the original

m eaning o f the re le vant Hebrew t i tl es . They grant that both shaddai and sebaoth areprobably t it l es ind icat ing p ow er , but add that 'power' is a m uch more genera l andless p r o n o u n ced c o n c ep t t h an the very spec i f ic '« //-mightiness. '

In this art ic le , the words 'a lmightiness ' and Omnipotence ' are used in terchangeably , a l thoughit is acknowledged tha t they have a slightly di f fe rent f lavour .E.g. H e n d r i k u s Berkho f , Christian Faith (Grand Rap ids 21986), 140-147; R. Feldm eier, 'N ich tÜ b e r ma c h t n o c h I m p o t en z , ' in : W .H. R itter e.a., D er Allmächtige: Annäherungen an ein umstrit-

tenes Goltesprädikat (Göttingen 1997), 13-42 (see especially the conclusion on 36f.).

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As far as the New Testament is concerned, it is pointed out that pantokrator as

well means something different from what w e norm ally understand by omnipotence

or a lmigh tiness. The Greek term does not indicate a Jack-of-all-trades, a kind of

master magician, but a royal sovereignty which is effectively extended over all

things. But how l iterally should this 'al l ' be understood? T he Co rinthians text, for

example, quite clearly has a strong O ld Testament f lavour. Here, th e appellation

pantokrator can in all l ike l ihood be traced back to sebooth, in which th e all-encom-

passing element of 'almighty' is, as men tioned before, n ot present. T he same applies

to man y of the nin e texts in Revelations, all of w hich appear in an eschatological-

liturgical context anyway: that is, they show how God is worshipped as the One who

will be alm ighty in the future, rather than that He is by definition almighty in Him-

self.

W e m igh t cal l this interpretat ion the minimising interpretation, since it tends

towards the conclusion that God is in fact not presented as almighty in the Bible at

all. Those who subscribe to this interpretation often refer, in support of their posi-

tion, to the many biblical narratives in which Godseems to give in to human beings,

and even lets their sins take their course un hind ered. A n d they insist that the l i fe of

Jesus of Nazareth shows ' that God is not an Imperial Caesar God of knock- down

power, but a creative servant God of i n v i n c i b l e love.'3

On the whole, they cannot

avoid th e imp ression that, acco rding to the Bible, G od's power is in fact limited in

various ways. N o doub t God has power, perhaps even superior power, but surely

He is not om nipo tent, i .e. not «//-powerful.

This conclusion can of course be reached only if the relevant data are

interpretatively connected in the outl ined specific way. The second interpretation,which perhaps might be labelled th e classical one, requires a less loaded reading of

th e Bibl ica l data on omnipotence , and comes across therefore as both less surprising

and less artificial.4

Those who subscribe to this interpretation point out, fo r

example, that th e Septuagint uses th e term pantokrator no less than 170 times fo r

th e Hebrew titles shaddai and sebaoth. This could of course indicate a tragic theo-

logical bias on the part of the Septuagint translators. But is it not more natural to

suppose that they were more familiar with the intricacies of Hebrew speech than we

are? And even if that is not granted, so that th e om nipotence terminology in the

Bible was only dragged in at a later stage, then still everything points to the fact that

3 David Jenkins, God, Miracles and the Church of England (London 1987), 29.

4 Cf. e.g. Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God (Edinburgh21977), 241-245 (the section on

omnipotence, entitled: 'Scripture teaches Go d's omnipotence everywhere'); C yril H . Powell, Th e

Biblical Concept of Power (London 1963), 41-45, 72f.; H. Langkammer, 'παντοκράτωρ,' in :

Horst Balz & Gerhard Schneider (ed.), Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament II I(Stuttgart 1983), 26f.

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th e Bible, at least implicitly, does at t ribute om nipo tence to G o d . God's unparalleleddeeds in creat ion and r e d e m p t i o n , th e miracles related in the Bible, no t least th eresurrect ion o f Christ, the way in w h i ch He is accla imed as king o f kings and Lord

o f lords (1 T i m . 6:15) - all of this suggest an unl im i ted d iv ine power .As f ar as the meaning of the bibl ical co ncep t o f o m n i p o t en c e is concerned, this

second in terp reta t ion usually does no t choose sides in the 'king o r magician 'd i lemma sketched ear l ier . T he biblical concept o f d iv ine om nipo t ence inc ludes no tonly God's actual r e ign over humani ty and the universe , but also H is unl imi t edcapaci ty fo r act ion . In suppo r t o f this last claim, which has occasionally beend o u b t ed , o ne cou ld po in t to the frequency with which phrases l ike 'al l things arepossible fo r God ' appear in virtually all layers of the biblical literature (see Gen.18:14, Jer. 32:17, Job 42:2, Matt. 19:26, Mark 14:36, Luke 1:37, Phil. 3:21 etc.).

Par t icular ly no tewor thy is a text l ike Phil ippians 3:21, in which bo th shades o fm ean i n g , th e capaci ty fo r ac t i on and the actual rule, are together applied to Christ

in their stro ng m utu al associat ion: '... by the po wer that enables him even to subjectal l things to himse l f . ' God , at any rate, is capable o f do ing more things than He infact does and has d o n e . T he c l aim m ad e fo r ex am p l e by Em il Brun ne r that God's

om nipo tence in the o r ig inal b ibl ical conte xt i s l im i ted to His re ign as ac tually exer-

cised, is therefo re mis t aken .5

All in all, w e c a n n o t escape th e co nclusio n that th is second in terp reta t ion, more

than the f irst, does justice to the to tal i ty of the bibl ical tes t im ony. A cco rd ing to theBible, G o d i s a l l - p o w er f u l in the sense that H e rules o ver eve rything, and that Hiscap acity fo r act ion k no ws no bo und s. It is im p o rtant to establish this, because it isof t en suggested that th e co n c ep t o f om nipo tence, a lo ng wi th o ther so -called ' o m n i -attr ibutes, ' stems from Greek soi l . However, it turns o ut that in the Greek phi lo -sophical t rad i tion om nipo tenc e is no t a par t o f d iv ine pe r fec t ion . Af ter a ll, ac tualdeeds, as wel l as the possession of the capaci ty fo r actio n, presupp ose si tuations o fde f i c i ency and need in which ac t i on is required. Ideally, however, such si tuationsdo no t oc cur . Thus th e highest pr inciple in the great G reek system s o f tho ught ( theidea o f the G oo d in Plato , the unm o ve d M ove r in Ar isto t le , the One in Plo t inus e tc .)is neve r po r trayed as ac t ive ly invo lve d in the w o r l d ; it is no t in need o f p e r f o r m i n g

actions!The em phas is on the ac t iv ity , and by ex tens ion the o m nipo t ence o f G od is , onth e other hand, character ist ic of the judaeo-christ ian tradit ion. And the classicalinterpretat ion of the biblical texts is at this point- 'God is a l l - power fu l ' - complete-

ly accurate. It comes as no surprise, then, that most theologians w ho deny God's

om nipo tence , do no t base that de nial on an app eal to Scr ip ture , but on an im pl ic i t

Emil Brunner , The Christian Doctrine of God (London 1949), 248, 250.

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or expl ici t denial that Scripture is the source and norm of our kno wledge of G od.

Having sa id this, however, we m ust also try to do ju stic e to the elements o f truth

that gave rise to the m i n i m i s i n g interpretation. For the m ini m isin g interpretation is

not s imp ly m isguided. O n the contrary, an engagem ent with the 'bibl ical ABC '

wh ich is not satisfied with rem ain ing at a super ficial level, leads in ev itab ly to some

qualif ications to the s imple 'God can do every thin g '-v iew, with which the classical

interpretation is often al l too easily equated. Am on g these qual i f icat ions, at least the

f o l l o w i n g f ive should be includ ed.

In th e f irst place, in the Bible the acknowledgement of God's omnipotence is

never a theoretical position adop ted as part of a proper metaphysics, but is always

embedded in the praxis of everyday l i fe. It functions, not so m uch as a factual ( let

alone an em pir ica l l y ver i f iable) truth cla im, but rather as an expression of trust

based on an interpretation of history with th e eyes of faith. Throughout, th e context

is one of prayer and promise, of hope against hope (e.g. Jer. 32: 17, 27), but also of

joy and confession.6 As the Psalmist expresses it :

T he LORD is K ing! Earth, be g lad!

Rejoice, you i s l ands of the seas!

(Ps.97:l,GNB)

One could also p oin t to the l itur gic al setting of the om nipo tence texts in Revel-

ations. That God is omnipotent is no t an abstract, l i fe less co nvic t ion, but an object

of faith, hope, and worship, grounded in the concrete, won drous discoveries that

were made dur ing th e history of salvat ion. Abraham came to recognize it whenSarah became pregnant , Job when G od revealed H is power in creation, th e disciples

when Jesus astonished them by his miracles.

This makes it clear, secondly, that in the Bible God's omnipotence is always

ind isso lub ly connected w ith th e deeds that G od performs in salvat ion history. God's

omnipotence is not s i m p l y the abi l i ty to do anyth ing as such, but is a power with

'content, ' wh ich consis ts in the abi l i ty to realise H is purp oses. This is pro totyp ically

exempl i f ied in the way the people of Israel came to k n o w Go d as the G od who led

them out of the Egyp t ian bondage. T he power of G od is a liberating power that sets

th e oppressed free.7 At the same t ime, in the history of Israel God's power alsoturns out to be of Ά judging nature . Th is became espec ially clear in the exile, which

th e people of Israel c ou ld not but interpret as G od's ju d g in g reaction to their dis-

6 Cf. Feldmeier. 'Nicht Übermacht , ' 36 .7 See e.g. Powell , Biblical Concept of Power, 6, 73; Daniel L. Migliore, The Power of God

(Philadelphia 1983), 48-59.

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obedience to the Torah. Furthermore, in recent years Old Testament scholars have

showed renewed interest in the creative power of God.8

God is not only the God

of a small band of slaves, He is the Creator of heaven and earth whose power is

evident in the immens i ty of nature and its regularities (cf. Jo b 38-41). T o

su m m a r i se : talk of the scope of God's power always occurs in the Bible in the

immediate context of the experience of God's deeds in creationand history.

It should be added, thirdly , that th e acts throughwhich G od realises H is power

do not occur in an unbroken series. Often, God's people f inds itself on the verge of

despair when God's active intervent ion fai ls to appear.9

Sometimes, there is even

th e impressionοία. complete failure of God's active i n v o l v e m e n t in the world. Here

th e cruci f ixion, as described in the gospels, is paradigmatic. 'H e saved others; he

cannot save himsel f , ' it is shouted at the cross (Matt. 27:42), and apparently this is

true. Go d is engaged in a struggle aga inst th e opposing forces of sin and death,and

on Calvary it becomes clear just how real that struggle is . Every form of docetism,

which suggests that God i s only partly engaged in this struggle and is in fact elev-

ated above it in omnipotent serenity, is misplaced here. That is also why the image

of the magician, w h i c h w e mentioned earlier, is inadequate after all. A magician

realises his intentions effort less ly . G od realises H is purposes with humanity and the

wor ld only along th e detour of a d y n a m i c and dram atic history, in which H e increas-

i n g l y gets more personally i n v o l v e d , to the point of going to the cross. An d there it

wou l d even seem as if God loses H is omnipotence altogether!

In this regard it is, fourthly, signif icant that in the Bible, precisely with refer-

ence to the cross of Christ, n ot only power, but also weakness is attributed to God

(1 Cor. 1:25). It is clear from th e context that this weakness by no means detracts

from th e power of God, but serves precisely to bring to l ight it s very specific char-

acter. T he cross does not show that God is incapable of real ising H is intentions (that

misunders tanding i s done away with at Easter!), but it does show that the way in

w h i c h H e does so can be q ui te contrary to all our human unders tandings of power.

A s a result, from o ur h u m a n perspective God's ways are often seen as ways o f

weakness an d foolishness. According to conventional human standards, Christ's

self-sacrifice on the cross w as such an act of weakness. B ut this weakness turns out

to be indicat ive of the very specific nature of the power of God: it is o n the cross,more than a n y w h e r e else, that G od realises H is deepest salvi f ic purposes with

humani ty . So a lso in such an unexpected, counter-intuit ive way Go d is powerful. In

th e Bible, therefore, omnipotence is something different than inf inite ly enlarged

human power. God's power is completely determined an d fi l led by His being.1"

8 See e.g. R . Albertz, Weltschöpfung und Menschenschöpfung, Stuttgart 1974.

9 See e.g. Psalm 77, and many others.

10 Cf. Roger White, 'Notes on Analogical Predication and Speaking about God,' in: Brian Hebble-

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—Fifthly, i t should co m e as no surprise a t this s tage o f our enquiry that the Bible

of ten speaks o f acts that G o d cannot pe r fo rm . Fo r instance, He cannot swear bysomeone higher than himself (Hebr. 6:13), He cannot lie (Hebr. 6:18), He cannot

deny Himse l f (2 T i m . 2:13) and He c a n n o t be t emp t ed by evil (Jas. 1:13). In allthese cases we are not d eal ing w ith acts that are in themselves logical ly impossible .O n the co ntrary, they are a l l ac ts pe rform ed dai ly by hum an be ings . However: G odcannot per fo rm them, fo r they are contrary to His being and character: no one i shigher than G o d Himsel f is, G od is per fec t ly good, com ple t e ly t rue to himse l f , no tdraw n towards evi l e tc . Acc ording to the Bible, therefore, God's omnipo t ence does

no t entai l His being 'capable of anyth ing ' - it is not w itho ut reason that this expres-

sion has nega t ive connota t ions in everyday language! - but it is l imi t ed and

in form ed by His uniqu e charac t e r.By qual i fying th e classical concept o f omnipo t ence a l ong these l ines, justice

can be do ne to the e l em ents o f truth in the 'm inim ising ' interpretat ion, witho ut thisl eading to a denia l of the biblic al basis for the doctrine o f omnipo t ence .

2 Omnipotence in the Theological Tradition

One of the most impor tant dec i s ions in the history of the church has been the ex-c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f Marc ion and the rejection of all f o r m s o f cosmic dual ism. Aftera ll , f rom that tim e o nwards it was clear that th e church did not wish to speak o f G o das jus t powerful , o r even very power ful , but as the one who , in the final analysis,possesses all power . Tha t does no t mean that other beings have no power , but itdoes mean tha t God i s the source of any power exercised by other beings. T hece ntrali ty of this co ncern in early Christian theo logy can be gleaned f rom the fac tthat om nipo tence i s the o nly d ivine a tt ribute exp l i c i tly ment ioned in the Apostles'

Creed.

It is also notable that th e Apost les ' Creed, with it s open ing fo rmula credo in

Deum patrem omnipotentem ('I believe in God the Father almighty ' ) , connec t sGod's om nipo t ence c l o se ly wi th H is fa therhood. That fa therhood concerns, f irst ofall, th e d ivine ly c rea ted wo r ld . G od is the Father o f Jesus Christ, He is also in a

special sense th e Father of the bel i ever , and certa inly bo th o f these senses are also

imp l i ed - but the c o m p i l e r s of the Creed d id think , f i rst o f all, o f creation as theobject o f God's fa therhood." A. de Hal leux has argued , in an essay in w h i c h he

thwaite & Stewart Sutherland (eels.), Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology (Cambridge

1982), 208-221; Paul Helm, Th e Providence of G od (Leicester 1993), 224-228.

11 J .N.D. Kel ly , Early Christian Creeds (London M 972), 134f.

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investigates the re lev ant patr is t ic texts , that in conf essing God's omnipotence theearly c hurch tho ught espec ial ly o f God's loving care for this very sam e creat ion.12

It is as Father that G o d created th e universe , it is as the Alm ighty tha t He still carries

and sustains it every day.Ho we ver this m ay be , i t is ce rtain that the term pantokrator primarily denoted

God's actua l reign over the unive rse, rather than His ability to realise all kind s o fstates of affairs. Pantokrator says som ething about w hat God ac tua lly does withregard to the w orld , not abo ut all the things whic h He m ight in theory be able to do .T he same goes for the Latin term omnipotens, which becam e th e standard renderingof pantokrator as soon as Latin took over f rom Greek as the dominant language.When G od was ca ll ed omnipotens i t was o riginally m eant to say that He rules overall things. Later a d i f f e r en t und ers tand ing of the t i tle omnipotens also came to thefo re , however , name ly as an abbreviation o f qui omnia potest, 'He who can do

everything. ' It was Augus t ine w ho consc ious ly s t imula ted this broadening o fm ean i n g . 'Who else is omnipotens than He who can do ev erything! ' he exc la im s a to ne po int .1 3 Thus , the d ivine om nipo tence becomes conce ived o f as the possessionof un lim ited capacit ies by G od , mo re or less irrespec tive of the way in which these

are exercised in God's acts o f creation and providence .This extens ion o f m e a n i n g is som et im es regre t ted in contemporary theology.

Peter Geach, fo r e xa m p l e , is of the op in ion tha t th e or igina l und ers tanding of theterm omnipotens is authe ntically Ch rist ian, and th at the attr ibutio n of om nipo tenceto G o d in this sense is a non-nego t iab le for the faith, also to day. Howeve r, th e later

'G od can do ev erything ' inte rpre ta t ion is, acco rding to him , an inauthent ic perver-sion o f the or igina l co nfess ion o f o m n i p o t e n c e , wh ich leads to ' intractable problemsand hopeless con fus i ons . '1 4 But as I have a l ready a t tempted to show, this laterinterpretation also has a solid biblical bac kgro und , so that i t need not be regardedas less auth en tic than the 'Go d rules over eve rything' interpretation . From an his-torical perspective Geach's thesis is therefo re highly ques t ionable . T o what extentGeach is jus t i f i ed in c la im ing tha t th e 'God can do everything ' account o f o m n i p -o tence leads to intrac table problem s from a systematic p o int of view , we shall co n-sider m ore c lose ly in the next sec t ion.

12 André d e Hal l eux , 'Dieu le Père tout-puissant , ' Revue Théologique de Louvain 8 (1977), 401-422.

13 Augus t ine , De Trinitate IV , 20.14 Peter Geach, Providence an d Evil (Cambridge 1977), 4f.; according to Geach, no graspable

sense has ever been given to the sentence 'God can do everything' '... that d id no t lead to self-con t rad i c t i on or a t leas t to conc lusions manifes t ly untenable from the Christian point of view'( ibid.) . Geach's cr i t ic ism is comparable to that of Emil Brunner mentioned above ( footnote 5) .

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In m ed ieval scholasticism we see a cont inua t ion of the early church ' s ref lect iono n the concep t o f o m nipotenc e . In par t icu lar , the d i s tinc t ion be tween potentia abso-

luta and potentia ordinata begins to p lay an im po rtan t ro le f rom th e early MiddleAges onwards .1 5 T he or ig inal intent ion o f this dist inct ion c an easily be graspedf rom the way in whic h Thom as Aqu inas u ses it .16 By i t Aquinas s im p ly m eans tosay that G o d do e s not do everything that He is capable o f doing . By potentia

absoluta he m e a n s God's po wer i rrespec t ive and apart ('ab-soluta') f rom God's

will,1 7 by potentia ordinata th e p o w e r of G od as He has dec ided to realise it in th eorder wi l led by H im . During the M idd le Ages th is order was discerned both innature with its regulari t ies and in the ch urch where grace w as distributed accordingto the sacram ental o rder .

The pa i r o f c once pts thus const i tu ted , for a long t im e, a success fu l a t tem pt a tavo i d ing both the Scylla o f de t e rmin i sm and the Charybdis o f arbitrariness. O n theo ne h a n d , the still very virulent de t e rm ini sm de r iv ing f rom Greek ph i losophy w asovercom e: af ter all , G od doe s not necessarily act, as Abe lard and o thers tho ught, inaccordance wi th the ex is t ing order . He does not co inc ide wi th tha t order, no r is Hispo we r exhausted by i t. Rather, G od also has 'absolute po we r, ' apart f rom and alsoover th e order decreed by H i m . O n the other hand, th e idea (which m ight be evokedby t hi s an t i -d e t e rm in i sm ) tha t G o d could in pract ice use His power compl e t e lyarbitrarily, was ef fec t ively coun t e red by the not ion of the potentia ordinata: inpract ice G o d real ises H is p o w e r , unl im i t ed as it m ay be, only in accordance with th eorder wil led and decreed by H i m . In this w ay God's p o w e r is not in tension w ith H isfa i thfulness and righteousness; w e canno t there fore expec t jus t anyth ing f rom G od,

but w e know where w e stand with H i m . G o d is certainly almighty, but not on thataccoun t 'capable o f any th ing ' !

Eventual ly , however , we again see a signif icant shift o f meaning occurr ing .Som e wo uld loc a l ise the first step s in this d irec tion as early as the second half of the13 lh c e n t u ry , in the work o f John D uns Scotus , o thers de ny that.18 In any case, itis unco nt rove rs ia l tha t th e shift is visible at the end of the 13 lh century, and becomes

15 See on i t s use in the ear l i es t per iod , Lawrence Moonan, The Medieval Power Distinction up to

its Adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, an d Aquinas (Oxford 1994). Alis ier McGrath, Christian

Theology: An Introduction (Oxford 1994), 224, wrongly suggests that th e dist inct ion was intro-duced on ly by Wi l l i am o f O c k h a m .

16 E.g. in his Summa Theologiae I, 25, 5.17 So the no t i on o f abso lu te p ower func t ions as a kind of 'd ialectical standby . . . to underline the

contingency of creation, . . . the fact that i t does not have ei ther to be what i t is or even to be ata l l ' ; Francis O akley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order: An Excursion in the History of Ideas

from Abelard to Leibniz. (Ithaca 1984), 50f.18 O n Sco tus ' use of the dis t inct ion , s e e my Almi%hty God: A Study of the Doctrine of Divine

Omnipotence (Kampen 1993) , 78-80, and cf. the fu r ther l i terature referred to there.

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m ore and m ore app ar en t du r ing the 14 'h and 15lh ce nturies. O nce again the tende ncyis to m o v e t o w ard s a broadening of the po ssibil i ties at tributed to G o d . Due to vari-o us factors, th e idea begins to emerge that G o d could in practice ac t outside th eorder decreed by Him f r om t ime to t ime . In such cases He does not act f rom Hiso rda ined power , de potentia ordinata, but de potentia absoluta, as if His absolutepower const i tu ted a separate reservoir o f pow er . When G o d acts f rom His potentia

absoluta, He is real ly capable o f any thing. Theo logians f rom Sco t is t and late-

nominalist circles in part icular ( the Thomists used to be more hesitant) translatedthis idea in to concrete exam ples . G abrie l Biel , Adam Wo od ham , Ro ber t Holcot andothers argue that in His abso lute power , G o d m i g h t fo r example t e l l a lie, refrainfrom fulfi l l ing a pro m ise m ade in Sc ripture, awaken an att itude of hatred towardsHim sel f in peop le , dest roy som eo ne who loves Him , and a l l o f that wi thout ac t ingunjustly ...19

It com es as no surpr ise that the 16 lh ce ntury Refo rm at ion, w i th i ts emp hasis onth e rel iabil i ty o f God's w o r d s and p romises and o n the steadfastness o f His coven-ant, radical ly p arted w ays with these m od e o f thinking. In m a n y places John C alvinexpresses his abhorrence o f w h a t he calls th e ' ch imera of the absolute power.'

20

Ap pare nt ly unaw are o f i t s o r ig inal m eaning, he co m plete ly re jec ts the d is tinct ionbetween God's abso lute and o rda ined power . Fo r h i m , G o d uses H is omnipo t encewho lly in the service of His goo dne ss and just ice . In fact , in Calvin we eve n find noseparate t rea tme n t o f d iv ine om nipo t ence as we find it in th e scholastics; obviously,he d id no t th ink th e subjec t could be de alt with prop erly in isolation fro m th e mightydeeds of G od in creat ion and salvat ion history.21

M ean w h i l e , th e Reformers ' p ro tes t did no t put a def in i te end to speculat ionsabout th e scope o f God's p o w er . A bold e f for t to think through co nsistently just ho wfar God's o m n i p o t en c e r e ach es, w as m ade, ra ther surp r isingly , by René Descartes.

In an intr iguing theory, the co nnec t ion o f w hich wi th the rest of his philosop hy isstill a mat t e r o f dispute, Descartes elaborated th e idea that also th e 'eternal truths'were c reated by G od and subject to His power . B y 'eternal truths' he m ean t th e lawso f logic , basic m athem at ical axiom s, fund am ental sc ient if i c in tui tions e t cetera. O fcourse G o d wanted these regulari t ies to r em ain unchanged , so that w e m a y rely o n

t h e m , but undo ub ted ly they fall within th e reach of the d iv ine om nipo tence . In termso f a standard example: i f G od wanted '2+2=5,' then that wou ld have been th e case.

We should no t exc lude th is p ossibi li ty just because i t t ranscend s the l im i ts o f

19 See in m o r e detail Van den Brink, Almighty God, 83-87.20 Cf. e.g. Institutes III 23, 2 (commentum absolutae potentiae).

21 Cf. Anna Case-Winters, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary Chal-

lenges (Lo uisville 1990), 39-62; Van den Brink, Almighty God. 88-91.

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conceivab i l i ty . In the final analysis, Descartes argues, our powers of conception are

limited, and God's power is unlimited.

Even if Descartes' conception was possibly inspired by a profound re l ig ious

motivation, it failed to find much approval in the theological tradition. Obviously

it was felt that a true tribute to God is not necessarily the same as heaping the

greatest po ssible 'metaphy sical com plim ents ' upon God. Nonetheless, Descartes has

taken the concept of omnipotence to its mo st extrem e l imit . After him we find no

further deve lopments in the theological reflection on the scope and nature of God's

omnipotence. What we do encounter, however, are con tinuous efforts at resolving

th e conceptual diff iculties s igna l led by the tradition. In §3 we shall consider th e

shape of these difficulties and the avai lable solut ion s. M uch more acute is the fact

that, in the later theolog ical reflec tion , and espec ially in our age, the doc trine o f

omnipotence as such came und er strong pressure. In §4 we shall con sider th e back-

ground to this development.

3 Conceptual Problems regarding Omnipotence '

As soon as we attempt to give a clear-cut d efinition of the concept of omnipotence,

we s tumble upon a n um ber of con ceptual problems. Let us begin with the obvious

definition that we hav e already enco untered above: om nipo tence is the abil ity to do

everything . Or, formulated more precisely :

Dl χ is omnipotent = χ has the ability to realise any and every state of affairs.

Here th e problem imm ediate ly arises of whether χ can also realise states of affairs

such as 'a square circle, ' or ' John is a married bachelor, ' or '2+2=5.' There are good

reasons for de n yi n g this. After a l l , an expression l ike 'm akin g a square circle' con-

stitutes a meaningless combination of words, since a circle is by definition round

rather than square; and, as C.S. Lew is has already noted, m eanin gless com binations

of words do not sudd enly acqu ire m eanin g by ha vin g the words 'God can' pref ixed

to them.22

A square circ le is no t a possible state of affairs, but a logical contradic-

t ion, and logical contradict ions are s i m p l y not realisable.In the theistic tradition, this inherent limitedn ess of theconcept of omnipotence

was already recogn ised at an early stage, and om nip oten ce was co nsequ ently

defined as the abi l i ty to realise all logically possible states of affairs (thus exp licit ly

in e.g. M a i m o n i d e s and Thomas Aq uinas) . However, this ' l imitat ion' of God's

22 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (London "1946), 16 .

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power c o n t i n u e d to meet resistance by believers of a more fideistic inclination.

Could the l aws of logic real ly set l imits to the power of God? Should we, with our

t iny human understanding, dare to claim that G od could not do something just

because it is contrary to our logic? Interestingly, this intuition has again received

philosophical-rel igious art iculat ion and elaboration in recent years. Some evenspeak of a 'neo-cartesian school' in which it is denied that there could be true prop-

osit ions which are true apart from God's will.23

Even propositions l ike '2+2=4'

wou ld then be true, and according to some neo-cartesians also necessarily true, only

because God wanted them to be so.

Other, m ore W ittgen steinian phi losophers of religion argue, however, that

propositions l ike '2+2=4,' '2+2=5' etc. are no t at all true or false in the sense that

they do,ordo not, constitute representations of external reality. Wh at we are dealing

with here, according to them, are rules that indicate how we employ our thought

forms an d concepts in a meaningfu l w a y . T he laws of logic are prescriptive ratherthan descriptive speech acts. For example, '2+2=4' prescribes: 'in the language

game ca l led m athem at ics , a lway s use the s y m b o l "4" as a subst i tute for the sum o f

two s y m b o l s "2."' And of prescriptive speech acts (such as 'Close the door!'), we

s imply cannot say that they are true or false. Neo-cartesian thin ke rs retort by point-

ing out that the l anguage game cal led mathematics is surely somehow connected

with concrete, describable reality, as is sho wn by the fact that through the applica-

tion of mathematical laws reliable bridges, trains, and a thousand things more can

be made! Consequent ly , th e quest ion arises with regard to those laws (as with regard

to all reality), whether they could have been different. If so, they presumably canbe seen as subject to the power of an om nipotent being.

Thus we see how even the simplest definition of om nipotence a lready raises

conceptual difficulties, for which, to this very day, no unanimous solutions are

available. L et us, for con ven ience's sake, assum e for now that th e neo-cartesians are

in the wrong, and that an a lm igh ty being by no means has the power to realise any

state of affairs that is logically impossible. In that case Dl is an inadequate defini-

tion of omnipotence, and we shall have to replace it with D2:

D2 χ is almighty = χ has the ability to realise every logically possible state ofaffairs.

But is D2 really adequate? A very old and well-known objection to the correctness

of D2 is the so-called 'paradox of the stone ' : can an om nipotent be ing make a stone

which is so heavy that afterwards i t cannot l ift it any m ore? In itself the existence of

23 E.g. Charles Taliaferro, 'The L i m i t s of Power,' Philosophy and Theology 5 (1990), 115-124.

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a stone which is so heavy that i ts make r canno t lift it, is a log ically p ossible state ofaffairs. But if an om nipo t en t be ing m us t the re fo r e be capable o f realising this stateo f affairs, then doubts arise about i ts o mn i p o t e n c e ! After a l l , there m ight then be as tone which it canno t lift . Surely that would det ract f rom its omnipo tence .Co nversely, i t i s c lear that a being which cann ot produc e such a stone, cannot c la imth e t i t l e Omnipo tent ' e i ther .

O ne should be ca re ful o f the re jo inder tha t we a re dea l ing here with a trivialquest ion, w hich o nly serves to show ho w easily phi losop hical theolo gians le t t hem-selves be tempted by absurd subtleties. There is , after all , an important theologicalvariant of the s tone p arado x: c an an alm ighty G od create peo ple , not as pup pe ts, butas free and autono m ou sly ac t ing persons? It is clear that, if Go d could not do that,He would no t , on the basis of D2, be o m n i p o t e n t , for the existence o f free andautonomous persons is logical ly possible . But at the same t ime i t may be askedwhether G od co uld s ti l l be cal led o m nip o te nt if He could do tha t . Could He then s ti llkeep th e course o f world hi s to ry under His control? That is a quest ion which, o ntheo logica l groun ds , m ay have to be answered di fferent ly f rom the s tone paradox.But th e conceptual structure o f bo th p rob l em s is, at least at first sight, identical . T herenewed interest in the s tone parado x d uring the last few de c a de s24 i s therefore notdevoid of a l l re levance.

Insofar as the s tone parad ox is not regarded as proof of the internal ly inco nsist-ent character of the conc ep t of o m nipo tenc e ( i.e . of ascribing al l abil it ies to one andthe sam e subject) , the solut io ns that have rece nt ly been offe red basical ly ado pt oneo f two strategies. First of all , som e autho rs claim that i t is sim p ly logically im po ss-

ible for an a lm igh ty be ing to m a k e a s tone which it canno t lift, o r, more generally,an object which i t cannot control . Now, precisely because these kinds of acts arelogical ly im po ssible , the abili ty t o pe r fo rm them does no t be long to the requi rem entsthat m us t be sa ti s f ied , acco rd ing to D2, by an om nipo t en t be ing . T he fact that anomnipo tent be ing cannot p roduce the s tone under cons idera t ion detracts as littlefrom it s o m n i p o t e n c e , as does th e fact that it cannot p roduce a square circle!

25

Seco ndly, som e authors c la im that there is no reason why an om nipo tent beingcould no t m ake the s tone un d er co ns ide ra tion . The only im pl i ca tion o f having th iscapacity is that, as soon as it is exercised, th e m a k e r of the stone thereby sacrifices

i ts om nipo tence . As long as an a lm ighty be ing can m ake the s tone, withou t actual lydo ing it, howeve r , its o m n i p o t e n c e r e m a i ns u n d i m i n i s h e d . O nly when the produc-tion of the s tone is actual ly p e r f o r m e d , does the maker d ep rive i tself o f i ts o m n i p -

24 For some im po r t an t co n t r ibu t i ons , see the anthology o f Linwood Urban & Douglas N. Walton(eds.), The Power of God: Readings on Omnipotence and Evil (Ne w Yo rk 1978), 131-168.

25 Thus e.g. George I. Mavrodes , 'Some Puzzles Conce rning Omnipo t ence , ' i n : Urban & Walton(eds.), Power of God. 131-134.

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o tence. And why should the ability of de pr iv ing i tse l f o f it s om nipo tence no t also

be am ong the ac ts that can be per fo rm ed by an o m nip o tent being?26

These two standard solutions to the stone paradox are not mutually exclusive.

Whic h o f the two i s app l icab l e d ep ends o n what sort of omnipo tence one has inm ind . I f one v i e ws om nipo t ence as an essential attribute of a being whic h necessar-

ily exists (e.g. of God in the classical theistic view), then only the first solutionof fe rs a way out. Afte r al l, it is then lo gical ly im po ssible fo r this being to sacrificei ts om nipo tence . In terms o f c lassical theism : wi thou t om nipo tenc e G od wo uld nolonger be G o d . His essence wou ld be des t r oyed , and that is impossible since G o dis imper ishable and exists ne ce ssari ly (a s G od) . How ever , i f one views omnipo tenceas an accidental attribute , that is to say as an attribute which o ne could lose withoutthereby also losing one's essential identi ty, then th e second solution applies. T heo m n i p o t e n t being co nt inues to exis t a f ter having m ade the s tone, but i s no longer

o m n i p o t e n t . Afte r a l l, throu gh the m aking o f the s tone a logical ly possible state o faffairs comes in to exis tence , w hich the a lm ighty being c annot realise, namely thelifting of the s tone u nd er co nside rat ion . Co ncep tual p roblem s l ike the paradox o f thestone ar ise, therefore, when w e d o n o t d ist inguish clearly to what sort of being w eare in fac t a t t r ibut ing o m nipo tenc e. Is it a being w hich is regarded as possessing

o m n i p o t e n c e as par t of its essence, or as an accidental at tr ibute? That makes ad i f f e r ence .

Simi lar ly , i t m akes a d i f f e renc e to the nature o f i ts om nipo tence whic h furtheressential at tr ibutes an o m nip o te nt be ing has. In the theist ic tradit io n, am ong other

proper t ies impeccability has been ascribed to God as an essential attribute. Thisascript ion expresses th e conv i c t i on tha t God , in view of His perfect goodness,canno t po ssibly s in . No w o ne co uld say: a Go d who c anno t s in , canno t do every-th ing which can logical ly be d one , and i s therefo re no t o m nipo tent on the basis o fD2. But if that is the case, then o nly a be ing which possesses no fur ther essentialat tributes c an truly be cal led o m nip o tent . T his po si tion , how ever , has huge conse-

quences . For if o m n i p o t e n c e is God's only essential attribute, then it is His veryessence: G o d is o m n i p o t e n c e . And as su ch , He is indeed necessari ly capable o fanyth ing!

I f we wish to avo id th is co nc lus ion , we have to adap t D 2. Usually that is doneby s t ip ulat ing that an a lm ighty be ing has to be cap able o f p er fo rm ing every logicallypossible act ion insofar as i t is in accordance with i ts nature. Thus, whenim pe ccab i li ty be longs to God's nature , it is logical ly impossible f o r Go d t o sin, butthis fact does no t detract f rom H is o m n i p o t en c e .

In this way D2 is usua lly rep laced by

26 Thus e .g . Richa rd Swinburne , The Coherence of Theism (Oxford 1977), 152-158.

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D3 χ is omn ipoten t = χ has the abil ity to realise every state of affairs which it is

log ica l ly possible for χ to realise.

Is this, in the end, what we mean by omnipotence? That is highly debatable. T he

current disc ussio ns on the definition of the concept of o mn ipotence are haunted by

a f ictit ious figure, who drives philosophers of religion to near desperation, because

he i l lustrates convincingly th e problematic nature of D3. H e is called 'M r McEar,'

because he has as an essential attribute that H e is inc apab le of do ing an ythin g but

scratching behind his ear (including all other actions implied by that). On the basis

of D 3, Mr McEar, even thoug h he can do almo st nothin g, would have to be regarded

as om nip ote nt! Afte r all, for McEar it is log ically im po ssible to realise any state of

affairs other than 'McEar scratches behind his ear.' Precisely because anything else

is logically impossible fo r h i m , it does not detract from his omnipotence. In other

words: on the assumpt ion of D3 even th e most powerless being can be called om -

nipotent!

One c ould of course attempt, at this po int, to t inker wit h D3. For example, one

could add the con dit ion that an a l m i g h t y b e i n g m u s t possess th e m a x i m u m n u m b e r

of abil it ies that are reconcilable with the remaining conditions.27

Then Mr McEar

is clearly disqualified. B ut then one m ust take great conc eptual pains to prevent G od

from being 'disq ualifie d' ! That can on ly be achieved b y de ny ing any other essential

attribute to Him, or by co nd em nin g the definition of omnipotence to the proverbial

death of a thousand qual i f icat ions . The latter is exactly what happens in much

philosophical-religious l iterature.

Jerome Gel lman has shown that th e root of the difficulties is to be found in thefact that the quest has been for a purely formal definition, and does not take into

account the concrete abil it ies w e w o u l d w a n t to attribute to an almighty God for

theological reasons. The abi l i ty to scratch behind one's ear, for example, is not

relevant here, but the abi l i ty to be perfectly sinless probably is . G ellman claims that

th e concept of omnipotence is not adequately definable apart from this theological

context.21

* Indeed, one can infer the failu re of the search for a context-free an alysis

of the concept of omnipotence from the great num ber of increasingly com plex

definit ions, all of which are found want ing .2 9

An d even if on e of these ' literal'

def ini t ions m i g h t turn out to be c o n v i n c i n g after al l , it w o n ' t do justice to what ismeant by God's almightiness in theology and the language of faith.

27 T h us , in an inf luentia l article, Thom as P. Flint & Alfred J. Freddoso, 'Maximal Power,' in : A.J.

Freddoso (ed.), The Existence and Nature of God (No tre Dam e 1983), 81-113.

28 Jerome L. Gellman, 'The L i m i t s of M a xim a l Power,' Philosophical Studies 55 (1989), 329-336.

29 Cf. Van den Brink, Almighty God, 140f.

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It is for this reason that we conclude this section with a definition that attempts

to take into acco unt the theological context in which the concept of om nipo tencefunctions:

D4 God is

omnipoten t= God has the

abilityto realise all states of

affairs thatare

logically po ssible for Him to real ise, given His pe rfect being.

Co nce p tual ly, this de f ini t ion is st ric t ly co nsistent. But i t is a very d i f ferent sort o fde f ini tion than Dl to 3 !Dl to 3 prov ide 'open' def in i t ions in the sense that, with the

help o f them , var ious po ss ib le c andida tes fo r th e t it le O m nipo t en t' can be tested asto the accuracy o f their c laim . D 4, however, simply takes as its poin t o f departureGod's om nipo tenc e as a theo logical datum , and l im its i tsel f to the expl icat ion of i tsmean ing .

What is not s t ipu la ted in D4 is what exact ly God's perfect being consists in .Several routes could be f o l l owed to sort this out. First o f all, o ne could a t t empt todeterm ine th is by fo l lo wing the rou te o f Anselm ian per f ec t be ing theology . LikeAnse lm , s tar ting f rom a preco nceived idea o f what per f ec t ion am ounts to o ne m ayspecify which great making properties constitute God's perfect being.

30Then,

however , th e ques t i on o f a theolo gical cri terion arises una vo id ably. For how are weto decide between m utual ly co nf l ict ing intui t io ns about what does, and does not,cont r ibute t o per f e c t ion? Mo reover , conc ep tual prob lem s abo ut the co m pat ib il ity o fessential attributes like those considered above return with a vengeance. Secondly,

therefore, w e m i g h t p r e f e r to f o l l ow the al ternat ive appro ach o f revelation theology,which starts no t f rom any preconceived notion o f perfect ion, but f rom the way inwhich Go d h a s concre te ly revea led Himsel f in history as attested in the Bible.31

Perhaps, however, th e approaches o f biblical and philosophical theology are notmutua l l y exclusive, but can fruitfully complement each o ther in the ques t for adoctrine o f G o d which is on the o ne hand close to the believers' faith, and on theother hand ne i ther op aque no r inconsis t en t but conceptual ly coheren t .

4 Is the Doctrine of Omnipotence Still Credible Today?

T he c o n c e p t o f a un i co rn is co nce ptual ly en t i re ly in order; o ne cou ld undoub t ed lygive a pe rfect ly ade quate de f in i t i on of i t. Ho weve r, f rom that we can obviously not

30 See A n s e l m ' s Proslttgion, and cf . e.g. Thom as V . Morris ,Anselmian Explorations (Notre Dam e1987).

31 See e.g. K.H. Miskot te ' s critique o f a philosophical doc t r ine of G od in his Bijbels AB C (Amster-dam 21966), and cf . my Almighty God, 176-184.

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conclude that unicorns actual ly exist . Similarly, from th e fact that th e c o n c e p t o fomnipo tence can be cons i s t ent ly desc r ibed , one cannot infer that there exists anom nipo t en t be ing , o r that G o d is om nipo t en t . Here we a re no t conce rned wi th show-

ing that the la tter is p lausible , s ince this largely depe nds up o n the plausibi l ity of theencompass ing t heo l og i ca l f r amework in which ta lk of an o m n i p o t e n t G o d i se m b e d d e d . It is conceivable , however, that there are certain considerations relatedto the do c t r ine o f om nipo tence as such, which m ake i t ext rem ely implausible .

In fact , such considerat ions seem to be q u it e d o m i n an t in the current cu l turalc l imate . Fo r instance, in l ine with Freud, m any peop le s ti ll regard it as sel f-evidentthat th e idea o f omnipo tence o r ig ina ted as a pro j ec t ion o f our h u m a n desires ontoa suppo sed de i ty , which took o ver th e role of the fa ther im age f rom o ur early child-hood . A gains t th i s i t m ay be po inted out tha t we d o no t norm al lydesire a G o d w h o ,as the almighty, is also responsible for the evil that befalls us. To other thinkers,

especial ly feminists , the idea of omnipotence appears implausible because, i t i sc la im ed, i t reflec ts a m agnif ied version of a typ ical ly m ale p reoccup ation withpower . Here one cou l d pose the quest ion whether such an intr insic connect ionbe tween power and mascu l in i ty is in fac t demons t rable , and also whether th eexclusivity and u n i q u e n e s s of the p red i ca t i on o f o m n i p o t e n c e to G od in the theo-logical t radi t io n has been suff ic iently taken into account . I f G od alone is a lmighty,then no m an has the r ight to behave as if he were a lm ighty; and if Go d is a lmighty,no t in the m a n n e r of an oppressive tyrant , but in the m a n n e r of the Redeemer whol iberates His peo ple f rom oppression and vio l ence , then the doc t rine o f om nipo tencecann ot serve as l egi t imisa t ion for any form o f power abuse.

Rather than exp loring these o bject ions any fur ther here, we shal l concentrateo n two o thers tha t have become m ore d eep ly em bedded in our cul tura l c l im ate since

th e Enl igh t e nme n t , and that are there fore exper i enced much more wide ly as con-siderat ions that de t ract from th e plausibi l i ty o f d iv ine om nipo t ence . I am referringto the objection that belief in an o m n i p o t e n t G o d makes it imposs ible to attributet rue resp on s ibi li ty , f reedom and a u t o n o m y to hum an be ings , and the object ion thatbe li e f in a G od who i s bo th o m nip o tent and per fe c t ly good i s falsif ied by the sheer

weight of the p a i n and suffer ing in the world . O f course, both these issues aream ong the perennia l p roblem s assoc iat ed wi th the idea o f an om nipo tent God, and

have been topics o f discussion throughout th e ages.32 Yet, in our t ime they haveacquired an unpreced ented in t ens i ty . Ever s ince th e Enl igh t enment , people haveunambiguous ly unders too d them se lves as free and autono m ous over against any andevery author i ty ; and since the two world w ars in the 20 th century, th e problem o f evil

32 Cf. on the problem o f suffering in relation to God's power e .g . the book o f Job.

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has b een i m p r i n t ed m o r e d e ep l y on the European soul in particular, than ever

befo r e .As f a r as the re l a t i on be tween o m nipo t ence and f r eedom i s concerned , the m os t

e laborated a t tem pt a t t h ink ing t h rough the m odern concep t o f f reedom wi th regard

to its repercussions for the doc t r ine o f o m n i p o t e n c e , has been made wi thin process

t heo logy . Process theo logians c la im that, as soon as one attributes a relevant kindo f f r eedom to human be ings , one canno t s imul taneous ly de f end the t r ad i t i ona ldoct r ine o f om nipo t ence anymo re . Acco rd ing to proce ss thinkers like Charles Harts-

home and David Gri f f in , th e classical do ct r ine o f om nipo tence im pl ies that G o d hasall p o w er , and that o ther beings are therefore power/eii.

33 However, when cer tainbeings do in fac t possess a ce r ta in degree o f freedom - and process thinkers arguethat th is app l ies not o n l y to p eo p l e , but to all ex ist ing enti ties - then that entails thatthey are not entirely powerless. Rather they also possess p o w er , a nd G o d canno t

therefo re possess all p o w er : He is not a lmigh ty .It is co ntestable , how ever , whether in this w ay just ice is d o n e to the t radi t ionaldo c t r ine o f o m nipo t ence o r to the conc ep tua l r e la ti on be tween o m nipo t ence andf r eedom . Nel son P ike has p o i n t ed o ut that w ha t l ies b eh ind th e omnipo tence-cr i t i -cism o f process t heo log ians is a substant ia li s t co ncep t o f powe r .34 It is suggestedtha t po wer is like a sort o f substance: if one has it, someone e l se canno t also haveit at the sam e t im e . Ther e can be o n l y o ne o w n e r o f a par t i cu la r am ount o f p o w erat a t im e , jus t as substan tial o bjects usually have only o ne o w n e r at a t ime. Thus, ifI fo r exam ple have a l l co ins o f a cer ta in type, you have none . Howe ver , th is v iew

of the nature o f po wer i s ne i ther typ ical o f the theo logical t rad i tion , nor c onc ep tuallys o u n d . Fo r ob viously , several b eings c an sim ul taneo usly have p ow er wi th regard toone and the same ac t i on . The fact that m y cat is cap able o f m o ving the ball in thegarden twe n ty inches , do es no t ex c l u d e m e f rom possessing th e same power . It isonly once I have started to exercise that power, that m y c a t will no longer becapable o f br inging abou t th e sam e r em o v a l. T he dis t inct io n between th e possession

and the use or exerc ise o f p o w e r is therefo re o f crucia l impor tance in this regard.T he sam e app l ies to the classical doctr ine o f o m n i p o t e n c e . T he fact that , in this

doc t r ine , all p o w e r is at t r ibuted to G o d , d o es no t im p ly that G o d exerts this power

at every m o m ent . Nei ther does i t im p ly, therefo re , that o ther beings, l ike hum ans,have no p o w er . As l ong a s G od d o e s not use His p o w e r to realise a part icular state

o f affairs, it is qui te p ossible fo r f r ee creatures to use their p o w e r to realise that state

o f affairs. In p r inc ip le they can even d o th is f r ee ly , i.e . w i thout being som ehow

33 Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence an d Other Theological Mistakes (Albany 1984), 10-26; DavidR. Grif f in , God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Lanham 21991), 268-270.

34 Nelson Pike, 'Process T h e o d i c y and the Concep t o f Power,' Process Studies 12 (1982), 154.

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forced into doing it. By the same token they m ay if they wish also use their powe rto realise the opposite state o f affairs . O nly when G o d intervenes directly in orderto realise or prevent such a state o f affairs - but then w e would rightly speak o f amiracle! - are other beings dep rived of this po ssibility.

Thus from a co ncep tual p oin t of view, hum an freedom consists in thespaceG od provides for hum anity, not by sacrif ic ing or l imi t ing His ow n power, but by not

continually actualising it . That G od can do everything,does no t mean that G o d alsodoes do everything. He can also gran t to hum an beings their o wn possibilities fo raction. That does no t in the least detract from His omnipotence o r providence, fo rGo d can intervene at every desirable moment, an d will in any case do so eschatol-o gically. So it turns o ut that th e doctrine o f omnipo tence is entirely compatible withhuman f r e edom. It is not only compatbile with ' freedom' in the weak sense o f'voluntariness ' (which leaves ope n th e possibility o f de te rminism; I can voluntarilydo that which I co uld no t have left und on e because o f m y determinedness), but alsowith freedo m in the strong sense of choice and altern ativity. In m od ern tho ught, thislatter typ e o f freedom is considered to be the o nly relevant one.

Just as incisive is , lastly, th e second diff iculty which in our t im e mo re than beforeis experienced with regard to G o d ' s omnipotence , namely the problem o f evil andsuffering. This problem has many facets, among them of course very existentialones, but here we shall concentrate on the philosophical-theological aspect. To b esure, it is gen erally ackno wled ged that Alvin Plantin ga and others have succeededin show ing, by elabo rating the so-called ' free will defense, ' that G o d ' s omnipotence

and perfect goodness are logically compatible with evil and suffering in theworld.35 But tha t still says ve ry little about the plausibility o f belief in G o d ' s omnip -otence and goo dness in the face of evil. Atheistic and agnostic thinke rs po int to thegreat am ount o f apparent ly qui te m eaningless suffering that occurs in the world.36

They argue that it is esp ec ially this kin d o f suffer ing which renders th e existence o fa good and almighty G o d extremely unl ikely! Som e theists respond that we humanbeings are, ep istem olo gically, sim p ly not in a po sition to draw such a conclusion,37

but that appears to be a cop -out. Therefore, m any theologians opt for d ropp ing o neof the two c l a im s at issue, m ostly th e claim that God i s omnipo ten t .

35 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids 1974), 7-64.36 E.g. William L. Rowe, 'The Problem o f Evil and Some Varieties of Athe ism, ' in : M.M. A d a m s

& R . M . A d a m s (eds.), The Problem of Evil (Oxford 1990), 126-137.37 E.g. Stephen Wykstra, 'The H u m e a n Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering, ' in :

A d a m s & A d a m s (eds.), Problem of Evil, 138-160. Cf. for the discussion as a whole DanielHoward -Snyde r (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil (B l oomi ngt on 1996).

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Yet we may w o n d e r w h e th e r th e existence o f apparently pointless suffer ingrenders th e existence o f an om nipo t en t , who l ly good G o d imp lausible indee d . Fo rlet us im ag ine that every ins tance o f suffer ing in the world wo uld have a po in t inthat it leads, perhaps of ten in a way we do no t comprehend, to some important

higher goal unattainable wi thou t it . Su p p o se w e wo uld kno w every suf fe r ing to bem e a n i n g f u l and j us t i f i ed in th is way, because o therwise G od, in His o m n i p o t en c eand love, w o uld have preve nted i t . In that case i t wo uld no t be clear why we shouldm ak e any e f for t to p r ev en t suffer ing. After a l l, som e im po r tant h igher good wi l l beserved by it, which is unattainable without that suffering. Every plea fo r morally

respo nsible act ion w o uld then be m eaningless, since al l the evil that we instigate ormainta in would ( in some incomprehensible way) eventual ly be benef ic ia l to thevic tim s. We w o uld no t be capable o f r eally harm ing s o m e o ne .38 But then we wo uldno t be respo nsible peo p le anym ore. Presum ably, we wo uld no t even be persons inany relevant sense of the word.

Thus, i f we are to be free and m o ral ly responsible persons, then it m u s t bepo ssible f or th ings to go truly wro ng through our ac t ions and om issions. O r to p utthis in theo logic al term s: the n we m ust have bee n created with the possibil ity o fsinning, that is to co m m it absurd, po intless evil . Precisely by allowing th e possibil-

ity o f real evil (which isn't good fo r anything) in creation, G o d makes o f our humanexistence a ser ious and v aluable thing, since this p o ssibili ty is a prerequisi te fo rm o r a l l i fe . From this pe rspect ive, the existence of unjust i f iable and po intless evil inth e wo rld co nst i tu tes no argum ent against th e ex i s t ence of an o m n i p o t en t , perfect lygood God .

Many other questions will have to be lef t untouched within th e scope o f this

chapter , such as why there are such large am o unts and such intense fo rm s o f appar-

ent ly m ean i n g l e s s suf fering, and why apar t f rom m oral evi l there is so m uch na tu ra levi l in the form of diseases, ea r thquake s et cetera.39 O ne m ore ques ti on , however ,we canno t escape, and that is w h e t h e r the end o f a ful ly per sonal hum an life just i f iesth e means of the possibility o f evil and suffer ing. What if someone were to say: inthat case it is bet ter to have no free and m o ral ly responsible p eop le at all! T he idealo f hum an ex i s tence in f r e ed o m and responsibil i ty, in love and care, is not worth th ehigh cost of so m u c h suf f e r ing . Ce rtainly that is an intel l igible react ion in m an y

38 See W ill iam Hasker, 'The Nec ess ity o f G r a t u i t o u s Evil , ' Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), 23-44;

'... o n e ma y undergo phys i ca l and m ental suf fe r ing, to r ture, degradat ion, and death, but all ofthis wil l be m o r e than compensa t ed for by the benef i ts .. . which wi l l come to one as a result o fthat s u f f e r ing ' (27f.).

39 Cf. on the first question Hasker, 'Necessity,' 33-37, and on the second e.g. my 'Natural Evil and

Eschato logy, ' in : Gijsber t van den Brink, Lu c o J. van de n Brom & Marcel Sarot (eds.), Christian

Faith and Philosophical Theology (Kampen 1992) , 39-55.

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situations. But whether it is an adequate reaction cannot be decided by m e a ns o frationally conclusive arguments.40 We are dealing with matters here, which,because of our l im ited und erstand ing, we cannot fully grasp. And co nsequently weeither turn away from Go d in outrage, or we entrust ourselves to Him in faith. W eprotest, with Iwan Karamazow in Dostoyevski ' s novel, against a God who allowssuch a sea of ago ny, or we ho ld, with Paul, that the sufferings of this present timecanno t be co m pared with the glory that is go ing to be revealed to us (Rom . 8:18).

In th e latter case, we can no t easily d o without th e belief in G o d ' s omnipotence .For if one thing is clear, it is that evil will not , by itself, turn to good. In this connec -tion, Christians should elaborate the d oc tr ine of G o d ' s alm ightine ss in a trinitarianway. Fo r them, the cross o f Christ is the m ost pro fo und reve la tion o f d iv ine omnip -otence: even this absurd and horrendous evi l is evident ly not too m u c h for Him todeal w ith. He transfo rm s the cross, as the ultim ate m anife station of hum an sin, intothe source of rec onc il iation. That offers hope for the future: eschatologically, God

will be victorious over sin and suffering. And in the school o f faith, the Spirit o fG o d teaches us to see all things, inc lud ing our own suffering, with th e 'eye o f faith'in this pe rspec tive. Then life acquires m ea nin g also in suffering in that, and insofaras, it is m a de to serve th e c o m i n g o f G o d ' s K ingdo m .

In s um , the c la im tha t Go d is almighty is , given th e a m o u n t and the intensity o fevil in the wo rld, ce rtainly no t se l f -evident , but a matter o f faith which in the finalanalysis canno t be rationally dem onstrated. C onsidered from the f ramework o f faith,however, th e doc tr ine o f o m n ip o t e nc e is still credible, especially when it iselaborated in a t r ini tarian-theological way. When confro nted with th e problem o f

evil, the trinitarian view of G o d ' s power is more adequate than a purelyphilosop hical notion of om nipotence , since the form er not only off ers a theoreticalexp lanation but also pro vides us with insights as to how we m ight com e to term swith th e evi l we encounte r in everyday life. T he ord inary philosophical argum ents,on the other hand, of fe r only 'cold and abstract co m fort . '41 They show us neitherhow God in Chris t took human evi l upon Himsel f and reconciled it, nor how,through His Spirit, He teaches us to live out o f that rec on ciliation and leads us onthe way tow ards His Kingd om .

40 'This is a question o f ul t imates invo lving a choice be tween tw o irreconcilably dif ferent ultimate

mora l universes ' ; Vincent Brummer , Speaking of a Personal G od (Cambridge 1992), 146.41 Marilyn McCord Adams, 'The Problem o f Evil: More Advice to Christ ian Philosophers , ' Faith

and Philosophy 5 (1988), 121-143 (140); c f . Vincent Brummer , 'Can a Theod i cy Console?,' in :id . . Speaking of a Personal God, 148-151.

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5. Conclusion

We can e lucidate the c la im that God is omnipo tent o r a lmighty by careful lydis t inguishing betwe en a theo logic al ly info rm ed and a li tera l o r phi losop hicalc o n c ep t o f o m n i p o t en c e . H av i n g at tem p t ed to do this, w e m a y conclude that th etheolog ica l ly i n f o r m e d c o n c e p t is more adequa t e than th e purely phi losophicalnot ion o f o m n i p o t e n c e at three leve ls. First, in the Bible God's p o w er is certainlydepic ted as a/ / -powerfu lness ; but God's p o w e r is of a very specif ic nature,d e t e rmined and ' f i l l ed ' as it were by His perfect character . Correspondingly, th eChristian tradition has usu ally rejected bo th th e denial of the un l imi t ed scope ando f th e spec i f ic nature o f G o d ' s power . Second , at a co ncep tual leve l it is notoriouslyd i f f icu l t to fo rmulate a consis tent def in i t ion o f the phi losophical concep t o fom nipo tence. O n the o ther hand, when we take in to acco unt the spec i f ic r e ligiouscon t ex t in w h i c h th e c o n c e p t f unc t i ons i t can be ade quately de f ined w i tho ut greatdi ff icul t ies . Third , when w e p resuppose th e phi losophical concep t o f omnipo t enceit is p roblemat ic to f o r m u l a t e a response to the problem o f evil which is not onlyco ncep tual ly co ns i st en t but also rel igiously re levant . If we d raw upo n it s (trinitarian)theo logical background, however , such a response, though no t easy, is certainlypossible.

In th e end , then, Peter G each ' s d is tinct ion between tw o rival notions o f divinepower , a correct theological one and a co n fus ing ph il o soph i ca l one ( to be dubbed'a lmigthiness ' and O m nipo t enc e ' resp ec t ive ly ), is vindicated in a sense.To be sure,

it is no t the case, as G each has it, that th e theological notion merely refers to God'sp o w e r over all th ings whereas the ph i lo so ph i ca l concep t has primarily t o do withGod's p o w e r to do all th ings. These tw o t ypes o f p o w er c an n o t be so easilyd isentangled . Rather , th e theo logical no t ion o f God's powe r pe r ta ins to both God's

actual po we r o ver th ings and G o d ' s abi l i t ies to do th ings, but in a way which f romth e be g inn ing t akes in to acco un t G od ' s pe r fec t character . T he phi losophical concep to f o m nipo tence , on the o ther hand, abstrac ts f rom the o r ig inal r e ligious co ntext o fbelief in G o d ' s po we r , and as a resul t causes som e im po r tant theo logical, co ncep tualand exis ten t ia l troubles .

understanding the attributes of god

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