understandingsudan.org university of california, berkeley © 2007 darfur facts, interpretations, and...

UnderstandingSudan.org University of California, Berkeley © 2007

Darfur Facts, Interpretations, and

Possibilities

Presentation material for educators and activists

developed by: UnderstandingSudan.org

latest version: February 13, 2007


Hamudi Abdullah Mohammed in Kalma IDP Camp, South Darfur

©UNICEF/2004/Westerbeekhttp://www.unicef.org/emerg/darfur/index_24605.html

Dedicated to the future of Sudan…

© UNICEF/HQ05-0943/Ron Havivhttp://www.unicef.org/childalert/darfur

Cover Photo from UNICEF Darfur Emergency September – October 2005 Reporthttp://www.unicef.org/emerg/darfur/files/DARFUREMERGSEPT_OCT2005.pdf


• Objectives– Complicate the picture

• There are many causes to the conflict and humanitarian catastrophe, many actors involved, and much vocabulary to be learned and debated

• The conflict is not just local, but can be seen as extending over many scales: from farmers and nomads fighting over water to the great powers of the U.N. Security Council negotiating the international order

– Highlight how discourse shapes understanding and action and encourage self-reflection

• Ethnicity and race are ideas constructed by people’s actions and discourses

• Genocide is debated in legal and policy circles• Intervention without a context can be a pretext

– Emphasize• Importance of knowing history• Importance of committing to long run involvement


GeographySudan in the Region2

Darfur1

Sudan in the World

1. http:// rightsmaps.com/html/sudmap1.html and2. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03772791.htm


Ethnicity in Darfur: Multiple and Mutable

Academics prefer the phrase “ethnic group” over “tribe”

• Darfurians tell a variety of histories

• Darfurians explain their ethnic identities in different ways

• Identities can become simplified, polarized and cemented through communal and especially sexual violence

• But experiences as refugees and displacement can have the opposite effect


Current Situation in Darfur (October/November 2006)

• Multiplicity of rebel groups: – Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) fractured; Minni Minawi

faction signed Darfur Peace Agreement with government– Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) fractures– Several groups have formed loose alliance called

National Redemption Front• Government-backed militia, janjawid, est. 20,000

persons • 200,000 deaths estimated overall since February

2003.• 218,000 refugees in 12 UNHCR camps in Chad2

– Not all refugees in Chad are in camps

• 2 million persons internally displaced (IDPs)3

• 4 million persons in need of humanitarian assistance. 3

1. Coalition for International Justice, 5/05; 2. UNICEF, 12/20/05; 3. UN, Darfur Humanitarian Profile, 10/1/06


Five Ways of Seeing the Crisis (‘Framing Stories’)

• Anti-government positions– Arab supremacism – Arabs against ‘black

Africans’ (Musa Hilal)– Regime in-fighting by proxy – Turabi versus

Beshir and Taha– Straight up scorched earth response to rebel

threat; Regime has little legitimacy but much oil money, response is massive retaliation that may or may not be controllable- like warlordism

• Pro-government positions– Farmers versus herders because of

desertification– Me-too spoilers of the main peace agreement


Five Ways of Seeing the Crisis

1. Arab supremacism – Arabs against ‘black Africans’ -Little is known about importance of ethnic identities among

ordinary persons in DarfurOne famous study by Frederick Barth suggested that ethnic

labbels were very fluidSome suggest a recent “hardening” of identities

Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Tunjur, Meidob “farmers” => called by others, in colloquial Arabic: zurga or zunji (translated into English as “black”)Rizeigat, Hamar, Humr, Bani Halba “nomads” => “Arab” (groups claiming descent from Arabian groups and typically practicing pastoralism)

-Regional conflict Chad, Libya) in 1970s and 1980s generated Tajamu al-Arabi – Arab Gathering, a group of Darfurians espousing Arab solidarity against other groups

Ideology of supremacy adapted by marginalized Arab (nomadic) groups with Musa Hilal as leader

-Encouraged by Islamicist, Arab regime in Khartoum, supported with weapons and mobility, and inflamed by international currents (war on terror, “clash of civilizations”)

-


Musa Hilal• A Janjawiid Leader • Son of Sheikh Hilal

Musa, Nazir of Um Julul, sub-clan of Abbala (camel-herding) Rizeigat, claiming descent from Juhayna Arab nomads who came into Darfur from the West between the 14th and 18th Centuries.

• In 2002 jailed because of violence in Darfur.

•Government of Sudan released him to lead militia counter-attacks after SLA April 2003 surprise attacks on El Fasher.•Claimed in 2004 HRW interview that GOS military officers lead PDF militias.

©Human Rights Watch, 2004 http://hrw.org/video/2005/musa/



2. Regime in-fighting by proxy: Hasan el Turabi versus Omar el Beshir and Ali Osman Taha



2. Regime in-fighting by proxy: Turabi versus Beshir and Taha

- June 1989 Coup followed by Islamicization

-Overthrew government of Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi

• Grandson of Mahdi

• Leader of Umma Party

•Turabi’s brother-in-law

-Continued civil war with SPLA in the South of the country.


The Mahdi

Mohamed Ahmed defeated the Turco-Egyptians along with British mercenaries (Charles “Chinese” Gordon”) in 1885. He died soon after, but his successor, the Khalifa Abdullah al-Ta’aishi, established an independent state that lasted until British – with Egyptian help – re-conquered much of Sudan in 1898.



3. Straight up scorched earth response to threat – Regime has little legitimacy but much oil

money – Many soldiers in regular military who had

fought in the South came from west so could not easily deploy them in Darfur.

– Other rebels based in Darfur had in the 1980s overthrown Chad regime

– Resort to militias out of habit• Used PDF’s in South and Nuba Mountains in long

running civil war• “Jihad” in mid-1990’s in Nuba Mountains

– Response to rebel threat in western Darfur was proxy militias who may or may not be controllable

– “Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap”- A. de Waal


Anglo-Egyptian CondominiumBritish defeated Sultan Ali Dinar in 1916 by force

and used local nomads as militias in process. The Sultanate of Darfur was then incorporated into Sudan. Aerial bombing was also part of the British campaign to subdue recalcitrant natives.


SPLA


Five Ways of Seeing the Crisis4. Farmers versus herders

because of desertification

Ecology of region• The Intertropical Convergence

Zone (ITCZ) • North to South increase in

precipitation• Transhumant RoutesVariation in arability of terrian and

soil• The Dar Fur Sultanate had

established the Hakura system of land tenure, where tribal leaders controlled large tracts of land

1980’s: Drought/Desertification• pressures on land increase

conflicts

Rainfall Analysis - Cumulative Amounts in relative terms : % of long term average

Sudan Agromet Dekadal Bulletin, Vol 2, Issue 19, 11-20 September 2004 http://www.mundo.u-net.com/samis/


Five Ways of Seeing the Crisis5. Me-too spoilers of the main peace

agreement



5. Me-too spoilers of the main peace agreement

• How to get respect: The SPLA got concessions only after 23 years of fighting.

• The Comprehensive Peace Agreement splits oil revenues between the GOS and the South. What about the rest of the country?

• US, UK, Norway – specifically choose to limit negotiations to North-South talks

• SLA in Darfur has origins in SPLA – took “One Sudan” of Garang to heart.

• Pick up weapon to get attention – February 2003


Why Intervene in Darfur?

• Continued child mortality among the displaced

• Continued insecurity and loss of capability for livelihoods in the camps

• Insecurity persists with no political solution


Variants of Intervention• Peacekeepers and monitors work in

cooperation with Sudan government, recognizing sovereignty

• Safe havens around towns with guaranteed relief corridors, with no government authority – bad idea; Makes displacement more permanent

• Darfur declared autonomous region under U.N. Authority


Current Interventions in Darfur• Humanitarian Intervention

– 13 UN agencies and 83 NGO’s and Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies– 13,869 Staff (12,895 national; 974 international as of Nov. 2005)

• Peace-monitoring/Protection Forces– African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with support from European

Union's African Peace Facility, UN and US (though US House just voted to cut funds 1/3/06.)

– Currently 6,848 personnel in Darfur (peacekeepers, civilian police and military observers). Many say should be double or as much as 45,000.

• International Political Actions– UN Resolutions– International Criminal Court – March ‘05 UN SCR 1593 referred situation

to ICC– AU led peace process –

• Negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria – Five point agenda agreed to: 1) The general principles; 2) security arrangements for

an enhanced humanitarian ceasefire; 3) comprehensive ceasefire and final security arrangements: 4) social reintegration; 5) and time line for implementation,

• January ’06 mini-Summit in Libya -- Now postponed

• Regional Involvements– Chad, President Idriss Deby faces internal threats and supposedly is

quite ill; recently diverted money from Chad oil pipeline to military uses, prompting World Bank and donors to cut-off assistance

– Libya, Egypt, Uganda, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia are involved in complicated ways


Further interventions?• Regime Change?• Negotiated Peace?• Nation building?• Multilateralism?


Genocide?• Declaration triggers intervention?

– Varying Definitions• 1948 Geneva Convention• Lay and Customary international usage

– Political equivocations– Political will (e.g. US House defunding AU

mission)

• Uses by parties– GOS – selective denigration of Arabs (re – Iraq,

Palestine). Double standards: Why not DR Congo?– Internalized locally – contributes to ‘hardening’ of

identities– Mobilizing international action


Conclusions• Be wary of “African” and “Arab”

labels– What histories are they hiding?– How are they being used

• Locally?• Internationally?

• Historically inaccurate, yet incredibly powerful in the present– The power of discourse, of labels, of

names


Conclusions continued

• Be committed to the long term– Educating ones’ self

• History, languages, cultures• Larger regional scene (Chad, Libya, Uganda – Lord’s

Resistance Army)

– Getting back to “normal” will take a long time.• Return of IDPs and Refugees?• Truth and Reconciliation?• Justice?• Re-establishing basic routines of

production, reproduction of life.• Who will decide access and control over

resources?


Conclusions continued

• Be committed to the long term– International aid – how to be part of a

sustainable solution?• Jan Egelund, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs

and Emergency Relief Coordinator

– Don’t wait for emergencies, create funds up front beforehand.

• Tony Blair and G8: Aid commitments to Africa?

• AU and NEPAD – African solutions?


Conclusions continued• Rethink “aid” and “development”• Interdependencies

– Consumption and Production•Oil, Gum Arabic, Livestock, Water

– Political Frameworks• War on Terror• Small arms proliferation• Peace-keeping, Peace-making….

– Gendered aspects of violence, justice, recovery?

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