United Mine Workers of AMericA

IndustrIal report on the Upper Big BrAnch Mine disAster

HomIcIde

“The other question I’d like to pose is,

‘Why didn’t don Blankenship

sHut this coal mine

down?’

We don’t have toquestion his authority.He runs this place. He could have walked up there and said this mine is shut down.

This mine’s not going to operate another

minute until we correct these

problems.”

cecil e. roberts PresidentUnited Mine Workers of America Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate May 20, 2010

Table of ContentsLetter from the UMWA Officers 4

Dedication 7

United Mine Workers of America 10

Executive Summary 12

General Overview of Upper Big Branch Mine – South 18

Explosion of April 5, 2010, and the Aftermath 19

Response to the Explosion 27

Rescue and Recovery Operations 32

Events Leading to the Accident

Ventilation 37

Coal Accumulations and Float Coal Dust 49

Longwall Shearer Bits and Sprays 54

Two Sets of Books 58

Responsibilities of the Mine Safety and Health Administration 60

Responsibilities of the West Virginia Office of Miner’s Health, Safety and Training 65

Hearing Process 70

Massey Energy Company 73

Massey Energy; Fatal Accidents Since 2001 82

Natural Gas Inundation Theory 84

Conclusions and Recommendations 85

UMWA Personnel Involved in the Investigation and Creation of this Report 90

Attachments 92

October 25, 2011

To the workers at the Upper Big Branch mine and the families of the victims of the explosion:

The 29 miners who died in the Upper Big Branch mine on April 5, 2010, did not go towork that day with the expectation that it was the last day of their lives. They kissed their wivesand children goodbye and drove the twisting roads of Raleigh County, W. Va., to make their wayto the mine.

Once there, they got into their work clothes, joked around with their buddies, then madeready to go to work. They perhaps knew something about the serious safety problems at themine. Everyone who worked there knew something was off. But they didn’t know just how badit was, and anyway they figured there was nothing they could do about it. After all, fixing themine’s problems was the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the federal andstate safety and health agencies.

The workers were right. But they were also, tragically, let down by the very people whowere supposed to be keeping them safe. And because of that, those 29 husbands, fathers,brothers, sons and grandsons never came home.

There were many factors that led to this disaster. But there is only one source for all ofthem: A rogue corporation, acting without real regard for mine safety and health law andregulations, that established a physical working environment that can only be described as abomb waiting to go off.

And that same company established a working environment where, operating throughsubterfuge, fear and intimidation, management prevented any opportunity for the workers toknow the full range of dangerous conditions in the mine, or to effectively protest them even ifthey did know.

Federal and West Virginia mine safety and health law is very clear: It was theresponsibility of the mine’s operator, Performance Coal Company, and its parent company,Massey Energy, to operate the mine in a safe and healthy manner in compliance with laws andregulations. That did not happen at UBB.

Indeed, the UMWA’s investigation reveals that well-established safety and health lawswere deliberately flouted at UBB, even after the federal and/or state agencies cited the operatormultiple times for breaking the law. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Masseysimply did not care if it broke the law. The safety of its employees was not worthy of its concern.The only thing that mattered was getting the coal out.

This attitude was not a creation solely of management at the UBB mine. Far from it. Thiswas a company-wide practice, fomented and directed by those at the highest corporate levels.The UBB mine was not unique in its manner of operation – other Massey Energy mines weresimilar.

It is unconscionable, in the 21st Century, for a mine to be operated in the manner thatUBB was. That it was allowed to be operated this way by the federal and state agencies is alsounconscionable. Though not the perpetrators of the crimes committed at UBB, they failed intheir responsibilities to be effective and thorough enforcers of the law.

Once again, miners have died because they were put in harm’s way by their employerand not sufficiently protected by those who are charged with doing so. Once again, the televisioncameras have come and gone in a rural hollow in Appalachia and reinforced the false notion thatmining coal is an inevitably deadly occupation.

Once again, those responsible for a mining disaster have tried to deflect blame ontoothers, while refusing to take responsibility for their own actions. And once again, the safetyagencies have thrown a needless cloak of secrecy over the investigation into the disaster,hindering the ability of anyone to shine the full light of day on what happened and on thoseresponsible.

Though the UBB mine was a nonunion mine, miners working there designated theUMWA as their representative in this investigation. Our charge is different from any other partyto this investigation. We don’t have operational policies from which to divert attention. We don’thave regulatory enforcement actions–or inactions–to explain away. We don’t have lawsuits todefend against.

All we have are the surviving miners, their families and most of all, the families of thevictims. More than anyone, they deserve to know the entire truth about what happened to theirloved ones. Because when all the investigations are finished and the lawsuits settled, theirhusbands will still be gone. Their fathers will still not be at their ballgames. Their sons will stillnot be there to flash a smile as they head out the door.

The memory of the 29 miners needlessly killed in this tragedy has been our only guide inthis investigation. Their untimely deaths must be properly explained and those responsible

brought to justice. Their loss must be matched by a renewed sense of purpose on the part of thosecharged with protecting miners in the United States and in West Virginia.

To do any less will be an insult to their memory, and will threaten the health and safetyof every current and future miner in the United States. We must not, we cannot, fail them.

Cecil E. Roberts Daniel J. KaneInternational President International Secretary-Treasurer

7

DedicationThe United Mine Workers of Americadedicates this report to the men and womenwhose job it is to toil within the deepestrecesses of the earth, subjected to inherentdangers so that others may enjoy the basiccomforts afforded by the coal they produce.These brave individuals, however, do notface this task alone. Like no otherprofession, the families of coal miners areas closely connected to the work that theydo as the miners themselves. We mustrecognize the sacrifice and struggle ofhusbands and wives, mothers and fathers,sons and daughters, brothers and sisters andall those who make up the miningcommunity. We must also dedicate thisreport to those individuals who, long afterthe cameras and microphones disappear,continue to live with the greatest lossimaginable: the loss of their loved ones.

On behalf of all the officers andmembers of the United Mine Workers ofAmerica, we wish to express our heartfeltsorrow and deepest sympathy to the familiesof each of these brave miners. The tragicand untimely death of your loved onescauses a pain that is too deep for mere wordsto provide comfort. The passing of each ofthese miners is deeply grieved not only inthe homes of family and close friends butthroughout the entire mining community.

The death of any miner in theperformance of their job profoundly affectsall miners, and all the members of theUMWA grieve with you. These miners’lives were a testament to love of family,hard work and dedication. Their deaths area horrific reminder of how tragically short

life can be, and how dangerous coal miningwill be when profits are placed above safetyand mining laws are ignored.

It is with great sympathy that wereflect on 2010 as an especially tragic andtroubling year for the entire miningcommunity. The loss of one coal miner istoo many, but for 48 to be killed in a singleyear is unconscionable. Not since 1992 havewe witnessed such carnage in the coalfieldsof this nation. The very reason for this reportis rooted in the systemic, widespread failureand disregard for the system that wasdesigned to protect miners. These failuresresulted in the worst U.S. mining disaster inover 40 years, causing 29 miners to perish ina single catastrophic event.

Each life is precious, and as thenumber of deaths are reported over and overin various reports, those who were lost canbecome another statistic. These numbersstrip away the human characteristics of thepersons they represent. They make it easierto tell the story and somehow easier toaccept. This should never be the case. These individuals were miners, they hadfamilies, they were part of our communityand in fact were very much part of us. Theylived a life of hard work, sacrifice anddedication. The names of the 48 minerswho lost their lives in 2010 are:

8

Miner Date Age Mine Controlling Co.

Rudolph Lindstrom 1-2-10 57 Mine No. 1 Signal Peak EnergyTravis Brock 1-22-10 29 Abner Branch Bledsoe Coal Corp.Christopher Bell 4-5-10 33 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyEdward Dean Jones 4-5-10 50 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyRonald Lee Maynor 4-5-10 31 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyJoe Marcum 4-5-10 57 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyGreg Steven Brock 4-5-10 47 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyWilliam I. Griffith 4-5-10 54 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyRicky Workman 4-5-10 50 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyHoward D. Payne, Jr. 4-5-10 53 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergySteven J. Harrah 4-5-10 40 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyBenny Ray Willingham 4-5-10 61 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyCarl Acord 4-5-10 52 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyDeward Allan Scott 4-5-10 58 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyRobert E. Clark 4-5-10 41 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyWilliam R. Lynch 4-5-10 59 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyJason Atkins 4-5-10 25 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyJoel Price 4-5-10 55 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyMichael Lee Elswick 4-5-10 47 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyAdam Keith Morgan 4-5-10 21 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyCharles Timothy Davis 4-5-10 51 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyCory Davis 4-5-10 20 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyRichard K. Lane 4-5-10 45 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyRex Mullins 4-5-10 50 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyNicholas McCroskey 4-5-10 26 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyJoshua S. Napper 4-5-10 26 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyDillard Earl Persinger 4-5-10 32 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyGary Wayne Quarles 4-5-10 33 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyGrover Dale Skeens 4-5-10 57 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyKenneth Allen Chapman 4-5-10 53 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyJames E. Mooney 4-5-10 51 Upper Big Branch Massey EnergyRay Oney 4-11-10 61 MC#1 Mine M-Class MiningJohn King 4-22-10 28 Beckley Pocahontas ICG BeckleyJustin Travis 4-28-10 28 Dotiki Mine Webster County CoalMichael W. Carter 4-28-10 28 Dotiki Mine Webster County CoalJames R. Erwin 5-10-10 55 Ruby Mine Massey EnergyPhillip W. Gustafson 6-8-10 38 Choctaw Mine Taft Coal SalesJimmy Carmack 6-16-10 42 Clover Fork No. 1 Lone Mtn. ProcessingBobby L. Smith, Jr. 6-24-10 29 Leeco 68 Mine James River CoalWilbert Ray Starcher 7-1-10 60 Pocahontas Mine Massey EnergyThomas N. Brown 7-9-10 61 Willow Lake Peabody EnergyJesse R. Adkins 7-29-10 39 Loveridge Mine Consol Energy

9

Brian W. Mason 8-31-10 25 Freelandville Triad Underground John Tittle 9-3-10 37 Kansas Mine Mallards Creek EnergyWilliam R. Dooley 10-11-10 56 Kingston No. 1 Alpha Natural ResourcesJames Falk 10-27-10 39 River View Mine River View CoalRhett Lee Mosley 11-23-10 32 Rex Strip #1 Rex Coal CompanyCharles Qualls 12-4-10 32 Republic Energy Massey Energy

To the families who lost a loved one:The easier path would have been to bear yourtremendous loss alone, withdraw from publicview and suffer silently. But you did not. Youhave confronted this terrible situation headon. Many of you have pressed the companiesand your government for answers. You havespoken out in the press and at publicmeetings. You have asked questions anddemanded answers.

By doing so, you have not onlygreatly honored the memory of your lovedones, but you have focused attention on theabusive culture of some coal operators in themining industry. Your efforts not onlydemand that someone be held accountable,but they also offer added protection forminers working today. What we as a miningcommunity owe these fallen miners is toensure they did not die in vain. We must alllearn from these tragedies.

To the members of the many minerescue teams who served diligently throughthe days and weeks after the Upper BigBranch (UBB) explosion, we offer a specialthanks. The task is never easy and seldomrewarding, but you are always willing to giveyour best effort. There are few who have theability to face the dangers and uncertainty ofthe job you willingly perform. It does not gounnoticed or unappreciated. Thank you foryour service to these fallen coal miners.

Finally, as we always do, we mustrecognize all the men and women who havegiven their lives in order to build and energize

this nation. More than 100,000 coal minershave tragically died in the nation’s mines inthe past 110 years, and 100,000 others havesuccumbed to occupational diseases and thehorrors of black lung disease. We alsodedicate this report to your memory and toyour families.

With this dedication, we are servingnotice that we pledge to pursue whateveravenues we must to enact greater health andsafety protections in our nation’s mines. Wewill, to the extent possible, see that those whocaused these tragedies are held accountable. And finally, and most importantly, wecontinue to work to make it possible for allminers to return home to their families at theend of every shift.

10

United Mine Workers of AmericaThe United Mine Workers of America(UMWA) has represented the interests of coalminers in the United States and Canada forover 121 years. However, the employees atthe Upper Big Branch Mine - South (UBB),despite trying to organize a UMWA localunion in the past, were not members of theUMWA or any other union.

Shortly after the explosion, theUMWA was contacted by employees at UBBrequesting that the Union represent theirinterests during the course of theinvestigation. The UMWA agreed to do so.

The UMWA made arrangements tofacilitate a meeting between these miners andrepresentatives of the Secretary of the U.S.Department of Labor. Such a meetingsatisfied Section 103 (f) of the Federal MineSafety and Health Act of 1977 (the Act)which states, in pertinent part:

“Section 103 (f) Subject to regulationsissued by the Secretary, arepresentative of the operator and arepresentative authorized by hisminers shall be given the opportunityto accompany the Secretary or hisauthorized representative during thephysical inspection of any coal orother mine made pursuant to theprovisions of subsection (a), for thepurpose of aiding such investigationand to participate in pre- and post-conferences held at the mine.”

The determining language fordesignation as Representative of Miners, isfound in 30 CFR §40.1 Definitions.

“(b) Representative of miners means:(1) Any person or organization whichrepresents two or more miners at thecoal or other mine for the purposes ofthe Act...”

The UMWA was notified that as ofApril 23, 2010, the Federal Mine Safety andHealth Administration (MSHA) recognizedthe Union as the miners’ representative(attached). While the UMWA has had apresence at the mine site since the day of theexplosion, it was not officially recognized byall parties until 18 days later. The UMWAnotified Mr. Robert Hardman, DistrictManager, MSHA District 4; Mr. RonaldWooten, then Director of the West VirginiaOffice of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training(WVOMHST), and Mr. Wayne Persinger,General Manager, Performance CoalCompany, of its representative status vialetters dated April 30, 2010 (attached).

The UMWA’s responsibility duringthis process under the Mine Act is solely torepresent the miners at the operation. In orderto do this effectively, the Union assembled ateam of UMWA staff to participate in nearlyall aspects of the physical investigation. These individuals traveled with andparticipated in the administrative process, theunderground and surface investigation and allother processes to the extent MSHApermitted.

This report is the result of, and basedon, our involvement in the investigation. TheUnion has reviewed the relevant, but limited,data we obtained and we have reachedconclusions supported by the evidence. Ourobligation is to see that the facts of the

11

investigation are brought to light and that theunderlying causes for the accident arerevealed.

However, the UMWA was barred byMSHA from participating in a very crucialstage of the investigation. When MSHAdecided to conduct private interviews ratherthan holding public hearings, the families ofthe miners and the UMWA were excludedfrom this important process.

The Union believes the refusal by theAgency to permit the Representative ofMiners to participate in the interviews wasthe wrong decision. Without open andtransparent hearings, which MSHA ispermitted to conduct under the Mine Act, wehave unanswered questions regarding thethoroughness and validity of theinvestigation.

Despite repeated requests toparticipate in the interviews and for MSHA tohold public hearings (including a lawsuit filedby the Union in the Southern District Court ofthe State of West Virginia), we were deniedan opportunity to participate. Likewise,repeated written and verbal requests fortranscripts of the testimony have thus far beendenied. The failure by MSHA to give theUMWA access to this critical informationdelayed the issuance of this report and madeit much more difficult to complete.

Finally, it is the intention of the Unionto call for those who were responsible for theconditions that led to the disaster to bebrought to justice. The Union intends to dowhat it can to meet this obligation.

We offer this report as the startingpoint for whatever action may be necessary tobring this tragic event to closure for thefamilies, friends and communities of theminers who perished on April 5, 2010.

12

Executive SummaryThe United Mine Workers of Americaparticipated in an extensive investigation intothe events of April 5, 2010, at MasseyEnergy’s Upper Big Branch Mine - South1

(UBB) in Montcoal, Raleigh County, WestVirginia. Based on the findings of thatinvestigation, the UMWA issues thefollowing report.

The miners at UBB were notrepresented by the UMWA, nor were theymembers of any other union. However, in theaftermath of the explosion, and at the requestof the UBB miners, the UMWA wasdesignated as the Representative of Miners onApril 23, 2010. It is important to note thatrepresentatives of the UMWA were on sitewell before that date, having been dispatchedimmediately upon the Union learning therewas an accident at the mine.

There is no way of knowing the extentto which miners underground on theafternoon of April 5 were aware of themagnitude of the events that were about tounfold in the mine. Clearly, workers at UBBwere fearful, because of managementintimidation, to report to anyone that the minewas not safe. The threat of reprisal, includingjob loss, was so real the employees did notfeel they could report hazardous conditions atthe mine.

Given the overall poor condition ofthe mine in general, it is not believable that

management personnel did not know thatthese conditions posed a substantial andimmediate hazard to the miners and couldpossibly escalate into a catastrophic event. Massey’s knowledge of the hazardousconditions is confirmed by the practice at themine of keeping two sets of record books. One set was for Massey’s eyes only, thatdocumented the actual conditions, and theother an official record which concealed thetruth. Mine management had the ability to actand the responsibility for correcting allconditions, but because of the culture createdby management at the highest levels of thecompany, management failed to correct manyhazardous conditions.

The extremely violent explosion thattore through the mine that afternoon created apath of destruction that took the lives of 29miners located at or inby 66 break of 5 NorthMains. The path of the explosion, aided bypoor ventilation practices, ineffective watersprays, excessive accumulations of float coaldust and inadequate rock-dusting, sealedthese miners’ fate.

Many of the conditions created in thedays and months before the explosioncontributed to the nation’s worst miningdisaster in 40 years. Before self-extinguishing, the explosive forces, fueled byfloat coal dust, traveled through more thanseven miles of mine entries. The explosiveforces were so powerful that they destroyedhundreds of ventilation controls and miles ofbeltline, and hurled heavy equipmentthroughout the mine entries. 1 Performance Coal Company, a subsidiary of

Massey Energy, operated the UBB mine. Throughoutthis report we will generally refer to the company bythe name “Massey” or “Massey Energy.”

13

The Union absolutely rejects the self-serving theory advanced by Massey Energythat a massive inundation of natural gas wasthe fuel that propagated the explosion. Thereis no evidence to support this theorywhatsoever. To the contrary, the direction ofthe explosion and the extent of the destructionclearly demonstrate that the UBB mineexperienced an explosion initiated bymethane gas, which was then fueled by floatcoal dust.

The only logical explanation for anexplosion to travel seven miles undergroundis that it had to have been propagated by acontinuing supply of highly explosive fuel.The only available fuel supported by theevidence that is sufficient to propagate anexplosion of this magnitude is float coal dust.

Massey claims that a crack in the floorof the mine was the source of a natural gasinundation that caused the explosion. Thatclaim is simply not supported by the evidencerevealed in the investigation. When it wasexcavated, the ‘crack’ only extended a shortway, becoming solid rock again and showingno signs of gas seepage from the underlyingcoal seam.

It is the determination of the Unionthat the sparking of the shearer bits and bitblocks, aided by missing and ineffectivewater sprays, a lack of water pressure andinadequate ventilation, ignited a pocket ofmethane at the tailgate near the longwall. Theignition traveled into the gob where itencountered an explosive methane-airmixture, resulting in an explosion. Theexplosive forces picked up and suspendedfloat coal dust in the mine atmosphere insufficient quantities to initiate a massive dustexplosion.

The fact that the UBB mine was notadequately rock-dusted played a significantrole in the death of the 29 miners. Massey’sfailure to adequately rock-dust the minepermitted excessive amounts of float coal dustto accumulate throughout the mine. This floatcoal dust served as a self-propagating fuelsource as the explosion tore through the mine.

MSHA rock dust surveys demonstratethat Massey failed to maintain theincombustible content of the float coal dust atlegal levels. The WVOMHST issued over adozen violations for “cleaning or rock-dusting” in the eight months of 2009 that aninspector was at the mine. Six additionalviolations were issued for these conditions inthe first quarter of 2010.

It is the UMWA’s opinion that hadMassey Energy adequately rock-dusted themine, float coal dust would have been inertedand the dust explosion would have beenprevented.

This explosion traveled in bothdirections of the longwall face with the majorforces exiting the tailgate entry. The forcestraveling outby towards the 5 North Mainssplit in several directions, following the fuelsource back into the longwall headgate entriesand the continuous miner sections inby theNorth Glory Mains.

The dangerous conditions thatcontributed to the explosion existed at themine on a daily basis. These conditions,which represented gross violations ofmandatory health and safety standards, werenot accidental. They were permitted to existby a corporate management at Massey thatcreated a culture that demanded production atany cost and tolerated a callous disregard forthe health and safety of the miners employedat the operation.

14

This attitude was made very clearwhen Edward Dean Jones (victim), a SectionForeman at UBB, attempted to keep his menout of the mine because of dangerousconditions and was told, “If you can’t go upthere and run coal, just bring your bucketoutside and go home.” (National PublicRadio, [NPR] June 29, 2011) Gina Jones,Dean Jones’s widow, explained that he triedto keep his men outside because, “I told himto.” She went on to tell him, “They (Massey)don’t live your life. They don’t care aboutyou.” (NPR, June 29, 2011)

The extent to which this attitudeexisted throughout Massey Energy is madeapparent in an October 19, 2005, memo fromCEO Don Blankenship. It states, “If any ofyou have been asked by your grouppresidents, your supervisors, engineers oranyone else to do anything other than run coal(i.e., – build overcasts, do construction jobs,or whatever) you need to ignore them and runcoal. This memo is necessary only becausewe seem not to understand that coal pays thebills” (attached).

Massey management bears primaryresponsibility for this tragedy. MasseyEnergy is mandated to comply with themandatory health and safety regulations, yetits mine management failed to comply withthese requirements. This responsibility wasroutinely ignored and in many instancesopenly disregarded by Massey Energy’smanagement from mine level managers atPerformance Coal Company’s UBB mine tothe highest offices within the company.

Massey Energy must be heldaccountable for the death of each of the 29miners. Theirs is not a guilt of omission butrather, based on the facts publicly available,the Union believes that Massey Energy and

its management were on notice of andrecklessly tolerated mining conditions thatwere so egregious that the resulting disasterconstituted a massive slaughter in the natureof an industrial homicide.2

MSHA also bears some responsibilityregarding its knowledge of the seriousventilation problems that existed at UBBmine over the past several years. It is theUMWA’s opinion that the ventilation plan,along with the numerous revisions submittedby Massey and approved by MSHA District4, was flawed. MSHA permitted the use of33 sets of double/airlock doors to controlventilation in lieu of utilizing conventionalventilation controls, such as overcasts,undercasts and regulators. While the doorsare not illegal, their use is a very poorpractice. We understand that no other mineof that size in the United States utilizes thatmany sets of double/airlock doors.

In addition, the sheer number ofcitations MSHA issued to Massey in the 15months leading up to the explosion,including:105 citations and orders for notcomplying with the approved ventilation plancovering air reversals; not maintaining theminimum velocity of air on the sections;

2 "Industrial homicide" is not a specificcriminal act and technically speaking is not one of theclasses of homicide in either the State of West Virginiawhere the tragedy occurred, or in the Commonwealthof Virginia where both the Company and Unionheadquarters are located. Nevertheless, there isevidence that the Company's conduct interfered withthe proper performance of mine health and safety lawsand regulations to such an extreme extent that theUnion believes that government would be able toprosecute Company representatives under applicablecriminal provisions for their roles in permitting thedangerous conditions in the UBB mine that killed 29miners.

15

making intentional and illegal air changeswith miners working inby; cement blocksmissing from brattice walls; airlock doors leftopen; ventilation controls constructed fromnon-permissible material; and seals leakingshould have raised red flags. Four of theorders were issued six months prior to theexplosion for air traveling in the wrongdirection and intentional air changes madewith miners working inby. This does notinclude approximately 59 citations issued byMSHA to Massey for failing to make requiredpre-shift, on-shift and weekly examinations.

While the UMWA applauds theMSHA inspectors for issuing the citations, itis clear that these enforcement actions did notmotivate Massey to change its practices tocomply with the law. We believe the vastnumber of citations issued proves that MSHADistrict 4 had knowledge of the seriousventilation problems that UBB wasexperiencing, which should have warranted ahigher degree of enforcement activity by theAgency including: increasing the gravity ofthe citations being issued, enhancedenforcement activity and targeting UBB for aPattern of Violations (POV). Mostimportantly, the UMWA believes MSHAshould have used every tool at its disposal toshut down Massey’s UBB mine until theegregious problems were corrected.

However, a culture existed at MSHADistrict 4 that made the likelihood ofincreased enforcement all but impossible. Forexample, MSHA inspector Minnis Justicereported that he was told by his superiors notto cite some violations and reduce the severityof others (Simple Legal Docs).

Bob Cavendish, another MSHAinspector, was assigned to UBB and had arun-in with Don Blankenship. He stated that,“...within a month, MSHA supervisors gave

him another mine to inspect, in spite ofAgency practice that a mine stay with thesame inspector for a year.” When hecomplained to his supervisor he was told,“...we are having a work realignment.” However, Cavendish stated, “...that was theonly mine I know of to be realigned.” (WestVirginia Blue 6-23-11)

We also learned from testimony thatMassey routinely knocked holes in ventilationcontrols and opened double/airlock doors tore-route air. This is a blatant violation of theapproved ventilation plan and the law thatcontributed to the events of April 5. Weunderstand that approximately two weeksprior to the explosion, MSHA conducted aventilation survey at UBB. The Union doesnot have the results of that survey. While weagain commend MSHA for its action, it wastoo little, too late.

The UMWA wishes to be very clear:Massey Energy had overall responsibility tomaintain the UBB mine in a safe operatingcondition at all times. Massey had theresponsibility to comply with all mandatoryhealth and safety standards. However, it wasMSHA’s job to oversee compliance and to bethe “watch dog.”

The UMWA believes that had MasseyEnergy been in compliance with all themandatory health and safety standards relatedto the conditions that contributed to theexplosion on April 5, 2010, the explosionwould not have occurred.

The evidence also shows thatMassey’s approved roof control plan wasineffective. There are numerous accounts ofroof falls above the anchorage points of thebolts and heaving that crushed out ventilationcontrols. However, there is no evidence thatMassey or MSHA sought to improve the plan

16

by reducing entry widths, increasing pillarsizes or requiring any other necessary safetyprecautions.

With both the headgate and tailgateentries becoming impassible because of rooffalls and accumulations of water, MSHArequired Massey to mine new tailgate entries. However, MSHA permitted the new longwallentries to be mined in exactly the samemanner as the previous setup.

The issue of record-keeping must alsobe questioned at UBB and other MasseyEnergy operations. Since the explosion, it hasbeen determined that Massey kept two sets ofbooks at UBB: the official record bookswhich everyone at the mine has a right toexamine and a second set of “production andmaintenance” books that were not madeavailable to inspectors or miners. The officialbooks did not reveal all of the hazards orproblems observed by certified examinersduring the shift as required by law. Insteadthe Company hid this information in the“production and maintenance” books whereonly select management personnel would seethem and know what the actual conditionswere in the mine.

There are several questions regardingsuch record-keeping that must be asked. First, why would it be necessary to keep bothsets? The only explanation is, like anaccountant hiding the true figures, Masseywas hiding some of the real conditions at themine. Second, how could governmentinspectors and mine management look at theofficial record books that reported the mine tobe safe, then enter the mine and find so manyproblems and not wonder what washappening? It should not be lost that highranking Massey officials were required bylaw to review and countersign the officialrecord books.

The West Virginia Office of Miners’Health, Safety and Training (WVOMHST)must also bear some responsibility for itsactions. The WVOMHST is required toreview and approve mining plans. Given thehazardous conditions that existed at UBB, theState had the authority to shut the mine down,but it failed to do so. The Unionwholeheartedly concurs with the finding ofthe Governor’s Independent InvestigationPanel (GIIP) that the relationship between theState and the industry it regulates must bechanged.

The UMWA reviewed and assessedthe relevant evidence, including the limiteddocumentation provided by the federal andstate agencies to the Union regarding theUBB disaster. This evidence, along with theconditions at the mine, led us to ourconclusions. We have maderecommendations and seek reforms toeliminate the barriers to miners seekinghealthier and safer working conditions.

We note that some information,including transcripts of the miners’ testimony,has been withheld by MSHA and the State.The only interview transcripts the Unionreceived were the 25 transcripts of minerescue team members posted by MSHA onthe internet. However, we note that over 300interviews were conducted in the course ofthe investigation.

While knowing the causes of thesetypes of disasters is important in trying toprevent them in the future, it is also importantfor lawmakers and regulators to admit thatafter so many coal mine tragedies, it is time tostop the rhetoric and take real action toprotect miners’ health and safety.

While taking into consideration theshortcomings of the enforcement agencies, it

17

is clear that had Massey Energy fulfilled itsregulatory obligation to comply with themandatory standards, there is every reason tobelieve that all 29 miners at UBB would bealive today.

As an authorized Representative ofMiners at UBB, the UMWA has a solemntask. We are not charged by any governmentor board of directors to issue findings thatoffer a certain perspective or meet anypreconceived conclusions. Rather, we arecharged with a much greater undertaking. Weare charged by the families of the deceasedminers, those miners who lost co-workers andthe membership of the UMWA to determinethe cause of this tragedy and see that thoseresponsible parties are held accountable. Weintend to uphold our obligations to theseindividuals without reservation.

It is our greatest hope that this is thelast such report we will have to ever write.

18

General OverviewUpper Big Branch Mine – South

The Upper Big Branch Mine–South (UBB),MSHA ID number 4608436, is located at 130Frontier Street, Raleigh County, Montcoal,West Virginia. It was purchased by MasseyEnergy on October 15, 1994, in the sale of itsparent company, Montcoal, by Peabody CoalCompany.

The mine accesses the Eagle CoalSeam through sixteen surface openings andone shaft at the Bandytown Fan. It isventilated using three fans in a “push-pull”system.

The South Portal Fan is an IndustrialWelding Buffalo blowing fan equipped with asix-foot diameter axial blade, operated by a480-volt, 200 horsepower motor thatgenerates 1,200 rpms. This fan is usedprimarily to ventilate the South Mains area ofthe mine.

The North Portal Fan is a Joy Model12065D blowing fan equipped with a ten-footaxial blade operated by a 4,160-volt,1,000horsepower motor that generates 900 rpms.

The Bandytown fan is a RobinsonModel DA 97AF1029-116 exhausting fanequipped with an eight-foot centrifugal bladeoperated by a 4,160-volt, 2,000 horsepowermotor that generates 890 rpms.

The mine operated five continuousminer sections and one longwall on twoproduction shifts and one maintenance shiftevery 24 hours. The average coal seamthickness is 54 inches and the average miningheight is 84 inches. The mine produced1,235,462 tons of coal in 2009, the last full

production year before the explosion. At thetime of the explosion, the mine employed 234underground and two surface employees.

In 2009 the mine reported fourteennon-fatal days lost accidents (NFDL) for anincident rate of 5.81, almost 45 percent higherthan the national average. However, a Part 50audit conducted by MSHA after the explosionuncovered eleven more incidents in 2009 thathad not been reported as required by law,meaning its NFDL rate was actually muchhigher.

From January 1, 2009, through April5, 2010, MSHA cited the UBB mine 645times for violations of the Mine Act, or theapplicable regulations found at 30 CFR. TheAgency assessed penalties for these violationsat $1,249,186.

The company has contested 229 ofthese citations. While the contested citationsrepresent less than 36 percent of the totalnumber issued, it is important to note that thecontested citations represent $929,245–ormore than 74 percent–of the assessed fines.

While citations are being contested,MSHA cannot use them to increaseenforcement pressure on the operator,including the issuance of a pattern ofviolations. Fines for contested citationscannot be collected until they are final.

19

Explosion of April 5, 2010, and theaftermathPumpers

The pumper crew; Jason Stanley, a “red hat”or inexperienced miner, David Farley, whohad recently become a certified miner andJeremy Burghduff, a Foreman, entered themine at approximately 6:28 a.m. from EllisPortal. They passed 78 break atapproximately 7:15 a.m. and proceeded inby. Both Stanley and Farley commented that theair velocity in the mine seemed very low,even for a mine like UBB that experiencedroutine ventilation problems. Farley stated,“...it was almost like there was nothing.”(GIIP at page 17)

The crew proceeded into the mine tothe tailgate entries of the longwall. The minehad been idled the previous two days, andupon arriving at their designated work area,the crew realized that sometime over theweekend the pumps had shut down. Stanleyand Farley headed inby to begin working onthe pumps.

Burghduff did not preshift the area asrequired by law and the two pumpers werepermitted to advance in the unexaminedentries without a detector. As they did so,they noticed that this area of the mine, whichwas usually cold because of the velocity ofthe air moving through the returns, was hot. Farley stated in testimony that, “...that day itwas miserably hot. I ended up taking,because we’ve got to put our waders on, and Iended up taking my long johns off. I mean Iwas just in my boxers. I mean it was hothot.” (GIIP at page 18)

Because they did not have thenecessary parts, the crew could only repairfour of the six pumps during the course oftheir shift. It is not clear how far the twotraveled into the tailgate entries that day. Reports from those familiar with thewitnesses’ private testimony indicated thetailgate entries were not passable all the wayto the back of the longwall panel.

At approximately 1:50 p.m., thepumpers headed outby and located Burghdufflying down at break 92. The Union has notbeen afforded the opportunity to review theexamination books to see if Burghduff signedfor making his examination of the area thatday. The three men left the area and on theirway out picked up Ralph Plumley, OwenDavis and Eric Jackson (track crew) at Ellis 5belt head. They passed by 78 break atapproximately 2:36 p.m., returning to thesurface at 3:01 p.m.

Construction Crew: Seven NorthBelt

Mike Kiblinger, Foreman, entered the mine atapproximately 6:05 a.m. from Ellis Portalwith two unidentified individuals. The tagreader at Ellis Portal recorded tag numbers723 and 729, however, these numbers are notassigned in the computer database. The threeproceeded inby 78 break at 6:36 a.m. andtraveled to the Glory Hole where aconstruction crew was preparing to set a newbelt head in the area where Headgate 22 beltwould dump coal onto the Seven North Belt.

20

While the crew was cutting the beltchannel in the roof, Kiblinger notice theairflow in the area had changed. He noted,“The Thursday before the explosion... the airwas blowing out of the mine.” When hereturned Monday, “...the air was blowing intothe mine, towards the longwall.” (GIIP atpage 19) The three left the area atapproximately 8:45 a.m. and arrived on thesurface at 10:15 a.m.

The remainder of Kiblinger’s crew,John Cox, Mark Gilbert and Jerry Weeks,entered the mine at 8:30 a.m. from the NorthPortal. They traveled past 78 break atapproximately 9:10 a.m. and continued inbyto take supplies to the Headgate 22 Section. They returned to the mother driveconstruction area at approximately 9:31 a.m. After spending some time there they exitedthe mine through the Ellis Portal at 11:45 a.m.

Construction Crew: Ellis Portal

Joshua Williams, Jeremy Reed, Joe Ferrell,Charles Smith and Bobby Baker, Foreman,entered the mine at 6:40 a.m. from the NorthPortal. They passed Ellis switch atapproximately 6:59 a.m. and proceeded to theEllis Construction site. When the crewarrived, Williams immediately noticedsomething was different with the ventilation. On Thursday, April 1, 2010, the air was goingoutby towards Ellis Portal. When theyreturned on Monday, April 5, 2010, henoticed the air “all going inby, back uptowards Ellis switch and... toward thelongwall.” (GIIP at page 19)

Bob Sullivan and Roger Toney, alsomembers of the construction crew, entered themine at approximately 9:40 a.m. from theNorth Portal. They traveled past Ellis switchat 10:54 a.m. and proceeded to the EllisConstruction area. The crew worked in the

area cutting the overcast for the new longwallpanel until about 2:45 p.m.

The crew boarded their mantrip andbegan to exit the mine at approximately 2:55p.m. As they proceeded towards the NorthPortal, the air velocity in the mine suddenlyincreased and the power went out. Toney,who was operating the mantrip, noted,“...instantly, you couldn’t see anything. It just– dust blew over top of us.” (GIIP at page 25)Williams felt his ears pop and noticed “it wasthrowing blocks. That’s when I laid down inthe mantrip and threw my jacket over myhead and was starting to get my self rescuerout because I didn’t know what was goingon.”

With the power out in the mine, thepressure wave from the explosion pushed theconstruction crew mantrip about five breaks. When power was restored, a decision wasmade to exit the mine through the Ellis Portal. Toney began to drive the mantrip towards thePortal. After derailing the mantrip twice,some of the crew got out of the mantrip at theEllis Construction site and began walking outof the mine. Toney finally moved through theswitch and the mantrip proceeded to thesurface.

Barrier Section Crew

Melvin Lynch, Chris Cadle, Jeremy Rife,Danny Williams, Eddie Foster, James Baileyand Wes Curry entered the mine at 6:40 a.m.from the North Portal and traveled to theBarrier Section. Because the tracking systemwas not fully operational, we remainuncertain of who the crew members were thatday.

At approximately 6:41 a.m., MineForeman Rick Foster and Examiner JimBoyer, traveling with a federal inspector

21

(whose name MSHA has not released),entered the North Portal and traveled to theBarrier Continuous Miner Section. Theyarrived at 6:51 a.m. and started to inspect thearea. The inspector wrote two citations; onefor failing to keep the escapeway map up todate and a second for an inadequate splice onthe trailing cable of the miner.

Boyer left the Section atapproximately 7:15 a.m. but remained in thearea, however, there is no record of where hetraveled. Boyer exited the mine through theNorth Portal at 2:24 p.m.

Foster and the inspector left theSection at 11:00 a.m. and exited the minethrough the North Portal at approximately11:20 a.m.

The crew completed their shift andleft 52 break at 3:27 p.m. They exited themine through the North Portal at 3:35 p.m.,over 30 minutes after the explosion.

Mine Examiners

Belt examiner Scott Halstead entered themine at 6:07 a.m. from Ellis Portal. Hearrived at 78 break at approximately 6:45 a.m.and began his examination. This examinationincluded belts on the Longwall Section, 6North, 5 North, 4 North and Ellis belts. Hewas tracked at 78 block at 12:47 p.m. andexited the mine through the Ellis Portal at2:25 p.m.

Examiner Lacy Stewart entered themine at approximately 6:45 a.m. and traveledto the Barrier Section. He was also chargedwith examining the Portal Section, however,that examination has not been confirmed. Heexited the mine at approximately 2:25 p.m..

Examiner Charles Semenske enteredthe mine at 6:35 a.m., most likely from theNorth Portal. He traveled by 62 break atapproximately 6:50 a.m. en route to perform aweekly examination of the Lower Big Branch(LBB) area of the mine. He exited the mineat 12:20 p.m., probably through the NorthPortal.

Belt examiner Michael Elswick(victim) entered the mine at approximately6:03 a.m. from the Ellis Portal. He traveledpast 78 break at approximately 6:36 a.m. andproceeded inby towards the working sections. He examined Headgate 22, Tailgate 22 and 7North belts. In his final call outside to reporthis examination, he noted the belts had coalaccumulations and needed to be rock-dusted. Elswick’s body was located near theconstruction area for the new mother beltdrive.

Examiner George Curry entered themine at approximately 6:42 a.m. from theNorth Portal and arrived at the Barrier Sectionat 8:14 a.m. During his examination, hereached Ellis switch at 10:53 a.m., 78 break atapproximately 11:12 a.m. and returned to theBarrier Section at 12:23 p.m. He left theBarrier Section at 1:59 p.m., exiting the minethrough the North Portal at approximately2:07 p.m. Curry was examining seals and theLBB power centers and pumps.

Belt examiner Tim Williams enteredthe mine at approximately 6:33 a.m. from theNorth Portal. He arrived at the BarrierSection at approximately 6:48 a.m. It is notclear where Williams traveled from that point,but he exited the mine through the NorthPortal at 2:11 p.m.

22

Track Crew

The track crew, Ralph Plumley, Owen Davisand Eric Jackson, entered the mine atapproximately 7:20 a.m. from the Ellis Portal. They traveled inby 78 break at approximately7:50 a.m. There is no further report of theiractivities until 2:30 p.m. when they traveledoutby 78 break. The crew left their track jeepat Ellis 5 belt head and rode out with thepumper crew. They exited the mine throughthe Ellis Portal at approximately 3:01 p.m.

Supply Crew

The supply crew entered the mine atapproximately 8:16 a.m. from the NorthPortal. They passed 78 break at 8:57 a.m.There was no further report of their activitiesuntil they traveled outby 78 break at approx-imately 2:30 p.m. They exited the minethrough the North Portal at 3:00 p.m.

Supply man Clifton Earls entered themine at approximately 9:36 a.m. from theNorth Portal. He traveled past Ellis switch ataround 10:01 a.m. on his way to deliver ahigh-voltage cable to the Ellis ConstructionSection. He traveled back past the Ellisswitch at 12:14 p.m. and arrived at the NorthPortal at approximately 12:32 p.m.

Earls re-entered the North Portal,arriving at the Barrier Section at 1:05 p.m. He later exited the mine through the NorthPortal, arriving on the surface at 2:07 p.m.

Electricians Tommy Sheets and VirgilBowman entered the mine at approximately10:20 a.m. from the North Portal. They trav-eled to the Glory Hole area where they strungpower cables for the new mother belt drive. They left the area, passing by 78 breakat 2:25 p.m., and exited the mine through theNorth Portal at 2:51 p.m.

Mine Superintendent Everett Hagarand Longwall Coordinator Jack Roles enteredthe mine at approximately 8:35 a.m. from theEllis Portal. They traveled to the mother beltdrive construction area, arriving at 9:37 a.m. MSHA reported that Roles was also on theLongwall face at some point during the shift. The two traveled outby, passing 78 break at1:55 p.m., and exited the mine through theEllis Portal at 2:21 p.m.

Mine Manager Wayne Persinger wastracked around Ellis Portal on April 5, 2010. He indicated he went to the Ellis ConstructionSection that day. Testimony indicates he wason the surface at the time of the explosion.

According to witness testimony,Charles Athey, Dennis Simms and JacobDoss were also underground on April 5, 2010. It is believed they were shoveling the beltnear the Ellis Construction Section. Theseindividuals were not wearing tags, or the tagsthey were wearing did not have namesassociated with the tracking database.

There is also witness testimony thatemployees were working in the South Mainsarea of the mine. It is reported that theyremained underground until 4:00 p.m., almostan hour after the explosion. It is unclear whothese individuals were because the trackingsystem was not operational in that area of themine.

At the time of the explosion, secondshift longwall employees were approximately3 breaks underground boarding their mantrip. Kevin Medley, Cody Davis, KennyWoodrum, Josh Stout, Kevin Brown, TommyEstep, Dustin Ross, David Shears and anotherminer whose tag was not read by the systemwere preparing to travel to the longwall.

23

Tailgate 22 Crew

William Lynch (victim), Carl Acord (victim),Benny Willingham (victim), Robert Clark(victim), Jason Atkins (victim), StevenHarrah (victim), Deward Scott (victim), TimBlake (survivor) and James Woods (survivor)entered the mine at 6:42 a.m. from the NorthPortal. They traveled past 78 break at 7:15a.m. and proceeded to the Tailgate 22Section.

The crew completed their shift andboarded the mantrip to exit the mine. At 78break, James Woods, who was operating themantrip, called outside to the dispatcher forclearance to proceed to the surface. Themantrip moved outby to 66 break when theexplosion occurred. Seven members of theTailgate 22 crew were killed as a result of theblast.

Headgate 22 Crew

Ricky Workman (victim), Howard Payne(victim), Ronald Maynor (victim), JamesMooney (victim), Kenneth Chapman (victim),William Griffith (victim), Joseph Marcum(victim), Gregory Brock (victim) and EdwardJones (victim) entered the mine at 6:05 a.m.from Ellis Portal. They traveled past 78 breakat approximately 7:15 a.m. and continuedinby to the Headgate 22 Section.

The rescue and recovery records showthat the crew had completed its shift and waspreparing to leave the section when theexplosion occurred. Six of the victims werelocated in the mantrip and the other threewere located in the track heading. It appearsthese three were walking toward the mantripin preparation to exit the mine.

Longwall Crew

The longwall crew, consisting of Rex Mullins(victim), Nicolas McCroskey (victim), JoelPrice (victim), Gary Quarles, Jr. (victim),Christopher Bell (victim), Dillard Persinger(victim), Richard Lane (victim) and GroverSkeens (victim) entered the mine atapproximately 6:04 a.m. from the Ellis Portal. Members of the crew arrived at the longwalland began loading coal.

Adam Morgan (victim) and boltersCory Davis (victim), Joshua Napper (victim),and Charles Davis (victim) rode to theirworkplaces with the longwall crew. Theywere working in the track heading outby thelongwall headgate.

24

Ignition, Explosion and Aftermath

Based on the evidence, the followingrepresents the UMWA’s reconstruction ofevents in the hours and minutes immediatelyprior to the explosion, and the Union’s theoryas to the cause of the disaster:

The shearer made two passes byapproximately 11:00 a.m. when the “B-Loc,”a retainer that holds the hinge pin for theranging arm in place, malfunctioned, shuttingdown production. The crew had troublemaking the repair, and reports indicate thehinge pin did not line up properly. Finally atabout 2:15 p.m., repairs were completed andthe crew was ready to load coal. The last callout from headgate operator Rex Mullins wasshortly after 2:30 p.m., when he reported theshearer was at shield 115, cutting towards thetailgate.

The shearer continued down the faceand shortly before 3:00 p.m., the taildrum cutout into the return entry of the tailgate. It isthe consensus of all parties involved in thisinvestigation (except Massey Energy) thatsparks caused by the bits striking sand rockon the face ignited methane that had migratedfrom the gob onto the face. The methane hadmigrated onto the face as a result ofinadequate ventilation. At that moment,MSHA determined that the shearer was de-energized at the tail drum remote control(panic button).

The investigation revealed the waterwas shut off at the headgate. The evidenceindicates that miners Joel Price, GaryQuarles, Christopher Bell and DillardPersinger realized there was a seriousproblem and attempted to exit the area in thedirection of the headgate. They traveled from

the tailgate to shields 104 – 107 (where theirbodies were found), which is approximatelyone-third of the way to the headgate.

The flame from the ignition traveledinto the gob and encountered an explosiveatmosphere of methane gas, resulting in anexplosion. The explosion traveled in bothdirections of the longwall face – with themajor forces exiting into the tailgate entry.

When the explosion exited at thetailgate, it traveled in both directions. Theexplosive forces traveled more than sevenmiles underground. The forces picked up andsuspended excessive amounts of float coaldust that had been allowed to accumulatethroughout the mine.

The suspended float coal dustimmediately became a self-perpetuating fuel. It is given that for the explosion to travel inexcess of seven miles, there had to be a fuelsource. The only logical conclusion is thatfloat coal dust was that fuel source.

As the blast forces traveled outby,they followed the fuel source into thecrossover between North Tailgate and NorthHeadgate, at the same time they traveledtoward 78 break and turned back in thedirection of the working sections. Mineexaminer Michael Elswick, Adam Morganand bolters Cory Davis, Joshua Napper andCharles Davis were killed by the blast as theforces traveled towards the headgate.

The flames and violent forcescontinued inby, killing headgate operator RexMullins and Nicolas McCroskey. The fireballcontinued to follow the fuel source, travelingdown the longwall face and killing Richard

25

Lane and Grover Sheets at shield 85 and JoelPrice, Gary Quarles, Christopher Bell andDillard Persinger, who were evacuating thelongwall face in the direction of the headgate.

So that it is clearly understood, theflames and forces that were traveling outby inthe tailgate entries followed the float coal dustinto the 1 North Longwall Crossover and theNorth Mains Entries. They continued inby inthe headgate entries and down the longwallface from the headgate towards the tailgate. The flames and forces circled around thelongwall panel and killed the crew membersas they were attempting to exit toward theheadgate (see attached map).

The flames and forces also traveledinby to the Headgate 22, Tailgate 22 and 9North Sections. Ricky Workman, HowardPayne, Ronald Maynor, James Mooney,Kenneth Chapman and William Griffith werein the mantrip preparing to exit the minewhen the explosion tore through the Headgate22 Section. Edward Jones, Joe Marcum andGregory Brock were in the track headingwalking toward the mantrip when they werekilled.

The force of the blast continued to

pick up and suspend float coal dust in itswake as the explosion tore through thecrossover from 1 North Tailgate towards 1North Headgate and crossed into the GloryMains at or around 85 break. The forces fromthe blast traveled inby their respectivelocations and into the working sections.

In the course of mining operations, ahole was drilled between UBB and the Castlemine, which is located in the coal seamimmediately above UBB. This hole, knownas the Glory Hole, was used to dump coalfrom the mine above onto UBB’s conveyorbelt system. The coal would then betransported to the surface for processing andshipping. While the Glory Hole between thetwo mines had been filled in, a six-inchborehole remained open in the area. Theforces and flames from the explosion traveledthrough the hole and scorched the roof of theadjoining mine.

The explosion traveled in an inbydirection in the Glory Mains and 1 NorthHeadgate entries. Forces continued inby inthe 1 North Headgate entries, splitting at thecrossover traveling from Headgate 21-1 Northtowards Headgate 22 and further inbyHeadgate 21-1 North to approximately 40break, where it appears restrictions preventedit from traveling further inby.

The explosion continued to be fueledby suspended float coal dust as it completedits destructive path into the remainingsections of the mine. The explosion traveledthe entire length of the Headgate 22 Sectionas well as 8 and 9 North Mains.

When the explosive forces and flamesreached the deepest penetration of the mine,they reversed themselves, retreating outby inmuch the same path that they entered eachTailgate 22 section belt and belt structure bent,

twisted from forces of explosion.

26

area. This event resulted in some of the mostdestructive forces released in the explosion.

These forces traveling outby from theworking sections killed most of the crewexiting the mine from the Tailgate 22 Sectionat 66 break of the North Mains. Despite theheroic efforts of Tim Blake to assist themembers of his crew, William Lynch, CarlAcord, Benny Willingham, Robert Clark,Jason Atkins, Steven Harrah and DewardScott all perished. When James Woodsarrived on the surface, he was loaded into anambulance and taken to the hospital.

The forces of the blast sent theexplosive fireball in an outby directionbeyond 78 break of the North Mains entries. The extreme pressure generated by theexplosion continued to travel outby carryingdebris and dust. These forces were so greatthat dust and debris blew out the surfaceopenings at both the Ellis and North Portals. The North Portals are approximately fivemiles from the ignition site.

MSHA was notified at 3:30 p.m. byJonah Bowles, Safety Director of MarforkMine, that the air at Ellis Portal had reversed,

concentrations of CO between 50 and 100ppm were detected, the mine was beingevacuated and no one was trapped. MSHAissued a 103(j) order at 4:00 p.m., setting inmotion the mine rescue and recoveryoperations (maps of explosion path attached).

The UMWA is convinced that theexplosion and forces on April 5, 2010, wereinitiated by a small amount of gas thatpropagated into a massive explosion fueledby float coal dust which, because of a lackof proper rock-dusting, was allowed toaccumulate in excessive quantitiesthroughout the mine. This float coal dustplayed the most significant role in thedisaster at UBB. It permitted the explosionto gain force and travel a great distance,causing vast destruction.

The Union recognizes that faceignitions can occur during normal miningoperations. Indeed, it is not uncommon forsuch ignitions to occur. In the 12 months priorto the UBB explosion, 70 such ignitions werereported to have occurred in the UnitedStates. None of them resulted in a fatality (listof ignitions attached).

The fact is that ignitions can becontrolled at mines that have adequateventilation, proper rock-dusting, functioningwater sprays, well-maintained machinery andproper overall mine maintenance.

In the case of UBB, none of thesenecessary preventive steps were taken byMassey Energy. In its focus to increaseproduction, the company turned a blind eye tothe requirements that ensure a safe andhealthy work environment for miners. Massey ignored the statutory requirementsunder the Act in it its drive for ever-greatercoal production at any cost.

Roof bolt plate bent from initial path (left side) andsecondary path (right side) of explosion.

27

Response to the ExplosionThe Federal Mine Safety and HealthAdministration (MSHA) initially issued a 103(j) order for the UBB mine at 4:00 p.m. EDTon Monday, April 5, 2010. The Order notedthat “An accident occurred at this operationon 04/05/10 at approximately 3:27 p.m.” MSHA District Manager Robert Hardmanissued the order verbally in a telephoneconversation with the mine (attached).

Section 103 (j) of the Mine Act states,“In the event of any accidentoccurring in any coal or other mine,the operator shall notify the Secretarythereof and take appropriate measuresto prevent the destruction of anyevidence which would assist ininvestigating the cause or causesthereof. In the event of any accidentoccurring in any coal or other mine,where rescue and recovery work isnecessary, the Secretary or anauthorized representative of theSecretary shall take whatever actionhe deems appropriate to protect thelife of any person, and he may, if hedeems it appropriate, supervise anddirect the rescue and recoveryactivities in such mine.”

The issuance of a 103 (j) order wasMSHA’s initial response to this accidentbecause it had the potential to be massive inscope or it placed the lives of miners at theoperation at grave risk. This section of thelaw gives MSHA broad powers to takecontrol over all areas of the mine, bothsurface and underground, for the purpose ofrescue and recovery. Further, it placesMSHA in the role of mine owner as the entityin charge of all plans for rescue and recovery.

Upon arriving at the mine at 5:20p.m., Mr. Hardman modified the 103 (j) orderto a 103 (k) order (attached).

Section 103 (k) of the Act states, “Inthe event of any accident occurring inany coal or other mine, an authorizedrepresentative of the Secretary, whenpresent, may issue such orders as hedeems appropriate to insure the safetyof any person in the coal or othermine, and the operator of such mineshall obtain approval of suchrepresentative, in consultation withappropriate State representatives,when feasible, of any plan to recoverany person in such mine or to recoverthe coal or other mine or returnaffected areas of such mine tonormal.”

The difference between these twosections of the Act is significant. Themodification of the order changes the role ofthe Agency from the active agent pursuing therescue and recovery to that of an entity thatapproves plans proposed by the company. The Union has long held that in these types ofdisasters, the Agency should always take thelead role in a rescue and recovery operation. As noted earlier, the issuance of these ordersis a routine response on the part of MSHA.

According to reports, shortly after theexplosion occurred, ten Massey Energyofficials entered the mine, six from EllisPortal and four from the North Portal. Thoseentering at Ellis were: Chris Blanchard,Performance Coal Company President; JasonWhitehead, Vice President of Operations;Jack Roles, Longwall Coordinator; EveretteHager, Section Foreman; Patrick Hilbert,

28

Section Foreman; and Wayne Persinger, MineManager. The individuals entering from theNorth Portal were: Gary May, MineSuperintendent; James Walker, SafetyDirector; Berman Cornett, Safety Director;and Rick Foster, Mine Foreman.

At the time these individuals enteredthe mine, a 103(j) order was in place andthere was no plan in place for exploring themine in a safe, effective and methodicalmanner. In fact, it does not appear thatmanagement personnel entering the portalswere aware of the activities of the others. Forindividuals placed in positions of authority,these actions show a remarkable disregard ofbasic mine rescue protocol. They put thelives of many at risk and compromised therescue operations.

This is an extremely important point,because from the moment such a disasteroccurs, no one from the surface should,without submitting a written plan to MSHAfor approval, enter the underground areas ofthe affected mine. Such protocols were put inplace to both protect the lives of the minerescue teams entering the mine and minerswho may be trapped underground.Unauthorized and unplanned excursionscould create dangerous conditions that wouldnot otherwise occur. Such conditions couldlead to additional catastrophic events.

Likewise, there is a very real need tosecure and prevent any damage to all materialevidence that may remain after the disaster. Individuals wandering through the mine,without proper authority and withoutfollowing appropriate protocols, could, formany different reasons, destroy importantevidence, jeopardizing the entire rescue andrecovery operation and the subsequentinvestigation as well as endangeringthemselves and others.

While it is not unusual to have someconfusion in the early stages of such anaccident, this should never be permitted tointerfere with the standard mine rescue andrecovery efforts that must be conducted. Thelevel of confusion and the fact it continuedthroughout the entire rescue operation wasunacceptable. Action must be taken to seethat this does not occur in the future.

Massey personnel who entered fromthe Ellis Portal drove a mantrip into the mine,removing debris from the track as they went. At approximately 42 break, they encounteredTim Blake, Roof Bolter, walking outby in thetrack heading. Blake was a member of theTailgate 22 crew that included: Steve Harrah,Section Foreman; James Woods, Electrician;Bill Lynch, Carl Acord, Jason Atkins, BennyWillingham, Robert Clark and Deward Scott.

Patrick Hilbert, an EMT, wasinstructed to stay with Blake. The rest of theunauthorized individuals traveled inby to 66break, where Blake told them the remainingmembers of his crew were located. After abrief period, Roles returned to 42 break andinstructed Hilbert to take the mantrip inby andassist those already there in loading theinjured miners for transport to the surface.

During this period, the mantrip fromthe North Portal carrying May, Cornett,Walker and Foster arrived in the same area.

Harrah, Woods, Lynch and Acordwere placed in the mantrip Hilbert wasoperating. Wayne Persinger got into themantrip with Hilbert and the others to assistHarrah and Lynch. Hilbert then began takingthe trip outside. On the way they encounteredGary May and Berman Cornett, who got intothe trip to assist Persinger with Harrah andLynch.

29

The second mantrip that entered fromthe North Portal, operated by Foster, alsobegan to exit the mine. They saw Roles andBlake at 47 break; the two men got into themantrip and exited the mine.

A third mantrip, which had originallybeen transporting the Tailgate 22 crew fromthe mine at the end of their shift, wasoperated by Everett Hager and includedAtkins, Willingham, Clark and Scott. It alsoexited the mine.

For reasons that may never be fullyknown, Blanchard and Whitehead, who hadself-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) but wereneither equipped with standard mine rescueapparatus nor trained mine rescuers, stayedunderground and illegally traveled throughoutthe mine.

Since these two individuals assertedtheir Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination during the investigation,there is no record of what activities theyperformed, nor is it known which areas ofthe mine they entered. However, it is clearthat their travels included the areas where theexplosion had claimed the lives of 29 minersjust hours before.

Evidence shows that these twoindividuals continued on foot inby in theNorth Mains headings, then traveled theGlory Mains to the mouth of the 1 NorthHeadgate and began walking into the section. It was reported that they were forced toretreat from the area before they reached thelongwall headgate due to high CO levels. Blanchard and Whitehead then traveledthrough the crossover from 1 North Headgatetoward 1 North Tailgate and proceeded up thetailgate entries to the longwall.

It is unclear how far they traveledin this area. However, the investigatorsfound a methane sensor inby the shearerthat appeared to be new. Despite theexplosion, it was not damaged, nor was itcovered with any soot or dust.

The two men then retraced their pathinto the 1 North Headgate entries, this timemaking it to the longwall. After spending anunknown amount of time in the area, theyproceeded through the crossover betweenTailgate 21-1 North and Headgate 22. Indications are that they traveled the entirelength of the entries and into the section.

At some point in time, Blanchard andWhitehead exited the area and arrived at 78break, where members of various mine rescueteams were assembling. It is important tonote that neither Blanchard or Whiteheadvolunteered any information to the rescueteams about where they had been, what theyhad been doing or what they had observed. Unfortunately, during the undergroundoperation, it does not appear anyone from theState or MSHA pressed them for thisinformation. The fact that they withheldcritical information placed lives at risk andseverely hindered the rescue and recoveryefforts.

Deployed SCSRs on top of mantrip and on ground at1 North 21 Longwall track.

30

This lack of communications wasextremely dangerous given the circumstances. Individuals wandering through the mine afteran explosion inevitably leave evidence oftheir travels, as was the case here. Rescueteams who were unaware of their travels post-accident may have mistaken their tracks asevidence that a miner survived the blast. Inthat instance, the teams may press forward inan effort to locate the miner, placing rescuersat unnecessary risk.

The Union seeks to make this pointregarding control of mine property after anaccident exceedingly clear. There should beno question that events that unfoldedimmediately after the accident and continuedwell into the early morning hours of April 6,2010, were not permissible given the circum-tances underground. Experienced personnelknow the protocol for these situations, andMassey management was acutely aware ofthese rules.

The dangers mine rescue teams faceare extreme. Following basic mine rescueprotocols, which have been established overmany years to deal with unknown conditionsafter a major accident, is crucial to the safetyof the rescuers. It was reported that the initialmine rescue plan submitted by Massey andapproved by MSHA and the State did notcontain necessary protections, and it becameclear to some that the rescue operation wasout of control.

CONSOL Energy, which had well-trained and experienced rescue teams on theground at UBB, refused to participate in therescue effort because of this lack of adherenceto mine rescue protocol. CONSOL contendedthat the risks posed by the approved planwere unacceptable, especially when a saferalternative plan was possible (GIIP at p. 32).

The Union believes it is impossible tocomplete a thorough investigation of the UBBmine disaster without knowing whatBlanchard and Whitehead did in the minutesand hours immediately after the explosion. These two individuals, after their unauthor-zed entrance and exploration of the mine,invoked their Fifth Amendment right againstself-incrimination and have refused todisclose significant and material information. Certainly these two high-ranking Masseyofficials understood that they were breakingthe law by doing what they did.

It is important to note that becauseMassey Energy was in violation of Section317(p) of the Mine Act, 30 CFR §75-1715and Section 2 (E) (ii) of the MINER Act atUBB for failing to maintain a check-in/check-out and post accident tracking system, therescue effort was compromised from the start.

30 CFR §75-1715 Identification checksystem states in part that “Eachoperator of a coal mine shall establisha check-in check-out system whichwill provide positive identification ofevery person underground, and willprovide an accurate record of thepersons in the mine kept on thesurface in a place chosen to minimizethe danger of destruction by fire orother hazard.”

MINER Act Section 2 (E) (ii) POSTACCIDENT TRACKING requiresthat “Consistent with commerciallyavailable technology and with thephysical constraints, if any, of themine, the plan shall provide for above-ground personnel to determine thecurrent, or immediate pre-accidentlocation of all underground personnel. The system so utilized shall befunctional, reliable and calculated to

31

remain serviceable in a post accidentsetting.”

The evidence demonstrates thatMassey Energy was not even aware ofeveryone who was underground at UBB at thetime of the explosion, much less where theywere located pre-accident.

There were assertions that theCompany tracked miners by means of a brasstag check-in/check-out system, however, nosuch board was ever located on the property. The tracking system required by the 2006MINER Act was not functional at UBB.

The first reports made available to thepublic regarding persons who were in themine at the time of the explosion indicated, “6people confirmed dead and at least 20 wereunaccounted for underground.” (GIIP at page34) This was at approximately 6:00 p.m. Clearly, no one at the operation was keepingtrack of who entered and exited this mine.

During the course of the evening andinto the morning, officials from the Companyreleased the following information: DonBlankenship, Massey Energy CEO, stated at8:32p.m., “...seven dead and 19 unaccountedfor.” (GIIP at page 38) Later when MasseyEnergy Vice President of Safety ElizabethChamberlin was asked by an official fromWest Virginia Office of Homeland Securityhow many people were underground, sheresponded, “We are having difficultyestablishing a number.” (GIIP at page 38)

This is absolutely unacceptable,especially given the tragic events that haveoccurred in the mining industry over the past10 years. The MINER Act was enacted inresponse to the tragedies that occurred in2006 alone. More to the point: The January19, 2006, deaths of two Massey Energy

employees at Aracoma Alma #1 Mine werepart of the catalyst for passage of thislegislation. One significant intent of thislegislation was to ensure these situations ofnot knowing who was in the mine and wherethey were would no longer occur. All minersentering the mine and their locations duringthe shift must be tracked and recorded on thesurface. Massey did not even follow thisbasic requirement.

It was not until after 1:40 a.m. onApril 6, 2010, that anyone at the operationwas able to establish that there were 22miners still underground. At that time it wasdetermined that 25 miners had perished as aresult of the explosion and four remainedunaccounted for. During the ten-hour periodbetween the explosion and the announcement,family members and friends of missingminers were gathering at the mine to hear anynews that was available. Even at the meetingheld at 3:20 a.m., where the families wereofficially informed of the numbers, no onewas able to tell them which miners weremissing and which were confirmed dead.

32

Rescue and Recovery OperationsIt is extremely difficult to determine whenMSHA District 4 and the State effectivelytook an active role in the rescue and recoveryefforts. All indications are that, despite themine being under orders by MSHA and theState, Massey Energy’s Chief OperatingOfficer, Chris Adkins, was handling all thecommunications from the surface to theunderground.

In large part this demonstrates therogue attitude of Massey Energy thatextended to the highest levels of theCompany. The attitude was that this wasMassey’s mine and despite the fact thatmanagement was responsible for allowinghazardous conditions to exist in the mine,they were in charge.

Some time after the first mantripscarrying victims exited the Ellis Portal,Robert Asbury, James Aurednik and MarkBolen, all trained mine rescue personnelemployed by Massey, entered the mine at theEllis Portal. It does not appear that theAgencies were made aware of their entry atthe time. Their stated intent was to repairtelephone lines and locate Blanchard andWhitehead.

Wayne McPherson, also a member ofthe Massey mine rescue team, was leftoutside to identify the victims who werealready on the surface. Not being able to doso, he had his equipment readied and traveledunderground to meet up with the othermembers of the team.

The men traveled to 78 break wherethey encountered Blanchard and Whiteheadoutby that location. Bolen reported to Adkinsin the Command Center that they had located

the two individuals (Blanchard andWhitehead) and that they were okay. This isnoted in the Command Center log books at8:00 p.m. This was just before other rescueteams began arriving at 78 break.

Prior to the arrival of additional rescueteams, Asbury and Aurednik advanced inby78 break barefaced heading in the direction ofthe active working sections. Both of theseindividuals were trained mine rescue teammembers, and Asbury was a team captain. Yet they violated the most basic mine rescueprotocols and traveled deeper into the mine,even though they were not wearing apparatusnor had necessary back-up.

It is unclear why these trained minerescuers would act this way. They hadalready spoken with Blanchard andWhitehead, who had been in the area. Whatcompelled the rescuers to re-enter the area?

Some time after 6:30 p.m., Fred Wills,MSHA field office supervisor from MountCarbon, Jim Hicks, MSHA field officesupervisor from Mount Hope, and Jerry Cook,MSHA field office supervisor fromPineville–all trained mine rescuepersonnel–entered the mine. The threetraveled to 78 break where they weresurprised to find Blanchard, Whitehead andtwo Massey mine rescue team members. Wills stated, “I thought we were the firstpeople going underground, I thought themines were evacuated.” (GIPP at page 43)

Despite the fact that neither Blanchardnor Whitehead were trained mine rescuepersonnel, it appears no one attempted toremove them from the mine. Recordsindicate Blanchard and Whitehead remainedunderground until the order was given to pull

33

all personnel at 12:45 a.m. This is highlyunusual in a mine rescue scenario. Rescueprotocol only permits trained rescuersunderground during sensitive operations; allother persons must be removed to thesurface.

When Wills, Cook and Hicks arrivedat 78 block, there was some limiteddiscussion with the four Massey managersregarding why they were in the mine andwhere they had traveled.

In the course of the discussion,Blanchard told Wills, “...that he andWhitehead had traveled toward the longwallon the headgate and tailgate, looking forsurvivors. They didn’t go into particularsexactly where they went to, because I don’tthink they wanted me to know,” he said. MSHA’s Command Center notes indicateBlanchard and Whitehead reportedencountering high carbon monoxide levels onthe tail side of the longwall. They also sawvictims on the longwall track, who were lateridentified as Cory Davis, Timmy Davis,Adam Morgan and Joshua Napper. It was notclear to investigators why the informationcontained in the Command Center notes wasnot shared with Wills, Cook or Hicks or otherunderground rescue team members.

Even after Wills’ conversation withBlanchard, no one told Cook or Hicks that themine managers had discovered four bodiesinby 78 break during their travels. This isvery strange because the rescue efforts werejust getting underway and this informationwould be important for all rescue teams toknow. Why it was not reported is just asperplexing as why the Massey managers wentunderground in the first place.

As Wills, Cook and Hicks werearriving at 78 break, two Massey Energy

teams and two State teams entered the mine. The teams were briefed by Massey COOAdkins while Link Selfe, MSHA AssistantDistrict Manager from Mount Hope, lookedon. The Union has not been made aware ofexactly when each team entered the mine orthe number of individuals that comprisedeach team, therefore we are unable todetermine the total number of peopleunderground at that point.

It is clear that the Massey Energyteams arrived at 78 break first. When theCommand Center became aware that theteams had arrived, Adkins told them to splitup, with one team to go to the longwall andthe other one to Headgate 22.

This was a grave breach of minerescue protocol. All mine rescue personnelare strictly trained that for every teammember going inby the fresh air base toperform any duties, an equal number ofrescuers must be in reserve at the fresh airbase. The reason for this protocol is that ifsomething unexpected happenes to theadvancing team, sufficient personnel wouldbe immediately available to offer assistance.

MSHA Field Office Supervisors Cookand Hicks were acutely aware of thisrequirement and objected to the orders fromthe Command Center. In the end Cooktraveled with one of the Massey teams to thelongwall. Hicks stayed with the other team atthe fresh air base in reserve in case problemswere encountered inby.

Whitehead discussed the situationwith Adkins on the phone. After theconversation, Whitehead directed Hicks to goto Headgate 22. Hicks took the phone fromWhitehead and spoke directly with Adkins,who informed him that “we need to find 16men, not play mine rescue.” (GIPP at page

34

44) Having received this order from Adkins,who was never trained in mine rescue, Hicksasked to speak with MSHA District 4Manager Robert Hardman.

After expressing his concernregarding proper back-up, Hicks was told byHardman, “You have other teamscoming.....We have to go” (GIIP at page 44).

Once again, and at a critical point inthe rescue operation, MSHA’s top official inthe Command Center allowed the mineoperator to call the shots. Hardman had toknow this was a serious breach of minerescue protocol.

Cook would later state in hisstatement for the investigation, “...it’s badenough trying to find 29 people, you don’tneed 40 more to look for....” (Cook at page 74- emphasis added). Hicks gathered his teamand began to travel into Headgate 22 asordered.

The GIIP Reports noted, “...that whenCook and Hicks reported to UBB thefollowing day, Tuesday, April 6, they weretold they would not be allowed to worktogether, that they would be assigned todifferent shifts and that they would not beallowed to go underground. Demoralized andupset, the two veteran mine rescuers pressedfor an explanation from MSHA mine rescueteam trainer Virgil Brown. They said Browntold them they had been through enough inthe mine.”

“I thought that was a lot of bull. I’m amine rescue person. That’s what I do,” saidCook, who had been involved in rescueefforts at Sago, Aracoma and CrandallCanyon. “And I just never did believe thatwas the reason why we didn’t go backunderground. I think because we run our

mouth [expressing opposition to theCommand Center’s decision to go forwardwithout one-to-one backup], and we donewhat we did when we was in there” (GIIP atpage 44).

Shortly after Hicks’ departure, EugeneWhite and two State rescue teams reached 78break. They worked for some time to movethe fresh air base to break 106 on 6 Northbelt. They could advance no further for aperiod of time because of high levels of gasinby.

White was soon instructed to take histeam and explore the crossover panel in frontof the longwall face. White instructed theother State team to remain at the fresh airbase as back-up, an acknowledgment ofproper mine rescue protocol.

While traveling to the longwall, theteam Cook was with noticed reflectivematerial ahead of them. There theydiscovered the bodies of Cory Davis, TimmyDavis, Adam Morgan and Josh Napper(previously discovered by Whitehead andBlanchard as well as Asbury and Aurednik)around 14 break near a roof-bolting machine(bolter) in the crosscut between number twoand three entries. They also located remnantsof new self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs)that had been deployed post-accident.

The evidence at the bolter indicatedthat someone may have survived theexplosion, so Cook began to follow the bootprints (map of SCSR’s opened post-explosionattached). It was only later that Cook wouldfind out that these SCSRs and the fresh tracksin the area were left by Blanchard andWhitehead or Asbury and Arudnek in theirthree-hour post-accident excursion throughthe mine.

35

As the evening progressed, the teamwith Cook continued to travel deeper into thelongwall section. Near the stage loader, theylocated the body of Rex Mullins. The teammembers continued down the longwall faceand discovered the bodies of Richard Laneand Grover Skeens at shield 85. Further inbybetween shields 104 and 107, the rescuersdiscovered four more bodies: ChristopherBell, Dillard Persinger, Joel Price and GaryQuarles.

Earlier in the evening while travelingtowards Headgate 22, the team with Hicksdiscovered the body of Michael Elswick atthe mother drive at 6 North belt. Theinformation was reported out to the CommandCenter at about 10:00 p.m. Hicks wasunaware at this point that Asbury andArudenik had previously discovered the body.

The team proceeded into Headgate 22,where they located a mantrip and the bodiesof six miners who were preparing to exit themine at the end of their shift. These minerswere later identified as Kenneth Chapman,William Griffith, Ronald Maynor, JamesMooney, Howard Payne and RickyWorkman.

High concentrations of carbonmonoxide and methane, as well as lowoxygen, halted the team’s advance. Afterreporting their finding to the CommandCenter, the decision was made to evacuate themine. This process was initiated at the orderof the Command Center, and all personnelwere outside by 3:30 a.m., Tuesday, April 6,2010.

The first rescue attempt revealed 25miners dead and four still unaccounted for. Unfortunately, the teams were unable toidentify all the miners who had been locatedat that time.

Rescue and RecoveryOperations Continue

The rescue operation over the course of thenext several days was sporadic at best. During that time, several mine rescue teamsentered the mine, only to be withdrawnbecause of hazardous conditions. High levelsof toxic and explosive gases as well as lowoxygen in many areas of the mine stymiedattempts by rescue teams to complete theirsearch.

During this time, Massey Energybegan drilling a series of boreholes in aneffort to monitor the mine atmosphere andclear the mine of the hazardous gases. In theend it would be necessary to drill tenboreholes to accomplish this. These boreholeswere located as follows:

Tailgate 22: No. 1 entry at break 34

Headgate 22: No. 2 entry at break 36 No. 2 entry at break 129 No. 2 entry at break 130 Between Nos.1 and 2 entries at break 130

8 North Mains: No. 4 entry at break 142

9 North Mains: No. 1 entry at break 153 No. 3 entry at break 161 No. 4 entry at break 161 No. 5 entry at break 161

Finally, two mine rescue teams

entered the mine under breathing apparatus atapproximately 4:00 p.m. on Friday, April 9,2010. One team, led by Eugene White,managed to make its way into Headgate 22

36

Section of the mine. The team traveled inbythe track entry, and between 14 and 18 breakfound the bodies of Gregory Brock, JoeMarcum and Edward Dean Jones.

The other team, which was sent toexplore the Longwall Section, was unable tolocate any victims in its search. After aperiod of time, both of the teams wererunning low on oxygen and retreated fromtheir respective search areas.

A third team, also under breathingapparatus, was ordered to the LongwallSection and continued to search the area. Their initial search, like the previous two, wasunsuccessful. When the team worked its wayback to the Headgate, they noticed a bodylodged in the headgate shields. At 11:20p.m., Friday, April 9, 2010, NicolasMcCroskey was the final victim located in theUBB mine.

Despite holding out hope theafternoon of April 9 that survivors would belocated, the discovery of McCroskey’s bodymeant that the rescue operation was over, andrecovery operations would officially begin.

Recovery of the VictimsThe recovery of the 22 miners who stillremained underground began on Saturday,April 10. The extremely hazardousconditions in the mine and the fact that powercould not be restored complicated an alreadydifficult situation.

Mantrips were stationed at 78 break,the deepest penetration possible by mobiletrack equipment. Recovery workers wereplaced in teams of two throughout the mine,and the miners’ bodies were carried fromteam to team until they could be loaded onto amantrip.

This slow and difficult processcontinued for almost four days. The lastvictims, the nine miners of the Headgate 22crew, arrived on the surface the morning ofApril 13, 2010.

The single largest recovery of victimsfrom a coal mine disaster since 1970 wascompleted almost eight days after theexplosion tore through the mine. Thesignificance of this should not be lost to themining industry. The failure of MasseyEnergy management to comply withmandatory health and safety standardsresulted in the death of 29 miners. Thereneeds to be an accounting for their actionsand inactions.

37

VentilationThe ventilation system at UBB consisted ofthree surface fans, two blowing and oneexhausting. Given the testimony we know of,the Union believes serious questions havebeen raised regarding the capability of theventilation system to provide sufficientquantities of fresh air to the entire mine. Thisfact is confirmed by the numerous citationsissued by MSHA.

The Union’s review of theunderground ventilation system at UBBreveals the plan submitted by Massey wasinadequate and included a patchwork ofinadequate plan modifications. Testimonygiven on Capitol Hill and interviews ofminers working at UBB reveals a pattern byMassey of making intentional and illegal airchanges.

MSHA Order number 8094581, issuedon September 1, 2009, substantiates this fact.Many such ventilation changes were madewhile miners were working underground, apractice that is illegal. The testimony alsorevealed that air was redirected to certainareas of the mine at times, robbing air fromother areas. This “Robbing Peter to PayPaul” ventilation scheme is a very dangerouspractice.

Based on the information we havereceived and the citations and orders forventilation issued by MSHA in the 15 monthspreceding the explosion, it is clear that thesystem was poorly designed and Masseypersonnel were continually experimentingwith the ventilation. Mine ventilationsystems are generally designed months andyears in advance based on the projectedmining plans.

However, Massey could not, based onreports from MSHA, produce a timely annualmine map to the Agency as required by law. Joe Mackowiak, MSHA District 4 VentilationSupervisor, stated about the 2009 UBBventilation map that “...it took four separatesubmittals in order to approve that map. So ittook 11 months to get the annual map. So assoon as the annual map was acceptable at thislocation, one month later they would do theirnext annual map.”

Keith Sigmon, a ventilation specialistin MSHA District 4, noted, “I would imagine,say, since December 30, [2009] probably 20some revisions went through our ventilationdepartment.” The Union would like to know:Why were all these revisions needed?

Ventilation is one of the mostimportant requirements in protecting thehealth and safety of miners. Massey’sinability to provide a basic ventilation map asrequired by law is extremely troubling. Whywere they unable to produce an accurate mapin a timely manner? It is the Union’s opinionthat ventilation changes were occurring sofrequently underground that Massey could notproduce the required map. The UMWAbelieves that the Agencies should have beenmore aggressive with regard to this issue.

The South fan at UBB was usedexclusively to ventilate the old workings inthe South Mains area and some sealedlongwall panels in the mine. There was oneworking section in the South Mains, thePortal Section. The beltlines necessary totransport coal to the surface through the SiloPortal were also ventilated by this fan.

38

After sweeping the South Mains area,the air would exhaust through the Silo Portal. This area was ventilated because the mine’swater supply enters here, meaning the areamust be ventilated and examined weekly. The Portal Section was an active miningsection, requiring it and the beltlines to beexamined every eight hours. During thecourse of the investigation, MSHA InspectorBill Bane issued an order to the operatorbecause an area of the South Mains, adjacentto #1 North Belt, had not been examined innearly a year (attached).

The North Portal and Bandytown fanswere the only sources of ventilation for therest of the mine. The information outlinedbelow, gathered during the investigation,demonstrates why the ventilation system didnot function adequately.

On May 20, 2010, prior to thebeginning of the underground investigation,MSHA was inspecting the mine’s fans on thesurface and issued the following citation:

Citation number 8247081 states, “TheNorth Portal Mine fan and the returnentry to the right of the fan is notseparated properly to prevent thereturn air from exiting the mine andre-entering through the mine fan. Themine fan is the primary escapewayentry to the Barrier Section. Whenchecked by utilizing a dry chemicalfire extinguisher at the return entry,the dry chemical for the extinguisherre-entered the mine through the Northfan. This condition prevents theprimary escapeway from beingventilated entirely with intake air ”(citation attached).

In order to correct the problem,workers were required to extend a wall

seventy-five feet on the surface between thetwo entries. This permitted the return air toremain isolated from the pull of the fan.

The Union is uncertain when theNorth Portal Fan was put into operation,however, this is one of the oldest areas of themine. Therefore the question must be asked:How long had this condition been permittedto exist? Just as important: Why was such adangerous condition never discovered by theoperator during regular examinations or citedby the agencies?

These types of events occurred overand over again at UBB, demonstrating thelevel to which health and safety requirementswere permitted to deteriorate. The operatorwas singularly focused on production.

Based on citations and orders issuedby MSHA, there is every reason to believethat Massey Energy’s personnel routinely andillegally changed the airflow in the minewithout Agency approval and with minersworking inby. UBB miner Stanley Stewartnoted that on July 26, 2009, his crew was“...told by management to make an airchange...stoppings were removed while crewswere still working.” (GIIP at page 26)

With respect to the Bandytown fan,MSHA had noted that it consistentlyexhausted 300,000 cubic feet of air perminute, an amount they claim was sufficientto ventilate the UBB mine. They also statedthat most of the air entered the mine throughthe Ellis Portal, traveled through the NorthMains into the numbers 1 and 2 entries of thelongwall tailgate, and exited the mine throughthe Bandytown fan. This could have beenadequate airflow to ventilate the mine.

However, there is overwhelmingevidence, based on the condition of the

39

mine’s ventilation system and throughtestimony, that the active areas of the minewere inadequately ventilated prior to theexplosion. On Saturday, April 3, 2010,Bobbie Pauley–who was working in theHeadgate 22 Section–noted that “I wouldn’tsay it was suffocating, but it was hot” (GIIPat page 16).

James Griffith, a miner on Pauley’screw, told the boss, Brandon Bowling,“You’re going to have to get air up here.There’s no air up here, Brandon” (GIIP atpage 16).

These areas of the mine from theNorth fan and Ellis Portal to 78 Block wouldnormally be easy to ventilate. There was onlyone active section, the Barrier Section in theNorth Mains. Therefore the majority of the airwas coursing through the entries to ventilatethe active workings inby the Glory Mains.

The North Portal Fan was designed toblow air into the North Mains and ParallelNorth Mains, splitting off to ventilate theBarrier Section of the mine. The bulk of theair continued inby the Mains to the 4 NorthBelt area where it split again. Some of the airwas directed outby to the Ellis Portal andthrough Lower Big Branch (LBB), while theremaining air was directed inby toward theactive working faces.

The Bandytown fan would pull airfrom the North Mains into each of the activecontinuous miner sections and into thelongwall section. Some of the air coursing tothe longwall traveled into the headgatebleeder entries and through the gob. Theremainder would sweep the entire longwallface and pressurize the gob. Finally, as theair traveled to the end of the longwall face, itwould course inby to the tailgate bleederentries and exit through the Bandytown fan.

In the normal mining cycle, as thelongwall completes the panel, the headgateentries of that panel will become the tailgateentries for the next longwall panel. However,because conditions in the 1 North Headgateentries had been allowed to deteriorate,mining plans were changed that would causeair entering from North Portal fan to bereduced to the active sections.

The entries in 1 North Headgate wereimpassible from approximately 40 break inbydue to roof falls and water accumulation. MSHA required Massey to begin driving newentries parallel to the current headgate entries.The time required to do this would mean thecurrent longwall panel would be completedbefore the new entries for the next longwallsetup were finished. A decision was made byMassey to move equipment into LBBadjacent to the entries from Ellis Portal todevelop two short longwall panels. This wasdone by Massey to avoid the loss ofproduction while the new 22 Tailgate entrieswere being developed. This also led toMassey’s decision to make the illegal airchange at the Ellis Construction site thatresulted in the active working sections beingventilated by return air.

A construction crew was assigned tocut overcasts and belt channel in the EllisPortal Construction Section. The week beforethe accident, the crew opened a set of double(air lock) doors, allowing air blowing outbytoward the Ellis Portal to sweep through theintersection where they were working. Thiswould inevitably have placed the crew in thereturn path of some of the dust generated bythe continuous miner as they cut the overcast. Such a practice is illegal and an extremehealth hazard.

Sometime between the Thursdaybefore the explosion (April 1) and the day of

40

the explosion, Massey made the illegal airchange. Ventilation controls in the LBB areaof the mine and at Ellis Construction Sectionwere compromised and a part of a regulatorwas torn out. This change resulted in air beingpushed from the North Portal fan, thentraveling up the North Mains and NorthMains Parallels to the lower end of LBB. Theair then split at LBB with an undeterminedamount traveling in both directions (citationattached).

After Massey made the illegal airchange at the construction site, just daysbefore the explosion, miners werecomplaining about a lack of air, air reversalsand extremely hot conditions.

The Union maintains that once theair change was completed at the EllisConstruction site, the mine from that pointinby to the active working sections was beingventilated by return air.

Some of the air exiting the EllisConstruction site was coursed inby to theactive working sections, placing all the activesections on return air. Members of the crewimmediately noticed the change when theyarrived at the Ellis Construction Section onMonday, April 5, 2010. Roof Bolter JoshuaWilliams stated that he asked the boss aboutthe air reversal, but received no explanation(GIIP at page 19).

Other crew members returning to themine on April 5 noticed the air had reversedin some areas and was almost stagnant inothers. Some of the miners questioned thelack of ventilation. One noted, “It was hot inthere, miserably hot” (GIIP at page 16).

Because the configuration of UBB’sventilation plan was designed on a “push-pullsystem,” the UMWA believes that when the

North Portal fan used to help ventilate theactive working sections was compromised,the ventilation system was renderedineffective. Based on the UMWA’sinvestigation and a review of Massey’sviolation history, illegal and intentional airchanges were a common practice at the mine.

The Bandytown fan continued tooperate, pulling air from the mine. Thisexplains the fact that air reversed in the GloryHole area where Construction Foreman MikeKiblinger noted, “Thursday before theexplosion... the dust was blowing out of themine. When he returned on Monday, thecrew was cutting the overcast, and the dustwas blowing into the mine..” (GIIP at page19).

The decrease in velocity resulted inthe longwall gob not being pressurized asrequired. Lacking the necessary air velocityalong the face inevitably permitted methaneto migrate onto the face. At the same time therestrictions in the bleeder entries compoundedthe problem. It is the UMWA’s opinion thatthis is the most likely explanation for thepresence of significant methane in the area tocause the ignition and subsequent explosion.

The investigation showed that poorventilation must have been a commonproblem on the longwall. The investigationrevealed a burnt remnant of a brattice clothhanging from shield 173 towards the tailgatedrive where a methane sensor was mounted. The curtain o-rings and tie wires indicate itwas hung from the shield towards the face toa point just inby the tailgate methane sensor. This would direct all the airflow towards thesensor, diluting the methane at that point andeliminating its ability to detect the actualamount of methane on the face.

41

Based on evidence uncovered duringthe investigation, we believe the methanemigrated onto the face and was ignited by theshearer. The flame followed the fuel sourceinto the gob area behind the shields, where itencountered a methane-air mixture thatresulted in the explosion. This methaneexplosion exited the gob at or around theshearer at the tailgate with sufficient force topick up and suspend float coal dust in thearea. From that point, the mine was engulfedin a self-propagating dust explosion thatentered all the active sections inby 78 blockand then reversed with greater force andexited the mine through the portals.

Violation HistoryThe violation history of UBB documents thehazardous conditions at the mine leading upto the explosion. Inadequate ventilationcoupled with repeated and unapprovedventilation changes made by Masseypersonnel set the stage for the tragic events ofApril 5, 2010. Massey consistently violatedthe law and provisions of its approvedventilation plan.

The sheer number and magnitude ofthese violations should have raised a red flag

with MSHA District 4. The following isproof of the severity of the problem:

CFR 30 §75.325 (b) “In bituminousand lignite mines, the quantity of airreaching the last open crosscut of eachset of entries or rooms on eachworking section and the quantity of airreaching the intake end of the pillarline shall be at least 9,000 cubic feetper minute unless a greater quantity isrequired to be specified in theapproved ventilation control plan. This minimum also applies to sectionswhich are not operating but arecapable of producing coal by simplyenergizing the power on the section.”

Massey Energy was required to supplyat least 15,000 cubic feet of air per minute(cfm) in the last open crosscut, according toits approved ventilation plan.

The UBB Mine was cited six timesfrom January 2009 until the day of theexplosion specifically for violating §75.325(b). The total air velocity reaching the lastopen crosscut in five of these violationsranged from 4,900 to 7,339 cubic feet perminute, far below Massey’s approvedventilation plan.

Citation number 8082682, issued onMarch 18, 2009, stated the following:“The operator is failing to maintain9,000 cfm of air in the last opencrosscut of the #2 working section. When tested there was not enough airpresent to turn the anemometer”(emphasis added).

Melted canvas and plastic ties on air hose wherecanvas was used to direct airflow onto methanesensor on the longwall.

42

These violations are indicative ofventilation problems that were occurring atUBB. To have such substandardairflow–including being cited for no airmovement at all–is unacceptable. What ismore troubling is that based on evidence andtestimony, the Union believes that had aninspector not been present when theseconditions were found, Massey would haveoperated the sections, despite havinginadequate ventilation.

The requirements of §75.333 areminimum requirements that may be increasedas mining conditions warrant. Any additionalrequirements must be included in the mineventilation plan.

CFR 30 §75.333 Ventilation controls. Ventilation systems are required to beconstructed using materials specifiedin the regulation. All brattice walls,undercasts, overcast, air locks, sealsand any other devices utilized tofacilitate proper and adequate air flowthrough the mine must be built inaccordance to these minimalstandards. Further, once constructedthey are required to be maintained tocontinuously perform the function forwhich they were built.

Massey was cited 48 times at UBBfrom January 2009 for violations of §75.333. There are various reasons for these citations,including failing to close air lock doors andblocks missing from brattice walls(ventilation controls).

Some are, however, especiallyimportant to note because they demonstratean obvious disregard for the law by Masseythat could materially affect the health andsafety of miners.

Citation number 8082751, issuedApril 30, 2009, states, “The operatoris failing to construct ventilationcontrols from non-combustiblematerial. The operator hasconstructed a regulator, at spad21083, out of line curtain” (emphasisadded).

Regulators are extremely importantstructures in the ventilation system, as waspointed out when one was partially torn out atthe Ellis Portal Construction site. Thepossibility of destruction by fire, heaving orforce, as pointed out in the citation, is veryreal.

The decision to build a regulator outof line curtain is yet another indication thatMassey disregarded both the law and thehealth and safety of its employees.

Citation number 6612932, issued July15, 2009, states, “The operator failedto maintain ventilation controls toserve the purpose for which they werebuilt in the left return off No. 1Section in that the return airway wascommon with the neutral airway in thediagonal connector from No. 1Tailgate to No. 1 Headgate and in thenumber 2 Heading outby Break No. 9. Add the following statement: Theareas that allowed the return to mixwith the neutral air are: 1) thestopping in 3 Heading at the cutthrough to 1 North Headgate had adoor open, 2) the overcast in 3Heading in the diagonal entries hasnot been sealed, 3) the stoppingbetween 1 and 2 Headings 1 bk [sic]inby old belt head has a 4' x 4' hole, 4)the scoop air lock doors are damagedat the old belt head, and 5) the scoop

43

airlock door outby No. 9 break are notadequately sealed.”

It was not a single event that led to theissuance of this citation. Incomplete work onventilation controls, damage to others andgeneral non-compliance noted in five separatelocations in the area came together to create ahazardous situation. Massey routinely usedairlock doors instead of overcasts to ventilatethe mine. This permitted air from differentareas of the mine to mix, compromising themine’s ventilation. Management had to beaware of these problems and was required bylaw to correct them.

Citation number 8085028, issued onNovember 19, 2009, states, “In sealset #3, seals numbered 14, 15, 16, 17,18 and 19 are being crushed out by thehoving bottom. Air can be heardleaking at the seals and when checkedwith a smoke tube, smoke can be seenentering the seals through cracks. Theseals are in-gassing at this time...”(emphasis added).

Sealed areas of a coal mine arerequired to be kept isolated from all activeareas of the mine. In sealed areas, gases oroxygen-deficient atmospheres can be created. In this instance the inspector noted the sealswere in-gassing. However, should thebarometric pressure drop, the seals will out-gas, causing the contaminated air to enter themine’s ventilation system.

These seals are required to beexamined weekly. Had management beencomplying with the law, this condition shouldhave been found and corrected.

Citation number 8080106, issuedDecember 1, 2009, states, “Thepermanent stoppings in break #54,

#55, #56, #57, #58, #59, #60, #61,#62, #63, #64, #65, #66, #67 and #68between the #2 and #3 entry of theHeadgate 1 North are not beingmaintained in the intent which theywere built due to adverse roofconditions pushing the stoppings out. The return from the #1 Section is notisolated from the return air from theworking longwall panel old works atbreaks...” (emphasis added).

The fact that the inspector foundfifteen consecutive walls that were damaged,eliminating isolation of the return entries, issignificant. Such a vast area of damage couldnot have gone unnoticed if a properexamination was completed as required. Based on the extent of the damage, Masseycannot claim it was unaware of this situation.It is our opinion that this citation should havebeen issued as “willful disregard.”

Citation number 8100144, issuedDecember 30, 2009, states, “Theoperator is failing to maintain thecorrect direction of air flow in firstright panel in the Old No. 3 section. The air flowing threw [sic] theregulator at MP#11 is going in thereverse direction.”

The reversal of air flow in a mine is asignificant event and we have alreadydiscussed the consequences of such events inthis report. However, this citation points outa reversal that occurred at a regulator. Regulators control air flow and force air tosplit in designated directions.

CFR 30 §75.370 Mine ventilationplan; submission and approval statesin part, “The operator shall developand follow a ventilation plan approvedby the district manager. The plan

44

shall be designed to control methaneand respirable dust and shall besuitable to the conditions and miningsystem at the mine. The ventilationplan shall consist of two parts, theplan contents as prescribed in §75.371and the ventilation map withinformation prescribed in §75.372.”

Massey was cited 47 times forviolating §75.370 since January 2009. Ventilation plans are precise documentsdescribing the layout of the mine and whatwill be necessary to ensure adequate air issupplied to mining sections and all other areasof the mine. The written details of the planare necessary for the Agency to ensure themine operator complies with the law. Moreimportantly, they are necessary so minersknow that the conditions they are required towork under are maintained in a manner thatprotects their health and safety.

None of these 47 citations and orderscan be considered incidental or minorinfractions. The violations all materiallyaffected the health and safety conditions forminers at the operation. Some are simplymore egregious than others, but collectivelythey demonstrate the obvious disregardmanagement had for the law and the lives ofits own miners.

Order number 8090855, issued June17, 2009, states in part, “The operatoris failing to comply with page 5 of theapproved ventilation plan... The minerman is standing in the visible dust inthe return of the continuous miner. The section foreman stated he wasaware of the condition.... and failed totake action to correct it” (emphasisadded).

Order number 8090856, issued June17, 2009, states in part, “The operatorfailed to comply with the approvedmethane/dust control plan... The mineroperator was standing in visible dust...The section foreman stated toMSHA that he was aware of theconditions” (emphasis added).

These orders not only revealunhealthy and illegal conditions, but alsoappear to represent routine occurrences atUBB. Visible dust in the mine atmospherecan be the result of several factors, withinadequate ventilation the most likely in thiscase. Secondly, the foreman was aware of thecondition but allowed it to continue. Thisdemonstrates such mining practices werecommon and tolerated by Massey Energy. Based on the investigation, the Unionsuggests such practices were part of thenormal operating procedures imposed byMassey on the workers.

The fact that miners worked in such adusty atmosphere offers great insight into thepresence of black lung disease detected inmany of the miners killed in the disaster. Ofthe 24 miners between the ages of 25 and 61whose lungs could be examined duringautopsy, 17, or 71 percent, showed somestage of black lung disease.

Massey was aware of conditions in themine and expected miners to continue to workin those conditions. The refusal ofmanagement to deal with the ventilationproblems is reflected in many of MSHA’scitations. Some of the bigger problems arelisted below.

Order number 6612934, issued onSeptember 1, 2009, states in part,“The operator failed to follow anapproved ventilation revision....The

45

cited conditions collectivelycontributed to an air reversal in thelongwall setup entries where menwere working.... The air reversalexisted since yesterday...” (emphasisadded).

Order number 8094581, issuedSeptember 1, 2009, states in part, “Anintentional change in the ventilationwas in the process of beingimplemented and unnecessary personswere working in the mine.... Airflowhad reversed in the longwall setupentries (see citation 6612934), andairflow was reversed in the neutral aircourses.... The condition was minewide and the existence of theunderlying ventilation conditions wereextensive and obvious. Foremantravel and worked in the areas whichwere not properly ventilated”(emphasis added).

Order number 8087709, issuedJanuary 7, 2010, just three monthsbefore the explosion, states in part,“The operator is not following theventilation plan as approved by theDistrict Manager on the No. 1 section(MMU 029-0), air flow was not in thedirection shown on the approvedmap.... Mine foreman stated he wasaware of the condition and that it hadexisted for approximately 3 weeks....This violation is an unwarrantablefailure to comply with a mandatorystandard” (emphasis added).

Order number 8103337, issued March9, 2010, states, “The approvedventilation plan, approved 8/09/09 andre-approved 1/22/10, was not beingfollowed in the tailgate entries of thelongwall panel. The air was going

outby in the No. 5-7 entries from thelongwall face (return air) to the mouthof the section instead of intake airgoing inby from the mouth of thesection to the longwall tail.”

These four orders, that were issuedwithin the eight months preceding theexplosion, demonstrate the problems thatrepeated occurred at the mine. Theseconditions were extremely dangerous andeasily detectable. These are conditions thatMassey should have corrected immediately.Based on the language of order number8087709, Massey knew the condition existedfor three weeks and yet failed to take anycorrective action. As with most of itsdecisions, production trumped all otherconcerns at UBB.

This fact cannot be more clearlyrevealed than it was in the report of the GIIP. On January 7, 2010, MSHA Inspector KeithStone started a quarterly inspection at UBBand issued order number 8087709, mentionedpreviously. He ordered miners to bewithdrawn from the Headgate 22 Section ofthe mine until the condition was corrected.

During discussions with the foremanand some crew members, it was learned thatMine Superintendent Everett Hagler;Performance Coal Co.Vice President JamieFerguson; and Performance President ChrisBlanchard were all aware the conditionexisted. (GIIP at page 63) There is no recordthat any of these high-ranking Masseyofficials did anything to correct it.

Further, when this order was abated,Stone continued his inspection and found thatair traveling in the belt entry was reversed. He issued another order and had all theminers on the Longwall Section removed. When Blanchard learned the longwall was

46

shut down, he confronted the inspector. Hetold Stone the situation was unacceptable. Itis difficult to understand why Blanchard wasnot concerned about the air reversal, acondition that placed the miners at great risk;rather, he was upset that the longwall was notproducing.

Time and time again when conditionspresented a hazard to miners, managementchose to place production above health andsafety. The structure of the company and thecontrol exerted by its officers make it clearthis culture of production over safetyreflected the policy of Massey Energy.

Mine ExaminationsThese ventilation regulations are intended toreduce the risk of methane ignitions andexplosions. However, they are not the onlylaws in place to prevent such occurrences. Examinations of the mine are required atpredetermined intervals. The purpose ofthese examinations is to identify hazardousconditions and to ensure they are corrected.

Three types of these examinations areoutlined below. Each is extremely importantto ensure the health and safety of all personsworking at the mine.

CFR 30 §75.360 Preshiftexaminations at fixed intervals. “(a)(1) except as provided inparagraph (a)(2) of this section, acertified person designated by theoperator must make a preshiftexamination within 3 hours precedingthe beginning of any 8 hour intervalduring which any person is scheduledto work or travel underground. Noperson other than a certifiedexaminers may enter or remain in anyunderground area unless a preshift

examination has been completed forthe established 8 hour interval.”

In the fifteen months prior to theexplosion, Massey was cited 37 times forfailing to carry out the requirements of§75.360. In essence, miners were permittedto enter areas without these areas first beingexamined by a certified person.

CFR 30 §75.362 On-shiftexaminations. “(a)(1) At least onceduring each shift, or more often ifnecessary for safety, a certified persondesignated by the operator shallconduct an on-shift examination ofeach section where anyone is assignedto work during the shift and any areawhere mechanized mining equipmentis being installed or removed duringthe shift. The certified person shallcheck for hazardous conditions, testfor methane and oxygen deficiency,and determine if the air is flowing inthe proper direction.”

Mining is a dynamic industry andchanges in working conditions can happenrapidly. Therefore, management is required todesignate a person who is certified to examinethe areas where miners are working duringtheir shift. Most often the person designatedto perform this examination is the foremanassigned to the mining section. Theseexaminations should identify hazards that arecreated while mining. Massey was cited fourtimes in the fifteen months prior to theaccident for failing to make theseexaminations.

CFR 30 §75.364 Weekly examination. “(a)Worked-out areas. (1) At leastevery 7 days, a certified person shallexamine unsealed worked-out areaswhere no pillars have been recovered

47

by traveling to the area of deepestpenetration; measuring methane andoxygen concentrations and airquantities and making tests todetermine if the air is moving in theproper direction in the area. Thelocations of measurement pointswhere tests and measurements will beperformed shall be included in themine ventilation plan and shall beadequate in number and location toassure ventilation and air quality inthe area. Air quantity measurementsshall also be made where the air entersand leaves the worked-out area. Analternative method of evaluating theventilation of the area may beapproved in the ventilation plan.(2) At least every 7 days, a certifiedperson shall evaluate the effectivenessof bleeder systems required by§75.334 as follows:...”

These examinations are required to beperformed in areas of the mine where work isnot performed on a daily basis, includingworked-out areas that are still accessible,intake and return entries as well as outbyareas and along the perimeters of sealedareas. Certified persons are required toexamine for hazardous conditions, test formethane and oxygen deficiency and ensurethe velocity of the air meets the planrequirements and is moving in the properdirection.

Like the other examinations, theseweekly examinations are critical to the healthand safety of the miners. Changingconditions outby the active working sectionscan create hazardous conditions affecting theentire mine. From January 2009 until thetime of the explosion, Massey was cited 18

times for failing to perform weeklyexaminations as required.

MSHA has released informationregarding the Massey mine examiner whowas assigned to perform weeklyexaminations of the longwall bleeders andmake preshift examinations for thepumpers at UBB: The multigas detectorassigned to this examiner had not beenturned on since March 18, 2010. Thissimple fact means that it would have beenimpossible for this individual to performany proper and legal examinations sincethat date, at least.

Belt AirMassey Energy officials have raised the issueof belt air on several occasions since theexplosion. They contend that MSHA singledout UBB and prohibited them fromcontinuing to use belt air to ventilate theworking faces. The Union would argue giventhe facts surrounding the use of thiscontroversial method of ventilation thatMSHA’s decision was warranted.

Under the provisions of the 2006MINER Act, Congress created a TechnicalStudy Panel (Panel) under Section 514 of theMine Act to, “...provide independentscientific and engineering review andrecommendations with respect to theutilization of belt air and the composition andthe fire retardant properties of belt materialsin underground coal mining.”

The Panel completed its work onDecember 20, 2007, and submitted its reportand recommendations to the Agency. MSHAthen used the information to promulgate newrules regarding the use of belt air to ventilatethe working face(s) of a coal mine. The

48

pertinent regulatory language is contained in30 CFR:

30 CFR § 75.350 Belt air courseventilation. “(a) The belt air coursemust not be used as a return aircourse; and except as provided inparagraph (b) of this section, the beltair course must not be used to provideair to working sections or to areaswhere mechanized mining equipmentis being installed or removed.”

“(1) The belt air course must beseparated with permanent ventilationcontrols from return air courses andfrom other intake air courses except asprovided in paragraph (C) of thissection.”

“(2) Effective December 31, 2009, theair velocity in the belt entry must be atleast 50 feet per minute. Whenrequested by the mine operator, thedistrict manager may approve lowervelocities in the ventilation plan basedon specific mine conditions. Airvelocities must be compatible with allfire detection systems and firesuppression systems used in the beltentry.”

“(b) The use of air from a belt aircourse to ventilate a working section,or an area where mechanized miningequipment is being installed orremoved, shall be permitted onlywhen evaluated and approved by thedistrict manager in the mineventilation plan. The mine operatormust provide justification in the planthat the use of air from a belt entrywould afford at least the samemeasure of protection as where belt

haulage entries are not used toventilate working places.” (emphasisadded)

In plain terms, this languageeffectively eliminated the routine use of beltair in the nation’s mines unless the affectedcompanies could justify its use. All minesaffected by this regulation were notified ofthe action and the Agency made arrangementsto phase in the revocation of belt air petitionsat mines that required it to complete currentmining.

No operator was singled out forapplication of this regulation. Massey’sstatements to the contrary are, therefore,completely false.

Massey Energy bears theresponsibility for creating and permitting thehazardous conditions that contributed to theexplosion to exist. The question is: DoesMassey’s conduct constitute criminalnegligence and industrial homicide? If theanswer is yes, the individuals who perpetratedthese crimes must face justice.

49

Coal Accumulations and Float Coal DustThe history of violations at UBBdemonstrates that Massey did relatively littleto comply with the nation’s mining laws. Infact, ample evidence exists to show itroutinely ignored health and safetyregulations in order to maintain productionlevels. This is especially true with respect tothe hazardous conditions that contributed tothe April 5 explosion.

Dust generated during the miningprocess or crushed under mobile equipmentcan create a serious problem in any coal mine. Float coal dust, if not controlled byventilation, water sprays, rock-dusting androutine maintenance, can be suspended in themine atmosphere, creating an explosionhazard. The Mine Act and federal regulationsprohibit these conditions from existing in themine.

Section 304 of the Mine Act states“(a) Coal dust, including float coaldust deposited on rock-dustedsurfaces, loose coal, and othercombustible materials, shall becleaned up and not be permitted toaccumulate in active workings, or onelectric equipment therein.”

“(b) Where underground miningoperations in active workings create orraise excessive amounts of dust, wateror water with a wetting agent added toit, or other no less effective methodsapproved by the Secretary or hisauthorized representative, shall be

used to abate such dust. In workingplaces, particularly in distances lessthan forty feet from the face, water,with or without a wetting agent, orother no less effective methodsapproved by the Secretary or hisauthorized representative, shall beapplied to coal dust on the ribs, roof,and floor to reduce dispersibility andto minimize the explosion hazard.”

“(c) All underground areas of a coalmine, except those areas in which thedust is too wet or too high inincombustible content to propagate anexplosion, shall be rock-dusted towithin forty feet of all working faces,unless such areas are inaccessible orunsafe to enter or unless the Secretaryor his authorized representativepermits an exception upon his findingthat such exception will not pose ahazard to the miners. All crosscutsthat are less than forty feet from aworking face shall also be rock-dusted.”

“(d) Where rock dust is required to beapplied, it shall be distributed uponthe top, floor, and sides of allunderground areas of a coal mine andmaintained in such quantities that theincombustible content of thecombined coal dust, rock dust, andother dust shall be not less than 65 percentum, but the incombustible contentin the return air courses shall be no

50

less than 80 per centum. Wheremethane is present in any ventilatingcurrent, the per centum ofincombustible content of suchcombined dusts shall be increased 1.0and 0.4 per centum for each 0.1 percentum of methane where 65 and 80per centum, respectively, ofincombustibles are required.”

Some of the most deadly minedisasters in history have been the result ofmine operators violating the mandatoryrequirements of this section of the Mine Act. This is what happened at UBB. The finaldeadly event was played out on April 5, 2010,but one of the major causes of theexplosion–float coal dust–was permitted toaccumulate for months before the explosion. These accumulations were widespread,encompassing almost all of the active sectionsand intake and return air courses. Many ofthe citations issued in just the fifteen monthsbefore the explosion demonstrate howimminent this danger was.

MSHA issued eight citations forinadequate rock dust from January 15, 2009,through February 8, 2010, based on rock dustsurveys performed at the mine that did notmeet the statutory requirements of the federalregulations. The percentage of each surveythat was out of compliance ranged from 24 to100 percent. Six of the eight samples takenwere out of compliance by at least 51 percent. These citations represented large areas of theunderground workings at UBB. While therock dust surveys are a snapshot of theconditions in a particular area of the mine,they represent a reliable measure of how theoperator maintains the mine in general.

Further evidence of Massey’sknowledge of the dust problems at the mineare contained in other citations issued for

violations of 30 CFR §75.400, Subpart E,Combustible Materials and Rock Dusting. The company was cited numerous times forloose coal, coal dust and float coal dustthroughout the mine. In the time period notedabove, MSHA issued forty citations andorders to Massey for violating §75.400 ofSubpart E.

Citation number 8082721 issued April14, 2009, states, “The #2 belt on the#1 section is not being maintained freeof combustible materials. The belt hasaccumulations of float coal dust, floatcoal and coal spillage along its entirelength in multiple locations under thebelt and between the belt and theoffside coal rib. There is obviousevidence that the belt has beenadvanced several times withoutcleaning up spillage around the tailpiece or feeder before advancing.” (emphasis added)

This citation is telling because it notesthat coal and float coal dust were presentalong the entire length of the belt. Also, thefeeder had been moved as the sectionadvanced, but no clean-up and rock-dustingwas performed after the moves. Thisdemonstrates it was a practice at the mine toignore these general and necessarymaintenance tasks. It becomes obvious thatmoving the belt closer to the productionequipment was Massey’s only objective. Once the belt was advanced, miningcommenced, and any hazards that werepresent were simply ignored by management.

Order number 8086127 issued July 9,2009, states, “The operator is failingto properly maintain the 029-040MMU section. Loose coal has beenallowed to accumulate in severallocations of the section. The No. 4

51

entry has coal measuring 1 inch to 24inches deep for a distance of 112 feeton both ribs and the roadway. The 3right cross-cut has coal accumulationsmeasuring 1 inch to 24 inches deep onboth ribs and the roadway for adistance of 79 feet in length. The No.3 entry, just outby the last opencross-cut has coal measuring 1 inch to24 inches deep on both ribs and theroadway. The 2 left cross-cut has coalaccumulations measuring 1 inch to 15inches deep on both ribs and theroadway for a distance of 40 feet.With the citation issued on 07/08/2009citing over 2% methane in the samelocation and the problems encounteredtoday with excessive methane, theabove conditions create a hazard. Thisviolation is an unwarrantable failureto comply with a mandatory standard”(emphasis added).

Like the previous citation, this orderdemonstrates the failure of Massey to correctknown hazards as they were found. Thismining section had been cited on July 8,2009, for an accumulation of methane. Whenthe inspector returned the following day, henot only found excessive methane, butexcessive coal spillage on the section as well. Either of these conditions posed a hazard tothe safety of miners underground, but to havethe condition worsen from one day to the nextshows Massey’s contempt for the law.

The problems created bymanagement’s refusal to address dangerousfloat coal dust did not end here, however. The lack of ventilation and reversals of the airflow, discussed previously, played asignificant role leading up to the explosion. The orders noted in the ventilation portion ofthe report, numbers 8090855 and 8090856,

described miners working in visible dust. The lack of adequate ventilation meant thecontaminated air could not course into thereturns and out of the mine; instead it slowlypushed the air down the entries, allowing dustto settle on the mine’s surfaces. The airreversals meant that float coal dust that wouldnormally be carried to the return was not.

Rock-DustingThe first line of defense in controlling floatcoal dust from becoming a dust explosion,like what occurred at UBB, is rock dust. This, too, was ignored by Massey. There isample evidence to demonstrate that inMassey’s never-ending push for greaterproduction, rock-dusting became a casualty. Virtually every credible report regarding rockdust application at UBB has concluded thatthe operator failed to implement a rock-dusting plan that complied with therequirements of the law.

This failure resulted in thedifference between a manageable ignitionon the longwall face being contained andextinguished and an explosion involvingfloat coal dust that killed 29 miners.

The accepted practice at longwallmines when the gate entries are completed fora longwall panel is to heavily rock-dust theentire area before production begins. Thiscoating of rock dust serves to mitigate thehazard that is created from float coal dustgenerated during the mining process.

This “blanket” of rock dust shouldcover both sets of bleeder entries and extendfrom the mouth of the section to the startinglocation of the longwall. In many instances,these areas can be dragged or raked to renderfloat coal dust inert. However, MSHA hasreported that prior to the start of the last

52

active longwall panel at UBB, the bleederentries were not rock-dusted.

MSHA reported that on the day of theexplosion, of the ten belts whereexaminations were recorded, five neededcleaning and six needed rock-dusting. In fact,on the day of the explosion, foreman MikeElswick (victim) called out his preshift reportstating that the belts needed rock-dusting.

While MSHA reported that Masseyhid many violations in the second set ofbooks (“production and maintenance”), it alsoreported that in a little over a month, justprior to the explosion, mine examinersreported that belts were in need of rock dustover 560 times. Management responded tothese reports only 65 times in that period. The preshift examination books for the beltsat UBB also show that management atMassey did not place a high priority on rock-dusting.

A mine the size of UBB would require

regular rock-dusting. Generally mines aslarge as this would have designated rock-dustcrews whose sole assignment would be toclean and dust the areas of the mine from theactive sections’ loading point outby. In orderfor rock-dusting to be done effectively, thesecrews would need to be assigned on each shiftand provided with equipment suitable tocomplete their work.

This was not the case at UBB. Massey designated a two-man crew to rock-dust the entire mine. While this in itselfwould be an impossible task, the crew wasfrequently taken off its rock-dusting job toperform other work. Finally, the equipmentthey were given to use was a 1980's modeltwin tank duster, which routinely broke down. The duster was not even in the mine at thetime of the explosion–it was on the surface.

When MSHA put power on the machine totest it as part of the investigation, the motorburned up.

The rock-dust crew and other minersat the operation were aware that rock dustwas not being applied as required. The GIIPreported that Charles Semenske and TimBlake, both veteran miners, testified that theybelieved rock-dusting was inadequate at themine.

From February 5-9, 2010, fivedifferent individuals were assigned to therock-dust crew. Nathaniel Jeter and CurtisIrwin, who were the dusting crew untilFebruary 5, reported problems performingtheir job. Jeter stated that the duster, “...would clog up, so we would have to spend30 minutes trying to unclog the hoses to getdusted. Then they would clog up again.” Irwin complained, “It would break a lot.”(GIIP at page 50)

On February 5, Gary Young andDustin Richardson were assigned to the rock-dust crew. Shortly thereafter, Richardson wasgiven another assignment and Clifton Stoverbecame the second member of the crew.

UBB rock-dusting machine where it was foundoutside the mine.

53

The crew kept notes regarding theirinability to perform the job because of brokenequipment, clogged hoses or being assignedother duties. One record in the rock-duster’snotebook states, “NO RIDE, NO help, NoSpotter. I’ll call you today. I’m set up to failhere.” (GIIP at page 52) The gap in the notesindicating that they were not rock-dusting onthose days is perhaps even more telling thanthe problems they experienced while trying toperform their job. Twice there are nonotations regarding rock-dusting, each for aperiod of six days.

James Fleming, third shift belt movecrew member who had worked at UBB forfour years, noted, “As far as I can rememberthey only had two men on one shift trying torock-dust this whole mines. And then whenthey do rock-dust, the only place they rock-dust is the track and belt entry. That’s it.”(GIIP at page 52) MSHA has reported thatheaving in the Longwall return entries, anarea that would require regular dusting,prevented the dusters from entering that area.

There are many other accounts fromMSHA, the GIIP and in the media regardingthe lack of rock dust in the mine. Puttogether, they paint another part of afrightening picture of a coal mine that was abomb waiting to go off and a coal operatorwith matches in its hands.

54

Longwall Shearer - Bits and SpraysHow they should typically workMaintaining the longwall shearer, includingmining bits and water sprays, in goodoperating condition is extremely important. The bits are the contact point between themining machine and the coal face. They spinrapidly on the drum of the shearer,penetrating the coal of the solid mining face. Bits striking rock surfaces within the coal oron the roof and bottom of the mining face willcause sparking. It should be noted that atUBB, the coal seam measured 54 inches andthe longwall was cutting 84 inches. Thiswould require the shearer to cut through 30inches of rock at all times.

Frictional sparks are reduced when thebits of the machine are well-maintained andchanged as necessary. The design is such thatthe angle of the bit allows the point to engagethe cutting surface first, shearing off thematerial and reducing the possibility of the bitshank or bit block contacting the solidsurface. As bits wear or are broken, thelikelihood of the shank or bit block, which aremade from softer metals, coming in contactwith the cutting surface is greatly increased. This increases the amount and intensity of thesparking at the point of contact. In someinstances, worn bits and bit blocks will leavea trail of sparks on the cutting surface that canlast for several seconds.

Water sprays are also intended to playa key role in reducing sparking, cooling bitsand controlling dust. Spray systems areengineered to apply a sufficient volume ofwater in a precise pattern. It is extremelyimportant to note that these systems dispensewater over the bits and face area in a mist. The mist effect is generated by water under

pressure passing through the small holes inthe tips of the sprays. This significantlyreduces the possibility of ignitions. They alsoknock down coal dust created during themining process. However, the sprays must bemaintained to operate properly.

Clogged or missing water spraysseverely reduce the system’s effectiveness. Aclogged spray is useless because it cannotgenerate the water mist as required. Amissing water spray, while generatingsignificantly more water at the point of exit, isalso useless. Large volumes of water gushingout of the spray opening, much like whatwould come out of a garden hose, cannotgenerate the same targeted mist required tocool the bits and reduce or eliminate thepossibility of a frictional ignition. Likewise,they will do nothing to control coal dust. Infact, each missing spray decreases the waterpressure within the drum. This pressure dropreduces the volume of water being dispensedat each active spray. When a sufficientnumber of sprays are missing, the remainingsprays will fail to emit any mist, rendering theentire system ineffective.

55

UBB Longwall Shearer -Bits and Sprays

Removing water sprays on the shearerappears to have been a common practice atUBB. Massey, in its effort to hide suchpractices, did not record such events in theofficial examination book. However, in theProduction and Maintenance book for March1, 2010, the record states, “Had no water oneither drum, cleaned several and stopped rightback up, removed 8 on each end, ran like thatrest of shift to try and flush drums, told 3rd

shift” (MSHA June 29, 2011, briefing[attached]). This would permit water to gushout from the shearer, rendering the spraysystem ineffective. However, it would alsopermit water to pass through the shearermotors, keeping them from overheating. Inother words, production continued, but safetywas compromised.

The longwall shearer at UBB was notmaintained in a manner that allowed it tofunction as designed. The evidence showsthat bits on the shearer were broken and wornto such a degree that they would causesignificant sparking as they came in contactwith the mine’s sand rock roof. The heatgenerated by this frictional sparking would besufficient to ignite methane generated duringthe mining process or migrating from the gobonto the face.

MSHA attempted, for several monthsafter the explosion, to test the water sprays onthe shearer. The testing was necessary todetermine the effectiveness of the spraysystem at the time of the explosion and ifMassey complied with its approvedventilation plan.

Massey refused to supply water to thelongwall area for this testing, citing its ownongoing investigation. It was not untilNovember 10, 2010, when MSHA issued a104(a) citation for impeding the investigation(attached), that work on installing a waterlineto the shearer was started by Massey Energy.

While installing the waterline was alarge undertaking, MSHA became concernedthat Massey was not putting enough effort intocompleting the job. In fact, a letter fromCharles Bearse III of Performance Coal Co. toMSHA, dated December 13, 2010, stated thatthe pipe necessary to complete the work wasordered and would be on property soon (attached). When Massey further delayedinstalling the waterline, MSHA beganthreatening the operator with stifferenforcement action in the form of a 104(b)order (for failing to abate a cited condition) ifwork on the waterline was not completedquickly. However, MSHA repeatedly yieldedas the original citation was modified,extending the time allotted for compliancetwelve times before it was terminated onDecember 20, 2010.

Testing of the water spray system onthe shearer was conducted on December 20,2010.

The condition of the water sprays isvery troubling. When water was supplied tothe shearer during the investigation, it wasdetermined that both drums and ranging armshad sprays that were not operating at the timeof the explosion. The tailgate drum was alsomissing several water sprays.

The investigation revealed thefollowing evidence regarding the water spraysthat could be seen on the shearer:

56

• Headgate drum - of the twenty-eightsprays visible, nineteen wereoperating and nine were plugged.

• Headgate ranging arm - of the tenspays visible, five were plugged.

• Tailgate drum - of the forty-twosprays visible, twenty-seven wereoperating, eight were plugged andseven were missing.

• Tailgate ranging arm - of the tensprays visible, five were plugged.

With almost forty percent of thevisible water sprays plugged or missing, thespray system was unable to function asdesigned. The fact that thirty-four of thesprays were plugged is problematic andshould be cited by the Agencies. However, inthis particular case, the Union believes noneof the sprays on the shearer drums wereworking properly, because the missing spraysreduced the water pressure significantly, thusrendering the system useless for purposes ofsafety.

The water-flow testing conductedduring the investigation demonstrated that theseven missing water sprays reduced thepressure within the drums to the point that the

system would not operate as designed. Thewater from the surface was piped through amanifold that controls the amount of pressurethat enters the shearer drums. Even when thewater pressure from the manifold wasincreased to 450 psi and a flow rate of 223gallons per minute, the pressure gauge on thetail drum registered zero psi. It was not untilthe seven sprays were replaced during testingand the water pressure at the manifoldincreased to 450 psi and a flow rate of 211gallons per minute that the pressure gauge onthe tail drum registered 120 psi.

There can be no question that thewater sprays on the shearer were notadequately maintained to control dust orreduce sparking. This raises the question:why was the shearer being operated in thismanner? It is probable, based on Massey’shistory, that shutting down the longwall–evenfor necessary routine maintenance–was notpermitted. Water sprays do not produce coal;therefore they were not important to MasseyEnergy’s management personnel.

The maintenance on the longwall thatwas reported to have been completed theprevious shift must also be questioned. Thereport states that a number of bits werereplaced and general maintenance wascompleted, yet the condition of the shearerafter the explosion contradicts thatinformation. If maintenance was performedon the midnight shift, why were so many bitsworn or missing and the sprays notfunctioning?

The water-flow testing revealedanother possible answer. The water suppliedto the sections in the mine was pumped fromthe Marfork River adjacent to the mine. Thiswater, filled with river sediment, was stored ina tank on mine property and used gravity toflow into the mine. The sediment in the water

Headgate ranging arm sprays on the UBB longwall.Five of the ten sprays were plugged and did not work.

57

had a great potential to clog the water sprayson the mining equipment.

During testing, the water flowingthrough the manifold into the shearer was sothick with sediment that after approximatelysix-and-one-half hours, the testing had to bestopped because the filters had becomeclogged. The testing resumed after the filterswere changed and water could flow throughthe manifold.

Removing water sprays would permitthe water to flow and protect the motors. However, they would not be able to performtheir primary function: controlling dust andsuppressing face ignitions. At the same time,removing sprays would eliminate anyprotection offered by a functional spraysystem.

58

Two sets of booksIn all instances, information about conditions within the mine must be availableto all interested parties at the mine. However,Massey Energy regularly disregarded theserequirements by keeping two sets of books.

On June 29, 2011, MSHA released sixpages from these books, three from theofficial record books and three from Massey’sproduction and maintenance books (attached). The entries are dated March 1, 2 and 16,2010. The official reports do not indicateanything of consequence, no hazards orunusual events. These are the records thatMassey made available to the inspectors andothers on the property, including the minersthemselves.

However, the mine’s production andmaintenance books tell a much differentstory. As noted above, the report for March1, 2010, reads, “Added 5 gal oil to the T/Eranging arm. Had no water on either drum,cleaned several and stopped right back up,removed 8 on each end, ran like that rest ofshift to try and flush drums, told 3rd shift.”

Running the shearer with no watersprays, as would be the case here, is a seriousviolation. Obviously, this would be aviolation of the ventilation plan and because itwas done knowingly, this action demonstratesa reckless disregard for the law. Moreimportantly, the action places the miners onthe section at immediate risk for an ignitionof gas or dust accumulating on the coal face. And over the long term, exposure touncontrolled coal mine dust greatly increasesminers’ chances of contracting black lungdisease.

The production maintenance book forMarch 2 states, “25 min Reventelating [sic] toget methane out of #3 1.5 Reduced to .30.”

The production maintenance book forMarch 16 notes, “Low Air in LOB outbygoing to HG22 Tail open 7:00-8:10....Adverse Roof condition their coal streak four?5' up. Falling out to in # 1 2.”

Since these incidents were notrecorded in the official record book, there wasno way for the oncoming shift to know thatthese hazards existed. Miners entering themine would be absolutely unaware ofpotentially dangerous conditions presentwhen they arrived on the section. Further,when MSHA reviewed the “official” books, itwould not get any sense of what conditionswere actually like in the mine.

The Mine Act requires operators toexamine the entire mine at regular intervals. The scope and timing of the examination isdetermined by the particular examinationbeing performed. Required examinations arelisted in 30 CFR Subpart D – Ventilation,previously referred to in this report.

The results of these examinations arerequired to be recorded in an official recordbook designated for that purpose, signed orinitialed by the person making theexamination and countersigned by the mineforeman or equivalent company official. Thereport must contain a record of hazardousconditions and their locations found by theexaminer during each examination and of theresults and locations of air and methanemeasurements.

59

The reason for recording thisinformation in a designated book is notsimply to have an official record of theconditions in the mine, but to ensure allpersons entering the mine are able to reviewthe information and know what to expect. Further, the Mine Act makes clear such datais necessary in order to assist representativesof the Secretary in doing their job.

Section 103 of the Mine Act states insubsection (d): All accidents,including unintentional roof falls(except in any abandoned panels or inareas which are inaccessible or unsafefor inspections), shall be investigatedby the operator or his agent todetermine the cause and the means ofpreventing a recurrence. Records ofsuch accidents and investigationsshall be kept and the information shallbe made available to the Secretary orhis authorized representative and theappropriate State agency. Suchrecords shall be open for inspectionby interested persons. Such recordsshall include man-hours worked andshall be reported at a frequencydetermined by the Secretary, but atleast annually. (emphasis added)

(h) In addition to such records as arespecifically required by this Act,every operator of a coal or other mineshall establish and maintain suchrecords, make such reports, andprovide such information, as theSecretary or the Secretary of Health,Education, and Welfare mayreasonably require from time to timeto enable him to perform his functionsunder this Act. The Secretary or theSecretary of Health, Education, andWelfare is authorized to compile,

analyze, and publish, either insummary or detailed form, suchreports or information so obtained.Except to the extent otherwisespecifically provided by this Act, allrecords, information, reports,findings, citations, notices, orders, ordecisions required or issued pursuantto or under this Act may be publishedfrom time to time, may be released toany interested person, and shall bemade available for public inspection.(emphasis added)

These official records are to berecorded in ink or on a computer using aprogram that cannot be altered and retainedfor a year at the mine. These are the officialexamination books all mine operators arerequired to complete and maintain.

MSHA also requires the recording ofhazardous conditions in a mine that arediscovered at a time other than one of thespecifically required examinations.

§75.363(b) A record shall be made ofany hazardous condition found. Thisrecord shall be kept in a bookmaintained for this purpose on thesurface at the mine. The record shallbe made by the completion of the shifton which the hazardous condition isfound and shall include the nature andlocation of the hazardous conditionand the corrective action taken. Thisrecord shall not be required for shiftswhen no hazardous conditions arefound or for hazardous conditionsfound during the preshift or weeklyexaminations inasmuch as theseexaminations have separate recordkeeping requirements.

60

Responsibilities of the Mine Safetyand Health AdministrationAlthough some members of Congress haveconsistently been great advocates forprotecting coal miners’ health and safety,legislative action to improve miners’ safetyand health has only occurred in the aftermathof horrific tragedies in the coalfieldcommunities of the country.

Passage of the Coal Act of 1969 wasthe result of the Farmington #9 explosion in1968. The disaster resulted in the death of 78miners, 19 of whom are still entombed in thatmine. The Coal Act was a significant stepforward, but because enforcement ofCongress’ mandate was generally ineffective,it was amended in 1977. This legislationcreated the Mine Safety and HealthAdministration (MSHA) to police theindustry, enforce mining laws and penalizeoperators that did not comply.

In 2006, after three deadly accidentsclaimed the lives of nineteen miners: twelveat ICG’s Sago Mine; two at Massey Energy’sAracoma Alma Mine #1; and five atKentucky Darby’s Darby Mine No. 1;Congress felt compelled to act again. OnJune 15, 2006, the Mine Improvement andNew Emergency Response Act of 2006(MINER Act) was enacted. These pieces oflegislation have afforded MSHA broaderpowers to regulate the mining industry.

The industry that has proven time andtime again that it cannot police itself. Historyhas shown that, left to their own devices andwithout strict regulatory requirements, somemine operators will do virtually nothing to

afford miners a safe and healthy workingenvironment.

With these legislative powers in placehowever, MSHA, as the agent for theSecretary of Labor, is also charged byCongress to “...develop, promulgate, andrevise as may be appropriate improvedmandatory health and safety standards for theprotection of life and prevention of injuries incoal or other mines.” (Section 101(a) MineAct).

Moreover, MSHA’s consistent andaggressive enforcement is necessary tocompel renegade operators to comply with thelaws and regulations. It is the Agency’s responsibility to see that unsafe and unhealthyconditions and practices are not tolerated. MSHA’s inspectors must cite all violationsthat exist during their inspections. They arerequired to be the cop on the beat.

The preamble of the Mine Actdemonstrates Congress’ desire for the Agencyto be a proactive and technology drivinginstitution. It is MSHA’s job to help preventaccidents and illness. It is to force anintractable industry to continuously improveits health and safety practices.

Furthermore, the overall intent of theMine Act is clear on the face of the statute:

Sec. 2. Congress declares that –

“(a) the first priority and concern ofall in the coal or other mining industrymust be the health and safety of itsmost precious resource – the miner;

61

“(b) death and serious injuries fromunsafe and unhealthful conditions andpractices in the coal and other minescause grief and suffering to the minersand to their families;

“(c) there is an urgent need to providemore effective means and measuresfor improving the working conditionsand practices in the Nation’s coal andother mines in order to prevent deathand serious physical harm, and inorder to prevent occupational diseaseoriginating in such mines,”

...(g) it is the purpose of this Act –

“(1) to establish interimmandatory health and safetystandards and to direct theSecretary of Health, Educationand Welfare and the Secretaryof Labor to develop andpromulgate improvedmandatory health or safetystandards to protect the healthand safety of the Nation’s coalor other miners;

“(2) to require that eachoperator of a coal or othermine and every miner in suchmine comply with suchstandards;

“...(4) to improve and expand,in cooperation with the Statesand the coal or other miningindustry, research anddevelopment and trainingprograms aimed at preventingcoal or other mine accidentsand occupationally causeddiseases in the industry.”

Further, the legislative history of theMine Act eliminates any ambiguity that it wasthe intent of lawmakers to create an Agencythat has real enforcement power. Thelegislative history states, “The bill creates anew Assistant Secretary of Labor for MineSafety and Health, to provide specializedtreatment and enforcement of the mine safetyand health amendments” (emphasis added).

To make the point crystal clear theSenate noted, “A separate enforcementstructure with separate attention to minesafety and health problems is mandated bythe very high fatality and injury rates for theindustry” (emphasis added).

The Senate was acutely aware of theadditional responsibility it was placing on thenewly created Mine Safety and HealthAdministration. Therefore, it took stepswithin the legislation to ensure sufficientfunding. In doing this, the legislative historynotes, “the increased enforcement andadministrative responsibilities under the bill,including increased inspection, enforcement,legal services, and administrativeresponsibilities, it is anticipated thatadditional resources may be needed by theDepartment for personnel and supportservices. Such resources can be providedthrough the normal appropriation process asbecomes necessary” (emphasis added).

Despite this, the UBB investigationhas raised some very serious concernsregarding some of the actions of MSHADistrict 4. There are reports of the Districtnot supporting inspectors who attempt tostrenuously enforce the law. Minness Justice,a retired MSHA inspector, was quoted inSimple Legal Docs saying, “MSHA offices inWest Virginia often had an environment thatdiscouraged the writing of S&S citations, alsoD citations...the constant resistance from coal

62

operators created an air of bureaucraticcaution.”

Truthout reported, “Days before thefire broke out in the Aracoma mine, a federalinspector tried to close down that section ofthe mine, but was told by his supervisor toback off and let them run coal, that there wastoo much demand for coal.”

The questions regarding MSHA’senforcement activity, especially with regardto Massey Energy operations, does not appearto be a failure by MSHA inspectors. The coalmine inspectors, and even some of theirsupervisors, were trying to carry out theirmandate.

However, the UMWA believes thatMSHA District 4 managers did not use all ofthe tools provided by Congress to forceMassey to comply with the law. MSHADistrict 4 should have shut down the UBBmine until Massey corrected all the hazardousconditions that existed We recognize thatDistrict 4 had been issuing more citationssince the first quarter of 2009. However, eventhat effort was insufficient to effectcompliance.

Tony Oppegard, a safety attorneyfrom Lexington, Ky., noted with regard toUBB, “It doesn’t matter whether you havemore or less violations than the average mine. This mine blew up. Mines don’t blow upunless there were violations.” He furtherstated, “Any mine that accumulates almost 50unwarrantable failure violations in a singleyear deserves the heightened scrutiny...”(Coal Tattoo)

After the passage of the MINER Act,the number of citations contested by operatorsnationwide rose from 5 percent prior to 2006to 30 percent at the time of the explosion.

The Tennessean noted on April 9, 2010,“Coal mine operators have paid just 7 percentof the fines they have been assessed for majorhealth and safety violations in the past threeyears.... They have paid just $8 million of the$113 million in major penalties since April of2007 when fines increased....”

In reality, although citations werebeing written, they were having no tangibleimpact on many operators. Contestedcitations and orders are held up for years inthe appeals system, during which time theoperator is not obligated to pay any fines. Moreover, MSHA lawyers routinely negotiatereduced fines in order to settle contestedcitations.

The Union is aware that the number ofclosure orders at UBB increased from three in2008 to 48 in 2009. While the inspectors onthe ground should be commended forattempting to increase enforcement, we mustagain question the response of District 4management. Such a significant increase in104(d)(2) orders should have raised seriousconcerns among senior MSHA personnel atthe District. Yet our investigation did notreveal a plan on the part of District 4 toaddress the problems at UBB.

Based on information released byMSHA, conditions continued to deteriorate atUBB in the months leading up to theexplosion. With the exception of aventilation survey completed by MSHA at themine two weeks prior to the explosion, thereis no record of an inspection blitz that wouldhave placed inspectors in every area of themine to determine if Massey was incompliance. Nor did the District use itsauthority under Section 8(a)(2) of the MINERAct to issue a single “flagrant” violation atUBB. That action would have imposed anautomatic $200,000 fine.

63

The conditions that existed in the mineon April 5, 2010, did not occur overnight. Instead, they were the result of weeks, monthsand years of neglect. Massey’s ventilationplan was flawed. The lack of adequate rockdust extending from the mouth of the mine tothe working sections was the result of blatantneglect. Water spray systems were notproperly functioning and worn bits wereignored. Float coal dust was permitted toaccumulate throughout the mine.

Massey Energy has a history ofmanipulation and intimidation, including ofMSHA inspectors and their supervisors. Thereshould have been a realization on MSHA’spart that Massey’s willingness to beconfrontational with agents of the U.S.Government placed the health and safety ofthe workers at the operation at greater risk,requiring greater oversight and control toensure miners were protected. If Masseywould treat MSHA personnel with suchdisdain, the Agency should have realized ithad to be even more protective of the miners.

It should be noted that except for acomputer error, the UBB mine would havebeen targeted for a Pattern of Violations.

Roof ControlAnother significant aspect for ensuring

the safety of miners is roof control. Suchplans are required to be submitted to MSHAin writing for approval by the DistrictManager and reviewed regularly. They are tobe mine-specific and contain detaileddescriptions of the methods that will be usedto not only support the roof, but to protectagainst rib rolls, rock or coal outbursts andany other conditions created because of thegeological make-up of the mine.

Sec. 302. (a) of the Mine Act states,“Each operator shall undertake tocarry out on a continuing basis aprogram to improve the roof controlsystem of each coal mine and themeans and measures to accomplishsuch system. The roof and ribs of allactive underground roadways,travelways, and working places shallbe supported or otherwise controlledadequately to protect persons fromfalls of the roof or ribs. A roof controlplan and revisions thereof suitable tothe roof conditions and mining systemof each coal mine and approved bythe Secretary shall be adopted and setout in printed form within sixty daysafter the operative date of this title.The plan shall show the type ofsupport and spacing approved by theSecretary. Such plan shall bereviewed periodically, at least everysix months by the Secretary, takinginto consideration any falls of roof orribs or inadequacy of support of roofor ribs. No person shall proceedbeyond the last permanent supportunless adequate temporary support isprovided or unless such temporarysupport is not required under theapproved roof control plan and theabsence of such support will not posea hazard to the miners. A copy of theplan shall be furnished the Secretaryor his authorized representative andshall be available to the miners andtheir representatives.” (emphasisadded)

§75.220 (a)(1) states, “Each mineoperator shall develop and follow aroof control plan, approved by theDistrict Manager, that is suitable tothe prevailing geological conditions,

64

and the mining system to be used atthe mine. Additional measures shall betaken to protect persons if unusualhazards are encountered.” (emphasisadded)

The UBB mine also had a history ofadverse roof conditions. There were manyinstances where roof falls were reported abovethe anchorage point of the bolts and wallscrushing out because of excessive pressures. This report notes many instances whereadverse roof conditions were cited byinspectors, including those that werediscovered during a MSHA Part 50 auditbecause the adverse roof conditions were notreported as required. Bottom heaving, acondition where the coal pillars are pushedinto the mine floor, causing the mine entries topush upward, was also a regular occurrence inthe mine.

Another glaring problem regardingroof control was that Massey failed to followits approved plan. The investigation revealedentries exceeded maximum widths outlined inthe roof control plan in almost every sectionof the mine. The maximum distance betweenbolts and between roof bolts and the rib alsoroutinely exceeded the parameters requiredunder the plan. Such practices were soprevalent that they became the norm at UBB.

MSHA District 4 should have takenthe appropriate action to force Massey tocomply with the roof control plan, or revokedthe plan.

Tracking Systems The MINER Act requires the

installation of post-accident communicationsand tracking systems. In December 2009, theAgency determined that these systems werecommercially available in sufficient quantities

for use in the Nation’s mines. It notifiedmine operators that by June 15, 2010, theywould be expected to have an approvedsystem installed and operational.

It appears that UBB had purchased asystem, but on April 5, 2010, it was not fullyinstalled nor was it fully operational. Basedon the GIIP report, the system installationwas only about 20 percent complete, and itwas doubtful that the operator would have itfully installed by the required date.

Because the tracking system at UBBwas not fully functional on April 5, there wasno record of who was underground, nor wasthere a record of their locations. It was notuntil 1:40 a.m. the next morning that thisinformation became available. Redundantsystems were required by MSHA, yet nonewere in use.

To reiterate: The tracking system wasnot functional. Massey’s responsible personhad recorded no log of miners entering ormoving around the mine. And the simplestform of tracking miners goingunderground–the check-in check-outboard–was not used.

In conclusion, MSHA possesses theauthority to take enforcement actionnecessary to force compliance withregulations and increase protection forminers. UBB was a mine crying out for thefederal government to step in and shut itdown. MSHA should have used all the toolsat its disposal to do just that until thehazardous conditions were corrected.

65

West Virginia Office Of Miners’Health, Safety and TrainingThe West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health,Safety and Training (WVOMHST or State)operates much like MSHA, but within thestate of West Virginia. It is charged withenforcing the mining laws adopted by theState Legislature and signed by the Governorand rules promulgated by the state’s board ofCoal Mine Health and Safety. In general, theWest Virginia state laws are moreencompassing than the federal regulations,and in some instances they are morerestrictive.

The WVOMHST declares its“Mission Statement” as follows:

“The West Virginia Office of Miners'Health, Safety & Training isresponsible for the supervision of theexecution and enforcement of theprovisions of the state's mining lawsand rules. Prime consideration isgiven to the protection of the safetyand health of persons employed withinor at the mines of the state. Inaddition, the agency protects andpreserves mining property andproperty used in connection withmining activities.” (emphasis added)

“The agency pursues this mandate byimpartially executing and enforcingthe state's mining laws andadministrative rules in a co-operativespirit through a comprehensiveapproach that includes not onlyinspection, enforcement, andinvestigative activities, but also, andperhaps more importantly, by

aggressively conducting timely andfunctional training activities focusedon all segments of the miningindustry.”

The WVOMHST has sufficient toolsat its disposal to force mine operators tocomply with the state’s mining laws andprotect the health and safety of its miners. Inthe case of the UBB explosion however, itdoes not appear that the state utilized its fullauthority to force Massey Energy to obey thestate’s mining code and regulations. WVOMHST had the authority to approve andmonitor UBB’s ventilation plan. It had thepower to ensure that UBB was adequatelyrock-dusted and the roof control plan wasadequate. Finally, WVOMHST had theability to ensure proper mining methods wereused.

The WVOMHST is responsible forthe approval and enforcement of ventilationplans at mines throughout the state. As such,it is charged with ensuring that mining lawsare obeyed. It is also required to takeappropriate action when mine operators breakthe law. Its code provides:

Ҥ22A-2-1 Supervision byprofessional engineer or licensed landsurveyor; and certification; contents;extensions; repository; availability;copies; final survey and map;penalties.

“...(27) The operator of everyunderground coal mine shall extend,or cause to extend, on or before thefirst day of March and on or before the

66

first day of September of each year,such mine map thereof to accuratelyshow the progress of the workings asof the first day of July and the firstday of January of each year.”

The statutory language of this sectionand the fact that MSHA was unable to obtainan up-to-date and accurate map for 2009 untilNovember of that year raises the questionwhether the state ever received an up-to-datemap. It is extremely doubtful that MasseyEnergy satisfied the state requirements, butfailed to do so with the federal agency.

The UMWA is on record stating thatthere is no doubt that the content of the mine’s ventilation plan was flawed. Forinstance, Massey failed to meet the state’srequirements with regards to doors.

Ҥ22A-2-4 Ventilation of mine ingeneral.

“...(k) The ventilation of any mineshall be so arranged by means of airlocks, overcasts, or undercasts, thatthe use of doors on passagewayswhere men or equipment travel maybe kept to a minimum” (emphasisadded).

The company used a series of 79doors, including 33 sets of double/airlockdoors, to direct air through the mine to theworking faces (see map attached showing 16double airlock doors and 20 single airlockdoors into 78 Break). This is not only a poorpractice, but it is prohibited by state statute. Yet there is no record of the state agency everrequiring the operator to change this practiceand install necessary overcasts or undercasts.

The law is specific in restricting theuse of doors in this manner, but the state

never exercised its authority and demandedthat the mine be made safer.

Furthermore, the evidence andtestimony after the explosion shows thatventilating the working faces wasincreasingly difficult. Miners testified that theair on the sections would ebb and flowthroughout the shift when they were working.Some days they would have only a little air,and some days they would not have any. Wenow know that air reversals were a commonproblem at the mine.

Management would routinely andillegally change the ventilation in the minewhile miners were underground. A citationissued on January 27, 2010, states, “A mineventilation change was made on MMU 029-0beginning on Dec. 18, 2009 to Dec. 21, 2009. This change was made without prior approvalby the Office of Miners Health, Safety andTraining, and a violation was written on 12-31-09. The original plan submitted byPerformance Coal - UBB was rejected on 12-31-09.... The rejected plan is still being used. This violates a health and safety provision orsafety rule, is of a serious nature and involvesan extraordinarily high degree of negligenceor gravity.” The citation was recommendedby the issuing inspector for specialassessment.

The condition above existed for over amonth while miners were operatingequipment underground. While the inspectorwas correct to write the citation, questionsremain. Given the ventilation problems at themine, the Union believes the state shouldhave forced Massey to properly ventilate themine using acceptable ventilation controls.

The problems that existed wereserious and systemic. Ventilation wasunpredictable from one day to the next. The

67

state did not conduct an inspection blitz todetermine the extent of the problems, nor wasa ventilation survey ordered to determinewhat the root problem was with theventilation.

Another area in which this systemicfailure can be seen is with ventilation fans inthe mine. The West Virginia mining lawsprovide:

Ҥ36-1-15 Ventilation - fans.

“15.1 Ventilation fans shall be:

“...(3) Designed to permit the reversalof air and located in an area whichwill prevent a recirculation of air fromthe shaft and/or slope orcontamination from any other source.”

The Union has determined that the

North Portal fan was actually recirculating airfrom the return entry near its location. ThisNorth Portal fan had been in operation formany years, yet it was not until after theexplosion that this violation was discovered.

The WVOMHST had an obligation toreview the ventilation system at UBB in itsentirety. The Agency has the authority torevoke the operator’s ventilation plan andstop the mining process until conditions arecorrected.

With respect to float coal dust androck-dusting, West Virginia state law requiresthe following:

Ҥ22A-2-24 Control of coal dust; rockdusting.

“(a) In all mines dangerousaccumulations of fine, dry coal andcoal dust shall be removed from themine, and all dry and dusty operating

sections and haulageways andconveyor and back entries shall berock-dusted or dust-allayed by suchother methods as may be approved bythe director.”

The state issued seven citations foraccumulations of loose coal and float coaldust at UBB from February 2, 2010 throughMarch 23, 2010. These citations coverthousands of feet of entries throughout themine and demonstrate a practice on the part ofMassey Energy to blatantly disregard the law.

Citation number 31078 issued March2, 2010, states, “The #5 North Mainsconveyor belt head and take up areaincluding the starter box [illegible] hasa heavy coating of very dry float coaldust, and float coal dust is present atvarious locations from head to tail ofthis belt.”

Citation number 31080 issued March2, 2010, states, “The track entry andbreak throughs connected thereto fromthe longwall track switch to the #1 /HG22 working section needs rock-dusted due to float coal dust in thisarea.”

Citation number 31091 issued March23, 2010, states, “The Head Gate 22conveyor belt (section) which is closeto a mile long is not being maintainedproperly due to the need for spotcleaning under the belt as well as thespillage in the walkway and rocks andcoal from ribs in the walkway as welland in addition float coal dust ispresent from the belt head to the belttail.”

Massey’s lack of proper rock-dustingat the mine is perhaps the most perplexing

68

problem to understand with regard to the stateagency. It appears from the citations issuedin the first quarter of 2010 that the stateunderstood the problem existed. The sevencitations chronicle the fact that Masseypermitted miles of float coal dust toaccumulate in the mine. The state understoodthat this presented a significant hazard thatneeded to be corrected. The number andseverity of the citations issued by theinspector should have raised a red flag withthe Director of the WVOMHST.

However, in the days between theissuance of the citations and the explosion,only two of the seven violations were abated. There should be no doubt, given thecircumstances, that in those ensuing daysadditional float coal dust was permitted toaccumulate throughout the mine. The veryconditions cited contributed to the deadly coaldust explosion.

Roof Control PlanWith respect to roof control the West

Virginia law states:

Ҥ22A-2-5 Roof control program andplans; refusal to work underunsupported roof.

“(a) Each operator shall undertake tocarry out on a continuing basis aprogram to improve the roof controlsystem at each coal mine and themeans and measures to accomplishsuch system. The roof and ribs of allactive underground roadways,travelways and working places shallbe supported or otherwise controlledadequately to protect persons from fallof roof or ribs. A roof control planand revisions thereof suitable to theroof conditions and mining system of

each coal mine and approved by thedirector shall be adopted and set out inprint form before new operations.

Ҥ36-10-4 Mining methods.

“The method of mining shall notexpose any person to hazards causedby excessive widths of rooms,crosscuts and entries, or faulty pillarmethods. Pillar dimensions shall becompatible with effective control ofthe roof, face and ribs and coal or rockbursts.”

The roof control plan at UBB, like allother mining plans, must be submitted to thestate and approved before mining is initiated. The plan must be sufficient to protect minersfrom roof falls, rib rolls, coal or rockoutbursts and other conditions caused byinadequate controls.

The Union contends that, based on theconditions at the mine both before and afterthe explosion, Massey was not complyingwith its approved roof control plan. The factthat after the explosion, both the federal andstate Agencies required over 9,000 additionalroof supports be set in order to conduct theinvestigation, confirms Massey’s non-compliance.

Before April 5, there were numerousreports of roof falls above the anchorage pointof the roof bolts. Some of these werereported as required by law, while more werediscovered during the post explosioninspections by the federal and state Agencies. Such events present serious hazards to minersand should have been evaluated to determineif there was a need to supplement the roofcontrol plan.

69

The fact that the longwall bleedersystem was caved to the point that it becameimpassible should also have caused the stateto re-examine the roof control plan. To makematters worse, heaving in one area of themine crushed out 16 consecutive stoppings. In another area, it damaged seals designed toseparate the old workings from the activemine entries. It became apparent that theconditions that existed in the headgate bleederwere so severe that new entries had to bedriven for the next longwall panel.

The state agency has a responsibilityto ensure that all mine operators comply withits law. Proper enforcement of the law – andin this case, aggressive application of the lawto an employer with a history ofnoncompliance – was required. The state hadbeen dealing with Massey Energy longenough to know that without strict applicationand rigid enforcement, the company wouldignore health and safety laws that interferewith maximum production.

Like MSHA, the state should haveused every tool at its disposal to shut downMassey’s UBB mine until all the hazardousconditions were corrected.

70

Hearing ProcessFor years, the UMWA has consistentlyadvocated and called on MSHA to exercise itsauthority under the Mine Act to hold publichearings as part of disaster investigations likethe UBB investigation. The Agency has thestatutory authority to require such hearingsunder Section 103(b) of the Mine Act, whichauthorizes the following:

“For the purpose of making anyinvestigation of any accident or otheroccurrence relating to health or safetyin a coal or other mine, the Secretarymay, after notice, hold publichearings, and may sign and issuesubpoenas for the attendance andtestimony of witnesses and theproduction of relevant papers, books,and documents, and administer oaths.Witnesses summoned shall be paid thesame fees and mileage that are paidwitnesses in the courts of the UnitedStates. In case of contumacy or refusalto obey a subpoena served upon anyperson under this section, the districtcourt of the United States for anydistrict in which such person is foundor resides or transacts business, uponapplication by the United States andafter notice to such person, shall havejurisdiction to issue an order requiringsuch person to appear and givetestimony before the Secretary or toappear and produce documents beforethe Secretary, or both, and any failureto obey such order of the court may bepunished by such court as a contemptthereof” (emphasis added).

The Union is convinced that thepublic hearing process is the only forum thatwill assure that all information necessary todetermine the cause and events that led up tothe disaster is discovered.

When MSHA refused our request forpublic hearings, the UMWA filed suit in theUnited States District Court for the southernDistrict of West Virginia, seeking injunctiverelief. The Union argued that the privateinterview process that MSHA was proposingand later employed during the UBBinvestigation was detrimental to the process. Instead of holding a transparent investigationinto the cause(s) of the UBB disaster, MSHAwould allow the credibility of theinvestigation to be called into question bypurposely excluding entities who have aninterest in participating in the process.

The private interview processexcludes interested parties. These individualsshould have the same opportunity as others toparticipate in the process. The restrictionsplaced on those parties by the Agency leavesthem to speculate about what was said or notsaid.

The UMWA, as a recognizedRepresentative of Miners, was not privy toeither the interviews or the transcripts. Likewise, documents pertinent to theinvestigation, including preshift, on-shift,weekly examinations and other documentscontaining important information werewithheld from the Miners’ Representatives,solely at the discretion of MSHA, itsattorneys and the solicitors office. The Unionhas long asserted that mine operators cannotbe trusted to police themselves. There must

71

be an open hearing process where allinterested parties are given the opportunity toparticipate.

The frustration with the systemimposed by MSHA does not end there. Whilethe families and miners’ representatives wereexcluded, Massey Energy, the entityresponsible for this deadly tragedy, hadrepresentatives present at some of the “privateinterviews.” The inclusion of theseindividuals should bring into question theentire process. MSHA claims the reason forthis type of interview process is to “protect”the individuals testifying. If the operator, hisagent or attorney are present, one must ask:Who are they protecting the miner from? Thisis absurd on its face.

The lack of resolve on the part ofMSHA to hold public hearings alsoeliminated the possibility that corporate andmine management personnel could becompelled to testify – or at least broughtbefore a public forum and asked questions. The private interview process does not giveMSHA the authority to issue subpoenas – asis the case with public hearings.

High-ranking individuals played keyroles in the day-to-day operations of the mine. They made decisions leading up to and afterthe explosion that are relevant to theinvestigation. When the State of WestVirginia tried to compel their testimony, theyinvoked their Fifth Amendment right againstself-incrimination. These individuals did noteven show up in person to take the Fifth.

The following individuals fromMassey Energy possess information that isvital to the investigation of the Upper BigBranch Mine-South disaster. They shouldhave been compelled to testify in open publichearings by MSHA, or at least to publicly

take the Fifth. Failing to do so, they shouldhave been found in contempt of court andmade to suffer the requisite penalty:

• Don Blankenship, Chairman andChief Executive Officer, created theclimate of intimidation andharassment that was Massey Energy’soperating policy. He was in control ofthe company from the board room tothe mine level. He was so intricatelyinvolved with managing Masseyoperations that he required longwalltonnage reports be submitted to himevery half-hour. He micro-managedthis company and should be heldaccountable for his actions.

• Chris Adkins, Senior Vice Presidentand Chief Operating Officer, carriedout the policy directives of uppermanagement. On more than oneoccasion, it was reported that minerswho shut equipment down for unsafeconditions were told by him to runcoal or go home. Although not trainedin mine rescue, during the rescue atUBB, he took control of theunderground activities, placing thelives of rescuers at risk.

• Chris Blanchard, President, UpperBig Branch Mine, and JasonWhitehead, Vice President, UpperBig Branch Mine, possess importantinformation regarding the conditionsat the mine, prior to and immediatelyafter the explosion. They were thesenior management employees whosepurpose it was to oversee theoperation. They need to be askedabout the three hours they spentunderground immediately after theexplosion. Where did they go, what

72

did they do and under what authoritydid they take these actions?

• Elizabeth Chamberlin, VicePresident of Safety at Massey Energy,who was the senior person in chargeof the health and safety of the minersat all of Massey’s operations. Whatdoes she know about the conditions atthe mine? The Union is concernedthat based on her limited participationin such a high-level incident, Ms.Chamberlin was in charge of healthand safety by title only. If this is true,it not only violates a court order in thewake of Aracoma, but places safety inthe hands of Massey’s productionpersonnel.

• Wayne Persinger, Mine Manager,Upper Big Branch Mine, was theindividual charged with managing theunderground operations at the mine. It was his responsibility to know whatwas occurring at all times and to carryout all corporate policies.

• Everett Hager, Superintendent fornorth side, Upper Big Branch Mine,was reportedly aware of hazardousconditions that existed at the mine. Inone instance, a foreman noted thatHager had known for three weeks thatair was reversed in the mine and didnothing.

• Robert Asbury, Captain, MasseyEnergy’s Southern West Virginiamine rescue team, would presumablybe the most qualified Masseyemployee on site with regard to minerescue. However, shortly after theaccident, he and two team membersdisregarded mine rescue protocol,

entered the mine and explored areaswithout proper back-up or notifyingthe Command Center. It is not clearwhat areas of the mine they were in orwhat they were doing there.

Also taking the Fifth were:

• Jamie Ferguson, Vice President,Performance Coal Company

• Rick Foster, Mine Foreman, UpperBig Branch Mine

• Gary Frampton, Chief of Safety,Route 3 Engineering

• Eric Lilly, Route 3 Engineering • Gary May, Superintendent of the

south side, Upper Big Branch Mine • Paul McCombs, Chief Engineer,

Route 3 Engineering • Terry Moore, Longwall Section

Foreman, Upper Big Branch Mine• Rick Nicolau, Longwall Coordinator,

Upper Big Branch Mine• Jack Roles, Longwall Coordinator,

Upper Big Branch Mine• Bill Ross, Coal Services

The individuals above should besubpoenaed by the government and requiredto testify, publicly take the Fifth or face theappropriate penalty(s) for their refusal.

73

Massey Energy Company“It’s like a jungle, where a jungle is the survival of the fittest; unions,

communities, people–everyone is going to have to learn to accept that inthe United States, you have a capitalist society, and that capitalism, from a

business standpoint, is survival of the most productive.” Donald Blankenship, 1984

This business model was expressed byBlankenship while he was President of RawlSales & Processing, an A.T. Masseysubsidiary. It was more than just a statementof his belief in how corporate America shouldoperate: In his years at Massey Energy invarying capacities, most notably his years asChief Executive Officer, this became thecompany’s operational policy. Nothing andno one would stand between Blankenship andhis desire for continually increasingproduction and ever-increasing profits.

There was no cost too steep for theminers, mining communities and the generalpublic living in or near the areas whereMassey Energy operated to ensure thatBlankenship’s vision of production at anycost would flourish. Blankenship’s namewould become synonymous with MasseyEnergy, and he came to manage the companydown to the smallest details. He created thecorporate culture that defined Massey Energy.

In a sworn deposition, Blankenshipadmitted knowledge of every significantevent at Massey operations immediately uponthem occurring or as soon as possiblethereafter. However, the depth of his powerand control were even greater. A formerHuman Resource manager at Massey’s BlackCastle Mine testified that Blankenship,“micromanaged every mine and signed off on

every hire, even the janitors.” He explained“that if he wanted to hire a person at BlackCastle, he would have to send a memorandumto Blankenship with the applicant’squalifications and salary requirements. [TheHuman Resource manager] would thenreceive a fax with Blankenship’s signature ifthe proposed hire was approved.” (MasseyEnergy Co. Securities Litigation at page 37)

Blankenship oversaw all aspects ofMassey Energy. In an interview with VanityFair, a manager stated, “...his amazement inlearning, soon after arriving at Massey, thatDon had to sign off on a tankful of gas for themanager’s truck.” Blankenship controlledeverything that happened at Massey Energyduring his tenure at the helm. Massey Energymade all its decisions based on Blankenship’srecommendations–and his concern wasalways the bottom line, without regard forany other consequences.

Massey Energy: Safety last

The following highlights some of the eventsthat created Massey Energy’s image as acompany that cared about production first andsafety last:

74

White Buck Coal Company: Guiltyplea

Significant health and safety problems werenot limited to Massey’s UBB mine. Forexample, Massey Energy supervisors atWhite Buck Coal Company pleaded guilty tofailing to perform required preshiftexaminations.

Examinations of all areas of the minewhere miners will be working or travelingprior to miners entering the area must be doneon eight-hour intervals (30 CFR §75.260). Yet Larry Roop, President of White BuckCoal Co., pleaded guilty on behalf of GassyCreek Mine, and Foreman William Winepleaded guilty to performing inadequatepreshift examinations at White Buck #1 mine.

While the plea agreement for Winespecifically dealt only with an inadequatepreshift on June 27, 2002, the CharlestonGazette reported that the failure to performthe preshift actually covered a period of two-and-one-half months. In a sworn statement,Wine said, “Roop specifically told him tofireboss as the men were going into the mine. I thought it was an order and how theywanted the preshift examination to beconducted.”

Massey’s Board of Directors wasacutely aware of the White Buck case and alater case that led to a guilty plea at the Aracoma-Alma mine. Legal actions wereregularly discussed as part of its Boardmeetings. However, instead of looking at thecircumstances that brought about legal actionand the need to hire outside counsel tolitigate, Massey simply looked to the bottomline. It mitigated the exposure, paid less infines and moved on as if nothing unusual hadoccurred. These actions and others like them

by the Board played a major role in Masseybecoming the most dangerous miningcompany in the nation.

Court Order: Manville Trust case

In the wake of the Aracoma Alma Mine #1fire, the Manville Personal Injury Trust filed aderivative case on behalf of Massey EnergyCompany shareholders. The case was joinedby other institutional shareholders claimingthat Blankenship and the Massey Board weredevaluing the stock price of the company by“...failure, among other things, to implementadequate internal controls to ensure thecompany’s compliance with applicable lawsand regulations concerning worker safety andenvironmental protection.” The case wassettled between the parties, and a bindingCourt Order was signed in June 2008.

The Settlement Order, among otherthings, required Massey Energy’s Board ofDirectors to create a Safety, Environmentaland Public Policy Committee (SEPPC). TheSEPPC would consist of a minimum of threedirectors, the majority of whom must beindependent.

The SEPPC was to meet at least fourtimes per year and attend all annual andspecial meetings of the shareholders. Itsmembers were to monitor the company’ssafety and environmental policies, includingtraining plans, regulatory compliance andsafety compliance at the company’soperations. It was given authority to makenecessary changes to any areas of thecompany’s safety and environmental plans toenhance the company’s effectiveness.

Massey was also to create thepositions of Vice President for BestEnvironmental Practices (EnvironmentalCompliance Officer) and Vice President for

75

Best Safety Practices (Safety ComplianceOfficer). These officers were to be present atall meetings of the SEPPC and offernecessary reports showing the effectivenessof the policies, plans and programs in theirreceptive capacities.

Further in the Order it stated, “TheCompliance Officers in consultationwith the SEPPC and the GeneralCounsel of the Company, shall havethe duty and authority to create,implement and oversee a system bywhich corporate employees, suppliers,customers and advisor professionalscan, on a confidential basis andwithout fear of reprisal, provideinformation concerning possibleillegal or unethical conduct regardingthe Company’s compliance withsafety and environmental issues.”

The company was also required toadopt written policies that would protectwhistleblowers, and the policies were to beincluded in the employee handbook; thehandbook was to be provided to eachemployee at least annually. A whistleblowerhotline was also to be established, to providean alternative reporting mechanism.

Massey Energy hired ElizabethChamberlin as Vice President for Safety andTraining. However, though the Court Orderrequired her to answer to the SEPPC on aquarterly basis, this was substantially alteredby Blankenship. The reporting process wascircumvented such that relevant informationregarding safety and compliance at Masseyoperations was first filtered throughBlankenship, Chris Adkins and ShaneHarvey, General Counsel for Massey.

When Chamberlin would finally meetwith the SEPPC, she presented them with

comparisons of Massey’s Non-Fatal Day Lost(NFDL) data to that of the industry as awhole. This was problematic.

NFDL data is not an accurateassessment of the mine’s safety andcompliance record, which is especially true atMassey, given its incomplete records.Chamberlin was presenting such inaccuratenumbers to the Board. The numberspresented by Chamberlin were as follows.

Year Chamberlin’s data Actual Data

2007 2.05 2.632008 1.94 2.522009 1.67 2.33

These numbers also represent amanipulated reporting system, wherebyMassey encouraged miners who were injuredto not fill out the required accident forms.This practice illegally deflated the actualnumbers. This was a common practice at allthe Massey operations. While there werethose (including Adkins and Chamberlin)who promoted the contrived data as “fact,”the entire Board had to be aware of the policyinsofar as there was a lot of other informationavailable, and its record of fatal injuries aloneshowed Massey was the worst operator in thenation.

This becomes clear in testimony givenby miners before the Senate HELPCommittee in April 2010. Jeffrey Harris, aone-time miner at Massey, stated, “...If yougot hurt, you were told not to fill out the lost-time accident paperwork. The companywould just pay guys to sit in the bathhouse orto stay at home if they got hurt – anything butfill out the paperwork.”

This blatant disregard for the lawdemonstrates the lengths to which Massey

76

Energy would go to shield itself fromshareholder and public scrutiny. Thosewithin the industry knew what washappening, but someone detached, like aninstitutional investor or potential investor,would likely be unaware.

These erroneous numbers were alsoreported by various officers and members ofthe Board at stockholder meetings, coalconferences and investor gatherings. Blankenship often touted these lies atfunctions he attended. Significantly, what hefailed to say was that the lower thecompany’s NFDL, the bigger his bonus.

Secondly, the SEPPC members wereacutely aware of their responsibility under theCourt Order. Further, each of them has toknow that a report of NFDL did not reallyreflect the safety and regulatory complianceof the company, insofar as they all had longtenures with Massey, the mining industry orboth. They were not being scammed, but theywoefully failed their obligations as membersof the court-ordered SEPPC and further asmembers of the Board of Directors.

Each of them had enough experienceto know that fatal accidents, severe accidents,near misses and the number and severity ofMSHA citations and other factors played amuch more significant role in the company’soverall safety performance than what theywere receiving from Ms. Chamberlin. Yet,for their own reasons, they seemingly ignoredreality. They permitted the lies to continue,and the mines of Massey Energy becamemore and more dangerous. They permittedthe conditions at UBB to exist, andaccordingly, they bear some responsibility forwhat happened there.

The Blankenship Memos

The extent of the Massey Board members’knowledge regarding the operation of thecompany’s mines and facilities was vast. Thefact that Blankenship ran the operations insuch a “public” manner makes it impossiblefor them not to know what was occurringwithin the company.

The infamous October 19, 2005, “runcoal memo” from Blankenship to all DeepMine Superintendents demonstrated theattitude of the company regarding the healthand safety of the workers. It states, “If any ofyou have been asked by your grouppresidents, your supervisors, engineers oranyone else to do anything other than run coal(ie – build overcasts, do construction jobs, orwhatever) you need to ignore them and runcoal. This memo is necessary only becausewe seem not to understand that coal pays thebills.”

The message, which was reported inmajor newspapers across the country, wasclear: Nothing got in the way of production atMassey Energy mines. The Board was wellaware of the memo, and by failing to re-directBlankenship, one can assume they agreedwith it.

The following week, on October 26,2005, Blankenship tried to tamp down thefirestorm he created by issuing anothermemorandum (attached). However, thewording in the document actually reinforcesthe “production at all cost” mentality of thecompany.

In part, the memo states, “...each ofyou is responsible for coal producingsections, and our goal is to keep themrunning. If you have construction jobs at

77

your mine that need to be done to keep it safeor productive, make every effort to do thosejobs without taking members and equipmentfrom coal producing sections that pay thebills” (emphasis added).

It should be noted that the UMWAattended Massey shareholder meetings andprovided this information to the Board ofDirectors and the shareholders in attendance.

Aracoma Alma Mine #1

Three months after Blankenship’s October“run coal” memorandum, on January 19,2006, a fire broke out on the beltline atAracoma Alma Mine #1. The fire claimedthe lives of Donald Bragg and Ellery Hatfield,who became lost in dense smoke whileattempting to escape. Friction between thebelt and belt structure caused coal fines andother combustible material to catch on fire.However, there was no water in the waterlineas required by law. And even if there hadbeen, the fire hose couplers were notcompatible with the ones on the water line.

When the inby crew attempted toevacuate, Bragg and Hatfield becameseparated from the group and succumbed tocarbon monoxide poisoning.

This tragic event did not seem to haveany effect on Blankenship. A few weeks afterthe deaths, he spoke at the Berkeley CountyRepublican Club, and the Herald-Mail ofHagerstown, Md., reported he stated, “...thefire at Arocoma Coal’s No. 1 Mine and theJanuary 2, 2006, explosion at InternationalCoal Group’s Sago Mine...were rare eventsand statistically insignificant.” These areextremely harsh comments when youconsider Blankenship was referring to thelives of fourteen miners.

Early Warning of MSHAInspections

The Mine Act requires that MSHA inspecteach underground mine at least four times peryear. It also specifies in Section 108(e) that,“Unless otherwise authorized by this Act, anyperson who gives advance notice of anyinspection to be conducted under this Actshall, upon conviction, be punished by a fineof not more than $1,000 (see note) or byimprisonment for not more than six months,or both” (note: Information regardingCriminal Monetary Fines and AlternateSentencing attached).

Massey Energy routinely violated thissection of the Mine Act at its operations. Such violations interfere with inspectors’ability to carry out a thorough inspection ofthe mine. It permits management to correctviolations immediately before the inspectorarrives in an area. It also allows managementto suspend operations in an area while theinspector is present, thereby reducing thegravity of the citation or eliminating italtogether.

Several miners testified that theseevents regularly occurred at the Masseymines where they worked. Gary Quarles, aformer Massey employee, testified before theHouse Labor Committee, “The code wordwould go out we’ve got a man on theproperty...When the word goes out, all effortis made to correct the deficiencies.”

On July 13, 2010, Stanley Stewarttestified before the House Labor Committee,“A section boss underground would be calledfrom the outside and told its cloudy outside orthere’s a man on the property, meaningthere’s an inspector outside, get things rightto pass inspection.”

78

Hughie Stover, Chief of Security atMassey Energy’s Performance CoalCompany, was indicted on February 28, 2011. The indictment states that “Stover and histeam allegedly used a clandestine radiochannel called the “Montcoal Channel” towarn miners of MSHA inspectors’ arrivals sothey could improvise safer conditions andcure violations.” His trial was set for lateOctober 2011, as this report went topublication.

Finally, Randy Lester, a miner atMassey Energy’s Tiller No. 1 mine, wasquoted in the Washington Post on June 2,2010, that “...he and his co-workers usuallysounded an alarm when they see state orfederal inspectors approaching, radioingdown to give the crew inside the mine asmuch as 45 minutes to spruce things up.”

Intimidation of the workforce

It is clear that miners at Upper Big Branchworked under fear of retribution if they madea complaint about safety conditions. Thereport of the GIIP cited examples of twoforemen, Dean Jones (victim) and Brian"Hammer" Collins, who tried to resolveventilation problems on their sections. Theywere threatened with job loss or beingdisciplined as a result of trying to properlyventilate the mine.

Jones, one of the explosion victims,received a "get it in the coal" message fromChris Blanchard through the dispatcher whenhe shut down his section because of lack ofair. Clearly, Blanchard wasn’t as concernedabout what dangers the miners faced as hewas about production.

Further, when Brian Collins did hispre-shift examination and found insufficientair in the last open crosscut, he stopped his

crew from running coal until the problem wasfixed. The next day, Collins was suspendedfor three days for "poor work performance." When the miners saw their foremenreprimanded in such a manner, the fear ofretribution was amplified. No one was goingto complain if they knew retaliation wasforthcoming.

As testament to the effectiveness ofMassey’s intimidation policies, MSHAreported at its June 29, 2011, public briefingon the Upper Big Branch investigation thatminers at UBB had submitted only oneunderground hazard complaint since 2006. Itis clear the miners understood if theycomplained and they were identified, theywouldn't be working at Massey for long.

In testimony from Gary Quarlesbefore the House Committee on Educationand Labor on May 24, 2010, in Beckley, W.Va., he stated, “When the MSHA inspectorcomes to a Massey mine, the only peopleaccompanying him are Massey companypeople. No coal miner at the mine can pointout areas of concern to the MSHA inspector. In fact, for a miner working for Massey, thefeeling is, if an MSHA inspector fails to sayanything about all of these safety problems,what right do I have to say anything aboutthem, and I definitely would be terminated orretaliated against if I said anything.”

Knox Creek Coal: Tiller No. 1

Shortly after the UBB explosion, MSHAlaunched impact inspections at 57 minesthroughout the nation. Nine mines operatedby Massey Energy, almost 16 percent of thetotal, were on the list. Knox Creek CoalCorporation’s Tiller No. 1 was one of theoperations designated for an impactinspection.

79

According to the WashingtonIndependent, MSHA considered Tiller No. 1“one of the most unsafe mines in thecountry.” The injury rate at the mine was 40percent higher than UBB at the time of theexplosion and over two times the nationalaverage, at 9.78. The mine had also beencited by MSHA 1,395 times from January 1,2008 through December 31, 2010.

The impact inspection at Tiller No. 1was an effort by the Agency to have the mineplaced on a pattern of violations program(POV). A mine being placed on a POV istargeted for more serious enforcement actionand increased penalties for the mine operator. The Agency outlines the POV process asfollows:

“A mine operator that has a potentialpattern of recurrent S&S violations ata mine will receive writtennotification from MSHA. An S&Sviolation is one that could reasonablybe expected to lead to a serious injuryor illness. The operator will have anopportunity to review and commenton the documents upon which thepotential pattern of violations is based,and develop a corrective actionprogram to reduce S&S violations.MSHA will closely monitor theaffected mine's compliance. If theoperator significantly reduces its S&Sviolation rate, it can avoid beingissued a Notice of a Pattern ofViolations pursuant to Section 104(e)of the Federal Mine Safety and HealthAct of 1977. If the improvement fallsshort of prescribed goals, MSHA willissue the notice. For each S&Sviolation subsequently found, MSHAwill issue an order withdrawingminers from the affected area until thecited condition has been corrected. An

operator can be removed from apattern of violations when 1) aninspection of the entire mine iscompleted and no S&S violations arefound; or 2) no withdrawal order isissued by MSHA in accordance withSection 104(e)(1) of the Mine Actwithin 90 days of the issuance of thepattern notice.”

The inspection at Tiller resulted in theissuance of 29 citations, all classified assignificant and substantial (S&S). Uponappeal, the Agency would need anAdministrative Law Judge to uphold at least25 to meet the threshold to issue a pattern ofviolations at the mine. While the Judgeagreed that Massey had committed all 29violations, he upheld only 19 as being S&S. The mine operator thereby successfullyavoided the POV designation at Tiller.

In 2009, four Massey Energy mines,including Tiller No.1, had accident rates morethan two times the national average. Theothers were:

• Slip Ridge Cedar Grove, W. Va.• M 3 Energy Mining Mine No. 1, Ky. • Solid Energy Mining Mine No 1, Ky.

Inman Energy: Randolph Mine

The Mine Safety and Health Administrationconducted an “impact inspection” at MasseyEnergy’s Inman Energy’s Randolph Mine onApril 29, 2011. MSHA inspectors arrived atthe mine and took control of the phones at theguard shack and mine office to preventnotification of the inspection to undergroundpersonnel.

The inspection resulted in twentywithdrawal orders and five citations beingwritten for violations of mining regulations.

80

Eleven of the orders were for violations of theventilation plan. Others included inadequatewater spray systems on the continuous miningmachines and failure to remove coal and floatcoal dust from the mine.

These are the three of the areas of thelaw that mine management ignored at UBBresulting in the April 5, 2010, explosion. MSHA inspectors found some of the sameviolations existed at the Randolph Mineduring a surprise inspection a year earlier.

The Boone Examiner noted,“According to MSHA, the violations atRandolph Mine allege the mine operatorengaged in aggravated conduct, constituting amore than ordinary negligence, by notfollowing mandatory safety standards, andallowing unhealthy and unsafe miningpractices to continue.”

The “Production Phone”

The extent of Blankenship’s control of allaspects of the mining operations at MasseyEnergy are highlighted in the book Coal Riverby freelance writer Michael Shnayerson. Hewrites, “There’s no question in my[Shnayerson’s] mind that Blankenship knewabout the repeated safety citations at UpperBig Branch. Don was a complete micro-manager. He knew everything that was goingon at Upper Big Branch. A lot of the fault forthe explosion would have to be laid at hisfeet.”

Blankenship went so far as to have ared phone installed at UBB so he couldimmediately contact the mine’s managerswhenever he wanted. According toShnayrerson, “it was the hotline to theboss...Frequently and without fail, the mana-ger on duty had to fax a production update toMassey’s Chairman. If the report was late or

the numbers weren’t good, or the mine wasshut down for any reason, the red phonewould ring. The terrified manager would pickit up to hear Mr. B [Blankenship] demandingto know why the numbers weren’t right.”

According to the GIIP, the productionreports Shnayerson is referring to wererequired every 30 minutes. Even on April 5,2010, purchasing agent Greg Clay was toreceive production reports every 30 minutesduring the day shift. The information wouldbe sent to “...UBB President Chris Blanchard,Vice President Jason Whitehead and LisaWilliams, executive secretary of MarforkCoal. Lisa Williams would then send theinformation to Chris Adkins, Chief OperatingOfficer, and Don Blankenship, Chairman andChief Executive Officer, of Massey Energy.”

This arrangement confirms two veryimportant aspects regarding the involvementand responsibility of Massey Energy’sexecutive officers regarding the explosion atUBB. First, they were acutely aware ofevents occurring at the mine on a continuousbasis. This type of minute-by-minuteinformation is only relevant in the hands ofthe individuals who are actually running theoperation on the ground.

Secondly, knowing exactly what isoccurring at the mine requires those with thatknowledge to correct hazards and make themine safe for the workers. The red phone,however, was apparently not part of Massey’sS-1 P-1 program (Blankenship’s signaturehealth and safety program). It was usedstrictly to make certain production wasmeeting the quota set by Blankenship.

81

Statements by Upper Big Branch minersStanley “Goose” Stewart stated to the

House Committee on Education and Labor atits July 13, 2010, hearing that, “In 2009, wewere made by Chris Blanchard, the Presidentof Performance Coal, to cut coal going intoour air supply. We mined that way for 2,000feet....”

Jeffrey Harris told the Senate HELPCommittee on April 27, 2010, “If you got hurt[at Massey], you were told not to fill out thelost-time accident paperwork. The Companywould just pay guys to sit in the bathhouse orstay at home if they got hurt–anything but fillout the paperwork.”

National Public Radio interviewed 10supervisors and miners from UBB who madesimilar statements regarding ventilation,including, “They would never fix theventilation;’ “I told them I needed more air[and] they threatened to fire me if I didn’t runenough coal” (Consolidated Amended ClassAction Complaint at page 47).

Chuck Nelson (a former Masseyminer) told the Washington Independent on

April 27, 2010, “I knew that if I saidsomething [about safety], I wouldn’t have ajob tomorrow.”

Steve Morgan, whose son Adam waskilled at UBB, said when his son raisedconcerns about dust, methane, ventilation andworking in unsafe conditions as a trainee, hisboss responded, “If you’re going to be thatscared of your job there, you need to rethinkyour career.” (Consolidated Amended ClassAction Complaint at page 69)

“When moving the longwall to a newface, we were made to load coal before all theshields and ventilation were in place sosomeone could call Mr. Blankenship and saywe were in the coal.” (House Committee onEducation and Labor, July 13, 2010)

“At all Massey mines, we’d shut downequipment when the inspectors were at themine so they couldn’t take readings while wewere mining. We’d have to say the machinewas down. But as soon as the inspector left,we’d kick it right back into service.” (JeffreyHarris, Senate HELP Committee)

And then there is this:

“I don’t care what people think, at the end of the day, Don Blankensipis going to die with more money than he needs.” Don Blankenship at a West Virginia Republican Party meeting

Don Blankenship, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer ofMassey Energy, along with his underlings who carried out his corporate policyof production over safety, must be held accountable for their actions thatcontributed to the death of these 29 miners.

3 Through June 1, 2011, when Massey was acquired by Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.

82

Workers killed at Massey Energy Operations Since January 20013

Miner Date Age Mine Parent Company

Allen Harris, Jr. 2-2-01 48 Brushy Eagle Marfork Coal Co.Herbert J. Meadows 3-29-01 48 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Gregory Barron 8-27-01 47 Cedar Grove Mine Independence Coal Paul Miller 9-14-01 28 Twilight MTR Surface Progress Coal Co.Danny Atkins 2-2-02 44 Justice #1 Mine Independence CoalKeith L. Casey 3-22-02 33 Mine #1 Rockhouse EnergyRodney Alan Scurlock 7-19-03 27 Upper Big Branch Performance CoalWilliam P. Burchfield 9-17-03 37 Twilight Mtn Surface Progress Coal Co.Rodney W. Sheets 9-17-03 47 Twilight Mtn Surface Progress Coal Co.Kenneth McNeely 2-5-04 33 Ruby Energy Mine Spartan Mining Co.Kevin Lupardous 10-20-04 41 Red Cedar Surface Endurance MiningChristopher McGuire 3-29-05 21 Mine #1 Rockhouse EnergyRussell Cole 8-3-05 39 Mine No. 1 Stillhouse MiningBrandon Wilder 8-3-05 23 Mine No. 1 Stillhouse MiningDonald Bragg 1-10-06 33 Aracoma Alma Mine #1 Aracoma Coal Co.Ellory Hatfield 1-10-06 46 Aracoma Alma Mine #1 Aracoma Coal Co.Paul Moss 1-1-06 58 Black Castle Mine Elk Run Coal Co.David J. Neal 12-4-07 57 No. 130 Mine Mammoth Coal Co.Nathan Dove 5-16-08 24 Aracoma Alma Mine #1 Aracoma Coal Co.James Woods 9-19-08 61 No. 1 Surface Massey Energy Co.Steven Cain 10-16-08 32 Justice #1 Independence Coal William Wade 2-6-09 70 Republic Energy Elk Run Coal Co.Christopher Bell 4-5-10 33 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Edward Dean Jones 4-5-10 50 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Ronald Lee Maynor 4-5-10 31 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Joe Marcum 4-5-10 57 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Greg Brock 4-5-10 47 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal William Griffith 4-5-10 54 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Ricky Workman 4-5-10 50 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Howard Payne, Jr. 4-5-10 53 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Steven J. Harrah 4-5-10 40 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Benny Ray Willingham 4-5-10 61 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Carl Acord 4-5-10 52 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Deward Allan Scott 4-5-10 58 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Robert E. Clark 4-5-10 41 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal William R. Lynch 4-5-10 59 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal

83

Jason Atkins 4-5-10 25 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Joe Price 4-5-10 55 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Mike Elswick 4-5-10 47 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Adam Morgan 4-5-10 21 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Charles Davis 4-5-10 51 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Cory Davis 4-5-10 20 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Richard Lane 4-5-10 45 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Rex Mullins 4-5-10 50 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Nick McCorskey 4-5-10 26 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Josh Napper 4-5-10 26 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Dillard Persinger 4-5-10 32 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Gary Wayne Quarles 4-5-10 33 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Grover Skeens 4-5-10 57 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal Kenneth Chapman 4-5-10 53 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal James Mooney 4-5-10 51 Upper Big Branch Performance Coal James Erwin 5-10-10 55 Ruby Mine Spartan Mining Co.Wilbert R. Starcher 7-1-10 60 Pocahontas Mine White Buck CoalCharles Qualls 12-4-10 32 Republic Energy Elk Run Coal

84

A massive gas inundation? Hardly.There is no evidence to support Massey’stheory that a massive inundation of naturalgas was the fuel source for the explosion atUBB. In fact, the path of the explosion andthe forces it generated clearly demonstratethat the primary fuel source of the explosionwas float coal dust.

The investigation revealed that thefloor crack Massey claims to be the source ofa natural gas inundation that caused theexplosion cannot be supported by theevidence. When it was excavated, the crackbecame solid rock, showing no signs of gasseepage from the underlying coal seam.

Perhaps the most important factor isthis: If there was a natural gas inundation,then once the gas exploded, the fuel sourcewould have been spent. There is no scientificbasis for the theory being put forward byMassey Energy. It simply serves to cloud theissues in an attempt to cover-up theapparently criminal acts committed by theoperator.

85

Conclusions and RecommendationsConclusion #1

Massey Energy Company is solelyresponsible for creating the conditions thatled to the deaths of 29 miners at the UpperBig Branch Mine – South on April 5, 2010.

Officials of Massey Energy, includingDonald Blankenship and his underlings whocarried out his corporate policy of productionover safety, must be held accountable fortheir actions that contributed to the death ofthese 29 miners These individuals,separately or as a group, and because of theirpersonal knowledge of these conditions,played an integral role in the events leadingup to and resulting in the explosion of April5, 2010.

Recommendation

Proper and immediate action should be takento determine the depth of knowledge andextent of each person’s culpability regardingthis matter. The Union believes that in orderfor this to be effectively and fairlyaccomplished, a Grand Jury should beempaneled and subpoenas issued to at leastthe Massey management officials listed onpages 71 and 72 of this report.

Upon the completion of the work ofthe Grand Jury, warrants and indictmentsshould be handed down as appropriate. Criminal trials for those indicted shouldcommence as soon as possible after theaffected individuals are served.

Conclusion #2

The Mine Safety and Health Administrationand the WVOMHS&T did not use all thetools available to them to compel MasseyEnergy to comply with the law.

Recommendation

A thorough review should be immediatelyinitiated into the actions of MSHA District 4. This review should be conducted by anindependent panel of experts not associatedwith the Agency or the U.S. Department ofLabor. The findings of that review should bereleased to all interested parties.

The State should follow therecommendations of this report and the reportissued by the Governor’s IndependentInvestigation Panel.

Also, Congress should amend theMine Act so that future multi-fatal incidentsare investigated by an independent body sothat all parties’ conduct is impartiallyconsidered and evaluated.

Conclusion #3

Massey’s ventilation plan approved byMSHA District 4 and the WVOMHS&T atUBB was flawed.

Recommendation

The Agencies should employ additionalventilation specialists.

Ventilation plans submitted by a mineoperator for approval by MSHA and the Statemust be complete and contain all the

86

requirements outlined in 30 CFR andapplicable State regulations. Plans that do notmeet this standard must be rejected andproduction halted until an adequate plan issubmitted and approved for the mine.

The approval of all ventilation plansshould be contingent upon the successfulcompletion of a ventilation survey of theentire mine. These surveys should beconducted each time the ventilation plan isreviewed. Plans that do not pass theventilation survey should be immediatelyrevoked.

The current standards governingacceptable ventilation controls are notadequate. MSHA must promulgate newregulations requiring conventional ventilationcontrols and limiting the use of doors tocontrol ventilation.

Conclusion #4

Massey Energy routinely made changes to theunderground ventilation without requiredapproval from the Agencies, many timeswhile miners were working underground,which endangered their lives.

Recommendation

The Agencies should cite all such air changesas flagrant violations of the law.

When illegal and intentional airchanges are discovered by an MSHA or Stateinspector, the inspector should be required toimmediately issue an order to evacuate theentire mine until the condition is corrected. The penalty assessed for the violation shouldbe issued, with all persons underground at thetime considered to be affected by thecondition.

Conclusion #5

Massey routinely failed to comply with theapproved roof control plan.

Recommendation

The Agencies should employ additional roofcontrol specialists.

The six-month review of a mine’s roofcontrol plan should include a comprehensiveroof control survey. This survey should noteall roof conditions in the mine that pose a riskto miners’ safety. All such conditions mustbe noted in the roof control plan along withthe appropriate remedy.

Roof control plans that do notadequately control roof falls, bottom-heavingor other dangers the plan is designed toeliminate should be immediately revoked. Nowork should be conducted in the mine untilan adequate roof control plan is submitted andapproved.

Special attention should be paid toroof support in bleeder entries.

Conclusion #6

Massey Energy continually contestedcitations and orders to avoid increasedenforcement action and avoid paying fines. This has become a standard tactic used byoperators to leverage the Agency intonegotiating reduced fines.

Recommendation

Congress should pass legislation requiring mine operators who contest citations to placethe amount of money assessed in fines into anon-interest bearing escrow account until thecase is resolved.

87

If a contest is found to be frivolous,additional penalties and fees should beapplied to such contested citations and orders.

Conclusion #7

The rights of the families of the deceasedminers and the UMWA, as the authorizedRepresentative of Miners, to participate in allaspects of the investigation were severelyrestricted when the Agencies decided toconduct private interviews instead of holdingpublic hearings.

Recommendation

The Mine Act and appropriate state lawshould be amended to give the investigativeagencies authority to subpoena documentsand to compel testimony for incidentinvestigations. Unless and until that happens,MSHA should be prepared to conduct publichearings.

In addition, the law should give familymembers of miners killed as the result of amine accident the right to designate aRepresentative of Miners. Miners’representatives should have the right to attendinvestigative interviews even when hearingsare not public.

Conclusion #8

The harassment and intimidation of theminers and inspectors by Massey Energymanagement personnel played a role in thehazardous conditions that existed at UBB.

Recommendation

The Mine Act should be strengthened toimprove whistleblower protections forminers. Also, penalties on mine operators thatinterfere with or impede the representatives of

the Agencies from performing their jobs,including giving advance notice ofinspections, must be enhanced.

Violations should be a federal crimewith substantial penalties, includingincarceration, with intentional violationsmade a felony.

Conclusion #9

Massey Energy employees did not knowabout and/or did not feel able to exercise theirrights to report unsafe and unhealthyconditions in the mine.

Recommendation

MSHA, not the operator, should provide asession on miners’ rights under the Mine Actas a part of the annual retraining.

Conclusion #10

The Command Center at UBB did not operateaccording to regulations and protocol duringthe rescue and recovery. Massey Energy ranthe rescue and recovery efforts without regardfor the safety of the mine rescue teams andwith limited input from the Agencies. It wasreported to be chaotic in the CommandCenter.

Recommendation The Agencies must ensure that there iscontrol in the Command Center at all times.

Mine rescue protocol must be adheredto at all times. Individuals who seek tocircumvent or ignore these protocols shouldbe immediately removed from the propertyand cited for interfering and impeding withthe Agency.

88

Conclusion #11

Massey Energy kept two sets of record booksat the mine. The official examination books,that can be reviewed by all interestedindividuals at the mine, did not report all ofthe violations and hazardous conditions. Theproduction and maintenance books, whichwere only seen by management, listedadditional hazardous and dangerousconditions in the mine.

Recommendation

All required examination books must containall violations and hazardous conditionsobserved by a certified examiner during thecourse of his examination. Operators whofail to adhere to these regulations should befined to the maximum extent possible. In thecase of MSHA, these violations should becited as flagrant.

The Agencies must do a better job ofreconciling what is recorded in theexamination books with the conditions theyfind underground. If conditions foundunderground do not accurately reflect what isrecorded, a citation should be immediatelyissued and the inspectors should increase theirscrutiny of the operators’ examinations andrecord-keeping.

Conclusion #12

Immediately after the explosion, severalmembers of mine management entered theunderground area of the UBB mine. JasonWhitehead and Chris Blanchard remainedunderground until the rescue efforts weresuspended. Four Massey managers wanderedthroughout the mine. There is no record ofwhere they traveled to or what they didduring the three hours they were underground

without the knowledge or permission of theAgencies. All of these individuals wereaware of the regulations in 30 CFR and stateregulations regarding limiting entry into mineafter a disaster.

Recommendation

These individuals must be cited for the willfuldisregard of the law.

In the future, the Agencies mustremove all non-mine rescue team personnelfrom the mine after a disaster. Further, minerescue personnel who are undergroundwithout the express permission of theAgencies must be removed.

Mine rescue protocol must be adheredto at all times.

Conclusion #13

Massey Energy did not adequately rock-dustthe mine as required by law. That act bymine management was a major contributingfactor to the coal dust explosion.

Recommendation

The Agency has already increased therequired incombustible content of combinedcoal mine dust and rock dust to 80 percent inall areas of the mine. This change, whichoccurred after the UBB explosion, is animportant step to protect miners. However,there is no more incentive for an operator likeMassey Energy to comply with these morerigorous requirements now than they didunder the previous regulation.

Therefore, the Agencies mustaggressively target operators who are foundto be out of compliance.

89

The approval and deployment of theCoal Dust Explosibility Meter would be asignificant improvement in enforcing rockdust standards. The Agency should immediately initiate this process.

Likewise, increased enforcementpressure should be applied to operators whoare found guilty of noncompliance. TheAgency should issue closure orders to areasfound to be in violation of the regulation andevacuate all miners inby the affected area.

90

United Mine Workers of AmericaCecil E. Roberts International PresidentDaniel J. Kane International Secretary-TreasurerMarty Hudson Executive Assistant to the PresidentRonald Airhart Executive Assistant to the Secretary-TreasurerRobert Scaramozzino Administrator, President’s OfficeTimothy J. Baker Assistant to the Secretary-TreasurerDennis O’Dell Administrator, Department of Occupational Health and SafetyRonald Bowersox Acting Administrator, Department of Occupational Health and SafetyLinda Raisovich-Parsons Deputy Administrator, Department of Occupational Health and SafetyPhilip Smith Director of CommunicationsJudith Rivlin Associate General CounselDavid Kameras Communications CoordinatorJoseph Carter International District 17 Vice PresidentDonnie Samms International At-Large Vice PresidentGary Trout Director, Region IIEmily Smith Communications SpecialistMax Kennedy International RepresentativeTheodore Hapney International RepresentativeJames Lamont International RepresentativeLeon Moscalink International RepresentativeLeo Cogar International RepresentativeKris Mallory International RepresentativeGary Butler International RepresentativeRon Stipanovich International RepresentativeAdam Vance International RepresentativeCharles Mills International RepresentativeColby Cunningham International RepresentativeDonald Cogar International RepresentativeDonnie Gray International RepresentativeGeorge Hill International RepresentativeGeorge Tudor International RepresentativeGerald Snyder International RepresentativeHenry McGinnis International RepresentativeJames Summerfield International RepresentativeJeff Harris International RepresentativeJoe Weldon Craig International RepresentativeJohn Palmer International RepresentativeJohn Toothman International RepresentativeJustin Scott International RepresentativeLarry Turner International RepresentativeMark Cochran International Representative

91

Mike Payton International RepresentativeRandy Henry International RepresentativeRichard Matheny International RepresentativeRoger Sparks International RepresentativeRonnie Huff International RepresentativeTanya James International RepresentativeThomas Mills International RepresentativeThomas Stern International RepresentativeTim Fleemont International RepresentativeTyler Peddicord International RepresentativeChuck Wilson International RepresentativeJames Summerfield International RepresentativeMichael Payton International Representative

92

Attachments• Investigation photographs

• Analysis of payouts to Massey Energy corporate personnel as a result of merger with AlphaNatural Resources

• UBB accident rates

• UBB Citations and Orders

• 103(j) order

• 103(k) order

• Map: Initial path of flames and forces

• Map: Second path of flames and forces

• Map: Evidence of two paths of flames and forces

• Map: Encircled by the blast

• Map: Victim locations

• Map: SCSRs opened post-explosion

• Abatement: North Portal fan recirculation of return air

• Citation: Providing water to the longwall shearer

• Chart: Gas ignitions at underground coal mines

• Notice from MSHA to the UMWA: Designation as representative of miners

• Letter from UMWA to MSHA District 4: Designation as representative of miners

• Letter from UMWA to WVOMSHT: Designation as representative of miners

• Letter from UMWA to Performance Coal Co.: Designation as representative of miners

• Blankenship “run coal” memorandum

• Blankenship memorandum following “run coal” memorandum

• MSHA notice regarding civil monetary fines

• Pages from UBB production and maintenance books (the “second set” of books)

• MSHA citation regarding air flowing in opposite direction of approved ventilation plan atUBB

• MHSA citation regarding failure to examine the mine for hazardous conditions

Investigation Photographs

Photo 2. Steel overcast cover panels twisted andcrumpled at #1 Crosscut in the Tailgate 22Section.

Photo 1. The longwall taildrum bits in a cut-out at thetail. The UMWA believes sparking from this areacaused an initial methane ignition, which then grewinto a coal dust explosion.

Photo 4. Bent and twisted steel belt structure at #4crosscut of Tailgate 22 Section shows evidence fromthe forces of the explosion.

Photo 3. A shuttle car inby the belt dump point in theTailgate 22 Section shows evidence of the flames andforces of the explosion.

Photo 5. Evidence of coking on mine roof inby the firstopen crosscut in the #1 Entry. This type of coking is aresidue of a coal dust explosion.

Photo 6. 1 North Longwall belt structure at a blown-out overcast. The belt structure has been completelyoverturned.

Photo 8. Airlock door blown from hinges and twisted,one block outby Tailgate 22 belt dump.

Photo 7. Shield hauler with a steel ventilation doorwrapped around the top, found at Headgate 22.

Photo 10. Tail drive assembly lid wedged between topof longwall shield and toes of shield at Shield #158.

Photo 9. Stopping blown out toward the north as a resultof the initial path of forces, at 73 crosscut, northeast of78 switch.

Photo 11. Shuttle car showing heat damage from theflames and forces, in the Tailgate 22 Section.

�

Init

ial

pa

th o

f fl

am

es

an

d f

orc

es

�

Se

co

nd

pa

th o

f fl

am

es

an

d f

orc

es

Path

s of F

lam

es a

nd F

orce

s

�

At�2

3�x�cut,�Survey�Spud

�227

12,�the

�1�North�21�

Long

wall�B

elt�a

nd�m

onorail�reveal�d

estruction

�bron�

directiona

l�forces�blow

ing�SO

UTH

�and

�EAST.�(Ph

oto�4)�

In�the

�Belt�H

eading�(#

1�En

try)�the

�North�21�Long

wall�B

elt�

and�the�mon

orail�reveal�destruction

�from

�direction

al�

forces�blowing�WEST�at�17�x�cut�.�survey�Spud

�226

74�

(inby

)�to�the�long

wall�face.(Pho

to�3)�

At�31

�x�cut�one

�intersection

�(ind

y)�W

EST�of�

Survey�Spu

d�22

793�in�#2�En

try,�two�

roofbo

lts�are�discovered

�with�im

pacted

�coking�dust�on

�the

�EAST�side�of�the

�bolt�

head

s,�in

dicating�direction

sl�fo

rces�

blow

ing�WEST.�(P

hoto�1)�

In�the

�31�x�cut�just�NORT

H�of�this�

intersection

,�a�roo

fbolt�is�discovered

�with�

impa

cted

�cok

eing�dust�on

�the

�NORT

H�side�

of�th

e�bo

lt�head,�indicating�a�direction

al�

force�blow

ing�SO

UTH

.�(Ph

oto�2)�

Photo�1

Photo�2�

Initi

al p

ath

of

flam

es a

nd fo

rces

Seco

ndar

y pa

th o

f fla

mes

and

forc

es

Photo�4

Photo�3�

�

Enc

ircl

ed b

y th

e bl

ast

As

Ch

rist

op

he

r B

ell,

Dill

ard

Pe

rsin

ge

r, J

oe

l Pri

ce

an

d G

ary

Wa

yne

Qu

arl

es

try

to e

sca

pe

up

th

e lo

ng

wa

ll p

an

line

to

th

e h

ea

dg

ate

fro

m t

he

ou

t o

f-c

on

tro

l ig

nit

ion

, th

ey

are

kill

ed

wh

en

th

e e

xplo

sio

n, h

avi

ng

cir

cle

d a

rou

nd

fr

om

th

e lo

ng

wa

ll ta

ilga

te, r

oa

rs t

hro

ug

h t

he

ta

ilga

te e

ntr

ies

an

d s

urr

ou

nd

s th

em

. Mic

ha

el L

ee

Els

wic

k, C

ory

Da

vis,

Tim

oth

y D

avi

s, A

da

m K

eit

h M

org

an

, Jo

shu

a S

co

tt N

ap

pe

r, R

ex

Mu

llin

s, N

ich

ola

s D

arr

el M

cC

rosk

ey,

Ric

ha

rd

La

ne

an

d G

rove

r D

ale

Ske

en

s a

re a

lso

kill

ed

in t

his

cir

cu

lar

mo

tio

n o

f th

e

fla

me

s a

nd

fo

rce

s.

�

Gre

g�Br

ock,

�Dea

n�Jo

nes�

and�

Joe�

Mar

cum

�foun

d�in

by�th

e�m

antr

ip�o

n�H

eadg

ate�

22.��

Kenn

y�Ch

apm

an,�W

illia

m�G

riff

ith,�

Rona

ld�M

ayno

r,�Ja

mes

�Moo

ney,

�H

owar

d�Pa

yne�

and�

Rick

y�W

orkm

an�

foun

d�in

�man

trip

�on�

Hea

dgat

e�22

.�

Cory

�Dav

is,�C

harl

es�T

imot

hy�D

avis

,�A

dam

�Mor

gan�

and�

Josh

ua�N

appe

r�fo

und�

on�1

�Nor

th�H

eadg

ate�

trac

k�en

try.

��

Mic

hael

�Els

wic

k�fo

und�

at�th

e�M

othe

r�D

rive

/bel

t�dum

p�tr

ansf

er�

for�

the�

1�N

orth

�Lon

gwal

l�sec

tion.

�

Rex�

Mul

lins�

foun

d�al

ong�

the�

righ

t�ri

b�be

side

�the�

sta g

eloa

der.

Nic

olas

�McC

rosk

ey�fo

und�

in�th

e�ba

ck�o

f�the

�No.

��2�

head

gate

�shi

eld�

inby

�the�

stag

eloa

der.

�� Rich

ard�

K.�L

ane�

and�

Gro

ver�

Skee

ns�fo

und�

at�N

o.�8

5�sh

ield

�dow

n�th

e�pa

nlin

e.

Chri

stop

her�

Bell,

�Dill

ard�

Pers

inge

r,�Jo

el�P

rice

�and

�Gar

y�Q

uarl

es�fo

und�

betw

een�

No.

�104

�and

�No.

�107

�shi

elds

.�

Carl

�Aco

rd,�J

ason

�Atk

ins,

�Rob

ert�C

lark

,�Ste

ve�

Har

rah,

�Will

iam

�Lyn

ch,�D

ewar

d�Sc

ott�a

nd�

Benn

y�W

illin

gham

�foun

d�ou

tby�

78�s

witc

h�on

�th

e�tr

ack�

entr

y.��

Loc

atio

n of

the

vict

ims

unIted mIne Workers of amerIca18354 Quantico gateway drive

suite 200triangle VA 22172

(703) 291-2400

www.umwa.org