United Nations S/PV.4950

Security CouncilFifty-ninth year

4950th meetingThursday, 22 April 2004, 9.50 a.m.New York

Provisional

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation ofspeeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Recordsof the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. Theyshould be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of thedelegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

04-31807 (E)

*0431807*

President: Mr. Pleuger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Germany)

Members: Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. BaaliAngola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Gaspar MartinsBenin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. AdechiBrazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. SardenbergChile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. MuñozChina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Wang GuangyaFrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. De La SablièrePakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. AkramPhilippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. BajaRomania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. MotocRussian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. GatilovSpain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. AriasUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . . Mr. ThomsonUnited States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Cunningham

Agenda

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

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The meeting was called to order at 9.50 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda.

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The President: I should like to inform theCouncil that I have received letters from therepresentatives of Albania, Argentina, Australia,Austria, Belarus, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, India,Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel,Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein,Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, NewZealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, theRepublic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden,Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tajikistan,in which they request to be invited to participate in thediscussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. Inconformity with the usual practice, I propose, with theconsent of the Council, to invite those representativesto participate in the discussion, without the right tovote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of theCharter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rulesof procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, therepresentatives of the aforementioned countriestook the seats reserved for them at the side of theCouncil Chamber.

The President: The Security Council will nowbegin its consideration of the item on its agenda. TheSecurity Council is meeting in accordance with theunderstanding reached in its prior consultations.

In accordance with the understanding reachedamong Council members, I wish to remind all speakersto limit their statements to no more than four minutesin order to enable the Council to carry out its workexpeditiously. More than one quarter of themembership of the United Nations has asked to speakin this meeting. I think it would be only fair to give alla chance to express their concerns and make theircomments and suggestions. If everyone sticks to fourminutes, I think everyone will have a chance toparticipate in a useful way in the Council’sdeliberations. Delegations with lengthy statements arekindly requested to circulate the text in writing and to

deliver a condensed version when speaking in theChamber.

As another measure to optimize the use of ourtime and in order to allow as many delegations aspossible to take the floor, I will not individually invitespeakers to take a seat at the table or invite them toresume their seat at the side. When a speaker is takingthe floor, the conference officer will seat the nextspeaker on the list at the table. I thank all for theirunderstanding and cooperation.

I now give the floor to the members of theCouncil.

Mr. Baja (Philippines): Mr. President, thank youfor convening this open meeting on the draft resolutionon non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD). We accept and respect your technical veto onstatements exceeding four minutes, and we will adhereto it.

It is fortuitous that your first speaker on thesubject comes from a country that does not produceWMD and has therefore nothing to proliferate, butwhich finds itself under the same obligations as othercountries that do produce and have the capacity toproduce WMD. I believe that a great majority of yourspeakers, and of the United Nations membership, is inthis unique position. It is also unique that, while themeasures mentioned in the draft resolution are directedat non-State actors, the onus of implementing themrests upon States.

My delegation appreciates, therefore, thetimeliness of this open debate and the value of listeningto the views of the general membership, who would beimplementing the resolution. Those who are boundshould be heard. This is an essential element of atransparent and democratic process, and is the best toproceed on a resolution that demands legislativeactions and executive measures from the 191 Membersof the United Nations. In this regard, we welcome theinitiative of the sponsors to present the draft resolutionto regional groups and to discuss with them and otherinterested parties what is in the text and what is not inthe text.

We approach the subject through the prism ofmeasures to combat terrorism, which constitutes athreat to international peace and security. We believethat other States also take this approach and that is whythere is a consensus, not only among the members of

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the Security Council but also in the generalmembership of the United Nations, about the seriousthreat posed by nuclear, biological and chemicalweapons falling into the hands of non-State actors andbeing used for terrorism.

There is also general acceptance that there is agap in existing non-proliferation regimes to addressthis threat. Addressing this serious threat now is thecommon ground on which we are all building. A clearand present danger that non-State actors will takeadvantage of this gap requires exceptional responses.

We are aware that existing multilateralobligations on WMD emanate from multilateral treatiesthat have resulted from negotiations in which all partieshave closely examined those treaties and have agreedto be committed to their provisions. This resolutiondeviates from time-tested modes of creatingmultilateral obligations but my delegation essentiallyregards it as an exceptional measure to address a newand urgent potential threat not covered by existingtreaty regimes. The Council is moving to a new phaseof combating terrorism and, if it is to play a crucialrole, as it should, in combating this threat tointernational peace and security, its members will haveto display extraordinary degrees of flexibility andrealism on the issue.

We note the positive elements of the draft, whichhave been stressed by the sponsors and which will helpus support it, namely, the incorporation of thefulfilment of obligations in relation to arms control anddisarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-retroactivity of the resolution. We are also assured thatthe draft does not preclude multilateral agreements onthe subject, that it does not infringe on existing treatyregimes nor hamper international cooperation inmaterials, equipment and technology for peacefulpurposes, and that it does not ipso facto authorizeenforcement action against States that fail or are unableto comply with the obligations imposed by theresolution. We accept these as articles of faith.

However, we seek further clarity in the definitionof the mandate of the proposed committee. Based onthe divergence of ideas on the time frame of thecommittee, it is clear that the sponsors have differentideas on the scope of the role of the committee. Webelieve that the time frame of the committee will bemore easily decided once the mandate is clarified andagreed upon.

Finally, we hope that the draft resolution on thisitem can be adopted by consensus to signify theseriousness and strong desire of the Council and of theinternational community to counter the threat posed byWMD falling into the hands of non-State actors. Anauthoritative pronouncement exerts an independentinfluence on State behaviour, even as it imparts astrong message to its intended recipients — the non-State actors. The Council’s efforts to address theproliferation of WMD will enjoy a greater resonance ifthe general United Nations membership can own suchefforts. In this way, the law on the books will be thelaw on the ground.

The President: I now call on the representativeof Brazil.

Mr. Sardenberg (Brazil): Mr. President, thedelegation of Brazil would like to commend you forconvening this timely open debate. By responding tothe request of Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, SouthAfrica, Sweden and Switzerland, you have created acrucial opportunity for all Member States to expresstheir views and perceptions on the draft resolution onweapons of mass destruction (WMD) and non-Stateactors. We believe that the United Nations membershipwill provide an indispensable input into thenegotiations now taking place within the SecurityCouncil.

The Brazilian position regarding the current draftis based on two clear underlying premises. First, theCouncil is dealing with the potential threat posed bynon-State actors, especially terrorists, who have accessto nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well asto their means of delivery. The Council seeks to close agap in international law — and let me add that therelevant international instruments do not deal in therequired detail with that potential threat. Secondly,there is a sense of urgency, given the gravity of thismatter.

Brazil is in a comfortable position to address thisissue. At the domestic level, the Brazilian Constitutionforbids the use of nuclear energy for non-peacefulpurposes. Appropriate laws regarding the prohibition ofchemical and biological weapons have already beenadopted. At the international level, we are party to allmajor treaties and arrangements: the Treaty ofTlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) andthe Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

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We are also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR). Additionally, with the creation of theBrazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting andControl of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), Argentina andBrazil pioneered a scheme for bilateral nuclearinspections that is widely seen as a model ofcooperation. Our credentials on this field are thusunimpeachable.

In parallel, we pursue the universalization of allinternational instruments in the field of WMD and urgetheir full implementation by States parties. A worldwithout any weapons of mass destruction would be asafer world for all of us, for our children andgrandchildren. We take this opportunity to invite allMember States to show their commitment to this cause.

With the aim of safeguarding the integrity ofexisting international treaties and conventions, thedelegation of Brazil circulated to members of theCouncil on 8 April a non-paper suggesting analternative way of addressing the subject of WMD andnon-State actors. We believe that such an approachprovides a satisfactory and expeditious manner ofpursuing our shared objectives in a way consistent withinternational law.

In addition, it is our view that, by avoiding theterm “non-proliferation” and by resorting to innovativelanguage aimed at characterizing the linkage betweennon-State actors and WMD as a new development ininternational life, we would have sidestepped manylegal, political and practical difficulties in ournegotiations, while sharpening the focus of the draft.

Although showing a readiness to consider ournon-paper, the sponsors were not really responsive toit. The explanations provided, however valuable, didnot seem to us entirely persuasive or sufficient. Thisencouraged the belief that the only way still open forimproving the draft resolution would be thepresentation of further amendments.

Indeed, last Tuesday, 20 April, our delegationcirculated a small number of amendments expressingour concerns. Those proposals, I note, arecomplementary to other suggestions already submittedby members of the Council, which have our support. Toour regret, only a few of the proposals have beenincorporated so far into the revised text. But, weassume that the Council will be working towardsreaching a consensus on this matter.

Having said that, I would like to state our corepositions regarding the draft resolution as it stands.

First, the draft resolution should emphasize theprimary responsibility of the Council to act against anypotential threat to international peace and security, asprovided for by the Charter of the United Nations.

Secondly, it should make use of new concepts toaddress a new issue, namely the transparent concepts ofnon-access, non-transfer and non-availability ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-Stateactors.

Thirdly, it should reflect the existing delicatebalance within international instruments in this fieldregarding the obligations of all States parties on non-proliferation, disarmament and internationalcooperation for peaceful purposes.

Fourthly, the draft resolution should not need toinvoke Chapter VII of the Charter, since Article 25 ofthe Charter provides that all decisions by the SecurityCouncil shall be accepted and carried out by theMember States of the Organization. If, however, areference to Chapter VII is retained, we could acceptthat its scope of application be limited to the draft’sfirst three operative paragraphs.

Fifthly, better language should be sought asregards the obligation contained in operative paragraph2 to the effect that all States shall adopt specified laws.We strongly recommend that the text take into accountthe independence of national congresses in the exerciseof their law-making power.

Finally, the committee envisaged by operativeparagraph 9 should not carry out activities that mayundercut the mandates of multilateral organizationsestablished by treaty. We are waiting for furtherclarification by the sponsors on aspects related to thepossible mandate, functions and composition of thecommittee. We are thus in the same position as that ofthe delegation of the Philippines.

I wish to reiterate that my delegation has highexpectations as to the results of this open debate. Thissession will certainly allow us to understand thevarious viewpoints of the international community. Forour part, we are ready to work towards a successfuloutcome — that is to say, an approach that effectivelyresponds to this potential threat against internationalpeace and security and that is considered to be

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meritorious by the wider membership of theOrganization.

Mr. Baali (Algeria) (spoke in French): I wouldlike to thank the States who have called for a publicdebate on an issue that clearly concerns all MemberStates of the Organization, since it has to do withaddressing the threat of the acquisition of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) by non-State players. It is,therefore, essential to face this threat as a united front,with optimal effectiveness and a full understanding ofwhat is involved.

The possibility of terrorist networks pursuingillegal trafficking of technologies and material thatcould be used to produce WMD indeed constitutes aserious threat to the security of all of us. This shouldcompel us to act without delay to prevent theirreversible from taking place.

This is why my country would like to express itsfull support for — and endorsement of — the goal setforth by the sponsors of the draft resolution ofaddressing this fearsome threat and filling the admittedgaps in international law. Indeed, there is nothing ininternational treaties that could fully protect us againstthe risk of WMD falling into the hands of terroristgroups.

In the absence of binding international standards,and because of the seriousness and the urgent nature ofthe threat, the response to it needs to be articulated andformulated by the Security Council. It is understoodthat, in shouldering this responsibility, the SecurityCouncil is acting in an exceptional manner, since,clearly, the Charter does not give it a mandate tolegislate on behalf of the international community, butsimply gives it the principle responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and security.

In accordance with Article 25 of the Charter, theMembers of the United Nations will accept andimplement the decisions that the Security Council willtake in this area. From this standpoint, it does not evenseem necessary for the Security Council to take actionunder Chapter VII. If it does, perhaps it should only doso for the three first paragraphs of the draft resolution,as my Brazilian colleague has just proposed. At thesame time, and parallel to the implementation of theresolution that the Security Council adopts, anintergovernmental process aimed at finalizing aninternational legal instrument on this issue should be

initiated and rapidly completed, perhaps in theConference on Disarmament or elsewhere.

That being the case, I would like to recall that,with respect to the relationship between States andWMD, widely accepted treaties do exist. Theirrelevance and validity must be consolidated and, at thesame time, reaffirmed. In this regard, it is useful tounderscore that the draft resolution needs to limit itselfto filling the gaps that exist in international law, that is,the relationship between WMD and non-State players.It should not create obligations for States that would bein addition to or compete with those that are providedfor by the above-mentioned treaties, or that couldweaken or modify the international regimes establishedby two of these treaties.

It is evident that the most effective way tocounter WMD is to completely eliminate them. This isclearly the principal goal of the three basic treaties andtheir protocols, and thus States parties mustscrupulously and fully implement the provisions ofthese international instruments.

From this standpoint, I believe it appropriate torecall that the five nuclear-weapons Powers didunequivocally commit to eliminate their nuclearstockpiles at the Sixth Review Conference of theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT), over which it was my honour to preside in2000, here in New York. The 2005 NPT ReviewConference, the third preparatory session of which willbegin next week here in New York, will undoubtedlyoffer us an opportunity to clearly assess the progressmade in this area since 2000.

In other words, proliferation in all its aspects anddisarmament are, for us, part of the same equation.This is why we believe that it is appropriate andnecessary for this draft resolution to reaffirm the needto work towards disarmament.

Similarly, we believe that the emergence ofWMD-free zones, based on freely agreedarrangements, would be an ideal contribution to non-proliferation, as the United Nations DisarmamentCommission expressed very clearly in 1999. We alsobelieve that this draft resolution must unambiguouslyreaffirm the legitimate right of States to peacefully usenuclear-related materials and technologies.

Lastly, the establishment of a monitoringcommittee, whose mandate must be determined in

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advance, should include the provision of a sunsetclause. It should also provide unequivocal support forexisting disarmament mechanisms, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency and the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons as key means ofimplementing the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (spoke in Chinese):The Chinese delegation welcomes this SecurityCouncil debate on the issue of non-proliferation. Webelieve it will undoubtedly help improve the draftresolution currently being considered by the Council.From the outset, we have supported holding such adebate at an early date.

Preventing the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD) and their means of delivery isconducive to the maintenance of international peaceand security and is in the international community’scommon interests. For years, United Nations MemberStates have made important efforts in that regard. Inthe new international security environment, it is crucialto strengthen international cooperation aimed atdeveloping and improving the existing internationalnon-proliferation regime so that we can respondeffectively to the threat of terrorism.

China opposes the proliferation of WMD and oftheir means of delivery, and we have taken an activepart in international non-proliferation efforts. Chinahas always advocated the complete prohibition andthorough destruction of all kinds of WMD. Thefundamental purpose of non-proliferation is to maintainand promote international and regional peace, stabilityand security.

The proliferation of WMD and of their means ofdelivery has itself complicated factors that haveeverything to do with the international and regionalsecurity environment. Pursuing the universalimprovement of international relations and acceleratingfair and rational settlement of the security issues of theregions concerned will help to attain the goal of non-proliferation. At the same time, the role of the existingnon-proliferation machinery should brought into fullplay, and proliferation issues should be resolvedthrough dialogue and international cooperation. Toeffectively push non-proliferation efforts forward, wemust guarantee the legitimate rights of all countries —including developing countries — to utilize and share

dual-use scientific and technological advances andproducts for peaceful purposes.

China supports the United Nations in its efforts toplay its proper role in non-proliferation, and we favourthe adoption of a Security Council draft resolution inthat area on the basis of broad consultations. TheChinese delegation has participated in the consultationson this draft resolution in an active, serious andresponsible manner. China’s proposals are reflected inthe current draft, and a reference to interdiction wasdeleted at the request of the Chinese delegation. We areof the view that the current draft is an effort to enhanceand strengthen international cooperation, on the basisof existing international law, and to deal withtrafficking in WMD and their means of delivery andrelated materials by non-State actors, so as to preventfurther proliferation of such weapons.

Non-proliferation is closely related to theinterests of all countries, and it requires joint efforts onthe part of all members of the international community.To gain the understanding and support of theoverwhelming majority of the international community,it is essential that we ensure a fair, rational and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime. Both theimprovement of the existing regime and theestablishment of a new one should be based onuniversal participation by all countries and ondecisions made by means of the democratic process. Itis, therefore, our consistent position that the opinionsof all Security Council members and of the majority ofUnited Nations Members must be fully taken intoaccount and their reasonable proposals and suggestionsreflected in the current draft resolution. That isessential in order to deepen international understandingand to move the international non-proliferation processforward.

We are pleased that the sponsors have made anumber of amendments to the draft resolution on thebasis of previous discussions in the Security Council. Itis my belief and hope that, by means of today’s debate,the Council will be able to draw on its collectivewisdom to further improve the current text and that itwill proceed to adopt a more comprehensive andbalanced draft resolution by consensus.

Mr. Arias (Spain) (spoke in Spanish): Mycountry endorses the statement to be made later byIreland on behalf of the European Union. Spain hasdecided to co-sponsor this draft resolution because we

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consider it essential to act urgently to fill a legalvacuum in which international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and regimes do not sufficientlyaddress the question of how to prevent access by non-State actors — particularly terrorists — to weapons ofmass destruction (WMD).

The draft resolution’s context is none other thanthe global fight against terrorism, and therefore Spainconsiders this exercise to be part of what began withresolution 1373 (2001). In that context, it is clear thatwe are confronting a grave and imminent threat tointernational peace and security: the possibility thatnon-State actors might gain access to WMD andsensitive materials. For that reason, my countrybelieves that the Council is competent to act. Webelieve that, since the Council is legislating for theentire international community, this draft resolutionshould preferably, although not necessarily, be adoptedby consensus and after consultation with non-membersof the Council. Therefore, without prejudice to the — Idaresay — unprecedented and intensive negotiations ofthe sponsors, Spain has always believed the holding ofthis formal open debate to be appropriate.

The most debated issues related to the draftresolution can be summarized in four points. The firstissue is non-proliferation. The draft’s objective is clearand limited. In no way does it attempt to modifyinternational disarmament or non-proliferationobjectives, which is clearly indicated in operativeparagraph 11. Therefore, we believe that the term “non-proliferation”, with the safeguard represented by thatparagraph, is the most appropriate way to refer to thephenomenon we want to combat, since it clearlyencompasses both the State and the non-State aspects.Therefore, proliferation cannot be qualified by limitingit to non-State actors, because obviously States canalso proliferate WMD and supply them to non-Stateactors.

The second issue is disarmament. It is a fact thatthe various treaties alluded to in the draft resolution aredisarmament rather than non-proliferation treaties andthat disarmament and non-proliferation are closelyinter-related concepts in international norms andpractice. Clearly, disarmament can help to prevent non-State actors from acquiring WMD, but this draftresolution will in no way cause States possessing suchweapons to comply more swiftly with theirdisarmament obligations under international treaties orcause non-parties to such treaties to accede to them.

What is more, if we introduce too many paragraphs ondisarmament into the draft resolution, we run the riskof diluting its objective. That does not mean we do notagree on substance, but we do not deem it appropriateto introduce too many disarmament references, becausethey are not appropriate in the context of the draftresolution. Therefore, my delegation is pleased that, forthe sake of balance, a reference to disarmament wasintroduced into a preambular paragraph withoutdiverting the draft resolution from its specificobjective.

The third issue is Chapter VII of the Charter.Spain believes that the draft resolution is notintrusive — because it gives States leeway on how tointernally interpret its implementation — and that itshould be adopted within the framework of Chapter VIIfor two reasons: to make it unequivocally legallybinding for all United Nations Members and to send astrong political message. In that context, I want toemphasize that Spain considers this exercise to be partof the fight against terrorism and a continuation ofwhat began with resolution 1373 (2001), which wasadopted within the framework of Chapter VII. It wouldtherefore be hard to understand why one would notapply Chapter VII on this occasion.

We also understand that the draft resolution in noway explicitly or implicitly gives a blank check for theuse of coercive measures, including the use of force, incases of non-compliance.

Fourthly, as to the follow-up mechanism, Spainsupports the creation of a Security Council committeeentrusted with monitoring the implementation of thedraft resolution and is flexible with regard to theduration of its mandate. The important thing is that ithave sufficient time to fulfil its functions. In any case,six months would not appear to be enough. As has beennoted concerning other Council committees, thecommittee should set its own terms of reference once ithas been established.

We believe that this would be a standardcommittee of the Security Council, composed of all themembers and operating on the basis of consensus, andwhose functions would be very similar to that of theCounter-Terrorism Committee. In other words, it wouldbe a committee governed by the principles ofcooperation, equal treatment and transparency, and ofwhich providing technical assistance to States would bean essential component. Furthermore and lastly, we

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believe that it should have experts to assist its work.For most Permanent Missions, it would be impossiblealone to process all the information to be provided byStates under the draft resolution.

Mr. De La Sablière (France) (spoke in French):At the outset, my delegation wishes to associate itselfwith the statement to be made on behalf of theEuropean Union by the representative of Ireland.

This public debate is taking place after severalweeks of work, during which the sponsors went togreat lengths to explain the draft resolution and closelylistened to Member States within and outside theSecurity Council. This public debate is therefore takingplace at the right time and we hope that it will proveconstructive.

I understand that there may not be agreement onthe details of all the elements of the draft resolution asit exists today, but I also understand from theconsultations that there is broad agreement. We areclearly on the same wavelength. The very target of thetext — non-State actors and the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and their means ofdelivery — is the subject of broad agreement. Each ofus is now aware of the aim of the text to fill a gap andto strengthen the non-proliferation regime by askingStates to take the necessary measures, in particularfollowing the latest proliferation crises. Each of us isaware of the gravity of the problem because we arenow in an era of wholesale terrorism and in which themost dangerous technologies have become accessibleand are being trafficked. Each of us is aware that wecannot remain passive.

As has been stressed by the European Unionpresidency, Europe is resolutely committed tostrengthening the current non-proliferation system byadopting a strategy in that regard. Others arecommitted to that path, but, faced with this seriousthreat, the Security Council has a role to play, which itis doing through the draft resolution, based on the ideathat the measures to be taken to counter proliferationactivities are the responsibility of States. The SecurityCouncil cannot take those measures in their stead, butit can decide that they do need to take them.

That is what the text seeks to ensure in twospecific areas: the criminalization of the activities ofnon-State actors and the establishment of securitymeasures for sensitive materials, export and bordercontrols, and the monitoring of export and transit

brokering activities. The Council is establishing thegoals, but it leaves each State free to define thepenalties, legal regulations and practical measures to beadopted. The draft resolution does not establish thoseaspects. It does not compel any State to abide by therules of instruments to which some States have chosennot to accede.

The sponsors clearly realize that the text willhave even greater impact if it is understood by MemberStates outside the Council. They have thereforepursued broad consultations that have in particular ledthem to meet with the Non-Aligned Movement andother groups of States. That work has set the stage fortoday’s debate and increases the chances of seeing itcontribute to improving the text.

The consultations have forged broad agreementon the gravity of the threat and have enabled us toidentify concerns. First, States have clearly expressedthe desire to incorporate a reference to disarmament.Even if this draft resolution — which is exceptionaland highly targeted — does not solve every problem,we understand that this issue is one of principle that isvery important to many. We have therefore supportedincorporating, at the beginning of the preamble, areference to disarmament obligations.

In addition, many countries have sought andcontinue to seek clarifications on the follow-upmechanism; on the timetable for reporting, which hasbeen deemed too brief; on the vague mandate of theCommittee; on the operating period, which has alsobeen deemed too brief; and on the unclear articulationof its relationship to the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) and the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Lastly, there are widespread misgivings withrespect to the reference in the draft resolution toChapter VII of the Charter, which has sparked concernsabout a potential use of force to ensure the draftresolution’s implementation. I should like to allay thatfear by addressing the problem in depth. We believethat we can mitigate this concern by enhancing thefollow-up mechanism, which must protect thelegitimate interests of States and coordinate SecurityCouncil cooperation with them.

I should like to explain first that we believe thereference to Chapter VII to be important for tworeasons. The first is a legal reason, as the referenceprovides as a basis for the Council in this area the

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notion that there is indeed a threat to internationalpeace and security. The second is a political reason.Reference to Chapter VII reflects the seriousness of thesituation and the resolve of the Member States. Havingsaid that, I believe that we need to reconcile twomessages.

The first is that there is a serious threat, which weneed to meet with determination — hence, underChapter VII. The second is that we are resolved topromote implementation based on cooperation andrespect for the sovereignty of States and to precludeany coercion that is not justified, considered orauthorized by the Council. France is particularlyconcerned to ensure such a balance and believes thatthe draft resolution does just that, specifically by virtueof the committee. We believe that it will go evenfurther towards giving States the necessary assurancesby providing that they submit their reports within animproved timetable; by stressing the possibilities forStates that lack resources to be able enjoy internationalassistance; by explaining that the Committee willconsider the reports on the basis of unanimity, withexpertise from the IAEA and the OPCW; and byensuring that decisions will be taken only by theCouncil itself. We believe that the Committee will beable to offer what is known in English as “dueprocess”, providing all safeguards to States.

France believes that this public debate will helpthe sponsors to spell out the provisions in this area withrespect to the committee which is, so far, that part ofthe text that could be improved in terms of quality. Wehave all said that we advocate effective multilateralism.This text on weapons of mass destruction and non-Stateplayers is, above all, implementation of the idea ofeffective multilateralism on a subject that is ofparticular concern for all countries. And this is thebelief that we have of the importance of what is atstake, which means that France will not hesitate toprovide its support to this initiative and become asponsor of the text.

Mr. Gaspar Martins (Angola): At the outset, Iwould like to express my delegation’s appreciation forthe convening of this open debate on the draftresolution on non-proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and on the threat it poses to internationalpeace and security. The participation of the entireUnited Nations membership in this important debateensures the need, or the needed collective vision, toaddress the existing gap in the current non-proliferation

regime and represents a great value added to the workthat the Security Council is currently undertaking.

The threat posed by terrorist organizations tointernational peace and security is an undisputed realityof contemporary life. To prevent the access of terroristsand non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction,related materials and their means of delivery is a newchallenge to non-proliferation efforts and a recognizedpriority to be addressed by the internationalcommunity.

The presidential statement adopted by theSecurity Council meeting at the level of the heads ofState and Government in 1992, Security Councilresolution 1373 (2001), and General Assemblyresolutions concerning the need for strengtheningmultilateral arms control and non-proliferation regimesto combat international terrorism demonstrate theinternational community’s awareness and commitmentin addressing the threat posed by the proliferation ofnuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their useby terrorists. The regime established by the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is ofparticular relevance. Strengthening the effectiveness ofthe comprehensive International Atomic EnergyAgency’s safeguard system is another importantcontribution to such endeavours. The draft resolutionsubject of our consideration today takes stock of thedisarmament concerns that should be strengthened byreaffirming the need for all Member States to fulfiltheir obligations in relation to arms control anddisarmament in all its aspects.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September conferred agreater sense of urgency on the required common effortto prevent the ability of terrorist organizations toacquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Themandate conferred upon it by the United NationsCharter entitles the Security Council to play the leadingrole in this global fight against terrorism. Accordingly,we welcome the Council’s decision to consider theadoption of a resolution on these matters in the contextof a widely felt urgency to fill the existing gap ininternational law relating to the current non-proliferation regimes in preventing chemical,biological and nuclear weapons and the means todeliver them from falling into the hands of non-Stateactors, especially terrorist groups.

By adopting resolution 1373 (2001), the SecurityCouncil took the unprecedented step of bringing into

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force legislation binding all States on the issue ofcombating terrorism. The draft resolution which is theobject of our consideration today, aimed at denyingaccess of non-State actors and terrorists to weapons ofmass destruction, is in accord with the objectives statedin resolution 1373 (2001). Its adoption will constitute anew landmark in the global fight against terrorism andin the ability of the Security Council to lead the fightagainst such threats.

We believe that open debates of the SecurityCouncil such as the one we are holding today arenecessary and timely. They contribute to mutualunderstanding and to the broad expression of views onsubjects of great importance to international life —outstanding issues such as the issue of arms control anddisarmament and international nuclear cooperation forpeaceful purposes. The follow-up mechanism on theimplementation of the resolution and on the issue notyet resolved might be an object of creative approachesin today’s debate whose outcome will surely be veryuseful for the improvement of the work on the draftresolution under consideration by the Security Council.I therefore commend you, Mr. President, for holdingsuch a debate today.

The fundamental outcome in the process of theresolution’s adoption is that the internationalcommunity shares a common vision on this subjectmatter and that the Security Council reaches a strongconsensus on the need and on the provisions of theresolution to be eventually adopted.

Mr. Muñoz (Chile) (spoke in Spanish): May Ifirst of all express my delegation’s thanks to you,Mr. President, for having convened this open meeting,so that we can discuss, with the participation of allmembers of the United Nations that are interested inthis subject, the issue of the non-proliferation ofweapons on mass destruction in the hands of non-Stateactors or terrorists. We are interested in hearing theopinions of other delegations and we have said thismany times, so we are delighted that this meeting hasbeen convened.

Chile resolutely supports all universal andregional instruments for disarmament, weapons controland non-proliferation, and we attach particularimportance to those that prohibit complete categoriesof weapons of mass destruction. My country firmlysupports efforts being made in the framework of theUnited Nations to ensure and strengthen

implementation of these instruments. We attach specialimportance to the legitimacy that is provided bynegotiations in a multilateral framework. At the sametime, we regret the fact that obstructionist use of therule of consensus has thus far impeded the adoption ofsuch important mechanisms as the protocol for theverification of the Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention or agreement on a treaty for the prohibitionof the production of fissionable materials for militarypurposes.

Chile recognizes that well-established multilateralforums have not made full use of all the effectivemeans available to States to provide legal guarantees inthe face of threats to international security. For thatreason, my delegation firmly supports the InternationalCode of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation— the Hague Code of Conduct — which addresses alsothe means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.It is a politically binding instrument that wasnegotiated and is implemented within the framework ofa broad group of like-minded countries.

We believe that a binding Security Councilresolution on weapons of mass destruction, addressingnon-State actors and terrorists, would effectivelybuttress those other international instruments onweapons of mass destruction and would constitute anappropriate measure with respect to theirimplementation, both in terms of international peaceand security and as concerns the specific issue at hand.

We reiterate that, despite its specific and limitedobjectives, such a resolution would be relevant to bothnon-proliferation and disarmament issues. Theexistence and proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and the means of manufacturing anddelivering them constitute a source of danger that weare seeking to prevent. The affirmation that nuclear,chemical and biological weapons in themselves pose athreat to international peace and security is the mainpremise underlying international agreements on theprohibition and non-proliferation of weapons of massdestruction, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and theConventions on chemical and on biological weapons. Itis also the key premise of the thinking behind the draftresolution under discussion.

In the face of the gravity of recent acts ofterrorism, we believe that the Security Council mustact without delay; it must take all possible timely

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measures within its power under the Charter. Suchmeasures would not prevent States from, at the propertime, negotiating international instruments that wouldcontribute to a legal framework countering this threat.

We agree that it would be appropriate to act underChapter VII of the Charter. The draft resolution underdiscussion contains provisions whose implementationwould not include enforcement action. My delegationtherefore feels that it would be appropriate to clarifythis and explicitly include it in the text that will be putto the vote, including the possibility of applyingChapter VII to only certain operative paragraphs.Moreover, we consider that a follow-up committeemust be created taking into account the existence andpowers of other bodies and international institutions inthe field of the control of weapons of mass destruction,thus enabling the committee to function in coordinationwith them. The powers of such a committee wouldhave to be stated clearly in the resolution; we believe itshould be established for a two-year period, whichwould give States a realistic period of time to adoptnational legislation under their respective legalsystems.

Finally, we reiterate our constructive, positiveposition on the draft resolution under discussion on thisitem. Because this is a highly important and complexmatter, it must be considered carefully; we believe thisis important so that the final text will, to the extentpossible, command universal acceptance within theinternational community — which will have toimplement it — and, of course, so that the SecurityCouncil can adopt it by consensus.

Mr. Thomson (United Kingdom): I should like toassociate my delegation with the European Unionstatement to be delivered later in this debate by therepresentative of Ireland.

This open debate marks a further stage in whathas been an unprecedented effort to discuss and consultwith the United Nations membership with respect tothe important draft resolution under discussion. Mydelegation has been encouraged by the constructivediscussions held so far with both members and non-members of the Council, by the helpful ideas andsuggestions received, by the opportunity to discussand, I hope, allay concerns and by the almost universalacceptance that we must act now to tackle the threat ofweapons of mass destruction falling into the hands ofterrorists and other non-State actors. We look forward

to listening carefully to the views that will beexpressed today.

The recognition that we need rapidly andeffectively to deal with this threat could not be morejustified. Osama bin Laden has called it a “duty” toobtain nuclear weapons. His networks haveexperimented with chemicals and toxins for use inattacks. In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda trained its recruits inthe use of poisons and chemicals, while manuals forthe manufacture of deadly substances were widelydistributed. The sarin attack on the Tokyo metro andthe anthrax attacks in the United States in the autumnof 2001 showed that there are individuals capable ofand willing to use these terrible indiscriminateweapons, and showed the seriousness of even arelatively small attack.

It is clear that in the face of this urgent threatonly the Security Council can act with the necessaryspeed and authority. My delegation believes that, insuch circumstances, not only is it appropriate for theSecurity Council to act, it is imperative that it do so.The Council has a responsibility to respond to thisthreat to international peace and security.

It is in that context that the United Kingdom andthe other sponsors proposed the draft resolutioncurrently before the Council, on which I would like tomake just three points.

My first point is that the draft resolution does notnegate the importance of disarmament or of themultilateral treaty framework. In response to theconcerns of many delegations, the draft resolution nowmakes clear the importance of arms control anddisarmament obligations. We agree with others herethat progress on these issues is important and should bepursued in the appropriate forums. At the same time,however, the sponsors have always been clear that thefocus of this draft resolution must remain the problemit is trying to tackle: the issue of the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) and non-Stateactors. Bringing in too many additional issues would,to be frank, risk deadlock. It would also risk treadingon the toes of competent bodies such as the FirstCommittee of the General Assembly, the Conferenceon Disarmament and the review process of the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).The draft resolution does not undermine in any way theimportance of disarmament; it is just that disarmamentis not its primary focus.

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Nor does the draft resolution negate theimportance of existing multilateral arrangements. Thedraft resolution in fact promotes the universalizationand strengthening of multilateral treaties and makesclear that it will not conflict with those regimes. It doesnot rule out future arrangements to deal with thecurrent gap in the multilateral framework. But the draftresolution and the urgently needed implementation of itshould not be held hostage to the uncertainty over howlong such arrangements would take to negotiate, howcomprehensive they would be or whether agreementwould be reached at all.

My second point is that the draft resolution is notabout coercion or enforcement. Many delegations haveraised questions about the Chapter-VII legal base forthe draft resolution and about what that implies. In ourview, this legal base simply reflects the fact that we aredealing with what is clearly a threat to internationalpeace and security, and we are therefore operatingunder the part of the Charter that covers internationalpeace and security. It would send an odd message if theSecurity Council were to act on any other basis.

A Chapter VII legal base also underlines theseriousness of our response to this issue and thebinding nature of the requirement to establish sensibleWMD controls. It will give States the increasedauthority they need to introduce robust domesticmeasures, and it leaves it up to Member States todecide exactly what steps they need to take.

What this draft resolution does not do is authorizeenforcement action against States or against non-Stateactors in the territory of another country. The draftresolution makes clear that it will be the Council thatwill monitor its implementation. Any enforcementaction would require a new Council decision.

My third point is that the draft resolution isinstead about a cooperative approach to tackling thethreat of weapons of mass destruction and non-Stateactors. The draft resolution, for example, explicitlyencourages technical assistance to countries that mayneed held in putting in place sensible controls onaccess to WMD materials. It also sets up a Councilsubcommittee. As is usually the case, we expect thatthat committee will determine its exact mandate, actingunder consensus and involving all Council members.We see the committee as the heart of a cooperativeapproach, allowing countries to compare experience, to

establish best practice and to identify areas wheretechnical assistance is needed.

We believe the committee would need to draw onappropriate expertise and to consult closely with thewider United Nations membership. We also believethat, given the time Member States would need toimplement the draft resolution, the committee shouldhave a two-year mandate to allow for a meaningfulcooperative process.

We do not, however, see it as necessary forlegislation or executive action to have been completedby Member States before they first report, as called forby the draft resolution. Indeed, Member States thatalready have strong laws and controls in this area maynot need to take additional measures.

In conclusion, this draft resolution is all abouteffective multilateral action to deal with a real threat tointernational peace and security. The cooperative actionand inclusive measures it envisages can help prevent atragedy. We should not have to wait for such a tragedyin order to act. The United Kingdom hopes thatmembers of the Council will embrace this collaborativemultilateral action.

Mr. Adechi (Benin) (spoke in French): I wouldlike to thank the States that have requested the holdingof this open meeting, which makes it possible for us toopen to all Member States the debate on the danger ofthe acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) by non-State actors. This danger relates aboveall to the emergence of non-State actors that vie withStates for dominance in the area of violent force, a newphenomenon, a phenomenon that also highlights theexistence of a legal void in the arsenal of contemporaryinternational law and that calls for the community ofnations to cooperate without delay to provide themeans to prevent the danger.

The Security Council, aware of its responsibility,through the sponsors of the draft resolution, has movedto the forefront and has begun negotiations for theestablishment of a plan that can mobilize thecommunity of States with a view to concerted action inthis field. My delegation will contribute to the searchfor a consensus on the ways and means of achievingthat goal.

We are convinced that the Council must doeverything in its power to eliminate this danger, adanger that no one can disregard today, following the

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sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 and thethreats that international community has faced sincethe attacks of 11 September 2001. These sad eventshave demonstrated that the worst is possible and that itcan take forms that were unimaginable until now.

We must reach agreement on the proper equationfor rational means to be found to face this situationwithin the framework of collective security establishedunder the Charter. In the common effort to find goodsolutions to effectively address this phenomenon, webelieve it is important that action to prevent access toweapons of mass destruction by non-State actors mustbe part of the broader effort to promote disarmament. Itseems to us that the problem of access to weapons ofmass destruction by non-State actors resides in theincomprehensible and unacceptable accumulation ofweapons of mass destruction.

The draft resolution before us is submitted underthe provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. Webelieve that Chapter VII is a collection of Articles thatprovide ways of countering imminent threats to one ormore States in which the various rules on disputesettlement under Chapter VI have been exhausted. Wehave noted and heard proposals, as well as the idea ofthe sponsors, on the need to place the draft resolutionunder Chapter VII. Efforts have been made to dispelconcerns of parties on the question, but we believe thatcertain aspects of those concerns remain, particularlythose related to the question of legitimate self-defence.It seems important to us that in the draft resolution thescope of Chapter VII be reduced to certain obligationsof States, particularly those contained in the threeArticles to which some delegations referred in thecourse of our debate today.

The draft resolution would also benefit fromunderscoring the need for treaty organizations whoseobjective is non-proliferation to negotiate additionalprotocols as soon as possible, in order to fill the legalvoid that we deplore today regarding non-State actors.We also attach great importance to the establishment ofa follow-up committee, especially with considerationof its mandate and duration. We are prepared to discussthese matters with other delegations.

The negotiations for the adoption of the draftresolution thus far have been conducted in an openspirit to make the process as inclusive as possible. Wewant that spirit to continue so that the draft resolutionwill have the broadest possible support. That is why we

will follow very attentively the contribution ofdelegations of non-members of the Council to thisdebate.

Mr. Motoc (Romania): Romania aligns itself withthe statement that will be delivered later on byAmbassador Ryan of Ireland on behalf of the EuropeanUnion. In addition, I would like to make the followingremarks.

First, we appreciate the opportunity presented bythis open debate, its timeliness and usefulness in ouroverall efforts to consensualize the adoption of thisdraft resolution and to improve conditions for its latersound implementation.

The proliferation threat has assumed a gloomierdimension: the prospect of non-State actors seeking toacquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Present-day security and stability are seriouslychallenged, both globally and regionally, by the riskassociated with the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction. State and non-State actor proliferationroutes are now starting to merge. Today, theinternational community is confronted with aconsolidated network of proliferators establishedamong States and entities located in regions marked byinstability and armed conflict. The possibility ofterrorist organizations acquiring elements or evensystems of WMD is largely recognized today as amongthe most dangerous threats — if not the mostdangerous threat — the international community isfacing.

There is no panacea or one-size-fits-all policy tocounter the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD.A number of tools are at the disposal of theinternational community. All are necessary; none issufficient by itself.

The spread of nuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons has been successfully limited by internationaldisarmament and non-proliferation multilateralagreements. But, unfortunately, the new phenomenon,intimately interconnected with terrorism, is not coveredby those treaties.

The Security Council has the primaryresponsibility for maintaining international peace andsecurity. Past experience in dealing with newlymagnified threats such as terrorism shows thatprevention is always better than the cure. It is thereforetime for the Security Council to address this new threat

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in an appropriate manner by filling the existing gap ininternational treaties. This is one threat the Councilcannot afford to overlook or fail to act upon.

The draft resolution will make a fundamentalcontribution to the efforts of all responsible membersof the international community to address threatsstemming from the proliferation of WMD, especiallyits most dangerous form — the pursuit of weapons ofmass destruction by non-State entities and terroristgroups and organizations. For that reason, Romaniadecided to be a sponsor of the Security Council draftresolution.

The draft is, indeed, a platform for inducinggreater responsibility by all States in reducingproliferation risks. At the end of the day, it can onlycreate a better and more secure environment for all ofus. It asks Member States, without discrimination, toenact and enforce appropriate legislation to prevent theproliferation of WMD, including criminal and civilpenalties for violations of export control regulations. Italso requires the establishment of physical protectionmeasures and effective controls over related materials.For such a preventive approach to work, the need forinternational cooperation is capital. It requires theestablishment of national authorities and the adoptionand enforcement of relevant domestic legislation.

While addressing a very specific and focusedissue, the draft resolution reaffirms the need for allMember States to fulfil their obligations in armscontrol and disarmament and upholds the multilateraltreaties.

Efforts for combating proliferation have to bedeeply rooted in the domestic implementation by Statesof their obligations and in the permanent enforcementof adequate related legislation on matters such asexport controls and the physical protection, securemanipulation and transfer of sensitive materials.

The draft resolution’s implementation will notaffect the obligations undertaken by States parties tointernational treaties nor the statutory responsibilitiesof the International Atomic Energy Agency and theOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.Efforts to prevent proliferation, undertaken at thenational, regional or international levels, throughenhanced coordination, do not hamper the transfer ofmaterials, equipment and technology for peacefulpurposes.

The critical importance of the draft resolution andits contents was demonstrated by the extensiveconsultations and exchanges that took place within andoutside the Council. They were complemented by atransparent and constructive interaction with individualMember States and regional and political groups. Mostof the concerns expressed during our deliberations havebeen reflected in the text. We are satisfied that all thosestrenuous efforts made possible a substantialimprovement of the draft and clarified how we canensure the optimal materialization of its fundamentalgoal.

The objective of the draft resolution is veryimportant. Its aim is very high. If our aspiration is toget rid of the scourge of the proliferation of WMD andprevent self-destruction, we have to act accordingly, ina united and responsible manner.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): Pakistan endorses thestatement that will be made later by Malaysia on behalfof the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.

There is a universal desire to prevent the horrorsthat would result from the use of chemical, biologicalor nuclear weapons. Historically, the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) has occurredwhen States have sought to acquire those weapons toaddress perceived threats to their national security. Butnon-State actors have often, not only in the recent past,been the instruments of proliferation by States seekingWMD. Recently, Pakistan detected and dismantledsuch a proliferation network involving our nationalsand those of a number of other countries.

The fear that non-State actors themselves mayacquire and use weapons of mass destruction is a recentphenomenon. That danger is present, but it must beviewed in perspective. Terrorist organizations and non-State actors could feasibly acquire chemical andbiological weapon capabilities. The acquisition and useof nuclear weapons by non-State actors is much moredifficult and much less likely. I think the example ofOsama bin Laden underlines not only that danger butalso the fact that WMD are difficult for terroristorganizations to acquire. That is especially true withrespect to nuclear weapons. The existing treaty regimescan address most of the threats that have been raised inthe context of the proliferation of WMD.

Pakistan is a nuclear-weapon State. We haveestablished effective command and control andphysical security of our nuclear assets, sites and

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materials. We are improving our export controls. Wecan thus readily fulfil the actions that are desired inoperative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the draft resolution.

But seen from a historical, legal and politicalperspective, the draft resolution initiated by somepermanent members of the Security Council andnegotiated for five months by the five permanentmembers, raises a number of doubts, questions andconcerns.

Pakistan believes that the first question is whetherthe Security Council has the right to assume the role ofprescribing legislative action by Member States. Theexisting treaties, the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),already prescribe most of the legislation that wouldcover proliferation by both State and non-State actors.These regimes can be improved, if and wherenecessary, through negotiations among sovereign andequal States. In particular, it is necessary to implementthe obligation imposed by the CWC regarding thedestruction of all chemical weapon stocks, andbiological weapons must be addressed through theadoption of the verification protocol, which wasnegotiated for eight years and summarily rejected.

The Security Council, where five States, whichretain nuclear weapons, also possess the right veto anyaction, is not the most appropriate body to be entrustedwith the authority for oversight over non-proliferationor nuclear disarmament.

Secondly, there is a discrepancy between theprofessed objective of the draft resolution and itsprovisions. Although the resolution is designed toaddress proliferation by non-State actors, it seeks toimpose obligations on States. There are graveimplications to this effort by the Security Council toimpose obligations on States, which their Governmentsand sovereign legislatures have not freely accepted,especially when some of these obligations couldimpinge on matters relating to their national securityand to their right of self-defence.

Thirdly, there is no justification for the adoptionof this resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. Thethreat of WMD proliferation by non-State actors maybe real, but it is not imminent. It is not a threat to peacewithin the meaning of Article 39 of the United NationsCharter. A legitimate fear arises that when one sees thedraft resolution under Chapter VII, with language such

as that used — “to combat by all means” — anauthorization is being sought which could justifycoercive actions envisaged in Articles 41 and 42 of theCharter, including the use of force.

Fourthly, this fear is exacerbated by the open-ended nature of the draft resolution. It provides forfurther decisions, in operative paragraph 10. Thus thescope of the draft resolution could be enlarged beyondnon-State actors. Such further decisions, if taken underChapter VII, could authorize coercive measures againstState and non-State actors, beyond nationaljurisdiction.

Fifthly, the creation of a Security Councilcommittee, in operative paragraph 9, is unnecessary. Itsfunctions are unclear and unspecified. It could beutilized in the future to replace the role of existingtreaty regimes. Nor can the “non-papers” informallycirculated by some States be ignored, which imply thatthe committee could be used to harass countries, andeven demand explanations regarding “why they are notparties to the NPT”.

Sixthly, the definitions provided in the footnoteof the draft resolution are entirely unclear. Aremissiles, rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles the onlymeans for the delivery of WMD? Who will judgewhether or not they are designed for this purpose?What is meant by the term “related materials”? The listprepared by closed regimes such as the MissileTechnology Control Regime (MTCR), the NuclearSuppliers Group (NSG) or the Australia Group cannotautomatically be accepted by or imposed upon Statesthat are not parties to these regimes.

In the informal consultations held on the draftresolution, the sponsors had publicly assured that thescope of the draft resolution is restricted to stoppingproliferation by non-State actors — and that is why isdoes not encompass disarmament; that no enforcementaction is envisaged — much less the use of force; thatimplementation will be done by States themselves,through national measures; that the committee willmerely collate and submit the reports from MemberStates and is being set up for a temporary period; andthat the draft resolution does not preclude thenegotiation of treaties or agreements to address theissue of proliferation by non-State actors. However, inthe negotiations that have been held so far, thesponsors have been reluctant to reflect most of theseassurances in the text of the draft resolution. Recent

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remarks appear to have retracted some of theseassurances.

Pakistan hopes that this debate will contribute todemonstrating the wide spectrum of concerns anddoubts that relate to the draft resolution and that it willhopefully convince the sponsors to be more responsiveto these concerns. We continue to hope that the Councilwill be able, through painstaking consultations andnegotiations, to adopt this draft resolution byconsensus.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Gatilov (Russian Federation) (spoke inRussian): We welcome the convening of this publicmeeting of the Security Council to discuss a pressingproblem related to the threat of the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD). We anticipatethat today’s discussion will allow us to strengthen theunity of the international community in facing thisthreat. The Russian Federation was one of the initiatorsof tabling a relevant draft resolution of the SecurityCouncil. We believe that the subject of the non-proliferation of WMD and means of delivery isbecoming one of the primary threats to internationalpeace and security.

The world community is called upon toincreasingly and actively address fundamentally newchallenges in this area and to counter heretoforeunknown but equally complex challenges. The tragedyof 11 September 2001, as well as the terrorist attacksthat have occurred in Moscow, Madrid, Tokyo, and in anumber of other cities around the world, demonstratevery clearly what is perhaps the primary threat of ourtime — terrorism.

The Security Council adopted a proactive role incountering this threat by adopting its well-knownresolution 1373 (2001). In this decision, the Councilhighlighted the close relationship between internationalterrorism, organized crime, and illegal trafficking ofnuclear, chemical, biological and other materials thatpose a threat to human life. It also called forcoordinating efforts at the national, subregional andinternational levels in order to strengthen the globalresponse to the challenges and threats to internationalsecurity.

Particular attention should be given to theproblem of the existence of black markets of WMD,

which are the most dangerous markets. Terrorists areinventive and will stop at nothing to acquirecomponents to produce WMD in order to strike totallyinnocent people. The draft resolution directs States topreventing WMD and materials that are sensitive fromthe standpoint of proliferation from falling into thehands of non-State actors, above all for terroristpurposes. The draft resolution guides the developmentof international cooperation efforts to counter thisphenomenon. Clearly, we believe that all the efforts inthis area should be based on international law andnational legislation, without impeding legitimate,peaceful cooperation efforts.

It is here that we see the substance of this draft,which was prepared after lengthy expert consultations,both among the five permanent members and by takinginto account discussions with the non-permanentmembers of the Council, as well as a broad range ofUnited Nations Member States. The sponsors did notseek to supersede, by a Security Council decision,international treaties in the area of non-proliferationand disarmament. This is precisely why the draftresolution contains provisions clearly pointing out thatits adoption in no way undermines or runs counter toobligations that States may have under the internationaltreaties in the area of non-proliferation anddisarmament to which they are parties.

We believe that the Security Council is not onlyentitled but also obligated to take appropriate measuresin the area of international security, to include thosethat are legally binding. This draft resolution is noexception. As such, exactly nine years ago, in April1995, the Council adopted resolution 984 (1995),which provided for security safeguards in the case ofan attack on States, including with the use of nuclearweapons. This resolution, at the same time, took noteof the security safeguards provided by the nuclearPowers with respect to the non-use of nuclear weapons.

Clearly, monitoring the implementation of thedraft resolution requires establishing an ad hocmechanism. We support the establishment of a SecurityCouncil committee on this issue, which would beengaged in collecting and analysing the responses ofMember States with respect to the measures they havetaken in implementation of the resolution and withrespect to possible assistance to those States, whenrelevant requests are made. We believe that thecommittee will need to work in close cooperation anduse the expert support of such agencies as the

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International Atomic Energy Agency and theOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,as well as of the United Nations Secretariat. Theduration of its work will, above all, depend on how itimplements the goals set for it. In this regard, webelieve that the minimum time period would be oneyear.

We call on all States to support the SecurityCouncil draft resolution on countering the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Cunningham (United States of America):Thank you, Mr. President, for organizing thisdiscussion today and for giving us an opportunity toaddress the entire membership on this vitally importantsubject and on the draft resolution before the Council.

In September of last year, President Bush came tothe General Assembly and said that, becauseproliferators will use any route or channel open tothem, we need the broadest possible cooperation tostop them. He asked the Security Council to help byadopting a resolution that would be effective in thefight against proliferation and against terror. The sameday, Secretary-General Annan, in his address to theGeneral Assembly, said that all of us know that thereare new threats that must be faced, or perhaps oldthreats in new and dangerous combinations, new formsof terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD). He added that terrorism is notonly a problem for rich countries; ask the people ofBali, Bombay, Nairobi or Casablanca. We agree withthat assessment. A terrorist use of WMD would punishall of us, strong and weak alike.

The draft resolution that the Security Council willadopt in the coming days responds to what all agree isa real and growing threat to global peace and security:the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons, their means of delivery and the ability toproduce them. This is especially true with regard tonon-State actors, including terrorists. Were non-Stateactors and outlaw regimes to possess these weaponsand the means to deliver them, they would be able toblackmail and create chaos in entire regions. Terroristgroups such as Al Qaeda have shown their readiness tokill thousands, and they do not hide their desire toacquire WMD and their means of delivery in order toincrease that number many times over. If such a groupacquired these weapons, they would be used to bring

sudden disaster and suffering on a scale that we canscarcely imagine.

The problem is not just with the weaponsthemselves, it is with the ability to produce them. Theinternational community has also become aware of theexistence of sophisticated international black marketefforts to buy and sell the plans, technologies andmaterials required to build these weapons, makingthem available to the highest bidder. Thus the threatthat the Security Council is addressing is both clear andpresent.

The draft resolution under discussion has aforward-looking focus, it sets a standard for hownations should act in the future rather than judging pastactions. It reinforces an objective of vital interest to all:that proliferation cannot be tolerated. We must act nowto stem this threat and the draft resolution soon to beadopted by the Council is the fastest means to addressit. It asks Member States to take precautions to ensurethat WMD and their technology are properlycontrolled. It asks Member States to review theirdomestic controls and to strengthen them if needs be. Italso asks Member States to review domestic legislationand adopt appropriate and effective laws to keepdangerous items out of the hands of non-State actors,that is, those not authorized by the State.

The goal of this draft resolution is to haltdangerous traffic by directing Member States to makeillegal the unauthorized trade in these weapons, theirmeans of delivery and the plans, technology andmaterials needed to develop and build them. It asksthem to do this by strengthening their national exportand trans-shipment controls and by providing for thephysical protection of sensitive materials within theirborders. The desirability of taking these steps is self-evident, we hope.

We have been careful to make clear that this draftresolution is in no way meant to undermine, undercutor otherwise weaken the existing treaties and regimes,and there is specific language in the draft resolution tothat effect. The draft resolution is placed under ChapterVII in order to send the important political message ofthe seriousness with which the Council views the threatto international peace and security. It also is placedunder Chapter VII because the Council is acting underthat Chapter and levying binding requirements.However, the draft resolution is not about enforcement.

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As others have noted, the text of the draftresolution has been revised and the current text is dated15 April. Revisions to the original text introduced bythe sponsors reflect the useful discussion we have hadin the Council and the many informal exchanges thesponsors have had with the wider United Nationsmembership. The text has been improved by theopinions and ideas that have been shared with us. Forexample, the revised text includes the recognition ofthe importance of disarmament obligations. Whilepreserving language that makes clear the fact that thedraft resolution is not meant to undermine or be atcross-purposes with existing treaties and regimes, therevised text also makes clear that Member States notparties to treaties or regimes will not be forced,through this draft resolution, to adopt them. Languageon the usefulness of peaceful dialogues has also beenmade more prominent.

While discussion on a follow-up mechanismcontinues, I would note that the follow-up committeewill establish its own programme of work upon itscreation, and that this is standard practice for SecurityCouncil committees. As is also standard practice, itwill be composed of all members and operate underconsensus.

I would also call attention to the language inoperative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution.Both of these paragraphs have been included in thedraft resolution to make clear that Member States whofind they would like assistance in implementing thisdraft resolution may voluntarily request it. To be clear,we are not expecting that Member States willnecessarily be able to report the completeimplementation of the resolution when they report tothe committee.

In conclusion, the United States and the sponsorswelcome the views that we are hearing and those thatwe will hear later on today. This is an important issue,and we value this discussion as part of our ongoingconsultations.

The President: I shall now make a statement inmy national capacity.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) in all its aspects, including those regardingnon-State actors, is a major threat to internationalpeace and security. Countering this threat requires acontinuous common effort by all United NationsMember States and relevant bodies. By actively

participating in today’s debate, a great number ofMembers are demonstrating their determination to liveup to the challenge and to contribute to the search forthe best solution.

Germany is fully committed to countering thisthreat. Our views are reflected in the European Union’sStrategy against Proliferation of Weapons of MassDestruction, which is based on the conviction thatdisarmament, arms control and non-proliferation aremutually reinforcing aspects of the samecomprehensive, cooperative approach.

We fully subscribe to the forthcoming statementby the presidency of the European Union.

We hope that the new resolution will provide auseful tool to prevent access by non-State actors toweapons of mass destruction and to hazardousmaterials. We therefore support it and hope that it cansoon be adopted. However, together with all otherCouncil members, we are trying to further improve thedraft resolution. That would increase its acceptance andthereby contribute to its full and globalimplementation.

I would like to make three points in that context.First, the multilateral treaty regime provides thenormative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. That iswhy the implementation, the universalization and,where necessary, the strengthening of existingmultilateral disarmament and non-proliferationagreements are essential. We have therefore suggestedthe inclusion of meaningful references to disarmament.Disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of thesame coin. The fewer weapons exist, the better theycan be controlled and kept safe from misuse andproliferation. In addition, we strongly believe thatevery effort must be undertaken to ensure effectiveverification of compliance with the multilateral treatyregime. That could also be reflected in the draftresolution. The same is true of security assurances,which are an important part of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime.

Secondly, as the resolution will be binding on allMember States, the Council as a whole must remain thefinal arbiter of compliance. Any necessary enforcementaction must be subject to a specific decision by theCouncil as a whole, without interfering with themandates of relevant institutions or of other bodiesestablished under international treaties orarrangements.

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Thirdly, a follow-up mechanism in the form of aSecurity Council committee, based on a clear two-yearmandate, should be established in order to assist theCouncil in its efforts to ensure both a transparentdialogue with States and an even-handed approach.This committee should work in cooperation with othercompetent bodies such as the International AtomicEnergy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons and the Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee. In our view, that would enhanceits efficiency and credibility.

To conclude, let me underline the fact that theSecurity Council has, in the context of counter-terrorism, already dealt with some key aspectscontained in the present draft. In operative paragraph2 (a) of resolution 1373 (2001), the Council decided,inter alia, that “all States shall ... eliminat(e) the supplyof weapons to terrorists”. In operative paragraph 7 ofresolution 1456 (2003), the Council, at the ministeriallevel, underlined “the importance of fully complyingwith existing legal obligations in the field ofdisarmament, arms limitation and non-proliferationand, where necessary, strengthening internationalinstruments in this field”.

The draft resolution before us should be made animportant step in our common endeavour to preventnon-State actors, and terrorists in particular, fromgaining access to weapons of mass destruction or tohazardous materials. The draft resolution shouldcomplement the existing system of internationalinstruments of global disarmament, arms control andnon-proliferation. We must not forget that thismultilateral treaty regime retains its full validity andrelevance and that that regime is the core instrumentfor the preservation of international peace and security.The obligations contained therein must be fullyhonoured and further developed.

I now resume my functions as President of theSecurity Council.

Before giving the floor to the next speaker, Iwould like to make a short procedural remark, becausewe started our meeting a bit early today and noteveryone was here at the outset. I should like toreiterate that the Council agreed that all those takingthe floor should limit their statements to four minutesin order to give all other speakers an equal chance tomake their views known, given the fact that more thana quarter of the United Nations membership will speak

at this meeting. We kindly ask delegations that haveprepared longer statements to circulate the texts inwriting and to present a condensed version in theCouncil Chamber. I thank members for theircooperation.

I now give the floor to the representative ofCanada.

Mr. Laurin (Canada) (spoke in French): Thankyou, Mr. President, for organizing this debate and forgiving us the opportunity to speak on this importantissue. I am convinced that our discussions today willreaffirm the international community’s resolve to worktogether to put an end to the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) and to promote measuresto strengthen our collective security.

We want the United Nations, including theSecurity Council, to continue devoting attention to thisissue in order to help all Member States to fulfil theirobligations with regard to non-proliferation, armscontrol and disarmament norms — norms whoseobjectives are universal and whose implementation isnearly so.

The Council has shown its leadership inaddressing a new challenge arising in a transformedworld security environment, namely, the threat of non-State actors seeking to acquire, develop, transfer or useWMD. We would strongly support any resolution thatwould facilitate important efforts by States tocriminalize trafficking in such weapons.

(spoke in English)

It is equally important that a draft resolution onthis subject show clarity and balance. The Councilshould ensure that definitions and concepts are clear,that Member States fully understand the measures thatthey are being called upon to undertake and that theCouncil’s role — as well as the roles of otherinternational bodies, such as the International AtomicEnergy Agency and the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons — are wellunderstood.

Canada supports the establishment of a committeeto monitor implementation of this resolution. Given thegravity of the challenge before us, the committee’sduration should be long enough to allow it toeffectively carry out its mandate and to meet theobjectives set out by the resolution. A six-month limit

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could handicap the committee by imposing impracticaldeadlines.

We should also recall that the aims of theinternational treaties that underpin our non-proliferation efforts are first and foremost to achieveeffective progress toward general and completedisarmament, including the prohibition and eliminationof all types of weapons of mass destruction. The draftresolution should recognize this important balance andequal emphasis on non-proliferation and disarmamentobligations.

Canadians recognize the importance of theCouncil’s addressing the issue of proliferation of WMDand the threat it poses to international peace andsecurity. Canada strongly supports a draft resolutionthat will help us confront the proliferation challenge,that respects the rights and obligations of States undercurrent international treaties and that encourages theinternational community to use its energy andcreativity to improve and build on the complexstructure of non-proliferation, arms controls anddisarmament regimes and mechanisms that have beenestablished over the past 50 years.

In closing, we encourage the Council to continueits consultations with Member States and to adopt aconstructive draft resolution that attracts broad supportand leads to effective implementation.

Mr. De Rivero (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): Allowme at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on havingconvened this open debate of the Security Council on asubject of great importance: the draft resolution on thenon-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction tonon-State actors.

Peru entirely shares the concern of all countriesthat weapons of mass destruction could fall into thehands of non-State actors. To a certain extent, we alsorecognize the gaps in the current international regime,which is binding solely on States. That is a fact weacknowledge. My country is fully aware of what itmeans to be the victim of terrorist attacks and in thatregard understands the fears about the possible use byterrorists of weapons of mass destruction, which haveled to the submission of this proposal.

We do not believe, however, that we oughttherefore to forget the quid pro quo between the currentinternational non-proliferation regime anddisarmament. A draft resolution advocating the non-

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should notbe isolated from the issue of nuclear disarmament.Those concepts have been united since 1965.

I reiterate that there are gaps in the current non-proliferation regime with respect to non-State actors. Ifthe intention is to establish a more rigid, stricter non-proliferation regime, that gap should be bridged, butnot to the detriment of disarmament. We also believethat, in the final analysis, a regime intended to bestricter and to apply to non-State actors must not beestablished to the detriment of countries’ ability tolegislate in that area through an international treaty onan equal footing.

We believe that the current text of the draftresolution remains ambiguous in its followingelements. First, it is not clear with regard to sanctionsor coercive measures that may be taken in cases ofnon-compliance. Secondly, it does not include aspecific list of materials for the production of weaponsof mass destruction that are subject to control, whichcould lead to conflicting interpretations. Thirdly, itraises a number of questions regarding follow-up andmonitoring mechanisms.

I know that Peru’s concerns are shared by manyStates. In that connection, we believe that consultationsmust continue in order to arrive at a realistic, well-balanced solution. It should be very clear that mycountry has no argument with the idea that there is anurgent need for concrete action, given the threat posedby the relative ease with which non-State actors cangain access to weapons of mass destruction. Webelieve, however, that the adoption of the text before usshould be subject to further consultations in order toensure broader support. A critical mass of countriesmust support the draft resolution in order to give itlegitimacy, which is always necessary in counteringterrorism.

Mr. MacKay (New Zealand): There can be nodoubt that weapons of mass destruction are a threat tointernational peace and security. They are a legitimatesubject for consideration by the Council and wewelcome its attention to the issues involved.

We support the draft resolution’s aim ofcontrolling the horizontal proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction to non-State actors. None of us wantsto see terrorists get their hands on these weapons or onmaterials that would allow their construction. It isunfortunate that, to date, there has not been sufficient

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will to see the existing multilateral disarmament andnon-proliferation regimes sufficiently strengthened,with the result that the Council is now being asked tostep forward to fill a gap, with the required urgency.

However, the draft resolution will not succeed inits aim without the support and acceptance of MemberStates. Such acceptance requires the Council to dispelany impression of negotiations behind closed doors orthat a small group of States is drafting laws for thebroader membership without the opportunity for allMember States to express their views. That is why NewZealand has joined other States in requesting this opendebate.

Before I make some specific points on the draftresolution, I want to reaffirm New Zealand’s strongview that it is no substitute for the development ofstrong and effective multilateral disarmamentinstruments.

We see the draft resolution as part of a widerdebate that covers disarmament and proliferation of alltypes, both horizontal and vertical. In our view, theonly way to guarantee that weapons of massdestruction do not fall into the hands of others is toeliminate them totally through a transparent andverifiable process of disarmament. We thereforeunderline our strong support for the reference in thesecond draft preambular paragraph to the presidentialstatement adopted by heads of State and Governmenton 31 January 1992, including the express reference tothe need for all Member States to fulfil theirobligations in relation to arms control anddisarmament.

Secondly, we place importance on the fact thatthe draft resolution would also impose restraints onthose States that have deliberately chosen to standoutside the major disarmament and non-proliferationtreaties to which most States, including my own, havecommitted themselves. This is a major gap that thedraft resolution can begin to fill.

Thirdly, if this draft resolution is to have value, itmust be more than simply a political statement. Byplacing the draft resolution under Chapter VII,members of the Council are sending a clear signal ofthe importance they place on the obligations itcontains. We share the Council’s view of theimportance of these obligations. The bottom line is thatif the Council is going to attempt to plug this gap, itmust be plugged tightly. Anything less would

undermine the credibility of the Council’s actions andthe fight against non-proliferation itself by providing afalse sense that the problem has been solved.

Fourthly, in New Zealand’s view, this draftresolution represents a critical stopgap measure ratherthan an optimal solution. These are complex issues,and they must be addressed comprehensively andeffectively. It is very hard to set up the necessarycomprehensive framework for verification andcompliance under a Security Council resolution. Webelieve that it is now urgent to start work onmultilateral treaty commitments to address theseissues.

Fifthly, we note that the Council intends tomonitor closely the implementation of the draftresolution and to create a committee of all members ofthe Council for that purpose. We expect that thecommittee will draw on expertise from the existingmultilateral regimes to guide its work and to givegreater clarity to Member States as to how best toimplement the general requirements of the resolution inpractice. We note, however, that the committee is tooperate for a period of no more than six months. Welook forward to further elaboration of how it isproposed to monitor implementation after that period,and what assistance in implementation might be madeavailable to Member States that need it. We welcomethe Council’s clarification that any action in respect ofStates that the Council judges not to have met therequirements of the resolution will be discussed andthat any decisions will be taken by the Council as awhole.

Finally, it is important that issues of process andsubstance do not become confused. It is no secret thatthere is some disquiet within and without the Councilover the process by which this draft resolution is beingproduced. However, those qualms must not be allowedto distract States, including members of the Council,from the importance of the issues being addressed inthe draft resolution and the need for all Member Statesto take all possible measures to prevent non-Stateactors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.

It is our hope that this draft resolution, whichaddresses a gap in global security, will at the same timeprovide a catalyst to reenergize our other work onmultilateral disarmament and arms control.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of South Africa.

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Mr. Kumalo (South Africa): South Africawelcomes this open debate and the fact that theSecurity Council is discussing the non-proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and terrorism, particularlyas it relates to non-State actors. We requested thisdebate, together with the delegations of Canada,Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland,because it is our view that this open debate provides anopportunity for the wider membership of the UnitedNations to contribute to the proposed draft resolutionby sharing new ideas and proposals.

We are pleased that the sponsors have alreadytaken some of the recommendations that have beenmade during the consultations that have been going on.We trust that the recommendations made during thecourse of this debate will also be taken intoconsideration and reflected in further adjustments tothe draft resolution.

South Africa shares the concerns regarding thethreat that weapons of mass destruction pose not onlyto individual countries but also to the internationalcommunity as a whole. This threat is exacerbated bythe possibility that weapons of mass destruction couldfall into the hands of terrorist groups or those engagedin the activities of networks dealing in the illicittransfer of weapons of mass destruction and relatedtechnology and materials. We are concerned, however,that the draft resolution under consideration addressesonly the spread of weapons of mass destruction, andeven then in an incomplete manner. There is only apassing reference to disarmament in spite of the factthat chemical and biological weapons have beenprohibited by international law and despite theunequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon Statesto eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

On the issue of non-proliferation, the draftresolution addresses only non-State actors whileignoring the threat to international peace and securityposed by proliferation by States. If the Council werenot to act in a comprehensive manner there is a dangerthat loopholes might remain that could be exploited bythose who seek financial or political gain and by thosewho seek to achieve their objectives through terror.South Africa believes that the threat posed by weaponsof mass destruction can be effectively addressed only ifwe use all the instruments at our disposal, in the fieldsof both non-proliferation and disarmament. Theattempt to establish a mechanism in the SecurityCouncil that is isolated from the Biological Weapons

Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention andthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a weakness thatmay impact on the effectiveness of the measures beingconsidered in the draft resolution. It is South Africa’sbelief that universal adherence to and compliance withinternational agreements on weapons of massdestruction and the complete elimination of thoseweapons provide the international community with theonly guarantee against the threat or use of thoseweapons.

It is important that the draft resolution be draftedin a manner that makes it practical and implementableby States. The current draft resolution imposesobligations on United Nations Member States andattempts to legislate on behalf of States by prescribingthe nature and type of measures that will have to beimplemented by States. That is the case also whereStates have already accepted non-proliferationobligations under international treaties and other legalinstruments. South Africa believes that the draftresolution could have far-reaching legal and practicalimplications for Member States, especially those thathave a capacity in nuclear, chemical and biologicalmatters. In recognizing the dual-use nature of suchmaterials, there may be potential implications for awide range of institutions, including hospitals,laboratories, universities, veterinary clinics,agricultural research centres and similar institutions.

In terms of South Africa’s national legislationthat controls such materials, there are clearly definedlists of items that are regulated. This is also the case inschedules attached to the Chemical WeaponsConvention and other regimes, such as the ZangerCommittee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the AustraliaGroup and the Missile Technology Control Regime.Such specified lists of controlled items are essential toensure that those controlling these items know exactlywhat to control. The absence of such clearly definedlists if items in the draft resolution could lead toconflicting interpretations of “controlled items” and toa multitude of control lists. A more effective ansustainable approach would be to utilize the existingmechanisms and regimes to ensure that they operatemore efficiently and effectively.

My delegation believes that all States Members ofthe United Nations would be opposed to the prospect ofweapons of mass destruction falling into the hands ofnon-State actors, especially terrorists. The challengefor the Security Council, whose mandate is the

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maintenance of international peace and security, is toensure that the systems assistance that we already haveto control the technologies, material and equipment forthe production and delivery of weapons of massdestruction are implemented more effectively andimproved where necessary. The efficiency of thosesystems and the ability of States to implement controlmeasures in a way that will prevent access by all ofthose, both States and non-State actors, who wish touse these items for the development of weapons ofmass destruction depends on the sharing of intelligenceand information.

It is unlikely that any application for the transferof a controlled item would be for a transfer to an end-user that is known to be a terrorist organization. It ismore likely that front companies or front end-userswould be used instead. The ability to prevent such atransfer is less dependent on the fact that the item iscontrolled and more dependent on information aboutthe real end use to which it will be put. Thatinformation holds the key to success and can be madeavailable only through intelligence sharing. Mydelegation believes that it is through such sharing ofintelligence information that the gap in non-proliferation controls can be bridged.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of India.

Mr. Nambiar (India): We appreciate thisopportunity, in today’s open meeting of the SecurityCouncil, to express our views on the vital issue of thenon-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD). The threat of terror and WMD proliferationcoming together is a real one and should clearly be anissue of the highest priority for the internationalcommunity.

As a victim of terrorism for almost two decades,India understands the danger that the transfer of suchweapons of mass destruction could entail. It is thatrealization that prompted India to pilot draft resolutionson measures to prevent terrorists from acquiringweapons of mass destruction, adopted by consensus bythe General Assembly at its last two sessions (GeneralAssembly resolutions 57/83 and 58/48).

We perceive today’s discussion as a logicalcontinuation of the process initiated in the GeneralAssembly. Hence the validity of the focus on non-Stateactors in the draft resolution under discussion.However, this in no way diminishes State

accountability with respect to combating terrorism andeliminating its support infrastructure and linkages withWMD. As in the case of terrorism, States cannot beabsolved of accountability on grounds that proliferationwas the result of private enterprise.

The sponsors of the draft resolution underdiscussion in the Council have stated that the intentionbehind their initiative is to fill a gap in the non-proliferation regime — which, if negotiated throughthe multilateral framework, could take years. In ourview, the issue should ideally have been addressedthrough existing international instruments and bybuilding on them.

Our recognition of the time imperative in seekingrecourse through the Security Council does not,however, obscure our more basic concerns over theincreasing tendency of the Council in recent years toassume new and wider powers of legislation on behalfof the international community, with its resolutionsbinding on all States. In the present instance, theCouncil seeks to both define the non-proliferationregime and monitor its implementation. But who willmonitor the monitors? We are concerned that theexercise of legislative functions by the Council,combined with recourse to Chapter VII mandates,could disrupt the balance of power between the GeneralAssembly and the Security Council, as enshrined in theCharter.

The issue goes beyond a mere legal considerationof the Council’s allocated powers under the Charter.The credibility and even respect that the SecurityCouncil can garner depend on its actions being theproduct of internal cohesion and universalacceptability. Although resolutions such as resolution1373 (2001) were adopted unanimously, the limitationsin their implementation underscore the need for cautionon the Security Council being used as a route to short-circuit the process of creating an internationalconsensus. Exhaustive and excessive reportingobligations resulting from resolutions 1267 (1999) and1373 (2001) have led to repetitive reporting exercisesand burdensome bureaucratic structures withoutcommensurate results on the ground.

As it returns to the theme of non-proliferationafter a gap of more than 12 years since 1992, theCouncil’s credentials are not helped by its track record.Exclusive focus on non-proliferation does disservice tothe essential principle of the mutually reinforcing

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linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation,recognized since the first special session of the GeneralAssembly devoted to disarmament. Internationaltreaties or agreements in this field should bemultilaterally negotiated, not imposed. They should bebased on a balance of obligations to ensure universaladherence, which is the true test of legitimacy andcredibility.

To our mind, export controls are not an issue onwhich the Security Council should prescribe norms.There is tension between ad hoc arrangements onharmonizing export controls among a select fewcountries on the one hand, and measures being putforward by the Council, intended for universalapplication, on the other hand. The flip side of exportcontrols is indiscriminate technology denial to Stateswith legitimate socio-economic needs. Recent caseshave thrown the spotlight once again on theinadequacies of the current regime. They have alsoshown that, far from effectively addressing genuineproliferation concerns, export controls on sensitivetechnology and materials have often served to denythose technologies to responsible nations which playthe game by the rules.

India has taken note of the observation of thesponsors that the draft resolution does not prescribeadherence to treaties to which we are not a State party.For our part, we shall not accept any interpretation ofthe draft resolution that imposes obligations arisingfrom treaties that India has not signed or ratified,consistent with the fundamental principles ofinternational law and the law of treaties. India will notaccept externally prescribed norms or standards,whatever their source, on matters pertaining todomestic jurisdiction of its Parliament, includingnational legislation, regulations or arrangements whichare not consistent with its constitutional provisions andprocedures which are contrary to its national interestsor which infringe on its sovereignty.

A word of caution on the definition of terms willbe in order. By applying traditionally understoodcategories of arms control in novel areas in whichdefinitions are not well established, we may be creatinggrounds for differing interpretations. That problem canbe compounded by differing national capacities amongStates to carry out their obligations. A one-size-fits-allapproach will not work. The draft resolution makesreference to non-State actors as those identified in theUnited Nations list, which may not be exhaustive.

While being under Chapter VII, the draftresolution ought to steer clear of any coercive orpunitive approach or follow-up mechanism, whichwould defeat its very purpose. We have noted thesponsors’ assurance that the use of force is notenvisaged or authorized by the draft resolution.Transparency and inclusiveness in that regard arecrucial. Given the far-reaching scope of the draftresolution, it stands to reason that membership of therelevant committee should not be restricted to that ofthe Council but should also include other MemberStates which have significant capabilities and expertisein related fields.

Having said that, it must be stated that MemberStates have undoubtedly seen the utility of urgentmeasures to foster cooperative action at the multilaterallevel, as is envisaged in the draft resolution.

As a matter of national policy, conscious of itsresponsibilities arising from the possession ofadvanced technologies, India is committed to aneffective and comprehensive system of export controlsto deny unlawful access, whether to States or to non-State actors. Our national effort is based on a policyanchored on a conscious decision to prohibit or controlexports of WMD-usable materials, equipment ortechnologies or their delivery systems.

The crisis underlying the non-proliferation orderis a matter of deep concern to India, since theinfirmities of the present order have adverselyimpacted on our security. It would be a precariousparadox if individual State actions, despite this draftresolution, condoned instances of proliferation orrewarded proliferating States by other means. Webelieve that meeting new proliferation challengesrequires fresh approaches, pooling the efforts andresources of the international community.

Today we renew the call made at the 1992Security Council summit on non-proliferation fordevising a new international consensus on non-proliferation. We hope that our endeavours will spurcommon efforts for mutual benefit and in the interestsof a safe and secure world.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of Singapore.

Mr. Mahbubani (Singapore): After the events of11 September 2001, it is not possible to realisticallydiscuss the threat of the proliferation of weapons of

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mass destruction (WMD) without reference toterrorism. The global threat of WMD proliferation andthe nexus between WMD proliferation and terrorismare of real and grave concern. There is ample evidence,and a growing consensus among terrorism experts, thatit is possible, if not highly probable, that the moresophisticated terrorist movements such as Al Qaedawill employ biological, chemical, radiological ornuclear WMD against their enemies. It is no longer aquestion of whether this will be attempted, but ofwhen.

The nexus between WMD proliferation andterrorism is of particular concern to a small, denselypopulated country like Singapore. Last year, severeacute respiratory syndrome (SARS) gave severalcountries a small foretaste of what a biological orchemical attack might be like. The threat is real. AWMD terrorist attack on a small State can mean thephysical end of the country. International terroristnetworks are deeply embedded in Southeast Asia. Itwill take many years to root them out. Until they arerooted out, we will be at risk.

In June 2003, authorities in Thailand intercepteda man trying to sell radioactive materials that couldhave been used to make “dirty bombs”. The 70 poundsof cesium-137, reportedly smuggled out of Russia,were seized by Thai police after an intelligence tip-off.The timely sharing of intelligence to find and interceptsuch dangerous materials and to stop them from fallinginto the wrong hands is a positive development. Thebad news is this confirms terrorists’ intentions on theuse of WMD and related weapons.

Singapore is serious about preventing WMDproliferation. We continue to do what we can in globalcounter-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts.Nationally, we have tightened our export controlregime. In January 2003, the Strategic Goods (Control)Act, which is aimed at countering the illicit shipmentof strategic goods, WMD and related materials throughour ports, came into effect. We made an early decisionto participate in the Container Security Initiative,which intensifies the screening of containers. Last year,we intercepted several shipments of items that couldhave been used in the manufacture of chemicalweapons or missiles. We will ensure that all Singaporeport facilities and Singapore-flagged ships comply withthe requirements of the International MaritimeOrganization International Ship and Port FacilitySecurity Code by 1 July 2004.

No country can deal with terrorism, let aloneWMD terrorism, on its own. We need to act quickly toclose the gap in current national, regional andinternational regimes, which today deal primarily withStates, and face up to the new challenges posed by non-State actors.

Singapore understands many of the concernsexpressed here in this debate by some of the otherdelegations. For example, they question whether theSecurity Council can assume the role of treaty-makingor of legislating rules for Member States. We agree thata multilateral treaty regime would be ideal. Butmultilateral negotiations could take years, and time isnot on our side. Urgent action is needed. We thereforesupport the draft resolution under discussion. We agreethat some of the details, such as the follow-upmechanisms and the reporting mechanisms, need to beironed out. The draft resolution is only a first step. Butwe need to take that first step and tighten the currentnon-proliferation regime. The longer we take to act, themore time the terrorists have to plot against us.

We therefore welcome the initiative by theSecurity Council to further enhance, through this draftresolution, the regime against the proliferation ofWMD. We believe that it will help make the world asafer place. We urge all countries to support it.

Mr. Ryan (Ireland): I have the honour to speakon behalf of the European Union (EU). The accedingcountries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakiaand Slovenia, the candidate countries Bulgaria,Romania and Turkey, the countries of the Stabilizationand Association Process and potential candidatesAlbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia andMontenegro and the European Free Trade Associationcountry Iceland, member of the European EconomicArea, align themselves with this statement.

The European Union and the countries alignedwith this statement welcome the readiness of theCouncil to respond to requests for an open debate on adraft resolution on the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD). This is a critical issue, and, giventhe impact that such a resolution will have on all StatesMembers of the United Nations, it is particularlyimportant that the wider United Nations membershipbe consulted and be given an opportunity to have theirviews heard in advance of action on the draft

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resolution. In this context, we appreciate the outreachefforts to the wider United Nations membership thathave already been made by the sponsors.

The European Union therefore welcomes andstrongly supports this initiative by the Security Councilto address the problem of the potential acquisition ofnuclear, chemical or biological weapons or materialsby non-State actors. Measures are needed to addressthis important issue, and enhanced internationalcooperation is required.

At their meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003,European Union heads of State or Government agreedthat the proliferation of weapons of mass destructionand means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, is agrowing threat to international peace and security.They have also recognized that the risk that terroristswill acquire chemical, biological, radiological ornuclear materials adds a new critical dimension to thisthreat. EU heads of State or Government have resolvedto take action to address this threat, using allinstruments and policies at the disposal of the Union,the objective being to prevent, deter, halt and, wherepossible, eliminate proliferation programmes ofconcern worldwide.

The European Union has since developed astrategy against proliferation of weapons of massdestruction, which was adopted in December 2003.Strengthening the role of the Security Council,including in relation to issues of non-compliance withmultilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties,is an important element of the EU strategy. We arepleased, therefore, to find in the draft resolution manypoints of commonality with that strategy, whilerecognizing at the same time that the focus of the draftresolution is more specific.

Integral to the strategy is our conviction that amultilateralist approach to security, includingdisarmament and non-proliferation, provides the bestway to maintain international order. Convinced thatnon-proliferation and disarmament are mutuallyreinforcing, the EU welcomes the fact that the mostrecent version of the draft resolution now includesreference to the role of disarmament.

The EU strategy reaffirms the EU commitment touphold and implement the multilateral disarmamentand non-proliferation treaties and agreements and themultilateral institutions charged respectively with

verification and upholding compliance with thesetreaties.

Accordingly, the EU believes that all Statesshould be asked to promote the universal adoption andfull implementation of the multilateral treaties, and notonly those States that are party to them. The EUwelcomes the explicit assurance that nothing in thedraft resolution should be taken to conflict with or alterthe rights and obligations of States parties to existingtreaties and conventions or with the responsibilities ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) andthe Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (OPCW).

The EU adopted in November 2003 a CommonPosition on the universalization and reinforcement ofmultilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferationof weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery.Accordingly, the EU is working independently, but inthe spirit of the draft resolution, for theuniversalization and, when necessary, strengthening ofthe main treaties, agreements and verificationarrangements on disarmament and non-proliferation.We are also committed to enhancing political, financialand technical support to verification regimes —including, in particular, the IAEA and the OPCW.

The EU is already working to strengthen exportcontrol policies and practices in coordination withpartners of the export control regimes, and isadvocating, where applicable, adherence to effectiveexport control criteria by countries outside the existingregimes and arrangements. We also strongly endorsethe need to enhance the security of proliferation-sensitive materials. We support efforts to strengthenidentification, control and interception of illegaltrafficking of WMD-related material. The EU decidedin November 2003 to include in its agreements withthird countries a non-proliferation clause, whichrequires, inter alia, the establishment by States partiesof an effective system of export controls.

The European Union is committed to reinforcingits cooperative threat reduction programmes with othercountries and plans to set up a programme of assistanceto States in need of technical knowledge in order toensure the security and control of sensitive material,facilities and expertise.

On such a critical issue, it is important that thelanguage and explanation of the draft resolution is asclear as possible to ensure an accurate understanding of

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its scope and its clear interpretation followingadoption. The draft resolution places far-reaching andlegally binding demands on States, and clarity oflanguage is therefore important. We appreciate thecontinuing efforts of the Council in that regard.

We believe that the resolution should be endowedwith an effective follow-up mechanism, firmlyanchored in the Council. That would also help reassureMember States that the resolution will be implementedin a transparent, cooperative and consistent manner. Wealso strongly believe that a committee of the Councilwould require a mandate of two years. Ways might alsobe explored to improve ties with non-Council membersin the work of the Committee.

Member States have a direct and vested interestin this draft resolution. The proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction is a global threat that requires aneffective global response. We are confident that theCouncil, in its ongoing deliberations on the draft, willcontinue to take account of the concerns of MemberStates so that the resolution, when adopted, will enjoywidespread support and so that truly collective actionto combat the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction will be assured. The security of our States,our peoples and our collective interests demands noless.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of Sweden.

Mr. Schori (Sweden): Sweden aligns itself fullywith the statement that has just been delivered by theAmbassador of Ireland on behalf of the EuropeanUnion and the acceding countries. However, I ampleased to be given this opportunity to highlight somepoints of special interest to Sweden.

Sweden warmly welcomes the Security Council’sactive involvement in efforts to prevent and stop theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Mycountry has a long tradition of strong engagement inissues of disarmament and non-proliferation. Our lateForeign Minister Anna Lindh initiated the work thatled to the adoption of a European Union strategyagainst the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction in December last year.

Addressing the threats to international peace andsecurity posed by weapons of mass destruction is anurgent task that needs to be undertaken collectively bythe international community. Sweden has consistently

advocated that a strong and central role be given to theSecurity Council in addressing those issues. We aretherefore pleased to support the draft resolution. In ourview, it is both timely and proper that the internationalbody that has been given the main responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and security alsonow addresses in a comprehensive way questionsrelated to the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction.

This important resolution will clearly affect allMember States. That emphasizes the need fortransparency in shaping the draft resolution. Therefore,we appreciate the opportunity that this meeting offersfor Member States to express their views. We hope thatthe remaining part of the work on this resolution willbe marked by the same openness and transparency,which will encourage broad support.

In that very spirit, Sweden would like toemphasize two specific points where the wording of theresolution needs to be unequivocally clear. First, anindividual who claims that his rights have beenviolated as a consequence of the implementation of thisresolution should be guaranteed access to courts at thenational level, and States have a duty to ensure that thishappens. Secondly, when States and individuals takemeasures to implement this resolution, all such actionshould be consistent with international law and theUnited Nations Charter.

Sweden is confident that the adoption of this draftresolution can have a positive impact on MemberStates’ capabilities to deal with the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and related materials. It istherefore a most welcome step in fulfilling theresponsibility of the Council for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security.

The President: I now call on the representativeof Japan.

Mr. Haraguchi (Japan): At the outset, allow meto state that, given the critical importance of the issue,Japan considered it desirable for States not members ofthe Council to be afforded the opportunity to expresstheir views. We therefore highly appreciate yourinitiative, Sir, of convening today’s open meeting.

Having said that, let me offer several commentsat this juncture. First, Japan shares the serious concernand misgivings at the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and their means of delivery and believes

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that the Security Council and the United Nations as awhole must play a more effective role in addressingthis issue. With respect to the present draft resolution,it is urgent and essential for us to act to ensure thatweapons of mass destruction do not fall into the handsof terrorists and other non-State actors. For that reasonand because the issue is one that is directly tied to thesecurity of many countries, including mine, myGovernment supports the adoption of a resolution bythe Council, as long as it is acceptable to MemberStates after further discussion of the present draft.

Secondly, in order to ensure the effectiveness ofthe resolution, it is desirable that the committeementioned in the current draft resolution offer advice tocountries concerned in order to enable them to correcttheir specific, concrete violations. Such a committeeshould be staffed by persons with sufficient expertise,who should be recruited not only from the members ofthe Council but also widely from Council non-members. For its part, Japan is prepared to make acontribution in that respect. In addition, I wish to drawthe attention of the Council to the fact that theDepartment for Disarmament Affairs, withresponsibility for disarmament and non-proliferation,already exists within the United Nations. It might beadvisable for the committee to make good use of itsresources.

Thirdly, in order to counter the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, it is essential to securethe active — not passive — and willing cooperation ofa large number of countries, especially developingcountries. The Security Council should therefore alsoplay an important role in encouraging the provision oftechnical assistance to developing countries, so thatthey will be able to enact the necessary domestic lawsin implementing the effective non-proliferationmeasures imposed under the resolution.

Finally, allow me to make a general observation.In adopting a binding Security Council resolutionunder Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, theSecurity Council assumes a lawmaking function. TheSecurity Council should, therefore, be cautious not toundermine the stability of the international legalframework.

Japan strongly hopes that the Security Councilwill take note of these observations so that discussionon the draft resolution may be conducted in such amanner that full transparency is guaranteed and that the

Council will adopt a resolution with the widest supportamong Member States.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of Switzerland.

Mr. Staehelin (Switzerland) (spoke in French):The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction andthe risk that non-State actors, in particular terroristgroups, could gain access to such weapons constituteone of the most serious threats of our time. Switzerlandbelieves that there is an urgent need to contain thatthreat, which concerns the entire internationalcommunity.

In principle, legislative obligations, such as thoseforeseen in the draft resolution under discussion,should be established through multilateral treaties, inwhose elaboration all States can participate. It isacceptable for the Security Council to assume such alegislative role only in exceptional circumstances andin response to an urgent need.

As the draft resolution under discussion containsobligations that affect all Member States, it must bedrafted with the greatest possible transparency. It isthis concern for transparency that has led Switzerlandto support the request for an open debate. Given thenature and scope of the draft resolution, the measuresprovided for should be understood as a provisionalregime, and thus be subject to review after a certainperiod of time, in light of the experience gained. Inaddition, from the outset, there needs to be maximumclarity with respect to the scope of the obligationsimposed on Member States. In this respect, Switzerlandis of the opinion that a number of concepts contained inthe draft resolution are not sufficiently precise. This isthe case for example in the operative paragraph 2 of thedraft resolution, where reference is made to“appropriate and effective laws”.

As for the monitoring of the implementation ofthe resolution, it must also be clearly defined. In ourview, the fact that the draft resolution is based onChapter VII of the Charter cannot be understood as apre-authorization for States to resort to unilateralsanctions. In other words, the monitoring of theimplementation must be carried out within amultilateral framework. In this respect, Switzerlandwelcomes the establishment of a committee of theSecurity Council. It is important therefore that thecommittee and the Security Council work closely withexisting competent organizations in this area.

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Moreover, there needs to be consideration as towhether the subject matter dealt with in the draftresolution should not, at least in the medium term, becontained in an international instrument, which wouldbe developed in a broader framework. This wouldallow all interested States to participate, on an equalfooting, in defining and monitoring this non-proliferation regime.

In the future, efforts to counter the proliferationof WMD must also focus more closely onstrengthening verification procedures and instruments.It would be therefore be positive to see this aspect begiven greater consideration in the draft resolution.

Finally, Switzerland welcomes the fact that thepreambular portion of the draft resolution explicitlyreminds Member States of their obligations concerningarms control and disarmament. In our view, this aspectmerits even greater attention. The long-term aim is, andmust remain, the complete elimination of WMD. Toachieve this aim, all States must fully meet theirobligations under the relevant conventions.

The President: I now call on the representativeof Israel.

Mr. Mekel (Israel): Mr. President, at the outset Iwould like to congratulate you on the assumption of thepresidency and express our appreciation for your wisestewardship of the Council’s deliberations.

The past year has been characterized, amongother things, by two major developments in the field ofnon-proliferation. The first is the exposure ofviolations committed by States regarding theircommitments, and henceforth the internationalrecognition of the limitations of the traditionalmechanisms to ensure compliance. The second majordevelopment, which complements the first one, is therevelation of proliferation networks through whichdual-use materials, equipment, technologies and know-how are being distributed to States and non-Stateactors.

Therefore, beyond the threat of proliferation byStates, there is a growing threat that terrorists might beable to obtain sensitive materials, technologies andknow-how. As one of the countries that faces thesethreats, Israel welcomes the international effort toidentify concrete and effective steps aimed atpreventing the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) and in particular the growing threatof WMD terrorism.

As a full partner in the effort to prevent thisphenomenon, Israel has recently adopted legislativemeasures in order to control the export of dual-usematerials, technologies and know-how that could beused for the development of WMD. These measuresinclude controls on items in accordance with lists basedon international standards in this field. They alsoinclude materials based on lists of relevantinternational standards that prohibit the export of anyitem designed for chemical, biological or nuclearweapons.

This step provides a legal framework andconstitutes an improvement to the stringent exportcontrol system that currently exists in Israel. Thissupplements Israel’s export control legislation onmissiles and related materials. We believe that the wayto prevent the spread of WMD, in particular toterrorists, is first and foremost to increase nationalcontrols and to improve the protection of sensitivefacilities at the national level.

Therefore, as mentioned before, we support thisinitiative and the objectives of this draft resolution.Taking into account our support for the current draft,we have a few suggestions which we believe canimprove the text and which, we hope, will enjoy thesupport of other delegations.

In regard to the fifth preambular paragraph, Israelbelieves that there should be a distinction betweenlegitimate cooperation for purposes of promotingpeace, and cooperation that only serves as a veil to hideillegitimate plans. Therefore, we believe that it isdesirable to add the word “legitimate” between thewords “hamper” and “international”, so thatcooperation is limited to legitimate cooperation. Wewould also like to suggest that the words “legislativemeasures” substitute for the word “laws” in operativeparagraph 2.

Taking into account the experience that we havegained during the past year as regards the non-obedience of States to the traditional mechanisms toassure obedience to international commitments andresponsibilities, Israel believes that it would be correctto add the following sentence at the end of operativeparagraph 6 (a): “ ... as well as the compliance ofStates to their obligations under these treaties”.

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We also believe that the definitions segment atthe end of the draft resolution should include the word“services” in the definition of “related materials”.

At this time, I would like to reiterate my supportto this international effort. As mentioned here today,this draft resolution could make an importantcontribution to the struggle against proliferation andprovide long overdue attention to the growing threat ofthe use of non-conventional weapons and terrorism.

The President: I now call on the representativeof Cuba.

Mr. Requeijo Gual (Cuba) (spoke in Spanish):Cuba shares the concern regarding the dangerous linksexisting between terrorism and weapons of massdestruction (WMD) and we completely support alllegitimate international efforts to prevent theacquisition of such weapons and their means ofdelivery by terrorists. Nonetheless, the Cubandelegation is also concerned that the Security Council,recognized to be of limited composition, and in whichsome members have the right of veto, has taken theinitiative to prepare a draft resolution on a subjectwhich should continue to be considered in theframework of the traditional multilateral disarmamentmachinery, where the appropriate space exists tonegotiate a legally binding instrument.

In this connection, we believe that internationallegal obligations, including those that relate to the fieldof disarmament, weapons control and non-proliferation, must not be imposed upon Member Stateswithout their participation and their sovereignacceptance, through the signing and ratification of thecorresponding treaties and agreements that have beennegotiated multilaterally. The possibility of terroristattacks with WMD cannot eliminated through aselective approach, such as that promoted by this draftresolution, which confines itself to combatinghorizontal proliferation, and virtually disregardsvertical proliferation and disarmament.

The only guarantee that WMD will not fall intothe hands of terrorists is the prohibition and the totalelimination of this type of weapon, especially nuclearweapons, whose very existence constitutes, in itself, athreat to international peace and security.

For reasons of time, I will not explore in depthother concerns that we have with regard to otherelements of the draft resolution, such as, for example,

the issue of the definitions used, the true scope andimplications of this text for Member States and thenegative impact that it might have on the existing non-proliferation treaty regime.

Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that somePower might interpret the adoption of this text underChapter VII of the United Nations Charter to be a pre-authorization or a justification for the unilateral use offorce against given States because of allegedsuspicions of proliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD) or their components. In our owncase, this is of particular concern, bearing in mind thathigh officials of the United States Government haverepeatedly and dangerously levelled completely falseand unfounded accusations against Cuba, alleging,without presenting the slightest evidence, that ourcountry possesses a limited capacity for the researchand development of biological weapons, an accusationwhich we will continue to vigorously reject.

The text of the draft resolution is ambiguousenough for some States to proclaim that, in it, theSecurity Council legitimizes the interception of shipsand of aircraft in the framework of the so-calledProliferation Security Initiative. This initiative isalready operational, although the great majority ofStates were not given an opportunity to participate inits development, in spite of its important implications.The Initiative, instead of contributing to internationalunity on this subject and contributing to thestrengthening of the role of the United Nations and ofinternational treaties, weakens these. Cuba believesthat a multilateral and non-discriminatory approach isthe only effective way of countering the use of WMDby terrorists.

Several elements of this initiative do notcorrespond to the basic principles contained in theUnited Nations Charter and recognized in internationallaw that prohibit interference in the internal affairs ofStates and the use or the threat of the use of forceagainst the territorial integrity or politicalindependence of any State. There is absolutely noguarantee that the prerogatives, which were self-assumed by the participants in the ProliferationSecurity Initiative and which could be given legitimacyby this draft resolution, might not be manipulated bysome, particularly by the States that have the greatestmilitary might, to commit abuses against the ships andaircraft of other States for a range of reasons.

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Likewise, we must not discard the possibility ofsome of the participants in the Proliferation SecurityInitiative considering that they have been given somekind of authorization to intercept any type of cargo onthe basis of arbitrary criteria. This would lead toattempts to board ships and aircraft, even violatingrights established by the 1982 United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea, the provisions onthe right of innocent passage of ships through States’territorial waters and the jurisdictional regime of thehigh seas contained in the above-mentionedConvention.

Lastly, it would be useful to recall that the mainauthor and promoter of this draft resolution is preciselythe State that has the largest military expenditures inthe world, that has doctrines of security thatcontemplate preventive attacks and the use of nuclearweapons against States that do not posses suchweapons, and that not only has many nuclear weaponsbut is also in the process of developing new types ofsuch lethal weapons. This double standard represents areal threat to all that must not be left without duedenunciation.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of Indonesia.

Mr. Jenie (Indonesia): Mr. President, thank youfor convening this open debate of the Security Councilon an issue that has become a preoccupation of theentire international community. We would also like totake this opportunity to associate ourselves with thestatement that will be delivered later by Malaysia onbehalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

It is a fact that the threat of nuclear weaponsproliferation is on the rise. There are signs that non-State actors remain interested in the illicit acquisitionof weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Illegalnetworks exist that can deliver nuclear materials andtechnology that can be used to produce weapons. Indealing with these potentially dangerous situations, weare hampered by the lack of any legal framework thatwould effectively thwart the efforts of non-State actors,in particular terrorists, to acquire and illegally transfernuclear and other WMD materials. Although there arerules and regulations promulgated by several armscontrol regimes, they are by no means uniform, beingsusceptible to varying interpretations, and, due to theirrestrictive nature, not enjoying universal support. Mostimportantly, there are no internationally acceptable

provisions to penalize illegal proliferation activities byindividuals or non-State actors. Thus the draftresolution now before the Council deals with one of themost important aspects of non-proliferation. There isclearly an urgent need to prevent nuclear proliferationinvolving non-State actors as demonstrated by recentrevelations.

However, the draft resolution is unbalanced andhas consequently raised serious concerns, as itimpinges on the sovereign rights of Member States.Because of its wide-ranging ramifications, the issuescontained in it need to be further deliberated andclarified prior to its adoption. Indeed, we are of theopinion that legal obligations can only be created andassumed on a voluntary basis. Any far-reachingassumption of authority by the Security Council toenact global legislation is not consistent with theprovisions of the United Nations Charter. It is thereforeimperative to involve all States in the negotiatingprocess towards the establishment of internationalnorms on the issue.

The draft resolution is one-sided and adopts aunidimensional approach: it deals with preventionbased on punitive measures for States but not theelimination of WMD. Nuclear non-proliferation is theobverse side of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation cannot be successfully promoted in theabsence of corresponding progress towards nucleardisarmament. Also conspicuous is the draft resolution’slack of reference to horizontal and vertical proliferationand nuclear disarmament.

The expanded scope contemplated in the draftresolution goes far beyond the stated objective ofpreventing the acquisition of WMD by non-State actorsand seeks jurisdiction even over treaty-implementingmechanisms such as the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA). It is, therefore, not only what iscontained in the draft resolution that is important, butalso what is also implied. This aspect needs to be seenfrom its proper legal and political perspective. Furthercompounding the situation are definitional problemsrelating to the terms “non-State actors”, “responsibilityof States” and other terms that are contained in thebody of the draft resolution and in its footnotes.

We are concerned about the invocation of ChapterVII of the Charter. The preferred course of actionshould be cooperative rather than coercive. The

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coercive option should be a last resort, undertakenwithin the framework of a consensus decision.

The establishment of a committee under theauspices of the Security Council would constitute aseparate regime for non-proliferation and could wellundermine the functions and the proven role of existingtreaty regimes such as safeguards regime of the IAEA.By excluding an overwhelming majority of MemberStates, such a body would be unrepresentative andwould serve no useful function. Its role as defined inthe draft resolution could be performed by the UnitedNations Secretariat.

Finally, in view of the importance and thecomplexities attendant upon the issues involved, thefive permanent members of the Security Council havetaken several months to examine and decide uponvarious aspects of the draft resolution. Likewise, thegeneral membership needs adequate time to assess itsimplications, both here in New York and in ourcapitals. The Council can effectively deal with thisaspect of non-proliferation by doing full justice to thepreponderant views of an overwhelming majority ofMember States.

The President: I now give the floor to therepresentative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Danesh-Yazdi (Islamic Republic of Iran): Ithank you, Mr. President, for convening this meetingon an issue that is of the utmost importance for theinternational community. The attention paid over pastfew weeks to the draft resolution — which proposes tobar the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) by non-State actors — indicates clearly thatthe stakes are very high for many States. We considerthis debate to be an opportunity for the United Nationsgeneral membership to present its viewpoints on thisdraft resolution, which, if it is adopted, would have far-reaching legal and political implications.

While associating my delegation with thestatement to be made later by the representative ofMalaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ishould like to summarize the views of my Governmenton the draft resolution before us as follows.

The proliferation of WMD is a serious threat, andthe prospect of non-State actors acquiring suchweapons is all the more threatening to the wholeinternational community. Thus, we wholeheartedlysupport all efforts that are aimed at dealing with this

potential menace and that are undertaken within theparameters of international law.

The United Nations, as the sole universal body,has an important role in addressing this serious threat.The growing risk of linkage between terrorism andWMD prompted the General Assembly, in operativeparagraph 1 of its resolution 57/83, to recognize thethreat and, accordingly, to call upon “all MemberStates to support international efforts to preventterrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destructionand their means of delivery”. The present SecurityCouncil initiative should therefore be considered to bea step along those lines.

We understand that the Council, in taking thisinitiative, intends to fill a gap in the non-proliferationregime by means of a binding resolution. However, anumber of serious and valid questions arise as towhether the content of the draft resolution fairly andadequately addresses the issue at hand, whether theCouncil’s present action is consistent with the letterand spirit of the United Nations Charter, and how theexisting gap — which indeed should be addressed —can be filled when the resolution overlooks theuniversality of existing international WMD instrumentsand neglects to require States non-parties to nuclear,biological and chemical weapon treaty regimes toaccede to those important treaties.

The United Nations Charter entrusts the SecurityCouncil with the huge responsibility to maintaininternational peace and security, but it does not conferauthority on the Council to act as a global legislatureimposing obligations on States without theirparticipation in the process. The draft resolution, in itspresent form, is a clear manifestation of the Council’sdeparture from its Charter-based mandate. We believethat the Council’s success in securing an environmentof non-proliferation depends greatly on the ability ofits own actions to inspire sincere cooperation by States.This open Council meeting is an opportunity for thedraft resolution’s sponsors to take on board the viewsand concerns of other States in order to fosterinternational cooperation aimed at collective andmeaningful action against terrorism and proliferation.

A major deficiency in the proposed draftresolution is its silence regarding the imperative ofdisarmament, as well as its failure to acknowledge thelinkage between non-proliferation and disarmament.The cosmetic and rhetorical reference to disarmament

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in the draft resolution’s preamble cannot and shouldnot be interpreted as a substantive provision addressingthe important issue of disarmament. Such negligence isin stark contrast to General Assembly resolution 58/48,which emphasized the urgent need for progress in thearea of disarmament and non-proliferation in order tohelp to maintain international peace and security and tocontribute to global efforts against terrorism. The draftresolution before the Council, by ignoring the issue ofdisarmament, not only undermines its significance andthrust aimed at fighting the potential threat of terroristsarmed with WMD, but also weakens its effectiveimplementation.

As recognized in existing international WMDinstruments, efforts to prevent access to such weaponsshould not hamper international cooperation to promotethe use of materials, equipment and technology forpeaceful purposes. To our regret, a provisionaddressing this key area has not been incorporated intothe operative part of the draft resolution. We believethat a fair and balanced draft resolution cannot andshould not fail to acknowledge this inalienable right ofMember States as it obligates them to shoulder heavyresponsibilities and complex commitments.

The proposed resolution contains certain conceptsand definitions that are either inadequately elaboratedor inconsistent with the terms and definitions embodiedin existing international instruments on nuclear,biological and chemical weapons. A clear example ofthat deficiency is the definition given for the means ofdelivery, which fails to refer to fighters capable ofdelivering such weapons. That can be rectified in thefinal draft of the resolution.

In our view, the draft resolution’s enforcementclauses are subject to various interpretations. Themonitoring mechanism also needs to be furtherelaborated and clarified. Hence, language should beincluded in the text that would, in effect, remove theambiguity from those vital provisions, therebypreventing suspicion and misinterpretation.Alarmingly, the current state of international affairsteaches us the following crucial lesson: the follow-upon and monitoring of such a resolution cannot be left tothe subjective interpretation of individual States. Weneed common and sound understanding on the part ofall States to ensure their faithful implementation of theresolution, irrespective of their status with regard tointernational WMD treaties. Obviously, if the proposed

draft resolution were not of a mandatory nature, thatconcern would be easy to address.

The draft makes no reference to initiatives onWMD-free zones, which are of great importance formany regions. We believe that that issue — particularlythe need to establish the Middle East as a WMD-freezone — should be incorporated into the draft.

Last but not least is the question of urgency. Itappears that the draft resolution will be acted upon inthe near future. That would satisfy the domesticconstituencies of certain States. However, we share theview of those who believe that the draft resolutionmust not be fast-tracked. The issues that it addressesare extremely important and highly controversial.Comprehensive consultations between sponsors andinterested States are not only desirable but imperative.Let us not miss this solemn opportunity; let us notsquander it in a hasty and inconclusive process.

Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke inArabic): We thank you, Mr. President, for conveningthis meeting to give Member States an opportunity toexpress their opinions on the important subject on theCouncil’s agenda today. My delegation associates itselfwith the statement to be made later by therepresentative of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The international community has agreed that thebest way to eliminate the danger posed by weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) lies in their total elimination,whatever form they may take and wherever they arefound.

Syria supports that approach. There is no doubtthat the possibility of weapons of mass destructionfalling into the hands of terrorists, in particular, and theissue of international terrorism in general are mattersof grave concern. This should compel us all toconsolidate international cooperation in stemming thedanger.

Syria is eager to protect our region and the worldfrom the danger posed by the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction. Syria’s commitment to shieldingthe world from that threat prompted us to take animportant step in the 1960s by acceding to the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).We later concluded a comprehensive safeguardsagreement with the International Atomic EnergyAgency. It is worth noting that virtually all Member

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States are now party to the NPT. Israel, however, is theonly Member that has not yet acceded to the Treaty,thus preventing the declaration of the Middle East as azone free of all weapons of mass destruction and, mostimportantly, of nuclear weapons.

The Security Council still has before it a draftresolution that was submitted twice by the Syrian ArabRepublic last year on behalf of all Arab Member Statesand issued in blue as document S/2003/1208 of 29December 2003 (see document S/2003/1219, annex). Inits operative and preambular paragraphs, the draftresolution stresses the need to address the danger posedby the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction byterrorist groups and seeks to prevent such weaponsfrom falling into the hands such groups.

It is truly regrettable, however, that the Councilhas not yet adopted that extremely important draftresolution. Instead, some have tried to exert misplacedpressure, wilfully forgetting the fact that Israelpossesses all types of weapons of mass destruction,including nuclear, biological and chemical. That facthas been confirmed by employees of the Israeliindustrial complex. This issue raises many questionsabout the credibility of the approach taken towards theelimination of all weapons of mass destruction, nuclearweapons foremost among them.

The draft resolution before the Council todaycontains references confirming that the proliferation ofnuclear, chemical and biological weapons poses athreat to international peace and security. It also

stresses support for multilateral agreements aimed atcurbing proliferation. While we approve thosereferences, we share the questions and doubts raised bythe States members of the Non-Aligned Movement(NAM) at their meeting with the sponsors concerningother aspects of the draft resolution.

We would welcome the convening of more suchconsultations prior to the Council’s adoption of its finaldraft. In particular, we would stress the need to refer tothe establishment of zones free of weapons of massdestruction, including and particularly in the MiddleEast, and to clarify certain terms used in the draftresolution, such as “means of delivery” and “relevantmaterial”. We also stress the special importance of thestatement issued by NAM concerning the need for thedraft resolution to be fully in line with Article 25 of theCharter of the United Nations. Finally, the follow-upmechanism for the implementation of the draftresolution must have a clear mandate and terms ofreference, including the time frame.

Allow me in conclusion to stress once again theimportance that my country attaches to countering,through cooperation with the countries of the worldwithin the United Nations and other forums, thechallenge posed by the acquisition by terrorist groupsof weapons of mass destruction. Such mutualcooperation represents the sound approach to pursue inorder to avert the danger posed by those weapons andto spare humankind the scourge that has emerged overthe past century.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m.