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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. ________________
AUSTIN BELANGER,
on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
JURY DEMAND
ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE
SERVICING CORPORATION, and
GREAT AMERICAN E&S INSURANCE
COMPANY and WILLIS OF OHIO, INC.
D/B/A LOAN PROTECTOR INSURANCE
SERVICES,
Defendants.
________________________________________/
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Austin Belanger, a Senior Airman in the United States Airforce, files this class
action complaint, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, against Defendants
RoundPoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation (“RoundPoint”), Great American E&S Insurance
Company (“Great American”) and Willis of Ohio, Inc. d/b/a Loan Protector Insurance Services
(“Loan Protector”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
INTRODUCTION
1. Undersigned Counsel have been litigating force-placed insurance (“FPI”) class
actions for more than six years in the Southern District of Florida and in other federal district courts
nationwide. The FPI cases have been the subject of two different Multi District Litigation Panel
(“MDL”) hearings and have included the discovery of thousands of pages of documents and
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dozens of depositions. In early 2011, Undersigned Counsel filed the first of this wave of FPI cases
in the Southern District of Florida, Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-cv-21233-RNS
(S.D. Fla.). The Williams case was certified as a class action, eventually settled, and was granted
final approval on September 11, 2013.
2. Undersigned Counsel subsequently filed additional nationwide class actions and
have been appointed Co-Lead Counsel in the Southern District of Florida and in the District of
New Jersey against many of the major mortgage lenders and servicers and their partner insurers.
These cases were very actively litigated and Undersigned Counsel have now reached nationwide
settlements in most of those cases certifying nationwide classes and providing more than $5.2
billion in monetary relief to over 4.7 million homeowners across the country, plus important
injunctive relief which has helped to put an end to most of the alleged unlawful practices for at
least five years.
3. Defendants’ main defense in nearly all of the cases has been that the “filed-rate
doctrine” acts as a complete ban to all of plaintiffs’ causes of action. However, Great American
acts as a surplus line insurer and thus does not file its FPI rates.
4. This action seeks to redress for injuries resulting directly from Defendants’ force-
placed insurance practices. Plaintiff and a proposed nationwide class and state subclass of
RoundPoint borrowers seek to recover damages they have suffered as a result of Defendants’
wrongful conduct in manipulating the force-placed insurance market through collusive agreements
involving kickback arrangements and other forms of improper compensation and their standard
practice of charging borrowers undisclosed and illegitimate costs in connection with force-placed
insurance.
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5. Founded in 2007, RoundPoint is a fully-licensed agency and non-agency
subservicer for commercial banks, credit unions, mortgage companies and hedge funds.
RoundPoint currently services over $75 billion worth of mortgage assets, which are comprised of
its own assets and loans subserviced for many other investor types nationwide. RoundPoint is
licensed to service loans in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S Virgin Islands.
RoundPoint is a seller and servicer for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It is an approved single
family issuer and servicer for Ginnie Mae, and maintains current MBS issuer eligibility.
RoundPoint is also an approved servicer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
In addition to servicing loans guaranteed by Fannie Mae, RoundPoint services for third parties and
has an extensive portfolio of loans involved in FDIC structured and shared loss transactions.
6. During the class period, RoundPoint, Great American, and Loan Protector engaged
in a pattern of unlawful and unconscionable profiteering and self-dealing in the purchase and
placement of force-placed insurance coverage on behalf of RoundPoint borrowers in Florida and
throughout the country. Their exclusive and collusive relationship has resulted in extraordinary
profits for all the Defendants totaling in the millions of dollars.
7. RoundPoint has entered into agreements with Great American and Loan Protector
that provide those companies with the exclusive right to monitor the entire RoundPoint loan
portfolio and force-place their own insurance coverage pursuant to a master policy that covers the
entire RoundPoint portfolio. Great American and Loan Protector provide RoundPoint with various
kickbacks that Defendants attempt to disguise as legitimate compensation. These kickbacks
include but are not limited to one or more of the following: (1) unearned “commissions” paid to
RoundPoint or an affiliate for work purportedly performed to procure individual policies; (2)
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“expense reimbursements” allegedly paid to reimburse RoundPoint for expenses it incurred in the
placement of force-placed insurance coverage on homeowners; (3) payments of illusory
reinsurance premiums that carry no commensurate transfer of risk; and (4) free or below-cost
mortgage-servicing functions that Loan Protector and Great American perform for RoundPoint
that often have nothing to do with the placement of insurance coverage. Because of these
kickbacks, RoundPoint essentially receives a rebate on the cost of the force-placed insurance.
RoundPoint homeowners, however, ultimately bear the cost of these kickbacks because
Defendants do not pass on these rebates to the borrowers. The charges for force-placed insurance
are deducted from borrowers’ escrow accounts and Defendants attempt to disguise the kickbacks
as legitimate when, in fact, they are unearned, unlawful profits.
8. During the proposed class period, Defendants treated Plaintiff and every putative
class member in an identical manner pursuant to their standard policies and procedures by among
other things: (1) notifying them that their coverage had lapsed and new coverage had been forced
with the same cycle of form letters; (2) forcing coverage for every borrower from one master policy
that covered RoundPoint’s entire loan portfolio; (3) forcing new coverage in the same manner for
every member of the proposed classes; and (4) including the same impermissible costs in the
amounts charged every putative class member for coverage.
9. This action seeks to redress for injuries resulting directly from Defendants’ force-
placed insurance practices. Plaintiff does not challenge RoundPoint’s contractual right to obtain
force-placed insurance to protect its interest in Plaintiff’s loan but instead challenges the manner
in which RoundPoint has manipulated the force-placed insurance process to enrich itself, Loan
Protector, and Great American at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class, and in violation of the
mortgage agreements.
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PARTIES
10. Plaintiff Austin Belanger was charged for force-placed insurance on his home in
Navarre, Florida by Defendant RoundPoint. Pursuant to its exclusive arrangement with Loan
Protector and Great American, and the master policy in place, and upon information and belief,
RoundPoint purchased the force-placed insurance coverage through Loan Protector and Great
American in 2016, and backdated the policy to August 2015. Mr. Belanger is a citizen of the State
of Florida.
11. RoundPoint is, and was at all relevant times, a corporation organized under the laws
of Florida, with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. RoundPoint services
residential mortgage loans in Florida and throughout the United States, including loans within this
district. RoundPoint serviced the Plaintiff’s loans.
12. Great American is a Delaware company with its headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio.
It is a surplus line insurance carrier in Florida, and throughout the country. Surplus line insurance
carriers do not file their insurance rates with State insurance regulators and therefore their rates
(and the ultimate insurance premiums) are not approved by the States.
13. Willis of Ohio, Inc. d/b/a Loan Protector Insurance Services (“Loan Protector”) is
an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Colon, Ohio. It provides lender placed
insurance and insurance tracking services to the mortgage servicing industry. Loan Protector
provides lender placed insurance and outsourced insurance tracking programs to residential and
commercial mortgage lenders and servicers across the United States. Loan Protector contracts
with servicers and lenders to act as a force-placed insurance vendor. During the relevant time
periods described in this Complaint, Loan Protector contracted as a force-placed insurance vendor
with RoundPoint. Upon information and belief, Loan Protector, along with Great American, tracks
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loans in RoundPoint’s mortgage portfolio, handles customer service duties related to force-placed
insurance, and issues certificates from the force-placed insurance master policy on properties when
a borrower’s insurance has lapsed. At all relevant times described in this complaint, Loan
Protector was acting as an agent, servant, employee, partner, and joint venturer of Defendants
RoundPoint and Great American. Loan Protector had actual or constructive knowledge of the acts
of each of these Defendants, and ratified, approved, joined in, acquiesced in, or authorized the
wrongful acts of each co-defendant, and retained the benefits of said wrongful acts. Loan Protector
was a direct, necessary, and substantial participant in the common course of conduct complained
of herein, and was aware of its overall contribution to and furtherance of the conspiracy and
common course of conduct. Loan Protector conducts business throughout the United States,
including Florida.
NATURE OF THE CASE
14. All mortgage lenders and servicers’ force-placed insurance schemes operate in a
materially similar fashion. When a homeowner’s voluntary insurance policy lapses, the mortgage
servicer force-places insurance on the property and charges the borrower inflated amounts.
Borrowers are told they will be charged the cost of coverage and contract to do so, but in fact pay
an amount greater than what the mortgage servicer, here RoundPoint, ultimately pays for the force-
placed insurance. This is because after the servicer pays the insurer for the force-placed coverage,
the insurer kicks back a percentage of the payment to the servicer or one of its affiliates. The
kickback essentially provides a rebate on the cost of the insurance coverage. The benefit of that
rebate is not, however, passed on to the borrower.
15. The amounts charged to borrowers for forced coverage are also inflated to cover
other costs that are properly borne by the loan servicer. These kickbacks, which are described in
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greater detail below, not only allow the insurer to secure an exclusive relationship with the
mortgage lender or servicer and keep the market closed, but also provide the participants in the
scheme with millions of dollars in ill-gotten gains—all at borrowers’ expense.
16. The amounts charged to the borrowers by RoundPoint for forced coverage often
have little to do with the actual risk insured or the value of the property, and are purely a function
of this kickback scheme. This action seeks compensation for borrowers who have been victimized
by this practice and an end to this illegal scheme.
17. At all relevant times, RoundPoint purchased force-placed insurance through Loan
Protector and Great American pursuant to a longstanding agreement whereby Great American
furnished insurance coverage for the entire RoundPoint portfolio of mortgage loans under a master
policy. Loan Protector facilitates the arrangement by taking over certain mortgage servicing
functions on behalf of RoundPoint, at below cost, including tracking the loans in the RoundPoint
portfolio for lapses in insurance, and notifying Great American of any lapse so an individual
certificate for the particular borrower’s property can be issued under the master policy.
18. This arrangement returns a significant financial benefit to RoundPoint that is
unrelated to any contractual or bona fide interest in protecting RoundPoint’s interest in the loan.
Pursuant to its agreement, RoundPoint purchases insurance coverage with inflated prices from
Great American, and in exchange, RoundPoint receives kickbacks from Great American and Loan
Protector in the form of unearned “commissions,” ceded premiums for riskless reinsurance,
subsidies for below-cost mortgage servicing functions (that often have nothing to do with
providing insurance coverage), or illusory “expense reimbursements,” among other things, that
amount to a rebate on the cost of the FPI to RoundPoint. RoundPoint then imposes these inflated
charges upon borrowers in amounts it claims to represent the cost of the insurance it paid for, but
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in fact it is a greater amount than RoundPoint paid because the charges include the secret kickbacks
and other illicit consideration that is remitted to RoundPoint, and that amount to a rebate that
RoundPoint does not pass on to its borrowers.
19. RoundPoint’s desire to reap greater profits through its prearranged agreements with
Loan Protector and Great American leads it to select high-priced insurance that includes a rebate
to RoundPoint but subsequently charges its borrowers an amount that does not pass on the rebate.
The charges RoundPoint imposes on borrowers, which RoundPoint attributes to the cost of the
insurance, are not only greater than its actual cost of providing the insurance and the actual cost
paid by RoundPoint, but also are usually greater than the premiums for the borrowers’ voluntary
insurance, even though the force-placed insurance typically provides less coverage. Through this
manipulation of the force-placed insurance selection process, RoundPoint maximizes its own
profits and those of its co-Defendants to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Class members.
The Force-Placed Insurance Industry
20. Lenders and mortgage servicers, like RoundPoint here, force place insurance
coverage when a borrower fails to obtain or maintain proper hazard, flood, or wind insurance
coverage on property that secures a loan. Under the typical mortgage agreement, if the insurance
policy lapses or provides insufficient coverage, the lender has the right to force-place coverage on
the property to protect its interest in the loan and to charge the borrower the cost of coverage.
21. Force-placed insurance schemes like the one at issue here take advantage of the
discretion afforded to the lenders and servicers in standard form mortgage agreements. The
mortgage agreements typically require the borrower to carry hazard insurance sufficient to cover
the lender’s interest in the property against fire and other perils. If a homeowner’s “voluntary”
policy lapses, the mortgage agreement allows the lender to “force place” a new policy on the
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property at the borrower’s expense.
22. These schemes also violate the mortgage contract’s express terms. The borrower
contracts to compensate the lender for the actual cost that the lender or servicer pays the insurer
for the forced coverage, but is then charged an inflated amount – more than the lender or servicer
actually paid. Typically, lenders delegate to servicers the lenders’ rights to enforce the terms of
the mortgage contract.
23. Force-placed insurance providers enter into exclusive relationships with servicers
to provide the FPI policies. To maintain their exclusive relationships with these servicers, the
force-placed insurers, using an insurance agency like Loan Protector as a conduit, pay unearned
kickbacks, often calculated as a percentage of the force-placed premiums and disguised as
“commissions” or “expense reimbursements,” offer subsidized mortgage servicing functions; enter
into lucrative captive reinsurance deals with them; and/or provide other financial benefits not
attributable to the cost of insuring the property.
24. The money to finance these force-placed insurance schemes comes from
unsuspecting borrowers who are charged inflated amounts for force-placed insurance by lenders
or servicers. Borrowers are required to pay the full amount that the lender or servicer initially pays
to the insurer despite the fact that a considerable portion of that amount is kicked back to the lender
or servicer in the manner described above. RoundPoint gets the benefit of an effective rebate from
Great American that it does not pass on to the borrower. Instead, it charges the borrower the full
amount, purportedly for the cost of insurance coverage. Lenders and servicers and their exclusive
force-placed insurers reap these unconscionable profits entirely at the expense of the unsuspecting
borrowers.
25. During a 2012 hearing on force-placed insurance at the National Association of
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Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), Mr. Birny Birnbaum, an expert on the force-placed insurance
market, illustrated the staggering growth in profits that force-placed insurance schemes have
reaped in recent years:1
26. It is no surprise that these practices have come under increased scrutiny in recent
years by the government and regulators:
At hearings before the New York Department of Financial Services
(“NYDFS”) on May 17, 2012 related to the force-placed insurance market,
the Superintendent of Financial Services, Benjamin Lawsky, stated that the
Department’s initial inquiry uncovered “serious concerns and red flags”
which included: 1) exponentially higher premiums, 2) extraordinarily low
loss ratios, 3) lack of competition in the market, and 4) tight relationships
between the banks, their subsidiaries, and insurers. He went on to state:
In sum when you combine [the] close and intricate web of
relationships between the banks and insurance companies on
the one hand, with high premiums, low loss ratios, and lack
of competition on the other hand, it raises serious questions
. . . .
In 2013, as a result of its investigation, the NYDFS entered into Consent 1 This graph and the ones that follower are from Mr. Birnbaum’s presentation to the NAIC on
August 9, 2012. The presentation is available
at:http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_120809-public_hearing_lender_placed-
insurancepresentation_birnbaum.pdf.
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Order with certain FPI providers that acknowledged that the “commissions”
are unearned, noting, in relevant part:
Commissions paid to affiliates are a form of reverse
competition; when insurers compete for servicers’ business
by offering higher commissions to servicers’ affiliates, there
is no incentive to reduce force-place insurance premium
rates. Commissions are paid to affiliates of servicers
because they are a cost of staying in the market, not for any
particular work the affiliates perform.
Similarly, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
has expressed concern with the “reverse competition” at play in the force-
placed insurance market whereby the insurers compete by offering
mortgage lenders and servicers a share in the profits, rather than by offering
lower prices. On its website, the NAIC states:
A key regulatory concern with the growing use of lender-
placed insurance is “reverse competition,” where the lender
chooses the coverage provider and amounts, yet the
consumer is obliged to pay the cost of the coverage. Reverse
competition is a market condition that tends to drive up
prices to the consumers, as the lender is not motivated to
select the lower price for coverage since the cost is born by
the borrower. Normally competitive forces tend to drive
down costs for consumers. However, in this case, the lender
is motivated to select coverage from an insurer looking out
for the lender’s interest rather than the borrower.
See http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_lender_placed_insurance.htm
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s new regulations on force-
placed insurance became final on January 17, 2013 and prohibit servicers
of federally regulated mortgage loans from force-placing insurance unless
the servicer has a reasonable basis to the believe the borrower’s insurance
has lapsed and require the servicer to provide three notices of the force-
placement in advance of issuing the certificate of insurance.2
On December 18, 2013, Fannie Mae issued its Servicing Guide
Announcement related to force-placed insurance that, among other things, 2 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Rules to Protect Mortgage Borrowers
available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-proposes-rules-to-protect-mortgage-borrowers/
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prohibits servicers from including any commissions, bonuses, or other
incentive compensation in the amounts charged to borrowers for force-
placed insurance and further requires that the force-placed insurance carrier
cannot be an affiliated entity of the servicer.3
In September 2015, an FPI provider, America Modern Insurance Group,
and its related entities (together, “American Modern”), entered into a
Consent Order4 with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (“FLOIR”)
after FLOIR discovered massive issues with American Modern’s force-
placed insurance program, the Consent Order prohibited some of the same
practices described in this Complaint including:
o Paying commissions to a bank or servicer or a person or entity affiliated
with a bank or servicer on force-placed insurance policies obtained by
the servicer;
o Issuing force-placed insurance on mortgaged property serviced by a
bank or servicer affiliated with American Modern;
o Reinsuring force-placed insurance policies with a captive insurer of any
Servicer;
o Paying contingent commissions based on underwriting profitability or
loss ratios to any Servicer or person or entity affiliated with a Servicer;
o Providing free or below-cost, outsourced services to servicers or their
affiliates; and
o Making any incentive payments, including but not limited to the
payment of expenses, to servicers or their affiliates in connection with
securing business;
On May 6, 2016, American Modern entered into a Consent Order with the State of
Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce, which included numerous pertinent findings
of fact, including that American Modern:
o Paid commissions to servicer-affiliated agencies in connection with its
force placed products;
o Paid commissions to insurance producers that are affiliates of Servicers;
o Paid commissions to insurance producers that are not affiliates of
Servicers;
o Made other payments or discounts to servicers and their affiliates in
connection with its force-placed products; 3 See https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/svc1327.pdf
4http://www.floir.com/siteDocuments/American_Modern_Insurance_Group_Inc%20_Consent_O
rder_174210-15-CO.pdf
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o Entered into agreements with servicers and their affiliates that provided
for the payment of compensation.
27. RoundPoint, Loan Protector, and Great American operate their force-placed
scheme in the same manner as in the cases above. Defendants’ self-dealing and collusion in the
force-placed insurance market has caused substantial harm to the named Plaintiff and the proposed
classes he seeks to represent. This class action seeks to redress that harm on behalf of these classes
of consumers and to recover all improper costs they have incurred related to the forced placement
of insurance by the Defendants.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
28. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C.).
29. Plaintiff Austin Belanger is a citizen of Florida who owns property in Florida on
which insurance coverage was forced by Defendant RoundPoint through its exclusive
arrangements.
30. RoundPoint is a Florida corporation and registered to do business in Florida. The
amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and there are at least one hundred members of the
putative class.
31. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff’s claims
arise under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d), according to the statute’s jurisdictional statement, 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Further, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on Plaintiff’s claims for
violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
32. This Court has further jurisdiction over Defendants because they are either foreign
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corporations authorized to conduct business in Florida, are doing business in Florida and have
registered with the Florida Secretary of State, or do sufficient business in Florida, have sufficient
minimum contacts with Florida, or otherwise intentionally avail themselves of the Florida
consumer market through the promotion, marketing, sale, and service of mortgages or other
lending services and insurance policies in Florida. This purposeful availment renders the exercise
of jurisdiction by this Court over Defendants and their affiliated or related entities permissible
under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
33. In addition, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under CAFA because the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and diversity exists between Plaintiff and Defendants.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Further, in determining whether the $5 million amount in controversy
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) is met, the claims of the putative class members are
aggregated. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
34. Venue is proper in this forum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendants
transact business and may be found in this District and a substantial portion of the practices
complained of herein occurred in the Southern District of Florida.
35. All conditions precedent to this action have occurred, been performed, or have been
waived.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
36. The standard form mortgage agreements for loans serviced by RoundPoint include
a provision requiring the borrower to maintain hazard insurance coverage, flood insurance
coverage if the property is located in a Special Flood Hazard Area as determined by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and wind insurance on the property securing the loan. In the
event that the insurance lapses, the standard form mortgage agreements permit RoundPoint to
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obtain force-placed coverage to protect the its interest in the loan and to charge the cost of the
insurance to the borrower rather than declare the borrower in default.
37. What is unknown to borrowers, and not disclosed in the standard form mortgage
agreements, is that RoundPoint has exclusive arrangements with Loan Protector and Great
American to manipulate the force-placed insurance market and artificially inflate the charges to
Plaintiff and the Class members. The charges are inflated to provide RoundPoint with kickbacks
disguised as “commissions,” or “expense reimbursements,” or to provide RoundPoint with
lucrative reinsurance arrangements that include unmerited charges, and to provide additional
financial benefits in the form of below-cost mortgage servicing functions that are not attributable
to the cost of insuring the individual property.
Defendants’ Force-Placed Insurance Scheme
38. Great American and Loan Protector have exclusive arrangements with RoundPoint
to monitor RoundPoint’s mortgage portfolios, perform various mortgage servicing functions
(obligations properly borne by RoundPoint), and provide force-placed insurance coverage. In
addition to the subsidized mortgage services it receives, as set forth in detail below, RoundPoint
is “kicked back” a percentage of the force-placed premium.
39. The scheme works as follows: RoundPoint purchases a master insurance policy
from Great American that covers the entire RoundPoint portfolio of mortgage loans. In exchange,
Great American is given the exclusive right to force insurance on property securing a loan within
the portfolio when the borrower’s voluntary insurance lapses or RoundPoint determines the
borrower’s existing insurance is inadequate.
40. Loan Protector and/or Great American monitor RoundPoint’s entire loan portfolio
for lapses in borrowers’ insurance coverage. Once a lapse is identified, they send a cycle of
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letters/notices, reviewed and approved by RoundPoint, to the borrower in RoundPoint’s name,
stating that RoundPoint will purchase insurance for the property, for which the borrowers will be
financially responsible, and force-place it on the property. In reality, however, the master policy
is already in place and RoundPoint does not seek out and purchase a new policy on the individual
borrower’s behalf, rather, a certificate of insurance from the master policy is automatically issued
by Loan Protector and Great American and RoundPoint is charged for that certificate.
41. The letters or notices sent to borrowers are done pursuant to an automated system
used by Great American and Loan Protector that generates and sends the letters at predetermined
times. The letters indicate an address for borrowers to submit proof of insurance or correspondence
to RoundPoint; however, the address is actually for a Great American or Loan Protector location
because they are performing these services for RoundPoint. Each borrower is subject to
Defendants’ automated system and receives materially the same letters described above.
42. Once a certificate is issued pursuant to the pre-existing master policy, coverage is
forced on the property, and RoundPoint charges the borrower an amount they attribute to the “cost”
of the force-placed insurance, which is either deducted from the borrower’s mortgage escrow
account or added to the balance of the borrower’s loan.5 The borrower’s escrow account is
depleted irrespective of whether other escrow charges, such as property taxes, are also due and
owing.
43. No individualized underwriting ever takes place for the force-placed coverage.
Insurance is automatically placed on the property and the inflated amounts, including the unlawful
kickbacks, are charged to the borrower.
5 On some occasions, when a borrower does not have an escrow account, RoundPoint creates an
escrow account with a negative balance and charges the borrower to bring the balance to zero.
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44. To fund the force-placed insurance scheme, RoundPoint pays for the certificate of
insurance, which issues from the already-existing master policy. RoundPoint, not the borrower, is
obligated to pay Great American for the force-placed insurance pursuant to the agreements
between Defendants, which govern the mortgage servicing functions that Great American and
Loan Protector perform as well as the procurement of the master policy, and are executed and
already in place before the borrower’s coverage lapses.
45. Once coverage has issued and RoundPoint has paid for the insurance, Great
American kicks back a set percentage of the premium to RoundPoint as a “commission” or an
“expense reimbursement.” The money paid back to RoundPoint and/or its affiliates is not given
in exchange for any services provided by it; it is simply grease paid to keep the force-placed
machine moving. In an attempt to mask the kickbacks as legitimate, Great American or Loan
Protector may disclose in the form letters sent to the borrower that RoundPoint may earn
“commissions” as a result of the forced placement of new coverage, that RoundPoint incurred
“costs” as a result of the force-placement of insurance, or that a “fee” is due to an agency.
46. These payments are not compensation for work performed; they are an effective
rebate on the premium amount owed by RoundPoint, reducing the cost of coverage that
RoundPoint pays to Great American. The “commissions” or “expense reimbursements” are not
legitimate reimbursements for actual costs, nor are they payments that have been earned for any
work done by RoundPoint or an affiliate related to the placement of the insurance; they are
unlawful kickbacks to RoundPoint for the exclusive arrangement to force-place insurance.
47. In reality, no work is ever done by RoundPoint to procure insurance for a particular
borrower because the coverage comes through the master policy already in place and the
procedures, including the issuance of the certificate of insurance, are automated. RoundPoint does
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not seek out insurance policies on a borrower’s behalf and has no involvement in the placing of
the insurance. As a result, the amount paid is not a true “commission,” no income is “earned,” and
RoundPoint does not incur any “expenses” in relation to the force-placement of insurance for any
particular borrower.
48. In addition to these direct payment kickbacks, RoundPoint also enters into
exclusive agreements whereby Great American and Loan Protector provide mortgage servicing
functions on RoundPoint’s entire loan portfolio at below cost. These functions, which include, but
are not limited to activities such as “new loan boarding,” “escrow administration,” “customer
service,” and “loss draft services,” are often not related to the provision of force-placed insurance
and are performed at below cost as a way to keep the exclusive arrangement in place. Indeed,
Great American does not perform these services for RoundPoint without also being the exclusive
provider of force-placed insurance. Loan Protector does not perform these services for
RoundPoint without also being the exclusive vendor for the procurement of force-placed
insurance.
49. Upon information and belief, Loan Protector and Great American are able to
perform many of the mortgage servicing functions for RoundPoint at below-cost because of the
funds received from the force-placed insurance charges, which subsidize any expenses incurred
for performing the services.
50. The borrower ultimately subsidizes the below-cost mortgage servicing through the
inflated charges for FPI imposed by RoundPoint. However, because insurance-lapsed mortgaged
property generally comprises only 1-2% of the lenders’ total mortgage portfolio, the borrowers,
like Plaintiff here, who are charged for the force-placed insurance unfairly bear the cost to service
and monitor the entire RoundPoint loan portfolio. These charges, passed on to Plaintiff and the
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proposed classes, are not properly chargeable to the borrowers because they are expenses
associated with the servicing of all the loans and often have nothing to do with the provision of
FPI, and RoundPoint is already compensated for these activities by the owners of the loans (e.g.
Fannie Mae).
51. Thus, the small percentage of borrowers who are charged for force-placed
insurance subsidize the costs of servicing RoundPoint’s entire loan portfolio, effectively resulting
in a kickback to RoundPoint to keep its exclusive arrangement in place with Loan Protector and
Great American.
52. In addition, upon information and belief, Great American enters into essentially
riskless “captive reinsurance arrangements” with RoundPoint or its affiliates, to “reinsure” the
property insurance force-placed on borrowers. An American Banker article illustrated this
reinsurance problem using JPMorgan Chase’s program with Assurant, Inc. by way of example:
JPMorgan and other mortgage servicers reinsure the property insurance
they buy on behalf of mortgage borrowers who have stopped paying for
their own coverage. In JPMorgan’s case, 75% of the total force-placed
premiums cycle back to the bank through a reinsurance affiliate. This has
raised further questions about the force-placed market’s arrangements.
Over the last five years, Chase has received $660 million in reinsurance payments and
commissions on force-placed policies, according to New York’s DFS[.]
Of every hundred dollars in premiums that JPMorgan Chase borrowers
pay to Assurant, the bank ends up keeping $58 in profit, DFS staff
asserted. The agency suggested the bank’s stake in force-placed
insurance may encourage it to accept unjustifiably high prices by
Assurant and to avoid filing claims on behalf of borrowers, since that
would lower its reinsurer’s returns.
The DFS staff also questioned the lack of competition in the industry,
noting that Assurant and QBE have undertaken acquisitions that give
them long-term control of 90% of the market. Further limiting
competition are the companies’ tendency to file identical rates in many
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states, Lawsky and his staff argue.
J. Horwitz, Chase Reinsurance Deals Draw New York Regulator’s Attacks, AM. BANKER, May18,
2012, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_97/chase-reinsurance-deals-
regulator-attack-1049460-1.html.
53. RoundPoint’s reinsurance program, like those of other servicers, is simply a way to
funnel profits from the force-placed scheme, in the form of ceded premiums, to RoundPoint at
borrowers’ expense. While reinsurance can, and often does, serve a legitimate purpose, here it
does not. RoundPoint and/or its affiliates enter into reinsurance agreements with Great American
that provide that the insurer will return to RoundPoint significant percentages of the premiums
charged to borrowers by way of ceded reinsurance premiums to RoundPoint affiliates – which in
turn provide these premiums to RoundPoint often in the form of “soft-dollar” or other credits. The
ceded premiums are nothing more than a kickback and a method for RoundPoint to profit from the
forced placement of new coverage. Indeed, while RoundPoint’s affiliates purportedly provided
reinsurance, they did not assume any real risk.
54. The amounts charged to borrowers are also inflated by the interest that accrues on
the amounts owed for force-placed coverage. When RoundPoint adds the cost of the high-price
force-placed insurance to a homeowner’s mortgage balance, it thereby increases the interest paid
over the life of the loan by the homeowner to the lender.
55. The actions and practices described above are unconscionable and undertaken in
bad faith with the sole objective to maximize Defendants’ profits at the expense of Plaintiff and
the other Class members. Borrowers who for whatever reason have stopped paying for insurance
or are under-insured on mortgaged property, are charged inflated and illegitimate noncompetitive
amounts for force-placed insurance. These charges are inflated to finance undisclosed kickbacks
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to RoundPoint or its affiliates (who, as described above, perform little, if any, work related to the
forced placement of the individual policies), as well as the cost of captive reinsurance
arrangements and the provision of below-cost mortgage servicing functions.
56. Borrowers have no say in the selection of the force-placed insurance carrier or the
terms of the force-placed insurance policies and have no ability to seek out and purchase their own
force-placed insurance policy. Force-placed policies are commercial insurance policies intended
to be sold to lenders and servicers and their terms are determined by the lender and/or servicer,
here, RoundPoint and the FPI providers, here, Great American. Further, it is RoundPoint and not
the borrower that is the Named Insured on the force-placed policies.
57. Plaintiff does not challenge RoundPoint’s right to force place insurance in the first
instance. He challenges the discretion afforded mortgage lenders and servicers in purchasing
force-placed insurance, as well as Defendants’ manipulation of the force-placed insurance market
whereby Great American and Loan Protector provide kickbacks to RoundPoint to keep the
exclusive arrangement in place. These kickbacks provide an effective rebate to RoundPoint on the
purchase of the force-placed insurance that RoundPoint does not pass on to the borrower.
Servicers, like RoundPoint, are financially motivated to select the insurer, like Great American,
that offers the best financial benefit in the terms of “commissions,” “expense reimbursements,”
direct payments, discounted mortgage servicing, or debt forgiveness.
58. This action is brought to put an end to Defendants’ exclusive, collusive, and
uncompetitive arrangements, and to recover for Plaintiff the excess amounts charged to him
beyond the true cost of insurance coverage. Plaintiff seeks to recover the improper charges passed
on to him and other RoundPoint borrowers nationwide through his claims for breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and violations of
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the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), TILA, and RICO.
Plaintiff Austin Belanger
59. Plaintiff Belanger is a Senior Airman in the United States Airforce.
60. Senior Airman Belanger took a mortgage loan from Prime Lending in April, 2015,
secured by a mortgage on real property at 210 Ortega St, Navarre, Florida 32566. At all times
relevant to the allegations herein, Senior Airman Belanger’s mortgage loan was owned and/or
serviced by RoundPoint.
61. Senior Airman Belanger’s mortgage provides as follows:
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing
or hereafter erected on the Property insured against loss by fire, hazards
included within the term “extended coverage,” and any other hazards including,
but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance.
This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels)
and for the periods that Lender requires.
* * * *
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may
obtain insurance coverage, at Lender’s option and Borrower’s expense. Lender
is under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount of coverage.
Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect
Borrower, Borrower’s equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property,
against any risk, hazard or liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage
that was previously in effect. Borrower acknowledges that the cost of the
insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed the cost of insurance
that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by Lender under
this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security
Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of
disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender
to Borrower requesting payment.
* * * *
9. Protection of Lender’s Interest in the Property and Rights Under this
Security Instrument. If (a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and
agreements contained in this Security Instrument . . . then Lender may do and
pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender’s interest in the
Property and rights under this Security Instrument[.]
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* * * *
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional
debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear
interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable,
with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.
Mr. Belanger’s mortgage is attached here as Exhibit A.
62. Upon purchasing his property, Senior Airman Belanger also obtained a voluntary
insurance policy from GulfStream Insurance Company with an annual premium of $1,138.00.
63. However, while Senior Airman Belanger was deployed in Kuwait, GulfStream
cancelled the policy because it had questions about the Plaintiff’s dog. Senior Airman Belanger
was unaware of the cancellation as he was deployed overseas.
64. Pursuant to the automated procedures in place, on March 22, 2016, a letter
purporting to come from RoundPoint was sent to Senior Airman Belanger informing him that
RoundPoint “plan[ed] to buy insurance for [his] property.” The letter stated that he “must pay us
for any period during which the insurance we buy is in effect but you do not have insurance.”
65. Pursuant to the automated procedures in place, on April 21, 2016, a second letter
purporting to come from RoundPoint was sent to Mr. Belanger informing him that RoundPoint
“plan[ed] to buy insurance for [his] property.” The letter stated that he “must pay us for any period
during which the insurance we buy is in effect but you do not have insurance.” Further, the letter
stated that the “insurance we buy: is estimated to cost $4,836.30.”
66. Pursuant to the automated procedures in place, on June 20, 2016, a third letter
purporting to come from RoundPoint was sent informing Plaintiff Belanger that Roundpoint
“bought insurance on your property and added the cost to your mortgage loan account.” However,
because Defendants backdated the policy over 8 months to begin on August 3, 2015 and expire on
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August 3, 2016, a second force placed policy was forthcoming. The annual premium of the current
policy was $4,836.30, and Defendants intended to renew the policy at the same price.
67. Pursuant to the automated procedures in place, on July 5, 2016, a letter identical to
the one sent on June 20, 2016 was sent.
68. The letters did not disclose any aspect of the secret and illegal compensation
arrangement entered into by Great American, Loan Protector, and RoundPoint, or inform Senior
Airman Belanger that he would be charged illegitimate amounts beyond what RoundPoint actually
paid for the cost of coverage. Nor did the letters disclose to Senior Airman Belanger that the
amounts being charged to him would be inflated to subsidize the cost of Loan Protector or Great
American performing mortgage servicing functions for RoundPoint that have little or nothing to
do with the provision of the force-placed insurance.
69. The communications to Senior Airman Belanger were false and misleading.
RoundPoint represented in the letters that it was charging him the amounts paid for the “cost” of
the insurance. However, the charges imposed on Senior Airman Belanger did not reflect
RoundPoint’s true cost of coverage because RoundPoint was receiving an effective rebate on the
force-placed insurance through the kickback scheme described above. RoundPoint, therefore, paid
less for coverage than it represented to and charged Senior Airman Belanger and the Class
members.
70. The communications to Senior Airman Belanger were also misleading in that they
represented that RoundPoint would “buy” or had “bought” or “purchased” the individual insurance
for Senior Airman Belanger’s property when an exclusive arrangement and master policy was
already in place with Great American, and RoundPoint did not in fact, perform any additional work
to procure coverage for Senior Airman Belanger’s property.
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71. It was never disclosed to Senior Airman Belanger or to the putative Class members
that because of RoundPoint’s kickback scheme, RoundPoint would be receiving a rebate and
effectively be paying less for the force-placed insurance coverage than it would charge Senior
Airman Belanger and the putative class. Nor was it disclosed to Senior Airman Belanger or the
Class members that the amounts charged to them covered other illegitimate kickbacks and below
cost mortgage servicing functions not properly charged to them.
72. Plaintiff Belanger was able to obtain a private insurance policy with an effective
date of July 18, 2016, and the lender placed policy was cancelled effective of that date.
73. Plaintiff Belanger paid the charges for the force-placed insurance.
74. There were no material differences between RoundPoint’s actions and practices
directed to Plaintiff Belanger and its actions and practices directed to the Class.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
A. Class Definitions
75. Plaintiff brings this action against RoundPoint pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated. Plaintiff
seeks to represent the following two classes:
(1) Nationwide class:
All borrowers who, within the applicable statutes of limitation, were
charged for a force-placed hazard or flood insurance policy through
RoundPoint or its affiliates, entities, or subsidiaries. Excluded from this
class are Defendants, their affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, board
members, directors, officers, and/or employees.
(2) Florida Subclass with Mr. Belanger as the Class Representative:
All Florida borrowers who, within the applicable statutes of limitation,
were charged for a force-placed hazard or flood insurance policy through
RoundPoint or its affiliates, entities, or subsidiaries. Excluded from this
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class are Defendants, their affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, board
members, directors, officers, and/or employees
76. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed
Classes before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate.
77. Defendants subjected Plaintiff and the respective Class members to the same unfair,
unlawful, and deceptive practices and harmed them in the same manner.
B. Numerosity
78. The proposed classes are so numerous that joinder of all members would be
impracticable. Defendants sell and service hundreds of thousands of mortgage loans and insurance
policies in the State of Florida, and nationwide. The individual Class members are ascertainable,
as the names and addresses of all Class members can be identified in the business records
maintained by Defendants. The precise number of Class members number at least in the thousands
and can only be obtained through discovery, but the numbers are clearly more than can be
consolidated in one complaint such that it would be impractical for each member to bring suit
individually. Plaintiff does not anticipate any difficulties in the management of the action as a
class action.
C. Commonality
79. There are questions of law and fact that are common to Plaintiff’s and Class
members’ claims. These common questions predominate over any questions that go particularly
to any individual member of the Classes. Among such common questions of law and fact are the
following:
a. Whether RoundPoint breached its mortgage contracts with Plaintiff and the
Class by selecting higher priced force-placed insurance policies in order to
receive illegal kickbacks (in the form of unwarranted commissions, expense
reimbursements, below-cost mortgage servicing, or reinsurance payments) and
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by charging the higher cost to Plaintiff and the Class members;
b. Whether RoundPoint breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by entering into exclusive arrangements with selected FPI insurers
and/or their affiliates, which resulted in inflated amounts being charged to
Plaintiff and the Class members;
c. Whether RoundPoint manipulated the force-placed insurance procurement
process in order to maximize its profits to the detriment of Plaintiff and the
Class members;
d. Whether RoundPoint or its affiliates performed any work or services in
exchange for the “commissions” or other forms of kickbacks it collected;
e. Whether the “expense reimbursements” received by RoundPoint are for true
expenses or are just kickbacks pursuant to its exclusive relationship with Loan
Protector and Great American;
f. Whether RoundPoint’s charges are inflated to compensate for mortgage
servicing activities that Loan Protector and/or Great American and its affiliates
provide to RoundPoint, and which are not chargeable to Plaintiff and the Class
members under the terms of their mortgages;
g. Whether the charges are inflated to include the cost of an unlawful captive
reinsurance arrangement;
h. Whether RoundPoint employed an unconscionable commercial practice,
misrepresentation, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the
knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with
content that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission by
their arrangement, which incentivizes RoundPoint to charge inflated
and unnecessary fees for force-placed insurance, and therefore violates
FDUTPA;
i. Whether an objective consumer would be deceived by RoundPoint’s FPI
arrangement, whereby RoundPoint pays a reduced amount for FPI but charges
its borrowers an inflated amount to cover the kickbacks it receives while
representing that it is only charging the cost of insurance coverage, and
therefore violates FDUTPA;
j. Whether there was actually a transfer of risk under Defendants’ purported
reinsurance arrangement;
k. Whether Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff
and the Class;
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l. Whether RoundPoint violated TILA by failing to disclose kickbacks charged
to Plaintiff and the Class members in their mortgages;
m. Whether Great American and Loan Protector intentionally and unjustifiably
interfered with Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ rights under the mortgage
contracts by paying kickbacks and providing free or below-cost mortgage
servicing functions to RoundPoint or its affiliates thereby inducing a breach of
the contract;
n. Whether Defendants were associated with the enterprise and agreed and
conspired to violate the federal RICO statutes; and
o. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to damages and/or
injunctive relief as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
D. Typicality
80. Plaintiff is a member of the Classes he seeks to represent. Plaintiff’s claims are
typical of the respective classes’ claims because of the similarity, uniformity, and common purpose
of Defendants’ unlawful conduct. Each Class member has sustained, and will continue to sustain,
damages in the same manner as Plaintiff as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct.
E. Adequacy of Representation
81. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes he seeks to represent and will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous
prosecution of this action and has retained competent counsel, experienced in litigation of this
nature, to represent him. There is no hostility between Plaintiff and the unnamed Class members.
Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a Class action.
82. To prosecute this case, Plaintiff has chosen the undersigned law firms, which are
very experienced in class action litigation and have the financial and legal resources to meet the
substantial costs and legal issues associated with this type of litigation.
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F. Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)
83. The questions of law or fact common to Plaintiff’s and each Class member’s claims
predominate over any questions of law or fact affecting only individual members of the class. All
claims by Plaintiff and the unnamed Class members are based on the force-placed insurance
policies that RoundPoint unlawfully imposed and its deceptive and egregious actions involved in
imposing the charges for the force-placed policies.
84. Common issues predominate when, as here, liability can be determined on a class-
wide basis, even when there will be some individualized damages determinations.
85. As a result, when determining whether common questions predominate, courts
focus on the liability issue, and if the liability issue is common to the class as is in the case at bar,
common questions will be held to predominate over individual questions.
G. Superiority
86. A class action is superior to individual actions in part because of the non-
exhaustive factors listed below:
(a) Joinder of all Class members would create extreme hardship and inconvenience for
the affected customers as they reside all across the country;
(b) Individual claims by Class members are impractical because the costs to pursue
individual claims exceed the value of what any one Class member has at stake. As a
result, individual Class members have no interest in prosecuting and controlling
separate actions;
(c) There are no known individual Class members who are interested in individually
controlling the prosecution of separate actions;
(d) The interests of justice will be well served by resolving the common disputes of
potential Class members in one forum;
(e) Individual suits would not be cost effective or economically maintainable as
individual actions; and
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(f) The action is manageable as a class action.
H. Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) & (2)
87. Prosecuting separate actions by or against individual Class members would create
a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class.
88. RoundPoint has acted or failed to act in a manner generally applicable to the
Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the Classes as a whole.
COUNT I
BREACH OF CONTRACT
(against RoundPoint)
89. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein
and further alleges as follows.
90. Plaintiff and all similarly situated Class members have mortgages that were owned
and/or serviced by RoundPoint.
91. Plaintiff’s and these Class members’ mortgages are written on uniform mortgage
forms and contain substantially similar provisions regarding force-placed insurance requirements
and its placement by RoundPoint. The force-placed provisions from Plaintiff’s mortgage are set
forth above and true and correct copies of the mortgage agreements are attached to this complaint
as Exhibit A.
92. Plaintiff’s mortgage requires that he maintain insurance on his property and
provides that if he should fail to do so, RoundPoint might obtain insurance coverage to protect its
interest in the property, “force place” the coverage, and charge the borrower the “cost of the
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insurance coverage.” Plaintiff’s mortgage further provides that RoundPoint may do and pay for
whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect its interest in the property and rights under the
mortgage agreement, including protecting and/or assessing the value of the property and securing
and/or repairing the property.
93. RoundPoint charges borrowers amounts for force-placed insurance that are more
than the actual amount it pays for the coverage because the charges include unearned
“commissions” or “expense reimbursements” and other kickbacks, as well as subsidies for below-
cost mortgage servicing functions that have little or nothing to do with the placement of force-
placed insurance. These costs are not costs of coverage, and are not applied to protecting
RoundPoint’s rights or risk in the collateral for borrowers’ mortgage loans. They are simply bribes
to keep the exclusive relationship in place.
94. Through the kickbacks it receives, RoundPoint pays less for force-placed coverage
than it charges to Plaintiff and other Class members.
95. RoundPoint breached the mortgage agreements by, among other things, charging
Plaintiff and absent class members the amounts beyond the actual cost of coverage and more than
what was reasonable or appropriate to protect its interest in the property.
96. Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered damages as a result of RoundPoint’s
breach of contract.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated Class members,
seeks compensatory damages resulting from RoundPoint’s breach of contract, as well as injunctive
relief preventing it from further violating the terms of the mortgages. Plaintiff further seeks all
relief deemed appropriate by this Court, including attorneys’ fees and costs.
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COUNT II
BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
(against RoundPoint)
97. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein
and further alleges as follows.
98. A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract and imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance. Common law calls for
substantial compliance with the spirit, not just the letter, of a contract in its performance.
99. Where an agreement affords one party the power to make a discretionary decision
without defined standards, the duty to act in good faith limits that party’s ability to act capriciously
to contravene the reasonable contractual expectations of the other party.
100. Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ mortgage contracts allow RoundPoint to force-
place insurance coverage on borrowers in the event of a lapse in coverage, but do not define
standards for selecting an insurer or procuring an insurance policy.
101. RoundPoint was afforded substantial discretion in force-placing insurance
coverage. It was permitted to unilaterally choose the company from which it purchased force-
placed insurance and negotiate the price of the coverage it procured without restriction.
RoundPoint had an obligation to exercise its discretion in good faith, and not capriciously or in
bad faith.
102. The purpose of the mortgage clause allowing a servicer, like RoundPoint, to force
place insurance is to protect the servicer’s interest in the property that is collateral for the mortgage
loan. RoundPoint breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by making
additional profits at Plaintiff’s expense through force-placing insurance on the property and
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receiving kickbacks on that insurance that bore no relation to protecting its interest in the property.
103. RoundPoint further breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by, among other things:
(a) Manipulating the force-placed insurance market by selecting insurers that
will artificially inflate premiums to include kickbacks to RoundPoint not
necessary to cover RoundPoint’s risk;
(b) Exercising its discretion to choose an insurance policy in bad faith and in
contravention of the parties’ reasonable expectations, by purposefully selecting
force-placed insurance policies with artificially inflated premiums to maximize
RoundPoint’s own profits;
(c) Assessing inflated and unnecessary charges against Plaintiff and the Classes
which RoundPoint attributes to the cost of the insurance coverage;
(d) Receiving an effective rebate on the force-placed insurance through the
kickback scheme but not passing on that rebate to the borrowers, thereby
creating the incentive to seek the highest-priced premiums possible;
(e) Charging Plaintiff and the Classes for “commissions” or “expense
reimbursements” when the insurance is prearranged and no commission is
earned or due and no expenses are incurred in placing the certificate of insurance;
(f) Charging Plaintiff and the Classes the cost of having Loan Protector and
Great American perform its obligation of servicing its entire mortgage portfolio,
which is not properly chargeable to Plaintiff or the Classes;
(g) Force-placing insurance coverage that is duplicative of existing coverage, or
in excess of what is required by borrowers’ mortgage agreements;
(h) Seeking out a force-placed insurance insurer that will provide it the best deal
in terms kickbacks and below-cost mortgage servicing functions with the
knowledge that these functions will be subsidized by the amounts paid for force-
placed insurance;
(i) Force-placing insurance coverage in excess of that required to cover its
interest in the property; and
(j) Charging Plaintiff and the Classes an inflated charge for the force-placed
insurance due to the captive reinsurance arrangement.
104. As a direct, proximate, and legal result of the aforementioned breaches of the
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated Class members,
seeks a judicial declaration that RoundPoint’s conduct described above and the amounts charged
to borrowers are in contravention of RoundPoint’s duties of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff
also seeks compensatory damages resulting from RoundPoint’s breaches of its duties. Plaintiff
further seeks all relief deemed appropriate by this Court, including attorneys’ fees and costs.
COUNT III
VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA DECEPTIVE
AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT
(Plaintiff Belanger on behalf of the Florida Subclass against RoundPoint)
105. Plaintiff Belanger re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully set
forth herein and further alleges as follows.
106. FDUTPA, section 501.201, et seq., Florida Statutes, prohibits “unfair methods of
competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.” § 501.204, Fla. Stat.
107. Plaintiff Belanger and the Florida Subclass are “consumers” as that term is defined
in section 501.203(7), Florida Statutes.
108. RoundPoint has engaged in, and continues to engage in, unconscionable acts or
practices and has engaged in unfair or deceptive acts in the conduct of its trade and/or commerce
in the State of Florida.
109. The policies, acts, and practices alleged herein were intended to result and did result
in the payment of inflated charges for force-placed insurance by Plaintiff and the Florida Subclass,
which in turn were intended to generate unlawful or unfair compensation for RoundPoint.
110. Specifically, RoundPoint had an exclusive relationship with Loan Protector and
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Great American, whereby it would pay unreasonable and inflated premiums for force-placed
insurance policies, charge that amount to Plaintiff and the Florida Subclass, and then receive
compensation through kickbacks, discounted mortgage services, or captive reinsurance
arrangements that resulted in an effective rebate for RoundPoint that was never passed on to
Plaintiff and the Florida Class members.
111. RoundPoint’s conduct of charging inflated amounts for the force-placed coverage
to Plaintiff Belanger and members of the Florida Subclass violates FDUTPA and was conceived,
devised, planned, implemented, approved, and executed within the State of Florida, which has an
interest in prohibiting violations of FDUTPA.
112. RoundPoint is not a bank or savings and loan association regulated by the Florida
Office of Financial Regulation of the Financial Services Commission. Further, it is not a bank or
savings and loan association regulated by federal agencies.
113. Plaintiff Belanger and the Florida Subclass have sustained actual damages in the
form of as a direct and proximate result of RoundPoint’s unfair and unconscionable practices.
Section 501.211(2), Florida Statutes, provides Plaintiff and the Florida Subclass a private right of
action against these Defendants and entitles them to recover their actual damages, plus attorneys’
fees and costs.
114. Plaintiff and the Florida Subclass have suffered and will continue to suffer
irreparable harm if RoundPoint continues to engage in such deceptive, unfair, and unreasonable
practices.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Belanger, on behalf of himself and the Florida Subclass,
demands judgment against RoundPoint for compensatory damages, pre- and post-judgment
interest, attorneys’ fees, injunctive and declaratory relief, costs incurred in bringing this action,
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and any other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT IV
UNJUST ENRICHMENT6
115. Plaintiff Belanger re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully set
forth herein and further alleges as follows.
116. RoundPoint receives a rebate on the cost of the force-placed insurance coverage
but does not pass that rebate on to its borrowers. The rebates are provided to RoundPoint in the
form of unwarranted kickbacks, including “expense reimbursements” or “commissions,” captive
reinsurance arrangements, and free or below-cost mortgage servicing functions. These benefits to
RoundPoint are paid through the amounts charged to Plaintiff and the Class members for force-
placed insurance.
117. RoundPoint entered into an agreement whereby the insurance vendors – Great
American and Loan Protector – would provide below cost mortgage servicing activities and cover
RoundPoint’s entire portfolio of loans with a master policy and issue certificates of insurance when
a borrower’s voluntary policy lapsed. RoundPoint would then charge Plaintiff and the Class
amounts for the force-placed insurance that had been artificially inflated to include the kickbacks
described above and then retain the amounts of those kickbacks for itself. The force-placed
policies imposed on borrowers therefore cost less than what RoundPoint had actually paid for
them.
118. Commissions or kickbacks were paid directly to RoundPoint or its affiliates in order
to be able to exclusively provide force-placed insurance policies. Great American and Loan
6 Plaintiff pleads his unjust enrichment claim against RoundPoint in the alternative to his
contractual claims against it.
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Protector were mere conduits for the delivery of the kickbacks and improper rebates to RoundPoint
or its affiliates.
119. These payments directly benefitted RoundPoint and were taken to the detriment of
the borrower. The kickbacks (in the form of expense reimbursements, commissions, or
reinsurance arrangements, as well as subsidized mortgage servicing functions) were subsumed into
the charges to borrowers for the force-placed insurance and ultimately paid by them. Therefore,
RoundPoint had the incentive to seek out unreasonably inflated prices for the force-placed
insurance and charge the inflated amounts to borrowers.
120. Further, RoundPoint was unjustly enriched through financial benefits in the form
of increased interest income when the amounts for the force-placed insurance policies were added
to the Class members’ mortgage loans.
121. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class members have conferred a benefit on
RoundPoint.
122. RoundPoint had knowledge of this benefit and voluntarily accepted and retained
the benefit conferred on it.
123. Had Plaintiff known the true facts behind RoundPoint’s force-placed insurance
scheme, that the charges from RoundPoint included the kickbacks described above, and that
RoundPoint was receiving an effective rebate on the charges but not passing on that rebate to him,
he would have expected remuneration from RoundPoint.
124. RoundPoint will be unjustly enriched if it is allowed to retain the aforementioned
benefits, and each Class member is entitled to recover the amount by which RoundPoint was
unjustly enriched at his or her expense.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated Class members,
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demands an award against RoundPoint in the amounts by which it has been unjustly enriched at
Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ expense, and such other relief as this Court deems just and
proper.
COUNT V
VIOLATIONS OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.
(against RoundPoint)
125. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein
and further alleges as follows.
126. Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ mortgages were consumer credit plans secured
by their principal dwellings, and were subject to the disclosure requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C.§ 1601, et seq., and all related regulations, commentary, and
interpretive guidance promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board.
127. RoundPoint is a “creditor” as defined by TILA because it owned or serviced
Plaintiff’s mortgages and changed the terms of the mortgage so as to create a new mortgage
obligation, of which RoundPoint was the creditor.
128. Pursuant to TILA, RoundPoint was required to accurately and fully disclose the
terms of the legal obligations between the parties. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(c).
129. RoundPoint violated TILA, specifically 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(c), when it: (i) added
force-placed insurance charges to Plaintiff’s mortgage obligations and failed to provide new
disclosures; and (ii) failed at all times to disclose the amount and nature of the kickback,
reinsurance, discount loan servicing, and/or other profiteering involving RoundPoint and/or its
affiliates as a result of the purchase of force-placed insurance.
130. When RoundPoint changed the terms of Plaintiff’s mortgage to allow previously
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unauthorized kickbacks and insurance amounts in excess of its interests in the property, it changed
the finance charge and the total amount of indebtedness, extended new and additional credit
through force-placed insurance charges, and thus created a new debt obligation. Under TILA,
RoundPoint was then required to provide a new set of disclosures showing the amount of the
insurance charges (i.e. finance charges) and all components thereof. On information and belief,
to the extent a borrower cannot pay the expense up front, RoundPoint increases the principal
amount under Plaintiff’s and Class Member’s mortgages when it force-places the insurance, which
was a new debt obligation for which new disclosures were required.
131. RoundPoint adversely changed the terms of Plaintiff’s loans after origination in
order to allow a kickback on the force-placed insurance charges. These kickbacks are not
authorized in the mortgage in any clear and unambiguous way. RoundPoint never disclosed to
borrowers the amount of the “commissions,” “expense reimbursements,” or other unearned profits
paid to it or its affiliates.
132. RoundPoint also violated TILA by adversely changing the terms of Plaintiff’s loan
after origination by requiring and threatening to force-place more insurance than necessary to
protect its interest in the property securing the mortgages.
133. Acts constituting violations of TILA occurred within one year prior to the filing of
the original Complaint in this action, or are subject to equitable tolling because RoundPoint’s
kickbacks, reinsurance, and other unearned revenue-generating scheme was the subject of secret
agreements among it and its affiliates and was concealed from borrowers.
134. Plaintiff and Class members have been injured and have suffered a monetary loss
arising from RoundPoint’s violations of TILA.
135. As a result of RoundPoint’s TILA violations, Plaintiff and Class members are
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entitled to recover actual damages and a penalty of $500,000.00 or 1% of RoundPoint’s net worth,
as provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)-(2).
136. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to recovery of attorneys’ fees and
costs to be paid by RoundPoint, as provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all Class members similarly situated,
seeks a judgment in his favor against RoundPoint awarding actual damages and a penalty of
$500,000.00 or 1% of RoundPoint’s net worth, as provided by 15 U.S.C. §1640(a)(1)-(2), as well
as of attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by RoundPoint, as provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3).
COUNT VI
Violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
(against all Defendants)
137. Plaintiff Belanger re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully set
forth herein and further alleges as follows.
138. At all relevant times, Defendants employed by and associated with an illegal
enterprise, and conducted and participated in that enterprise’s affairs, through a pattern of
racketeering activity consisting of numerous and repeated uses of the interstate mails and wire
communications to execute a scheme to defraud, all in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
139. The RICO enterprise which engaged in and the activities of which affected
interstate and foreign commerce, was comprised of an association in fact of entities and individuals
that included RoundPoint, Great American, Loan Protector and their affiliates.
140. The members of the RICO enterprise had a common purpose: to increase and
maximize their revenues by forcing Plaintiff and Class members to pay inflated amounts for force-
placed insurance through a scheme that inflated such amounts to cover kickbacks and expenses
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associated with servicing RoundPoint’s entire loan portfolio, and concealing from Plaintiff and
Class members the true nature of those charges. Defendants shared the bounty of their enterprise
by sharing the illegal profits generated by the joint scheme.
141. The RICO enterprise functioned over a period of years as a continuing unit and
maintained an ascertainable structure separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity.
142. RoundPoint, Loan Protector, and Great American conducted and participated in the
affairs of this RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity that projects into the
future, lasted more than one year, and consisted of numerous and repeated violations of federal
mail and wire fraud statutes which prohibit the use of any interstate or foreign wire or mail facility
for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.
143. RoundPoint, along with Loan Protector and Great American, directed and
controlled the enterprise as follows:
a. RoundPoint, Great American, and Loan Protector specifically developed and
implemented guidelines and standards for the timing and content of the cycle of
deceptive letters sent to borrowers about force-placed insurance, to which
RoundPoint agreed;
b. Great American, Loan Protector, and RoundPoint drafted the language of the
fraudulent letters and correspondence to borrowers that was specifically designed
to deceive borrowers into believing that they were coming from RoundPoint. The
letters fraudulently misrepresented the true “cost” of the insurance forced on their
properties, and these letters were approved by RoundPoint prior to being mailed to
class members;
c. Great American and Loan Protector ran the day-to-day operations of the force-
placed scheme by, inter alia, tracking RoundPoint’s portfolio, mailing a cycle of
form letters to borrowers notifying them that insurance coverage would be forced,
and misrepresenting to borrowers both that they would be charged only the costs of
coverage and that an agency would be paid a fee as compensation for securing an
individual policy;
d. RoundPoint received kickbacks and below-cost mortgage servicing functions from
Loan Protector and Great American to maintain the exclusive relationship and keep
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their force-placed scheme moving forward;
e. by directing, controlling, and creating an enterprise and arrangement by which
RoundPoint would receive unearned kickbacks;
f. by directing, controlling, and creating an enterprise and arrangement by which
RoundPoint would receive illegitimate revenues (ultimately charged to borrowers)
in the form of direct payments, reinsurance, expense reimbursements, or credits that
were merely bribes to keep the exclusive relationship and not disclosing same to
borrowers;
g. by directing, controlling, and creating an enterprise and program by which
RoundPoint received rebates on the cost of the insurance but never charged the
borrowers its actual or effective cost to procure the lender placed policies;
h. by designing and directing an exclusive arrangement by which RoundPoint
manipulated the force-placed insurance market in order to artificially inflate the
amounts it charged to borrowers for force-placed insurance. The charges were
inflated to provide RoundPoint with kickbacks disguised as “commissions” or
expense reimbursements, or to cover the cost of discounted mortgage servicing,
and/or to provide RoundPoint with lucrative debt forgiveness or reinsurance
payments. Great American and Loan Protector benefited by securing business from
RoundPoint—they provide kickbacks to RoundPoint at the expense of the
borrowers who are charged the inflated charges;
i. by developing and implementing guidelines and criteria to determine when force-
placed insurance is placed on a borrower’s home, in what amount, for what
coverages and for what period of time—all of which resulted in inferior and more
expensive insurance that covered time periods where no claims were made and/or
resulted in “double coverage;” and
j. by developing and implementing an automated system to send the cycle of
deceptive letters to borrowers, to determine the type, time period and amount of
substandard and unnecessary coverage, and to remove or charge borrowers’ escrow
accounts automatically for improper and inflated charges.
144. In order to further their control and direction of the enterprise, Great American and
Loan Protector paid bribes and kickbacks in the form of unearned commissions, direct payments,
expense reimbursements, reinsurance payments, and below cost mortgage servicing.
145. As part of and in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, Defendants made numerous
material omissions and misrepresentations to Plaintiff and Class members with the intent to
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defraud and deceive Plaintiff and Class members.
146. For example, Great American and Loan Protector, with the approval of
RoundPoint, sent form letters to Plaintiff on RoundPoint letterhead through the U.S. Mail, stating
that RoundPoint would purchase force-placed coverage if voluntary insurance was not secured by
a certain date. Specifically, to Plaintiff, it was represented in the letters that RoundPoint would
“buy” the required coverage that would cost Plaintiff Belanger $4,836.30. In making these
statements, Defendants knowingly and intentionally falsely stated that the amounts for force-
placed insurance that Plaintiff was charged represented the actual cost of the policies, when in fact
RoundPoint paid less for the insurance due to the inclusion of the kickbacks and other costs paid
as bribes to RoundPoint that resulted in an effective rebate. Defendants engaged in similar conduct
as to all class members.
147. Defendants also knowingly and intentionally fostered the mistaken impression that
RoundPoint was actively obtaining a policy for the borrower when in fact no work was done and
no expenses were incurred by RoundPoint or its affiliates because a master policy was already in
place and the force-placed insurance was issued pursuant to the automated procedures in place.
148. None of the letters sent to Plaintiff disclosed the financial arrangement between the
Defendants.
149. Defendants had a duty to correct these misstatements and mistaken impressions.
These misrepresentations and omissions were material, as they helped Defendants advance their
scheme to charge Plaintiff unreasonably high amounts for force-placed insurance and were
designed to lull Plaintiff and the Class into believing that the charges were legitimate.
150. Plaintiff and the other homeowners would not have paid, or would have contested
these specific charges had RoundPoint disclosed that the illegal bribes and kickbacks were
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included and that RoundPoint was effectively paying less for the force-placed insurance than what
it charged to Plaintiff and the Class members. Letters such as these were sent to Plaintiff Belanger
on March 22, 2016, April 21, 2016, June 20, 2016, and July 5, 2016.
151. Great American and Loan Protector, with the approval of RoundPoint, also sent
form letters to Plaintiff and the Class members informing them that force-placed insurance had
been purchased. The letters represented that RoundPoint would add the cost to Plaintiff’s
mortgage loan account. Thus, Defendants knowingly and intentionally fostered the mistaken
impression that the amounts for force-placed insurance that Plaintiff and Class Members were
charged represented the true cost of the force-placed coverage. In fact, the amount charged to
Plaintiff was less than what RoundPoint actually paid for the insurance coverage because it
included “commissions,” reinsurance profits, direct payments, “expense reimbursements,” below-
cost administrative services and other compensation returned to RoundPoint but not passed on to
Plaintiff or the borrowers. Letters such as these were sent to Plaintiff Belanger on March 22, 2016,
April 21, 2016, June 20, 2016, and July 5, 2016.
152. The omission was material, as it gave Defendants a colorable reason to charge
Plaintiff unreasonably inflated amounts for insurance and would have influenced Plaintiff’s
decision to pay the charges or contest them. Plaintiff would not have paid or would have contested
the charges for force-placed insurance had he known that the amounts charged to him were more
than what RoundPoint paid for the insurance or included kickbacks to RoundPoint. Letters such
as these were sent to Plaintiff Belanger March 22, 2016, April 21, 2016, June 20, 2016, and July
5, 2016.
153. For the purpose of executing the scheme to defraud, Defendants sent, mailed, and
transmitted, or caused to be sent, mailed, or transmitted, in interstate or foreign commerce
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numerous materials, including but not limited to the notices and letters described above informing
Plaintiff and Class members that they could charge Plaintiff and Class members unreasonably high
amounts for force-placed insurance. This scheme to defraud proximately injured Plaintiff and the
Class because it prevented them from making an informed decision regarding whether to dispute
or pay the force-placed charges, or whether to allow new coverage to be placed on their property.
Had they known that the charges had been artificially inflated to include kickbacks and other
improper charges and that they were paying more than what RoundPoint ultimately paid, they
would not have paid them or would have contested them. Defendants also transferred sums among
themselves, including but not limited to “fees,” or “commissions” to Loan Protector to cover the
below-cost mortgage servicing functions it provided in furtherance of their scheme to defraud
Plaintiff and Class members, in violation of the wire fraud statutes.
154. By reason and as a result of Defendants’ conduct and participation in the
racketeering activity alleged herein, Defendants have caused damages to Plaintiff and Class
members in the form of unreasonably high force-placed insurance premiums.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and Class members seek compensatory damages, treble
damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
COUNT VII
Violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(against all Defendants)
155. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above herein as if fully set forth
herein.
156. At all relevant times, Defendants were associated with the enterprise and agreed
and conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Defendants agreed to conduct and participate,
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directly and indirectly, in the conduct and affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
157. RoundPoint, Loan Protector, and Great American illegally agreed to violate RICO,
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), by, inter alia:
Through Loan Protector, agreeing that Great American would be RoundPoint’s
exclusive force-placed insurance providers and would extract unreasonably inflated
amounts from RoundPoint’s customers. RoundPoint also agreed that Great
American and Loan Protector would pay kickbacks to RoundPoint and its affiliates;
Agreeing that Loan Protector and Great American would administer the LPI
program and monitor RoundPoint’s mortgage portfolios for lapses in voluntary
insurance and would, with the approval of RoundPoint, send misleading notices to
borrowers. These misleading notices would inform the borrowers that if new
coverage were not procured, coverage would be force-placed, the borrower would
be charged the “cost” of the insurance”;
Entering into illusory commission, reinsurance, or outsourcing agreements in
order to disguise the true nature of the amounts charged to borrower under the
guise of force-placed insurance; and
Agreeing to commit two or more predicate acts as described above in Count VII.
158. Through “soft-dollar” or other credits, or cash payments RoundPoint affiliates pass
profits from this scheme to RoundPoint.
159. RoundPoint committed and caused to be committed a series of overt acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy and to affect the objects thereof, including but not limited to the acts
set forth above.
160. As a result of Defendants’ violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), Plaintiff and Class
members suffered damages in the form of unreasonably high force-placed insurance charges.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and Class members seek compensatory and treble damages,
and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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COUNT VIII
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP
(against Great American and Loan Protector)
161. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein
and further alleges as follows.
162. Plaintiff and the Class members have advantageous business and contractual
relationships with RoundPoint pursuant to the mortgage contracts. Plaintiff and the Class
members have legal rights under these mortgage contracts. For example, Plaintiff and the Class
members have a right not to be charged exorbitant amounts attributed to force-placed insurance in
bad faith.
163. Great American and Loan Protector had knowledge of the mortgage contracts and
the advantageous business and contractual relationships between Plaintiff and the Classes and
RoundPoint. Great American and Loan Protector were not parties to the mortgage contracts, nor
were they third-party beneficiaries of the mortgage contracts. Further, Great American and Loan
Protector did not have any beneficial or economic interest in the mortgage contracts.
164. Great American and Loan Protector intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with
Plaintiff’s and the Classes’ rights under the mortgage contracts, as described above, by, inter alia,
entering into an exclusive relationship with RoundPoint and/or its affiliates, whereby Loan
Protector provided RoundPoint with below-cost mortgage servicing functions and Great American
provided kickbacks in the form of “commissions” or “expense reimbursements,” or ceded
reinsurance premiums, among other things, which are purposefully and knowingly charged to
Plaintiff and the Class members, to RoundPoint in exchange for the exclusive right to be the force-
place insurance provider.
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165. As a result of Great American’s and Loan Protector’s interference with Plaintiff’s
and Class members’ mortgage agreements, Defendant RoundPoint breached the express and
implied terms of its mortgage contracts with Plaintiff and the Classes, by using funds that were
designated to pay insurance, taxes, and other items, in order to pay non-designated costs of
Defendants, including kickbacks, reinsurance premiums, and subsidized mortgage servicing
functions (i.e. new loan boarding, loss drafts) that have no relation to the placement of force-placed
insurance.
166. Plaintiff and the Classes have been damaged as a result of Great American’s and
Loan Protector’s interference with their mortgage contracts by being charged bad faith, exorbitant,
and illegal charges in connection with the force-placed insurance in contravention of their rights
under the mortgages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all Class members similarly situated,
seeks a judgment in his favor against Great American and Loan Protector for the actual damages
suffered by him as a result of the tortious interference. Plaintiff also seeks all costs of litigating
this action, including attorneys’ fees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated individuals,
demands judgment against RoundPoint as follows:
1) Declaring this action to be a proper class action maintainable pursuant to Rule 23(a)
and Rule 23(b)(1) and (2), or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and declaring
Plaintiff and his counsel to be representatives of the Classes sought in this complaint;
2) Enjoining Defendants from continuing the acts and practices described above;
3) Awarding damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class members as a result of
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RoundPoint’s breaches of the subject mortgage contracts and the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, together with pre-judgment interest;
4) Finding that RoundPoint has been unjustly enriched and requiring it to refund all
unjust benefits to Plaintiff and the Class, together with pre-judgment interest;
5) Awarding Plaintiff Belanger and the Florida Subclass damages, injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs under FDUTPA;
6) Awarding damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class members as a result of the
Great American’s and Loan Protector’s tortious interference with the mortgage agreement;
7) Awarding Plaintiff and Class members costs and disbursements and reasonable
allowances for the fees of Plaintiff’s and the Classes’ counsel and experts, and reimbursement of
expenses;
8) Awarding actual damages and a penalty of $500,000 or 1% of RoundPoint’s net
worth as provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a)(1)-(2), and attorneys’ fees and costs as provided by 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (a)(3);
9) Awarding compensatory and treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs under
the federal RICO statute; and
10) Awarding such other and further relief the Court deems just and equitable.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff and the Classes request a jury trial for any and all Counts for which a trial by
jury is permitted by law.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of August, 2017.
By: /s/ Adam M. Moskowitz
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Adam M. Moskowitz, Esq.
Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Esq.
Rachel Sullivan, Esq.
Robert J. Neary, Esq.
KOZYAK TROPIN &
THROCKMORTON LLP
2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 9th Floor
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Telephone: (305) 372-1800
Facsimile: (305) 372-3508
Counsel for Plaintiff
Lance A. Harke, Esq.
Sarah Engel, Esq.
Howard M. Bushman, Esq.
HARKE CLASBY & BUSHMAN LLP
9699 NE Second Avenue
Miami Shores, FL 33138
Telephone: (305) 536-8220
Facsimile: (305) 536-8229
Counsel for Plaintiff
Aaron S. Podhurst, Esq.
PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
City National Bank Building
25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800
Miami, FL 33130
Telephone: 305-358-2800
Facsimile: 305-358-2382
Counsel for Plaintiff
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