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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

KEITH STANSELL, CASE NO.: MARC GONSALVES, THOMAS HOWES, JUDITH G. JANIS, CHRISTOPHER T. JANIS, GREER C. JANIS, MICHAEL I. JANIS, JONATHAN N. JANIS, Plaintiffs, vs. CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. Defendant. ________________________________/

COMPLAINT Plaintiffs sue Defendant and allege:

THE ACTION, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION & VENUE

1. This is a civil action for damages arising from acts of international terrorism committed

by Defendant by knowingly providing material support to the REVOLUTIONARY ARMED

FORCES OF COLOMBIA (“FARC”).1

2. This action is brought pursuant to the civil remedies provisions of the Anti-Terrorism

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 which provides:

“(a) Action and jurisdiction.--Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.”

1 Plaintiffs are suing the FARC Defendants in related case number 8:09-cv-2308-RAL-MAP

Case 8:10-cv-00786-SCB-TBM Document 1 Filed 04/05/10 of 82

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3. Plaintiffs seek damages against Defendant for knowingly providing material support to a

known terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2339A and § 2339B.

4. Defendant knowingly provided currency or monetary instruments, weapons (including

arms and ammunition), and other forms of material support and resources and transport of

munitions, to the FARC, a foreign terrorist organization that has killed, maimed, injured,

kidnapped and held hostage thousands of civilians, including many U.S. citizens.

5. Chiquita’s substantial payments and provision of weapons to the FARC supported the

commission of acts of international terrorism, as defined by 18 USC §2331, including the

terrorist acts that killed Thomas Janis and injured the remaining Plaintiffs. Defendant is

therefore civilly liable under 18 U.S.C. §2333 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”) to

Plaintiffs.

6. Defendant knew that FARC was a terrorist organization and that it kidnapped, killed

and terrorized thousands of people in Colombia.

7. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2338, the district courts of the United States have

exclusive jurisdiction over this action and extraterritorial jurisdiction pursuant to 18 USC

§ 2333B(d). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these claims and this action.

No exclusions or limitations under the Anti-Terrorism Act apply here. This Court also

has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the state of incorporation and

principal places of business and residence for Defendant are in a state other than Florida

or Connecticut.


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8. Venue is proper where any Plaintiff resides pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a), therefore

venue is proper in this district because Plaintiffs KEITH STANSELL and THOMAS HOWES

reside in the Middle District of Florida.

9. This action is not subject to the February 20, 2008 Transfer Order issued by the United

States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, In Re: Chiquita Brands International, Inc.

Alien Tort Statute and Shareholders Derivative Litigation. This action does not involve any

claims arising under or related to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. §1350. This action

is not based on Chiquita’s payments to the right wing paramilitary group AUC. The

Shareholders Derivative Litigation portion of the MDL proceedings is now concluded by

settlement. There are two ATA actions in S.D.FL. MDL Case No. 1916 alleging liability

related to Chiquita’s support of the FARC. The Julin v Chiquita ATA action, S.D.FL. Case

No. 08-cv-20641-KAM, was originally filed in the Southern District by the Julin Plaintiffs.

The Pescatore v. Chiquita ATA action, D.C. Case No. 09-cv-00490-RMC, was transferred

from the District of Columbia without opposition from Plaintiff. The Julin and Pescatore

ATA actions involve FARC kidnappings in 1993/1994 with subsequent murders in 1995/1996

and the causation facts at issue in those actions are far different from the instant action.

Chiquita has already admitted the fact of its payments to the FARC in a factual proffer

supporting its guilty plea and the SLC has issued a 268 Report detailing factual findings of its

internal investigation. Finally, issues of causation, damages and setoff are common to issues

in two other related actions previously filed in the Middle District of Florida: Stansell v


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FARC et al, Case No. 09-cv-2308-RAL-MAP, and Stansell et al vs. BGP, Inc. CNPC, et al,

Case No. 09-cv-2501-JSM-AEP.2

THE PLAINTIFFS 10. Plaintiff KEITH STANSELL is a U.S. citizen residing in Manatee County, Florida who

was injured by repeated acts of international terrorism occurring from February 13, 2003 and

continuing through the date of his rescue on July 2, 2008.

11. Plaintiff MARC GONSALVES is a U.S. citizen residing in Connecticut who was

injured by repeated acts of international terrorism occurring from February 13, 2003 and


12. Plaintiff THOMAS HOWES is a U.S. citizen residing in Brevard County, Florida who

was injured by repeated acts of international terrorism occurring from February 13, 2003 and


13. Plaintiff, JUDITH G. JANIS, is a U.S. citizen and resident of Alabama and is the

surviving spouse and personal representative of the Estate of Thomas J. Janis.

14. Plaintiff CHRISTOPHER T. JANIS is a U.S. citizen and resident of New York State

and the surviving son of Thomas J. Janis. Christopher Janis is on active duty with the United

States military.

15. Plaintiff GREER C. JANIS is a U.S. citizen and resident of Virginia and the surviving

daughter of Thomas J. Janis.

2 Plaintiffs have a pending Motion to Transfer Case No. 09-cv-2501 to Judge Lazzara and will be filing a Motion to Transfer this action to Judge Lazzara.


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16. Plaintiff MICHAEL I. JANIS is a U.S. citizen and resident of Alabama and the

surviving son of Thomas J. Janis. Michael Janis is on active duty with the United States

military.

17. Plaintiff, JONATHAN N. JANIS is a U.S. citizen and resident of Orange County

Florida and the surviving son of Thomas J. Janis.

18. At all times material, decedent, Thomas J. Janis was a citizen of the United States. The

FARC murdered Thomas Janis on February 13, 2003 and he is survived by his wife Judith

Janis, and four children: Christopher, Greer, Michael and Jonathan.

DEFENDANT

19. Defendant Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (“Chiquita”) is a multinational

corporation incorporated in New Jersey and with its principal place of business in Cincinnati,

Ohio and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

20. Chiquita is a leading producer and distributor of bananas and other produce

worldwide.

21. In March 1989, Chiquita – then known as United Brands – formed a wholly owned

subsidiary C.I. Bananos de Exportacion, S.A. (“Banadex”), an export company that

consolidated all of Chiquita’s Colombian operating divisions and which was headquartered

in Medellin, Colombia.

22. At all times material hereto, Banadex was Chiquita’s wholly-owned, controlled

subsidiary, agent and/or alter ego which it used to conduct and manage its business

operations in Colombia including over 200 banana production farms operating within

Colombia.


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23. Between 1989 and 1999, and again in 2004, Defendant purposefully and intentionally

provided material support to the FARC when they knew that the FARC was a foreign

terrorist organization and knew of its ongoing international terrorism activities, including the

kidnapping, hostage taking, imprisonment, and murder of U.S. nationals.

24. Defendant had fair warning and knew or should have known that its activities would

subject them to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. for civil liability under the Anti-

Terrorism Act.

25. Defendant has purposefully directed their activities at U.S. citizens residing in this

District and is therefore subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court compatible with fair

play and substantial justice.

26. Defendant is also subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Florida’s long arm

statute, Fla. Stat. §48.193 because defendants engaged in substantial and not isolated business

activities in Florida.

27. Defendant intentionally and purposefully hid and concealed from the public and

Plaintiffs its involvement in its payments and provision of material support to the FARC.

DEFENDANTS’ PURPOSEFUL DIRECTION OF ACTIVITIES AT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES

28. Prior to 1997, the FARC were known terrorists operating in Colombia who engaged

in international terrorism, including premeditated, politically motivated violence, threats of

violence, hostage takings, murders and other terrorist related activities perpetrated against

noncombatant targets including U.S. nationals including directing terrorist activities across

national and international borders in order to influence U.S. and Colombian policy.


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29. On October 8, 1997 the Secretary of State of the United States, designated the FARC

designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO), pursuant to Title 8, United States Code,

Section 1189. The FARC was re-designated on September 5, 2001. At all times material to

this action, the FARC was and is a designated foreign terrorist organization. As a result of

this designation, it is unlawful for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to

provide material support and resources to the FARC. Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)

authorizes the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist

organization . . . if the Secretary finds that (A) the organization is a foreign organization; (B)

the organization engages in terrorist activity . . . ; and (C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of

the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of

the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). On October 8, 1997, the European Union and

Colombian governments also designated FARC as a terrorist organization. The FARC was

also identified by the President of the United States as a significant foreign narcotics

trafficker, or drug kingpin, pursuant to the Kingpin Act on May 29, 2003.

30. On February 13, 2003 Plaintiffs were conducting a counter narcotics surveillance

mission in a U.S registered civilian aircraft (Cessna 208 tail number N1116G) when the

FARC opened fire on the aircraft. Post-crash investigation revealed the FARC had hit the

aircraft with heavy machine gun fire before it had crash landed. Plaintiffs’ aircraft was not a

military aircraft, the aircraft was not equipped with weapons systems and bore no markings

of any U.S. or Colombian military force or organization. Plaintiffs were civilians, non-

military personnel, not part of any armed forces, employed by a U.S. corporation, and were

not a military force of any origin.


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31. FARC members have publicly admitted that the FARC had intentionally fired at the

aircraft to shoot it down, and capture its crew, knowing that it was a U.S. registered aircraft

and U.S. national crew on-board.

32. All five occupants of the plane survived a crash-landing, but were immediately taken

captive by FARC terrorists who quickly located the downed plane. The American pilot,

Thomas Janis was shot and killed by FARC members within minutes of the landing, and his

body were left a short distance from the damaged plane. The Colombian host nation rider,

Sgt. Luis Alcides Cruz, was also shot and killed by FARC members at the same time and

place as Tom Janis. The other three Americans, Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves, and Thomas

Howes were seized by force, taken hostage, and marched into the jungle by FARC members,

where they were held captive for 1,967 days until their rescue July 2, 2008.

33. About two months after the plane crash, on April 27, 2003, the FARC issued a public

communique taking credit for seizing and holding the three Americans hostage. In that

public letter, published to the United States, the FARC offered to release approximately 250

high level Colombian citizens that it was then holding hostage, together with the three

Americans captured on February 13, 2003, in exchange for certain political concessions from

the Colombian government and to illegally influence the policy of the U.S. The FARC

demanded that the Colombian government carve out of its sovereign territory a demilitarized

zone (DMZ), which would be used as a new base of operations for the FARC, and release

hundreds of FARC terrorists currently held by the Colombian authorities, as a condition for

the release of the three American hostages. These terrorist acts were well publicized in media

outlets worldwide.


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34. The FARC publicly demanded, in a form of communication published in the U.S., the

release of two convicted FARC terrorists in the U.S. or the defendants would kill, injure, and

continue to forcible detain the plaintiffs.

35. The foregoing terrorist acts were committed by the terrorist group or organization the

FARC.

FARC TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 36. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – an English translation of the Spanish

name of the group “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (commonly known as

and referred to hereinafter as the “FARC”) – is an armed and violent terrorist organization in

the Republic of Colombia.

37. The FARC is, and has been since its inception in 1964, engaged in terrorist acts

against the government of the Republic of Colombia, which is a constitutional, multi-party

democracy. The FARC seeks to destabilize all levels of the Colombian government by means

of violence, including murders and hostage takings, threats of violence, and other terrorist

related activities. The FARC’s activities throughout Colombia have caused hundreds of

civilian deaths and injuries.

38. The FARC has been strongly anti-American, characterizing American citizens as

“military targets,” it has engaged in violent acts against U.S. nationals in Colombia, including

murders and hostage takings.

The FARC Secretariat and Estado Mayor

39. The FARC is a highly structured terrorist organization with a central command


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structure. At the top of the organization is the Secretariat, the top seven leaders who are the

ultimate decision makers of the FARC. The number and identity of Secretariat members

changes periodically. Members of the Secretariat also have additional responsibilities,

including acting as advisors to different regions of the FARC.

40. The central governing body of the FARC is the Estado Mayor, or general counsel,

which is directly under the Secretariat. It is comprised of the seven members of the

Secretariat, and approximately 20 others. Although the membership of the Estado Mayor

changes, its members are comprised of Bloc Commanders, senior Front Commanders, and

other individuals who have attained leadership positions within the FARC.

41. The Secretariat and Estado Mayor set FARC policies for the entire organization, its

international terrorism activities, including policies related to hostage taking and murder and

the manufacture and distribution of cocaine paste and cocaine. The Secretariat and Estado

Mayor also control distribution of narcotics trafficking and other criminal activity proceeds

amongst and between the various Fronts for payroll, weapons, ammunition, uniforms, chains,

fencing, food, supplies, medicine, medical care, communication equipment and other

expenses of operating a terrorist organization and maintaining hostages and kidnap victims.

The FARC Blocs, Fronts and Mobile Columns 42. The FARC is comprised of approximately 77 Fronts and Mobile Columns

(collectively, "Fronts"). These are designated by number (e.g., the "16th Front") or by name

(such as "Teofilo Forero Castro Mobile Column” (“TFMC”)). The size of each Front varies,

with between several dozen to more than hundreds of FARC members comprising a Front.

43. Front Commanders are typically assisted by one or more Finance Officers, who


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oversee all financial matters for the Front, including material support of terrorist activities,

hostage captivity and maintenance and illegal narcotics manufacturing and distribution.

44. Groups of Fronts and Mobile Columns are organized into geographical clusters, called

Blocs or Joint Commands. All Front Commanders report to the leadership of each Bloc,

which is comprised of a small group of leaders which form the Estado Mayor of that particular

Bloc. The individual in charge of each Bloc Estado Mayor is known as the Bloc Commander

for that Bloc.

45. The FARC control illegal narcotics production Colombia and engage in international

narcotics distribution and sale directed at the U.S. and its citizens, outside of the borders of

Colombia and defendants use kidnapping, hostage taking and murder as part of their illegal

narcotics trafficking as terrorist activities.

46. At all times material hereto, the FARC was a well known terrorist organization

operating in Colombia who engaged in international terrorism, including premeditated,

politically motivated violence, threats of violence, hostage takings, murders and other

terrorist related activities perpetrated against noncombatant targets including U.S. nationals

including directing terrorist activities across national and international borders in order to

influence U.S. and Colombian policy.

47. Prior to 1999, the FARC had kidnapped or murdered many U.S. and Colombian

nationals. These terrorist acts were well publicized in media outlets worldwide.

48. The FARC is not a foreign state or agency of a foreign state. The FARC is not a

nation. The FARC is not an armed force of a nation. The FARC is not an “armed forces.”

The FARC is not a military force of any origin. The FARC is a terrorist organization or


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group. The events giving rise to these acts of terrorism and plaintiffs’ claims were not part of

a declared war, not part of an armed conflict between two nations, and not part of armed

conflict between military forces of any origin. There is no “act of war” exclusion applicable

to this action and these claims and therefore this Court has subject matter over this action and

these claims.

50. FARC supports its operations through kidnappings, extortion, drug trafficking and

“war taxes” it collects from residents, businesses and landowners.

51. In addition to kidnapping over twenty-three Americans between 1993 and 1997 alone,

FARC has also committed many murders, including killing Americans. During the period

relevant to this action, FARC held significant influence over, controlled, or was fighting

other terrorist organizations for control of labor unions in Colombia’s banana growing

regions.

CHIQUITA’S MATERIAL SUPPORT & CONCEALMENT

52. From 1989 through 1999, Chiquita knowingly and intentionally made numerous

and substantial secret payments to FARC, and also provided FARC with weapons,

ammunition and other supplies through its transportation contractors. Chiquita did so

knowing that FARC was a violent terrorist organization.

53. Chiquita’s payments to FARC, which began as cash at FARC’s request, escalated into

regular monthly payments ranging from $20,000.00 to $100,000.00. Over time, the payments

were fixed to a percentage of Banadex’s gross revenues, with as much as ten percent being

diverted to FARC.

54. Chiquita went to great lengths to hide its relationship with FARC.


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55. The payments were often delivered by a former American military pilot known as

“Kaiser,” who held a management position with Chiquita in Colombia. Kaiser would travel

with bodyguards throughout the Uraba region to deliver the cash to the FARC, often in

places such as Chogorod and Carepa. Kaiser continues to work for Chiquita in Latin

America.

56. In order to conceal the payments, Chiquita placed false names and non-existent

employees on its payroll, providing the funds on local paydays to regional FARC

commanders.

57. Chiquita also assisted and/or advised FARC terrorists on how to create front

organizations, enabling Chiquita to continue to channel funds to FARC and to mislead law

enforcement, regulators, auditors, and anyone else who might examine Chiquita and

Banadex’s books and records.

58. Chiquita also drew up fictitious contracts with legitimate operating organizations or,

alternatively, overvalued existing contracts it maintained with such organizations. This was

done for the express purpose of hiding its secret payments to FARC.

59. Chiquita also worked with FARC-controlled labor unions, such as Sintrabanano, as

another means of channeling payments to FARC. Chiquita also collaborated with

FARC and assisted FARC in subverting many local labor unions, and wresting control of

local labor unions from other terrorist organizations. In doing so, Chiquita anticipated and

strived to obtain a competitive advantage over other banana growers facing less

accommodating unions.

60. FARC also helped Chiquita by harassing its competitors in the region.


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61. In addition, Chiquita funneled weapons to FARC (and assisted FARC in the transport

of weapons) through Chiquita’s local transportation contractors.

62. Chiquita willfully provided this material support to FARC even though as early as

the1980s, the Department of State publically listed FARC as a terrorist organization,

including in all of its subsequent annual terrorism reports. For instance, in its publically

available terrorism report titled “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987,” the Department of

State noted that FARC was “anti-US” and engaged in “[a]rmed attacks against Colombian

targets, bombings of US businesses, kidnappings of Colombians and foreigners for ransom,

and assassinations.”

63. Defendants knew that FARC engaged in acts of terrorism against US interests in

Colombia and knew the danger that providing material support to FARC would pose to the

safety of other individuals and entities working within Colombia, but Defendant ignored

these risks in order to further their own narrow business interests in growing and exporting

bananas in Colombia. As such, Defendant is liable to plaintiffs for all damages arising from

defendant’s provision of material support to FARC.

64. This kidnapping and murder was subsequently documented in a U.S. Department of

State report, “Patterns in Global Terrorism: 1997,” which noted:

Frank Pescatore, a US geologist and mining consultant, was kidnapped by the FARC in December 1996 and later killed by his captors; his body was discovered 23 February 1997.

Similarly, the FARC’s 1993/1994 kidnappings and subsequent 1995/1996 murders of U.S.

national missionaries (Mark Rich, Dave Mankins, Rick Tenenoff, Stephen Welsh and

Timothy Van Dyke) was also well publicized in U.S. media.


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CHIQUITA’S MARCH 19, 2007 GUILTY PLEA 65. On March 19, 2007, Chiquita pled guilty to violating U.S. anti-terrorism laws by

funding another Colombian terrorist organization, the AUC from 1997 through 2004. In so

doing, Chiquita acknowledged that it had for years 1989 through 1997 it made payments to

FARC as well.

66. Chiquita’s President, CEO and Chairman of the Board signed the United States’

Factual Proffer, Docket Entry 123-3 in District of Columbia Case No. 07-cr-00055, and

stated that on behalf of Chiquita and after consulting with its attorneys, Chiquita stipulated

that the statement of facts was true and accurate and would have been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt if the government had proceeded to trial. Paragraph 20 of the Factual

Proffer stated that “Defendant Chiquita had previously paid money to other terrorist

organizations operating in Columbia”, including the FARC, and that “Defendant Chiquita

made these earlier payments from in or around 1989 through in or about 1997, when the

FARC and the ELN controlled areas where Chiquita had its banana-producing operations.”

67. Chiquita admitted to using many concealment tactics similar to those alleged in

paragraphs 55 - 59 above as a means of disguising and hiding its AUC payments. Later, in

2007, as part of the sentence imposed on it pursuant to the guilty plea, Chiquita agreed to pay

a $25 million fine to the U.S. government.

68. On May 11, 2008, CBS News broadcast a 60 Minutes report on Chiquita’s payments

to terrorists in Colombia, in which Chiquita’s Chief Executive Officer, Fernando Aguirre,

admitted that Chiquita hid its payments to the terrorists so well that: “if we hadn’t gone to the


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Justice Department, we probably would not be here talking about this whole issue. No one

would know about this.”

69. Until the DOJ made public its plea agreement with Chiquita on March 14, 2007, none

of the Plaintiffs had any knowledge of Chiquita’s payments and provisions to the FARC.

70. Moreover, Plaintiffs could not have discovered Chiquita’s payments and provisions to

the FARC by the exercise of reasonable diligence because Chiquita actively and fraudulently

concealed theses activities.

CHIQUITA’S SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE REPORT

71. A 268 page report was issued in February 2009 which summarizes and synthesizes

the facts that have been developed in the investigation conducted by the Special Litigation

Committee (the “SLC”) of the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Chiquita Brands

International, Inc.

72. The SLC report documented Chiquita’s decision to place its own business interests

above the safety of others in Colombia and the manner it used its wholly-owned subsidiary,

Banadex, to make illicit payments to FARC with the direct knowledge and authorization of

Chiquita’s officers in Colombia and at its Cincinnati, Ohio headquarters. The following are

excerpts from the SLC Report.

73. Chiquita personnel based in Central America and Colombia were well aware of the

FARC’s violent acts before the Company received its first demand for payment. Each of the

Colombian based employees interviewed by the Chiquita Shareholder Litigation Committee

(“SLC”) credibly related their experience with the FARC and stated that, during this time

period, the FARC was responsible for daily acts of violence, including killings.


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Initial Payments to Guerrilla Groups

74. At some point between 1987 and 1989, Banadex received a demand for payment from

the FARC in the amount of $10,000, delivered by a FARC representative to [a Banadex farm

manager]. [The Banadex farm manager] told [Banadex Employee #1] about the demand. This

was the first demand.

75. [Banadex Employee #1] then called [Chiquita Employee #2], and told him that the

FARC had demanded another “extortion payment”. In turn, [Chiquita Employee #2] called

Robert Kistinger, who, at the time, was head of Chiquita’s Latin American operations based

in Cincinnati. According to Kistinger, [Chiquita Employee #2] told him that the Company

had been “approached for protection money.”

76. Several weeks after learning about the demand for payment from the FARC,

[Banadex Employee #1] was told to travel to Cincinnati to meet with members of senior

management to discuss the demand. In Cincinnati, [Banadex Employee #1] met with

Kistinger, Dennis Doyle, then-Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of

the Banana Group, and Charles Morgan, the Company’s then-General Counsel.

77. [Banadex Employee #1] said that this meeting was brief and memorable, at least for

him. He said that when he communicated the amount of the demand, Doyle responded,

“Let’s pay it.” While he did not recall the specifics of this meeting at which the payment was

approved, Kistinger said that executives at the Company had a “number of discussions”

about how to respond to this demand and the future demands that the Company anticipated.

78. According to [Banadex Employee #1], no alternatives to making the payment were

discussed at the meeting.


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79. After the meeting, [Chiquita Employee #2] instructed [Banadex Employee #1] to

meet him at a hotel in Guatemala in order to put the payment process in motion. [Chiquita

Employee #2] had come from Honduras, where he had obtained $10,000 from the General

Manager’s Fund (generally, an account in a division’s general ledger from which the General

Manager is permitted to make discretionary payments), which he gave to [Banadex

Employee #1], who brought it back to Colombia. [Banadex Employee #1] then delivered the

cash (which he arranged to be converted from dollars to pesos) to [the Banadex farm

manager], who in turn delivered the payment to the FARC.

80. Following the initial payment, Banadex continued to make payments in response

to extortion demands on a more or less regular basis, mostly to the FARC but also to

other guerrilla groups. [Banadex Employee #1] believed the initial authorization he

received was sufficient to cover subsequent payments of the same type and for

approximately the same amounts if necessary to ensure the safety of Company

employees and property. [Banadex Employee #1] said that he knew that senior

management in Cincinnati was aware of the payments, the payments were recorded in

the Company’s books, and they were reviewed periodically by [Chiquita Employee #2]

and the Company’s internal auditors.

81. All payments to guerrilla groups were delivered by an intermediary and were

made in cash. The SLC believes that the total amount of guerrilla payments ranged

from $100,000 to $200,000 per year.


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82. During the course of its investigation, the SLC examined guerilla payments going

back to the late 1980s and the SLC Report, page 30, fn. 27, states that these payments “ended

sometime between 1997 and 1999”.3

Internal Procedures and Accounting Relating to FARC Payments

83. The FARC payments were considered “sensitive” payments and given special and

confidential treatment. The Company made efforts to limit the number of people who had

knowledge of the guerrilla payments.

84. FARC payments were initiated within the Company by completing a document called

a “1016,” which was required by Chiquita’s accounting procedures for virtually every

disbursement. Each 1016 was approved by [a Banadex employee] and typically included the

following information: (i) the purpose of the payment, (ii) an accounting code, (iii) the date,

(iv) the person requesting payment, and (v) an authorizing signature. For FARC payments,

the description on the 1016 was coded (for example, as a payment for “military transport”) in

order to conceal the nature of the payments from local staff in Colombia.

85. Once a properly authorized 1016 was submitted to the Accounting Department,

the funds were disbursed. As noted above, all payments to FARC were

delivered by an intermediary and were made in cash.

3 The SLC did not attempt to reconstruct every aspect of the payments to the guerrilla groups in the same manner as it did for payments to the convivir/AUC in the later period. The SLC did, however, make a thorough effort to understand (i) the security issues relating to guerrilla activity in Colombia in areas where the Company operated going back to the late 1980s; and (ii) the personnel in the Company responsible for approving and making the payments during that period.


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86. [Banadex Employee #1] told the SLC that [Banadex Contract Employee #2] and

[Banadex Contract Employee #1] were two intermediaries that Banadex used to make the

guerrilla payments.

87. The Company’s Internal Audit Department developed a special accounting process

for recording “sensitive” payments, which were described as payments requiring an

“appropriate level of confidentiality” that “would not fall into other account classifications

such as Contributions, Donations, Consulting Services, Public Relations, etc.” As a general

matter, the accounting process involved (i) ensuring the adequacy of supporting

documentation for purposes of compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),

(ii) conducting a quarterly review of sensitive payment transactions, and (iii) providing the

underlying payment documentation to the General Counsel in Cincinnati. This process was

described in memoranda authored by Bud White and distributed widely throughout the

Company, which were redistributed on an annual basis by the Internal Audit Department.

The process applied to payments to FARC.

88. The evidence gathered by the SLC, from documents and testimony, varies as to how

FARC payments were recorded in Banadex’s books. The evidence suggests that the

payments were recorded on Banadex’s General Ledger as either: (i) general manager’s

expenses drawn from the General Manager’s fund or (ii) security payments drawn from an

operations account.

89. The FARC payments were not explicitly recorded as “guerrilla payments” in

Banadex’s accounting records.


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90. Individuals at Banadex and at Company headquarters in Cincinnati were aware of the

payments to FARC. As documented above, [Banadex Employee #1], [Banadex employee

#3], [Chiquita Employee #2], and Kistinger knew about the payments, in part because of

their involvement in the original decision to approve the payments or in making the payments

thereafter. The Legal and Internal Audit Departments knew about the payments due to their

roles in monitoring the FCPA reports. William Tsacalis, then-Controller and Chief

Accounting Officer, also knew about the payments. Tsacalis said that he was generally

aware of the guerrilla payments and was “under the impression that if we didn’t make

payments to guerrillas, people would get killed.” [Chiquita Employee #3] was also aware of

the guerrilla payments, which he learned about while preparing to conduct the 1995 audit of

Banadex. Steven Warshaw, then-Chief Administrative Officer and Chief Financial Officer,

said that he did not “specifically recall the terminology ‘guerrilla,’” but did say that he

recalled that Chiquita had to make “protection payments” in Colombia.

91. However, several witnesses, including their direct reports, said that they are virtually

certain that Keith Lindner and Warshaw were aware of the FARC payments during the time

that they were made, and they inferred that because Keith Lindner was aware of the

payments, Carl Lindner was aware of them as well. The SLC believes that the evidence

supports the conclusion that Keith Lindner, then-President and COO, and Steven Warshaw,

then-Chief Administrative Officer and Chief Financial Officer, knew the payments were

being made.

92. Robert Olson, then VP and General Counsel for Chiquita, said that when he was first

told about the FARC payments soon after joining the Company in 1995, he was led to


22

believe that the Audit Committee had been informed of the payments. He also said that this

impression was confirmed when the FARC payments were discussed at a 1997 Audit

Committee meeting in such a way that confirmed his impression that the Audit Committee

had received reports of the FARC payments at an earlier date. Further, Kistinger said that he

believed Jean Sisco, the long-time Chair of the Audit Committee, knew about the FARC

payments because either he or someone else told her about them.

93. The SLC was unable to determine with precision when the Company stopped making

the FARC payments. According to at least one witness, the Company made the payments to

the FARC until 1999.

94. In 2004 Chiquita made a further payment to the FARC in the form of a kidnapping

ransom payment. This payment occurred after Chiquita knew or should have known of the

well publicized murder and hostage taking of Plaintiffs.

ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND EQUITABLE TOLLING

95. Section 2335(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides for a four-year statute

of limitations period for actions brought under § 2333(a), requiring that such actions be

“commenced within 4 years after the date the cause of action accrued.” The statute is silent

as to when an ATA action accrues.

96. Plaintiffs claims are subject to equitable tolling principles and the diligence-discovery

rule of accrual. The diligence-discovery rule postpones accrual of a claim and the doctrine of

equitable tolling suspends the statute of limitations once a claim has accrued.

97. Under the discovery rule of accrual, the four-year limitations period did not start

running until the disclosure of Chiquita’s guilty plea on March 19, 2007.


23

98. Plaintiffs contend that, even with the exercise of due diligence, they did not and could

not have discovered Chiquita’s connection to FARC and its terrorist activities, or Plaintiffs’

resulting injuries, before the March 19, 2007 guilty plea.

99. Equitable tolling' is a doctrine under which plaintiffs may sue after the statutory time

period has expired if they have been prevented from doing so due to inequitable

circumstances. Equitable tolling principles apply to all federal causes of action where time

limits are in the character of a true statute of limitations.

100. The language of § 2335(b) contemplates a defendant whose existence is known and is

essentially unable to be sued under the circumstances. If a plaintiff does not know of a

defendant, the defendant’s absence from the jurisdiction is immaterial. It does not follow

logically that the statutory tolling provision would preclude the application of equitable

tolling principles to someone about whom a plaintiff does not know or someone who has

concealed his involvement. Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 2335(b) is not inconsistent with, nor does it

foreclose, Plaintiffs’ assertion of equitable tolling.

101. The running of the statute of limitations was tolled by the Defendant’s systematic,

long-running, and successful concealment of its connection to the FARC.

102. Equitable tolling is available and appropriate because of extraordinary circumstances

that are both beyond Plaintiffs’ control and unavoidable even with diligence. Because

Defendant's fraudulent concealment left the public and Plaintiffs ignorant of the facts or

existence of these claims, the limitations period is tolled until discovery of the fraud which

occurred sometime after March 19, 2007.


24

103. Defendants individually and collectively had fair warning and knew or should have

known that their activities would subject them to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S.

for civil liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

104. Defendant wrongfully concealed material facts relating to its wrongdoing, the

concealment prevented plaintiffs' discovery of the nature of the claim within the limitations

period; and the plaintiffs exercised due diligence in pursuing the discovery of the claim

during the period they seek to have tolled.

105. Plaintiffs were prevented from discovering the facts supporting a material support

claim because of Chiquita’s furtive, secret payments, including large sums of cash personally

transported and made by a senior Chiquita employee on a regular basis; falsification of

names and non-existent employees on Chiquita’s payroll to provide funds to regional FARC

commanders on local paydays; assistance in creating false front organizations and dummy

corporations to channel funds; creation of fictitious contracts with legitimate organizations or

overvaluation of existing contracts to bury secret payments in its bookkeeping; cooperation

with FARC-controlled labor unions, including Sintrabanano, to channel payments to FARC,

funneling weapons to FARC and assistance of the transport of weapons through Chiquita’s

local transportation contractors; payments to AUC through intermediaries known as

“convivirs”; making false and misleading entries on its books and records; and filing false

and/or misleading documents with the Colombian and United States governments.

ANTI-TERRORISM ACT

106. Plaintiffs claim that Chiquita provided material support, in the form of money,

weapons, and services, to the FARC through 1999, and again in 2004, which supported the


25

FARC in its ability to murder, kidnap and continue to hold hostage Plaintiffs, and that this

material support was itself an act of international terrorism which was causally related to

Plaintiffs’ damages.

107. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 and 2333 were initially enacted in 1990 as the Anti-Terrorism Act

of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990), but were repealed as the result of

a technical deficiency. They were subsequently re-enacted as part of the Federal Courts

Administration Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).

108. In 1994, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which criminalizes the provision of

material support to terrorists:

“Whoever, within the United States, provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section … 1203, … 2332, ….. of this title …., or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment or an escape from the commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”

18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). “Material support or resources” is a defined term and includes

provision of currency or monetary instruments, weapons, transportation, and false

documentation.. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).

109. Two years later, Congress passed the Antiterrorism And and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), PL 104-132 (S 735) which provides in part:

SEC. 301. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. (a) FINDINGS.--The Congress finds that-- (1) international terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that threatens the vital interests of the United States;


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(7) foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct. (b) PURPOSE.--The purpose of this subtitle is to provide the Federal Government the fullest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the United States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.

110. Congress extended criminal liability to those providing material support to foreign

terrorist organizations in Section 303 of the AEDPA:

“Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).4 Section 2339B adopts the definition of “material support or

resources” provided in section 2339A, and looks to 8 U.S.C. § 1189 for the definition of

“terrorist organization”.

111. Congress intended that the intentional or reckless provision of material support to a

terrorist organization in violation of §2339A or §2339B fulfills each prong of §2331(1)’s

definition of “international terrorism” and therefore suffices to establish civil liability under

§2333(a).

112. § 2339A of Title 18 of the United States Code created a civil cause of action

for those injured by terrorist acts against individuals who provided support to terrorist groups

knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a

violation of 18 U.S.C. §1203 or § 2332.

113. 18 U.S.C. § 1203. Hostage taking, provides:

4 In 2004 Congress amended §2339B(a)(1) as set forth in ¶ 141 herein.


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“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the person detained, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment.” (emphasis supplied).

114. §2332 of the ATA, in turn, criminalizes the killing (whether classified as homicide,

voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter), conspiring to kill, or inflicting bodily

injury on, any American citizen outside the United States.

115. The mental element required to fix liability on Chiquita for providing support to the

FARC terrorist organization is present if Chiquita knew the character and terrorist nature of

the FARC - which they did.

116. Chiquita’s provision of money and support to an organization that commits terrorist

acts was intentional misconduct because Chiquita knew that the FARC engaged in terrorist

acts, or was deliberately indifferent to whether it did or not, and Chiquita knew there was a

substantial probability that the FARC engaged in terrorism and would continue to do so.

117. The facts known to Chiquita placed it on notice of a risk of contributing to murder or

hostage taking or the continued detention of U.S. national hostages, therefore Chiquita

cannot ignore the facts and plead ignorance of the risk.

118. Extending liability to secondary actors is recognized under the ATA.

119. Chiquita knowingly provided substantial assistance to international terrorism.


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120. Chiquita possessed general awareness of its role as part of an overall illegal activity,

and Chiquita’s knowing and substantial assistance to a terrorist organization with a long and

proven track record for murdering and kidnapping Americans.

121. Chiquita was guilty of many “atypical practices” from which it is possible to infer

knowledge necessary for aiding and abetting liability, including Chiquita making furtive,

secret payments, including large sums of cash personally transported and made by a senior

Chiquita employee on a regular basis; falsification of names and non-existent employees on

Chiquita’s payroll to provide funds to regional FARC commanders on local paydays;

assistance in creating false front organizations and dummy corporations to channel funds;

creation of fictitious contracts with legitimate organizations or overvaluation of existing

contracts to bury secret payments in its bookkeeping; cooperation with FARC-controlled

labor unions, including Sintrabanano, to channel payments to FARC, funneling weapons to

FARC and assistance of the transport of weapons through Chiquita’s local transportation

contractors; payments to AUC through intermediaries known as “convivirs”; making false

and misleading entries on its books and records; and filing false and/or misleading

documents with the Colombian and United States governments.

CAUSATION

122. Because money is fungible, it is not generally possible to say that a particular dollar

caused a particular act or paid for a particular gun, nor is this level of “but for” causation

required under the ATA.


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123. Chiquita’s provision of funds and other support to the FARC was a substantial factor

in the FARC’s maintaining its ability to carry out future terrorist acts and was a proximate

cause of the terrorist acts suffered by Plaintiffs from February 13, 2003 through July 2, 2008.

124. Chiquita, as a reasonably prudent person, could have foreseen that a harm like the one

that the plaintiffs suffered might result from its conduct, therefore there is proximate

causation.

125. It was entirely foreseeable that transmitting money to a terrorist organization would

lead to violence and Congress had precisely that lethal connection in mind in passing the

ATA.

126. A donor of even $1,000 to a terrorist organization can be liable under the ATA

because knowing contributors as a whole significantly enhance the risk of terrorist acts and

thus the probability that the Plaintiff's decedent and Plaintiffs would be future victims.

127. Chiquita knowingly and intentionally supplied secret monthly payments of between

$20,000 and $100,000 to FARC over a ten year period beginning in 1989 and continuing

through 1999, and again in 2004, knowing that FARC was a violent terrorist organization.

128. The FARC routinely buried large caches of currency obtained from illegal support

payments received from companies, including Chiquita, and then used these caches many

years later to finance future terrorist activities. For example, a Colombian Army unit that

was actively searching for the FARC unit guarding Plaintiffs discovered a $20 million buried

cache of U.S. currency in an area near where Plaintiffs were being held.

129. Moneys paid by Chiquita to the FARC in 1994 through 1997, and again in 2004, were

used in part to finance operations in 2003 through 2008, including purchase of weapons,


30

ammunition, chains, fencing, food, supplies, communication equipment, payrolls and other

expenses of maintaining a terrorist organization and political hostages.

130. Further, weapons and ammunition provided by Chiquita in 1994 through 1999 were

still being used by the FARC between 2003 – 2008 and these cash payments, weapons and

ammunition were a cause in fact and/or played a causal role and/or contributed to causing the

FARC’s terrorist acts against Plaintiffs alleged herein.

131. Chiquita’s ransom payment to the FARC in 2004 provided additional substantial

material support to the FARC which played a causal role in enabling the FARC to maintain

its ongoing captivity of Plaintiffs Stansell, Gonsalves and Howes.

COUNT ONE (Keith Stansell 18 U.S.C. § 2333)

132. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates the allegations and facts contained in prior

paragraphs and in allegations common to all counts.

133. Plaintiff Keith Stansell is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of international

terrorism and seeks non-economic compensatory damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2333.

134. At all times material, Plaintiff was a civilian employee of Northrup Grumman

engaged in a counter-narcotics surveillance mission and was not injured as a result of any

“act of war” as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2331(4) because Plaintiffs were not injured by reason

of any “declared war”, or “armed conflict between two or more nations”, or “armed conflict

between military forces of any origin”.

135. Plaintiff was victimized by acts of "international terrorism" as defined by 18 U.S.C. §

2331(1) which states:


31

“(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that--

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended-- (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”

136. Defendant has admitted that unlike kidnap victims held for money ransom payment,

Plaintiffs were “political hostages” whose detention and captivity fall within the definition of

“international terrorism” above.5

137. Plaintiffs have been injured in their person, property or business by reason of acts of

international terrorism committed by Defendant that involved violence, were dangerous to

human life, and violated the criminal laws of the United States, including the prohibitions

against providing material support to terrorists, kidnapping, and killing a U.S. citizen as set

forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.

138. Defendant’s payments and material support to the FARC from 1992 to 1999, and

again in 2004, supported violations of 18 U.S.C. §1203 (hostage taking) and §2332

(homicide) and Plaintiffs’ civil remedy is actionable under §2333 (1992).

5 S.D.Fl. Case No. 08-cv-20641, Docket Entry 32, pp. 21-23


32

139. Defendant’s payments and material support to the FARC from 1994 to 1999 violated

the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§2339A (1994) and Plaintiffs’ civil remedy is actionable under

§2333 (1992).

140. Defendant’s payments and material support to the FARC from October 8, 1997 [when

FARC was designated as an FTO by the Secretary of State] to 1999, and again in 2004,

violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).

141. Defendants’ giving money and other material support to the FARC, like giving a

loaded gun to a child, is “an act dangerous to human life”, is an act of international terrorism,

and it violates a criminal law of the United States, 18 USC §2339B(a)(1). ), which provides

in relevant part:

§ 2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations

(a) Prohibited activities.-- (1) Unlawful conduct.--Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d) (2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).

142. Section 2339B(a) on its face does not require proof that the provider of material

support intended for that support to further the terrorist activities of the organization; the

provider need only have knowledge that the organization has been designated a foreign

terrorist organization. Defendants’ provision of material support to the FARC appears to

have been intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the


33

policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a

government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; because Defendants knew the

FARC was a designated foreign terrorist organization, or because Defendants knew the

FARC was engaged in terrorist activity.

143. Plaintiffs’ 1,967 days of captivity as FARC hostages occurred outside the territorial

jurisdiction of the U.S. The material support provided by Defendants to the FARC also

occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. and transcend international boundaries.




§2333(a). Defendants’ material support to the FARC, as alleged herein, are acts of

international terrorism actionable under § 2333(a).

145. Chiquita is a “person” as defined by 18 USC §2331(3) as “any individual or entity

capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property”.

146. Defendant knowingly provided material support to the FARC which Defendant knew

was a terrorist organization, and eventually a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, or

knowing that it was engaged in terrorist activities. This material support of acts of international

terrorism assisted the FARC with its ongoing terrorist activities, including murder, hostage

taking and the continuing ability to maintain captivity and torture of hostages, including

Plaintiffs.


34

147. Defendant’s activities of providing material support to the FARC were themselves

violent and dangerous acts to human life that were, and are, a violation of the criminal laws

of the United States.

148. The FARC’s terrorist acts against Plaintiffs were intended to intimidate or coerce the

Colombian and United States civilian population, to influence policy of the U.S. Government

by intimidation or coercion, and to affect the conduct of a government by kidnapping,

hostage taking and assassination.

149. Defendants’ provision of material support to the FARC supported the FARC in

continued acts of international terrorism that and continued to injure Plaintiffs.

150. Defendants’ payment of moneys and provision of material support to the FARC from

1989 to 1999, and again in 2004, was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages. “But for”

causation is not required under the ATA.

151. Congress intended these provisions to impose, “liability at any point along the causal

chain of terrorism.” S.Rep. No. 102-342 at 22. In enacting the material support statute

Congress made an express finding of fact that, “foreign organizations that engage

in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to

such an organization facilitates that conduct.” (emphasis supplied). Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-32, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247

(1996).

152. Money is fungible; Defendant’s giving money and material support to the FARC – a

known terrorist organization and later a designated FTO - freed up resources to be used for

terrorist acts. The material support provided by Defendant to the FARC played a causal role,


35

or was a cause in fact, in the FARC’s ability to kill or hold hostage Plaintiffs, and then

continue to maintain their captivity, because the support and resources provided to the FARC

was used in part to maintain Plaintiffs’ captivity and/or freed up other FARC resources to be

diverted for the purpose of maintaining Plaintiffs’ captivity.

153. Defendant intentionally and purposefully hid and concealed from Plaintiffs its

involvement in providing material support to the FARC terrorist activities, thereby delaying

Plaintiffs discovery of their cause of action and entitling Plaintiffs to equitable tolling of any

statute of limitations for the time period of Defendant’s concealment, and for the time they

were held captive in the jungles of Colombia.

154. Defendant’s giving money and providing material support to a FARC Front or

member in one geographic area of Colombia benefitted the FARC organization as a whole

because these moneys are centralized at the FARC’s central command (Secretariat) and then

re-distributed to FARC Fronts and columns operating in other geographic areas of Colombia,

including to fund the continued captivity of hostages, like Plaintffs.

155. Defendants’ payment of moneys to the FARC in areas where it had banana growing

operations both: (i) freed up FARC resources being paid by the Secretariat to FARC Fronts

or Mobile Columns that killed and held Plaintiffs hostage and/or (ii) was used in part directly

by the these Fronts/Mobile Columns to kill, and hold hostage and continue to maintain

Plaintiffs’ captivity.

156. The legislative history of 18 USC §2333 indicates that Congress intended to allow a

plaintiff to recover from anyone at any point along the full length of the causal chain of


36

terrorism. Plaintiff has standing by demonstrating causation and that his injuries will be

redressed by a favorable decision.

157. By providing material support to the FARC, Defendant is liable for the injuries and

damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of the FARC’s terrorist acts against them.

158. Defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, agents, independent

contractors, and those of its alter ego wholly owned-controlled subsidiary Banadex, and

knowledge of any employee, agent, subsidiary or independent contractor is imputed to

Defendant.

159. FARC’s activities were intended to: (a) intimidate or coerce the civilian population of

Colombia; (b) influence the policy of the governments of Colombia and the United States by

intimidation or coercion; and (c) affect the conduct of the governments of Colombia and the

United States by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

160. By willfully providing material support to FARC, Defendant supported FARC’s acts

of international terrorism and other violations of law that have injured plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Keith Stansell, demands judgment in his favor against

Defendant for his past and future physical and mental pain and suffering, disability,

disfigurement, mental anguish, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, emotional distress,

loss of years of his life, including treble damages under 18 U.S.C. §2333, plus costs,

attorneys fees, and such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems

appropriate to compensate plaintiff.


37

COUNT TWO (Marc Gonsalves – 18 USC § 2333)



162. Plaintiff Marc Gonsalves is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of international












(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to


38

intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”








forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.






§2333 (1992).



violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).





39


in relevant part:
















40













Plaintiffs.











41










(1996).














42




















Defendant.




43





WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Marc Gonsalves, demands judgment in his favor against






COUNT THREE (Thomas Howes - 18 U.S.C. § 2333)



191. Plaintiff Thomas Howes is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of international








44














forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.



45






§2333 (1992).



violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).




in relevant part:






46























47


Plaintiffs.



















(1996).


48
























49










Defendant.







WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Thomas Howes, demands judgment in his favor against







50

COUNT FOUR (Judith Janis - 18 U.S.C. § 2333)



220. Plaintiff Judith Janis is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of international

terrorism and seeks non-economic compensatory damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 for the

February 13, 2003 murder and wrongful death of her husband Thomas Janis.

221. At all times material, Plaintiff’s decedent was a civilian employee of Northrup

Grumman engaged in a counter-narcotics surveillance mission and was not injured as a result

of any “act of war” as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2331(4) because Plaintiff were not injured by

reason of any “declared war”, or “armed conflict between two or more nations”, or “armed

conflict between military forces of any origin”.






(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by


51

which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”





forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.






§2333 (1992).



violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).




in relevant part:


(a) Prohibited activities.--


52

(1) Unlawful conduct.--Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d) (2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).










229. Mr. Janis’ murder occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. The

material support provided by Defendants to the FARC also occurred outside the territorial

jurisdiction of the U.S. and transcend international boundaries.





53










Plaintiffs.









continued acts of international terrorism that injured Plaintiffs.





54







(1996).




or was a cause in fact, in the FARC’s ability to murder Mr. Janis, because the support and

resources provided to the FARC was used in part to shoot down the civilian aircraft and

murder Mr. Janis and/or freed up other FARC resources to be diverted for the purpose of

committing these acts.










55





or Mobile Columns that murdered Mr. Janis and/or (ii) was used in part directly by the these

Fronts/Mobile Columns to murder Mr. Janis.










Defendant.








56

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Judith Janis, demands judgment in her favor against

Defendant for her past and future mental pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional

distress, loss of solatium, loss of companionship, society, affection, consortium and

guidance, including treble damages under 18 U.S.C. §2333, plus costs, attorneys fees, and

such other monetary and equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate to

compensate plaintiff.

COUNT FIVE (Christopher T. Janis - 18 U.S.C. § 2333)



248. Plaintiff Christopher Janis is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of

international terrorism and seeks non-economic compensatory damages under 18 U.S.C. §

2333 for the February 13, 2003 murder and wrongful death of his father Thomas Janis.









(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or


57

that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;







forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.






§2333 (1992).



violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).


58




in relevant part:













59
















Plaintiffs.







60














(1996).









61
























62


Defendant.







WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Christopher Janis, demands judgment in his favor against

Defendant for his past and future mental pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional





COUNT SIX (Greer C. Janis - 18 U.S.C. § 2333)



276. Plaintiff Greer Janis is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of international


February 13, 2003 murder and wrongful death of her father Thomas Janis.


63
















forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.


64






§2333 (1992).



violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).




in relevant part:






65























66


Plaintiffs.



















(1996).


67























68










Defendant.







WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Greer Janis, demands judgment in her favor against

Defendant for her past and future mental pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional






69

COUNT SEVEN (Michael I. Janis - 18 U.S.C. § 2333)



304. Plaintiff Michael Janis is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of international


February 13, 2003 murder and wrongful death of his father Thomas Janis.











(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by


70

which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”





forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.






§2333 (1992).



violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).




in relevant part:


(a) Prohibited activities.--


71

(1) Unlawful conduct.--Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d) (2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).

















72










Plaintiffs.














73







(1996).

















74
















Defendant.








75

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Michael Janis, demands judgment in his favor against






COUNT EIGHT (Jonathan N. Janis - 18 U.S.C. § 2333)



332. Plaintiff Jonathan Janis is a U.S. national injured by reason of an act of international


February 13, 2003 murder and wrongful death of his father Thomas Janis.









(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or


76

that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;







forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2332, 2339A & 2339B.






§2333 (1992).



violated 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1)(1996).


77




in relevant part:













78
















Plaintiffs.







79














(1996).









80
























81


Defendant.







WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Jonathan Janis, demands judgment in his favor against






DATED: April 3, 2010


/s Newton Porter______________ /s_Tony Korvick_________________ NEWTON P. PORTER TONY KORVICK Trial Counsel Trial Counsel (Florida Bar No. 833738) (Florida Bar No. 768405) [email protected] [email protected] & KORVICK, P.A. PORTER & KORVICK, P.A. Pinecrest Professional Building Pinecrest Professional Building 9655 South Dixie Highway Suite 208 9655 South Dixie Highway Suite 208 Miami, Florida 33156 Miami, Florida 33156 Telephone: (305) 373-5040 Telephone: (305) 373-5040 Facsimile: (305) 668-9154 Facsimile: (305) 668-9154 Attorneys for Plaintiff s Attorneys for Plaintiff s

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