UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

August 11, 2010 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. Eric McCartney Vice President - Robinson Plant H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 SUBJECT: ROBINSON NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION

INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2010007 Dear Mr. McCartney: On April 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, another exit meeting was held by telephone on May 13, 2010 and June 29, 2010 with Garrett Sanders and other members of your staff to discuss the final disposition of the inspection results. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. You are not required to respond to this letter. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS

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is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-261 License Nos.: DPR-23 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000261/2010007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl.: (See page 3)

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cc w/encl: Brian C. McCabe Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Eric McCartney, Vice President H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit 2 Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution R. J. Duncan, II, Vice President Nuclear Operations Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Scott Saunders Plant General Manager Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Christos Kamilaris, Director Fleet Support Services Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Curt A. Castell, Supervisor Licensing/Regulatory Programs Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution B. C. White, Manager Support Services - Nuclear Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Joseph W. Donahue Vice President Nuclear Oversight Carolina Power and Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution David T. Conley Associate General Counsel Legal Dept. Progress Energy Service Company, LLC Electronic Mail Distribution

S. D. West Superintendent Security H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Progress Energy Electronic Mail Distribution Susan E. Jenkins Director, Division of Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution R. Mike Gandy Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt. S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution W. Lee Cox, III (Acting) Section Chief Radiation Protection Section N.C. Department of Environmental Commerce & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution John H. O'Neill, Jr. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N. Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 Chairman North Carolina Utilities Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC 4326 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-4326 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P.O. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211

Letter to Eric McCartney from Rebecca L. Nease dated August 11, 2010. SUBJECT: ROBINSON - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT

05000261/2010007 Distribution w/encl: RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMRobinson Resource

G PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G SENSITIVE G NON-SENSITIVE

ADAMS: G Yes ACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________ G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE

OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS SIGNATURE RA RA RA RA RA RA RA

NAME WALKER BRAXTON EHRHARDT FILLION RODRIGUEZ SUGGS WISEMAN DATE 7/8/2010 6/29/2010 6/29/2010 6/29/2010 6/29/2010 7/9/2010 7/7/2010 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRS SIGNATURE RA RA NAME MUSSER NEASE DATE 8/6/2010 8/11/2010 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\ENG BRANCH 2\REPORTS\ROBINSON\ROBINSON TFPI 2010-007\ROB TFPI RPT 2010007 REV2 (NFS).DOC

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-261

License Nos.: DPR-23

Report Nos.: 05000261/2010007

Licensee: Carolina Power & Light

Facility: H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2

Location: Hartsville, South Carolina

Dates: March 15 – 19, 2010 (Week 1) March 29 – April 2, 2010 (Week 2)

Inspectors: S. Walker, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector) P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector F. Ehrhardt, Senior Operations Examiner (first week only) P. Fillion, Senior Reactor Inspector (March 29 & 30 only) R. Rodriguez, Senior Reactor Inspector (first week only) L. Suggs, Reactor Inspector G. Wiseman, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000261/2010-007; 03/15 - 19/2010 and 03/29 – 4/1/2010; H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2; Fire Protection. This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a triennial fire protection team composed of seven regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC's) program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, “Reactor Oversight Process,” Revision 4, dated December 2006. A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings None B. Licensee Identified Violations None

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R05 Fire Protection

This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection of the H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (RNP) Unit 2. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05TTP, “Fire Protection-National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Transition Period (Triennial),” dated December 24, 2009. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of 3 risk-significant fire areas to verify implementation of the fire protection program (FPP) and to verify site specific implementation of at least one B.5.b mitigating strategy as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The three fire areas (FAs) and associated fire zones (FZs) were selected after reviewing available risk information as analyzed by a Senior Reactor Analyst from Region II, previous inspection results, plant walk downs of fire areas, relational characteristics of ignition sources to targets, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting the B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. Section 71111.05-05 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of three fire areas and one B.5.b implementing strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure. The specific FAs/FZs chosen for review were:

1. FA 5 (FZ 16), Train A/Train B Battery Room 2. FA G1 (FZ 25E), 4160 V & 480 V Switchgear Area in Turbine Building

3. FA A3 (FZ 7), Auxiliary Building Hallway

The team evaluated the licensee=s FPP against applicable requirements, including RNP Unit 2 Renewed Operating License Condition 3.E, “Fire Protection”; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix R, “Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979”; 10 CFR 50.48; commitments to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1; RNP Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); related NRC safety evaluation reports (SERs); and plant Technical Specifications. The review of the B.5.b mitigating strategies was based on the RNP Unit 2 B.5.b submittal letters, related NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. The team evaluated all areas of this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements. Specific licensing basis documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

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Enclosure

.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) and the dedicated shutdown procedures (DSP) to verify that equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown was adequately protected from fire damage in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Section III.G.2. The reviews were performed to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from the main control room (MCR) with and without the availability of offsite power for postulated fires in FA G1, FZ 25E. The inspection activities focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support system functions. The team reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would remain free from fire damage.

Methodology

The team selected a sample of SSD components that were required to be operable for post-fire safe shutdown for a postulated fire in the selected FA/FZ. The team reviewed the component cable routing (i.e., power and/or control circuits by fire area) to determine if the SSD components could be potentially damaged and made inoperable by a fire in the selected FAs/FZs. The selected sample of SSD components included in the review is listed in the Attachment. As for those fire areas where the licensee had implemented operator manual actions (OMAs) in lieu of cable raceway protection per 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, the inspectors verified the OMAs were feasible utilizing the guidance of Attachment 2 to IP 71111.05TTP. Operational Implementation The team reviewed the adequacy of the DSPs utilized for post-fire SSD from the MCR for a postulated fire in FA G1, FZ 25E. The review was performed to verify that the shutdown methodology properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The team assessed the timeliness of the operators in identifying and assessing the initial plant conditions, response to suspected fire, and subsequent actions credited afterwards. The team performed a walk through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The inspectors verified the licensee personnel credited for procedure implementation had procedures available, were trained on implementation, and were available in the event a fire occurred. The team also reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. The team reviewed and walked down applicable sections of the following fire response DSPs:

• DSP-001, Alternate Shutdown Diagnostic • DSP-015, Hot Shutdown from the Control Room with a Fire in the Turbine

Building

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b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .02 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected FAs/FZs, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire barrier walls, ceilings, floors, mechanical and electrical penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers. Where applicable, the team examined installed configurations to the approved construction details, and supporting fire endurance test data, which established the fire resistance ratings of the selected fire barriers. The team reviewed licensee evaluations of the non-standard fire barrier penetration seals for FA A3 (FZ 7) and FA 5 (FZ 16). In addition, the team reviewed licensing bases documentation, such as NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) and deviations from NRC regulations, to verify that passive fire protection features met license commitments. The team inspected the material condition and as-built configuration of accessible passive fire barriers surrounding and within the FZs selected for review to evaluate the adequacy of the fire resistance in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, and Appendix A of BTP APCSB 9.5-1. The team reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the seal material was of the appropriate fire rating. A sample of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures for selected fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals was reviewed to ensure that these passive fire barrier features were properly inspected and maintained. Additionally, the team verified that the as-built configurations met the engineering design, standard industry practices, and were properly evaluated or qualified by appropriate fire endurance tests. The fire protection features included in the review are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.03 Active Fire Suppression a. Inspection Scope

The team’s review of active fire suppression included the fire detection systems, fire protection water supply system, automatic fire suppression systems and manual fire fighting fire hose and standpipe systems. The inspection of fire detection systems included a review and walk-down of the as-built configuration of the systems as compared to the applicable NFPA standard. In general, the acceptance criteria applied to active fire suppression systems were contained in applicable codes and standards listed in the Attachment as modified by the design basis documents. The team inspected the material condition, and operational lineup of fire detection and fire suppression systems through in-plant observation of systems, design and testing of the sprinkler systems in reference to the applicable NFPA codes and standards. The

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Enclosure

team also reviewed the detection and suppression methods for the category of fire hazards in the selected FAs/FZs. The locations of sprinkler heads in FZ 7 were checked for obstructions, which consisted of reviewing the system layout drawings against the field installation. The redundancy of fire protection water sources and fire pumps to fulfill their fire protection function to provide adequate flow and pressure to hose stations and automatic suppression systems were reviewed as compared to licensing basis requirements. Additionally, the team performed inspections of smoke control equipment availability and condition, hose station locations, hose lengths, and nozzle types. Particular attention was given to location and capacity of hose stations and approach routes to the FZs. The hose stations, as designated in the pre-fire plans for the selected FZs, were reviewed to assess whether adequate reach and coverage was provided. The team reviewed and walked down operational aspects of the fire detection system such as the location of panels and alarms. The team compared the detector layout drawings against actual detector field locations, NFPA Code 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors, spacing, and placement requirements. The testing and maintenance program and its implementation for the fire detection system were also reviewed. Specific fire brigade attributes evaluated were: (1) staffing, training, and response strategies; (2) utilization of pre-fire planning; (3) fitness for duty and qualification training; (4) equipment lockers, offsite fire department communications, and staging procedures; and (5) personal protective equipment and emergency lighting. The team reviewed fire drill critique reports that transpired over the last 12 months at or in the vicinity of the selected FZs to assess the fire brigade readiness to respond to any and all fires that may occur. The team supplemented the documentation reviews by discussions with persons responsible for fire brigade performance. The team examined the fire brigade staging and dress-out areas to assess the operational readiness of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. The fire brigade personal protective equipment, self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) and SCBA cylinder refill capability were checked for adequacy and functionality. The team walked down the selected FZs to compare the associated fire fighting pre-plan strategy drawings with as-built plant conditions and fire response procedures. This was done to verify that fire fighting pre-plan strategies and drawings were consistent with the fire protection features and pertinent information was provided to fire brigade members to identify potential effects to plant and personnel safety, and to facilitate suppression of an exposure fire that could impact SSD capability.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. .04 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities a. Inspection Scope

The team evaluated whether the automatic fixed sprinkler systems or manual fire fighting activities could adversely affect the credited SSD equipment, inhibit access to alternate shutdown equipment, and/or adversely affect the local operator actions required for SSD in the selected fire areas. With regard to the fixed automatic pre-action sprinkler system in the Unit 2 Hallway (FZ 7), the team considered consequences of a pipe break, and inadvertent system actuation. The team also checked that sprinkler system water would either be contained in the fire affected area or be safely drained off.

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Enclosure

The team addressed the possibility that a fire in one FZ could lead to activation of an automatic suppression system in another FZ through the migration of smoke or hot gases, and thereby adversely affect SSD. Air flow paths out of the selected FZs were reviewed to verify that inter-area migration of smoke or hot gases would not inhibit necessary operator actions. This portion of the inspection was carried out through a combination of walk-downs, drawings, and records review.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability a. Inspection Scope

The team verified that the licensee’s alternative shutdown methodology properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions for a fire in FA 5 (FZ 16) and in FA A3 (FZ 7) in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Section III.G.3. The team reviewed the licensee’s UFSAR, SSA, DSPs, emergency operating procedures (EOP), and other supporting documents for postulated fires in the selected FA/FZs. The reviews focused on ensuring that the required functions for post-fire SSD and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those functions were included in the procedures. The team also made a comparison of the SSA and the SSD procedures with regard to credited SSD equipment to verify that the two were consistent. The team assessed the timeliness of the operators in identifying and assessing the initial plant conditions, response to suspected fire, and subsequent actions credited afterwards. The inspectors verified the licensee personnel credited for procedure implementation had procedures available, were trained on implementation, and were available in the event a fire occurred. Reviews included verification that alternative shutdown could be accomplished with or without offsite power. Operational Implementation The team reviewed the training lesson plans of licensed and non-licensed operators to verify that the training reinforced the shutdown methodology in the SSA, DSPs, and EOPs for the selected FZs. The team also conducted interviews and reviewed shift manning procedures to verify that personnel required for SSD using alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available onsite, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members. The team performed tabletop reviews of post-fire SSD procedure DSP-002, “Hot Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System” and also performed a walk through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team checked whether the SSD procedures included steps to prevent or mitigate the consequences of spurious operations. The team walked down the in-plant location of all operator actions specified in the DSP procedures with operations personnel to evaluate the expected ambient conditions, relative difficulty and operator familiarization associated with each operator action. The team reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that

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Enclosure

they would remain free from fire damage. The team reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.

b. Findings No findings were identified. .06 Circuit Analyses a. Inspection Scope This segment is suspended for plants in transition, because a more detailed review of

cable routing and circuit analysis will be conducted as part of the fire protection program transition to NFPA 805. However, to support this inspection, a limited scope review of a select sample of SSD components was conducted to verify that the existing fire response procedures were adequate for a postulated fire in any of the selected FAs. The cables examined were based upon a list of SSD components selected by the team. The team reviewed the electrical control wiring diagrams and identified the cables associated with the SSD components and examined in detail the cable routing and potential for fire damage and the effects on the circuit. The specific components reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified. .07 Communications a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of the communication systems to support plant personnel in the performance of local operator manual actions to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis and associated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would be available to plant personnel and fire brigade following a fire. The team also reviewed the communication systems available at different locations within the plant that would be relied upon to support fire event notification and fire brigade fire fighting activities to verify their availability. During this review the team considered the effects of ambient noise levels, clarity of reception, reliability and coverage patterns. In addition, the team reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for the communication systems to verify that the plant telephones, portable radios, and mini-cell phones would be available to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required duties during a fire. The team inspected the contents of designated emergency storage lockers and reviewed the alternate shutdown procedure to verify that dedicated alternative shutdown communications system was available, operable, and adequate for the performance of designated activities.

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Enclosure

b. Findings No findings were identified.

.08 Emergency Lighting a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the emergency lighting system required to support plant personnel during the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, and for illuminating access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions are required. The locations and positioning of emergency lights were observed during a walk-through of Procedure DSP-002, Revision 41, “Hot Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System,” and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas to provide reasonable assurance of illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post fire safe shutdown. The team verified that the battery power supplies were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity. The team also verified that the emergency lighting units were maintained in accordance with the manufacturer recommendations, tested and performed maintenance in accordance with plant procedures and industry practices. The team validated that the emergency lighting system was scoped into the licensee’s Maintenance Rule Program. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified. 09. Cold Shutdown Repairs a. Inspection Scope

10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.1(b) allows repairs to be made to equipment needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown that was damaged by a fire provided that such equipment can be repaired within 72 hours of the fire. Section III.L.5 requires that material for such repairs shall be readily available on site and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs. The team reviewed the licensee’s procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and independently verify that the equipment, tools, and supplies used for the repairs following a fire were available and accessible. Using procedure DSP-012, Revision 12, “Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Control/Power Repair Procedure” and DSP-008, Revision 9, “Residual Heat Removal Pump Repair Procedure,” the team evaluated whether these components could be repaired in the time frames specified in their design and licensing basis. The procedures were reviewed for completeness and clarity. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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Enclosure

.10 Compensatory Measures a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded, and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, or pumps, valves or electrical devices providing SSD functions or capabilities). The team reviewed selected items on the fire protection impairment list and compared them with the FZs selected for inspection. The compensatory measures that had been established in these zones were compared to those specified for the applicable fire protection feature in fire protection procedure FP-012, Revision 12, “Fire Protection Systems Minimum Equipment and Compensatory Measures.” The team checked that the risk associated with removing the fire protection feature from service was properly assessed and adequate compensatory measures were implemented in accordance with the approved FPP. Additionally, the team reviewed the licensee’s short term compensatory measures (compensatory fire watches) to verify that they were adequate to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken and that the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified. 11. Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the administrative control of combustible materials and ignition sources. Plant administrative procedures were reviewed to determine if adequate controls were in place to control the handling of in-situ and transient combustibles in the plant. The team walked down numerous areas in the plant, including the selected FZs, for control of combustible materials, storage of in-plant materials, transient combustibles and general housekeeping. The team reviewed controls on the potential ignition sources of welding and grinding. Reviews of flow diagrams and engineering calculations associated with the ‘A and B’ battery room (FZ 16) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. This review was done to verify that systems used to accomplish safe shutdown would not be inhibited by potential hazardous hydrogen gas concentrations and fire in the battery room. The team performed fire model calculations, using NRC recommended computer codes, to estimate the rate of hydrogen generation in the battery room and the ventilation system’s effectiveness. This review was performed to ensure that hydrogen gas concentrations generated by the station batteries remained below explosive limits.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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Enclosure

.12 B.5.b Inspection Activities a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed, on a sampling basis, the licensee’s external spent fuel pool mitigation measures for large fires and explosions to verify that the measures were feasible, personnel were trained to implement the strategies, and equipment was properly staged and maintained. The team requested and reviewed maintenance records of required equipment. Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation, and plant walk-downs, the team verified the engineering basis to establish reasonable assurance that the makeup capacity could be provided for the minimum time using the specified equipment and water sources. The team reviewed the licensee’s capability to provide a reliable and available water source and the ability to provide the minimum fuel supply. Additionally, the team reviewed printed and video drill records of the implementation of the selected strategies. The team performed a walk-down of the storage and staging areas for the B.5.b equipment to verify that equipment identified for use in the current procedures were available and maintained. In the presence of licensee staff, the team conducted an independent audit and inventory of required equipment and a visual inspection of the dedicated credited power source. The team reviewed training records of the licensee’s staff to verify that operator training/familiarity with the strategy objectives and implementing guidelines was accomplished according to the established training procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed recent independent licensee fire protection program audits for thoroughness, completeness and conformance to requirements. Requirements for the independent audits are contained in Regulatory Guide 1.189, “Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants,” Generic Letter 82-21, “Technical Specifications for Fire Protection Audits,” and the licensee’s Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 17, “Quality Assurance.” The team reviewed Nuclear Assessment Section Audit RNAS-08-022, dated April 17, 2008, and Self Assessment Report No. 311294-03, completed October 8, 2009. The team also reviewed corrective action program documents, including completed corrective actions documented in selected action requests (ARs) and operating experience program documents, to ascertain whether industry-identified fire protection problems actually or potentially affecting RNP were appropriately entered into, and resolved by, the corrective action program process. Items included in the review were NRC Information Notices, industry or vendor-generated reports of defects and non-compliances submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 21, and vendor information letters. The team

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Enclosure

evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for the identified issues. Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. 4OA3 Event Follow-Up (Discussed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000261/2008-01, Unprotected Post-Fire

Safe Shutdown Cables and Related Non-Feasible Local Manual Operator Actions

This LER describes a situation where an Appendix R local operator action for alternate shutdown would have been delayed or prevented due to an improper lock configuration on a gate between the Radwaste Building and the auxiliary boiler. It also involved the lock configuration control and human error issues.

The team reviewed the facts of the subject LER as well as NRC guidance, and

evaluations and analysis conducted by the licensee. The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s immediate corrective actions to ensure proper action was taken to prevent recurrence. In addition, the team reviewed the licensee’s root cause evaluation to ensure a thorough assessment was performed. This LER will remain open pending completion of the inspectors’ review of the technical impacts the delayed operator action would have had on the safe shutdown strategy.

4OA5 Other Activities .1 (Discussed) Unresolved Item (URI) 05000261/2004006-03, Appendix R Safe Shutdown

Vulnerabilities The team reviewed the facts of the subject URI as well as evaluations and corrective

actions taken by the licensee. The NRC inspection team conducted onsite interviews with appropriate licensee staff and reviewed Engineering Change 58657R12, Condition Reports NCR 11308 and AR 136517, and associated plant drawings and procedures to verify that corrective actions were adequately implemented. Additional corrective actions and plant modifications are planned to occur during the licensee revalidation process as they transition the existing fire protection licensing basis to 10CFR 50.48(C), NFPA 805. This URI will remain open pending final review by the inspectors of these additional corrective actions and modifications.

.2 (Discussed) Unresolved Item (URI) 05000261/2004006-04, Inadequate Corrective

Actions For Appendix R Safe Shutdown Vulnerabilities

This URI is associated with NRI 05000261/2004006-03 discussed above. The team reviewed the facts of the subject URI as well as existing operating experience,

NRC guidance and evaluations and analysis conducted by the licensee.

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Enclosure

In addressing the concern regarding inadequate corrective actions taken for the Appendix R safe shutdown vulnerabilities identified above, the licensee conducted an adverse condition investigation (AR 136517) and concluded that given the combination of conservative assumptions applied in NCR 11308, the mitigating factors not credited in the NCR (some of which are credited in the current licensing basis of the plant) and the influential factors associated with the postulated fire induced circuit failures, the initial compensatory measures provided adequate assurance that the core would remain covered. In the case of the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), it was shown by calculation and a simulator run that the manual actions to remove power and close the valves can be achieved prior to core uncovery with no resulting core damage. Additionally, the NRC inspection team concluded that once operators take the actions in FP-001 and DSP-002 to close the pressurizer PORVs and associated block valves, the re-opening of the block valve(s) would constitute a multiple spurious operation. Furthermore, once the pressurizer PORVs are closed and de-energized, the reopening of its associated block valve would have no additional adverse consequence. This issue will remain open pending closure of the associated URI (URI 05000261/2004006-03) discussing the technical aspects of this finding.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On April 1, 2010, the inspection team leader presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. E. McCartney, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee’s staff. The license acknowledged the results. A re-exit was conducted with the licensee’s staff on May 13, 2010 and June 29, 2010, to discuss the final disposition of the inspection results. The licensee also confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Discussed 05000261/2004006-03 URI Appendix R Safe Shutdown Vulnerabilities (Section

4OA5.1) 05000261/2004006-04 URI Inadequate Corrective Actions for Appendix R Safe

Shutdown Vulnerabilities (Section 4OA5.2) 05000261/2008-01 LER Unprotected Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Cables and

Related Non-Feasible Local Manual Operator Actions (Section 4OA5.3)

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel G. Sanders, Licensing Contact C. Castel, Licensing Supervisor B. McCabe, Regulatory Affairs Manager J. Ertman, Corporate Fire Protection Supervisor B. Gerwe, Fire Protection Manager W. Farmer, Engineering Manager K. Jensen, Maintenance Manager S. Saunders, Plant General Manager J. Lucas, Nuclear Assurance Manager S. West, Security Manager J. Rhodes, Radiation Protection Superintendent K. Jones, Operations Manager E. McCartney, Vice President

NRC personnel D. Bollock, Resident Inspector, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant R. Nease, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II

Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

LIST OF FIRE BARRIER FEATURES INSPECTED (Refer Report Section 1RO5.03- Passive Fire Barriers)

Fire Barriers Floors/Walls/Ceiling Identification Description Poured concrete wall FZ 7 to FZ 2 Concrete ceiling FZ 16 to FZ 34 Fire Damper Identification Description FD-14 FZ 7 to FZ 4 FD-16 FZ 7 to FZ 4 FD-17 FZ 7 to FZ 5 FD-20 FZ 7 to FZ 5 FD-45 FZ 16 to FZ 20 Fire Door Identification Description FDR-3 FZ 7 to FZ 5 FDR-11 FZ 16 to FZ 20 FDR-20 FZ 7 to FZ 4 FDR-24 FZ 7 to FZ 2 Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Identification Description 2322 FZ 7 to FZ 4 2334 FZ 7 to FZ 4 2338 FZ7 to FZ 4 2541 FZ 7 to FZ 5 2562 FZ 7 to FZ 5 4602 FZ 16 to FZ 20 4617 FZ 16 to FZ 20

Attachment

LIST OF COMPONENTS REVIEWED

(Refer to Report Section 1R05.01 / 1R05.05 / 1R05.06 – Circuit Analyses)

Component Identification Description

LI-607A-2 Steam Generator Wide Range Level LI-607B-2 Steam Generator Wide Range Level LI-607C-2 Steam Generator Wide Range Level TI-413B RCS Temperature THot TI-410B RCS Temperature TCold LI-1454C Condensate Storage Tank Level RV-1 Steam Generator PORV RV-2 Steam Generator PORV RC-3 Steam Generator PORV PIC-477 Defeat Switches PIC-497 Defeat Switches

Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Applicable Codes and Standards ASTM E 814, Standard Method for Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops, August 10,

2000 IEEE 634, IEEE Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test, 06/21/1979 Fire Protection Handbook, 17th Edition NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 1977 Edition NFPA 14, Installation of Standpipe and Hose System, 1974 Edition NFPA 80, Fire Doors and Windows, 1975-1993 Editions NFPA 90A, Installation Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, 1989 Edition NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric

Generating Plants, 2001 Edition NFPA 72E, Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors, 1974 Edition NFPA 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary Protection

Signaling Systems, 1975 and 1986 Editions NUREG-1552, Supplement 1, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards Underwriters Laboratory Standard 555, Standard for Fire Dampers and Ceiling Dampers, dated

May 14, 1979 Procedures AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control, Rev. 14 AOP-032, Response to Flooding from the Fire Protection System, Rev. 6 AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, Rev. 26 AOP-041, Response to Fire Event, Rev. 1 APP-038, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus and Fire Brigade Breathing Air Supply, Rev. 9 APP-044, Fire Alarm Console (FAC), Rev. 18 CM-620, Fire Door Installation, Rev. 19 CM-621, Structural, Mechanical, and Electrical Penetration Fire Barriers, Rev. 34 CM-737, Fire Detection and Actuation Panel Ground Fault Isolation, Rev. 2 EDP-006, Lighting Panels, Rev. 52 EDP-011, Dedicated/Shutdown Emergency Lighting Units, Rev. 19 DSP-001, Alternate Shutdown Diagnostic, Rev. 9 DSP-002, Hot Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System, Rev. 41 DSP-015, Hot Shutdown From the Control Room with a Fire in the Turbine Building, Rev. 6 DSP-002-BD, DSP-002 Basis Document, Rev. 41 DSP-007, Cold Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System, Rev. 23 DSP-008, RHR Pump Power Repair Procedure, Rev. 9 DSP-009, RHR System Flow Indication Repair Procedure, Rev. 2 DSP-011, RHR System Temperature Indication Repair, Rev. 2 DSP-012, Pressurizer PORV Control/Power Repair Procedure, Rev.12 DSP-015-BD, Basis Document, Hot Shutdown from the Control Room with a Fire in the Turbine

Building, Rev. 6 FIR-NGGC-0003, Hot Work Permit, Rev. 4 FIR-NGGC-0004, Determination of Combustible Loading and Equivalent Fire Severity, Rev. 2 FIR-NGGC-0005, Fire Door and Frame Repair, Rev. 1 FP-001, Fire Emergency, Rev. 57 FP-002, Fire Report, Rev. 16 FP-003, Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev. 25 FP-004, Duties of a Fire Watch, Rev. 14

5

Enclosure

FP-006, Handling of Flammable Liquids and Gases, Rev. 4 FP-010, Housekeeping Controls, Rev. 30 FP-012, Fire Protection Systems Minimum Equipment and Compensatory Measures, Rev. 12 FP-014, Control of Fire Barrier Penetrations, Rev. 10 FPP-RNP-100, Appendix R Separation Analysis Safe-Shutdown Component Index, Rev. 9 FPP-RNP-150, Appendix R Separation Analysis Safe-Shutdown Cable Schedule, Rev. 9 FPP-RNP-300, Appendix R Long Term Compliance Safe-Shutdown Component/Cable Separation Analysis, Rev. 9 MNT-NGGC-0004, Scaffolding Control, Rev. 11 OMM-002, Fire Protection Manual, Rev. 41 OP-802, Low Voltage Fire Detection and Actuation System, Rev. 14 OST-013, Weekly Checks and Operations (Weekly), Rev. 89 OST-610, Unit 2 Portable Fire Extinguishers, Fire Hose Stations and Houses (Monthly), Rev. 51 OST-611-7, Low Voltage Fire Detection and Actuation System Zone 12, Rev. 3 OST-611-10, Low Voltage Fire Detection and Actuation System Zones 16, 17, 18, 29 & 30

(Semi-annual), Rev. 8 OST-624, Fire Damper Inspection (18-Month), Rev. 21 OST-625, Fire Door Inspection (Semi-Annually) Rev. 30 OST-629, Zone 12 and Zone 14 Pre-Action Sprinkler System Quarterly Flow and Low Air Alarm

Test, Rev. 25 OST-632, Unit No. 2 Fire Suppression Water System Flow Test (3-Year), Rev. 19 OST-639, Fire Equipment Inventory (Monthly), Rev. 31 OST-906, Emergency Control Station Test (Refueling), Rev. 21 OST-922, Dedicated Shutdown Equipment Identification Audit, Rev. 27 PLP-076, Portable Transceiver Usage, Rev. 8 PM-047, Emergency Lighting System Unit Load Test, Rev. 5 PM-163, Inspection and Testing of Circuit Breakers for 480 Volt Bus E2, Rev. 27 PM-402, Inspection and Testing of Circuit Breakers for 480 Volt Bus E1, Rev. 39 PM-418, Smoke Detector Sensitivity Checks, Rev. 0 PM-459, Self Contained DC Emergency Lighting System, Rev. 13 SD-045, Fire Detection and Actuation System, Rev. 4 SP-771, Verification and Documentation of Dedicated Shutdown Emergency Lighting Adequacy,

Rev. 5 TPP-219, Fire Protection Training Program, Rev. 18 Fire Protection Pre-Plans and Fire Drill Critiques Fire Protection Pre-Plan, OMM-003, Section 8.1, Auxiliary Building Hallway Central, Rev. 55 Fire Protection Pre-Plan, OMM-003, Section 8.2, Auxiliary Building Hallway North, Rev. 55 Fire Protection Pre-Plan, OMM-003, Section 8.3, Auxiliary Building Hallway South, Rev. 55 Fire Protection Pre-Plan, OMM-003, Section 8.20, A and B Battery Room, Rev. 55 Fire Protection Pre-Plan, OMM-003, Section 8.42, Turbine Building Ground Floor Level, Rev. 55 Fire Protection Pre-Plan, OMM-003, Section 8.53, 4KV Switchgear Room, Rev. 55 Fire Drill Critiques, for the Period 01/19/2009 to 12/05/2009 Completed Surveillances Combustible Item Quarterly Walk-down Sheets, FP-003, Attachment 10.8, completed 3/3/2010 OST-610, Unit 2 Portable Fire Extinguishers, Fire Hose Stations & Houses (Monthly), completed

10/4/2009, 12/5/2009, 12/30/2009, and 1/26/2010 OST-013, Weekly Checks and Operations (Weekly), Re. 89, 03/07/2010 OST-922, Dedicated Shutdown Equipment Identification Audit, Rev. 27, 02/28/2010 OST-639, Fire Equipment Inventory (Monthly), Rev. 31, 1/26/2010, 2/17/2010, and 3/20/2010

6

Enclosure

OST-701-6, Manual Valve Cycling Inservice Test, Rev. 13, 04/14/2009 OST-906, Emergency Control Station Test (Refueling), Rev. 20, 11/02/2008 OST-906, Emergency Control Station Test (Refueling), Rev. 20, 02/24/2009 OST-918, Dedicated Shutdown Equipment and Instrumentation Check (Monthly), Rev. 15,

03/03/2010 OST-922, Dedicated Shutdown Equipment Identification Audit, Rev. 27, 02/01/2010 OST-936, Emergency Equipment Inventory (Quarterly), Rev.21, 02/16/2010 Audits and Self Assessment Reports Assessment # RNAS-08-022, RNP Fire Protection Program Assessment, 04/17/2008 Assessment # 311294-03, RNP Fire Protection/Safe Shutdown Program Effectiveness,

10/8/2009 Emergency Lighting System Health Report, 2/18/10 Fire Protection System (6175) Health Report, 01/29/2009 Fire Protection System (6175) Health Report, 10/16/2009 Fire Detection System (6180) Health Report, 01/27/2009 Fire Detection System (6180) Health Report, 10/16/2009 Fire Protection System (6175) Health Report, 01/29/2009 Emergency Lighting Work Order Records WO# 00885070 WO# 01544256 WO# 01490416 WO# 00863906 WO# 01584763 WO# 01508396 WO# 00834522 WO# 01525651 WO# 01540843 WO# 00862460 WO# 01446948 WO# 01531755 WO# 001643599 WO# 01450696 WO# 01451330 Design Changes EC 73882, Appendix R Emergency Lighting Modification PCHG-DESG, Engineering Change 61818R2 PCHG-DESG, Engineering Change 58651R12 Calculations and Evaluations CPL025.0200.0001, Combustible Loading Calculation, RNP, Rev. 23 GID/R87038/0014, Fire Barrier System Evaluations of Typical Designs, Rev. 1 FPP-RNP-300, 10 CFR50 Appendix R Long-Term Compliance Safe Shutdown Component/

Cable Separation Analysis, Rev. 9 RNP-E-5.010, Cable Sizing-RHR Pump Repair Cables, 4/27/1989 RNP-M/BMRK-1002, Evaluation of NFPA 30, Unit 2 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks, Code

Compliance Variances, 10/23/2001 RNP-M/BMRK-1004, Evaluation of NFPA 90A, Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems,

03/27/2001 RNP-M/Mech-1675, Evaluation of Non-Standard Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Fire Zone 4,

Damper FD-16, 09/24/2007 RNP-M/Mech-1676, Evaluation of Non-Standard Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Fire Zone 5,

Damper FD-20, 03/19/2002 EE-90-104, General Engineering Evaluation of HVAC Fire Damper and Fire Door Installation

Discrepancies, 01/26/1991 RNP-M/Mech-1725, Evaluation of NFPA 13, Code Compliance Variances, 03/19/2002 5137-M-304, H. B. Robinson Battery Room Hydrogen Concentration Calculation, Rev. 1 RNP-M/MECH-1797, Thermal Hydraulic Response to Appendix R Cooldown Scenarios, Rev. 0 RNP-M/MECH-1712, Appendix R Mechanical Basis, Rev. 11

7

Enclosure

PO38T10, H.B. Robinson Post Fire Procedure: Spurious Operation Analysis, Rev. 4, Action Request Reviewed AR 00250740, SA 220881-14, R1, Review VC Summer & McGuire Reports AR 275634-02, Evaluation of IN 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts AR 233389-07, Evaluation of IN 2007-17, Fires at Nuclear Power Plants AR 243083-07, Evaluation of IN 2007-26, Combustibility of Epoxy Floor Coatings at Commercial

Nuclear Power Plants AR 136517, Additional Compensatory Actions Relating to Spurious Operation of Pressurizer PORVs Beyond Those Described in LER 2003-03 AR/NCR 111308, Two Vulnerabilities of Cables to Fire Damage that could Result in an Unrecoverable Condition Licensing Basis Documents Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Sec. 9.5 Carolina Power & Light Company letter to NRC, Fire Protection Modifications - Additional

Information, 04/02/1979 Carolina Power & Light Company letter to NRC, Fire Protection Program Information,

06/12/1980 Carolina Power & Light Company letter to NRC, Appendix R Exemptions, 02/13/1985 Carolina Power & Light Company letter to NRC, Appendix R Exemption Requests-Additional

Information, 05/10/1985 Carolina Power & Light Company letter to NRC, Rev. to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Separation

Analysis, 5/31/2001 HBR2 Updated FSAR, Appendix 9.5.1A, Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 22 HBR2 Updated FSAR, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Rev. 22 HBR2 Updated FSAR, Section 17, Quality Assurance, Rev. 22 NRC letter to Carolina Power & Light Company, Fire Protection Review of Acceptable Items,

12/08/1980 NRC letter to Carolina Power & Light Company, Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10

CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3, 09/17/1986 Miscellaneous Documents MMM-005, Maintenance Management Manual, Rev. 20, Attachment 13.1, PMR 97-0327,

10/3/1997 CSR608R1, Char Services Final Report, Results for Site Wide High Frequency Electromagnetic

Survey at Robinson, 9/27/07 EMC Test Report 9668-01, Test Report for the Emissions Mapping at Progress Energy Robinson Nuclear Plant, Rev. 1, 5/10/07 Work Order 01008132, Emergency Battery Replacement in FDAP-A1, 6/28/08 Work Order 01034546, Emergency Battery Replacement in FDAP-B1, 11/04/08 Fire Impairments List for Time Period 01/01/2009 through 12/31/2009 General Employee Training Fire Protection Module and Outage Fire Protection Housekeeping

Human Performance Tips Refuel Outage 25 Handbook, Fire Protection SD-045, Operations Training, Plant System Description, Fire Detection and Actuation System,

Rev. 4 S18 1.4, Electrical Engineering Guides and Data, Ebasco Services Incorporated, Rev. 3 SD-021, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 10 SD-056, Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator, Rev. 7

8

Enclosure

OPS-NGGC-1000, Att. 1, Shift Staffing, Rev.3 OMM-001-12, Att. 10.13, Inside AO Turnover Sheet, Rev. 65 OMM-001-12, Att. 10.14, Outside AO Turnover Sheet, Rev. 65 Drawings B-190628, Transducer Power Supply, Sheet 1, Rev. 12 B-190628, Mux 3 to Aux. Relay Panels CE & CF, Sheet 1453, Rev. 1 B-190627, Power Distribution from Power Panels, Sheet 45, Rev. 9 B-190627, Auxiliary Electrical Distribution System Single Line Diagram Motor Control Center, Sheet 2, Rev. 7 B-190628, V2-14A, SDAFW Pump to S/G A, Sheet 647A, Rev. 11 B-190628, V2-14A, SDAFW Pump to S/G A, Sheet 647B, Rev 14 B-190628, V2-14A, SDAFW Pump to S/G A, Sheet 647C, Rev 10 B-190628, Dedicated Shutdown Instrumentation Interconnection Diagram, Sheet 1070, Rev. 8 5379-3502, Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Temperature, Rev. 28 5379-3527, RCS Cold Leg Temp-PRZR Relief Tank Pressure, Rev. 31 5379-3232, Safeguards System, Rev. 32 B-109628, RWST to Charging Pump Suction Header Valve LCV-115B, Sheet 198, Rev. 8 B-109628, RC-535, Pressurizer PORV PCV-456 Block, Sheet 121, Rev. 18 B-109628, RC-536, Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C Block, Sheet 122, Rev. 27 B-109628, Switch Development, Sheet 37, Rev. 16 B-109628, Pressurizer Relief Valve PCV-456, Sheet 119, Rev. 28 B-109628, Pressurizer Relief Valve PCV-455C, Sheet 120A, Rev. 21 B-109628, Pressurizer Relief Valve PCV-456 (R.G. 1.97 Indication), Sheet 120B, Rev. 16 B-109628, LCV-115C Volume Control Tank Discharge, Sheet 160, Rev. 16 B-109628, 52/34B, Charging Pump “A” Fire Protection Related, Sheet 161, Rev. 27 B-109628, 52/21B, Charging Pump “B,” Sheet 162A, Rev. 19 B-109628, 52/23A, Charging Pump “C,” Sheet 163A, Rev. 20 G-190304, HVAC-Turb., Fuel, Aux., Reactor & Radwaste Buildings, Sheet 3, Rev. 22 G-190400, Reactor Auxiliary Building Plan-Masonry, Sheet 1, Rev. 26 G-190495, Reactor Auxiliary Building Plan-Plumbing and Drainage, Sheet 1, Rev. 9 G-190496, Reactor Auxiliary Building Plan-Riser Diagrams and Details, Plumbing and Drainage,

Sheet 1, Rev. 9 G-190626, 480 & 120/208 Volt One Line Diagram, Rev. 16, Sheet 2 HBR2-8255, Fire Protection System Flow Diagram, Sheet 1, Rev. 14 HBR2-8255, Fire Protection System Flow Diagram, Sheet 2, Rev. 31 HBR2-8255, Fire Protection System Deluge & Pre-Action Control Valve Flow Diagram, Sheet 5,

Rev. 17 HBR2-8319, Fire Dampers, Sheet 95, Rev. 1 HBR2-9716, Fire Barrier Penetrations, Sheet 91, Rev. 8 HBR2-9716, Fire Barrier Penetrations, Sheet 109, Rev. 0 HBR2-9716, Fire Barrier Penetrations, Sheet 116, Rev. 5 HBR2-9716, Fire Barrier Penetrations, Sheet 130, Rev. 1 HBR2-9716, Fire Barrier Penetrations, Sheet 283, Rev. 11 HBR2-9717, Turbine Building Ground Floor Plan, Rev. 4, Sheet 4 HBR2-9717, Fire Area/Zone Locations, Rev. 6, Sheet 2 HBR2-9717, Turbine Building Mezzanine Floor Plan, Rev. 1, Sheet 5 HBR2-9717, Fire Area/Zone Locations, Rev. 3, Sheet 1 HBR2-9717, Fire Area/Zone Locations, Rev. 4, Sheet 3 HBR2-9717, Turbine Building Operating Floor Plan, Rev. 0, Sheet 6 HBR2-9717, Turbine Building Sections, Rev. 0, Sheet 7 HBR2-9717, Fire Area/Zone Locations, Sheet 1, Rev. 3

9

Enclosure

HBR2-9717, Fire Area/Zone Locations, Sheet 1, Rev. 5 HBR2-9717, Fire Area/Zone Locations, Sheet 2, Rev. 6 HBR2-11390, Appendix R and Station Blackout Safe-Shutdown Analysis Flowpath/Boundary Diagram, Sheet 20B, Rev. 0 HBR2-11390, Appendix R and Station Blackout Safe-Shutdown Analysis Flowpath/Boundary

Diagram, Sheet 3, Rev. 3 HBR2-10291, P/A Communication System Single Line Diagram for PP-48, Rev. 1 HBR2-11324, Post-Fire Operation Routes, Operating Locations and Emergency Lighting Unit

Locations, Rev. 6, Sheet 3 HBR2-11324, Post-Fire Operation Routes, Operating Locations and Emergency Lighting Unit

Locations, Rev. 10, Sheet 1 HBR2-11324, Post-Fire Operation Routes, Operating Locations and Emergency Lighting Unit

Locations, Rev. 5, Sheet 5 HBR2-11324, Post-Fire Operation Routes, Operating Locations and Emergency Lighting Unit

Locations, Rev. 4, Sheet 4 HBR2-11324, Post-Fire Operation Routes, Operating Locations and Emergency Lighting Unit

Locations, Rev. 13, Sheet 2 Lesson Plans FPLP001R, Fire Brigade Lesson Plan Duties and Responsibilities, Rev. 8 Robinson Fire Protection Initiative Project Items Identified During This Inspection 514, Evaluate NFPA 805 process for determining reliability of electrical solenoid valve and release cables which actuate fire suppression systems 516, Ensure SSD manual operator actions feasibility analysis to support that there are no unacceptable consequences from a fire event, manual fire fighting activities, or potential actuation of fire suppression systems Technical Manuals and Vendor Information Technical Manual 728-563-05, External Wiring Series DCF & DCM Fire Pump Controller 6965N,

Rev. 2 Technical Manual 734-172-71, Fire Protection Pyrotronics System 3, 10/13/09 Technical Data Sheet for Power Sonic Rechargeable Sealed Lead-Acid Battery, PS-12180 Technical Data Sheet for Carboline Inc., Intumastic 285 Fire Protective Coating, 03/2006 LIST OF NCRS GENERATED AS A RESULT OF THIS INSPECTION 387768 INSTRUMENT AIR PRESSURE GAGE REMOVED FCV-479 AND FCV-499 387662 DSP-015, REV 6, FIRE IN TURBINE BLDG S/D AND IMPEDANCE TRIPS 387765 WCC DS RADIO RELOCATION 390236 IDENTIFICATION OF TIME CRITICAL ACTIONS IN FPP-RNP-300 390673 IDENTIFICATION OF RESOLUTION METHOD IN FPP-RNP-300

Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure APCSB Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch AR Action Request BTP Branch Technical Position CAP Corrective Action Program CFR Code of Federal Regulations DC Direct Current DSP Dedicated Shutdown Procedure ELU Emergency Lighting Unit EOP Emergency Operating Procedure FA Fire Area FPP Fire Protection Program FZ Fire Zone HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Condition IR Inspection Report IP NRC Inspection Procedure LCV Level Control Valve LER Licensee Event Report MCR Main Control Room NFPA National Fire Protection Association NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG An explanatory document published by the NRC OMA Operator Manual Action P&IDs Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams PORV Power Operated Relief Valve RCS Reactor Coolant System Rev Revision RNP H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant ROP Reactor Oversight Process RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus SER Safety Evaluation Report SDP Significance Determination Process SSA Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis SSD Safe Shutdown TFPI Triennial Fire Protection Inspection UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report URI Unresolved Item VAC Volts Alternating Current VCT Volume Control Tank VDC Volts Direct Current

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