1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ) Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule ) RM18-1-000 COMMENTS BY AMORY B. LOVINS, COFOUNDER AND CHIEF SCIENTIST, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE (22830 Two Rivers Road, Basalt CO 81621)Inlanguageurgentwithoutevidence1,alarmistwithoutcause2,andperemptorywithoutauthority3,theSecretaryofEnergydirects4theindependentFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)toreversetheNation’sbedrockelectricitypolicyofopenwholesalecompetition,painstakinglyevolvedoverfourdecades.Instead,hewouldfavorandrewardderegulatedcoalandnuclearplantsoverallotherresour-ces—givinguncompetitivemerchantplantsusingthosetwofuels,andnoothers,theadvantagesofratebasingregardlessofneed,cost,prudency,oractualuse.Tomyknowledge,noelectricalresourceanywherehaseverbeenaffordedanysuchsubsi-dybyFERC,letaloneresourceswhoseownerschoseandfailedtocompetetheminopenmarkets.Forthisunprecedentedproposal,theSecretaryinventsanimaginaryemergency,afancifulrationale,andnonexistentauthorities.Icannotrecallanyreg-ulatoryproposalsounhingedfrommarkets,facts,logic,andlegalandpolicynorms.TheCommissionshouldaffordtheSecretary’sviewsthedueprocesssetbylawandcourtesy,butisnounderobligationtoacceptthem,andindeedcouldnotdosoviaareasoneddecisionbasedonasoundevidentiaryrecord.Noneofthe14attributeslatelyclaimedtojustifyout-of-marketsupportforcoalandnuclearplants,includingtheSecretary’scentral“fuelonhand”attribute,actuallyoffersmaterialrealbenefitsormeritsextrapayment.5

1JointMotionoftheEnergyIndustriesAssociation,FERCRM18-1-000,2Oct2017,https://info.aee.net/hubfs/Joint_Energy_Motion_on_DOE_Letter_NOPR_to_FERC.10.2.17.pdf.2NeithertheSecretary’sAugust2017StaffReportonElectricityMarketsandReliability(fromwhichtheNOPRcherry-picksbriefquotationsinconsistentwithitsbroadanalysis),thereliabilityauthorityNERC(NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation),anyregionalIndependentSystemOperator(ISO)orRegionalTransmissionOrganization(RTO),oranyotherdisinterestedauthorityhasack-nowledgedthereliabilityemergencythattheNOPRclaims.(Otherdiscordantsourcesarecitedonthefirstpageofref.5.)TheSecretary’surgencyisevidentlyaboutpolitics,notelectricity.3DOEOrganizationAct(42USC84),§7171(d)and§7175.4FERC,“GridResiliencyPricingRule,”82FR46940–46948,10Oct2017(18CFR35);originalDOENoticeofProposedRulemaking(NOPR)originaltestposted29Sep2017athttps://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/09/f37/Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Rulemaking%20.pdf.5A.Lovins,“Docoalandnucleargenerationdeserveabove-marketprices?,”TheElectricityJournal30:2–30(July2017),http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2017.06.002.AnExelon-sponsoredcritiquebyD.Murphy&M.Berkmanandmyresponseareinpressatthesamejournal(2017).

2

Myexperience6intheelectricityandnational-securityissuestheSecretaryinvokesleadsmetobelievethathisNOPRisnotjustunjustifiedbutbackwards.Hispolicywouldnotenhancebutdiminishgridresilienceandnationalsecurity,asthiscommentexplains.I’vesoughttoorganizethecommentasacoherentnarrative,butAnnex2alsotabulatestheFERCStaffquestionscorrespondingtoeachpart,andasStaffinvites,Ihavealsocommentedonmanyquestionsnotasked.TheSecretaryoffersnoargumentorevidencethatexistingwholesalepriceforma-tionisunjustorunreasonable,asFERCwouldneedtofindinordertoapprovehisproposedrule.Moreover,takenintheircontext,theattributeshewantsrewarded,thoughframedasiffuel-neutral,areeffectivelyfuel-specifying—hence“undulydis-criminatoryorpreferential,”aprohibitedpractice.7Asref.5says,too,around-mar-ketinterventions,includingtheNOPR’suniqueones,“distortpool-wideprices,crowdoutcompetitors,discouragenewentrants,destroycompetitivepricediscov-ery,reducetransparency,rewardundueinfluence,introducebias,pickwinners,andinvitecorruption.”TheseoutcomesareallcontrarytoFERC’sduties.TheNOPR’sproposalsarealsolikelytoprovediscouragingtoinvestorsandveryexpensivetocustomers,thoughitsoperationaldetailsaretoovaguetopermiteconomicanalysis.Thiscommentfocusesnotonsucheconomic,legal,orpolicyissues,butratherontheNOPR’sflawedframingandfactbase.IseektocontributeheresomeimportantinformationonwhytheNOPRrestsoncounterfactualbasicassumptionsaboutthereliabilityandresilienceofcoalandnuclearplants,otherresources,andgrids—thusmakingitsprescriptionfarlessablethanother,overlookedtechnicalandpolicyop-tionstoachieveitsstatedgoals.1.ThevitalgoalofresilientelectricalserviceisnearlyunrelatedtotheNOPR’sdemandforrewardingspecificattributesofcertaincentralpowerstations,chieflythesizeoftheironsitefuelinventories.Resilientelectricalservicesrequirethatelectricitybegenerated,delivered,andconvertedbyanend-usedeviceintoeachdesiredservice(hotshowers,coldbeer,illumination,comfort,torque,computation,etc.)inawayresistanttodisruptionbyaccidentormalice,capableofpromptrecovery,andabletolearnfromdisruptionsoitbecomesmoreresilientagainstfutureshocks.(IpreferthisdefinitiontoNARUC’sthoughtfulbutnarrower“robustnessandrecoverycharacteristicsofutilityinfra-structureandoperations,whichavoidorminimizeinterruptionsofserviceduringanextraordinaryandhazardousevent.”SomewhatbetteristheJan.2017DOEQuadrennialEnergyReview’sencapsulation:“Resilienceistheabilityofasystemoritscomponentstoadapttochangingconditionsandwithstandandrapidlyrecoverfromdisruptions”[p.4–4];butresilienceisanattributeofsystems,nottheirparts.)

6PleaseseeattachedAnnex1:Qualifications.I’msolelyresponsibleforanyerrors,butgratefullyack-nowledgereviewcommentsbymyRMIcolleaguesJamesNewcomb,MarkDyson,andRyanLaemel.716USC824e(a).

3

Thedesignprinciplesandpracticesthatcreateenergyresilience(or,astheSecre-tarycallsit,resiliency)werefirstframedforthePentagonin1981,8andstillbroadlyguideDoDdoctrineforresilientpowersuppliestomilitarybasesandotherfacilitiescriticaltonationalsecurity.Theseprinciplesdonotincludecontinuedorenhancedrelianceoninherentlyvulnerablepowerlineshaulingelectricityhundredsofmilesfromremotecentralpowerstations—asystemrifewithsinglepointsandmodesoffailurerequiringcostlyredundanciesbutstillnotfullyeffective,asthesecommentselaborate.Suchgrid-dependenceisthelargestfactorpreventingelectricresilience.Rather,resilientdesignlogicallystartsatthecustomerandworksbackupthesupplychain,seekingtomakethatchainasshortaspossibleandeachofitslinksrobust,redundant,withgracefulfailureandquickreroutingorrepair.AsalaysummaryofBrittlePowerexplained,9aresilientsystem“hasmanyrelativelysmall,dispersedelements,eachhavingalowcostoffailure.Thesesubstitutablecompo-nentsareinterconnectednotatacentralhubbutbymanyshort,robustlinks.Thisconfigurationisanalogoustoatree’smanyleaves,andeachleaf’smanyveins,whichpreventtherandomnibblingsofinsectsfromdisruptingtheflowofvitalnutrients.”TheSecretary’sNOPR10saysnothingaboutgridresilience—thecoresecurityissueforthemodernelectricitysystem—butfocusesexclusivelyoncentralpowerplantsandintentlyontheironsitefuelinventories.Heemphasizesaremark,inacoverletterfromtheCEOofNERC,thatbecomestautologouswithemphasisadded—that“prematureretirementsoffuel-securebaseloadgeneratingstationsreduces[sic]resiliencetofuelsupplydisruptions”—butNERCnowheresaysfuel-supplydisrup-

8A.&L.H.Lovins,BrittlePower:EnergyStrategyforNationalSecurity(esp.Ch.13),499pp.,~1,200refs.,DoD/CEQ/BrickHouse(AndoverMA),1982,ForewordbyADMT.H.Moorer(USNRet,Presi-dentNixon’sChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff)andR.JamesWoolsey(ex-UndersecretaryoftheNavy,laterDirectorofCentralIntelligence),www.rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/brittlepower3ptcombo.pdf;originallyEnergypoliciesforresilienceandnationalsecurity:FinalreporttotheCouncilonEnvironmentalQuality,ExecutiveOfficeofthePresident,1981,commissionedbyFEMA’spredecessor,theDefenseCivilPreparednessAgency;summarizedas“ReducingVulnerability:TheEnergyJugular,”inR.J.Woolsey,ed.,NuclearArms,Inst.forContemp.Studies(SanFrancisco),1983,https://d231jw5ce53gcq.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RMI_Document_Repository_Public-Reprts_S84-23_EnergyJugular.pdf,.Forbroaderenergy-securitycontext,pleaseseealsoA.Lovins,“Howinnovativetechnologies,businessstrategies,andpoliciescandramaticallyenhanceenergysecurityandprosperity,”invitedtestimonytoUSSenateCommitteeonEnergyandNaturalResources,HearingonEnergyIndepen-dence,SD-366,7March2006,https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/E06-02_SenateTestimony.pdf.9A.&L.H.Lovins,“TheFragilityofDomesticEnergy,”Atlantic,Nov1983,https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RMI_Document_Repository_Public-Reprts_S83-08_FragilityDomesticEnergy.pdf.10IascribeitpersonallytotheSecretaryofEnergybecause,basedonDOE’sStaffReporttotheSecretaryonElectricityMarketsandReliability(hereinafterStaffReport),Aug.2017,https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/08/f36/Staff%20Report%20on%20Electricity%20Markets%20and%20Reliability_0.pdf,hisDepartment’sprofessionalstaffdonotappeartosupporttheNOPR’sanalysisorfindings.

4

tionsareadominantandurgentissue.NordoesNERCendorsetheSecretary’sstrikingassertions(NOPRsectionIIpreamble,II.I,III)that:Theresiliencyofthenation’selectricgridisthreatenedbytheprematureretirementsofpowerplantsthatcanwithstandmajorfuelsupplydisruptions….Thesefuel-secureresourcesareindispen-sableforthereliabilityandresiliencyofourelectricgrid….ItistimefortheCommissiontoissuerulestoprotecttheAmericanpeoplefromenergyoutagesexpectedtoresultfromthelossofthisfuel-securegenerationcapacity….Thecontinuedlossoffuel-securegenerationmustbestopped.Thesegenerationresourcesarenecessarytomaintaintheresiliencyoftheelectricgrid….[C]hronicdistortionofthemarkets[i.e.,payingmarketpricesinsufficienttoretaintheseuncompetitiveresour-ces]…isthreateningtheresilienceoftheNation’selectricitysystem….[I]tistheCommission’sim-mediateresponsibilityto…ensurethatthereliabilityandresiliencyattributesofgenerationwithon-sitefuelsuppliesarefullyvaluedand…todevelopnewmarketrulesthatwillachievethisurgentob-jective….Immediateactionisnecessarytoensurefaircompensationinordertostoptheimminentlossofgeneratorswithon-sitefuelsupplies…andavoidthesevereconsequencesthatadditionalshut-downs[offuel-securegenerators]wouldhaveontheelectricgrid….NotoneoftheNOPR’scitedsourcessupportsthesedramaticclaimsnoreventheSecretary’sframingoftheissue.TheDOEStaffReport(sectionB)notesplantretire-mentsbutdoesnotinfercapacityshortagesnorreducedresilience,and(insectionG)callsforpropergridplanningandpricingofreliabilityandresilienceattributesbutnotforrewardingplantshavinglarge“fuelonhand.”DOE’sQuadrennialEnergyReview(sectionD)discussesresilienceandmentionspricing,but(Jan.2017,p.4–41)doesnotcallforcoalornuclearuplifts.TheIHSMarkitstudy(sectionE)decriescoalandnuclearretirementsbutdoesnotspecifythe“lessefficientdiversitycase”underlyingitsclaimsofhighercost,norprovideanalysisjustifyingtheSecretary’surgentreliabilityconcerns.NERC(sectionF)rightlynotesthatsupplyshifts“mustbewellunderstoodandproperlymanaged,”anddescribesitscontinuedmonitoringandimprovementofpotentialfuel-supplyissuesforbothgasandcoal,butdoesnotsupporttheNOPR’srecommendations,nor,asimplied,equate“resiliencetofuelsupplydisruptions”withresilienceoftheelectricitysystem(including,predomin-antly,thegrid).EventhecitedCongressionalletter(sectionH)doesnotsupporttheNOPR’sanalysisandprescription.NoneoftheFERCstatementsandproceedingsquotedinSectionIdoessoeither.FERChasnotpreviouslyconsideredtheNOPR’ssuggestedpolicies,asfarasIknow,simplybecauseneitherFERCnorothershadanyanalyticbasisfordevelopingthemorwouldhavedreamedofproposingthem.DOE’sAugust2017StaffReportrecommends(asdoI)thatregulatorsseekbetterwaysforcompetitivemarketstovaluespecifictechnicalreliabilityattributesandservices—chieflyfrequencysupport,voltagesupport,andramprate.Itdoesnotsuggestanyrequirementorrewardforlargeonsitefuelinventories—letalonepay-ingcoalandnuclearplants’entirecosts,whetherthey’reneededornot,competitiveornot,andapparentlyevendispatchedornot.11Thatis,DOE’sStaffReportrightly

11ImentiondispatchbecausetheNOPR’slanguageisunclearaboutwhetherthatrewardmustbeearnedbydispatch,makinglegalandeconomicanalysisoftheNOPR’simplicationsimpossible.Forexample,theNOPRlanguageof§358(g)(10)(iii)(B)mandatesthat“eacheligibleresourcerecoversitsfullyallocatedcostsandafairreturnonequity,”whilethemorerestrictive§358(g)(10)(iii)(A)(2)

5

suggestscraftingrulestovaluerecognizedandtechnologicallydefinedgridservicesmorethoroughly—butnottoadvantagespecifictechnologies,fuels,orsources.AndnobodybuttheSecretaryseemstoseemeritincreatingacomplexnewsetofinter-regionalfinancialdisparitiesbetweenmarketswithlittlecoalornuclearcapacity(e.g.NE-ISO,CAISO),thosewithalot(e.g.MISO,FERC-freeERCOT),andthosewithalotthatwouldn’tgetanupliftduetowidespreadStateregulationornocapacitymarket(e.g.Southeast)—plusfurtherdistortionsfromputtingmerchantgenerationownersinamorefavorableearningposturethanstate-rate-regulatedowners,up-endingtraditionalrisk/rewardrelationshipsandcapitalmarkets’riskperceptions.Unlike“reliability”—aconceptlongrigorouslydefined,alreadyrewardedandre-quired,andsoundlymanagedunderrationalandevolvingpolicies—theSecretaryreliesontheundefinedandunquantifiedconceptof“resiliency,”forwhichtheQuadrennialEnergyReview(Jan.2017,p.4–3)confirmsthereare“nocommonlyusedmetrics.”WeturnnexttotheSecretary’sunprecedentedconceptofhowtoachievethisvagueRorschach-likeattribute.2.TheNOPRfocuseson“fuel-secure”generatorswithatleast90days’onsitefuelinventories,wheninfactdependenceonfuelburnedinlarge,remotepowerstationsispartoftheproblem,notapromisingsolution.UtilitieshavereportedtoDOE12thatoverthepastfiveyears,inadequateorinter-ruptedfuelsupplytopowerstationscausedjust0.00007%ofthe3.4billioncustom-er-hoursofmajorUSpowerfailures—andofthosefuel-causedfailures,83%werefromasinglecoal-firedpowerplantinnorthernMinnesota.ThustheissueonwhichtheNOPRfocuses—fuelinventoriesonhand—isonlyinfinitesimallyrelatedtoutili-ty-reportedcausesofthelights’goingout.Generationinadequacyfromallcausesexceptfuelinadequacywasreportedtohavecausedonly0.0086%ofpowerfail-ures.Severeweathercaused96.2%(athirdofitfromSuperstormSandyalone),andallotherfactors3.8%.Takenatfacevalue,theNOPR’scentralfocus(inadequatefuelinventoriesatpowerplants),anditsmitigationsthatsections2.3–2.4belowwillshowareoftenineffectual,couldappeartohavecausedlessthanaten-millionthasmanycustomer-hoursof2012–16USpowerfailuresassevereweatherdid,i.e.0.00007%dividedbyroughly90percentasdiscussedinthenexttwoparagraphs.SuchDOEFormOE-417dataneedcarefulinterpretationbecausetheyreflecteachutility’srole,perspective,andattributionofanoutage’s“primarycause.”Autilitywhosepowerplantfailsbecauseitscoalorgassupplyhasfrozenmayapparentlyascribetheoutagetoweather,nottofuelinterruption.Thateventreportalsodoes

providesthosepayments“forsuchresourcedispatchedduringgridoperations.”Eitherway,howandwhenthosepaymentswouldbetriggered,forhowlong,andhowthey’daffectbidpricesisunclear.12T.Houser,J.Larsen&P.Marsters,“TheRealElectricityReliabilityCrisis,”RhodiumGroup,3Oct2017,http://rhg.com/notes/the-real-electricity-reliability-crisis.SummarydataareregularlyreportedinTablesB.1andB.2ofEIA’sElectricPowerMonthly.

6

notprovideacompletepictureofwhatgridoperatorsandcustomersexperience:apowerplantoragrouporclassofpowerplantsmaywellfailwithoutblackingoutanycustomers,assection2.3illustrates.Otherdatasourcestoohavetheirownlim-itations.NERC’sGADSunit-availabilitydataseemtooffersomelatitudeinassigningcausality.TheISO/RTOsreportlossofload(which,forexample,werezeroforISONewEnglandinJan.2014).AsLBNL’sEvanMillsurgedin2012,13FERCshouldcon-siderpossiblewaystoclarifyhoweachdatasourcedefinescausalities—anewissuecreatedbytheSecretary’snovelconcepts.Today,noneofthesethreedatasourcescanreliablycapturewhatfractionofcustomerblackoutsiscausedbythefuel-inven-toryinadequaciesthattheNOPR’sapproachclaimstomitigate.Powerplantswithamplefuelcanfail.Thelightscangooutdespiteampleavailablegenerationbecausethegridcannotdeliveritsoutput.Thatthelightswentoutjustwhenaplantfaileddoesn’tmeanitsfailuremadethelightsgoout:thefailurecouldhaveoccurredanywhereinthesupplychain,notablydownstreaminthegrid.Con-versely,thelightsstayedoninthePolarVortexthankstoreservemargins,capacitypayments,andthemanylayersofreliabilitymechanismsbuiltintoorganizedmar-kets,eventhoughsomeplantsandfuelsuppliesfailed.Butnomatterhowoneinter-pretsthedata,outagesarecausedoverwhelminglybyweather,andoccurthroughinadequaciesofgriddelivery,notofavailablegeneration,letaloneofpowerplants’onsitefuelinventories.DOEandtwoExecutiveAgenciesfound14~87%ofmajor1992–2012outageswerecausedbysevereweather.LBNLfound(ref.13)thatfor1992–2011,66%bynumberand78%bycustomerswereweather-related,and“thegridisincreasinglyfrail/vulnerable.”Bothstudiesfoundtheweather-relatedfrac-tionisrising,asonewouldexpectfromtherisingincidenceandseverityofdown-pours,heatwaves,wildfires,andviolentwindstorms.15Someestimatesoftherecentweather-relatedfractionofcustomer-hoursofoutagearemuchhigher,e.g.inthehigh90sofpercentaccordingtoQERAnalytics(2015)asquotedbyDOE.16Robuststatisticalevidenceconfirmsweatherlinkagesandrisingseverity.17All12large-

13E.Mills,“ElectricGridDisruptionsandExtremeWeather,”3–4May2012,LawrenceBerkeleyNationalLaboratory,http://evanmills.lbl.gov/presentations/Mills-Grid-Disruptions-NCDC-3May2012.pdf.14President’sCouncilofEconomicAdvisors,DOE,andOSTP’s“ObservedOutagestotheBulkElectricSystem1992-2012,”ExecutiveOfficeofthePresident,“EconomicBenefitsofIncreasingElectricGridResiliencetoWeatherOutages,”2013,p.8,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_FINAL.pdf.15E.g.,S.Lacey,“Resiliency:HowSuperstormSandyChangedAmerica’sGrid,”10Jun2014,https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/featured/resiliency-how-superstorm-sandy-changed-americas-grid#gs.LC5edvE.16M.Kenderdine,“PolicyDrivers,Challenges,&theQuadrennialEnergyReview,”5Nov2015,2015C3EWomeninCleanEnergySymposium,,http://c3eawards.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015Kenderdine.pdf.17P.Larsen,K.LaCommare,J.Eto,&J.Sweeney,“AssessingChangesintheReliabilityoftheU.S.ElectricPowerSystem,”LBNL-188741,Aug2015,https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-188741.pdf.

7

scalepoweroutagesin2015wereweather-related,thoughweathercausedonlyhalfofsmall-scale2015outages.18ThustheNOPR’sobsessionwithcontinuityoffuelsupplytogenerators—evenif2.1–2.4’srebuttalsbelowwereinvalid—ignoresthegrid.Yetanyrationaltreatmentofelectricreliabilityandresiliencemustfocusprimarilyonthegrid.TheElectricPowerResearchInstitutelongagoestimated,andmoderndataagree,thatroughly98–99%ofpowerfailuresoriginateinthegrid,and~90–95%ofthoseinthedistributiongrid.19AstheNOPR’s§II(A)rightlynotes,America’sgridcompris-es707,000milesofhigh-voltagetransmissionlines,55,800substations,and6.5millionmilesoflocaldistributionlines.Allareinterruptiblebyhighwinds,lightning,icestorms,treelimbs,carscrashingintopowerpoles,squirrels,birds,operatorerrors,fires,solarstorms,electromagneticpulses,cyberattacks,orriflebullets.20AsIwritethis,aboutthreemillionPuertoRicanAmericancitizensfacemonthsoffurtherblackout,withonly16%returnedtoserviceafterthreeweeks,becauseahurricanedestroyedtheirgrid,eventhoughtheir98%-fossil-fueledutilityhasampleandavailablegeneratingcapacitywithadequatefuelonhand.TheNOPRisirrelevanttothemandtotheotherAmericansblackedoutinTexasbyHarvey,FloridabyIrma,theVirginIslandsbyIrmaandMaria,etc.HurricaneMaria’sgriddestructioninPuertoRicoalonehasalreadyaboutdoubledin2017thetotaloutagecustomer-hoursexperiencednationwidein2016.YettheNOPRsaysanddoesnothingaboutthebrittlegridconnectingpowerplantstocustomers—onlythevirtualnon-problemofhowbigapileofcoalsitsateachplant.TheNOPRdoesvigorouslyseektopreventandreversethecompetitivemar-ketexitofoutdatedplantstypicallysitedhalftoseveralstatesawayfromcustomers,henceinherentlyvulnerabletogridfailure.TheNOPR’sefforttoreversethemarket-drivendecentralizationanddiversificationofhistoricgriddependencewouldweak-ennationalsecurity:sincegridfailuresdominatetotalfailures,anyelectricitystrate-gythatperpetuatesandincreasesrelianceonremotecentralpowerplants,nomat-terhowreliabletheyare,willincreasevulnerabilityandreduceresilience.Section5belowsuggestspractical,profitablewaystomakeelectricitysupplysoresilientthatmajorfailuresbecomeimpossiblebydesign—ratherthan,asnow,inevitablebyde-sign—butthoseoptionsrelylessonfarawaygiantplantsandhenceonthegrid.

18DOE,Year-in-Review:2015,EnergyInfrastructureEventsandExpansions,pp.11&14,http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/06/f32/2015-YIR-05122016.pdf.19A.Lovinsetal.,SmallIsProfitable:TheHiddenEconomicBenefitsofMakingElectricalResourcestheRightSize,RockyMountainInstitute,2002,atp.241,www.smallisprofitable.org.The2017Quadren-nialEnergyReview’sSecondInstallmentconfirms>90%atp.4–2.LBNL’sJ.EtoandK.LaCommareconfirm≥94%bySAIDIand≥92%bySAIDIin2014:“APreliminaryEvaluationofLossofSupplyasaContributortoSAIDI/SAIFI,”IEEEDistributionReliabilityWorkingGroup(Memphis),12Jan2016.20Conversely,thegridcancreateotherdangers:theCaliforniaPUCisinvestigatingwhetheraclusterofunusualfailuresofPG&Epowerlines(designedtowithstand56-mphwindsbutreportedlyfelledbyless)mighthavehelpedtriggerthewinedistrict’sextraordinarilydestructiveOct2017wildfires.

8

ThustheNOPRproposesnottoimprovebuttoretainorworsenthegrid’sunmen-tionedlackofresilience.Coalandnuclearplants,bydefinition,areremotecentralstations,averaginghundredsofmilesfromtheircustomers,whilethedistributedandrenewablesuppliestheNOPRwoulddisadvantagecanbebuiltatanalmostinfiniterangeofsitesandscales.Coalandnuclearplantscan’tserveyourcommuni-tyorneighborhoodthroughshortlocalpowerlines,asdistributedresourcescan.Coalandnuclearplantscan’tsitonyourroofandneednopowerlines,assolarmodulescan.ThoughlessonslearnedfromSandyhelpedsoftenIrma’sblowandspeedrecoveryinFlorida,muchofthegridwasdestroyeddespiteFloridaPowerandLight’spriormulti-billion-dollarsmart-gridandgrid-hardeninginvestments.Demand-sideresourcesareevenmorevitalforresilientelectricalservices:notonlyaretheyonsite(nogrid)and~90–100%available,buttheyrelievepreciselythepeakloadsthatstressthegridandthefleetofgenerators.Asref.8andAlexWilson’sResilientDesignInstitute’spublicationsexplain,end-useefficiencyprovidesthemost“bounceperbuck”bybuyingtimetofixwhat’sbrokenorimprovisenewsup-plies;itshrinksthoseneededsupplies;andefficientbuildingscankeeptempera-turescomfortable(andstaydaylitinthedaytime)forlongerwithoutpower.YettheNOPRdoesnotrecognizeanyresiliencevaluefordemand-sideresources.2.1.TheNOPRcontradictstheelectricresiliencestrategyofitspremierpractitioners—America’sArmedForces.OurNation’sforemostexpertsonenergysecurityhavereachedtheoppositeconclu-siontotheSecretary’s.Toensureitsmissioncontinuity,21thePentagonaimstoachieveelectricresilienceforitsbasesandfacilitiesbyrelyingchieflyonrenewablegenerators(solar,wind,geothermal,etc.)onsiteornearby,abletorunthebaseandthesurroundingcommunityevenifthegridfails.Renewablesaregenerallyalsocheaperthangridpower,expandingmilitarybudgets,andareconstant-price,de-riskingthosebudgets.That’swhytheDepartmentofDefenseistheFederalGovern-ment’sunrivaledleaderinvigorouslydeployingrenewablepowersources.OurArmedForcesneedtheirstufftowork,butsodowecitizenswhomthey’redefend-ing.Thelogicisidentical,andthedetailsdiffersurprisinglylittle.TheDepartmentofDefense’sresilienceinitiativesseektoreplacepreciselytheunresilientpower-sup-plyarrangementsthatDOE’sNOPRseekstoperpetuatenationwide.ThusDOE’sNOPRwouldundercutDoD’snational-securitymission.2.2.TheNOPR’snarrowcorecriterionfor“fuel-securegeneration”(therebyqualifyingforitsnewsubsidies)ashavingatleast90days’“fuelonhand”disqualifyandhence

21DefenseScienceBoard,MoreFight—LessFuel,TaskForcereporttoUSDepartmentofDefense,Feb2008,www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf,summarizedinA.Lovins,“DoD’sEnergyChallengeasStrategicOpportunity,”JointForceQuarterly57:33–42(Feb2010),ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-57.pdf.

9

disadvantageresilientmodernrenewablespreciselybecausetheyusenofuel—avoid-ingtheveryvulnerabilityofwhichtheNOPRcomplains.Renewablescannotstockpilefuelbecausebydefinitiontheyneednofuel22—handilysidesteppinganyarbitraryrequirementfor“fuelonhand”—buttheNOPRirration-allyinsistsondiversifyingfuels,ratherthandisplacingfuelswithanevenmorediversifiedportfoliothateliminatesvulnerablefuellogistics.TheNOPRaimstoshieldspecificallycoalandnuclearplantsfromthemarketcom-petitiontheirownerschose,beton,butlost.Thisdestructionofcompetitivemarketswoulddisadvantagepreciselythecheapestandmostresilientcompetitorsthatarebeatingcoalandnuclearplantsinmarketsnationwide—efficiencyandflexibledemand(whichareallowedtocompetehead-to-headwithsupplyinabouthalfthemarketsorathirdofthecountry),cogeneration,andthemodernrenewablesthatadded62%of2016’sUSnewcapacity(nearlytwicegas)and55%globally.ThisiswhyvirtuallyallenergysectorsexceptcoalandnuclearopposetheNOPR(ref.1).TheSecretary’swishtoreverserenewables’marketvictoriesisespeciallyoddbe-causehetakesproperTexasprideinhavingasGovernorhelpedmakehisstatebyfarthenationalleaderinwindpowerwithover20GWand15%of2016generation,bringingTexasover25,000jobsandhelpingbringits2016wholesaleelectricitypricestorecordlows.Windandsolarpowerharnessnaturalenergyflowsthatarereliablydeliveredfreeofcharge,withaccuratelyforecastablevariationsbutvirtuallynoriskoflonginterruptions.23Naturalgaspassedcoalin2016tomake34%ofUSelectricity,vs.30%coaland20%nuclear.AlmosttheonlyfueledpowerplantsstillbeingaddedintheUSaregas-fired,thoughrenewablesarerapidlytakingtheirmarketshare.Butthoughafewgas-firedplantshaveassociatedgasstorageandmanyarefedbymultiplepipelinestoincreasetheresilienceoftheirfuelsupplies,nearlyallrelyonjust-in-timedeliveryfromthenationalpipelinenetwork.Thatnetworkishighlyreliable—morereliablethantheelectricgrid24—andhasextensivestoragespreadovermorethan400undergroundsites(DOEStaffReport,p.93).Likecoallogistics(section2.3

22Otherthanthesmallfractionofmodernrenewablesthatburnmunicipal,industrial,oragriculturalwastes.Thesemade1.5%of2016USelectricity,typicallyfrommajoronsitesourceslikepulpmills,sawmills,refineries,livestockfacilities,andlandfills.Whetherhydroelectricdams’storedwater,undergroundgeothermalheat,andsolarandwindenergyflowsarea“fuel”isunclear.Oddly,DOE’sStaffReportatp.86adoptsaPJMgraphicthatshowsneitherrenewablesnorstorageas“NotFuelLimited”andhaving“On-siteFuelInventory”—outmodedrequirementstheyavoidandtranscend.23Notquitezerobecauseofmajorbutunlikelyeventslikeapostwar“nuclearwinter”oraworld-scalevolcaniceruptionakintoKrakatoa.Cheapinsuranceinanall-renewablegridcouldcomefroma“strategiccapacityreserve”ofexistinggas-firedpowerplants,mothballedandhardlyeverrun:T.W.Brownetal.,“Responseto‘BurdenofProof:Acomprehensivereviewofthefeasibilityof100%-renewableelectricitysystems.’”arXiv:1709.05716v1[physics.soc-ph],17Sep2017.24C.Page(NevadaPUC),“HowReliableIsNaturalGas?AnHistoricalInterviewofNaturalGasTransmission’sOutageTrackRecord,”2017,http://www.usaee.org/usaee2017/submissions/OnlineProceedings/Natural%20Gas%20Reliability%20paper%20CJP%20Final.pdf.

10

below),itremainsvulnerableinprincipletoextremeweather,sabotage,andcyber-attack25,butgastransmissionoutagesareduevastlymoretosimple(andmostlyquick-to-fix)mechanicalfailuresthantoweather26,makingitsfailuremodeslargelycomplementarytoandmilderthantheelectricgrid’s.DOEin2015foundnoparticu-largroundsforconcernaboutnatural-gasdeliverabilitytopowerstations,andgoodgroundsforcomfortabouttheslowingpaceofUSgasinfrastructureadditions.27TheNOPRseekstodisadvantagegas-firedgenerationasinsecure—despitetheAd-ministration’sfondnessforfracking,whichprovidestwo-thirdsoftheNation’sgas—perhapsbecause,astheStaffReportfound,cheapgasisthemainreasonmanycoalandnuclearplantscan’tcompete.AsthecaptiontotheStaffReport’sFig.3.28correctlysays,“Whileconcernsexistabouttheimpactofwidespreaddeploymentofrenewableenergyontheretirementofcoalandnuclearplants,thedatadonotsug-gestacorrelation.”Infact,theyshowtheopposite:cheapgasisthemaincauseofcoalretirements,followedbyslackorfallingelectricitydemand,thenrenewables.Totrynonethelesstoexcludeandsuppressrenewablesandnaturalgaswithoutnamingthem,theNOPRadoptstheSecretary’singeniousbutdisingenuousnewterm“fuelonhand”—anotionsonovelwhenheintroduceditthatinmid-April2017aGooglesearchfoundnorelevantentries.TheNOPRusestheequivalentconceptof“fuel-secureplants.”UnfortunatelyfortheNOPR’sthesis,analysisrevealsthisnotiontobealmostentirelyunrelatedtoelectricresilience,aswe’llseenext.2.3.Fuelinterruptionisaninsignificantcauseofpowerfailures.Evenifthatwerenotso,“fuelonhand”cannotensurethattheadjacentpowerplantwilloperateatneed,butonthecontraryoftencreatesnewvulnerabilities.28DOE’sStaffReportrightlysaysonp.91,“Whilehavingfuelonsitereducestheriskthatageneratorwillbeunabletooperatewhenneeded,everytypeoffuelandpowergenerationsourcehasknownvulnerabilitiesthatcancompromiseitsability25Detailedinref.8.Anotherrisk—occasionalGulfhurricanes’shutdownofupstreamgasplatforms—isbufferedbyextensiveundergroundandin-pipestorage.Atsignificantcapitalandcarryingcost,gas-firedpowerplantscouldaddonsiteliquidfuelstorage—liquefiednaturalgas(LNG,whichslowlyboilsoffifnotused),liquefiedpetroleumgas(LPG),oroil.Manyolder“dual-fueled”gas-firedpowerplantscanalreadyswitchbetweengasandoil,butoil’sworldmarketpriceisvolatileanditssupplylogistics,likeanyotherfuel’s,notfullyreliable.Inthe2014PolarVortexevent,2–3GWofdual-fueledplantsintheNortheasthadsuchfuelconstraintsaslimitedinventoriesortrucks,gelledfuel,orfrozenfuellinesandinjectors.Assection2.3describes,manycoal-firedpowerplantshadanalogousproblems,whichtheNOPRsystematicallyandasymmetricallyignores.26Ref.24.27DOE,“NaturalGasInfrastructureImplicationsofIncreasedDemandfromtheElectricPowerSector,”Feb2015,https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/02/f19/DOE%20Report%20Natural%20Gas%20Infrastructure%20V_02-02.pdf.28Mostfactsanddatainsections2.3–2.5notspecificallysourcedarehyperlinkedinmy1May2017Forbesarticle“Does‘FuelonHand’MakeCoalAndNuclearPlantsMoreValuable?,”https://www.forbes.com/sites/amorylovins/2017/05/01/does-fuel-on-hand-make-coal-and-nuclear-power-plants-more-valuable/,fromwhichsomeofthosesections’textisalsoadapted.

11

tooperatereliably.”TheNOPRdoesnotmentionthatthosevulnerabilitiesaresubstantialforbothcoalandnuclearpower,assummarizednext.Nomatterhowbigthepileofcoaloutsideacoal-firedpowerplant,extremeweathercanandsometimesdoesmakethecoalunloadableorunburnableorboth.TheNOPRfeaturesthe2014PolarVortexeventtoemphasizethatsomeofthecoalandnuclearplantscalleduponwhenotherplantsfailedhavesinceretiredorareplannedtoretire.Ofcourse,that’snotananalysisclaiming,asimplied,thatthe65millionpeopleinthePJMpowerpoolwho“couldhavebeenaffected”bythoseretirementsactuallywouldhavebeen.NOPRsectionC’sclaimthat“currentandscheduledretirementsoffuel-secureplantscouldthreatenthereliabilityandresilienceoftheelectricgrid”isspeculativeanddisputed,andcannotbejustifiedbyevidenceinorbehindDOE’sStaffReport.It’salsoinconsistentwithNERC’sandtheregionalgridoperators’continuing2017declarationsofadequatereliability,basedondetailedregion-by-regionanalysesthatexplicitlyincludesuchextremeweatherevents.Theretiredplantswereofcoursereplacedbyotherdemand-andsupply-sideresources,often(asexplainedinsections2.3–2.5)providinggreaterresilience.USgeneratingcapacityislarger29andmorediverse(DOEStaffReport,p.89)thanin2014(orin2002,asshownid.,p.90).Bulkpowersystemreliability“isadequatetodaydespitetheretirementof11percentofthegeneratingcapacityavailablein2002,”and“overall,attheendof2016,thesystemhadmoredispatchablecapacitycapableofoperatingathighutilizationratesthanitdidin2002”30—hardlyadec-larationofapoweremergency.Practicallyeveryreliabilitymetrichasimprovedoverthepastfiveyears,andinparticular,theBulkPower’sSystem’s“resiliencetosevereweather”improvedin2016forthesecondconsecutiveyear.31Indeed,thesameNERCCEOwhotoldtheCommissioninJune2017that“thestateofreliabilityinNorthAmericaremainsstrong,andthetrendlineshowscontinuingimprovementyearoveryear”isrepeatedlycitedintheNOPRasimpliedlysupportingtheSecreta-ry’swarningofanimminentgridemergency.Hedidnosuchthing.ThespecificissuesraisedbythePolarVortexhavealreadybeenintensivelyaddressed.Nogridoperatororreliabilityauthorityhassuggested,requested,orendorsedthekindofradicalreversalofmarkettrendsthattheNOPRdirects.32TheSecretary’sPolar

29EIAdatashow18GWofutility-scalenetcapacityadditionsduring2014–16,withhigher-than-historicfueldiversity:https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30112.30TheDOEdraftreport’sforthrightstatementthat“thegridisingoodshapedespitetheretirementofmanybaseloadpowerplants….Thepowersystemismorereliabletodayduetobetterplanning,marketdiscipline,andbetteroperatingrulesandstandards”wasremoved,buttheretainedquotation,onp.63,confirmsthatthegridhadmoreflexibilityin2016thanin2002.31NERC,StateofReliability2017,June2017,p.5&Ch.4,http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/PA/Performance%20Analysis%20DL/SOR_2017_MASTER_20170613.pdf.32Forexample,NERC’slatest(Dec2016)2016Long-TermReliabilityAssessmentnotesatpviiithatalthoughNewEngland’s“recentwinterexperienceshavecreatedchallengesinbothmaintainingback-upfuelinventoriesandsuccessfullyswitchingfromgastooil…emergingmarketrulesinISO-NE,beginningin2018,areexpectedtosupportreliabilityandtheresilienceofthegenerationfleet.”

12

Vortexargumentisaredherring,andmorecloselyexamined,iscontradictedbythatevent’sfacts,asweexplorenext.2.3.1.Coalvs.gasvulnerabilitiesinextremeweather33TheNOPRomitsmaterialbuthighlydiscordantfactsaboutthe2014PolarVortexevent.NERCfound34thatofthedisabled19.5GWofgeneratingcapacity,some91%failedasequipmentfrozeinsomanywaystheytakethreepagestolist(pp.14–16).Weatherasmuchas35F˚belownormaldisabled8of11GWofNewEnglandgasplants,mainlybecausetheirexpectedgassupplieswerepreemptedbyextraordin-aryspace-heatingdemand(houseshavepriorityoverutilities)orblockedbycon-tractuallimitations,notablynon-firmgasdelivery—acorrectableprocurement-practicesissue,notapower-plantdeficiency.(Regionalgassupplieswereavailablethroughouttheperiod,butnotallusershadtherightdeliveryarrangements.Muchofthegasdeliverabilitythatcouldnotassuresupplydidturnouttobeavailable,butnotintimetoscheduledispatchofgas-firedunitsthatthushadtobepassedover.35)AstheCommissionwellknows,thegasandelectricindustrieshavesincebeenatpainstofixthoseunforeseenproblemstopreventrecurrence.ButinthePJMpowerpool,asloadssoared,recordcolddisablednearly30%ofgeneratingcapacity—one-fourthforlackofgas,buttherestmainlybecausecoal-firedplantshadfrozencoalpilesorcoal-handlingequipment.ThustheSecretaryillogicallycitesthePolarVortextosupporthisclaimthatgiantcoalpileswillprotectcoalplantsfromthePolarVortexcoldthatinfactoftenmadetheircoalpilesunusable.AstheDOEStaffReportsays(p.98),“Manycoalplantscouldnotoperateduetocon-veyorbeltsandcoalpilesfreezing….”Itscitedreference36states(p.4):“Equipmentissuesassociatedwithcoalandnaturalgasunitscausedthegreatestproportionofforcedoutages.Naturalgasinterruptionscomprisedapproximately25percentoftheforcedoutages.”PJM’s9.7GWofgas-plantoutagesnotcausedbynatural-gasinterruption(9.3GW)wereexceededbycoal’slost13.7GW(p.26),andthatfigure

http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2016%20Long-Term%20Reliability%20Assessment.pdf.33C.Jietal.,“Large-scaledataanalysisofpowergridresilienceacrossmultipleUSserviceregions,”NatureEnergy1(16052),doi:10.1038/nenergy.2016/52(2016),foundthat“extremeweatherdoesnotcause,butratherexacerbates,existingvulnerabilities,whichareobscuredindailyoperations.”Thatpointisbeyondthescopeofthesecommentsbutshouldbeexamined.34NERC,PolarVortexReview,Sep2014,http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/January%202014%20Polar%20Vortex%20Review/Polar_Vortex_Review_29_Sept_2014_Final.pdf,and2014–2015WinterReliabilityAssessment,Nov2014,http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2014WRA_final.pdf.35NewEnglandISO,10Jan2014responsetoFERCdatarequest,https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/pubs/spcl_rpts/2014/iso_ne_response_ferc_data_request_january_2014.pdf.36PJMInterconnection,AnalysisofOperationalEventsandMarketImpactsduringtheJanuary2014ColdWeatherEvents,8May2014,www.pjm.com/E%7E/media/library/reports-notices/weather-related/20140509-analysis-of-operational-events-and-market-impacts-during-the-jan-2014-cold-weather-event.ashx.

13

doesn’tincludefailuresofnon-gasfuelsupplies.TheNOPRfailstomentionthis,omitstoothe1.4-GWnuclearplantdisabledbycold,andcriticizesonlygas.TheNOPR’ssectionII.CimpliesthatPJMwasbarelyabletosustainsupplyinthe2014PolarVortexbyvirtueonlyofcoalplantsnowretiring.Yetboththoseunitsandnon-retiringcoalandnuclearunitsremainpronetothesameextreme-weathervulnerabilities;PJMhasother,moreresilient,demand-andsupply-sideresources(includingmanyGWofdemandresponseasnotedbelow);andPJMpredictsade-quatesupplyeveninfutureextremeweather,despiteallplannedretirements.IntheSoutheast,wheremanyplantsweren’tdesignedforsuchcold,9.8GWofsup-plywaslost,oftenforsimilarreasons.IntheMidwesternMISOpool,onlyafifthofthe31%ofcapacitylostwasduetolackofgas;mostoftherestwascoal.Similarly,theFebruary2011Southwestcoldsnapblackedout4.4millioncustomersinthreestates,andintheSecretary’snativeTexas,210of550electricgeneratingunits—nearlyallcoal-orgas-fired—couldn’tstart,orstopped,orputoutlessthantheirratedpower.FiftyTexasfossil-fueledplantstotaling7GWcouldn’twithstandfrozencoalpiles,burstpipes,andotherforeseeableconsequencesofadeepfreeze.Inthesimilar1989Texascoldsnap,thelargestlostcapacity(4.7GW,8units)wasfromcoalplants,whilein2011,wind,gas-steam,simple-cyclegas,andcoalwereequallyfailure-prone.37NERCnotes38thatTexasligniteis~30–40%water,soitreadilyfreezes(id.),justasdampnaturalgascan.TheNOPRmentionsnoneofthis.EveninnormallycoldstateslikeWisconsinandPennsylvania,coldsnapshaverepeatedlyfrozencoalpiles,strandedfuelbargesonfrozenrivers,andpreventedpower-plantstartups.Arepetitionofthewinterof1917/18,whichlockedBaltimoreHarborinthreefeetofsolidice,cannotbeexcludedasweatherandclimatebecomemorevolatile.NERCsummarizedakeyreliabilityfindingin201439(p.7,emphasisadded):“ProlongedcoldweathereventsinpartsofNorthAmericamaycauseanincreaseingeneratorunavailabilityduetonaturalgasandcoalconstraints”—notjustgas.Thesameistrueofotherextremeweatherevents.HurricaneHarveyleftlargecoalpilesinTexassowaterloggedtheycouldn’tbemovedtotheboilers,forcingtwocoalplantstoswitchtogasforthefirsttimeineightyears40.HurricanesHarveyandIrmaalsoforcedstaffevacuationsfromcoalandnuclearplants,shuttingthemdown

37FERC/NERC,ReportonOutagesandCurtailmentsDuringtheSouthwestColdWeatherEventofFebruary1–5,2011,Aug2011,pp.143&176,http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/February%202011%20Southwest%20Cold%20Weather%20Event/SW_Cold_Weather_Event_Final.pdf.38Ref.37,Appendix“PowerPlantDesignforAmbientWeatherConditions,”p.5.39NERC,2014–2015WinterReliabilityAssessment,Nov.2014,https://studylib.net/doc/13609546/2014–2015-winter-reliability-assessment-november-2014.40Seehttps://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/houston/harveys-rain-caused-coal-to-gas-switching-nrg-21081527.

14

despitetheir“fuelonhand.”41DOE’sEnergyInformationAdministrationsummar-ized:42“Powerplantoutageswerelargelycausedbyrainorfloodingaffectinggener-atorfuelsupplies,outagesoftransmissioninfrastructureconnectinggeneratorstothegrid,andpersonnelnotbeingabletoreachgeneratingfacilities.”Incontrast,efficiency,demandresponse,andmostrenewableresourceswereunaffected;evenutility-scalerenewablesseldomneedstaffonsiteandareoftenrunremotely.Bothgasandcoalfuellogisticsareaging43andexhibitsomedeficientmaintenance,asillustratedbya2000NewMexicopipelineexplosionthatworsenedCalifornia’selectricitycrisis,the2010SanBrunopipelineexplosion,andthe2015AlisoCanyongasstoragedisaster.Thecoal,gas,andelectricityindustriesalsodependoneachotherinbothsupplyanddemand,sopowerfailurescouldultimatelycrimpgassupplies.ButNERChasexpressedconcernsaboutbothcoalandgasdeliverabilityandresilience,notjustgas.Tobesure,55%ofthegeneratoroutagesinthe2014PolarVortexweregas-fired—inflatedbypoorinter-industrycoordinationlatercorrected—but26%werecoal-fired,andasnotedearlierinthissection,PJMlostmorecapacitytoequipmentfailuresatcoalplantsthanatgasplants.Evenwithoutsuchextremeweatherevents,theaverageU.S.coal-firedplantbreaksdownabout6–10%ofthetime,andforvariousreasonsisunavailableforabout15%ofitstheoreticaloutput(whichwasonly53%usedin2016,andfalling,sinceit’softenuncompetitive;gaspowergenerallybeatitandranat56%oftheoreticaloutput).Formoderncombined-cyclegasplants,unavailabilityisonlyabout5%,one-thirdtheleveltypicalofcoalplants.Thehighesttechnicalavailabilityisachievedbydemand-sideandrenewableresources(section2.5below).2.3.2.Coalsupply-chainvulnerabilitiesRoughlydoublingcoalplants’typicalexistingfuelstocksto90dayswouldbeaboonandprice-boosterforthestrugglingcoalindustry—iflimitedrailcapacitycouldactuallydeliverthecoal,whichNERCin2014explicitlyconsidereddoubtful.44ButonceinventorieswereraisedtoqualifyfortheNOPR’srewards,adeeperandmore

41ThisparagraphisdrawnfromR.Orvis&M.O’Boyle,“DOErulemakingthreatenstodestroywholesalemarketswithnotangiblebenefit,”2Oct2017,http://www.utilitydive.com/news/doe-rulemaking-threatens-to-destroy-wholesale-markets-with-no-tangible-bene/506289/?platform=hootsuite.42EIA,“HurricaneHarveycausedelectricsystemoutagesandaffectedwindgenerationinTexas,”13Sep2017,https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32892.43Arevivalofcoal-haulingassetsisnotinprospect.TheCEOofcoal-haulingrailwayCSXrecentlyannouncedthat“Coalhasnofuture”(foreconomicreasons)andthathisfirmwouldbuynomorecoal-haulinglocomotivesorotherequipment,nordouble-trackitscoal-haulingraillines.J.Voelker,“’Fossilfuelsaredead,’saysCSXrailroadchief:nomorenewtrainsforcoal,ever,”31Jul2017,http://www.greencarreports.com/news/1111824_fossil-fuels-are-dead-says-csx-railroad-chief-no-more-new-trains-for-coal-ever.44NERC,2014SummerReliabilityAssessment,May2014,http://www.nerc.com/files/2014SRA.pdf,pp.5–6,section“CoalSupplyImpactsCausedbyConstrainedRailServiceCouldCreateReliabilityImpacts.”

15

troublesomeissuewouldcomeintosharperview.Worryingly,thegasindustry’shistoricfocusaroundtheGulfCoastismatchedbytheextraordinaryrelianceofcoalonWyoming’sPowderRiverBasin(PRB).Thatregionminestwo-fifthoftheNation’scoaland,saysDOE’sStaffReportatp.97,hadtroubleservingits166powerplantswith172GWofcapacityduringwinter2013/14.Itdependsonspecificrailandbridgechokepointsatleastasconcentratedasmajorgaspipelines.This2002governmentmaprevealsnothinglessthananall-AmericanStraitofHormuz:

NearlyallthatWyomingcoalgoesthroughone103-mile,24/365railcorridor.InMay2005,heavyprecipitationandcompromiseddrainagetriggeredtwoderail-mentsintwodays,requiringayear’srebuilding,curtailingshipmentsformostoftherestof2005,andmorethandoublingcoal’sspotpriceinfivemonths.Laterthatyear,twohurricanesfurtherdisruptedMidwesternrailwaysasgrainshipmentsshiftedfromMississippiRiverbargetorail,andafootofOctoberraininKansasCityroiledmajorcoal-railroutesfortwoweeks.In2006,DOE’sEnergyInformationAd-ministration’sDeputyAdministratortestified45:“Hardlyamonthgoesbythatdeliv-eryofPRBcoalsomewhereinthesupplychainisnotinterruptedbyaderailment,freezing,flooding,orothernaturaloccurrence”(whichmore-volatileweatherwillmakemorefrequentandsevere).Attheendofthecitedrepost,aGeorgiautilityexecutivesaidhisPRBcoalishauled2,000miles,thentheunittrainsimmediatelyshuttlebacktoWyomingforthenextload.Headded:“Ourexperiencesuggeststhatthesupplychainisveryfragileandanyevent[,]weatherrelatedorotherwise[,]thatdisruptsthissupplylinecouldquicklycauseamajorreductioninsupplyandinven-torylevelsduringthetimeofgreatestneedsandhighestreplacementcosts.”

45H.Gruenspecht,SenateCommitteeonEnergy&NaturalResources,109-601,25May2006,“Coal-basedgenerationreliability,”https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings-and-business-meetings?ID=C30108B1-0B1A-41FC-A66C-A3849ED54C60,reposted18Feb2017athttp://energyskeptic.com/2017/interdependency-coal-power-plants-depend-on-railroad-delivered-coal-to-keep-running/.

16

In2007,theNationalAcademiesconcurred46:“Therailnetworksthattransportthenation’scoal—likeairtrafficcontrolandelectrictransmissionnetworks—haveaninherentfragilityandinstabilitycommontocomplexnetworks.Becauseconcernsaboutsabotageandterrorismwerelargelyignoreduntilrecently,existingnetworkswerecreatedwithpotentialchokepoints[likesomerailbridgesovermajorrivers]…thatcausevulnerability…[and]thepotentialforsmall-scaleissuestobecomelarge-scaledisruptions.”That’shardlyaringingendorsementofcoal’sresilience.YettheNOPRbaldlyassumesthatcoalandnuclearplants,andnootherresources,areresilientandmeritmajormandatorysubsidyforthatattribute.Theavailableevi-dence,noneofitmentionedintheNOPR,doesnotsupportthatassumption.2.3.3.Gassupply-chainvulnerabilitiesThisisnottosaythatthenationalgasnetwork,orparticulargasfacilities,arenotalsovulnerabletodisruption.The1981PentagonstudyBrittlePower(ref.8)foundthatahandfulofpeoplecould,atthattime,turnoffthree-fourthsoftheoilandgassupplytotheEasternStatesinoneeveningwithoutleavingLouisiana—thoughitalsofoundthepowergridwasevenmorevulnerable.(Sincethen,fracking,newpipelines,andLNGhavegreatlydiversifiedU.S.gasflows,whilegridvulnerabilitieshavepersistedand,withcyberthreats,risenrelativetogas.)TheSecretary’sconcernaboutsupposedlyunreliableandunresilientgassuppliestopowerplantsisthusil-logical.Aphysicalassaultorcyberattackwouldbefarmoreeffectiveontheelectric-itysystemthanonitsgassupplies(id.),hencemoreattractivetoadversaries,duetofundamentaldifferencesbetweenthesetwosystems.Whatarethosedifferences?2.3.4.Comparinggassupply-chainvulnerabilitiesGashaslargelyundergroundandprotectedinfrastructure,hasextensiveandwidelydistributedbulkstoragebothundergroundandinthepipelines(“linepack”),hasamixofgrid-dependentandself-poweredcompressors,usesincreasinglydiversifiedgeographicalsourcesandsub-networks,hasrelativelyfewercybervulnerabilities,andchangespressureoverhoursordays.Incontrast,theelectricitysystemuseslargelyaerialandaccessibleinfrastructure,ishighlyinterconnectedwithinjustthreesubnationalgrids,hasubiquitouscyberattackentrypointsandnumerousscarceoruniquecriticalfacilities,and(mostimportantly)requiresexactsynchronywithinroughlyathousandthofasecondacrossenormousdistances.Theseattri-butesmaketheelectricgridinherentlymorevulnerablethanthegasgridbothtoattackandtonaturaldisaster.47ThustheNOPR’surgentprescriptiontodiscrimin-

46Coal:ResearchandDevelopmenttoSupportNationalEnergyPolicy,p.83,https://www.nap.edu/read/11977/chapter/7,fromwhichthemapaboveiscopied(p.82);itsoriginalisfromOakRidgeNationalLaboratory’sCenterforTransportationAnalysis.Noupdateisavailable,butifredrawntoday,thedegreeofconcentrationwouldprobablybegreater.47Seeref.24.Historyamplyconfirmsthis,e.g.inthe22–24Jan2016Easternwinterstorm,whichbroughtextensivepoweroutagesbut“relativelystable”gasdeliverieswithnoreportedfreeze-offs:

17

ateinfavorofcoalandnuclearplantsand,unavoidably,thegiantandinherentlyvulnerablegridonwhichtheydependwouldincreaserelativerelianceontheleastresilientandmostbrittleelementsofourNation’senergysupply.2.3.5.Less-vulnerableoptionstheNOPRignoresThatdirectiveisnotonlybackwards;itdeliberatelyignoresavailablesolutionsthatareempiricallyfaster,cheaper,andmoreresilientthancontinuedcoalandnuclearoperation.Theseoptions—fasterdeploymentofefficiency,demandresponse,co-generation48,andrenewables—arenotproposedordiscussedintheNOPR.Yetarecenteconomicanalysisfoundthatbecausedistressednuclearplantshaveveryhighoperatingcosts(averaging$62/MWhintheindustry’slatestpublisheddata—thereasontheycan’tclearinwholesalemarkets),closingthemandreinvestinginaverage-costelectricefficiencywouldsave~2–3timesmoreelectricitythanthedisplacednucleargeneration.TheexampleofVermontYankeeillustrateshowlostnuclearcapacitycanbedisplacedbyefficiencyandrenewablesinaboutayear(ref.5,section2.7).TheplannedorderlyclosureoftheDiabloCanyonnuclearunitsshowshowwell-plannednuclearclosurecanindeedsavebothcarbonandmoney.49YettheNOPRdoesn’tcompareanyoptionexceptcoalandnuclearpower.Thatisaverymaterialomission:energyefficiencyisnowtheworld’slargestenergy“source,”biggerthanoil,50andrenewablesdominatetheworldmarketinnewgeneratingcapacity,withsolarpowernowtheworld’sfastest-growingenergysource.51TheInternationalEnergyAgency’sExecutiveDirectornowexpects(id.)renewableswillgrow“byabout1,000GWby2022,whichequalsabouthalfofthecurrentglobalca-pacityincoalpower,whichtook80yearstobuild.”TheNOPRindirectlyalludestoelectricend-useefficiencyonlyinnotingthatthedownwarddriftofUSelectricitydemand,evenastheeconomygrows,hascontributedtoretirementofcoalandnuclearplants.Yetitdoesn’tmentionthattheNationalAcademies’America’sEnergyFuture(2009)foundelectricefficiencycouldbeprofitablydoubledby2030,northat

EIA,“Winterstormknocksoutpowerformorethanamillioncustomers,”29Jan2016,https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24752.48TheDOEStaffReport(p9)ignoresgeothermal,biomass,andcogenerationbecausetheyare“notasprevalentorwidespreadasgas,coal,andnuclearplants,”butinfact,EIA’sMonthlyEnergyReviewdatashowtheyrespectivelyproduced63,17,and~117TWhin2016—collectively5%ofUSelectricity,nearlyall“baseload,”orthree-fourthsasbigassolarandwindpowercombined.49A.Lovins,“ClosingDiabloCanyonWillSaveMoneyAndCarbon,”Forbes,22Jun2016,https://www.forbes.com/sites/amorylovins/2016/06/22/close-a-nuclear-plant-save-money-and-carbon-improve-the-grid-says-pge/.50InternationalEnergyAgency,EnergyEfficiency2017,5Oct2017,https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/market-report-series-energy-efficiency-2017-.html.51InternationalEnergyAgency,Renewables2017,4Oct2017,https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2017/october/solar-pv-grew-faster-than-any-other-fuel-in-2016-opening-a-new-era-for-solar-pow.html.

18

alateranddeeperassessmentfoundpotentialsavingstwiceasbigandfourtimescheaper,52largelyviawell-provenbutuncounted“integrativedesign”methods.532.4.Nuclearplantstypicallyhaveample“fuelonhand,”butsufferfromatleastsixseriousvulnerabilities—besidestheiruniquevalueasatargetforphysicalorcyber-attack(ref.8).TheaverageU.S.nuclearplanthasaforcedoutageabout1–2%ofthetime,plus6–7%scheduleddowntimeforrefuelingandplannedmaintenance(ideallyevery1.5–2years),togethermakingitsomewhatlessavailablethanagas-firedcombined-cycleplant(themostmodernandefficientkind)andmuchlessavailablethanmodernrenewables(section2.5below).However,whenassessingnuclearpower’sprospectsandthewisdomofretiringreactorsthatnowaverage37yearsold,with37ofthe97operatingunitsover40yearsold,it’simportanttorecallthattoday’snuclearfleetexhibitsastrong“survivorbias.”Ofthe259USpowerreactorsorderedin1955–2016,128(49%)wereabandonedbeforestartupand34(13%)wereprematurelyclosedlater.Atmid-2017,97remainedinoperation(37%),ofwhich49areuneconomictorun54,and35havesufferedatotalof45safety-relatedoutageslastingayearormore.Just28units(11%),somenowslatedforclosure,remaincompetitivelyoperableandhavenotyethadayear-plusoutage55—anever-presentrisk.Indeed,nuclearplantsfacesixfurthershutdownrisksthatarelargelyorwhollyuniquetothisdemandingtechnology:

1. Oncetheroughly35-day(nominal)refuelingbegins,itmustbecompleted,soguessingwrongaboutwhentoscheduleitcanputsupplyadequacyatrisk.

2. IntheUSandEurope,heatwavesanddroughtshaveclosedorderatedmultiplenuclearplantssimultaneouslywhentheircoolingwaterbecomestoowarm.DOE’sStaffReport(p.95)citesthe2010exampleofBrown’sFerry,andotherexamplesaboundintheUSandabroad.56

3. Byfederalregulation,anynuclearplantmustshutdowninsustained(foraminuteormore)windsofatleast74mph,i.e.theweakestkindofhurricane(CategoryOne).Windgusts,however,remainagrayarea.Someobservers

52A.Lovins&RockyMountainInstitute,ReinventingFire,ChelseaGreen(VT),2011,www.rmi.org/reinventingfire.SummariesatProcs.Am.Inst.Phys.1652:100–111,doi:10.1063/1.4916173,https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/uploads-2017/05/AIP_RF.pdfandForeignAffairs91(2):134–146(Mar/Apr2012).53A.Lovins,“HowBigIstheEnergyEfficiencyResource?,”invited16Sep2017Essayinreview,ClimaticChange,2017.54J.Polson.“MoreThanHalfofAmerica’sNuclearReactorsAreLosingMoney,”BloombergNewEnergyFinance,14Jun2017,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-14/half-of-america-s-nuclear-power-plants-seen-as-money-losers.55These(alongwithsevenmoreyear-plusoutagesinnow-closedunits)totaled138reactor-ycosting~$82billion(2005$).D.LochbaumanalysisfromUSNRCdata,http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/whos-responsible-nuclear-power-safety/no-more-fort-calhouns(2015),andmyanalysisofoverlapbetweenthosedataandthepreviousreference.56S.Röhrkasten,D.Schäuble,&S.Helgenberger,“SecureandSustainablePowerGenerationinaWater-ConstrainedWorld,”2015,doi:10.2312/iass.2015.023.

19

feltthattheSt.Lucieplant,whichexperiencedsustained71-mphwindswith100-mphgusts,shouldhavebeenshutdowninHurricaneIrma.57

4. Amajorattack,crediblethreat,ornuclearaccident,evenabroad,couldcausemostorallotherreactorstobeshutdown.FalsifiedsafetydatainJapanshutall17TEPCOreactors(thesameownerasFukushimaDaiichi)formanymonthsofsafetychecksin2002–04;anearthquakebiggerthanthoughtpossiblewhendesigningsevenTEPCOunitsattheworld’sbiggestnuclearcomplexcloseditcompletelyfor21months,disruptingnationalpowerandglobalfuelmarketsandcostingTEPCOprobablyover$20billion(theunitsstillstruggletorestart);andthemorethantenfoldlargercostofthe2011FukushimadisasterthenbankruptedthatutilityinallbutnameandclosedallofJapan’snuclearplants.About34remainshutafteranaverageof5.5years,withfewexpectedtorestart.Ofthatlostoutput,70%wasreplacedbycheaperandmore-resilientefficiency,renewables,andotherdistributedresourcesinthefirstfiveyears,soit’shardtoseehowmanyshut-downunitscouldrestartbeforetheirmarketdisappears.

5. Radiationexposureandspecialtechniquesandrulestoreduceitsrisktendtomakenuclearrepairslong,complex,andcostly.Atmulti-reactorsites,aproblemwithoneunitcanalsomaketheothersinaccessibletokeepsafe.

6. Regionalblackoutsautomaticallyandinstantlyshutdownoperatingreactorstoensuretheirsafety.Butthencertainfissionproductsthattrapneutronsneededtosustainthechainreactionunavoidablybuildup,complicatingstablerestart.Thustheninereactorsthathadbeenrunningperfectlyat100%outputbeforethe14August2003Northeastblackouttooktwoweekstorestorefully,producinglessthan3%oftheirratedpoweroverthefirstthreedaysand41%inthefirstweek.(Ref.28graphstheNuclearRegulatoryCommissiondata.Canada’srestartwaseventougher:Torontowasneargridcollapsefordaysamidfranticappealstoturneverythingoff.)Thislittle-knownnuclear-physicsattributemakesnuclearplants“anti-peakers,”guar-anteedunavailablewhenweneedthemmost—rightafterablackout.

TheNOPRmentionsnoneoftheseissues.Italsoclaimsthat“overall,nuclearreac-torsperformedextremelywellduringthePolarVortex,withanaveragecapacityfactorof95percent.”True,butNRCdataalsoshowthatduringtheninedaysaroundHurricaneIrma,threeoffourFloridareactorslostatotalof11.91reactor-daysorone-thirdoftheirpotentialoutput,withTurkeyPoint3completelydownfor4days,TurkeyPoint4for6,andSt.Lucie2for1,andtwo-thirdsoftheirtotalcapacitydownontheworstday.58NRCdoesn’tsaywhetherthiswasduetotechnical

57L.Daprile,“HurricaneIrmanearlyforcedFPLtoshutdownSt.LucieNuclearPlant;shouldithave?,”TCPalm,5Oct2017,http://www.tcpalm.com/story/weather/hurricanes/2017/10/05/hurricane-irma-nearly-forced-fpl-shut-down-st-lucie-nuclear-plant-should-have/724802001/.58Seewww.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/2017/20170908ps.htmlandfollowingdatesthroughtheperiod9–18Sep2017.EIAsaysoneTurkeyPointunitwaspre-closedasaprecautionandtheotherclosedlaterforamechanicalissue.

20

problemsorimpairedoperatoraccess,butitdoesnotappeartobeduetotrans-missionfailuressuchasthosethatdisabledsomeTexaswindfarms.2.5.Modernrenewablegeneratorsarelargelyfreeofthevulnerabilitiesofcoalandnuclearplants,andhaveconsistentlyhelpedtokeepthelightsonwhenthoseplantsfailed.Solarcellshavealmostnomovingparts—justinverterfansandtrackermotors,alleasilymaintainedatnightfromgroundlevel—sotheirforcedoutagerateistypicallylessthan1%.(Foraleadingbrandofutility-scalePVinverter,nearlytheonlysourceoffailureinsuchsystems,theguaranteedmaximumis0.15%.)Modernwindtur-binesdonearlyaswell—1.8%formorethan20,000performance-guaranteedVestasturbinesin2016,1.1%inaSandiaNationalLaboratorydatabase.Althoughthesemodernrenewablesare98–99+%technicallyavailable,varyingsunandwindheldtheir2016averagecapacityfactor(thefractionoffull-timefull-ratingoutputactuallyproduced,perEIAEl.Monthly,Table6.7.B)to34.7%forwindpower(cutseveralpercentagepointsbytransmissionormarketcurtailments)and27.2%forsolarphotovoltaics,bothimprovingwithtechnologiesandoperatingtechniques.Dothesecapacityfactors,lowerthanthoseofcoalandnuclearplants,meanthesetwokindsof“variable”renewables—sometimesmisnamed“intermittent”or“vola-tile”59—areunreliable?Notatall.Theiroutputcangenerallybepredictedmoreaccuratelythanelectricitydemand.Whenproperlydesigned,built,run,anddis-patched,asmostnoware,theyaremorereliableandresilientgeneratorsthanfossil-fueledornuclearplants,fortwomainreasons.60First,aportfolioofrenewables,diversifiedbytypeandlocation,canexploitdifferentsites’simultaneoussolarandwindconditions,whichareoftencomplementary.Second,roughlyhalftheworld’srenewableelectricity(excludingbighydrodams)isn’tvariable—it’sneitherwindnorphotovoltaic.61Thereforeatleasttennationsnotmainlyhydro-reliantnowgetmanytimesthefractionoftheirannualelectricityusefromrenewablesthattheUSdidin2016(9%withoutor16%withhydropower),withatleastsixsurpassing37%-windpoweredIowa:Iceland100%,CostaRica99%,Portugal63%(2016),Denmark62%(2015),Scotland59%(2015),andpeninsularSpain40%(2016).Yetsuchhigh-renewablescountriesgenerallyachievesuperiorreliability.Denmarkonmanydaysoftheyeargetsallitselectricityfromrenewables;Germanyinallof

59“Intermittent”isbestreservedforunpredictable(forced)outages,notforpredictablevariations.“Volatile”ispejorativebutmeaningless.“Unreliable”issimplywrong,asthesecommentsshow.60ThisparagraphisdocumentedinaninvitedpaperbyA.Lovins,“Reliablyintegratingvariablerenewables:asystemsview,”TheElectricityJournal,inreview(2017),availablefromtheauthorunderembargouponrequesttolpauli@rmi.org.SeealsotheInternationalEnergyAgency’sMar2017nontechnicalprimer“GettingWindandSunOntotheGrid:AManualforPolicyMakers,”https://www.iea.org/publications/insights/insightpublications/Getting_Wind_and_Sun.pdf.61E.Goldfield,R.Laemel,&A.Lovins,“MicropowerDatabase2017,”RockyMountainInstitute,https://d231jw5ce53gcq.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/RMI_Micropower_Database_2017.xlsm.

21

2016was32%poweredbynonhydrorenewables,and82%forseveraldaysinMay2017;yetbothnationsaveraged23–24minutesofcustomeroutageperyear,whiletheUSaveraged198.62Tobesure,muchDanishandGermanelectricinfrastructureisunderground,butforthemasforEuropeasawhole,rapidrenewablegrowthhasbeenaccompaniedbyrisingreliabilityofpowersupply63eventhoughI’mawareofnodatashowinganincreasedundergroundfractionoflines.Somepunditsstillclaimthatrenewablescanprovidelittleelectricityreliablyunlessbackedupbycomparablestoragecapacityingiantbatteries.Yetnoneofthehigh-renewablescountriesjustmentioneddoesthat,norfeelsanyneedto.Eightkindsof“gridflexibilityresources”otherthanbulkstorageofelectricity64nowpermitlargelyorwhollyrenewablepowersupplyatattractivecostsandwithunchangedorim-provedreliabilityandresilience.65ThatiswherebothdomesticandglobalmarketsarerapidlyheadedandwhattheNOPRseekstoblock.TheSecretaryseemsunawarethattheultrareliableformerEastGermanutility50Hertzgot49%ofits2015elec-tricityfromrenewables—three-fourthsofthemvariable—andhasstated66thevariablerenewablesharecouldriseto60–70%withoutaneedtoaddbulkstorage.Americanandglobalexperienceconfirmthatmodernrenewablesareexceptionallyimportantinhelpingkeepthelightsonduringgridemergencies.Forexample:

• IntheFebruary2011Texascoldsnap,whichwasaccompaniedbyhighwinds,windpowerreliablygeneratedabout3.5GWinthemorningpeak.

• Inthe2014PolarVortex,consistentwindpoweroutputhelpedsavemid-AtlanticandGreatLakescustomersmorethan$1billionintwodays,andPJMreported4GWofpeakloadmetbywindpower’soutperformingitsnorm67.InNewEngland,whererenewables’“Coldweatherrelatedequip-mentissuesdidnotcauseanyoperationalissues,”thetotalrenewablecontributionto7Jan2014peaksupply,thoughunmentionedintheNOPR,

62D.Hochschild&D.Olson,“Renewableenergynothreattoelectricgrid,asTrumpaidesclaim,”SanFranciscoChronicle,16Jun2017gives240minutes,buttheQuadrennialEnergyReview,p.45,Jan.2017,gives~198minutesfor2016.63C.Morris,“SAIDI:Germangridkeepsgettingmorestable.”2015.http://www.renewablesinternational.net/german-grid-keeps-getting-more-reliable/150/537/89595;S.Amelang,J.Schlandt,“Germany’selectricstableamidenergytransition,”CleanEnergyWire,20Oct2016,https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-electricity-grid-stable-amid-energy-transition;S.Lacey,“CountriesWiththeMostWindandSolarHave10TimesFewerOutagesThanAmerica,”19Jun2017,https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-countries-with-the-most-wind-and-solar-have-far-fewer-outages#gs.2IiSoS4.64Describedinref.60anditsnumerouscitations.65AsexhaustivelyanalyzedbytheNationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory,ref.52,ref.5§6’scita-tions,otherDOENationalLabs,anddozensofregionalreportslistedinApp.BofDOE’sStaffReport.66G.Parkinson,“Germangridoperatorsees70%wind+solarbeforestorageneeded,”7Dec2015,http://www.energypoint.eu/german-grid-operator-can-handle-70-wind-solar-storage-needed/.67PJM,ref.36,pp.21–22.PJMstates:“ThewindpowerproducedhadapositiveimpactonsupplyandcontributedtoPJM’sabilitytomaintainreliability.”

22

equaledcoal’s14%inthemorningandexceededit(by15%vs.11%)intheafternoon.68Moreover(id.,p.15),“Therewasnoneedtocallondemandresponse/interruptibleload”during6–8Jan2014,leaving282MWofthathighlyreliableresourceunused—oversixtimesthereported44-MWpeaksupplymargin.

• Inthesurroundingcoldwinterof2013/14,windpowerwasimportanttogridsupportinTX,NE,CA,andthePJMandNewEnglandpowerpools.Inspring2014,CAISOtoldFERCthat“renewableshelpedtogetusthroughthewinter,”andISO-NewEnglandtoldtheHouseEnergyandCommerceCom-mitteethatrenewables“wereanimportantpartofthe[winter]energymix.”69

• NewYork’sIndianPoint3shutdowninDecember2015wasoffsetbythestate’swindturbinesplustwogasplants.

• HurricaneHarveydestroyedpowerlinesbutreportedlynowindfarms.70Someautomaticallyshutdownforself-protection(sustainedwindsreached130mph,twicemostturbines’designcutoutspeed),butoutsidethosepeak-windperiods,windoverproduced,supplementingfailedfossil-fuelplants.71

• HurricaneIrmadidn’tstopsolarpowerfromservinghomesequippedwithbatteriesandspecialarrangementstoavoidthemainFloridautility’sstrangemonopolyandanti-resilient-hookuprules72(cf.section5below).

• RuralHaitianPVs,sometemporarilytakendownandquicklyputbackup,solidlywithstoodHurricaneIrma.73

• InSouthAustralia’s28Sep2016statewideblackout—wronglyblamedonwindpower,theAustralianEnergyMarketOperator’sMarch2017FinalReportfound,whentheproblemarosefromtornado-downedtransmissionlinesandincorrectgridsettings—gridfaultsstoppedsixwindfarmsbutthreeotherskeptrunning.Withpropergridsettings(nowinplace)toacceptmorewindpower,another445MWofwindcouldhaveavertedtheblackout.

• SolarpowerissoultrareliablethateachoftheUSArmedServicesisinstallingabillionwattsofitonornearmilitarybases,withmoretocome.Portable

68Ref.35.69J.Moore&A.Clements,“ThePolarVortexandthePowerGrid:Whatreallyhappenedandwhythegridwillremainreliablewithoutsoon-to-retirecoalpowerplants,”29Apr2014,https://www.nrdc.org/experts/john-moore/polar-vortex-and-power-grid-what-really-happened-and-why-grid-will-remain.70R.Kessler,“MostTexascoastalwindfarmsavoidHarveystormdamage,”29Aug2017,http://www.rechargenews.com/wind/1335924/most-texas-coastal-wind-farms-avoid-harvey-storm-damage.71EIA,ref.42.72L.Gilpin,“AftertheHurricane,SolarKeptFloridaHomesandaCity’sTrafficLightsRunning,”15Sep2017,https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15092017/after-hurricane-irma-solar-florida-homes-power-gird-out-city-traffic-lights-running;M.Rozsa,“Florida’slargestpowercompanymadeinstallingsolarpanelsmuchharder,”18Sep2017,http://www.salon.com/2017/09/18/floridas-largest-power-company-made-installing-solar-panels-much-harder/.73W.Steel,“HaitianSolarPVWeathersHurricaneIrma,”13Sep2017,http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2017/09/haitian-solar-pv-weathers-hurricane-irma.html.

23

solarpowerisalsowidelyandsuccessfullyusedinexpeditionarypowersupplytoreducedependenceonvulnerablefuellogistics—an“attackmagnet”thathaskilledmorethanathousandServicemembers,makingitamongthehighestcausesofcombatriskinIraqandAfghanistan(refs.21).

Weather-relatedrenewableoutagesarenotunknown74butarerare,brief,andseldomrepeated.Demand-sideresourcesarealsoimportantforgridsupport,asdemandresponseprovedintheSoutheastpoolSECduringtheJanuary2014coldsnap.DemandresponseoutperformedinthePolarVortextoo,whenvoluntaryandpaid-fordemandreductions“wereavaluablepartofmaintainingreliability”butnocustomerswereorderedtocutback.75Thesedemand-sideresourcesandstoragelikewisesupportedCalifornia’sgridduring2016and2017heatwaveswhentheAlisoCanyonstorageleakcutgassupplies.76Dozensofdiversestudiesconfirmthathighrenewablefractionsanddemand-sideresourcesstronglysupportresilientgridoperations.77ButundertheNOPR,theseresilientresourceswouldbediscriminatedagainst,whiletheunderperformingandcostliercoalandnuclearplantswouldgetspecialrewards,eveniftheircoalpileswerefrozenandtheiroperatorsgone.2.6.TheNOPRprovidesnoevidence—perhapsbecausethereisnone—thatthe“fuel-secure”plantsitaimstosubsidizeactuallyprovideuniqueandvaluable“resiliencybenefits,”letalonethattheyprovidehigheconomicoruniqueoperationalvalue.Sections2.2–2.5aboveshowthatcoalandnuclearplantshavesignificantdirect,andinthecaseofcoalalsofuel-logistics,vulnerabilities.Thosemakethemdubioussubstitutesfortheinherentlymore-resilientdemand-side,cogeneration,andrenewableresourcesthattheNOPRwouldhavethemsupplant.TheSecretary’sviewthattheyareessentialtoreliableandresilientpower-systemoperationismostsimplyrefutedbytheexceptionalperformanceofvery-high-renewablescountries(2.5)andindeedbytheNERCreliabilitystatisticsforUSregionswithunusuallylowfractionsofcoalandnucleargeneration.The“baseload”-centricviewofelectricitysystemsthatseemstoanimatetheSecretary’sclaimsisfamiliartotheCommissionasanoutmodedviewlongabandonedbymostexpertsasnolongerusefulorneeded.78However,specifictechnicalattributesneededforpower-systemreliability74E.g.NERC’s2012Texascase-studyofavoidablecold-relatedwindpowerinterruptions,http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/February%202011%20Southwest%20Cold%20Weather%20Event/20120901_Wind_Farm_Winter_Storm_Issues.pdf,and2017Californiacase-studyforPVsshutdownbywildfireinterruptiontotransmissionduetooverlysensitiveinvertertripsettings,http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_Interruption_Final.pdf.75ISO-NewEngland,quotedinref.40,p.9.76Orvis&O’Boyle,ref.41.77E.g.,http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/files/2017/06/DOE-Baseload-Study-Letter-Attachment.pdf.78E.g.,S.Straub&P.Behr,“Energyregulatorychiefsaysnewcoal,nuclearplantsmaybeunnecessary,”N.Y.Times,22Apr2009,http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/04/22/22greenwire-no-need-to-build-new-us-coal-or-nuclear-plants-10630.html;K.Beckman,“SteveHolliday,CEONationalGrid,‘Theideaoflargepowerstationsforbaseloadisoutdated,’”11Sep2015,

24

andtraditionallyprovidedbylargerotatingmachinesincentralthermalstationsareimportant,andcanbereliablyprovided,oftenatlowercost,bydistributedenergyresources(DER)suchassolarandwindpoweratutilityscale.NERCsays79these…arenowrequiredtoridethroughdisturbances,toprovidereliabilityservices,andtohaveactivepowermanagementcapabilitytorespondtodispatchorautomaticgenerationcontrol…signals.ManyDERwillalsohavesuchcapabilities,[which]…maybeusedeitherdirectlyorthroughaggregatorsfornumerousemergingservices(e.g.demandresponse,micro-grids,virtualpowerplants,etc.)….TechnologyadvanceshavethepotentialtoalterDERfromapassive“donoharm”resourcetoanactive“supportreliability”resource.Fromatechnologicalperspective,modernDERunitswillbecapableofprovidingERS[EssentialReliabilityServices—primaryfrequencyresponse,voltagesupport,andrampingcapability]andsupportingBPS[BulkPowerSystem]reliability.Thesetechnologiesarelikelytobecomemorewidelyavailableinthenearfuture,andtheypresentanop-portunitytoenhanceBPSperformancewhenappliedinathoughtfulandpracticalmanner.NERCthenillustratesaggregatingDERintoalargefrequency-response,voltage-sup-port,system-balancing,demand-response,reserve,andramp-rateresource.DOE’sStaffReportacknowledgesmanyofthesesamepoints,anditsteamleadervaluablyamplifiestheneweroptionsforprovidingfrequencyresponsecomparabletoorbetterthan80wastraditionallyprovidedbyfueledpowerplants:81

Frequencyresponseprovision–Notallinertiaiscreatedequal.Whilerotatingmass-basedgenerationwastheonlysourceoffrequencyresponsedecadesbackinthedaysofaslowgrid,suchsourcesarenolongertheonlywaytogetfrequencyresponse.DOE,NERCandothersshouldconductimmediateresearchtodeterminethecapabilitiesandlimitsofrotatingmass-basedinertia,inverter-basedsyntheticinertia,andavarietyofstorageandautomateddemandresponsesourcestoprovideprimaryandsecondaryfrequencyresponse.

Ifthereisuniquevaluetorotatingmass-basedinertia,weneedtoknowthevalueofthatre-sourcerelativetootherfrequencyresponsesources,andhowmuchandwhere(topologically)suchrotatingmass-basedresourcesmustbelocatedformaximumeffectiveness.Earlystudiessuggestthatinverter-basedresourcescanbeusedtogreatadvantagetomanagefrequencycontrolandresponseandvoltage,ifwefirstidentifythenecessaryperformanceexpectationsonatechnology-neutralbasisandbuildthoseintogridparticipationrequirements.

http://www.energypost/eu/interview-steve-holliday-ceo-national-grid-idea-large-power-stations-baseload-power-outdated/;ref.5§6anditscitations.79NERC,DistributedEnergyResourcesTaskForceReport,Feb2017,http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/Distributed_Energy_Resources_Report.pdf.80G.Parkinson(GE),“Whygridsdon’tneedtorelyon‘synchronous’generation,”16Dec2016,http://reneweconomy.com.au/ge-grids-don’t-need-rely-synchronous-generation-89161/;H.Trabish,“Californiasolarpilotshowshowrenewablescanprovidegridservices,”UtilityDive,16Oct2017,http://www.utilitydive.com/news/california-solar-pilot-shows-how-renewables-can-provide-grid-services/506762/,provingsolarancillaryservicesarebetterandcheaperthanfromgasplants.81A.Silverstein,“IfI’dwrittentheDOEgridstudyrecommendations,”2Oct2017,http://www.utilitydive.com/news/silverstein-if-id-written-the-doe-grid-study-recommendations/506274/.If,contrarytothesecondref.90,mechanicalinertiadidprovetohavespecialvalue,marketsmightsimplyelicitanoldmotor-generatorsetwithagiantflywheel.

25

GridscananddorunreliablywithoutthelargethermalpowerplantstheSecretarycalls“baseload”plants.82Reliabilitythencomesfromadiverseportfolioofresourcessodesignedandrunthatcustomers’needsaremetatalltimes.Manyutilitieshavedonethisformanyyears(seeexamplesinsection2.5)asrenewableshavegraduallyreplacedtraditionalthermalplants,andsomepartsoftheUnitedStates,suchasIowaandCalifornia,aremovingrapidlyinthisdirection.Low-costbatterystoragewouldhelpsuchoperationbutisnotrequiredforitssuccess(ref.60).Forexample,theSouthwestPowerPoolaveraged21.5%windpoweredinMarch–May2016andhasattimesapproached40%,butfounditcouldhandleupto60%,withlowercostandlowerpricevolatility,bystraightforwardconventionalimprovements.833.TheNOPRcorrectlystatesthatmanycoalandnuclearplants,generallyoldandamortizedandoftenpaidfortwiceormorealready84,haverecentlyretiredorareslatedforretirement,butitprovidesnoevidencethattheseretirementshaveendangeredorwillendangergridreliability.TheNOPRselectivelyquotesNERC,theDOEStaffReport,andotherauthoritativesourcesoutofcontexttotrytomakewhattheyactuallysaysoundlikesupportfortheNOPR’sthesis.Ofcoursetheshiftinggeneratingmixiscausingelectricitysystemchangesthat“mustbewellunderstoodandproperlymanagedinordertoassurecontinuedreliabilityandensureresiliency.”Practicallyeveryoneintheindustryunderstandsthisneedforunderstandingandmanagement,andisintentlyengagedinachievingit.Butthatisaveryfarcryfromtheunfoundedimplicationthatthismulti-decadeevolutionmustbeurgentlyreversedanditsold,uneconomic,fadinggeneratingassets(whichNERCagreesare“economicallymarginalized”)mustbebailedoutandrestoredtotheirformerdominancebecausefurtherretirementsimminentlythreatensystemreliabilityandresilience.Thereisnoevidenceforthatproposition.ThefullStaffReport,NERCstudies,andpower-poolandNationalLaboratorystudiescitedaboveconsistentlyshowtheopposite.Theydoshowthattheindustrymustcontinuetoadaptitstechnicalandinstitutionalarrangements,inthoughtfulandorderlyfashion,tothechangingneedsandopportunitiesofnew

82Thistermhasatleastfivemeanings(ref.5n.58).Theproperandlongstandingindustrydefinition,acceptedbyNERC,restsonoperationalrolederivedfromleastmarginalcost—long-termforre-sourceacquisition,short-termfordispatch.Silverstein(id.)correctlynotesthat“baseload”isanoperationalmode,notatypeofpowerplant,andthatmanyrecentlyretiredthermalplantswerebythennolongrunningthatwaybecausecheaper-to-runrenewablesshranktheiroperatinghours.83 DOE, Quadrennial Energy Review, Jan. 2017, p. 4–10, paraphrasing Southwest Power Pool (SPP), 2016 Wind Integration Study (Little Rock, AR: SPP, January 2016), 38, https://www.spp. org/documents/34200/2016%20wind%20integration%20study%20(wis)%20final.pdf. 84Ref.5’ssection2notes(withcitationomitted)thatmanynuclearplantownerswere“compensatedfirstforbuildingtheirassets(withsubsidiesaround0.8–4.6¢/kWhforshareholder-ownedand1.7–6.3¢/kWhforpublicutilities,excluding~8.3¢/kWhofhistoricsubsidiesthatoriginallylaunchedthenuclearenterprise),thenfortransitioncostsoftherestructuringtheylaterdemanded(notably‘stranded-asset’allowances),sometimesyetagainbysomeISO-RTOs’additionalcapacitypaymentsfavoringlargethermalunits,andnow(theyhope)forafourthtimevianewstatepaymentsandcompetitiveboostsforallegedunrecognizedvirtues.Onceisenough.”

26

kindsofgenerators.ButnotasinglesuchstudybythoseentrustedwithanalyzingandoperatingthegridsupportstheNOPR’sviewthatourNationmustslamonthebrakesofelectricityreform,accelerateinreverse,andeffectivelyabandoncompet-itivewholesalemarkets.Onthecontrary,DOE’sStaffReportcitesinitsAppendixBapartiallistof35studiesofconsiderablyhighervariablerenewablepenetration(upto80–90%,vs.the2016USaverageof6.7%)withsameorbetterreliability,greaterresilience,andoftenlowercost.TheNOPRignoresthatliteratureandinsteadcitesinitsref.14–15atendentiousandunreviewednewstudy85,bytheconsultantIHSMarkit,whosecon-tentdoesnotinspireanalyticconfidence.Forexample,thestatementintheNOPR’ssectionEthatagridmixmuchcostlierthanacoal-and-nuclear-centriccasecanbedevised(asIHSMarkitdoeswithoutspecifyingthatcase’scontent)doesnotmeananysuchcasemustbefarcostlier,northatacheaperonecouldnotalsobedevised.Infact,anexhaustiveandheavilypeer-reviewed2012analysis86bytheNationalRenewableEnergyLaboratoryfoundexactlythatwhenupdated87totherenewablecostsof2014,farhigherthantoday’s,andref.52foundanevencheaper,half-dis-tributedsolutionusingthesameNRELmodel.Aneweranalysisshowshowdistribu-tedrenewablescouldnearlyhalveCalifornia’selectricitypriceswhileimprovingresilience.88TheIHSMarkitstudyalsodecriestheincreasingdiversityoftheU.S.generatingmixwithoutexplainingwhyithasaccompaniedloweroutagerates(beforethe2017hurricanes)andlowercosts.AndDOE’sStaffReportagrees(p.123)thatrenewablesstabilizeelectricityprices,makingelectricitymoreaffordable.Itisthereforenotsurprisingthatover80%ofNorthAmericanutilityemployeesinasurveyofover600professionalsexpectmoderate-to-significantincreasesinrenew-ableenergyintheirservicesterritoriesoverthenextdecade.89Theirreportedcon-cernaboutgridintegrationhasfallenbyhalfinthepastyear,tolessthanhalfthefractionofrespondentslisting[post-election]regulatoryandmarketuncertaintyastheirmostpressingconcern.Thismatchestheever-increasingweightofanalysis,suchastheNationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory’sfindingthattheEastern

85IHSMarkit,EnsuringResilientandEfficientElectricityGeneration,Sep2017,https://www.globalenergyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Value%20of%20the%20Current%20Diverse%20US%20Power%20Supply%20Portfolio_V3-WB.PDF.Thisreportfaithfullyreflectsthelobbyingpositionsofitssponsors—EdisonElectricInstitute,theNuclearEnergyInstitute,andtheGlobalEnergyInstituteoftheUSChamberofCommerce.86NREL,RenewableElectricityFuturesStudy,2012,http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/re_futures/.87T.Mai,D.Mulcahy,M.Hand,S.Baldwin,“EnvisioningarenewableenergyfuturefortheUnitedStates,”Energy65:374–386(2014),summarizedathttps://gcep.stanford.edu/pdfs/events/workshops/Mai_2015-04-01%20GCEP%20Net%20Energy%20-%20public.pdf.88R.Jain,J.Qin,&J.Rajagopal,“Data-drivenplanningofdistributedenergyresourcesamidstsocio-technicalcomplexities,”NatureEnergy2(17112),2017,doi:10.1038/nenergy.2017.112.89H.Trabish,“Whyutilitiesaremoreconfidentthaneveraboutrenewableenergygrowth,”25Apr2017,http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-utilities-are-more-confident-than-ever-about-renewable-energy-growth/440492/.

27

Interconnection(bysomemeasurestheworld’slargestpowersystem)canreliablyincreaseitsrenewablesbymorethantenfold.90WhathaskepttheUSelectricitysystemaworldleaderisthecontinuousinnovationdrivenbyopenmarkets,innovativeregulation,andadvancedtechnologies.TheNOPR’sefforttopickfuelsunderaspuriousnational-securitypretextputsallthatatrisk.AsJeffSt.JohncorrectlyparaphrasestheRStreetInstitute’sDevinHartman91,“themuchdeeperanalysispresentedin[DOE’sStaffReport]builtonexistingworkatFERCand[theISOs/RTOs]…callingforimprovementsinenergypriceformationandvaluationof[E]ssential[R]eliability[S]ervicessuchasvoltagesupportandfrequencyresponse”—notofonsitefuelinventories.AndastheDOEStaffReport(pp.90–91)quotestheRStreetInstitute,whichlaterfoundtheNOPR“deeplytroubling”92andhostiletocompetitivemarkets:Fuelneutralityisessentialforbothmonopoly-utilityresourceplanningandcompetitivemarketstomanageriskandachievereliabilityefficiently.Interventionstopromotespecificfueltypes—suchasbailoutsforcoalandnuclearormandatesandsubsidiesforrenewables—skewinvestmentriskandcanundermineincentivesforreliability-enhancingbehavior….Forregulators,attemptstoachievefueldiversityinmarketdesignsexplicitlywouldlikelyresultininefficientandpotentiallydiscrimina-torypracticesthatareinconsistentwiththeFederalPowerAct.4.Resilienceisbestachievedthroughefficientandtimelyuseofelectricitygeneratedbydiverse,distributed,andpreferablyrenewableresources.Ref.13’sevidence,muchofitparaphrasedinsections2.3–2.5,suggestssixlessonsthatitsummarizesthusandthatarehighlyrelevanttothisdocket:

1. Withoutexception,allsourcesofelectricitysometimesfail.Theirfailuresdifferwidelyincause,size,abruptness,predictability,frequency,duration,andimportance.Big,lumpyfailuresaremoreawkwardthansmall,granularones.

2. Coal-andgas-firedplants’often-farflungfuellogisticsareparticularlyvulnerable….Gasandelectricitysuppliesarealsointerdependent.93

90A.Bloometal.,EasternRenewableGenerationIntegrationStudy,NREL/TP-6A20-64472,Aug2016,https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/64472.pdf.91J.St.John,“BehindtheBacklashtoEnergySecretaryRickPerry’sDemandforCoal-NuclearMarketIntervention,”5Oct2017,https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/behind-the-backlash-to-energy-secretary-rick-perrys-demand-for-coal-nuclear#gs.e6Upvd0.92RStreetInstitute,“DOEproposalmisframesgridresiliency,”1Oct2017,http://www.rstreet.org/2017/10/01/doe-proposal-misframes-grid-resiliency/.93E.g.,NERC’sSouthwest2012case-studyathttp://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/February%202011%20Southwest%20Cold%20Weather%20Event/LL20120905_Gas_and_Electricity_Interdependency.pdf.NERC’sinterdependencyreportsareathttp://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/Gas_Electric_Interdependencies_Phase_I.pdfandhttp://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_PhaseII_FINAL.pdf.

28

3. Coalandnuclearpowerplants,thetwokindsthatkeep“fuelonhand,”areparticularlyproneto“common-modefailures”thatcanstoptheiroutputoverlargeareasforsubstantialperiods.

4. Thoughnuclearplantsrequireonlyinfrequentdeliveryoffreshfuel,andaccountedforonly3%oftheforcedoutagesinthePolarVortex,theycansufferrelativelyinfrequentbutunusuallylongoutages,canbeshutdownatanationalscale(ormore)aftercertainuncontrollableevents,andcanbeslowandhardtorestartafterasuddenandwidespreadblackout,sotheytoohavereliabilityshortcomings.

5. Renewablepowerhaslessfrequentandbriefertechnologicalfailuresthanfueledgeneration,butwindpowerandPVsdovary(albeitverypredictably)withwindandsun.(Otherrenewables,deliveringhalfthe2016globaloutputofallrenewablesotherthanbighydropower,are“dispatchable”—youcanhavethemwheneveryouwant.)Especiallywhenintegratedintomicrogrids,renewablesaremoreresilientthangeneratorsthatneedfuel—evenwindpowerandPVsiftheirforecastablevariabilityisproperlymanaged.Thatneedisanalogoustobutprobablycheaperthanmanagingtheintermittenceoflargethermalplantsthroughreservemarginandspinningreserve.Makinglargelyorwhollyrenewablepowersupplyhighlyreliabletypicallyneedslittleornobulkelectricitystorage,butcombinesprov-entechniques94forforecasting,diversification,integration,demandflexibility,thermalstorage,andelectricitystorageworthbuyinganyway(suchasinparkedelectricvehicles).

6. Allthesecomparisonsbetweengeneratorsoverlookaveryimportantfactor.Whetheritcomesfromarenewableoranonrenewablepowerplant,theaverageelectronmovesseveralhundredmilesthroughthetransmissionanddistributiongridsbeforeitreachesyourmeter.Butnofarawaypowerplantcanserveyouifthatgridfails.Gridfailures,notgeneratorshortfalls,causeroughly98–99%ofUSpowerfailures.Soifyouwantthemostreliablesupply,useanearbygenerator,likePVsonyourroof,tobypassthegridaltogether.Ifyoucan’tdothat,atleastconsideralocalmicrogridtominimizethedistanceyourelectricitymusttravel.Ifyoureallywantreliableandresilientpower,nokindofremotecentralpowerstationisasuitablechoice(ref.8).

Whateverthevirtuesoffueledcentralpowerstations,“fuelonhand”isnotoneofthem.Thecommendableimpulsetodiversifypowersourcesdoesnotrequiresubstitutingoneparticularlybrittleandcostlysourceforanother,anymorethandiversifyingafinancialportfoliowillmakeitperformbetterifyouunwiselychoosecostlyandriskyinvestments.Tomanagebothcostandrisk,bothreliabilityandresilience,adiverseportfolioofefficiency,loadflexibility,andrenewablesissufficient,smart,andwinninginthemarketplace—whilealsoadvancingfreemarkets,nationalsecurity,andCreationcare.

BothconservativesandprogressiveswhoshareSecretaryPerry’sgoalsof“reliability,affordability,andfuelassurance”—wherefuelisneededatall,andnototherwise—willfindthisawinningformula.Itsprudentmanagementofotherrisksisafreebyproduct.

94E.g.https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/projekte/2014/integrationskosten-wind-pv/agora-integration-cost-wind-pv-web.pdf.

29

ThusasmycolleaguesMirandaBallentine(previouslyatopWal-Martofficial,thenAssistantSecretaryoftheAirForce)andMarkDysonputit,95theNOPR“looksbackward,notforward.Anyseriousattempttoimprovethecountry’senergyresilienceneedstotakeadvantageofemergingsolutionsratherthanpropup20thcenturyones.”BuildingonFERC’slongstandingandexpertleadershipinfuel-neutralandtechnology-neutralmarkets,improvingresilienceshoulduseinnovationandcompetitiontoenablethenewenergysystem,notprotecttheold.

5.Fortheforegoingreasons,FERCshouldrejecttheNOPRasunsupportedbyevidenceofrecord.Butgridresilienceisimportantandneedsmoreattention.FERCshouldthereforeintensifyitsexaminationofgridresiliencebydiligent,orderly,unhurried,andinclusivemeansthatconsiderthefollowingfourclassesofsuggestions.5.1.Distributedresources’gridinterconnectionsshouldbecomeresilientbydefault.Distributedrenewablegeneratorscanpoweryourhousethroughdisasters—butnotifcrippledbyobsoleteutilityrules.WhenSuperstormSandyblackedoutmorethantwomillionNewJerseyhouseholds,manyfordays,thatstatehadthesecond-high-esthomesolarpowercapacity,overathousandmegawatts.Over90%ofthosesolarpanelssurvivedthestormandevenmanythatflewawaywiththeirroofswereOKwhentheylanded.Butbyutilityrule,that“grid-tied”gigawatthadallbeenwirednottoworkwithoutthegrid,makingrenewablessoirrelevanttorestorationthatNERC’sanalysisdoesn’tmentionthem.96Evenbackupengine-generatorscouldn’tgetfuelandsoonbecameuseless—anissueaddressedbelowinsection5.3.NowPSE&GandConEdarestartingtorethinkthatno-islandingpolicy,asthewholeindustryshould.Sandyshouldhavebeenawakeupcall97,andwasforafewutilities,butmosthitthesnoozebutton.Inarecentindustryseminar,Iaskedrepresentativesofdozensofutilitieshowmanyallowedresilienthookup.Onlytwodid.Theissuehasn’tevenbeenonEEI’sagenda,andfewstatePUCshaveyetpaidattention.Butaprovenandpreapprovedsolutionisreadilyathand.ThenationwideindustryconsensusstandardIEEE-1547ondistributedgenerators’gridinterconnection,approvedin2003andenshrinedintheEnergyPolicyActsignedbyPresidentGeorgeW.Bushin2005,98automaticallymakesthehookup95M.Ballentine&M.Dyson,“RickPerry’splantosubsidizecoalandnuclearplantsdoesnothingtofixtheU.S.powergrid,”6Oct2017,http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ballentine-dyson-energy-resilience-power-grid-rick-perry-20171006-story.html.96NERC,“HurricaneSandyEventAnalysisReport,”Jan2014,http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Oct2012HurricanSandyEvntAnlyssRprtDL/Hurricane_Sandy_EAR_20140312_Final.pdf;D.Levitan,“RooftopSolarStoodUptoSandy,”IEEESpectrum,16Nov2012,https://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/solar/rooftop-solar-stood-up-to-sandy/.97S.Lacey,“Resiliency:HowSuperstormSandyChangedAmerica’sGrid,”10Jun2014,https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/featured/resiliency-how-superstorm-sandy-changed-americas-grid#gs.Ofrl_g0.98B.Reppert,“EnergyActIncludesProvisionsChampionedbyIEEE-USA,”Today’sEngineer,Sep2005,http://te.ieeeusa.org/2005/Sep/energy_act.asp.

30

resilientwhileprotectinglineworkers—eveniftheyignoretheirownsafetyrulesandiftheyfailtoactivatetheutility-operableshutoffswitches(nowoftentwoseparateswitches)mandatedbytheNationalElectricalCode.ThereisnotechnicalreasonformostUSutilitiestoforbidmodernrenewables’ownersfromactivatingtheIEEE-1547-compliant“islanding”featurebuiltintomostmoderninverters.Suchrulesareonlyanartifactofaknife-switchmentalitypersistingintheageofpowerelectronics.Ifallowedto,1547-compliantsolarpowercanisolatefromthefailinggridandkeepcriticalloadsrunning,notendangeringlineworkersbutlettingforesightedcustomersandtheirneighborscarryonuninterrupted.Increasingly,too,behind-the-meterbatteries(oftencost-effectivenowduetomanyvaluablebenefits99)arefirmingrooftopsolarpower,furtherincreasingresilience.Thestate-of-the-artsolarsystematopamajornewconventioncenterwhereIspokeinNorthCarolinaafewyearsagowouldn’tevenbeabletolightitsparkinggarage’stornadoshelterinthedaytimeifthetornadotoredownthepowerlines.Theinvert-erswerefullyIEEE1547-compliant,butoldutilityruleswouldn’tletthatfeaturebeactivated.Andsuchneedlessgapsinpublicsafetyaren’tisolatedflukes;they’rethenorm.SuchshamefullybackwardrestrictionspersistunnoticedinmostoftheUnitedStates,sacrificingvitalbenefitstofamily,community,andnationalsecurity.That’sbackwards.“Resilienthookup”shouldbenottheexceptionbuttherule.Utilitiesshouldn’tforbidanycustomerfromadoptingthesamehookupthatDoDdoctrinerequirestosustainitsmilitarybases’resilientpower.FERCshouldtakeupthisissueandencouragegridoperatorsandtheirmarketactorstomake“resilienthookup”permissibleandencouragedeverywhere.Thenthegradualdeploymentofdistributedgeneratorscanbuildfromthebottomuparesilientgrid,includingnucleationofblackstartandcontinuityofvitallocalservices.Sandy’svictimsshouldhavehadpowerimmediately,notdayslater,andsoshouldeveryoneinAmerica’shurricane-afflictedzonestoday.5.2.Gridarchitectureshouldbeallowedandencouragedtoshifttonettedislandablemicrogrids.Next,tomakepowersuppliesresilientnationwide,weneedtoreorganizedistribut-edrenewablesintolocalmicrogridsthatnormallyinterconnectbutcansplitapartfractallyatneed,standaloneandservecriticalloadsasbesttheycan,thendetectgridrestoration(afterapausetoensureit’srealandnotareclosertransient),resynchronize,andreconnectseamlessly.That’sthePentagon’sstrategyformilitarypowersupplies.It’showmyownhouseworks.It’showDenmarkisreorganizingitsgridina“cellular”architecturethatmakescascadingblackoutsimpossible,asprovenbyregularstress-tests.Ataboutthesamecostasbusiness-as-usual,resilient

99RMI,“TheEconomicsofBatteryEnergyStorage,”Oct2015,https://rmi.org/insights/reports/economics-battery-energy-storage.

31

gridarchitecture100couldmaximizenationalsecurity,customerchoice,entrepre-neurialopportunity,andinnovation.Resilientgridarchitectureplusefficientend-useformthestrongestknownroutetoresilientpowersupply.Whena2007wildfiredisruptedSanDiego’sgrid,theUniver-sityofCaliforniacampus’sislandablemicrogrid,101providing92%ofthecampus’sannualelectricityat$8millionlowerannualcost,switchedinundertenminutesfromimporting4MWtoexporting3MWofpowerfromitsonsitesources,includingPVs.102When14transmissiontripsinHurricaneGustav(2008)isolatedaBatonRouge–NewOrleanszonefor33hours,Entergy,using21phasormeasurementunits,wasabletoimproviseislandedoperationthatsustainedserviceacrossfourstatesbybalancingthreelargegeneratingunitswithoutaccesstothelargergrid.103Theworldnowhasontheorderof2,000microgrids,ranginginAmericafromOcracokeIslandinNorthCarolinatoBorregoSpringsinCaliforniaandSterlinginMassachusetts.104SeveralpoweredtheirinstitutionsthroughSandy.105Thehurri-cane-beset Caribbean,wheremyorganizationhadalreadyundertakensubstantialeffortstoswitchseveralislandnationsfromdieselgeneratorstoefficiencyandrenewables,isnaturallyveryinterestedinmicrogrids.Cuba106usedmicrogridsandseveralcomplementaryreformstocutitsseriousblackoutdaysfrom224in2005tozeroin2007,thensustainedvitalservicesin2008whentwohurricanesintwoweeksshreddedtheeasterngrid—afeatreportedlyrepeatedinthisyear’shurri-canesdespiteimmensedestruction.WhydidsophisticatedUSgridsperformworseinthe2017hurricanesthansomepartsofCuba?Mightourutilities,whileempha-sizinghardeningandsmarteningofthetraditionalgrid,havenottakenseriouslyenoughtheneedtoevolveitsarchitectureanddistributeitsresources? 5.3.FERCshouldencourageregionalandindustryactorstoundertakepromptspecialinitiativestoenablemotor-fuelfillingstationstorunevenwithoutthegrid.

100A.Lovins,HowToEndBlackoutsForever,”Time,2012,http://ideas.time.com/2012/11/15/how-to-make-blackouts-history/.101UCSD,“TheMagicoftheMicrogrid,”2017,https://sustainability.ucsd.edu/highlights/microgrids.html;forthePrincetonequivalent,seeM.Fitzgerald,“WhenthePowerGoesOut,MicrogridsKeepElectricityFlowing,”WallSt.J.,18May2014,https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-the-power-goes-out-microgrids-keep-electricity-flowing-1400272693.102MMilleretal,“StatusReportonPowerSystemTransformation,”May2015,NREL/TP-6A20-63366,forCleanEnergyMinisterial,atp.58,https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63366.pdf.103Ref.14,p.16.104Allhyperlinkedinref.95.105Ref.14,p.15n;seealsoref.102.106A.Lovins,“EfficiencyandMicropowerforReliableandResilientElectricityService:AnIntriguingCase-StudyfromCuba,”memopreparedforseniorDoDtheatercommanders,RMI,31Jan2010,https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RMI_Document_Repository_Public-Reprts_2010-23_CubaElectricity.pdf.SeealsoY.Zhao,“PowerShiftinCuba,”10Feb2017,http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2017/02/power-shift-in-cuba-seven-reasons-to-watch-the-renewable-energy-sector-in-the-post-fidel-and-trump-era.html.

32

FERCcouldencouragetheISO/RTOsandtheirmarketactorstoworkwithlocalgasoline-stationowners(oftenmajoroilcompanies)toequipeverystationwithrooftopsolarpower,abattery,andslightlyrevisedbreaker-boxwiringsothesubmergedgasolinepumpsandthepoint-of-saleterminalaredisentangledfromtherestoftheconveniencestore.(Currentlythey’reoftencombinedsotheentire20–30-kWstoreneedstobepoweredupbeforeyoucanpumpanygas—andmodernpumpslacktheoldsocketforamanualcrank,sothatoptionisgoneunlessare-sourcefulownerkepttheoldpump-headandcanreinstallitinanemergency.)Aslongaswehaveremotepowerplantsconnectedtocustomersbyfrailwiresstrungthroughtheair,stormswillcontinuetotakedownpowerlinesandblackoutcus-tomers.Butatleastfirstresponders,gensetowners,andeveryoneelseshouldstillbeabletogetgasolineanddieselfueltokeepvitalmobilityservicesrunningthroughoutpost-disasterrecovery.DOEactuallypioneeredasolar-poweredgasolinestationinWestChicago,wheretheSecretaryofEnergycuttheribbonin1980.It’stimetorepeatthatgoodidea.5.4.FERCshouldenhancewholesalecompetitionbyrequiringpropervaluationoffuel-pricevolatilityandbyatleastshadow-pricingandemulatingenergydesubsidization.Finally,FERCshouldaddtoitsexistingpoliciesforfullandfaircompetitionbetweenallresources—bothsupply-anddemand-side—twonewelements:

1. Economiccompetitionsandcomparisonsbetweenfueledandnonfueledresourcesshouldincludethefairmarketvalueoffuel-pricevolatility—risk-equalizingforfaircomparisonwithefficiencyandrenewables,whichhavenofuelandhenceconstantprices.Ref.5§12summarizesthisbasicbutcur-rentlyignoredfoundationoffinancialeconomics.Itseffectwouldbetoroughlydoubletheeffectivepriceofnaturalgas(andprobablysomewhatincreasethatofcoal,oil,LPG,andperhapsbiofuels).Thatwouldhelpnuclearpowercompeteagainstfossil-fueledgeneration,notablygas,withoutdistort-ingcompetitionbetweenallcarbon-freeresources.

2. FERCshouldconsiderwaystoencourageacross-the-boarddesubsidizationoftheentireelectricity(andenergy)systemsothatalloptionscancompeteontheirmerits.Ingeneral,fossilandnuclearelectricityismoreheavilysub-sidizedthanrenewableelectricityorefficiency,bothoncurrentaccount107

107DOE’sStaffReport,p.53,citesafallaciousnuclear-industrystudyasshowingthatinayearofveryatypicalrenewablesubsidies,theygotmoresubsidythannonrenewables(particularlynuclear).Theoppositeistrue:thecited2015EIAstudy(https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf)isunhelpfulbecauseitsCongressionalsponsorscarefullyexcludedmostsubsidiestononrenewables.Seee.g.D.Koplow,“TheNuclearSolution?TheRoleofSubsidiesandMarketDistortions,”Mar2017,https://sustainability.ucsd.edu/highlights/microgrids.html;—,“EIAEnergySubsidyEstimates:AReviewofAssumptions,”2010,https://earthtrack.net/sites/default/files/uploaded_files/EIA%20subsidy%20review%20final_17Mar20.pdf;—,“SubsidiestoconventionalenergyinthePJMregion:Aninitiallisting,”May2017,

33

and(evenmore)historicallyoverdecades—forsomesubsidiesevenforacenturyormore.Ibelievecomprehensive,orderly,fairdesubsidization(whichIhavelongfavored108)wouldtendtohelpthemostresilientresources,enhancingbothourwealthandourcommunityandnationalsecuritywhilerespectingthesoundtenetsofconservativemarketeconom-ics.FERCshouldexplorewhethershadowpricingcouldemulatedesubsidi-zationevenifCongressisnotyetreadytoimplementit,thusachievingmore-efficientmarketoutcomesandreducingmarketdistortions.

Together,theseapproachesshouldbetterachievetheNOPR’sresiliencegoals,notbybackwards-lookingemphasisonthesizeofapileoffuelthatthemarketisreject-ingandthepowersystemnolongerneeds,butbyaforward-looking,market-friend-lyfocusonhowcompetitionandinnovationcanbestprovidethereliableandresili-entpowersupplyourNation’ssecurityandprosperityrequire.IthanktheCommissionforkindlyacceptingandconsideringtheseideas,andstandreadytohelpdiscussandelaboratethemifdesired.Thethoughtfulconsiderationandpublicparticipationrequiredbylawseemstomeimpossiblewithintheextraor-dinarilyshorttimeframeproposedintheNOPR.Indeed,theNOPRdoesnotmeetthebasicAdministrativeProcedureActrequirementofsufficientspecificityforinteres-tedpartiestocommentandFERCtoconsider.Forbothreasons,theNOPRshouldberejectedinitsentirety.However,asperhapsthepersoninvolvedmostearlyanddeeplyinraisingthewholeissueofgridresilienceoverthepast37years,IamexcitedandgratefulthatthisexistentiallyimportantissueisnowfirmlyontheCom-mission’sagendaandcanbenefitfromitsproudlegacyofevidence-based,nonpar-tisanrulemaking.

Respectfullysubmitted,

AmoryB.Lovins

***

https://earthtrack.net/documents/siubsidies-conventional-energy-pjm-region-initial-listing;—,“NuclearPower:StillNotViableWithoutSubsidies,”2011,http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/cost-nuclear-power/nuclear-power-subsidies-report#.WeKLIa2ZOis.D.Roberts’s7Oct2017fossil-fuellaysummary“FriendlypolicieskeepUSoilandcoalafloatfarmorethanwethought”(https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-subsidies)isanexcellentintroduction,andoneofthethreestudiesitdescribeswasjustpublishedinNatureEnergy(P.Ericksonetal.,“EffectofsubsidiestofossilfuelcompaniesonUnitedStatescrudeoilproduction,”2Oct2017,doi:10.1038/s41560-017-0009-8).108A.Lovins,“Nuclearsocialism,”WeeklyStandard,25Oct2010,http://www.weeklystandard.com/nuclear-socialism/article/508830.

34

ANNEX1:QUALIFICATIONSOFAMORYB.LOVINSAmoryB.Lovins(1947–)isChiefScientistandChairmanEmeritusofRocky

MountainInstitute(RMI)—anindependent,apolitical,nonprofit,~200-personener-gythink-and-dotankhecofoundedin1982.AnAmericanconsultantphysicist,heisaninnovatorinenergyanditslinkswitheconomy,environment,resources,security,and development. He has advised the energy and other industries for over fourdecades inmore than65countries.Hehasreceived theVolvo,Zayed,BluePlanet,Onassis, Nissan, Shingo, andMitchell Prizes, the Benjamin Franklin, Happold, andSpencer Hutchens Medals, MacArthur and Ashoka Fellowships, 12 honorarydoctorates, and theRightLivelihood (“AlternativeNobel”),Heinz,Lindbergh,TimeHero for the Planet, World Technology, and National Design Awards. A Swedishengineeringacademician,UShonoraryarchitect,formerOxforddon,andmemberoftheNationalPetroleumCouncil,hehasbriefedmorethan30headsofstate,advisedmajorfirmsandgovernmentsworldwide,taughtattenuniversities(mostrecentlyStanford’sSchoolofEngineering),andwritten31booksandmorethan600papers.In2009,Timenamedhimoneofthe100most influentialpeopleintheworld,andForeignPolicy,oneofthe100topglobalthinkers.In2016,thePresidentofGermanyawardedhimthatnation’shighestcivilianaward fornationalservice, theOfficer’sCrossoftheOrderofMerit(Bundesverdienstkreuz1.Klasse).

Ahands-onpractitioner,Lovinshasledthesuperefficientredesignofmorethan$40billionworthofindustrialfacilitiesin30sectors,scoresofbuildings,andvariouslandandseavehicles.Histrademark“integrativedesign”techniquesoftenmakeverylargeenergysavingscheaperthansmallones.His1999businessbookNaturalCapitalism(1999)withPaulHawkenremainsabest-seller.SmallIsProfit-able,thefoundationalworkonthescaleeconomicsofelectricitysystems,wasanEconomist2002BookoftheYear.HisPentagon-cosponsored2004synthesisWinningtheOilEndgameroadmappedhowtoeliminateU.S.oiluseby2040andrevitalizetheeconomy,ledbybusinessforprofit;sofarit’saheadofschedule.His2011ReinventingFiresynthesisexpandedthatagendatoincludecoalandsave$5trillion,andsofarisontrackinthemarketplace.(Thesebookshadrespectively2,6,4,and60coauthors.)In2012–16heco-ledaconsortiumwiththeChinesegovern-ment’stopenergymodelers(NDRC’sEnergyResearchInstitute)andLawrenceBerkeleyNationalLaboratory,drawingsimilarconclusionstoinformChina’s13thFiveYearPlan.In2017heco-ledwithPrimeMinisterModi’sNITIAayogtheofficiallyadoptedIndiaLeapsAheadreframingofIndia’spersonalmobilitystrategy.

Inthe1980s,Lovinsformedmanyofthebasicconceptsthatunderlietoday’selectricityindustryandledthemostdetailedstudiessofarofelectricend-useefficiency,theninthe1990s,foundedandspunoffasESOURCEwhatremainstheleadingtechnicalandstrategicinformationserviceforsuchefforts.Hehasgivenexperttestimonytotenstateutilitycommissions.InMarch2013,theEditorofPublicUtilitiesFortnightlydevotedninepagestohiselectricityprescience,109andin

109“TurningEnergyInsideOut,”https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2013/03/turning-energy-inside-out;“SavingGigabuckswithNegawatts,”

35

June2016listedhimfirstamongutilities’Top10MostInfluentialpeoplesince1990.110PowerEngineeringInternationallikewisesingledhimoutforthebestforesightamong20electricityexpertsithadinterviewed20yearsearlier.111

HisclientshaveincludedtheUSCongress,13stateand5foreigngovernments,dozensofmajorfirms,majorreal-estatedevelopers,andmorethan100electricandgasutilities.HelongtaughtatCampNARUCandhasaddressedsuchgroupsastheNationalAcademies,AssociationofEnergyEngineers,sevenDOENationalLaboratories,UKRoyalAcademyofEngineering,NationalScienceFoundation,CouncilofScientificSocietyPresidents,ASHRAE,InstitutionofElectricalEngineers,EdisonElectricInstitute,ElectricPowerResearchInstituteanditsJapancounterpartCRIEPI,NARUC,AmericanGasAssociation,AmericanPetroleumInstitute,AmericanAssociationofPetroleumGeologists,UrbanLandInstitute,IndustrialDevelopmentResearchCouncil,CoreNet,AmericanInstituteofArchitects,AmericanPhysicalSociety,HighlandsForum,WorldEnergyConference,GoldmanSachs,MerrillLynch,JPMorgan,MorganStanley,SwissRe,Allen&Co.,BloombergNewEnergyFinance,NewsCorporation,CouncilonCompetitiveness,CSIS,HooverandBrookingsInstitutions,CouncilonForeignRelations,ConferenceBoard,Keidanren,WorldEconomicForum,WorldBank,InternationalMonetaryFund,RoyalSociety,andRoyalSocietyofArts.

NewsweekcalledLovins“oneofthewesternworld’smostinfluentialenergythinkers”;Dr.AlvinWeinberg,formerDirectorofOakRidgeNationalLaboratory,“surelythemostarticulatewriteronenergyinthewholeworldtoday”;andCarmagazine,the22ndmostpowerfulpersonintheglobalautomotiveindustry.Dr.JohnAhearne,thenVicePresidentofResourcesfortheFuture,said“AmoryLovinshasdonemoretoassembleandadvanceunderstandingof[energy]efficiencyopportu-nitiesthananyothersingleperson.”

Lovins’snational-securitybackgroundincludesdevisingthefirstlogicallyconsistentapproachtonuclearnonproliferation(manypapersandtwobooks,1979–83);performingforDoDin1981thestill-definitiveunclassifiedstudyofdomesticenergycriticalinfrastructureandresilience(BrittlePower:EnergyStrategyforNa-tionalSecurity);codevelopinga“newsecuritytriad”ofconflictprevention,conflictresolution,andnonprovocativedefense;lecturingatOSD,NDU,DAU,USMA,USNA,NWC,NPS,STRATCOM,etc.onleast-costsecurityandonhownewtechnologieswilltransformmissionsandforcestructures;leadingforVADMLopezthe1995–98overhaulofNAVFAC’sdesignprocess;leadinga2000–01analysisforSECNAVDanzigofhowtosaveuptohalfthehotel-loadelectricityaboardUSSPrincetonCG-59;addressingASNE10andtheUSMCCommandant’s2010expeditionaryenergysymposium;keynotingSECNAVMabus’s62thCurrentStrategyConference;servingin1980–81onDOE’sEnergyResearchAdvisoryBoard;andservingon1999–2001https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/1985/03/saving-gigabucks-negawatts-1985;“ScratchingtheSurface,”https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2013/03/scratching-surface.110S.Mitnick,“MostInfluentialSince1990,”PublicUtilitiesFortnightly(151(3):3,28–36),https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2016/06/most-influential-1990.111D.Flin,“BacktotheFuture:Europeanpowerpredictions,”PowerEngineeringInternational,26May2016,http://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/print/volume-24/issue-5/features/back-to-the-future.html.

36

and2006–08DefenseScienceBoardpanels,findingcost-effectiveDoDfuel-savingpotentiallaterestimatedbyRMItototal~66%plusavoidedlift,andfirstexplicatingthemodernthreatspectrumofpower-griddisruptionsthatheforesawpre-InternetinBrittlePower.LovinscontinuestohelpDoDwithenergystrategy,electricityresilience,andplatformefficiency,andhasbeentaskedbyCOMNAVSEAtohelptransformtheNavaldesignprocess.HavinghelpeddriveDoD’senergyagendaforthreedecades,hejoinedCNO’sAdvisoryBoard(CAB)in2013,andsince2011hasservedasProfessorofPracticeattheNavalPostgraduateSchool.

AndyBochman’sauthoritativeDoDEnergyBlogkindlystated:112“RockyMountainInstitutefounderAmoryLovinshasbeeninthislonggamelongerthananyone,andmuchofthecreditforDoD’scurrentmomentumonenergycanbetraceddirectlytohisdecades-longleadershipandperseverance.”Bochmanadded113,withsomehyperbole:“He’sathought-leadingoutsiderwhoknowsmoreaboutDoDandenergy—whereit’sbeenandwhereitneedstogo—thanmaybeallthereadersandwritersofthisblogputtogether.”VADM(Ret.)DennisMcGinn,formerDeputyChiefofNavalOperationsandanenergy-resiliencepartnerfor21ofhis35yearsofNavalservice(thenduringhis2014–17termasAssistantSecretaryoftheNavy),wrotethat“asadirectresultofhisunmatchedknowledge,effectiveengagementandtirelesseffort,Dr.LovinshasalmostsinglehandedlyshapedtheenergyandenvironmentalsecurityawarenessandsustainabilityperspectivesofthemostseniorleadersintheDepartmentofDefenseandArmedServices,aswellassecurityleadersinkeyforeignnations,”andhas“hadaprofoundanddirectinflu-enceonmilitaryoperationaldesignsandpractices.”

112A.Bochman,15Mar2010blog,http://dodenergy.blogspot.com/2010/03/lovins-on-dod-energy-opportunities-in.html.113A.Bochman,12May2010blog,http://dodenergy.blogspot.com/2010/05/lovins-addresses-new-nuclear-power-for_12.html.

37

ANNEX2:CONCORDANCETOFERCSTAFF’S30QUESTIONS

Thistablematchesmysubmission’spagenumbers(andlinenumbersinparentheses)withcategorized,numberedstaffquestionsfromFERCRM18-1-000.

Page FERCQuestion(s)Answered1 Implementation#3(14–20);NeedforReform#4,90-dayRequirement

#2(26–29)2 NeedforReform#4(2–4,10–16);Implementation#1&5(8–10);Other

#4(16–18);90-dayRequirement#2,FuelSupplyRequirement#2(28–30);NeedforReform#1(32–42)

3 NeedforReform#1(2–22),90-dayRequirement#2(22–25)4 90-dayRequirement#2(1–36);NeedforReform#4,FuelSupply

Requirement#2(18–27);GeneralEligibilityQuestions3–5(38–40)5 GeneralEligibilityQuestions#4(1–2);NeedforReform#4(3–9);

GeneralEligibilityQuestions#6(5–9);NeedforReform#1(11–15);90-dayRequirement#2,FuelSupplyRequirement#2(19–35);NeedforReform#3(30–31)

6 NeedforReform#2&3(15–28)7 NeedforReform#3(1–2,8–23);NeedforReform#4&5(27–33)8 NeedforReform#2–4(2–11),Other#3(4–6,13–20),90-day

Requirement#2(39–40)9 90-dayRequirement#2(1–7);NeedforReform#5(5–7);Needfor

Reform#1,Other#3(10–15)10 90-dayRequirement#2(3–5,24–30)11 NeedforReform#2(4–15,24–26),NeedforReform#5(18–24)12 NeedforReform#2,90-dayRequirement#2,FuelSupplyRequirement

#2(6–30)13 NeedforReform#2,90-dayRequirement#2,FuelSupplyRequirement

#2(1–2,11–36);NeedforReform#4(4–9)14 NeedforReform#2(14–17),Other#3(4–6,24–25),NeedforReform

#4(29–31)15 NeedforReform#4(1–7);NeedforReform#3,FuelSupply

Requirement#2(11–26)16 NeedforReform#3,FuelSupplyRequirement#2(2–11)17 NeedforReform#1,Other#3(7–30)18 Other#3(1–2),FuelSupplyRequirement#3(24–25),FuelSupply

Requirement#2(26–32)19 NeedforReform#3,FuelSupplyRequirement#2(1–2,6–10,21–26,

34–38);Other#3(13–16);NeedforReform#2(32–34)20 NeedforReform#1,Other#3(4–6,20–36)21 NeedforReform#1,Other#3(1–3,8–13,19–29);NeedforReform#2

(24–27)

38

22 NeedforReform#1,Other#3(6–11,21–26);NeedforReform#3(12–20)

23 NeedforReform#1,Other#3(6–17);GeneralEligibilityQuestions#3(33)

24 NeedforReform#1,GeneralEligibilityQuestions#3,Other#3(1–33)25 NeedforReform#5(2–3),NeedforReform#4(13–16,24–32)26 NeedforReform#4,Other#3(1–4,14–20)27 NeedforReform#5(18–20),Other#3(23–24),90-dayRequirement

(28–32)28 90-dayRequirement(1–3),NeedforReform#2&3(4–8),Other#3(9–

21),GeneralEligibilityQuestions#3(22–31)29 Other#3(9–34)30 Other#3(1–41)31 Other#3(1–29)32 Other#3(2–36)33 Other#3(1–8)