united states/russian federation incidents at sea and ... · subj: united states/russian federation...

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

2000 NAVY PENTAGONWASHINGTON, D.C. 2035G-2OOO

OPNAVINST 5711.96CN3/N510 Nov 08

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5711.96C

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: UNITED STATES/RUSSIAN FEDERATION INCIDENTS AT SEA ANDDANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES AGREEMENTS

Ref:

Encl:

(a) Agreement Between the Government of the United Statesof America and the Government of the Union of SovietSocialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents Onand Over the Waters Outside the Limits of theTerritorial Sea, As Amended by the 1973 Protocol tothe Agreement and the 1998 Exchange of DiplomaticNotes (NOTAL)

(b) Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous MilitaryActivities (with annexes and agreed statements)Signed at Moscow on 12 June 1989; NO. 27309 (NOTAL)

(c) National Imagery and Mapping Agency Pub. 102,International Code of Signals for Visual, Sound, andRadio Communications; United States Edition, 1969Edition (Revised 2003) (NOTAL)

(d) DOD Flight Information Publications, FlightInformation Handbook (NOTAL)

(e) OPNAVINST 3100.6H, Special Incident ReportingProcedures (NOTAL)

(1) Instructions for Use with the Supplementary Signals/Table of Signals

1. Purpose

a. To provide information and to issue procedures concerningthe agreements between the Governments of the United States andthe Russian Federation (also referred to as "Russia") on theprevention of Incidents at Sea (INCSEAs) and the prevention ofDangerous Military Activities (DMAs) (references (a) and (b),respectively) .

b. To issue the Table of Supplementary Signals authorizedfor use during communications between the United States and theRussian Federation units under reference (a).

OPNAVINST 5711.96C10 Nov 08

c. This instruction has been substantially revised and,therefore, should be reviewed in its entirety

2. Cancellation. OPNAVINST 5711.96B.

3. Background

a. INCSEA Agreement

(1) Prior to reference (a), numerous INCSEAs involvingharassment or interference occurred between units of the Sovietand United States Naval surface and air forces. In April 1968,after a series of incidents in the Sea of Japan, the UnitedStates invited the Soviet Union to discuss procedures to reducethe number of INCSEAs. The Soviets replied in November 1970 withan invitation to open discussions in Moscow. Following anexploratory round of talks in October 1971, the agreement wasconcluded in May 1972 in Washington, D.C. As a measure of theimportance with which this agreement was viewed, it was signedformally on 25 May 1972 in Moscow by the Secretary of the Navyfor the United States and the Commander in Chief of the SovietNavy for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In May1973, during the first annual review, a protocol to the agreementwas negotiated which extends certain provisions of the agreementto include non-military ships. Refer to reference (a) for theactual agreement text, as modified by the 1973 Protocol and anExchange of Diplomatic Notes in 1998. The Russian Federation hassucceeded the USSR for all rights and obligations of thisagreement.

(2) Reference (a) is operational in nature and isapplicable to U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Military SealiftCommand (MSC) , U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Armyunits when operating on and over waters beyond the territorialsea.

(a) U.S. Naval Ships (USNS) are U.S. Navalauxiliaries and, therefore, are subject to reference (a) asspecified in article I. USNS do not fly a Naval auxiliary flagas Russian auxiliaries do. Rather, such ships are identified byblue and gold stack markings unique to USNS.

(b) The remainder of the MSC fleet consists ofcommercial ships under charter for various lengths of time.

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These ships bear the usual commercial markings of their owners.They do not bear any markings to indicate their charter to MSC.All commercial, non-military u.s. ships are protected fromharassment by Russian naval and naval auxiliary ships andmilitary aircraft under the provisions of the 1973 Protocol toreference (a). The protocol requires the United States and theRussian Federation to take measures to notify non-military shipsconcerning provisions of the agreement, and is directed atsecuring mutual safety. No specific action, however, such as useof special signals, is required of non-military ships.

(c) Submarines are covered by reference (a) only whenoperating on the surface.

(d) On the Russian side, naval and naval auxiliaryships (ships authorized to fly a Russian naval auxiliary flag)are bound by reference (a). This includes Russian electronicreconnaissance ships.

(3) Reference (a) is intended to:

(a) reduce the risk of serious, unintendedconfrontation between U.S. and Russian forces on and over watersoutside the limits of the territorial sea; and

(b) promote safety of operations where U.S. andRussian naval and air forces operate in proximity to each other.

(4) Reference (a) is consistent with and, in fact,requires compliance with the International Regulations forPreventing Collisions at Sea (Rules of the Road). Reference (a)recognizes that surveillance activities are not fully accountedfor by the Rules of the Road and prescribes guidance in thesesituations. Reference (a) also provides guidance in aircraft-toship and aircraft-to-aircraft situations for which there are nointernationally recognized rules of conduct.

b. DMA Agreement

(1) Reference (a) provided procedures and a forum fordiscussion which greatly reduced friction between the U.S. andSoviet/Russian Navies. During 1987 discussions to increase U.S.USSR military-to-military contacts, then Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Crowe, advanced the idea of

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establishing a high level forum similar to the INCSEA forum tomeet regularly and discuss ways of avoiding dangerous militaryconfrontations over land and territorial waters. This idea wasturned over to a joint U.S./Soviet working group to analyze andpropose actions to prevent DMAs. Between October 1988 and May1989, the joint military working group met six times, identifyingspecific situations where u.s. and Soviet military forces mightinteract with a potential for harm to personnel or damage toequipment, and negotiated a draft agreement using reference (a)as a model. The u.s. CJCS and the Chief of the Soviet GeneralStaff signed reference (b) in Moscow on 12 June 1989 to enterinto force on 1 January 1990. The Russian Federation hassucceeded the USSR for all rights and obligations of reference(b) .

(2) Reference (b) is operational in nature and isapplicable to the armed forces of the United States whenoperating in proximity to units of the Russian armed forces.Naval forces covered by reference (b) include military aircraftand the ships and auxiliaries discussed in paragraphs 3a(2) (a)through 3a(2) (d) .

(3) Reference (b) is intended to:

(a) reduce the risk of serious, unintendedconfrontation between U.S. and Russian forces by preventing thespecific DMAs defined in reference (b);

(b) resolve expeditiously and peacefully, anyincident between U.S. and Russian forces arising as a result ofDMAs; and

(c) promote safety of operations where U.S. andRussian armed forces operate in proximity to each other duringpeacetime.

c. Table of Supplementary Signals

(1) The Table of Supplementary Signals, per enclosure (1),which contains a "local U.S.-USSR code adopted in 1974, and theInternational Code of Signals (ICS), per reference (c), that wasadopted by the International Maritime Organization in 1965, areauthorized for communications between U.S. and Russian units as aresult of references (a) and (b).

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(2) Reference (b) authorizes the use of reference (c) and(d), as appropriate, and enclosure (1) for communications betweenU.S. and Russian units. This is in addition to the signalsprovided in annex 1, section III of reference (b).

4. Discussion

a. INCSEA Agreement

(1) Reference (a) extends to military ships, non-militaryships, and aircraft. U.S. commands should comply strictly withreference (a) in both letter and spirit. Aircraft shouldmaintain a safe distance from Russian ships and aircraft, andespecially from ships conducting air operations so as not topresent a hazard. Any Naval or air unit assigned a missionrequiring maneuvers in close proximity with Russian naval or airunits must do so with due regard for the provisions of reference(a) .

(2) The actions listed below are prohibited by reference(a) :

(a) simulating attacks by aiming guns, missilelaunchers, torpedo tubes or other weapons in the direction ofRussian ships and aircraft;

(b) launching objects or firing signal flares in thedirection of Russian ships and aircraft so as to pose a danger,constitute a hazard, or interfere with navigation and flight;

(c) using searchlights or other powerful illuminationdevices to illuminate the navigation bridges of Russian ships orthe cockpits of Russian aircraft;

(d) using lasers in such a manner so as to causeinjury to personnel or damage to equipment aboard Russian shipsor aircraft; and

(e) intentionally interfering with communicationsystems of Russian ships or aircraft.

(3) Reference (a) applies to U.S. armed forces on andover waters beyond the territorial sea even when under the

5


control of multinational organizations such as the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO)

b. DMA Agreement

(1) Reference (b) addresses four specific DMAs whichcould occur when u.s. and Russian armed forces are operating inproximity to one another:

(a) unintentional or distress (force majeur) entryinto the national territory of the other party;

(b) use of lasers in a manner hazardous to the otherparty;

(c) hampering operations in a manner hazardous to theother party in a "Special Caution Area"; and

(d) interference with command and control networks ina manner hazardous to the other party.

(2) Reference (b) applies to u.S. armed forces even whenunder the control of multinational organizations such as NATO.

(3) Reference (b) applies to only u.S. and Russian armedforces. In case of an incident occurring on or over theterritory of an ally, each side has reserved the right to consultwith its ally concerning measures to be taken.

(4) Reference (b) does not affect the rights andobligations of either side under other international agreementsor arrangements in force between the United States and theRussian Federation, such as reference (a). Reference (b) doesnot affect the right to individual or collective self-defense,the right of assistance entry, or the rights of navigation andoverflight per international law.

5. Procedures

a. INCSEA

(1) When operating in the proximity of Russian ships oraircraft, commanding officers and aircraft commanders shall, tothe maximum degree possible, use the appropriate signals from

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references (c) and (d) and enclosure (1) to indicate maneuveringintentions to Russian commanding officers. At night, inconditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lightingand distance when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light,supplemented by radio communications, should be used to passappropriate signals between u.s. and Russian units.Communication between military aircraft or between ships andmilitary aircraft of the sides will utilize radio communicationprocedures set forth in reference (a). Communication betweenships may also use the radio communication procedures ofreference (a). In addition, procedures for aircraft interception,specific to the Russian Federation, outlined in reference (d) areto be used when necessary. In order to establish communications,use the call signs "u.s. WARSHIP," "RUSSIAN WARSHIP," "U.S.AIRCRAFT," and "RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT." Commanders of ships andmilitary aircraft should use appropriate signals from enclosure(1) when they want to communicate information or describe anaction which may constitute danger for ships and militaryaircraft of the sides. To ensure ship and aircraft safety, clearvoice radio communications in English may also be used.

(2) Incidents evaluated as potentially violating theletter or spirit of reference (a) must be reported promptly bymessage per reference (e) or procedures specified by fleetcommanders.

(3) Message reports may be used by Chief of NavalOperations (CNO) to discuss an INCSEA incident with the RussianNaval Attache shortly after it occurs. Messages amplifying orevaluating the report of an INCSEA incident should not be delayedwhile collecting supplemental information and documentation forthe detailed written report. The message reports should, however,provide sufficient detail (e.g., signals exchanged, position,course, speed, bearing, and range information on the unitsinvolved) to support timely discussions with the Russian NavalAttache. These exchanges are not diplomatic protests and shouldnot be characterized as such. If a diplomatic protest isappropriate, diplomatic channels are used. Detailed writtenreports, for both alleged Russian and U.S. violations ofreference (a), serve as the basis for detailed discussions at theINCSEA review with the Russians.

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b. DMAs

(1) Procedures for preventing and reporting DMA are thesame as those outlined in paragraphs 5a(1) and 5a(2) above, withone exception: the communication procedures of reference (b)should be used.

(2) Reference (d) has instructions specific for aircraftin a section of the emergency procedures. It is titled"Procedures for the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activitiesbetween the u.s. and Russia." This reference should beaccessible for use by aircrews operating in the vicinity ofRussian ships or aircraft.

(3) As per reference (b), "The parties shall exchangeappropriate information on instances of DMA or incidents whichmay arise as a result of such activities. The CJCS shall conveysuch information through the Defense Attache of the RussianFederation." Message reports may be used by CNO to discuss a DMAincident with the CJCS shortly after it occurs. Messagesamplifying or evaluating the report of a DMA incident should notbe delayed while collecting supplemental information anddocumentation for the detailed written report. The messagereports should, however, provide sufficient detail (e.g., signalsexchanged, position, course, speed, bearing, and rangeinformation on the units involved) to support timely discussionswith the CNO and CJCS.

c. Reporting INCSEA and DMA Incidents

(1) In general, Operational Report (OPREP)-3 NAVY BLUEseries messages from reference (e) are appropriate for reportingINCSEA and DMA incidents, except in cases of national levelinterest, when OPREP-3 PINNACLE series messages should be used.Amplifying message reports should follow as soon as informationis available. Detailed written reports should be submittedwithin 15 working days via operational chain of command to CNO(Attn: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plansand Strategy (N3/N5») with advance copy to CNO. When notified ofa Russian allegation of a U.S. violation, appropriate reports arerequired from the units involved.

(2) The following documentation has proven effective inpresenting the u.S. view of an INCSEA incident, and should be

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forwarded with the detailed written report. Similar informationshould be provided DMA incidents:

(a) A written chronology of events. Include signalsused during the incident and whether or not both sidesacknowledged signals. Provide appropriate position, course,speed, bearing, and range data. A voice cassette narrativerecording is an effective tool for use in constructing anaccurate chronology.

(b) Narrated video, motion pictures, and/or sequenceof photographs. Video, which present an interaction clearly, isby far the most convincing evidence of a violation. A portion ofthe reporting ship/aircraft in foreground is desired to provideperspective. Pictures taken for intelligence purposes (i.e.,close-ups) are of limited value, but are desired to supplementother visual documentation that presents the overall perspective.Indication of ship's wake can be effective in showing history forhazardous maneuvering situations. In order for a report of agun-training incident to be effective, video or a series ofphotographs which document weapons movement and relative motionof own unit is considered necessary to substantiate a violation.Visual documentation of flashing light sequences, flag hoists,hull numbers or names of ships is also desired. Annotatedocuments as necessary to permit correlation with geographicreconstruction and chronology (e.g., time taken and location ofthe camera for pictures) .

(c) A geographic reconstruction. Ensure sufficienthistory is presented to answer probable questions. Multiplecharts may be required for complex hazardous maneuveringincidents (ship-to-ship, air-to-ship, air-to-air).

(d) Clarifying comments. For example, disparitiesthat exist with previously submitted reports should be resolved.

6. Classification Guidance. Details of an incident or eventbetween u.S. or Russian units do not merit classification unlessoperational aspects surrounding the incident requireclassification for national security reasons.

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7. Action

a. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)

(1) Ensure that requirements which may result in closeproximity between u.s. Naval forces and Russian naval and airunits are as explicit as possible, so as to permit operationswithin the intent and purpose of references (a) and (b).

(2) Analyze reports of INCSEA and DMA incidents andprovide guidance, as necessary, in cases of possible violationsof "references (a) and (b) by u.s. units.

(3) Forward reports of alleged u.s. violations to theappropriate fleet commander.

(4) When appropriate, discuss alleged INCSEA with theRussian Navy using a Navy-to-Navy communication channel. Inaddition, discuss alleged DMA incidents with the CJCS who willcommunicate with the Defense Attache of the Russian Federation.

b. Fleet Commanders

(1) Ensure units are familiar with the provisions ofreferences (a) and (b) and the procedures for theirimplementation. Deployed units should have this instructionreadily accessible.

(2) Require strict compliance with references (a) and (b)in both letter and spirit.

(3) Issue guidance concerning adherence to references (a)and (b) for operations involving close proximity to Russian unitsand Russian territory, e.g., surveillance missions.

(4) Ensure units are properly prepared to report anddocument encounters with Russian units.

(5) Ensure potential INCSEA and DMA incidents arereported by message per paragraph 5c(I), including:

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(a) initial report by OPREP-3;

(b) amplifying reports, including initial evaluationby fleet commander;.

(c) detailed written reports with supportingdocumentation within 15 days, including follow-up evaluation byfleet commander; and

(d) when notified of a Russian allegation of a u.s.violation, obtain reports from involved units and prepare adetailed evaluation for submission to the CNO.

(6) Retain documentation on encounters with Russian unitsuntil the results of an INCSEA review or a Joint MilitaryCommission Review of DMA covering the time period of the incidentare received.

(7) Submit recommendations for improvement of enclosure(1) and this instruction to the CNO (Attn: N3/N5).

8. Records Management. Records created as a result of thisinstruction, regardless of media and format, shall be managed inaccordance with Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Manual 5210.1.

9. Reports. The reports required by this instruction are exemptfrom reports control per SECNAV Manual 5214.1.

W. D. CROWDERVice Admiral, U.S. NavyDeputy Chief of Naval Operations(Operations, Plans, and Strategy)

Distribution:Electronic only, via Department of the Navy Issuances Web sitehttp://doni.daps.dla.mil/

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OPNAvrNST 5711.96C10 Nov 08

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE WITH THE SUPPLEMENTARY SIGNALS

1. General

a. The signals in the attached table supplement those in thercs, issued by reference (c).

b. Although these supplementary signals are also entered inreference (c) as appendix 6, the signals in the attached tableare considered to be a local code for use between U.s. andRussian units and are not part of the rcs.

c. rn situations where units of a third country are present,these supplementary signals may still be used unless thepotential for confusing the third country outweighs the advantageof communicating with the Russian unit{s).

d. Since NATO and other allies are aware of the arrangementbetween the U.S. and Russia for use of these supplementarysignals, these signals may also be used when U.s. units areoperating within a NATO formation, or in other allied formations.

e. As a result of bilateral rNCSEA agreements with Russia,signals like those in the attached table may also be used byallied navies when their units encounter Russian units. Thereare, however, no assurances that each country's rNCSEA signalstable is identical to the U.S.-Russia agreed signals.

2. Use

a. The general instructions for use of the rcs apply to theuse of the supplementary signals as amplified below.

b. The "CODE" or answering pennant is not used with signalsfrom the table of supplementary signals. Use of the code oranswering pennant with the rcs signals is specified in reference(c), chapter 1, section 5, paragraphs 3, 4, and 8.

c. The signal "YVI" - which means "the groups that followare from the local code" - should precede the supplementarysignals in order to avoid misunderstanding as to the source ofthe signal code (i.e., Table of Supplementary Signals vice rCS).

d. The supplementary signals may be communicated by the samemethods used when signaling with the rcs, i.e., flag hoist,flashing light, voice, Morse, or hand (semaphore) flags.

Enclosure (1)


e. The following guidelines apply when using radiocommunications to pass supplementary signals under reference (a):

(1) Use radio communications as backup for flag hoist orflashing light when limited visibility exists, or when inextremis and danger of collision or other hazard is imminent(i.e., time is essential and use of all means of communication isprudent)

(2) For ship to ship communications, use bridge-to-bridgeVery High Frequency (VHF radio) channel 16 (156.8 Megahertz (MHz»or high frequency band frequency 2182.0 Kiloherz. Forcommunications with or between aircraft, use VHF band frequency121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz; after initial contact is made, theworking frequency 130 MHz or 278.0 MHz may be used. In order toestablish these communications, use the call signs "U.S.WARSHIP,""RUSSIAN WARSHIP," "U.S. AIRCRAFT," and "RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT"instead of the call signs contained in reference (d).

(3) Use radio communications procedures established foruse with the ICS, including the use of international phoneticEnglish letters and numbers.

(4) Use the signal "YANKEE VICTOR ONE" (The groups thatfollow are from the local code) preceding each supplementarysignal.

(5) The following selected supplementary signals may beused during radio communications between military aircraft orships and military aircraft: PP8, RT7, RT8, UY1, UY2, iJY3, UY4,UY9, UY10, UY12, ZL1, ZL2, and 2L3. These signals are noted inthe Table of Signals by a pound sign (#). These signals areintended for transmission to aircraft over voice circuits sinceit is extremely difficult for aircraft to identify and understandflag signals.

(6) To ensure ship and aircraft safety, clear voice radiocommunications in English may also be used.

EXAMPLE:

Situation:the east.

U.S. Warship intends to conduct a gunnery exercise toRussian aircraft is in the area.

2 Enclosure (1)


Call up:Russian Aircraft, Russian Aircraft, Russian Aircraft deltaecho U.S. Warship.

Response:U.S. Warship, U.S. Warship, U.S. Warship delta echoRussian Aircraft.

After comms established:Russian Aircraft delta echo U.S. Warship UNIFORM YANKEETHREE TACK TWO.

Russian aircraft acknowledges:U.S. Warship delta echo Russian Aircraft ZULU LIMA ONE.

f. The following guidelines apply when using radiocommunications to pass supplementary signals under reference (b):

(1) Use bridge-to-bridge VHF radio channel 16 (156.8 MHz)or other communication equipment and frequencies specified inreference (d).

(2) Use the radio communications procedures establishedfor use with the ICS, including the use of international phoneticEnglish letters and numbers, supplemented by call signs andphrases in reference (d).

(3) Use the signal "YANKEE VICTOR ONE" (The groups thatfollow are from the local code) preceding each supplementarysignal.

g. Certain supplementary signals require an amplification toindicate distance, course or time. Since the meaning of eachsupplementary signal is precise, and in order to avoid confusion,the amplifying section should not be preceded by the signal codedesignators "R" (distance); "C" (course); "T" (time).

EXAMPLES:

"RT9 - 6" means "I shall cross astern at a distance of 600meters."

"UYl - 120" means "I am preparing to launch/recover aircraft ontrue course 120.·"

"RU2 - 5" means "I am beginning a port turn in approximately 5minutes."

3 Enclosure (1)


h. Certain supplementary signals may be amplified to show adirection of danger indicated with respect to the signaler. Thedirection is indicated using directional compliments listed inthe ICS (reference (c), chapter 2, section 10, table 3).

EXAMPLES:

"UY3 - 2" means "I am preparing to conduct gunnery exercises.Request you remain clear of the hazard which is in the directionfrom me as indicated ... East."

"NB1 - 8" means "I have my unattached hydrographic surveyequipment bearing in a direction from me as indicated ... North."

i. In order to reduce the opportunity for confusion, receiptof supplementary signals should be acknowledged by using "ZL1"from the supplementary table or, if not understood, by "ZL3" fromthe supplementary table, rather than "ZL" or "ZQ" from the ICS.

4 Enclosure (1)


TABLE OF SIGNALS

SIGNAL

IRI

lR2 ( ... )

lR3

lR4

JHl

MHI

NBI ( ... )

MEANING

I am engaged in oceanographic operations.

I am streaming/towing hydrographic survey equipmentmeters astern.

I am recovering hydrographic survey equipment.

I am conducting salvage operations.

I am attempting to retract a grounded vessel.

Request you not cross my course ahead of me.

I have my unattached hydrographic survey equipmentbearing in a direction from me as indicated(Table 3 of ICS).

PJl I am unable to alter course to my starboard.

PJ2 I am unable to alter course to port.

PJ3 Caution, I have a steering casualty.

PP8( ... )# Dangerous operations in progress. Request you remainclear of the hazard which is in the direction from meas indicated (Table 3 of ICS) .

PS2 I am engaged in hot pursuit.

QFl Caution, I have stopped my engines.

QG5 You are located in an area declared a danger zone.

QS6( ... ) I am proceeding on course

QV2 I am in a fixed multiple leg moor using two or moreanchors or buoys fore and aft. Request you remainclear.

5 Enclosure (1)

SIGNAL

QV3

RT2

RT3

RT4

RT5

OPNAVINST 5711.96C10 Nov OB

MEANING

I am anchored in deep water with hydrographic surveyequipment streamed.

I intend to pass you on your port side.

I intend to pass you on your starboard side.

I will overtake you on your port side.

I will overtake you on your starboard side.

RT6 ( ... ) I am [formation is)clear of the hazardas indicated

maneuvering. Request youwhich is in the direction(Table 3 of ICS) .

remainfrom me

RT7( ... )# I shall approach your ship on starboard side to adistance of 100's of meters (yards).

RTB( ... )# I shall approach your ship on port side to a distanceof 100's of meters (yards).

RT9 ( ... )

RU2 ( ... )

I shall cross astern at a distance ofmeters (yards).

I am beginning a port turn in approximatelyminutes.

100's of

RU3 ( ... )

RU4

RU5

RU6

RU7

RUB

SL2

I am beginning a starboard turn in approximatelyminutes.---

The formation is preparing to alter course to port.

The formation is preparing to alter course tostarboard.

I am engaged in maneuvering exercises. It isdangerous to be inside the formation.

I am preparing to submerge.

A submarine will surface within two miles of mewithin 30 minutes. Request you remain clear.

Request your course, speed and passing intention.

6 Enclosure (1)


SIGNAL MEANING

TX1 I am engaged in fisheries patrol.

TX 2 I am engaged in monitoring sea pollution.

UY1( ... )# I am preparing to launch/recover aircraft on course.

UY2( ... )# I am preparing to conduct missile exercises. Requestyou remain clear of the hazard which is in thedirection from me as indicated (Table 3 ofICS) .

UY3( ... )# I am preparing to conduct gunnery exercises. Requestyou remain clear of the hazard which is in thedirection from me as indicated (Table 3 ofICS) .

UY4 # I am preparing to conduct/am conducting operationsemploying explosive charges.

UY5( ... ) I am maneuvering in preparation for torpedo launchingexercises. Request you remain clear· of the hazardwhich is in the direction from me as indicated ---(Table 3 of ICS).

UY6 ( ... ) I am preparing to conduct/amreplenishment on course

conducting underway(Table 3 of ICS) .

UY7 ( ... )

UY8 ( ... )

UY9 #

UY10 *#

UY1l *

I am preparing to conduct extensive small boat andship to shore amphibious training operations.Request you remain clear of the hazard which is inthe direction. from me as indicated (Table 3 ofICS) .

I am maneuvering to launch/recover amphibious landingcraft/boats. Request you remain clear of the hazardwhich is in the direction from me as indicated(Table 3 of ICS).

I am preparing to conduct/am conducting helicopteroperations over my stern.

I am testing my gun systems.

I am testing my missile systems.

7 Enclosure (1)


SIGNAL MEANING

UY12( ... )# I am preparing to conduct/am conducting gunnery(bombing) exercises from aircraft on a towed target.Request you remain clear of the hazard which is inthe direction of me as indicated (Table 3 ofICS).

YY1 I would like to establish communications with you onthe 16th USW channel.

ZF1 I intend to conduct training with you exchangingSpecial Signals per the Agreement.

ZF2 Exercises exchanging Special Signals complete.

ZL1 # I have received and understood your signal.

ZL2 #

ZL3 #

Do you understand? Request acknowledgment.

Your signal has been received but not understood.

* Compliance with article III, paragraph 6 of reference (a)(i.e., do not train armament at Russian ships and aircraft) isrequired while conducting gun or missile system checks.

# These selected supplementary signals may be used duringradio communications between military aircraft or ships andmilitary aircraft. These signals are intended for transmissionover voice circuits since it is extremely difficult for aircraftto identify and understand flag signals.

8 Enclosure (1)

united states/russian federation incidents at sea and ... · subj: united states/russian federation...

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