On behalf of the women and men of the U.S. Capitol Police, I want to thank the Committee, the

Congress, and the American people for their support following the attack of January 6, 2021.

As you know, the U.S. Capitol Police’s sole mission is to protect Congress to ensure that Congress

may fulfill its legislative obligations under the Constitution of the United States. The Department

understands the gravity of this important objective and holds itself to the highest of standards in

ensuring mission fulfillment. The Department also knows that you – the Congressional community –

expect excellence from the Capitol Police and depend on us for your safety, but, most importantly, the

protection of the democratic process.

On January 6th, in the face of a terrorist attack by tens of thousands of insurrectionists determined to

stop the certification of Electoral College votes, the Department failed to meet its own high standards

as well as yours. Although the Department fulfilled its mission of protecting Members and democracyultimately prevailed, the insurrectionists’ actions and the Department’s inability to immediately secure

the U.S. Capitol emboldened the insurrectionists and horrified millions of American. We fully expect

to answer to you and the American people for our failings on January 6th.

I am here to offer my sincerest apologies on behalf of the Department.

But I am also here to tell you what we are doing to secure the U.S. Capitol from future threats –

whether domestic or foreign.

Let me be clear: the Department should have been more prepared for this attack. By January 4th, the

Department knew that the January 6th event would not be like any of the previous protests held in

2020. We knew that militia groups and white supremacists organizations would be attending. We also

knew that some of these participants were intending to bring firearms and other weapons to the event.

We knew that there was a strong potential for violence and that Congress was the target.

The Department prepared in order to meet these challenges, but we did not do enough. Based on the

information we had about the event, the Department changed its existing operational plan for January

6th. It required all available officers to be working that day. It increased the number of Civil

Disturbance Units scheduled to work the event from four to seven, including four hard platoons

equipped with less lethal munitions. It activated its SWAT team to extract violent demonstrators or

those with weapons from the rally and to engage in counter sniper activity. It also adapted a new

security perimeter based on instructions it received from the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms.

Additionally, on January 4th, former USCP Chief of Police Steven Sund requested that the Capitol

Police Board declare a state of emergency and authorize a request to secure National Guard support.

STATEMENTOF ACTINGCHIEFOF POLICEYOGANANDAD.PITTMAN

UNITEDSTATESCAPITOLPOLICE

The Board denied the request, but encouraged Chief Sund to contact the DC National Guard to

determine how many Guardsman could be sent to the Capitol on short notice, which he did. Chief

Sund also coordinated with Acting Chief of Police Robert Contee of the Metropolitan Police

Department to guarantee additional support on January 6th.

The Department had over 1200 sworn personnel workingon site when the attack occurred,which was

no match for the tens of thousands of insurrectionists(many armed) attacking the Capitol and refusing

to comply with lawful orders.

In my experience,I do not believe there was any preparationsthat would have allowed for an open

campusin which lawful protestorscould exercise their first amendment right to free speech and at the

same time preventedthe attack on Capital grounds that day.

However, I do believe certain challenges the Department faced the day of the attack could have been

overcome with additional preparation.

First, it became clear early on that the Departmentneeded much more manpower than what was

available. We receivedimmediateassistance from the MPD who sent a hundredofficers within

minutes of the initialbreach of the outer securityperimeter.

Chief Sund immediatelycoordinatedwith federal agenciesand law enforcementpartners across the

area to gain additional boots on the ground. He also lobbied the Board for authorizationto bringin the

NationalGuard,but he was not granted authorizationfor over an hour.

In addition, the Department’s resources were diverted to other major concerns. At nearly the exact

time the mob arrived on the Capitol, a pipe bomb was discovered at the RNC headquarters at First and

C Street, SE. The Department sent USCP personnel to investigate and secure the location, which

included evacuating the Madison and Cannon House office buildings as well as residents and local

businesses. Shortly after the initial pipe bomb was discovered, USCP discovered a vehicle with

explosive chemicals and a firearm in plain view parked on that same block. An identical pipe bomb

was also discovered at the DNC headquarters several minutes later.

Second,our officerswere equippedwith less lethaloptionssuch as OC spray and batons. They were

also backed up by CDU platoons deployingpepper balls and other chemicalmunitions. They did not

have other less lethal options, such as impact weapons, at their disposal.

Moreover,due to the amount of less lethal chemicals beingused to disperse the crowd, additional

supplies should have been staged for easy access. Instead,the Department had to send in personnel to

reload our officers.

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Third, once it became clear that the mob was getting too close to the Capitol building, I ordered a

lockdown of the Capitol, which means that every entrance should have been closed and sealed to

prevent entry from the outside. The Department has very specific lockdown procedures that require

the lockdown to take effect even when officers remain outside of the building. The policy may not

have been consistently followed.

Fourth, we have been told by the Union and other employees that our communications were difficult to

hear on their radios over the ruckus of the attack. Without a clear line of communication, officers were

operating with limited information about what was occurring and with little instruction from

leadership.

Similarly, Members and staff have told us that our communications over the PA system were not clear

enough.

This is not an exhaustive list, but a general overview of some of the things that the Department could

have done better then and that we are working to improve now.

Once the Capitol buildingitself was breached,the Department’spriority was evacuatingMembers.

Our DignitaryProtection Divisionagents immediatelyevacuatedcongressional leadershipand took

them to a secure location to ensure the continuity of government.

Almost simultaneously I connectedwith both the House and Senate Sergeant at Arms to arrange the

evacuationof Members from the House and Senate Chambers,as well as the extractionof Members

from their officesby USCPpersonnel.

It was while Members were being evacuated that an invader was shot by a USCP official outside of the

House Floor. This matter is still undergoing investigation by outside law enforcement.

Once Members were safe, the Department began aiding staff barricaded in offices in the Capitol.

It was not until Members and staff were safely evacuated that the Department began clearing the

Capitol of invaders floor by floor with the assistance of its law enforcement partners.

Immediately following January 6th, the Department’s priority has been to secure the campus now and

into the future.

We have acquired the assistance of the National Guard who have providedthousands of armed

personnel to assist us in securing the campus. Access to the campushas been restricted. And the inner

and outer perimetersare protectedby an eight foot non-scalable global fencing.

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Additionally, the Department has taken steps to ensure that it shares and receives critical intelligence

information from its law enforcement partners and that such information is disseminated to its

workforce. The Department’s Intelligence Director holds daily internal intelligence briefings with

USCP officials. The Department has also arranged to deliver intelligence briefings to the Union on a

routine basis.

The Department is also leaning forward with briefings for the Congressional Community, including for

core leadership, oversight committees, and congressional caucuses.

The Department is also providing additional training to personnel on civil disturbance policies and

practices.

These are only some of the steps taken by the Department in the immediate wake of the January 6th

insurrection.

In addition to proactive measures intended to shore up the Capitol’s security, the Department has taken

numerous steps to aid our officers.

I want to stress that the vast majority of Capitol Police officers who were on the front lines on January

6th performed valiantly in the face of extraordinary violence. They held off the attackers long enough

for us to evacuate the House and Senate Chambers and lead the Members and staff to safety. These

officers are heroes.

I visited every roll call to meet with officers in the days following my being sworn in as Acting Chief

of Police. Many are suffering from PTSD, particularly after the loss of two of our officers directly and

indirectly as a result of the events of January 6th. And since January 6th, they’ve been working around

the clock to prepare for future events, including the inauguration.

The Department has EAP on site to offer counseling services to officers and their families. The

Department also has trauma counselors specialized in dealing with military and law enforcement

PTSD. Finally, due to the uptick in COVID-19 infections following the January 6th event, the

Department has provided onsite testing for USCP personnel and is seeking additional sources for

COVID-19 vaccinations.

The attack on the U.S.Capitol on January 6 also forever changed how we look at the “People’s

House.” By design, the Capitol campus is open and welcoming to visitors. The CapitolBuilding,until

recently,had not been surroundedeight foot global fencing.

And, because it is an open campus, it is very difficult to fortify. Even before September 11, 2001,

security experts, including former USCP chiefs of police, argued that more needed to be done to

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protect the Capitolcampus – although I doubt manywouldhave thought it would be necessaryto

protect it against our own citizens.

As the Acting Chief, I take responsibilityfor the mistakes that were made by the Department,and I

pledge to this Committee,the Congress, the Americanpeople,and myUSCPcolleagues,that we will

do better going forward,but we need to make changes.

The Department is working with the variousoffices and agenciestasked with documentingthe events

as they unfoldedthat day, as well as conductingour own in depth reviewof the incident,to ensure that

accurate, factual and detailed informationisprovided.

I believe the multiple reviews,after actions,and investigationscurrentlyunderwaywill conclude that

the Capitol’ssecurity infrastructuremust change and that the Department needs access to additional

resources – both manpower and physicalassets.

We know the eyes of the country and the world are upon us. The U.S. Capitol Police remain steadfast

in addressing the new challenges that we face head on. We are committed to protecting and defending

this institution that is responsible for safeguarding the freedoms we all hold dear – including the

public’s right to exercise their First Amendment rights at the U.S. Capitol.

Once again, I’d like to thank this Committee and the entire Congress for their support of our law

enforcement officers. I am prepared to address any questions you may have.

Thank you.

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Chair DeLauro,RankingMemberGranger, and Membersof the Appropriations Committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the events of January 6, 2021—one of the darkest

days in the history of our democracy.

I want to briefly touch on the relationship between the House Sergeant at Arms and the Capitol

Police. The House Sergeant at Arms coordinates requests and security planning for the House of

Representatives with the United States Capitol Police. Additionally, the House Sergeant at Arms

serves on the Capitol Police Board – essentially a Board of Directors for the Capitol Police.

I will brieflydiscusswhat went poorly and what went well. It isclear there was a failure of

preparation.Whether it was insufficientor conflictingintelligence,lackingability to translate

that intelligenceinto action,insufficientpreparationor an inadequateability to mobilize partner

agenciesfor immediateassistance,a seriesof events,once thought unfathomable,unfoldedallowingour most sacredhalls to be breached.And,sadly,several liveswere lost, including

OfficerBrianSicknickand Officer HowardLiebengood.As time unfolds,we are beginningto

have a better understandingof this series of events.We must examinethe event and we must

learnfrom these lessonsto ensure that our systemsand structuresdo not fail usagain.One of the

initialexaminationsmust be in how communicationswork on the Hilland how we must adapt

and evolveour structures,mindset,and our procedures.We must hardenthis campus.Too many

access pointswere breachedon January 6 and the SpeakerhastaskedLt.General Russel Honore

to reviewCapitolSecurity to help us turn these lessonsinto action.

Communicationsto the Hill communityalso need to improve.Our current communications

structure is too rigid to appropriatelyadapt to the multiplevarying crises that unfoldedthatday—multiplebombs,a breachof the Capitol,and a riot.The different crisesstrained the ability

to communicatefast, accurate,and pertinent information.Inaddition,the sole relianceon pre-

worded,generic messagingis not transparent.Originallydesignedto avoid disseminating

incorrect informationwhile in the midst of an event, the communicationsdid not convey much

needed informationin a dynamic crisis. We also need to rethink the frequency of

communication.In the past,we have been criticizedfor sending too many messages.This may

be a fair point when dealingwith day-to-day incidents,but not in an extraordinarysituation.

Another system we need to implement is an accountability system. Numerous staff were

barricaded in offices during the insurrection. When these staff notified SAA staff that they were

trapped, either USCP or SAA staff or both together would go out and retrieve the individual. We

need to implement a system where we can be notified in real time so we can assist in the retrieval

Statementof ActingSergeantat Arms TimothyP.BlodgettBefore

The CommitteeonAppropriations

January26, 2021

Office of the Sergeant at Arms

U.S. House of Representatives

of Members and staff in a crisis. Hopefully we will never have to use the system, but it is better

to be prepared. We rarely encounter the crisis we expect, but our system of communications

needs to adapt to constantly changing and unexpected circumstances.

I also want to discuss what went well. First, the bottom line is that every Member and House

staff went home without death or serious injury. That is always the number one priority of the

Office of the House Sergeant at Arms. Congress consists, at its core, of people. The House of

Representatives has met in different places, and different chambers, but it isalways the people’srepresentatives and their staff who are irreplaceable.

Our evacuationproceduresworked well. With the assistance of many brave USCP officers,

Sergeant at Armsstaff and Members,we were able to evacuate the Chamber and get Members

and staff to a secure location.We were able to utilize the escape hoods to enable the Capitol

Police to deploy tear gas, when and ifnecessary,to clear an evacuationroute from the Chamber.

We were ultimately able to prepare for Congress to discharge its Constitutionalresponsibilities

that same night.

Additionally, the employees of the House Sergeant at Arms have shown tremendousdedication.Amidst a pandemic, they have worked countlesshours—essentiallyabandoned their loved

ones—to work in what became a war zone. They have arranged for airport security, monitored

threats, conducted emergency training, prepared for a Presidential Inaugurationand are taking

every effort to ensure that Membersof Congress are safe at the U.S.Capitol, in their district, and

while traveling.

Please know that I come here today to tell you that I and the entire Sergeant at Arms team are

dedicated to fixing what went wrong and ensuring that the House and its Members and staff can

continue to safely fulfill their constitutional duties.

However, I also need your help. Please take time from your calendar to ensure both you and your

staff are prepared for emergencies.We are able to provide training on a variety of differentsecurity and emergency procedures. Ifyou call our office, we will be happy to arrange that

training. Please also support forthcoming efforts to develop a stronger security posture on the

Hill; it will require assistance from Members to make the necessary changes to our culture to do

so.

.Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this briefing

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