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CHAPTER 13

Universality and Diversity inthe Vocalization of Emotions

Jörg Zinken, Monja Knoll, and Jaak Panksepp

Introduction

There is no doubt that prosodic channelsplay an important part in emotional com-munication (Bachorowski & Owren,1995; Frick, 1985; Viscovich et al., 2003).A relationship between emotional expe-riences and acoustic properties of vocal-ization was already suggested by Darwin(1872), and it finds support from primateresearch (Jürgens, 2006).The aim of this paper is to discuss

universals in the vocal expression ofemotion. In particular, we will share per-spectives on the theoretical modeling ofuniversalityand diversityunderlyingresearch in this field. Our analysis will be based on diverse lines of evidenceemerging from an increasingly substan-tial body of empirical research. Resultsfrom this research show an ambiguouspicture, but they are most frequently

interpreted as confirmation for the exis-tence of universal mechanisms in thevocal communication of emotions. Thisresearch, briefly summarized in the firstsection, provides the background for dis-cussions in the remainder of the chapter.In the second section, we scrutinize the notions of universality and diversityframing much of the current debate. Inparticular, we argue that misleading jux-tapositions of universality versus diver-sity still seem to underlie the design andinterpretation of empirical studies. Pro-posals for an alternative framing of uni-versality and diversity are provided inthe third section. In particular, we arguethat universals of different types of affectvocalization need to be studied withintheir respective semiotic systems. Thesymptomaticcommunication of rawaffect can be studied to discover evolvedacoustic action patterns. Such patterns arecontinuous across species, and universal

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Erschienen in: Izdebski, Krzysztof (Hrsg.): Emotions of the human voice. San Diego: Plural Publishing, 2008, S. 185-202

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across human communities. However,research into the cross-cultural recogniz-ability of emotion from the voice hasused speech stimuli obtained by askingspeakers (mostly professional actors) toposevarious emotions. Such iconiccom-munication of affect can be studied as anaspect of advanced sign use in humans.Such sign use is diverse across cultures, butbecomes universal in histories of engage-ment. In the fourth section, we discussnew questions that such a perspectivebrings into view, and we close with a setof conclusions in the fifth section.

Universality and Diversity inthe Vocalization of Emotions:

An Overview of Empirical Research

Results from Cross-CulturalRecognition Studies

The vocal expression of emotions hasnot received nearly as much attention asthe facial expression of emotions. This isall the more true for analysis of universal-ity and diversity in the vocal expressionof emotions. Nevertheless, there is nowa growing body of empirical researchaddressing these questions, includingmeta-analyses (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002;Juslin & Laukka, 2003).1

2 VOICE AND EMOTION: VOLUME 1

Empirical research on the universalityof vocal expression of emotions haslargely focused on the ability of raters torecognize emotions expressed in speechsamples produced by a member of a dif-ferent culture (e.g., Albas, McCluskey, &Albas, 1976; Bezooijen, Otto, & Heenan,1983; Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001).2,3

Recognition studies consistently showan ambiguous picture. Virtually all stud-ies report that emotions are recognizedfrom voice with above-chance accuracyacross cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady,2002). At the same time, all studies showthat the accuracy of recognition decreaseswith the cultural distance between thespeaker and the rater (Elfenbein &Ambady, 2002; Scherer et al., 2001).These results have received widely

differing interpretations, depending onwhether the authors were interested inuniversality or in diversity. For example,Scherer and his colleagues (Scherer,1999a; 1999b; Scherer et al., 2001) tendto interpret the literature as providingsupport for the existence of a universalcore of mechanisms for inferring emo-tions from the voice. Beside the fact thatemotions are recognized with above-chance accuracy across cultures, theyhave found a similarity in confusion pat-terns. For example, the vocal expressionof fear by a German-speaking actor wasmost frequently mistaken for sadnessrather than any other emotion by both

1In most cases, cross-cultural studies of emotion recognition identify language with culture, so that the con-trasted “cultural” groups are defined by the native languages. However, this is not always the case. In somestudies,culturehas been defined ethnically or geographically (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). The results havebeen similar to those where cross-linguistic diversity was studied. For example, Australian speakers of Englishwere worse than American speakers of English at recognizing emotions from the voice of an American speaker.2These studies aim to investigate people’s ability to recognizeemotion from voice. However, given the designof these studies, which require participants to choose an emotion from a list of alternatives, it seems moreappropriate to interpret the results as indicating an ability to discriminatebetween emotions (Frick, 1985).3The study of recognition of emotions bears parallels with the extensive literature on basic color terms usingMunsell color chips: participants are asked to apply a local label to an array of foreign stimuli. It has beenargued that this methodology produces rather than uncovers conceptual universals (Saunders, 1995).

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UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE VOCALIZATION OF EMOTIONS 3

German and Indonesian raters (Schereret al., 2001).However, the same results also indi-

cate a systematic relation between cul-tural proximity and accuracy of emotionrecognition. Notably, vocal expression of emotion by German-speaking actorsin the study by Scherer and colleagues(2000) was recognized most accuratelyby speakers of German, less accurately byspeakers of other Germanic languages(Dutch, English), less accurately still byspeakers of other Indo-European lan-guages (French, Italian), and least accu-rately by speakers of the only non-Indo-European language included, BahasaIndonesia.4Although Indonesian ratersstill achieved above-chance accuracy,their accuracy rates were significantlylower than those of the German-speakingparticipants. Some evidence also suggeststhat the similarity in confusion patternsdecreases with linguistic-cultural distancebetween speakers and raters. In a studyon emotion recognition from the voiceof English speakers by English, Spanish,and Japanese raters, the confusions in thejudgments by Spanish speakers weresimilar to those of English raters, whereasthose of Japanese raters were more dissim-ilar (Graham, Hamblin, & Feldstein, 2001).The diversity evident from these stud-

ies becomes even more interesting whenwe take into account that the languagesand cultures studied so far are not actu-

ally very diverse. For example, the mostextensive cross-linguistic study in thisarea seems to be Scherer et al. (2001),who asked speakers of seven languagesfrom nine countries to rate the emotionsexpressed in voice samples produced by German-speaking actors. However, ofthe seven languages included, six wereIndo-European languages. With approxi-mately 6000 languages currently spokenaround the globe, this is hardly a repre-sentation of actual linguistic diversity,and it is unclear what conclusions aboutuniversality can be drawn from such anarrow and relatively homogeneous sam-ple of languages.Furthermore, only a few specific emo-

tions have been studied systematically,and these usually relate to the differentextant proposals regarding “basic” emo-tions. If universal mechanisms exist thatguide the recognition of emotion fromvoice, or the vocal expression of emo-tion, these should surely exist for basicemotions. Given this restriction to a fewbasic emotions, the ambiguity of theresults from recognition studies seemsquite surprising. We would not expectsuch a result if the vocal expression ofthese emotions was itself grounded inuniversal mechanisms.5

An interpretation de-emphasising uni-versal mechanisms might suggest thatwhat these results show is the degree offamiliarity of raters with the speaker’s

4The only exception from this genetic trend was French-speaking Swiss, who achieved better recognition ratesthan speakers of Germanic languages (Dutch, English). The authors suggest that this is because of the factthat most Swiss speakers of French have some knowledge of German. More specifically, we would argue thatit is the communication histories between French-speaking and German-speaking Swiss that leads to thisresult; cf. section The Relation between Universality and Diversity: A Systems Model.5Indeed, when humans are asked to express a single word, such as momor any other single-syllable word infour basic emotional intonations (happy, sad, angry, and scared), the forced choice emotional detection rateapproaches 100% in American students (greater than 90% in four separate studies, Panksepp, 1985–1991,unpublished data). However, such emotional sounds could not be distinguished from EEG recordings fromthe cortical surface processed with sophisticated Event Related Desynchronization signal-detection algo-rithms, probably because the recording sites were far from the source generators (Panksepp, 2000).

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culture. This notion is also supported bya much earlier study that was concernedwith the effects of familiarity on theenhancement of emotion recognitionwithin the same culture (Hornstein,1967). It was found that the prosodicemotional communication between com-patible college roommates improvedduring the first 3 months of livingtogether. In contrast, incompatible room-mates’ emotional communication did notimprove. In the remainder of the article,we will argue that recognition studiesutilizing posed emotions can addresssuch “developing universals,” but notevolved universal “mechanisms.”

Results from Cross-CulturalStudies on Infant-Directed Speech

Another area that has sought to combineresearch into prosody and emotionalresponsivity is that of speech directed toinfants (e.g., Burnham, Kitamura, &Vollmer-Conna, 2002; Fernald, 1989; Fer-nald & Simon, 1984; Kuhl, 1994). Theprosody of infant-directed speech (IDS)has been extensively analyzed and ischaracterized by higher pitch, exagger-ated pitch contours, hyperarticulation ofvowels, shorter utterances, and longerpauses (Burnham et al., 2002; Fernald & Simon, 1984; Stern, Spieker, Barnett, &MacKain, 1983; Trainor, Austin, & Des-jardins, 2000). Independent raters ofsuch speech perceived high positiveemotional affect (Burnham et al., 2002;Kitamura & Burnham, 2003). Theseprosodic modifications are generallyassumed to be universal, and severalcross-cultural studies have found supportfor this (e.g., Fernald al, 1989; Kuhl,2000; Scherer et al., 2001).


As a large proportion of research intoIDS deals with the analysis of naturalinteractions, specific emotions (e.g., hap-piness, sadness) have rarely been ad-dressed; instead content-filtered speechsamples are normally rated for general-ized emotional affect (such as positive,negative). What makes IDS an extremelyrelevant case study for the discussion ofthe expression of vocal emotion is theprelinguistic stage of the infant. Thisvocal expression of emotion towardinfants is only possible through the mod-ification of prosodic channels, as the lex-ical content of IDS is presumably notunderstood at this developmental stage.A second reason why we have decidedto include IDS in this discussion is thefundamental assumption of universalityin this area.This viewpoint of universality is often

maintained regardless of the fact that dif-ferences are apparent across cultures.For instance, differences were found inthe way mothers express vocal affectbetween Australian English and Thai(Kitamura, Thanavishuth, Burnham, &Luksaneeyanawin, 2002). Thai is a tonallanguage, in which pitch is used to con-vey lexical meaning. Kitamura et al.(2002) found that Thai mothers com-pared to Australian English mothersrestricted their pitch excursions in orderto not disrupt tonal information. Theauthors concluded that instead of usingheightened pitch to convey emotionalaffect as found in the English speakingmothers, Thai mothers may use differentvocal characteristics (final particles toexpress mood and status) and maybeincreased affective linguistic content.Similarly, pitch contours in Mandarin

Chinese (another tonal language) IDS are less exaggerated than in American

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English IDS and are more similar to adult-directed speech (ADS) in Mandarin Chi-nese (Papousek & Hwang, 1991). Thisstudy also compared both IDS and ADSto foreign-directed speech (FDS), andinterestingly found that Mandarin ChineseFDS had more exaggerated pitch contoursthan both IDS and ADS. In contrast tothis, British English mothers’ FDS doesnot show the same exaggerated pitchcontours, and was found to be more similar to ADS, while IDS exhibited exag-gerated pitch contours (Knoll, Walsh,MacLeod, O’Neill, & Uther, 2007). Thisshows that exaggerated pitch contoursin tonal languages might have a different,more linguistic function compared to thenontonal languages, and we can thereforenot assume that these acoustic featuresper se are indices of certain emotionalstates across all cultures. Many moreexamples of these slight but importantdifferences in prosodic modificationsacross cultures in IDS exist. Japanese IDShas lower, less exaggerated pitch valuesthan American IDS, but this is obviatedby a higher affective linguistic content(Toda, Fogel, & Kawai, 1990; Viscovichet al., 2003). Another language that alsoexhibits lower pitch values in IDS buthigher pitch values in ADS is Quiche(Mayan language, Bernstein Ratner & Pye,1984). The authors explained their find-ings in terms of the utilization of pitch asan indication of status rather than affect.The important aspect here is first that

IDS shows slight differences in prosodicmodifications across cultures, and thatuniversality of the vocal expression ofemotions per se can therefore not becompletely maintained. We also suggestthat prosodic modifications, regardlessof how they are perceived by independ-ent raters, might have a variety of differ-

ent functions. For instance, in the case ofthe British English FDS, raters perceivedlow-pass filtered speech samples of FDSas more negative than ADS despite similar pitch contours and pitch values.The only difference that was foundbetween those two speech conditionswas the aforementioned hyperarticula-tion of vowels, which should have a lin-guistic but not an emotional function(Knoll & Uther, 2004). The research intoIDS shows that regardless of featuresheld in common in IDS across cultures,there are also differences that cannot bediscounted and which would require analternative, less simplistic explanationthan the common universality versusdiversity debate can offer.

The Relation betweenUniversality and Diversity:

Linear Models

Similarities and differences are both evi-dent in the recognition of vocal expres-sions of emotion across cultures. Thishas been interpreted as showing that thevocal expression of emotions itself hasboth cross-culturally universal and diversefacets. Similarly, the acoustic propertiesof IDS show both similarities and differ-ences across cultures. It seems then thatinstead of asking whether emotionalexpression is universal or diverse weshould ask questions about the relation-ship between universality and diversityin emotional expression. This statementseems to be uncontentious and is en-dorsed so commonly in the introductionsections of research articles (e.g., Schereret al., 2001) that it might even seem likea “shallow platitude” (Ellsworth, 1994).

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However, explicit metatheoretical dis-cussions of what we imagine the relationbetween universality and diversity to beare comparatively sparse (Manstead &Fischer, 2002).We will argue in this section that the

relation between universality and diver-sity has been modeled, more implicitlythan explicitly, as the two poles of a sin-gle continuum.6This model is evident inthe conviction underlying much of theempirical literature that if we find simi-larities in behavior across raters, thenthis will diminish the existence or at leastthe relevance of diversity. It is evident,conversely, in the argument that if wecan illustrate diversity across cultures,then this decreases the convincingness,or relevance, of theories assuming theexistence of universals. These if-thenarguments are only valid if we can thinkof the truth about the expression of emo-tions as a point moving between the twopoles on a continuum, or between twoscales, so that an increase in universalitynecessarily decreases diversity and viceversa. A continuum model is also evidentin some interpretations of differences in


the recognizability of different emotions.For example, van Bezooijen and col-leagues found that some emotions, suchas sadness, were fairly well recognizedfrom the voice across cultures, whereasothers, such as joy, were relatively poorlyrecognized (Bezooijen et al., 1983).They concluded that some emotions areexpressed in culturally specific ways,whereas others are universally expressedin the same way; in other words, emo-tions can fall on different places along auniversality-diversity continuum.A continuum model is evident also in

the way universality and diversity maycome together in the processof the vocalexpression of emotions. This process issometimes imagined as a sequentialmotion along the continuum, as repre-sented in Figure 13–1.The basic opposition between a uni-

versal and a diverse pole is here supple-mented with a vertical metaphor: theevaluation of diverse practices being asurface behavior that is initiated by uni-versal underlying mechanisms. The vocalexpression of emotion is imagined to beinitiated by universal evolved mecha-

universalmechanisms

diverse display rules

Figure 13–1.The expression of emotions as a sequence from universal tolocal steps.

6The figures discussed in this section are not intended as reconstructions of anybody’s explicit theoreticalviews. Rather, they are meant as reconstructions of the nontechnical models and assumptions that underlieexplicit scientific thinking (Black, 1962).

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nisms. In a second step, this expressionis adapted to local, potentially diverse,display rules. This sequential model isevident, for example, in Scherer’s meta-phors of pushand pulleffects. Physiolog-ical changes in the organism constitutethe push effects that initiate a vocalexpression of emotion. Pull effects sub-sequently work on this expression to“suppress,” “amplify,” or “modify” it accord-ing to local display rules (Scherer, 1999b).This model is also evident in the his-

torical development of a division of laborbetween academic disciplines in the studyof the expression of emotions. Much ofthe psychological literature treats theinterest in diversity of emotional expres-sion as belonging to the realm of anthro-pology and ethnology, which study localpractices of showing emotions. Psychol-ogists, on the other hand, have identifiedtheir subject as the universal mecha-nisms of emotion expression, which arethought of as an evolved potential that isitself universally shared across cultures,and possibly across species.Accordingly, the interest in universal-

ity and the interest in diversity are effec-tively conceptualized as two distinctenterprises concerned with the differentends of the continuum. Interest in univer-sality goes with a focus on evolved mech-anisms, and interest in diversity goes witha focus on local practice. These views canbe brought together by considering uni-versality and diversity on different levelsof generality. For example, the intrinsiccapacities for infant musicality can lead toa host of culture specific learning princi-ples that help weave a child into its localsocial ecology (Trevarthen, 2000).Nevertheless, many authors still frame

the debate as concerning universalityversusdiversity (e.g., Elfenbein & Ambady,

2002; Scherer, 2000), even when theyexplicitly acknowledge the importanceof accommodating bothuniversality anddiversity. It seems that the research tradi-tions of being either interested primarilyin universals or in diversity are so strongthat they still frame the current debate.The continuum model can account for

the empirical findings in the sense that itis able to incorporate both universalityand diversity. However, this does not makeit an appropriate model, and we will nowconsider that there are some problemsassociated with it. The model suggeststhat we can uncover universally evolvedmechanisms of vocal emotion expres-sion by identifying areas of overlap in thebehavior (mostly recognition behavior)of members of different cultures. Thoseemotions for which we can find satisfy-ing degrees of overlap (whatever theseare) are emotions for which universalmechanisms of vocal expression exist.We have stripped away the diversity andidentified the universal core.We believe that this research strategy

is not justified as long as intentional emo-tion portrayals are used. The reason is thatintentional vocal communication andvocal affect bursts belong to two differentsemiotic systems (Borod, 2000). Affec-tive vocalizations shared across species,which can be described as evolved uni-versal mechanisms, belong to a sympto-matic system. Posed emotion portrayals,on the other hand, require advanced abil-ities of sign use and belong to an iconicsystem. Both systems have their univer-sals, but the relation between overlap inbehavior in one system, and the struc-ture and functions of the other system, isnot as straightforward as the continuummodel suggests. We will elaborate on thiscontention in the next section.

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The Relation betweenUniversality and Diversity:

A Systems Model

In this section, we want to spell out analternative model of the relation betweenuniversal and diverse factors in the vocalexpression of emotions, represented inFigure 13–2. Again, this figure is notintended as a technical model, but as afigurative handle for the following dis-cussion. In particular, we do not suggest,as it might seem from the figure: (a) thataffect bursts occur independently ofcontext; (b) that evolved universals areindependent of evolving universals.The gist of this model is that it sepa-

rates affect burst behavior (the affectivesystem) from intentional communicativebehavior (the communicative system).Evolved mechanisms implicated in vocalbursts of emotion are part of the ancientaffective systems that humans share withother primates and possibly other mam-mals (Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002).There is presently little doubt that thereare intrinsic emotional-vocal control


mechanisms in the mammalian brain,with a great deal of cross-species coher-ence (Hauser, 1996; Jürgens, 1998). Vocalcommunication of emotions builds onthe acoustics of affect bursts, but univer-sality of such communication cannot beattributed to, and should not be soughtin, just evolved mechanisms. In what fol-lows we present this argument in moredetail, discussing universality first in theaffective system, and then in the commu-nicative system.

Affect Vocalizations as EvolvedAction Systems: Figure 13–2(a)

Emotional vocalizations occurring in allmammals can be described as evolvedaction systems (Panksepp, 1982; 2005). Itwould seem that such vocalizations, indic-ative of affective states experienced byother mammals, should also be a naturalpart of the vocal repertoire of the humanspecies. These action systems would bepart of what Scherer calls push effects.Affective vocalizations might not so

much relate to cognitive aspects of emo-

(a) (b) (c)

symptomatic affective action system iconic communicative system

affect burst

interpretation

simulation

conventionalization

conventional iconattention

Evolved universals Evolving universals

Figure 13–2.Systems model of the vocal expression of emotion.

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tions such as anger or happiness, butrather to fundamental affective statesthat are part and parcel of motivationalarousals shared by many species, statesthat we can refer to in English withwords such as being enraged, joyous,cold, lustful, etc. (Panksepp, 2005). Ofcourse, the terms of a particular lan-guage might be associated with variousevaluations, expectations, or action“scripts” (Wierzbicka, 1991) that mightbe quite specific to that language. Never-theless, we believe that many of the rawfeelings that exist beyond words areshared across human cultures and acrossspecies. It is the symptomatic vocal ex-pression of fundamental affective states,rather than the iconic vocal communica-tion of emotions, that we would expectto exhibit similarities in acoustic proper-ties across cultures (Juslin & Laukka,2003; Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002).The recognizability of such raw emo-

tional sounds is also reasonable from the point of view that certain emotional(or affective) states are associated withdistinct physiological changes such asincreased muscle tension and sympatheticarousal. For instance, tension in both therespiratory and laryngeal muscles canlead to louder and higher pitched speech(Frick, 1985). These physiological changeswould presumably occur cross-culturallyduring the expression of certain affectivestates if these were accompanied byincreased muscle tension and subse-quent sympathetic arousal.The existence of intrinsic brains cir-

cuits for a variety of basic emotions,which can yield vocal outputs (Jürgens,1998), from essentially the same subcor-tical brain regions in all mammalianspecies that have been studied (New-man, 1988) provides powerful testimonyfor the existence of intrinsic emotional

vocal control in all mammals. Perhapsthe most compelling example is thesqueal of pain. However, one criticalquestion is whether these sounds arecommunicatory or merely by-productsof emotional expressions.There is increasing animal data that

many of these sounds do contribute tocommunication and infection of emo-tional states among interacting animals.For instance, happy laughter type 50 kHzchirps in rats facilitate social and sexualchoices (Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2006),and 22 kHz distress calls reduce the like-lihood that colony members will leaveburrows to explore and forage. The infan-tile separation-distress vocalizations inmany species motivate maternal retrievaland attention, and hence have clear sur-vival value (Panksepp, 2003). It is nothard to imagine that such emotionalsounds, even after enculturation, will stillhave distinct kinds of emotional impacteven in highly encephalized specieswhere learned display rules tend to over-ride instinctual ones. Indeed, it doesremain possible that the roots of culturalpractices such as musical expressions ofemotions still rely on our capacities formaking and appreciating intrinsic emo-tional sounds (Panksepp & Bernatzky,2002) as our capacity to mold such rawmaterials into complex communicationsthrough the engines of culture.Symptomatic vocalizations might be

difficult to study in humans. One reasonfor this is the methodological difficultyof using words relating to complex cate-gories such as joyor sadnessin anattempt to study nonlinguistic affectivestates. Another reason is that humansocieties seem to impose constraints onthe expression of affective states, so thathumans, at least adults, have a tendencyto cover up these states to make their

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vocal expressions socially acceptable (cf.Scherer’s notion of pull effects). The finalusage or contribution of these acousticcues to the communication of emotionswould differ depending on cultural con-ventionalization processes, which couldbe very diverse, depending on how dif-ferent cultures viewed the propriety andusefulness of emotional frankness.Societal restrictions in the form of dis-

play rules are therefore one factor in thedevelopment of diversity. However, suchsocial expectations are not the only, andprobably not the fundamental, factor thatleads to a diversity of vocal expression ofemotions across cultures. The influenceof society on human behavior is not apurely negative, constraining one. Rather,the motive for communication itselfleads people to modify their voice, as wewill argue in the following sections.Thus, as soon as intentionality becomespart of communication, diversity beginsto impose new levels of complexityupon universality.

Attention to and Interpretation ofNatural Signs (Symptoms): Figure 13–2(b) and (c)

Whereas the ancient affective action sys-tems that produce affect bursts are veryhard to study in the human species, thisis not the case for the acoustic perceptthat an affect burst produces. The cogni-tive significance of vocal expression ofemotion lies in the fact that the expres-sion can be attended to and so itself be-comes an input into cognitive processes(Jackendoff, 1996). When the acousticpercept produced in an affect burst isattended to, either by the producing


organism itself or by another, we leavethe system of affect burst behavior, andintrinsic communication, and enter thesystems of intentional communicativebehavior.As a communicative process, the

vocal expression of an emotional state isnot the endpoint, but rather the startingpoint. It has been implicitly assumed inthe research that others understand theexpressed emotion in a natural way,maybe because they possess the samemechanisms for expressing emotionvocally, or because of the existence ofuniversal “inference rules” (Scherer, 2003)that allow receivers to infer vocalizers’emotional states from vocal cues. How-ever, we must keep in mind that the nat-uralness of an expressiondoes not makeits interpretationnatural. Although avocal expression with particular acousticqualities might be a natural symptom ofa particular affective state in all humans(and beyond), the interpretation of theexpression asa symptom is not naturallygiven.7In order for a particular acousticpercept to be interpreted asan expres-sion of happiness, the expression has tobe attended to and understood. Whilethis understanding might indeed be pos-sible due to evolved inference systems inthe case of the vocalization of raw affec-tive states, human vocal communicationof emotions clearly goes beyond that.

Imitation and theConventionalization of VocalIcons: Figure 13–2(b) and (c)

The vocalization of emotions in humansis not restricted to symptomatic expres-sion. Most of the time, vocal expression

7Although fever has always been a natural expression (a symptom) of an inflammation in the organism, thisinterpretationof fever required the development of medical knowledge (Rodriguez, in press).

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of emotions in humans, and possiblysome other primates, also has an appealfunction (Scherer, 1992). That is, humansuse the voice in order todo something,in order to achieve a change in the stateof others. Humans intentionally use theirvoices for communication. An under-standing of the reasons for universalityand diversity in vocal communication inhumans therefore ultimately requires us toinvestigate the evolution of this communi-cation system in its mutuality with (a) theintertwined evolution of voluntary controlover vocalizations and of the phonatoryapparatus (Ploog, 1992) on the one hand,and with (b) the evolution of understand-ing other minds on the other hand.Crucially, in explaining possible uni-

versals as well as diversity in humanvocal communication of emotions, wecan no longer refer to evolved mecha-nisms. The reason for this is the flexibil-ity inherent in the processes of imitationand conventionalization. This flexibilityis due to the fact that any actual speechevent is more complex than the proper-ties that become semiotically interpretedby a listener (Bühler, 1934/1982). Forexample, the vocal expression of happi-ness involves communication through avariety of acoustic channels (e.g., Frick,1985), such as pitch, rate, tension, etc.The interpretation of a vocal affectexpression asexpressing a happy statecan become associated with one or sev-eral of these channels in the processes of simulation and conventionalization,coarsely represented in Figure 13–2(b)and (c). The intentional vocal communi-cation of emotion, while initially a simu-lation of universal affect bursts, modifiesthe acoustic percept in a multitude of

ways that cannot be reduced to socialrepressions. The iconic expression con-ventionally used in the vocal communi-cation of an emotional state is con-strained not only by societal rules, butalso by system-internal considerations.For example, if the vocal simulations ofhappiness and nervousness are similarenough to be confused frequently, theconventional vocal expression of one orboth of these emotions will change tomake them more distinguishable.8Thismeans that the motive for engaging withothers through communication is itself adriving force behind the development ofdiversity. Such functional constraints arethemselves universal, but they have theeffect that overlap in the intentionalvocal behavior of adult speakers acrosscultures will bear a complex relation toevolved affect burst systems. This posi-tive motive for local developments ofvocal communication is the reason whydiversity cannot just be peeled away toreach a universal core. No known directlink leads from one to the other. Indeed,there may not exist one single path fromone to the other, since propositionalcommunication has a neural infrastruc-ture of its own. Still there has to be somekind of interconnection between thetwo, perhaps in the fundamental motiva-tional urge to communicate, which isheavily represented in limbic social-brainstructures such as the anterior cingulate,which also regulate social motivation.However, it is worth considering thateven lower brain functions, such as theseeking urge, driven by general purposedopaminergic motivational systems, is amajor force in promoting the desire tocommunicate.

8The intentional use of voice in communication does not mean that changes in the conventional vocal expression of emotion are intended. Intentional actions on the individual level lead to unintended changes inconvention (Keller, 1994).

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Discussion

Universality and Diversity Do Not Exclude Each Other

The major consequence that followsfrom the systems model we have sug-gested is that universality and diversitydo not stand in opposition.On the one hand, we are convinced

that many affective states are, on a pre-conceptual level, shared by all humans.These shared affective states are surelymore numerous than the modest six or so basic emotions often suggested asuniversal. This universality, however,does not at all diminish the fact that theexpression of emotion, as soon as itinvolves elements of volition and creativ-ity, might become very diverse acrosscultures. What is more, this diversity isnot at all superficial, a package for a uni-versal content. Rather, communicationprocesses, including vocal communica-tion, are a major force in the develop-ment of complex affective categoriessuch as happiness or despair that consti-tute a culture’s “forms of life” (Brakel,1994). Human utterances are more thanjust expressions of a subjective state:they give this state a form, and thusenable its scrutiny and categorization(Humboldt, 1835/1994; Jackendoff, 1996).They become an input to cognitive andcommunication processes.Conversely, diversity does not at all

diminish the existence or relevance ofuniversals. Imagine two cultures in whichthe conventionalization of the vocalexpression of happy affective states hastaken maximally diverse paths. Say, cul-ture A has conventionalized increasedpitch variation as a signal of such states,and has dramatized this acoustic prop-


erty in vocal communication. Culture Bhas conventionalized fast speech rate asa signal of happy states, and has drama-tized this acoustic property in vocalcommunication. Here we have maximaldiversity: the two typical expressions of happiness do not overlap in terms oftheir acoustic properties. Nevertheless,if presented with vocal portrayals of hap-piness from a member of culture B, amember of culture A might still be ableto correctly identify the intended state,because she will recognize it as a possi-blesimulation of happy affect burstvocalizations. This will be even more soif she is faced with a choice between,say, happiness, sadness, anger, and fear.Diversity can be absolute—this does notdiminish the universal potential providedby the acoustics of affect bursts.In order to say anything about evolved

universals of affect burst vocalization,those vocalizations have to be studied inall their complexity, including neurolog-ical substrates. Hence, studying affectburst vocalization might be difficult inhumans, and simpler in other animals.For instance, the topic is already beingaddressed in primate research (Jürgens,2006). The study of intentional vocal por-trayal of emotions, on the other hand,can address a different kind of univer-sals. This is so because intentional vocalcommunication is constrained by factorsthat are not themselves related to theaffective system.

Developing Universals

The communicative model we have pre-sented [Figure 13–2(b) and (c)] predictsthat overlap in the vocal expression ofcommunication develops through pro-cesses of conventionalization, that is, in

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social contact. In this sense, universals of vocal communication of emotion aredeveloping as networks of communica-tion expand. These are universals thatdevelop through histories of engagement.In this sense, diversity is ultimately notbased in ethnic, geographical, or linguis-tic factors, but perhaps mostly in lack ofmutual engagement. This is supportedby research showing that cross-culturalrecognition rates of vocal expression ofemotions increase with the increase of telephone contact between countries(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). It is alsoconsistent with the finding that within acountry, minority groups are better atrecognizing emotions expressed vocallyby majority group members than viceversa (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).Research into universality and diver-

sity of vocal communication of emotionshould take histories of engagementacross groups into account.9For instance,the extent to which cross-cultural inter-course is resulting in imitation of emo-tional prosody should not be underes-timated. People might consciously orunconsciously mimic the prosody of inter-locutors, particularly where continuousengagement occurs, much in the mannerof a “phonetic chameleon.” However, thisappears to be presently untested.

Units of Analysis

The basic reservation we have aboutmuch of the empirical research and itsinterpretation can probably be summa-

rized thus. A communication system can-not be properly understood if the unitsof analysis are the individual, on the onehand, and the society, on the other. Wealso need to take the communicativeprocess as the unit of analysis. Dividingindividuals from society has, in the cur-rent research context, led researchersinterested in universality to a fundamen-tally negative view of communicationand sociality in general: what the publiccontext of emotional expression does isto constrain the individual, place ruleson her behavior, and force her to sup-press or modify emotional expression.We have argued that this view concealsmany interesting questions about uni-versality and diversity in the vocalexpression of emotions, for example, thedevelopment of universality in historiesof engagement. This leads to two typesof universality (Marková, 1987) in affec-tive vocalizations: evolved universals insymptomatic systems, shared acrossspecies, and developing commonalitiesin iconic systems, shared within commu-nities, which become universal as net-works of communication expand.

Universals and Functionality

We might therefore reopen the questionof what it means if a behavior or psycho-logical state is universal or not. Whyshould vocal expressions of emotion beuniversal anyway? The general point thatresearchers interested in universalitywish to claim is that vocal expressions

9The fact that it is engagement in communication rather than just exposure to communication is supportedby a study showing that students of English as a second language with high proficiency in English were notbetter at recognizing emotions vocally expressed by a native English speaker than students with low Englishproficiency. The authors conclude that learning a foreign language in a classroom setting might not be suffi-cient to become sensitive to this channel of communication.

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are universal because of phylogeneticcontinuity (e.g., Scherer, 1999b). Thiswould mean that vocal expression ofemotion must be, and must have been,an adaptive behavior, that is, it must befunctional. Its functionalitydeterminesthe properties of an emotional expression(Darwin, 1872). However, in the sequencemodel of vocal expression discussed inthe second section, the local displayrules also rendervocal expression func-tional. A more positive view of vocalcommunication of emotion would sug-gest that the community, the culture ofthe speaker, is itself one of the environ-mental systems that influence ongoingsocial microevolution. In this perspec-tive, then, there is mutuality, rather thana unidirectional influence, between thetwo systems discussed here: the emo-tional-affective action systems and thecognitive communicative systems.

Conclusions

Raw affective experiences are a gift ofnature; they are not cognitively penetra-ble (Panksepp, 2005). However, the per-cepts that result from vocalization arepenetrable for humans: they can beattended to, repeated, reflected upon,dramatized, etc. Diversity develops incommunication systems because expres-sions of emotion involve multiple chan-nels, including various cognitive ones,but intentional vocalization might utilizeonly a subsection of these. In situationsof fear the voice might become tense,it might tremble, and so on. In attendingto the vocalization, a listener might pickout one of the vocal qualities, and ulti-mately a tense voice can become associ-ated with fear in one group, whereas in


another group a trembling voice is themore typical expression of fear. Commu-nication systems undergo processes ofconventionalization and change that arein part independent from the universalconstraints of the affective system. Com-munication is a way of engaging theworld that is distinct in principle fromsuch evolutionarily more basic systems(Panksepp, 2005, p. 162).The human voice comes to convey

many subtle changes in emotional state—at least to somebody who has a historyof engagement with the speaker. It ismisleading to narrow down the universalto only a handful of emotions, in thehope that they will be the major way inwhich emotionality is communicated in the voice. Rather, it seems to us thatthere is a lot that is universal in the com-munication of affective states, and at thesame time there is a lot that is diverse:many affective states (tiredness, playful-ness, exhilaration, fear, many shades ofdistress, and many shades of joy) aresurely felt by all people (Panksepp,2005). However, as soon as such statesare communicated, not to mention givennames and thus ordered into categories,it is increasingly less fruitful to look atthese vocalizations for a universal core of emotionality. Emotions become semi-otically formed in communication, andemotions are easily recognizable fromthe voice if hearer and speaker share ahistory of using the same communicationsystem. For example, it is easy to recog-nize contempt from the voice of a per-son that one knows well. However, therecognition of contempt has been verylow in recognition studies (Elfenbein &Ambady, 2002).What follows is that universality in the

vocal expression of emotions can be stud-ied in two ways. Studies of biologically

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entrenched action systems might bemore successful with nonhuman animalsand very early stages of communicationdevelopment in our own species. Studiesof the vocal communication of emotionsin humans that have been or are becom-ing enculturated might more fruitfullyfocus on the development of universalityin histories of social engagement.Models trying to incorporate both uni-

versality and diversity have taken theform of unidirectional sequence models:An emotional state triggers a universalmechanism (a motor program for vocalexpression, for example), which is thenmodulated according to local displayrules. Fundamentally, these models useconduit-metaphors of communication(Reddy, 1979/1993), where the basicemotions are the substance that itselfremains untouched, and just becomeswrapped into different cognitive-com-municative packages by the local codethat needs to be decoded by the listener.We have suggested an alternative modelthat accommodates the ambiguous resultsof empirical research and motivates newquestions about the universality anddiversity of vocal expressions of emotions.Vocal expression of emotion is usually

studied as a natural sign, with a self-evident meaning. However, the fact thatwe can study the acoustic properties ofan auditory signal and establish acousticregularities does not mean that the mean-ing of such a natural sign is self-evident.The fact that a certain percept (such as aparticular pitch contour) is a naturalsymptom of a state does not mean that itis understood asa sign of this state. Aslong as it is not clear what the relation isbetween auditory perception and con-scious states, the description of acousticproperties cannot be used as a consis-tent description of a meaning.

In sum, we have been arguing thatuniversals of iconic vocal emotionalcommunication develop in histories ofengagement. If such a process of devel-oping universals exists, it must necessar-ily build on yet other universal potentialsof the brain and mind. One of thesepotentials is accessible in the acousticsof affect bursts. Others have to be foundin consistent patterns of social cogni-tion, which may become increasinglycomplex with increasingly complexmanmade environments. Presumably, theuniversal tendencies that govern socialcognition would have less variability inhumans still living in natural environ-ments, but they may vary substantiallydepending upon the ecological factorsof those environments. Future researchmight attempt to address the develop-ment of universals in the intersubjectiveengagements that emerge in differentsociocultural contexts and world envi-ronments, and the relation between suchdeveloping universals and evolved vocalaction patterns.

Acknowledgments.We are gratefulto Alan Costall for discussions on an ear-lier draft of this chapter. Jörg Zinken’sresearch is supported by the EuropeanUnion’s sixth framework project “Stagesin the Evolution and Development ofSign Use.”

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