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Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange SCN 2014, 03-09-2014 Eduarda S.V. Freire, Julia Hesse , Dennis Hofheinz

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Universally Composable Non-Interactive KeyExchangeSCN 2014, 03-09-2014

Eduarda S.V. Freire, Julia Hesse, Dennis Hofheinz

Oh no, ...

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 1/23

Oh no, ...

...it’s a UC talk!

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 1/23

Oh no, ...

...it’s a UC talk!

...please no proof,please no proof,please no proof...

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 1/23

Oh no, ...

...it’s a UC talk!

...please no proof,please no proof,please no proof...

...I should havebrought coffee!

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 1/23

Introducing...

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 2/23

Introducing...

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 2/23

Introducing...

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 2/23

Introducing...

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 2/23

Outline

1 Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE)IntroductionReview: NIKE Security Notions

2 UC Security of NIKEUC SecurityThe New FunctionalityRelations to Game-Based Security

3 Summary

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 3/23

Outline

1 Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE)IntroductionReview: NIKE Security Notions

2 UC Security of NIKEUC SecurityThe New FunctionalityRelations to Game-Based Security

3 Summary

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 4/23

A Popular Example

gb ga

a b

ga

gb

H(Alice,Bob,gab) H(Alice,Bob,gab)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 5/23

A Popular Example

gb ga

a b

ga

gb

H(Alice,Bob,gab) H(Alice,Bob,gab)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 5/23

A Popular Example

gb ga

a b

ga

gb

H(Alice,Bob,gab) H(Alice,Bob,gab)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 5/23

A Popular Example

gb ga

a b

ga

gb

H(Alice,Bob,gab) H(Alice,Bob,gab)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 5/23

A Popular Example

gb ga

a b

ga

gb

H(Alice,Bob,gab) H(Alice,Bob,gab)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 5/23

A Popular Examplegb ga

a b

ga

gb

H(Alice,Bob,gab) H(Alice,Bob,gab)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 5/23

A Popular Examplegb ga

a b

ga

gb

H(Alice,Bob,gab) H(Alice,Bob,gab)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 5/23

Attacks on NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

NIKE schemes rely on a PKI!

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 6/23

Attacks on NIKE

Manipulate the phone book byregistering a hijacked public key for himselfregistering a public key of invalid format

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 7/23

Outline

1 Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE)IntroductionReview: NIKE Security Notions

2 UC Security of NIKEUC SecurityThe New FunctionalityRelations to Game-Based Security

3 Summary

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 8/23

Game-based security notions

CKS Security (simplest form)

Challenger

(ski , pki )← KeyGen, i ∈ {0, 1}

pk∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗i ∈ {0, 1}

(use ski )

.

.

. key∗ =

{keypk0,pk1

if b = 0

random else

b $← {0, 1}

output b ?= b′

pk0, pk1

pk∗, pki

keypk∗,pki

key∗

b′

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 9/23

Shortcomings

CKS security admits arbitrary public keys pk∗

=⇒ adversary can ask for session keys involving(possibly invalid) pk∗

Extending CKS security to support (possibly interactive) validitychecks (e.g., proofs of possession of sk)

requires session handlingleads to a variety of different notions

Use modular security model!

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 10/23

Does it matter?

Freire et al.: Non-Interactive Key Exchange (PKC 2013)A factoring-based NIKE in the standard model that

assumes valid public keysprovides a validity check

=⇒ We may need a more flexible security notion than CKSsecurity!

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 11/23

Outline

1 Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE)IntroductionReview: NIKE Security Notions

2 UC Security of NIKEUC SecurityThe New FunctionalityRelations to Game-Based Security

3 Summary

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 12/23

UC Security

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 13/23

UC Security

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 13/23

UC Security

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 13/23

Outline

1 Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE)IntroductionReview: NIKE Security Notions

2 UC Security of NIKEUC SecurityThe New FunctionalityRelations to Game-Based Security

3 Summary

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 14/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?

Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?

Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?

Is Bob registered?

Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?

Is Bob registered?

Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?

Is Bob honest?

Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?

Is Bob honest?

Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?

Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

An ideal NIKE

FNIKE

what’s my key with Bob?

Is Bob honest?Is Bob registered?Is Bob honest?Key of Alice and Bob?

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 15/23

Advantages

Complete modeling of NIKE protocols that makeassumptions about public keysModular security notionIntuitive security notionCan also be used for ID-based NIKE

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 16/23

Outline

1 Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE)IntroductionReview: NIKE Security Notions

2 UC Security of NIKEUC SecurityThe New FunctionalityRelations to Game-Based Security

3 Summary

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 17/23

Static Security

Static UC adversary

corruption only allowed before first key is issued

Backwards compatibility:π CKS-secure =⇒ π UC-emulates FNIKE w.r.t staticadversaries.

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 18/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Adaptive UC adversary

corruption allowed at any time

Impossibility result:FNIKE not realizable without additional assumptions.

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 19/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (1)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 20/23

Adaptive Security (2)

If the simulator has more powerful tools like a programmablerandom oracle...

+

... FNIKE becomes realizable.

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 21/23

Adaptive Security (2)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 22/23

Adaptive Security (2)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 22/23

Adaptive Security (2)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 22/23

Adaptive Security (2)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 22/23

Adaptive Security (2)

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 22/23

Summary

Definition of UC-secure NIKEintuitive and modularanalyze protocols that are vulnerable to PKI attacks

Relations to game-based notionsPossibility and impossibility results

Thank you!

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange 23/23